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We are delighted to publish this Routledge Handbook of Taxation and Philanthropy, a project we 
conceived in 2019. It started with the choices the University of Geneva’s Geneva Centre for 
Philanthropy (GCP) had to make shortly after it was established in September 2017. We wanted 
to focus on topics that were still largely unexplored from an academic standpoint; that had 
the potential to bring added theoretical and practical value in the philanthropy field; and that 
required, or at least deserved, a multidisciplinary perspective. The relationship between taxation 
and philanthropic initiatives was at the top of the list. Thus, our sense of pride when the Swiss 
National Science Foundation granted four-year funding for this project.
Initially, we had planned to focus on the data coming from Swiss federal and cantonal sources, 
but it quickly became clear that limiting the analysis to Switzerland would be of insufficient 
interest. So, we decided to get in touch with Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the OECD’s Cen-
tre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA). Thanks to the support of Ulrich Lehner (then 
Swiss ambassador to the OECD in Paris), Pascal Saint-Amans confirmed his interest in what he 
immediately perceived as a study with global and societal significance. In November 2019, the 
OECD, in collaboration with the GCP, launched an ambitious project to collect and analyze 
data from OECD members and other countries. The objective was to prepare a report on taxa-
tion and philanthropy to be published in OECD Tax Policies Studies. The project quickly gained 
momentum and attracted the interest of many more countries than initially expected. Forty 
countries responded to the detailed OECD questionnaire.
In parallel, the GCP organized an international academic conference in Geneva in Novem-
ber 2020. We decided to present the OECD report at that conference. The delegates would 
be experts from various academic disciplines with the expertise and ability to contribute to 
whether, why, and how states should grant tax incentives to support philanthropic initiatives. 
About 60 academics volunteered to contribute. This led to 25 papers being selected for the 
event. Because of what we will all remember as the gloomy COVID-19 period, the conference 
was held virtually instead of physically. However, this cloud had a silver lining, as it enabled a 
vast international community to attend.
Routledge enthusiastically agreed to publish a handbook mainly containing the lead-
ing papers prepared for the conference. Thanks to the contributors’ discipline and interest in 
the project, this was done remarkably quickly. The Handbook contains an introduction and 




wide range of disciplines: economics, sociology, political science, psychology, affective sciences, 
philosophy, behavioral economics, cognitive neuroscience, and law. They also come from many 
different countries and cultures, including North America, Europe, India, Australia, and New 
Zealand. The Handbook also contains the landmark OECD report as an integral part of the 
project.
Its editors cannot conclude this introduction without thanking the many people who made 
it possible. All the authors, of course, who prepared an impressive series of outstanding papers 
on a topic still widely unexplored, but also the CTPA team, from Pascal Saint-Amans to David 
Bradbury, head of the Tax Policy and Statistics Division; Bert Brys, head of the Country Tax 
Policy team and of the Personal and Property Taxes unit in the Tax Policy and Tax Statistics 
Division; Alastair Thomas, senior economist; and Daniel Fichmann, junior economist. It was a 
privilege to collaborate with them for over a year. Our gratitude also goes to the Swiss National 
Science Foundation for the grant that made this project possible. And, last but not least, to the 
GCP team that supported us efficiently since this project began. Our special thanks go to Sémia 
Bey, project manager, for her meticulous work in managing this project from its outset; Anne-
Françoise Ritter, who is in charge of Publications, for her professional assistance during the 
editing phase; Laetitia Gill, executive director; and Pauline Guédon, administrative assistant, for 
their constant support in so many ways. We are also grateful to the Routledge team, particularly 
Kristina Abbotts and Christiana Mandizha, for their extremely professional support and avail-
ability. And, of course, for believing in this project.
Henry Peter and Giedre Lideikyte Huber
June 14, 2021
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Taxation of philanthropy is a heterogeneous topic that extends to multiple scientific disci-
plines. For academics and practitioners working in philanthropy, it is not uncommon to turn 
to branches such as philosophy, law, sociology, and economics to obtain thorough answers to 
the questions they encounter in their research and work. To date, however, there has been no 
comprehensive multidisciplinary analysis of the interaction between taxation and philanthropy. 
The present volume seeks to fill this gap. Through this handbook, the editors also endeavored 
to contribute to the emerging multidisciplinary domain that can be referred to as “the science 
of philanthropy.” It is hoped that the readers will find the contributions in this volume not 
only useful but also thought provoking and that they will be encouraged to pursue such studies 
further.
Due to the diversity of the questions and scientific fields involved, we, the editors, have 
decided to structure the present handbook around four topics. The first part consolidates con-
tributions to the justification of tax incentives for philanthropic initiatives. The second part 
ventures into the economic and technical aspects of tax incentives for philanthropy, exploring 
and comparing various models and their respective efficiencies. The third part addresses tax 
issues arising from cross-border philanthropy. Finally, the last part of the handbook explores the 
phenomena of corporate philanthropy and social entrepreneurship, inquiring into, among other 
things, the rationale of the traditional distinction between charity and business, which is now 
often blurred.
Annexed to this handbook is the OECD report “Taxation and Philanthropy,” which was 
published in November 2020 in the context of the research project that led to this book (here-
after the “OECD report”). It is the first in-depth comparative analysis of the legal norms and 
practices in the field. Based on the data gathered through country questionnaires by the OECD, 
it provides a detailed review of the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and philanthropy as 
applied by 40 OECD members and participating countries. It was carried out as part of a col-
laboration between the OECD and the Geneva Centre for Philanthropy at the University of 
Geneva.
In this introduction, the contributions of all four sections of this handbook are briefly 
presented.
EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION  
TO THE VOLUME
Giedre Lideikyte Huber and Henry Peter
2
1 Justification of tax incentives for philanthropy
One cannot analyze the taxation of philanthropic initiatives without addressing the fundamental 
question of the rationale behind the tax incentives for philanthropy. This justification raises con-
troversies; in essence, tax incentives for private philanthropy amount to channeling public funds 
into support for private activities that have been decided and structured by bypassing democratic 
governance mechanisms. Why would legislators delegate some of their budgetary prerogatives 
to private actors? How can one reconcile different views on what constitutes philanthropic 
activity? Can a clear distinction be drawn between philanthropic and political goals? In the first 
part of the handbook, authors from diverse scientific fields offer perspectives on these and many 
other questions.
This first part of the volume opens with the contribution of Rob Atkinson, who looks at 
the OECD and its concept of philanthropy from a historical perspective. What was the global 
vision of philanthropy almost 100 years ago during the era of the Marshall Planners? Has this 
vision changed? Atkinson argues that philanthropy was seen as an international alliance between 
states, and this vision must subsist today, with activist states being the only agents of philanthropy 
truly capable of doing work of a global scope and scale.
Caroline Honegger, Romain Carnac, Philip Balsiger, and Alexandre Lambelet 
study the concept of philanthropy in Switzerland from the perspective of policymakers. After 
conducting and analyzing multiple interviews with politicians, they dig deep into the specific 
rationales and frames used by Swiss policymakers to support tax incentives for philanthropy 
and their understanding of the notion of public interest. These authors observe that the reasons 
for supporting philanthropy are diverse and sometimes contradictory due to the very different 
realities of philanthropy, such as the variety of types and sizes of philanthropic entities and the 
diversity of their goals. They suggest that when taken together and linked to discourse focused 
on efficiency, these arguments lead political actors to increase the incentives for philanthropy.
Emanuella Ceva’s chapter offers readers a perspective on the justification of philanthropy 
from a political theory viewpoint. Ceva submits that members of society have reasons to be vig-
ilant regarding and responsive to institutional failures that may threaten the general social order. 
When the institutional system is dysfunctional, it is justified to sustain public institutional action 
through donations. When such donations become crucial for proper institutional functioning, 
not only are they justified, but there are good reasons to incentivize them – for instance, through 
tax benefits. Exploring the same question from another perspective, philosopher Emma Tief-
fenbach analyzes the justification of tax incentives for philanthropy through the “gifting puz-
zle,” which refers to the attempt to explain in terms of maximizing utility theory the donors’ 
inherently costly choice to unilaterally transfer their financial resources. As Tieffenbach shows, 
many of the solutions offered to that puzzle amount to displacing, sometimes even erasing, the 
conceptual boundaries between acts of gifting and acts of consumption. Examining these solu-
tions thus proves relevant to the actual practice of tax deductions being granted in much legisla-
tion on conditions that donations be non-profit activities of general interest.
Nicolas Duvoux offers a sociological perspective on certain aspects of taxes and giving. 
He delivers a qualitative study on the way philanthropic donors perceive the taxation of wealth 
in France. He analyzes the “elite” households that are at the top of wealth distribution and 
are usually considered major philanthropic donors (see also the analysis based on top income 
conducted by Lideikyte Huber, Pittavino, and Peter in this book). Duvoux analyzes the elite 
class, taking into account its diversity, and observes that the aspects of economic capital as well 
as occupational status, both former and current (e.g., businessmen, managers), appear to be 
salient in framing philanthropists’ relationship with the wealth tax – for instance, in relation to 
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dismissing its legitimacy. Duvoux also observes that families with larger and more dynastic 
wealth value tax deductions for their contribution to pluralism.
Distinguishing between charitable and political activities is often difficult, and Calum M. 
Carmichael addresses this topic in his chapter. The unregulated use of private monies to 
finance political activities is commonly identified as constituting a risk to democracy. Carmi-
chael seeks to clarify whether governments, in regulating the political activities that charitable 
organizations perform without losing their fiscal privileges, take a similarly restrictive or per-
missive stance as they take in regulating the private financing of politics. He finds that in all 
but 3 of the 16 countries that he compares, the stance toward regulating the political activities 
performed by charitable organizations differs from the stance toward regulating the private dona-
tions received by political entities. According to Carmichael, such inconsistencies suggest that 
in their regulation of charities, governments are guided by considerations apart from the use of 
private monies to finance political activities, and he offers examples of these.
Closing the first part of the handbook, two chapters discuss specific aspects of charitable 
entity exemption regimes that are potentially difficult to justify: benefits given to members 
and the control of the entity retained by the donor. In general, membership-based charities 
are almost never tax exempt, as one can also observe from the OECD report (p. 46). However, 
Ann O’Connell shows that the Australian legal framework diverges from this general trend 
because some entities that provide significant benefits to their members are recognized as chari-
ties. She explains the legal foundations of this trend and provides a critical overview. She also 
highlights that the Australian experience serves as a reminder to other countries of the impor-
tance of transparency and the need for ongoing vigilance in relation to eligibility for tax relief. 
Ian Murray examines a different aspect of the justifications of tax concessions for charitable 
entities. He presents a new take on different tax regulations (United States, Australia, Canada, 
England, and Wales), exploring the extent to which they encourage donor autonomy and 
control of charitable foundations’ assets. Murray notes that, to the detriment of public benefit, 
tax laws are often overly focused on restricting marketable private benefits but not on intangi-
ble control rights, and that tax regulators generally lack the tools to reform the use of charity 
assets to reduce donor control. He proposes several possible reforms, such as strengthening the 
distinction between public and private charities, providing the tax authority with access to 
tools to modify a charity – such as administrative or cy-près schemes – and better support for or 
encouragement of charity trustees and directors to themselves access such schemes to remove 
donor controls.
2 Taxes, efficiency, and donor behavior: theoretical  
and empirical insights
Tax incentives in the field of philanthropy can take many forms, such as tax deductions, tax 
credits, tax assignments, or tax refunds to charitable organizations (Hemels, 2017: 39 et seq.;). 
Deduction is arguably the most-used instrument (OECD report, p. 79). The choice of approach 
depends on multiple factors, such as legal tradition or political motives, which do not neces-
sarily result from an in-depth efficiency analysis. Nonetheless, the question of the efficiency 
of a tax incentive is a key factor in systems based on the ability to pay (Lideikyte Huber, 
pp. 635–638). As tax incentives for philanthropy diverge from this fundamental principle of 
taxation, they should, at a minimum, provide society with benefits that are larger than the con-
cessions granted by the state to private philanthropic donors. However, it is not uncommon for 
states to be unclear about their objectives in this context. In addition, states do not systemati-
cally evaluate the efficiency of the incentives that they put in place (Chapter 13, Chakravarty/
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Singh; Chapter 14, Lideikyte Huber/Pittavino/Peter). One reason for this is that the discussion 
regarding the efficiency of tax incentives for charitable giving (and, more generally, the effi-
ciency of any tax incentive) is complex due, inter alia, to diverging views about the definition 
of efficiency. The authors in this section study various aspects of these issues, which are briefly 
presented in the following.
James Andreoni and Sarah Smith open this technical topic with their chapter on two 
issues relevant to policymakers in designing incentives for giving: tax efficiency and the social 
efficiency of tax incentives. They suggest that policymakers should not only focus on tax-price 
elasticities but also, as recent behavioral insight has shown, on the design and framing of tax 
incentives, including salience, fixed costs, minimum threshold, social norms, and social infor-
mation. They further submit that the definition of social benefit goes beyond channeling giving 
to the most cost-effective charities and should also encompass discussing what it means to have 
a healthy charitable sector and a strong civil society. Andreoni and Smith suggest that by allow-
ing citizens to have a say in the allocation of government funding via tax-subsidized donations, 
governments may help build support for tax and spending more generally.
Richard Steinberg’s chapter provides a theoretical analysis that challenges several main-
stream ideas frequently discussed in studies of tax incentives for philanthropy. He questions three 
widely reported academic findings on tax design in that context, arguing that they are wrong 
or misleading. He specifically argues (i) that although charitable tax deductions are, in some 
sense, favorable to those with higher income, they are not regressive; (ii) that the traditional 
treasury efficiency test is incorrect; and (iii) that the correct treasury efficiency test does not lead 
to social efficiency. Steinberg then discusses various policy options and trade-offs. Although 
the economic case for the favorable tax treatment of charitable donations is uneasy, he supports 
favorable tax treatment of giving, following some reforms, on noneconomic grounds.
Certain chapters in this section focus specifically on the structure and efficiency of national 
tax incentives that make them of particular interest to the respective countries. The contribu-
tion by Brigitte Alepin studies the Canadian tax system and concludes that it is currently inef-
ficient. The reason for this is that the disbursement quota of foundations is too low – in other 
words, foundations do not spend enough annually on public utility purposes; their disburse-
ment to society is not close to what the state currently spends on them. Therefore, this quota 
must be increased to make the system more efficient and justified from a policy perspective.
Maja Adena examines the treasury efficiency of German tax incentives. She analyzes Ger-
man taxpayer data, alleviating the scarcity of studies on the tax-price elasticity of charitable giv-
ing behavior in European countries in comparison to numerous studies on the United States. 
Adena estimates the tax-price and income elasticity of charitable giving in Germany and pro-
vides evidence that donors adjust their donations gradually after changes in the tax schedule and 
respond to future predictable changes in price. In addition, they respond mainly to changes in 
current and, to a smaller extent, future income. She concludes that German tax incentives are 
effective overall.
Malini Chakravarty and Priyadarshini Singh provide a rare study of the Indian tax 
incentive regime. They argue that tax incentives in India primarily incentivize donations to 
government entities, and their design is conservative when compared to 11 other selected 
countries across the developed and developing world. Still, these authors highlight that such 
incentives are an important source of financial stability for smaller NGOs, which form the bulk 
of the sector, and a factor of recognition. On the other hand, based on analysis of available data, 
they also argue that such tax incentives do not cost the government much. Overall, they stress 
that the Indian context lacks a systematic evaluation of whether tax incentives can effectively 
increase donations to the non-profit sector as well as their legal and regulatory implications.
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Two chapters study national tax incentives for giving using longitudinal data. Giedre Lid-
eikyte Huber, Marta Pittavino, and Henry Peter observe taxpayers’ giving behavior in 
the canton of Geneva from 2001 to 2011 using tax data of the entire Geneva population. As 
Geneva is one of the most important cantons for philanthropic activities in Switzerland, study-
ing taxpayers’ giving patterns provides important indications about the philanthropic sector 
in general. The authors observe that the number of taxpayers deducting charitable donations 
significantly increased during the study period, and the median deduction decreased among all 
income classes. In other words, more taxpayers deduct charitable donations, but they deduct 
smaller amounts. In addition, studying the years 2001 and 2011, the authors observe that both 
the size and frequency of deductions for charitable donations increase sharply with taxpayers’ 
income class.
Nicolas J. Duquette and Jennifer Mayo study the long-run distribution of philanthropy 
in the United States from both donor and beneficiary perspectives. They find that over several 
decades giving by the biggest donors increased, and those households were more likely to be 
married, older, and have children than households that were not top donors. The concentration 
of giving across charitable organizations has been more modest, suggesting that much of the 
concentration of donations has happened within, rather than across, charities (i.e., the chari-
ties are chaining slowly in the aggregate, but the donor base of each organization individually 
is becoming more top-heavy on average). Duquette and Mayo conclude with a review of tax 
policies that affect the composition of donors and donees as well as with proposals for tax policy 
reforms that would broaden the donor base.
Donor motivations play an important role in charitable giving, but do tax incentives boost 
them? Jo Cutler explores the psychological factors that determine donors’ motivations and 
reviews the key findings in the fields of psychology and neuroscience. She describes the 
main concepts and major experimental techniques and discusses potential future research 
directions. Charles Sellen questions the importance of financial motivations for increasing 
giving. He highlights a certain fatigue in the public discourse around philanthropy, including 
its definition and related concepts, and suggests revitalizing it. Would placing less emphasis 
on the financial costs associated with giving (such as tax incentives) and instead highlighting 
the noneconomic benefits derived from altruism spur generosity? Sellen says yes and proposes 
a new paradigm centered on happiness and wellbeing, putting forth a conceptualization of 
philanthropy as a form of voluntary self-taxation that generates lasting inner satisfaction for 
the donor.
The chapter by Kimberly Scharf and Johannes Lohse pushes the boundaries of field 
efficiency studies, exploring questions beyond fundraising and tax incentives for giving. In par-
ticular, what motivates charities (as opposed to donors) and makes them efficient? To answer this 
question, Scharf and Lohse consider the implications of inter-charity competition in relation 
to different factors, such as the distribution of donations, charities’ outputs, and the structure of 
charitable markets. They show that, in contrast to competition in private markets, inter-charity 
competition does not eliminate all inefficiencies and may even exacerbate them. They then 
discuss the scope of government policies and tax incentives using these insights.
What are the technical means for lawmakers to test the effects of tax incentives that have 
not yet been introduced in a given jurisdiction? Maja Adena highlights that the treatment of 
donations in tax codes and fundraising strategies, respectively, share a number of design ele-
ments. Thus, lawmakers could turn to experimental research on fundraising when looking for 
ways to improve tax incentives. Adena provides an overview of the experimental field literature 
in the economics of philanthropy, explaining what such results could suggest for tax laws and 
indicating research gaps.
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The section closes with an interdisciplinary study by Ursa Bernardic, Maël Lebreton, 
Giedre Lideikyte Huber, Henry Peter, and Giuseppe Ugazio introducing behavioral phi-
lanthropy and its relationship with tax incentives. The authors note that the behavioral philan-
thropy perspective and methods are particularly relevant to policymakers and law researchers 
who design tax-based incentives to stimulate private engagement in philanthropy. They high-
light the benefits of producing data in controlled environments, such as laboratory settings. In 
particular, this approach promotes the understanding of the psychological and affective mecha-
nisms supporting philanthropic decision-making, helps build new sound theories that rely on 
precise computational models, and provides implications for informed policy that could help 
design efficient tax schemes to generate the most impactful giving and welfare systems across 
the globe.
3 Tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy
Historically, tax subsidies for philanthropic activities limit tax relief for charitable donations 
outside national borders. There are two main reasons for this restriction. First, the driving 
principle is that to be justified, such relief has to produce a positive impact on the national 
budget, which can only happen if the receiving entity is in the same jurisdiction. In addition, 
cross-border philanthropic activities are more difficult to control and, therefore, potentially sub-
ject to the misallocation of funds (money laundering, terrorism funding, etc.; Silver and Buijze, 
2020, p. 112). The situation is slightly different in the EU, where the European Court of Justice 
has issued several landmark decisions that greatly facilitate cross-border philanthropic transfers 
within the common market (Buijze, 2016). However, in practice, cross-border payments still 
encounter multiple obstacles, even in the EU, where cross-border restrictions on tax relief are 
still present in all jurisdictions (OECD report, p. 110). In this section, the authors outline the 
tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy in their respective jurisdictions as well as national 
and global solutions.
The opening chapter confronts the readers with the following question: Can double taxa-
tion conventions solve or alleviate the potential tax burdens of cross-border charitable giving? 
Xavier Oberson considers that they could indeed play a more important role in this context. 
Oberson bases his reasoning on various double taxation treaties, and by giving examples, he 
suggests new clauses that can be inserted into the treaties. For instance, the states could recog-
nize non-profit entities as residents for convention purposes, introduce specific clauses on the 
deductibility of cross-border philanthropic gifts, or even in the longer term, create a multilateral 
approach to the problem.
Providing insight into the specific aspects of cross-border giving in the domain of art, 
Renate Buijze compares theory and practice, looking into the experiences of philanthropic art 
organizations. She concludes that, despite the relaxing of EU rules, donors face practical diffi-
culties in cross-border giving. According to Buijze, giving intermediaries emerge as the current 
best solution until legislation (ideally) introduces a provision at either the national, bilateral, or 
supranational level that allows for tax-efficient cross-border giving to equivalent foreign philan-
thropic organizations based on an ex-ante approach and home country control.
Exploring cross-border philanthropy from the U.S. perspective, Eric M. Zolt poses two 
questions: (i) whether tax benefits should support charitable activities outside the United States 
and (ii) whether contributions to foreign charities should be treated differently by the U.S. 
tax system from contributions to domestic charities. In answering these questions, the author 
provides an in-depth presentation of the U.S. legal framework, showing that tax law provides 
relatively low barriers for U.S. donors who engage in cross-border philanthropy. The theoretical 
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analysis of such a tax framework is difficult, as the United States lacks a comprehensive theory 
on the rationale behind tax subsidies for domestic charities engaged in domestic charitable 
activities. Therefore, the author discusses different factors that policymakers may find useful 
when considering options to either reduce or increase barriers to cross-border philanthropy.
As few countries have removed tax barriers to cross-border philanthropy, Natalie Silver’s 
analysis of the Australian example is interesting. Silver examines the implications of Australia’s 
shift in its policy approach from a very restrictive to a more permissive one. The chapter also 
assesses the lessons for other countries seeking to achieve an appropriate balance between facili-
tating tax-effective cross-border philanthropy and ensuring appropriate oversight of domestic 
entities engaged in international charitable activities.
4 Tax incentives for hybrid entities and social entrepreneurship
Traditionally, the legal status of a philanthropic organization, which allows it to operate under 
special favorable tax conditions (e.g., exempt from profit or other taxes), has stood under the 
assumption that such an organization does not engage in commercial activities. Over the last 
two decades, however, an entirely new sector that does not fit into the distinction between 
traditional business and charity has emerged. This new sector is usually called “social entrepre-
neurship” or “for-profit charity.” The so-called “social enterprises” operating in this context (for 
instance, “hybrid entities” or “B-corporations”) blur the line between the profit and non-profit 
sectors, as they derive revenues from commercial activities, but their main – or, in any event, 
substantial – objective is to have a positive social impact rather than merely to maximize their 
owners’ profit. Certain countries (e.g., the United States and Italy) have adopted new legal 
forms of entities to accommodate these “hybrid” goals without granting them any tax benefits.1 
Thus, social entrepreneurs may be confronted with the following dilemma: Either operate via 
a tax-exempt organization, without the possibility to self-finance their activities, or choose 
a taxable business entity and face potential difficulty finding investors to fund their socially 
responsible activities.
Authors from four jurisdictions  – the Netherlands, the United States, Australia, and 
Switzerland – discuss various aspects of this emerging phenomenon.
Showing that companies and corporate foundations have become important players in phi-
lanthropy, Dutch scholar Sigrid Hemels analyzes the general business rationale driving corpo-
rate philanthropy, questioning, for instance, the distinction between sponsorship and donations. 
Furthermore, Hemels illustrates the challenges the Netherlands faces in trying to fit the entre-
preneurial forms of philanthropy into its system for gift deductions and charities. In particular, 
she highlights problems in relation to the deductibility of corporate gifts, donations of shares, 
donations to for-profit entities, as well as program-related investments, and describes existing and 
potential solutions to such problems. She also highlights the threats represented by the EU 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) directive. It could harm corporate phi-
lanthropy in the Netherlands because of its interplay with the Dutch national legislation, which 
would, in effect, result in limiting corporate deductions.
Stephanie Koolen-Maas, Claire van Teunenbroek, and René Bekkers  explore the 
2012 tax reform on charitable donations in the Netherlands, which enhanced the deductibility 
of gifts to cultural organizations and allowed cultural organizations to earn more commercial 
income. The goal of the reform was to encourage the cultural sector to reduce its historical 
dependency on government grants, become more entrepreneurial, and increase philanthropic 
giving by private donors and corporations. Using survey data, the authors find that giving to 
culture has increased but probably not as a result of the tax reform. Among cultural nonprofit 
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organizations, they observe an increase in entrepreneurial orientations but not more diversifi-
cation of income. They also observe a Matthew effect, as larger cultural nonprofit organiza-
tions prove more successful in attracting other forms of income.
Addressing the same question from the U.S. perspective, Steven Dean and Dana Brak-
man Reiser consider why socially responsible business struggles to attract investors and what 
the importance of trust between philanthropists and society is. They outline the last half-century 
history of American philanthropy from the perspective of Stanley Surrey, highlighting that often 
philanthropists hope to retain access to their wealth. To re-establish trust, the authors suggest 
using a wealth tax that falls more lightly on assets placed in private foundations than on assets 
lodged in alternative vehicles that are currently popular among U.S. philanthropists, such as phi-
lanthropy LLCs. In fact, such a tax scheme may nudge elites to donate rather than burden them.
Fiona Martin analyzes the framework for social enterprises in Australia. She shows that 
currently, there is no separate legal structure for social enterprises in the Australian legal system, 
and that such enterprises are commonly operated by charities. The social enterprises may be 
either an income-tax exempt or for-profit company limited by shares. Martin discusses the 
overlap, limitations, and advantages of carrying out a social enterprise through charity and uses 
case studies to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of this approach in Australia.
Raphaël Gani then discusses the Swiss legal framework as well as the general rationale for 
social enterprises, focusing on the conditions under which entrepreneurial activities can claim 
tax exemptions. Analyzing the current tax and competition laws in Switzerland, Gani advocates 
for a larger exemption framework in favor of social enterprises.
In the final chapter of the handbook, Philippe Durand, Dominique Lemaistre, and 
Laurence de Nervaux address the French approach as to which entity and, more generally, 
which activity should be considered of public interest and should thus enjoy privileged tax treat-
ment. As in other countries, the test includes whether and to what extent such entities carry out 
economic activities, on the one hand, and, on the other, whether competition law is complied 
with, both issues being intertwined. They review the development of the French requirements 
and argue that the current French system needs to be amended in order to take better account 
of the growing social impact of economic activities.
The OECD 2020 Taxation and Philanthropy policy study2
This book also contains the OECD 2020 report entitled “Taxation and Philanthropy” (here-
after “the report”), the first-ever OECD study on the tax treatment of philanthropy, issued in 
collaboration with the GCP. The report acknowledges that in most countries philanthropy 
plays an important role in mobilizing private support for the public good. Some cross-country 
studies estimate the economic contribution of the non-profit sector at as much as 5% of the 
global GDP, and this support is especially vital in times of hardship and crisis, such as during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The report undertakes a detailed study of the legal frameworks related 
to tax incentives for the charitable sector. 40 countries took part in this survey.
The fundamental question in the report is as follows: How can governments design tax 
rules that support philanthropy in a manner that aligns with the public interest? An overview 
of related doctrines shows that striking the right balance can be difficult, as certain theoretical 
and practical difficulties exist with regard to the justification of such incentives. In particular, 
tax support for philanthropy can raise inequality and democracy concerns, as such policy meas-
ures could give a small number of wealthy donors disproportionate influence over how public 
resources are allocated. This apprehension is highlighted by the rise in the number of very large 
private philanthropic foundations established by ultra-high-net-worth individuals, who are able 
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to channel substantial resources into their own priorities while significantly minimizing their 
tax liabilities. While risks of abuse should be addressed, this concern should not overshadow the 
overwhelmingly positive contributions of philanthropy in general.
Nonetheless, the report suggests that there are ways to safeguard tax systems and allow gov-
ernments to continue providing support to the philanthropic sector. It highlights a number of 
important considerations for policymakers to help them strike a balance. First, the report sug-
gests that policymakers should reassess the activities eligible for tax support. In particular, across the 
countries surveyed, the activities eligible for tax support were very broad. Countries should 
ensure that the range of activities eligible for tax support is limited to those areas that are con-
sistent with their underlying policy goals. In addition, the OECD suggests the use of tax credits 
and fiscal caps for this purpose. The report highlights that, among the countries surveyed, the 
most popular tax incentive for philanthropic giving is tax deductions. However, this can dis-
proportionately benefit higher-income taxpayers. A tax credit coupled with a percentage-based 
cap may be fairer and more closely aligned with democratic principles. Furthermore, reassessing 
the extent of tax exemptions for the commercial income of philanthropic entities could also be con-
sidered. Exempting income from commercial activities could be limited to the extent that they 
are related to the purpose of the entity. Taxing unrelated commercial income would minimize 
any competitive disadvantage faced by for-profit businesses. The report also suggests reducing the 
complexity of tax rules and related compliance costs that disproportionately affect low-income donors 
and smaller philanthropic entities. For this purpose, the countries could, for example, align the 
eligibility requirements for tax incentives, simplify the tax rules for non-monetary donations, 
and facilitate payroll schemes for philanthropic giving. Another important policy measure could 
be to improve the oversight of tax concessions. Increased transparency, such as public registers of 
approved philanthropic entities, annual reporting, differentiating between donating and spon-
soring, and publishing tax expenditure data, would help safeguard public trust in the sector and 
ensure that tax concessions used to subsidize philanthropy are better understood by the public 
at large and not abused through tax avoidance and evasion schemes. Finally, the OECD report 
suggests reassessing restrictions imposed on cross-border philanthropic activities. Responding to global 
issues such as poverty, environmental concerns, and pandemics may require countries and insti-
tutions to cooperate across borders. With appropriate requirements, equivalent tax treatment 
can be provided to domestic and cross-border philanthropy.
***
As can be seen, the authors participating in this volume cover extremely diverse questions and 
perspectives related to taxation and philanthropy. The OECD report presents an additional 
in-depth comparative study on this topic. A number of the issues and problems raised remain 
open for further analysis and potential solutions, as not all contributions provide final answers. 
However, we believe that these works offer a number of promising ways to contribute to the 
further development of the complex field of taxation related to philanthropic activities, and we 
hope that they build solid foundations for further studies on this topic.
Giedre Lideikyte Huber and Henry Peter
Notes
 1 L. Ventura, Le “società benefit” nel mondo: Un’analisi comparata, in Societa’ Benefit: Profili giuridici ed econom-
ico-aziendali, ed. by C. Bellavite Pellegrini, R. Caruso, EGEA, Milano, 2020, 115–126.
 2 This section mirrors the article authored by Pascal Saint-Amans and Henry Peter and published as a blog 
on the OECD forum network platform.
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PART I
Justification of tax incentives  




THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP 
OF PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND THE LIBERAL 
DEMOCRATIC STATE
The inquiry and the inquirers as the answer
Rob Atkinson
Introduction: back to which future, forward in which tradition?
In public affairs, as in the humbler departments of human life, questions of ends and 
questions of means inevitably intersect. Disputes as to the former commonly pro-
duce more sparks than light, and more heat than either. If a man affirms that his heart 
leaps up at the spectacle either of a society in which the common good is defined 
by the decisions of a totalitarian bureaucracy, or of one – like, to mention only one  
example – the England of a century ago, where, in the unceasing struggle of indi-
viduals for personal gain, a conception of the common good cannot easily find 
a foothold, it may readily be admitted that no logic exists which can prove these 
exhilarating palpitations either right or wrong. One cannot argue with the choice 
of a soul.
(Tawney, 1964)
Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing but are ravenous wolves. 
You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from this-
tles? In the same way, every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit.
(Matthew 7:15–17)
Taxation and Philanthropy (OECD, 2020), jointly produced by the OECD Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration and the University of Geneva Centre for Philanthropy, surveys 
and assesses the tax policies that member states, donee states, and others might want to use to 
encourage both private philanthropic organizations and donations to those organizations from 
private individuals and for-profit entities. The point of this chapter is to identify and unpack 
several apparent paradoxes in the Report’s position, admittedly in an apparently paradoxical 
way. I argue that the Report is, in several important respects, at odds with the basic mission 
of the OECD itself; I mean that deep criticism in the most friendly possible way, and I mean 
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to explain why. This chapter offers not just friendly amendments but a comradely salute (or 
at least a word, with a wink, to the wise who would set global policy for the good of all 
humankind).
The Report’s most basic proposal poses the deepest paradox: A collaborative report by two 
public institutions, one a consortium of liberal democratic states and the other an old and 
renowned state university, suggests to states that they may want to use their fiscal systems to 
encourage non-state institutions to do the philanthropic work that states themselves have done 
and to do that work financed by voluntary contributions rather than by the state’s own method 
of finance, taxing and spending. In both respects, the financing and the delivering of public 
services, the Report’s cosponsors seem to suggest ways of doing philanthropy better than their 
own. They seem to propose, if not quite to preach, something very different from what they 
practice, what both the OECD and public universities have always practiced: tax-financed, 
state-delivered works for the common good.
The collection of essays published along with the Report poses a second, and almost equally 
deep, paradox: The wisdom of a policy to be recommended to democratic nations is to be 
assessed not by submission to the voters of those nations, or even to their elected leaders, but by 
academics and civil servants, agents of meritocraticly elitist, and thus implicitly undemocratic, 
institutions. This anthology thus has a distinct ring to it: “inside the Beltway,” in the idiom of 
the United States; “over there in Brussels,” in that of the United Kingdom.
Unpacking those two paradoxes – the paradox of the Report’s recommendations and the 
paradox of this volume’s commentary on those recommendations – produces a double paradox 
of its own. On the one hand, this chapter offers the strongest possible praise for the Report; on 
the other hand, it raises a very deep qualification. Compounding, perhaps more than doubling, 
that paradox, it spends far more time on the qualification than on the praise. Its praise is not 
faint, and the very opposite of damning, but that praise may seem overshadowed by its heavy 
qualification.
This is the praise: The joint Report is a really fine example of the ethos of the Marshall 
Planners, the OECD’s long-standing tradition of collaboration between career civil servants 
and mainstream academics in addressing major issues of public concern. This is the qualifica-
tion: The Report might have gone further in advancing that very tradition. At the end, the 
praise and the qualification are not at odds; if they are not essentially the same, they demon-
strably derive from the same source, the ethos of the original Marshall Planners. The proper 
answer to the relationship of the modern state and private philanthropy is for both to serve 
the two related goals of the Marshall Plan: at the very least, the maintenance of peace as the 
minimal condition of human flourishing; at the very best, the active promotion of those con-
ditions that encourage human flourishing itself, an essential collaboration of modern states and 
traditional universities to advance the fullest possible realization of the core of philanthropy: 
the love of humankind.
Those truly Good Shepherds, the original Marshall Planners, knew very well the wolves that 
were at the door of the nations of Europe and Asia, the victorious allies as well as the defeated 
Axis, in the ruins of World War II. On the one hand loomed a new and emboldened species 
of totalitarian bureaucracy, Soviet and Chinese Communism, in place of the old and defeated 
species, Nazism and Fascism. This was the first alternative to the ethos of the Marshall Plan that 
R. H. Tawney mentioned in our first epigraph. Thanks in no small part to the Marshall Plan, 
Stalinism and Maoism, like Nazism and Fascism, have slunk back to their lairs.
On the other hand, the second alternative that Tawney identified is still very much with 
us, even among us: equating the common good with either aggregate consumer satisfaction or 
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unexamined popular political preference. As the Marshall Planners knew from the most painful 
possible experience, the market’s “invisible hand” can, in the wrong hands, dangerously misdi-
rect economic gains to the few, even as demagogues can distort the political preferences of the 
many. These are the false prophets, the wolves in sheep’s clothing, that the very Gospels warn 
us about. And here we have yet another paradox, itself both deep and double, that we must 
unpack: These false prophets approach us in the very garb of both philanthropy and philosophy 
themselves; they preach a gospel all their own, often grounded in the best universities. We, like 
the Marshall Planners, must know them by their fruits: Who best advances the vision of univer-
sal human flourishing embraced by the victorious allies, East and West?
Only when we have unpacked all these paradoxes – the paradoxes of the Report’s proposals 
and the paradoxes of my friendly criticism – can we properly appreciate a final paradox. This last 
one lies at the intersection of the other two. On the one hand, I imagine that, for their part, the 
co-producers of the Report and the sponsors of this symposium, the OECD and the University 
of Geneva, not only anticipated my criticisms but also embraced them – all before I had even 
written them down. On the other hand, I cannot fault them for not raising these objections 
themselves; I must salute them for the very great wisdom of their forbearance. Unpacking this 
final paradox is perhaps this chapter’s ultimate homage to the Reports’ authors and this sympo-
sium’s sponsors. It is a salute that is more a whisper (with a wink): Well done, good and faithful 
fellow laborers in the vineyards of the Marshall Planners (and perhaps – a matter I must leave to 
still other fellow laborers – the Master Planner).
To unpack all these paradoxes, we must situate the Report in three related contexts. Part 
I examines the debate on the effectiveness of taxation as a means of promoting private philan-
thropy, Part II takes up the theory of private philanthropy’s function, and Part III traces the 
historical links between private philanthropy and the ethos of the Marshall Planners.
This chapter’s conclusion is the paradox of its subtitle: The inquiry and the inquirers are the 
answer. The question that the OECD and the University of Geneva pose can only be answered, 
in the ethos of the original Marshall Planners and traditional academics, by exactly the kind 
of inquiry they have invited us to join them in undertaking. As the work of the OECD and 
its academic partners has long demonstrated, the role of private philanthropy in advancing the 
ethos of the Marshall Planners has always been decidedly secondary and, ironically, sometimes 
not only unhelpful but actively opposed. If the work of global humanitarianism must depend, 
in a dark time, on handouts from the wealthy, virtuous or vicious, we can nonetheless hope for 
a brighter day, a day that seems already to be dawning.
I Situating the report in tax theory: are tax favors effective  
in encouraging private philanthropy?
The basic position of the Report is that states may want to support private philanthropy by 
means of favorable tax treatment. Much of the Report is taken up with evaluating whether 
various forms of favorable tax treatment are effective means of advancing that end, private phi-
lanthropy. Plausibly enough, the Report begins with an effort to identify what the end to be 
advanced, private philanthropy, actually is. It next proceeds to a detailed analysis of the scholarly 
literature on effectiveness of tax favors in promoting private philanthropy. As we examine this 
analysis, we can only conclude that it inevitably raises questions that it studiously declines to 
answer: whether particular private philanthropic purposes, or even private philanthropy in gen-
eral, actually advance the public good – including the public good as identified and advanced 
by the Marshall Planners.
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a  The meaning of philanthropy: a working definition (with real  
and recognized limits)
At the outset, after noting the term’s derivation from the Greek term meaning “love of human-
ity,” the Report identifies what will prove to be a very serious problem: “The term ‘philan-
thropy’ does not have a universally accepted meaning” (OECD, 2020, Section 1.1, p. 11). In a 
telling understatement, the Report notes that “Various attempts have been made to define the 
term” (OECD). After a dutiful review of those efforts, the Report ventures its own:
Despite the divergent uses of the term, there are some common threads: philanthropy 
is concerned with “giving”, and with “worthy” and “public”, rather than private, 
causes. . . . The focus then, is on “gifting” – the making of voluntary contributions 
without expectation of return; and on identification of appropriate worthy causes or 
purposes. This identification of “worthy purposes” is likely to differ between jurisdic-
tions and is an important part of the tax framework in this area.
(OECD, 2020)
In this last detail, identifying worthy purposes, lies either God or the devil, depending on one’s 
point of view – particularly one’s view of philanthropy.
As we shall see, and as the authors of the report seem to recognize, their definition, particu-
larly its last detail, raises at least as many questions as it answers. It works quite well enough, 
however, as a kind of algebraic “x” at the next level of their analysis: If you want to promote 
philanthropy’s “worth purposes” (whatever you think those are), here is our assessment of how 
various tax favors will work.
b  Favorable tax treatment as a means of encouraging  
private philanthropy
It would be hard to over-praise the Report’s diligence in reviewing the vast literature on the 
efficacy of various tax treatments of philanthropy. Its analysis is long and detailed and clear and 
compelling. But that analysis also has to be awarded a more ambiguous accolade: It is clear, and 
clearly inconclusive. On balance, it is clearly unclear whether tax favors are really all that effec-
tive in promoting private philanthropy. As our epigraph from Tawney implies, proper inquiry 
into questions like this, questions of means, often sheds a great deal of light, without generating 
much friction, much igniting of heated disagreement. Here, however, what the cool light of 
careful analysis reveals about the efficacy of tax favors as a means of promoting philanthropic 
ends is very nearly a Scots verdict: not proved.
Nor, alas, is that the end of the matter. If a state decides to use tax favors to that end anyway, 
it will have to return to a hugely difficult problem that the Report has already flagged: It will 
have to decide whether the purposes that nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations claim to 
be philanthropic, and thus entitled to tax favors, are really the kind of benefits that the govern-
ment itself wants to encourage. To answer that question, as the Report implicitly notes, one 
must turn from an analysis of the effectiveness of tax favors to the function of nonprofit, non-
governmental organizations, to the kinds of public benefits they promise, the kinds of worthy 
purposes they purport to serve – and to the still more difficult question of whether they deliver 
on those promises, actually serve those purposes. Before a state decides whether to encourage 
private philanthropy, it will need to know what private philanthropy does and what it does well 
(OECD, 2020, p. 22, note 1).
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Here we move from questions of means to questions of ends; here, as Tawney also reminds 
us, we may expect our inquiry to produce friction as well as light, to spark debate that is politi-
cal, even existential, not merely technical or descriptive.
II Situating the report in positive economic, political,  
and sociological theory: what is the function  
of nonprofit, nongovernmental entities?
Here again, the Report does an admirable job of surveying, summarizing, and evaluating a vast 
scholarly literature. We need to review the Report’s review the better to appreciate a problem 
that the Report identified at the outset: In important respects, philanthropy is in the eye of the 
beholder. As we shall see, and as the Report clearly appreciates, the relevant beholders are not 
only the private individuals who operate and support private philanthropy but also the states 
that must decide their proper relationship with those entities, including whether to try to 
encourage them with favorable tax treatment.
a  The Standard Model of positive economics and political science
Here we must, alas, summarize aggressively. Here is the basic point, something of a good news, 
bad news situation. First, the good news: Positive economic analysis and positive political theory 
have offered complementary theories of how private philanthropy functions, two sides of essen-
tially the same coin. Each theory assumes a particular kind of four-sector modern society. One 
sector is the liberal democratic state; a second sector is the capitalist market economy. The third 
sector includes private philanthropy; the fourth sector comprises households, or nuclear fami-
lies. The identification of these sectors involves the intersection of two variables: whether the 
sector’s constituent institutions are voluntary and whether they are for profit.
Four Societal Sectors
    For Profit?








Yes For-Profit Sector Nonprofit Sector
No Household Sector Governmental Sector
(Harding and Pascoe, 2018, p. 50).
Diagram.
According to this Standard Model (Diagram), each sector in this four-part social system has 
certain distinct advantages over the others in providing goods and services, advantages traceable 
to their two defining characteristics: for profit (or not); voluntary (or not). What is more, two 
of these four social sectors, the liberal democratic state and the capitalist market economy, have 
their own intrinsic standards of performance. The standard of positive economics is economic 
efficiency: giving consumers, in the aggregate, the most of what they want at the lowest possible 
cost. The standard of positive political science is democratic legitimacy: giving a majority of 
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voters what they want, subject to constraints imposed by the majority voters on what the state 
is allowed to do, and how.
Each of these disciplines, economics and politics, accounts for the function of the others as 
providing goods or services that the institutions of its own sector fail to provide by that sector’s 
own standard. Thus economic theory holds that when private firms cannot produce a good or 
service at optimal efficiency, individuals will seek that good in one of the other sectors. Simi-
larly, political theory holds that if the majority of voters do not provide a good or service at the 
level preferred by an individual voter, that dissatisfied voter can turn to one of the other sectors. 
Since the Standard Model thus defines the function of the nonprofit, nongovernmental sec-
tor by default of the market and governmental sectors, it is sometimes called the Twin Failure 
theory.
Even this briefest outline should convey some of the elegance of the Standard Model. It 
explains the function of not just the nonprofit, nongovernmental sector, but also the other three 
sectors as well. It is, essentially, social science’s equivalent of a Grand Unified Theory; it is as if 
physicists had managed to unify the microcosmic theory of quantum mechanics with the mac-
rocosmic theory of general relativity. If there were a Nobel Prize for positive social science, the 
economists and political scientists of the Standard Model should have shared it long ago. That, 
obviously enough, is the good news
Now the other shoe must drop; here’s the bad news: The Standard Model, for all its elegance 
as a sectoral map, is no guide through the relevant policy maze. The Standard Model, for all its 
descriptive elegance, offers the policy makers whom the Report is addressing very little guid-
ance in the task at hand: whether to try to encourage private philanthropy with favorable tax 
treatment. The full elaboration of this bad news, alas, is a very long story. But it only takes a 
slightly closer look to reveal several limitations of the Standard Model’s usefulness as a guide to 
policy-making in general and thus to the policy planning of the states to which the Report has 
directed its own policy recommendations.
Most obviously, the Standard Model is, by its own terms, limited to a particular kind of 
society: liberal democratic polities with capitalist market economies. Its insights, accordingly, 
apply with much less force in other kinds of societies. This is a very big limitation: Some of 
the OECD’s donees do not have liberal democratic polities; some do not have capitalist market 
economies; some have neither of the two. (And, complicating matters even more, the current 
democratically elected leaders of Poland and Hungary – members of not only of the OECD but 
also of both NATO and the EU – openly aspire to make their countries “illiberal democracies.”)
A second important limitation to the Standard Model as a policy guide applies even with 
respect to countries that have, and hope to retain, both liberal democratic polities and capitalist 
market economies. To appreciate this limit, we must notice something odd about how posi-
tive economics and positive political theory both define and measure the public good. Both 
disciplines measure the public good as an aggregation of unexamined individual preferences: In 
economics, these are the goods and services that consumers are both willing and able to pay for, 
quantified in monetary units; in politics, these are the politicians and policies that a majority of 
citizens prefer, quantified in terms of the ballots they cast. It is this common metric, aggregated 
individual preference, that allows economists and political scientists to produce their Grand 
Unified Theory (of, as we have seen, a certain kind of society).
A moment’s thought will reveal that, as a guide to choosing policy ends, as a means of iden-
tifying the public good, the Standard Model is wholly unhelpful to policy makers in two dia-
metrically opposite ways. On the one hand, if policy makers identify the public good with what 
the people want, then the policy makers do not need the Standard Model to tell them what they 
need to know: That is what free markets and free elections already do. On the other hand, if 
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policy makers want to know what is really good for the people, not just what the people want, 
then the Standard Model offers them no guidance at all, and they will have to look elsewhere, 
beyond not only the market and the ballot box but also the Standard Model.
This radical limitation of the Standard Model is not just demonstrably true; it is also read-
ily conceded by the Model’s architects. But, though entirely true, this criticism is a bit overly 
harsh. Even if the Standard Model is no help to policy makers in identifying ends, what the 
public good is, it might be quite helpful in identifying means to ends not otherwise accounted 
for, how to go about achieving the public good without evaluating that good by standards other 
than their own (aggregate consumer satisfaction and majority voter preference). The Standard 
Model could, in that strictly instrumentalist way, help both kinds of policy makers, those who 
want to give people what they want and also those who want to give people what they need, 
what they should want (as identified by standards supplementing those of positive economics 
and political science).
In fairness, this is what the Standard Model primarily purports to do; its main purpose is to 
explain how society works, not how to make society work better. As we have seen, the Stand-
ard Model purports to explain why each sector is better at providing some kinds of good and 
services than others. It is particularly insightful about two broad categories of goods and services 
that capitalist firms, left to their own devices, are likely not to produce efficiently – so as to give 
consumers more bang for their buck – on their own.
Let’s look at the two kinds of goods and services that the Standard Model identifies as par-
ticularly relevant here. The first, and most obvious, are what economists call public goods. Clas-
sic example are lighthouses and radio broadcasts. Private firms have a hard time making a profit 
providing these goods and services, because they have no effective way of charging consumers 
for them. With respect to the second kind of products, the shoe is basically on the other foot. 
Private firms can quite easily deny the benefits of these products to those who don’t buy them, 
but those who do buy them are not in a position to evaluate whether they are, in fact, getting 
what they pay for. This is especially true of services involving highly technical knowledge, like 
medicine or law or advanced education; unless you’re a doctor or a lawyer or a professor, it is 
hard to know if your doctor or lawyer or professor really knows what he or she is doing (for 
you – or to you).
In both these classic cases of “market failure,” externalities and information asymmetries, 
private firms are not likely to give consumers in the aggregate the most of what they are willing 
and able to pay for at the lowest possible price. In these cases, then, for-profit private firms fail 
to function optimally by the standard of positive economic analysis itself. Provision by another 
sector might, in those very terms, be a better means of meeting consumer demand.
But notice that, in such a situation, consumers may have an embarrassment of riches: They 
could avoid their problems with private firms by turning to providers in either of the other two 
public sectors, state agencies on the one hand or private philanthropies on the other – assum-
ing, of course, that suppliers were available in both alternative sectors and that those alternative 
suppliers offered consumers a comparable product at a competitive price.
Here, alas, the consumer may find further problems. Maybe the product is available from 
only a private philanthropy or the state. Or maybe the product is available from both, but the 
consumer is no better able to tell which of the two is producing it at the ideal price/quality 
point than he or she was in the case of private, for-profit providers. Why might this prob-
lem arise again outside the for-profit sector? Because governments and private philanthropies, 
though less tempted than non-profits to skimp on quality to increase their profit margins, may 
be tempted to skimp on quality for other reasons; without net profit as an incentive to lower 
costs, maybe they will “slack off” rather than “skim off.”
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Here policy makers might be a real help making sure consumers get what they are paying for. 
If they knew which nonprofit suppliers, state agencies or private philanthropies, were likely to 
be the lowest-cost, highest-quality provider, they could direct consumers to that alternative. If 
none, or too few, were available, they could have the state subsidize those providers or provide 
the relevant product themselves.
But here policy makers would have, alas, yet another problem. Although that course would 
seem to be the economically appropriate course of action, it might not be the politically appro-
priate course. Individual consumers might prefer the less economically reliable alternative to 
for-profit suppliers because they have a preference for that provider independent of its eco-
nomic efficiency. Some consumers, in fact, may prefer private for-profit providers over either 
governmental or private non-profit suppliers, even though both of the latter are the most cost-
effective providers.
And that (alas yet again) is not just an academic hypothetical; it seems to be the case in a 
great deal of the “real world.” Individual consumers do seem to have preferences not just for 
products but also for the sector that provides the product. And, what is more, these preferences 
as to both providers and product seem to vary with consumers from country to country. As a 
result, the Standard Model, though quite elegant in showing which sectoral providers – state, 
private nonprofits, or private for-profits – consumers would choose if getting the most for their 
money were their only concern, is a pretty poor predictor of which sectoral providers they 
actually do choose.
Here is the trouble. The Standard Model takes preferences for particular goods and services 
as exogenous but assumes that consumers will want their preferences met by the lowest-cost 
provider not only within each sector but among all four sectors. Inconveniently for the Stand-
ard Model, consumers have preferences not only for particular goods and services but also for 
particular sectoral providers. The Standard Theory has, in its own terms, no way to account for 
individual preferences; this is fine at the level of particular products, but, at the level of sectoral 
choice, it seriously affects the predictive power of the model.
b Social Origins Theory
As the Report nicely notes, insights from a third descriptive social science, sociology, give a 
very powerful improvement here. These insights, aptly called Social Origins Theory, trace 
individual countries’ preference for particular combinations of state or nonprofit provision of 
social services to a critical moment in the state’s development (OECD, p. 12, citing Anheier 
and Salamon, 1996, pp. 213–248). That critical moment is when the state actually becomes 
modern; the critical variable at that moment is the social group most politically empowered. 
Social Origins Theory identifies four distinctive kinds of states that emerge in that moment, 
each of which has a distinctive kind of relationship with private philanthropy in the provision 
of social services.
With one terminological qualification,1 the Report’s own summary cannot be improved 
upon:
• “[Negative] liberal states” – where democratic government developed before the welfare 
state. The welfare state may be limited but available to the “deserving poor”. These coun-
tries are likely to have a larger philanthropic sector;
• “social-democratic [or Positive Liberal] states” – where the working class gained power and 
pushed for a universal welfare state. As a result of the high level of welfare, these countries 
tend to have smaller philanthropic sectors;
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• “corporatist states” – where the welfare state developed under the control of non-demo-
cratic states that later became democratic. These countries tend to have low welfare and 
large philanthropic sectors;
• “statist states” – where a country’s elites are in control of the public good provision, and this 
leads to both low government spending on social welfare and a small philanthropic sector.
(OECD, p. 12) (Salamon, Sokolowski and Anheier, 2000, at 16–17)
Social Origins Theory claims, plausibly enough, to account far better for the actual mix of 
state and private delivery of social services than does the Standard Model alone. By its account, 
the predictable pattern is Negative Liberal in the United Kingdom and the United States; Posi-
tive Liberal in Scandinavia; Corporatist in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; and 
Statist in Japan and Latin America.
Social Origins Theory also analyzes another variable that is critical both to its own predic-
tive power and to our present purposes: the predominant kind of private philanthropy at the 
time that the modern state decides to assume modern welfare functions. Thus, for example, in 
the nineteenth century, the critical period in both Germany and France, a very powerful and 
oppositional Roman Catholic Church managed to retain an extensive role in the provision of 
social services not found in Scandinavia, where legally established Protestant churches were not 
only state supported, but also state supporting.
Here, then, the policy makers who are interested in giving consumers and voters what they 
want would seem to have the guidance that they need. If citizens in their country show a pref-
erence for provision of a good or service from private philanthropies, and if the policy makers 
conclude that tax incentives actually encourage private philanthropy, then they should supply 
those incentives; if they prove wrong on either point – the efficacy of the incentives or the 
preferences of their citizens – then their citizens can correct them.
That would, alas, be no help to the other kind of policy maker, those who want to give 
the people not just what they want but also what they need. Nor, upon still closer inspection, 
would it give the preference-serving policy makers quite what they need, either. Three insights 
of Social Origins Theory are especially relevant here.
First, and most basically, society is not static. The starting point of Social Origins Theory, the 
emergence of the modern state itself, represented a radically new prospect in the relationship of 
the public sector and the private non-profit sector: Modern societies, with modern states, gen-
erate a great deal more wealth than traditional societies. As the Social Origins model reminds 
us, the state can deal with that new wealth in several distinct ways. Thus, for example, statist 
states tend to hoard it in the hands of political elites; liberal states tend to leave it in the hands of 
economic elites; social democratic societies tend to redistribute it across their entire population 
on the basis of democratic politics; corporatist states tend to allocate it across social classes by the 
lights of soi-disant publicly spirited elites.
Second, as the Social Origins theory clearly implies, these ideal-type states themselves, 
each with its own pattern of wealth allocation and relationship with private philanthropy, are 
dynamic, not static. This is clear in the Report’s own description of Positive Liberal states and 
Negative Liberal states: In the former, “democratic government developed before the welfare 
state”; in the latter, “the working class gained power and pushed for a universal welfare state.” It 
is bracing to be reminded that fundamental institutional choices, both individual and collective, 
are not what they once were and thus may not remain what they now are.
This brings us to the third insight implicit in Social Origins Theory, in considerable ten-
sion with the first two. True, social institutions change; also true, human beings, individually 
and collectively, are profoundly significant agents of social change. And yet, as Social Origins 
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Theory also reminds us, individuals’ preferences are not entirely chosen; they are also shaped, 
and they are shaped to a very large extent not by pure or unencumbered individual choice but 
by exogenous factors that both constrain and condition, even implant, individual inclinations 
toward particular choices. More specifically – and far more significant for our purposes – is this: 
Among the primary shapers and limiters of individual choice are precisely the two kinds of enti-
ties with whose proper function in relationship to each other that the Report and the policy 
makers it addresses must be most concerned: contemporary states and private philanthropies.
c  Summary of positive social scientific functional theories
The Report’s examination of positive social theory – economic, political, and sociological – 
sheds admirable light on our understanding of the basic topic the Report addresses: tax support 
for private philanthropy. For this it is, once again, very much to be commended. The light that 
positive social theory sheds on that topic sharpens our focus even as it reveals an essential second 
phase of our analysis. We now have a much better sense of how, and how well, tax favors might 
be used, and best used, to support private philanthropy.
Beyond that, we have a much better sense of what private philanthropy actually is and does, 
of how it functions alongside the other three sectors of a modern state: the private for-profit 
sector, the governmental sector, and the household sector. But here, if you’ll forgive me, we 
find another paradox: That we know more about both the modern state and private philan-
thropy is good news; what we now know about each of them is by no means entirely good – at 
least from the perspective of those of us committed to the traditional work of both the Report’s 
sponsors, the liberal democratic states of the OECD and modern research universities like the 
home of the Geneva Center on Philanthropy.
Let’s pause to look at that news, the good and bad, with respect to both institutions in ques-
tion, private philanthropy and the modern state. Let us begin with the lessons learned, first 
about philanthropy, then about the modern state. With those lessons in mind, we can better 
appreciate where we need to go next – where we might be forgiven for wishing, if only provi-
sionally, that the Report had taken us.
The Report, much to its credit, begins with an effort to understand exactly what we mean by 
philanthropy. No beginning could be better rooted in the best of academic traditions. For both 
Socrates and Confucius, much turns on proper terminology, and no concept is more important 
than the loving care of humankind, in both oneself and others. The Report’s provisional defi-
nition of philanthropy focused on two factors: private voluntary efforts for publicly beneficial 
purposes. Both halves of this definition, we can now see, need considerable amendment.
On the one hand, the focus on private agency is seriously distorting. Some modern states 
do much of the work once done by private philanthropy; to award the very positive associa-
tions of the term “philanthropy” to one set of sectoral providers to the exclusion of another is 
doubtlessly an innocent oversight in the OECD report; elsewhere, unfortunately, it is a most 
artful rhetorical move. Whatever the motive, the effect tends to be the same: to suggest that one 
of the two sometimes competing sectors serves the public good essentially; the others, at best, 
only incidentally.
This suggestion is doubly dubious.
This becomes even clearer when we look more closely at the second element of the 
Report’s definition, serving the public good. As we have seen, and as the Report quite rightly 
acknowledges, what counts as “public benefit” is often very much in the eye of the beholder. 
One person’s meat is another’s poison; the Trojan horse was nothing if not a gift, but its good-
ness depended entirely on the side of the relevant wall from which one saw it.
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In our case, the relevant walls are those that divide the most distinctive kinds of modern 
states. As Social Origins Theory points out, some modern states are more likely to rely on the 
organizations in the non-profit, non-governmental sector than others. But that insight, useful 
though it is, is only the beginning. Basically, the OECD Report’s tendency to take “philan-
thropy” as synonym for nonprofit, non-governmental organizations implicitly begs two impor-
tant questions.
On the one hand, using the term “philanthropic” to describe all third-sector organizations 
implies that all third-sector organizations are “philanthropic” in a meaningful sense, a sense that 
has to do with genuine “love of humanity.” To the contrary, as we shall see, some third-sector 
organizations are “philanthropic” only in a technical, or perhaps deceptive, sense. Some soi-
disant “philanthropies” are false prophets, wolves in sheep’s clothing. On the other hand, using 
“philanthropy” to cover all third-sector organizations tends to obscure a very old human aspira-
tion and a very real possibility: The state itself may be philanthropic, in the fullest possible way. 
Such, so we might remember, was the ideal polis of classical philosophy; so, too, were the states 
that formed the precursor of the OECD and eventually the OECD itself.
We are back – much better informed, to be sure! – to the questions with which we began: 
whether the state should encourage private philanthropy, and, if so, which ones? Here, I have 
to suggest, the Report needs to look past the social science of both the efficacy of tax favors to 
private “philanthropy” and the function of private philanthropy in relationship to our society’s 
other three sectors. In addition to the social sciences, the physical sciences offer hugely helpful 
insights. This is especially true of evolutionary psychology, where there is increasingly com-
pelling evidence of our capacity for both selfish and pro-social orientation. For our purposes, 
though, the most important place to look must be the humanities.
Here the obvious choice might seem normative philosophy, particularly the classical subjects 
of ethics and politics, those ancient and perennial inquiries into the basic question of philan-
thropy: how to be the best possible human beings, individually and collectively. I myself have 
spent a good bit of time trying to show how a neo-classical understanding of philanthropy has 
much to commend it.
But here, in commenting on the OECD’s joint proposal, the discipline to turn to, I hope 
to convince you, is history, in particular the history of the OECD itself and the relationship of 
the OECD and its members and donees with private philanthropy. Before turning from social 
science to history, though, I want to note what I think is a most important point: These are 
all disciplines centered in the university; this turn to yet another academic discipline, like the 
course of our study so far, is very much in the tradition of the OECD, approaching the solution 
to complex social problems in conversations between policy makers and academics. So: In turn-
ing to the history of the OECD and private philanthropy, we remain well within the tradition 
of the OECD (and, at the deepest possible level, the Academy).
III Situating the OECD Report in history: the affairs of Marshall 
Plan members and private philanthropy as a drama in three acts
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities 
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,  institutions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by 
which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s develop-
ment through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must 
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know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult his-
tory and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult labor will be to under-
stand the combination of the two into new products at every stage.
(Holmes, 1881, p. 1)
And if you want biographies, do not look for those with the legend “Mr. So-and-so 
and his times” but for one whose title-page might be inscribed “A fighter against his 
time.” Feast your souls on Plutarch, and dare to believe in yourselves when you believe 
in his heroes. A hundred such men – educated against the fashion of today, made 
familiar with the heroic, and come to maturity – are enough to give an eternal quietus 
to the noisy sham education of this time.
(Nietzsche, 1957, pp. 41–42)
As Social Origins Theory reminds us, in any particular country at any particular time, the 
relationship between the modern state and private philanthropy will be, to a more or less sub-
stantial degree, path dependent. In approaching the work of philanthropy in their own time, 
both private individuals and public policy makers find their choice of means to the great end 
of global human flourishing influenced, even constrained, by inherited institutions and cus-
tomary modes of institutional relationships. Properly to understand the context in which the 
OECD Report has appeared, and thus the constraints under which policy makers who read it 
have to operate, we need to focus our analysis on a particular era and two particular nations. 
The relevant era is the twentieth century; the relevant nations are the United Kingdom and 
the United States.
This latter focus requires a word of explanation, though I think not apology. By historical 
accident – happy or not – the United States and the United Kingdom have loomed especially 
large in two critical developments: first, the “Social Democratic,” or “Positive Liberal,” mode 
of domestic interaction between states and private philanthropy and, second, the Marshall Plan 
as the expansion of that mode into the international arena. The basic story line is this: At the 
turn of the twentieth century, even as Social Origins Theory has pointed out, both the United 
States and the United Kingdom were paradigms of the Negative Liberal mode of state and 
private philanthropic interaction (SSA, p. 19). As a result, traditions and institutions of private 
philanthropy were particularly strong and well-developed in the United Kingdom and United 
States, and, as the Report acknowledges, scholarly focus long centered on the latter (OECD, 
2020, p. 12).
In both nations, that pattern changed dramatically (but not permanently) in the wake of 
World War I and especially in response to the global economic depression of the 1930s. Reli-
ance on vastly expanded central government provision of essential goods and services, very 
much in the Positive Liberal pattern, became the practice and the expectation in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom.
That pattern continued, perforce, through World War II. The states allied against the fascism 
of the Axis Powers were neither “night watchmen” nor “nannies.” And, through the Marshall 
Plan, the victorious allies made the Positive Liberal domestic model of the United States and the 
United Kingdom not only the template of post-war recovery but also the pattern of collective 
defense and international development for next three decades.
By the 1970s, a distinct reaction had set in not only in the United States and United 
Kingdom but across much of the rest of the Western Alliance and the world, a reaction that 
accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet threat. If you’ll pardon the eponyms, it went like 
this: The Marshall Plan ethos, the ethos of Roosevelt and Attlee, gave way to a very different 
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ethos, first of Reagan and Thatcher, then of Clinton and Blair, and finally of Trump and 
Johnson. Understandably enough, these developments cannot but have affected the position 
of the OECD and its supporters toward private philanthropy in both domestic politics and 
international relations.
To put the change most bluntly: A new generation of vastly wealthy private, purportedly 
philanthropic, foundations, some of which had grown extremely large in the unraveling of the 
domestic and international order of the Marshall Planners, became one of the few available 
sources of financial and technical support for international development once done by the 
OECD and its member states themselves, with limited but significant aid from older and closely 
allied private foundations.
As we have said, the main theme of this historical review is the shift in relations in the rela-
tionship between the state and private philanthropy as the governments of the United Kingdom 
and United States went from Negative Liberal to Positive Liberal (Social Democratic) and then 
back. As we examine this cycle, we also need to watch the other side of the relationship, private 
philanthropy. On this side, we need to be particularly mindful of the role of three significant 
institutions: religious organizations, especially Protestant Christian churches; universities, both 
private and public; and private philanthropic foundations, both those favoring Positive Liberal-
ism and those favoring Negative Liberalism.
a  In the beginning (as identified by Social Origins Theory): the 
amazing rise and spectacular fall of the (Negative) Liberal state
Radicals and conservatives, after all, necessarily share some ground in common. . . . 
Radicals, for example, are traditionalists, just as conservatives are; it is simply that they 
adhere to entirely different traditions.
(Eagleton, 1996, p. 6)
[I]f this faith is truly liberal, then somewhere in it lies a deep strain of political 
conservatism.
(Rossiter, 1955, p. 71)
The era that set what Social Origins Theory identifies as the distinctive mode of state inter-
action with private philanthropy in the United States and United Kingdom, our Negative 
Liberalism, is often and tellingly known, especially in the United States, as the Gilded Age. It 
was an age of astonishing industrial, commercial, and financial expansion; particularly savvy 
entrepreneurs, often neither morally scrupulous nor socially conscious, amassed hitherto unim-
aginable private fortunes. Collectively, and hardly affectionately, called robber barons, their 
ranks included names that are still household words, if no longer watch-words, today: Ford and 
Carnegie, Rockefeller and Mellon. At the time these magnates amassed their vast fortunes in 
steel and oil, assembly-line production, and international banking, the state, decidedly Negative 
Liberal, imposed minimum regulation on their profit-making conduct and virtually no control 
over the disposition of their accumulated wealth (SSA, p. 19). To say that these private fortunes 
conferred a considerable say in state policy in these and other matters is to strain understatement 
to the point of self-parody.
The insulation from state interference of these “Captains of Industry” did not depend 
entirely on their direct political influence. They received considerable support from two signifi-
cant sources: mainstream Protestant churches and universities, particularly the newly emerging 
economics departments of those universities R.L. Heilbroner (1972). But, quite significantly, 
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neither church nor academic support was ever unanimous, and, as the effect of essentially 
unregulated capitalism became increasingly apparent, opposition in both churches and universi-
ties increased.
Partly in response to that criticism and its feared effect on public policy, though surely in 
part out of genuine good will, several of the great magnates developed a significant new form 
of private philanthropy, the private foundation. The foundation was to do for private charity 
what the magnates’ soi-disant genius had done for capitalism itself: introduce new levels of scale 
and new methods of scientific management. In the view of these Captains of Industry, just as 
capitalism, before their age of industrial consolidation, had been a wasteful battleground of petty 
competition, so private charity had remained an amateurish, ill-guided social enterprise. Private 
foundations were to change all that. And, to a considerable extent, they did, in two particularly 
important ways: They became, functionally speaking, old-style charities’ consulting firms and 
investment bankers; private foundations’ permanent and increasingly professional staffs gave 
expert advice not only on how best to undertake traditional philanthropic operations like poor 
relief, primary education, and hospital care but also on getting at the roots of traditional prob-
lems like poverty, ignorance, and disease.
And, it has to be noted, many of the giant first-generation private foundations had the 
explicit goal, and all of them the cumulative effect, of performing functions that, as early 
skeptics duly noted, might have been undertaken by a more active state itself. Private founda-
tions were, in theory as well as in effect, the archangels of Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel of Wealth: 
Best to let the titans of industry control not only the making of money but also its ultimate 
direction and distribution (Carnegie, 2017). Some unfortunate souls, to be sure, would fall by 
the wayside, in the happier future as in the less fortunate past. But now, to quote a reluctant 
private philanthropist, fictitious but famous, this decrease of the excess population could be 
seen not as the tragic outworkings of Professor Malthus’s inscrutable mathematics and man-
kind’s manifestly fallen nature but as the social implications of the Reverend Darwin’s acces-
sible insights into the progressive improvement of all surviving species, not excluding Homo 
sapiens.
These assuredly wholesome, if sometimes stern, domestic arrangements had important 
implications for foreign affairs. The Titans of Industry, with their supportive lawyers and policy 
makers, were committed to free international trade and open global markets among nearly 
absolutely sovereign nation-states (once their own nascent industries were safe against older 
industries established elsewhere earlier). Nation-states, as sovereign legal agents, were free to 
regulate their internal affairs as they chose; in their relations with each other, they were to 
keep their borders open to the free movement of goods and capital (though not, significantly, 
labor). Their disputes were to be resolved peaceably, if not by the disputants themselves, then by 
neutral international tribunals they themselves created to apply universal principles of law duti-
fully fashioned by university-based law faculties in a remarkably formalized conceptual system 
(Giovanopoulou, forthcoming, 2021, pp. 11–12).
This story is hard to tell with a completely straight face, and, no matter how one tells it, it 
does not have a surprise ending. It all came crashing down in two watershed events: the Great 
War and the Great Depression. As we look back upon these ruins, we must be careful not to 
commit the post hoc fallacy; indeed, some still assert, in what we must in all charity take to 
be good faith, that unregulated capitalism itself was not a major cause of either the War or the 
Depression. For our purposes, it is enough to note that many observers, then and now, have 
taken quite a different view and acted on those convictions. Their legacy includes, as most rel-
evant here, the Marshall Plan and its direct descendant, the OECD.
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b  The post-war realignments: Positive Liberalism’s ascendancy, 
domestically and internationally
It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no politi-
cal stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or 
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.
(Marshall, 1947)
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
(King, 1963)
In the wake of the global catastrophe of WWII, as the great English Social Democrat R.H. 
Tawney was writing his fellow socially conscious Christians across the Atlantic, other leaders of 
the Western Alliance were laying the foundations of the post-war world order. A cornerstone 
of that order was the Marshall Plan; out of the Marshall Plan, of course, grew the OECD. For 
our purposes, several aspects of that new order are especially salient. We will look first at the 
role of the relevant states, focusing still on the United States and the United Kingdom, then at 
those states’ relationships with three particular institutions: universities, private foundations, and 
Protestant churches.
As in the preceding era of Negative Liberalism in the United States and the United King-
dom, the domestic and foreign policies of the relevant nations were critically linked. The Mar-
shall Planners saw the need to respond militarily to the threat of the Soviet Union. This, quite 
by itself, would require a rebuilding of both the Western Allies and former enemies Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. The Marshall Planners knew this would involve massive infusions of North 
American money, material, and technical assistance; they also knew that this aspect of the Plan 
was a necessary but not sufficient condition.
In addition to ensuring a military response to the Stalinist threat, the Marshall Planners 
believed they had to appeal to the “hearts and minds” of the citizens of then-donee countries, 
the previously industrialized countries, friend and foe, devastated by the war. Again, Tawney’s 
insight is instructive:
[T]he task of reconstruction, both for England and for several of her continental 
neighbors, is more subtle and exacting than the mere reparation of a shattered edifice.
(Tawney, 1964, p. 139)
Tawney and his Marshall Plan allies looked ahead, then, not merely to restoring the pre-War 
domestic arrangements. That regime, they believed, had broken down in two world wars and an 
intervening global economic collapse. Against the backdrop of that failure, the architects of the 
new order worked address the reasons why the old had failed. In persuading the United States 
to join the Allied war effort, Roosevelt had promised freedom from fear (Roosevelt, 1941). 
After the war, any tenant farmer or factory worker might well have known, many from quite 
bitter experience, that what they had to fear along with the Communists in Moscow was not an 
activist government in Washington or Westminster, Paris, or Bonn but the Boss and the Man, 
the Sir and the Seigneur, very much closer to home.
And so, in a fundamental sense, the Marshall Plan was, from the perspective of both spon-
sors in the United States and its participants abroad, an extension of the Roosevelt’s New Deal 
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onto the international stage (Priestland, 2012, p.  156; Giovanopoulou, forthcoming, 2021, 
pp. 13–16). And, as the Cold War with the Soviet Union expanded beyond Eastern Europe 
and into less economically advanced countries outside Europe, particularly in Latin America, 
Africa, and South Asia, the Marshall Planners expanded their basic development program, both 
economic and political, into those areas as well (Machado and Marshall, 2007, Giovanopoulou, 
forthcoming, 2021, p. 25).
Seen through the very useful lens of Social Origins Theory, the Marshall Planners’ new 
world order was far closer to the Positive Liberal, or social democratic, model first established 
in the Nordic countries than to the Negative Liberal model dominant in the United Kingdom 
and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Two aspects of this change from the 
prior period are critical for our analysis. First, for the Positive Liberal direction of the Marshall 
Planners to enjoy the necessary international cooperation of its member countries, it had also to 
have very broad political support within those countries. It did. Second, it did not need to rely 
on private philanthropy in either the design or the implementation of its program, domestically 
or internationally. It did not.
The Positive Liberal ethos of the Marshall Planners was not merely the position of the parties 
of the West’s democratic Left, parties like Labor in the United Kingdom and the Democrats in 
the United States. That ethos also became, in basic outline, the position of center-right parties 
like the Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the Republican Party in the United States. 
(And so, too, it was across Europe the consensus position of not only the moderately leftist 
social democratic parties, but also center-right parties like the Christian Democrats.) Thus, in 
the United States, as one prominent scholar of the period has observed,
Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the [Republican] party had made peace with 
New Deal social provisioning and backed large-scale federal spending on infrastruc-
ture and education. Even as late as the 1970s, President Richard Nixon passed legisla-
tion expanding federal regulatory agencies.
(McGirr, 2021)
This convergence of mainstream political parties toward the social democratic center-left was 
even older and more secure in Britain. Thus, as Tawney noted, in the interwar years, the United 
Kingdom had more than doubled real spending on social programs, mainly under Conservative 
governments (145).
Of equal importance was a parallel development: In both countries, the political position 
of the nineteenth century’s Negative Liberalism had all but collapsed. In the United Kingdom, 
the nominally Liberal Party came apart at the seams (Dangerfield, 2012). In the United States, 
the Republican Party lost the presidency in 1932 and regained it only in 1952. For more than 
a generation after the war, both the Conservative Party and the Republican Party accepted the 
social democratic status quo of the Roosevelt and Attlee years.
A second feature of the new era was, for our purposes, every bit as important. As it was for 
the paradigmatic Social Democratic states in the Social Origins Theory of philanthropy, so it 
was with the corresponding but later phase of Positive Liberalism in American and British poli-
tics: It had no particularly large place for private philanthropy as such. The reason is radically 
significant: The Positive Liberal state is itself actively philanthropic. A chapter title from David 
Owens’s contemporary survey of English philanthropy in this period nicely captures the situa-
tion: Junior Partner in the Welfare Firm (1964, p. 527). And, at least in the early post-war period, 
it seemed that the trend toward less reliance on private philanthropy would continue: “Not only 
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did the State emerge as the predominant partner, but for a time there was grave doubt as to what 
might be left for its older but now junior associate” (p. 526).
A closer look, however, reveals that there was quite a lot. The Marshall Planners’ broad 
political consensus, it is important to note, rested on a social consensus that was equally broad 
and quite likely even deeper. And this social consensus included, quite critically, two particu-
lar kinds of traditionally philanthropic organizations, universities and churches, as well as that 
newer innovation, the private foundation.
Take the oldest, the churches, first. The academic leadership of mainstream Protestant 
denominations in the United States was solidly behind the New Deal and the Marshall Plan – 
when not ahead of them. And these mainstream denominations – Presbyterians, Episcopalians, 
Congregationalists, Lutherans, and, increasingly, Methodists  – insisted that their clergy hold 
graduate-level university degrees, which their academic leadership, through its professional 
organization, hoped to make the norm in other prominent denominations as well (as it had 
long been, of course, in the Catholic communion) (Niebuhr et al., 1957, p. 203). The leader-
ship of the Catholic Church was considerably slower in accepting secular liberalism in politics, 
but it was at least equally reluctant to embrace laissez-faire liberalism in economics (Leo XIII, 
1891). And the Catholic laity in the United States, particularly those of the urban working class, 
became essential constituents of the New Deal coalition (until, in the next period, that coali-
tion turned further left on social as well as economic issues, particularly abortion and same-sex 
marriage).
Even as the academic elite of Protestants in the United States supported social democratic 
programs, so those programs drew heavily from universities for both their inspiration and their 
implementation. Felix Frankfurter at Harvard Law School was a particular significant “talent 
scout” before Roosevelt elevated him to the Supreme Court (and almost certainly afterward) 
(Urofsky, 1991, p. 62). Nor were elite private Eastern universities like Harvard the sole, perhaps 
even the principal, source of intellectual talent. The great public universities of the West and 
South also provided both ideas and leadership. When George Marshall himself announced what 
was to be his namesake plan at Harvard, one of the premier private universities in the United 
States, he spoke as a graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, a university founded and funded 
by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Far more of the United States military officer corps were 
graduates of the nation’s own military academies. And the same, of course, was true in the 
United Kingdom as well.
This relationships among the Positive Liberal state, the mainstream Protestant churches, and 
the universities had an equally important additional dimension: It was deep as well as broad. 
The academic elites of the movement were, for both practical and theoretical reasons, reticent 
about the ultimate foundations of their political faith. But they were quite clear that, secular 
though many among them certainly were, their basic values were quite compatible with those 
of their more traditionally religious allies, if not the very same. Tawney was, famously, promi-
nent in the leadership of both social democrats and socially progressive Christians (Sifton, 2003, 
pp. 198–199). Among the latter, it was the daughter of the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr who 
paid him perhaps the highest compliment: “Tawney is my idea of a really effective Christian, 
not least because he never talked about being one” (Ibid.).
Another example captures the Marshall Planners’ ecumenical spirit even more nicely. Jerome 
Frank was one of the more prominent, as well as one of the more theoretically radical, of the 
New Dealers, first as a Harvard law professor, then as a federal judge. And yet, when pressed 
on what his basic values were, he replied, “I do not understand how any decent man today can 
refuse to adopt, as the basis of any modern civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural 
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Law, relative to human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas” (Frank, 1963, p. xx). Thus the 
most secular of Positive Liberals had no trouble reconciling their political principles with those 
of the most orthodox doctor of the Catholic Church.
The relationship between private foundations and the post-war Marshall Plan consensus 
was less significant than that of either churches or universities. It was, however, profoundly 
significant in comparison with what had gone before, in the era of the Negative Liberal state’s 
original ascendancy and even more significant in comparison with what was to come after, the 
era of the Negative Liberal state’s revival. All the major foundations, even those founded and 
funded by laissez-faire proponents like Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, eventually espoused, 
even advanced, an essentially state-supportive role. Ironically, the namesake foundations of the 
Captains of Industry, established as bulwarks against the Positive Liberal state, came to be an 
important part of its vanguard: seeking out new areas of human need for it to enter, providing 
“seed money” until it got there. (And, as we shall see, later acting as “stop-gaps” when it left.) 
This was equally true of their counterparts in the United Kingdom (Owen, 1964, p. 553).
This new role of the great private foundations as vanguards of the newly activist, Positive 
Liberal state points us, finally, to a most significant aspect of that state’s political leaders: They 
were both democrats and leaders but only in very distinctive meanings of those two words. 
They rallied their electorates behind policies that they themselves believed were for the com-
mon good; they were, if you will, modern democrats in practical politics but neo-classical 
republicans in political ideology. To paraphrase Lincoln, a real as well as nominal republican, 
they practiced government “for the people,” and they mastered enough of the common touch 
to make it seem as “of the people” as necessary. But they took “by the people” as better politics 
than policy. They had seen the direst dangers of demagoguery; they were interested neither in 
following the angry mob down dark paths that end in “blood and soil” populism nor in leading 
the tractably gullible into schemes that could only benefit their promoters’ own narrow class 
or partisan interest. They were too wise to preach the rule of the wise for the good of all; they 
were too good not to practice it.
The achievements, domestic and foreign, of the post-war center-left coalitions within and 
among the Marshall Plan’s donor and donee nations call to mind Thucydides’ observation about 
democratic Athens under Pericles:
In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the 
first citizen. With his successors it was different.
(Thucydides, Crawley and Gavorse, 1951, pp. 120–121)
As classical Athens passed from Pericles to Cleon the tanner and Alcibiades the turn-coat, so, 
alas, the Positive Liberalism of the Marshall Planners would have its own populist epigones.
c  The recrudescence of Negative Liberalism: the tragi-comic  
third act in three scenes
History repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.
(Marx and De Leon, 1898)
Even as Tawney and his counterparts early in the post-war period championed the path of 
Positive Liberalism and the Marshall Plan, they knew there were other paths ahead, ways that 
looked back to very different traditions. Two of these troubled them the most: on the one hand, 
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Soviet-style totalitarian communism; on the other, Anglo-American-style laissez-faire capital-
ism, our Negative Liberalism. The Marshall Planners and their fellow Positive Liberals held the 
middle ground – I daresay the high ground – for the better part of four decades.
By the last decade of the twentieth century, the threat from the radical “Left,” Soviet Com-
munism, was collapsing. In 1989, the Berlin Wall, symbol of the Soviet threat that the Marshall 
Plan had initially anticipated, had fallen. But by then, the threat from the radical right was 
already looming large. At the beginning of the prior decade, the Anglo-American form of 
laissez-faire capitalism and negative Political Liberalism returned with what can only be called a 
vengeance. Ronald Reagan was elected US president in 1980; his political soul-mate, Margaret 
Thatcher, had been elected UK prime minister the year before. The epigraphs to their era, 
which we must take up next, can only offer an aftertaste of that bitter revanchism.
i. The Reagan-Thatcher Negative Liberal counter-revolution
The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the Government, 
and I’m here to help.
(Reagan, 1986)
They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there’s no such thing 
as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no 
government can do anything except through people, and people must look after 
themselves first.
(Thatcher, 1987)
Both Reagan and Thatcher were too nearly two-dimensional characters to be classically tragic 
figures themselves; Reagan quite literally became a public figure through the medium of the 
movie screen, in roles that were, themselves, decidedly flat.2 The tragedy repeated first in the 
scene they shared was not personal but institutional, a repeat of the old Negative Liberalism of 
the Gilded Age with which our historical survey, following Social Origins Theory’s account of 
the role of private philanthropy in the United States and the United Kingdom, began.
We need only review the main script in mercifully brief outline. Under Reagan and Thatch-
er’s remarkably charismatic leadership, majorities in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom voted to dismantle the three basic domestic pillars of the Marshall Planners’ Positive 
Liberal ethos: aggressive state regulation to keep capitalism both efficient and competitive, gen-
erous social programs to alleviate misery and promote opportunity, and aggressively progressive 
taxation to fund both of the other two.
A key component of Reaganism and Thatcherism’s success was raising social over economic 
issues as a means of splitting the core coalitions of both the New Deal and the Labor Party: set-
ting working-class people against Positively Liberal, often university-based, intellectuals. Both 
Reagan and Thatcher preached a decidedly old-fashioned brand of self-reliance, even as they 
caricatured the beneficiaries of the welfare state as idlers (Reaganism’s “welfare queens”) and 
the agents of the welfare state as elitist meddlers (Thatcherism’s “nanny state”). In international 
affairs, both Reagan and Thatcher defended, even redoubled, the NATO opposition to the 
Soviet Union and generally pressed for the traditional Negative Liberal line on unregulated 
trade, even as they more quietly reduced support for the OECD’s global development goals.
With respect to private philanthropy, both Reaganism and Thatcherism preached a return to 
the model of the Negative Liberal state that, as we have seen, Social Origins Theory identifies 
as characteristic of the modern state’s first phase in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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This involved important shifts in the relationship between the state and the three institutions on 
which we have been focusing: churches, universities, and especially private foundations.
Churches were critical in shifting the attention of working-class voters, the basis of both 
the Labor Party and the New Deal Democratic coalition, away from economic issues and onto 
social issues. This generally involved divisions within Protestant denominations and the Catholic 
Church as much as between them. Mainstream Protestant denominations with traditions of uni-
versity-educated clergy tended to divide along urban/rural and higher-income/lower-income 
lines; other Protestant denominations remained divided along lines of both class and race. And, 
especially after Vatican II, Catholics tended to divide into traditionalists and progressives.
The most interesting development for our purposes was the role of private foundations. The 
older flagship foundations – Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, for example – continued their 
post-war supporting role in the Positive Liberal political consensus. A new generation joined 
them in that general political orientation, but with a critical difference: They saw themselves 
less as leading the welfare state into new areas and filling gaps in areas of critical need until the 
state arrived. Instead, the newer positively liberal foundations tended to take that role as per-
manent. This is nicely reflected in Bill Gates’s response to a question about the role of private 
foundations, a question prefaced by the implication that more of his wealth might better have 
gone into the hands of the Positive Liberal state:
[w]e think there’s always going to be a unique role for foundations. They’re able to 
take a global view to find the greatest needs, take a long-term approach to solving 
tough problems and manage high-risk projects that governments can’t take on and 
corporations won’t.
(Gates, AP News, 2018)
Among private foundations engaged in international development, the Gates Foundation has 
accounted for very nearly half the private funding (OECD, 2018, p. 16). Here is a voice very 
likely to be listened to. And perhaps listened to too intently, as the OECD has itself commend-
ably noted (PPD at 96) and pointed out to donor states (PPD at 96). Surely the Marshall Planners 
would have balked at the “conventional wisdom” of the Gates generation of private foundations: 
The Positive Liberal State is too parochial, too short sighted, and too risk averse for major projects.
At risk of belaboring the obvious, two further points bear emphasis here. First, and most 
obviously, it is hard to imagine a project bigger than that of re-building Europe after World War 
II, even as it is inconceivable that such a project might have been funded by private philanthropy. 
Nor, as we have seen, did the Marshall Planners find themselves reliant upon private philanthropy 
either to show them the strategic, global perspective or to provide them with the necessary tac-
tical, boots-on-the-ground expertise. Second, it only takes a glance at the OECD’s impressive 
statistical survey to see how large big private foundations in general, and the Gates Foundation in 
particular, now figure in the funding and implementation of projects that the Marshall Planners 
would surely have thought to be within the proper purview of states and their agencies, particu-
larly interstate institutions like the OECD itself, and allied universities, public as well as private.
Nor, with respect to private foundations, is that the most notable departure from the pattern 
of the Marshall Planners. As Positively Liberal foundations like Gates seemed ready to displace 
the work of the state with their own, a new brand of Negative Liberal foundations arose to chal-
lenge the very ethos of the Marshall Planners themselves. It is difficult to summarize this vital 
phase of the relevant history without sounding at least a little like something of a conspiracy 
theorist. To redress that problem fully would require providing far more detail than appropriate 
here. A very brief outline must suffice, backed with references to long and deeply documented 
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accounts (Andersen, 2020; Mayer, 2017). Newly minted billionaires essentially retro-engi-
neered the work of the post-war private foundations: They funded populist movements like the 
Tea Party, they promoted the social agenda of more Negatively Liberal Christians, and, perhaps 
most significantly, they fostered an alternative intellectual establishment of Negative Liberalism, 
particularly in law and economics.
For our purposes, the point is this: These new Negative Liberal foundations did not mean 
to be partners in advancing the Positive Liberal ethos of the Marshall Planners; they meant to 
destroy that ethos, root and branch. Here we have, then, a particularly important example in 
very recent history of a more general point long ago announced in theory: When it comes to 
philanthropy’s core mission of advancing the public good, opinions can be not only divergent 
as to the best means but even diametrically opposed on the end itself.
ii The interlude of Neo-Liberalism lite: the Negative Liberal consolidation 
of the Clinton-Blair “New Left”
The era of big government is over, but we cannot go back to the time when our citi-
zens were left to fend for themselves.
(Clinton, 1996)
One has to say that, for better or worse, President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher were 
charismatic leaders with the courage of their convictions. One also has to say that, surely for 
the worst, President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, if almost their predecessors’ equals in 
charisma, seem considerably less graced with either courage or conviction. Their political home 
bases, more inherited than chosen, were on the port side of Positive Liberalism; the timing of 
their political ascendancy made them tack, reluctantly or not, rather far toward the starboard side 
of Negative Liberalism. This is not the place to say whether their tacks were motivated more by 
the felt need to keep their parties from totally floundering or by their own overweening personal 
ambition to sail first past the farthest political post, leadership positions in their respective parties 
and countries. The fuller record, suffice it to say, speaks quite loudly enough for itself.
What matters here is that, in matters of both economic regulation and wealth redistribution, 
the rightward trim of Clinton and Blair’s rigging helped both to consolidate and to legitimate the 
Reagan-Thatcher Negative Liberal counter-revolution against the United States and the United 
Kingdom’s generation-long commitment to the Positive Liberalism of the Marshall Planners.
iii The denouement of Donald Trump and Boris Johnson: illiberal 
democracy in the lands of the Marshall Plan
For they sow the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.
(Hosea 8:7)
The minimalist, negative liberal state dominant in both the United States and the United King-
dom at the turn of the twentieth century first repeated itself, as we have seen, in the tragedy, 
at least in philanthropic terms, of the Reagan and Thatcher years. The rich got richer, and 
the poor poorer. We now have its farcical second repetition, the triumph of Trumpism in the 
United States and Brexitism in the United Kingdom, the rejection of the ethos of the Mar-
shall Planners. As we have seen, Reaganism and Thatcherism quietly abandoned President 
Roosevelt’s pre-War promise to end fear and want everywhere on the globe, abroad as well as 
at home. But Reagan and Thatcher carefully kept intact two other elements of that ethos, those 
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most important to their wealthy patrons: opposition to the Soviet Union and expansion of free 
trade (again, in goods and capital, not in labor).
President Trump infamously campaigned on the slogan of the very isolationists who opposed 
the United States’ opposition to the Axis Powers: America First! He openly admires former KGB 
agent Putin, even as he openly questions the continued utility of the NATO alliance, bringing 
the embrace of Marshall Plan foes and the abandonment of its friends together in a musing once 
unimaginable for a president of the United States: Why would we defend tiny Estonia against a 
Russian invasion? (Kramer, 2016). Reagan famously demanded that Gorbachev tear down the 
Berlin War, symbol of Soviet occupation; Trump virtually invites Putin to move it further West. 
And President Trump both actively promoted protective tariffs and openly favored bilateral 
trade agreements over regional economic integration and multilateral free trade arrangements; 
this latter position, with the prospect of a special U.S./UK trade relationship, was a major selling 
point of Boris Johnson and the Brexiteers.
In Trump and Johnson, those who worked to reverse the ethos of the Marshall Planners have 
become the victims of their own success. With barely disguised “blood and soil” populism, they 
lured rank-and-file voters out of the Labor Party’s worker-intellectual alliance and New Deal’s 
economically progressive coalition and into parties that preached social conservatism while 
practicing plutocracy. Then the establishment of those very parties lost control of the beast they 
had waken and ridden to power; the angry body of populist voters turned on the neo-liberals 
themselves – the Republicans in the United States and the Conservatives in the United King-
dom – and the unholy alliance of plutocrats and populists ripped along its unseemly seam.
Hardly the least obvious element of this farce: In the United States, the populist leader was 
a self-proclaimed billionaire; in the United Kingdom, the product of the public school and 
Oxbridge establishment.
d Unpacking the final paradox: Marshall Planners’ ends,  
Fabius’s means
For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring 
against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you 
must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain, and fruitless.
(Fabians.org.uk, 2010)
I know the comments that some people will make on our Fabian conduct. . . . But 
the more discerning, I trust, will not find it difficult to conceive that it proceeds from 
the truest policy.
(Alexander Hamilton, quoted in Ricks, 2020, p. 154)
Against this background, we can now unpack the final paradox we noted at the beginning. This, 
remember, was the paradox: In its suggestion that policy makers may want to support private 
philanthropy with public finances, particularly favorable tax treatment, the EOCD Report does 
not go far enough in its own direction. This is the unpacking: The Report goes no further, 
because the way is blocked. In the ethos of the Marshall Planners, private philanthropy played 
no essential part. Their vision of global peace and prosperity, of universal economic and social 
justice, was to be the work of Positive Liberal, social democratic states, at home and abroad – 
independently if necessary, cooperatively if possible.
When Positive Liberalism lost the United States and the United Kingdom to a Negative 
Liberalism that was both isolationist and anti-statist, then private philanthropy, especially the 
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great private foundations, seemed an essential, if stop-gap, source for even the most basic work 
of organizations like the OECD itself (OECD, 2018, p. 29). In the candid words of the OECD,
As the ambitious priorities of the Sustainable Development Goals [for 2030] come 
face-to-face with limited economic resources exacerbated by the 2007 financial crisis, 
the time is ripe to harness the promise of philanthropy.
(Ibid., p. 3)
This reliance on private philanthropy is a decidedly second-best solution, a distant and dim 
reflection of the Positive Liberal ethos of the Marshall Planners. The OECD’s own report, Pri-
vate Philanthropy for Development, bears sad testimony to the novelty of this departure:
Several major declarations on global development policy and financing were endorsed 
between 2000 and 2010, including the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2005 Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. None mentioned philanthropy as a 
development actor or as a source of finance.
OECD/ PPD at 93–94 (emphasis added)
Still and all, half a loaf is better than no bread – and today it is real loaves and literal starvation 
that all too often measure the success and failure of global development. In these dark times, it is 
good policy not to bite any hand that feeds the hungry3 – even hands that would keep the hun-
gry on very short rations indeed, as they help themselves to the lion’s share of social resources. 
But, even in dark times, it is wisest to work for better days, when – claiming no originality 
here! – the wise rule, as they did in the West in the wake of World War II, for the good of all.
And this day may be dawning even now. In the words of Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate in 
economics,
For the lesson of 2020 is that in a crisis, and to some extent even in calmer times, the 
government can do a lot to improve people’s lives. And what we should fear most is a 
government that refuses to do its job.
(Krugman, 2020)4
Conclusion: what is to be done now?
I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for 
their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom 
for their spirits.
(King, 1964)
One cannot help but be at least a little hopeful, as we enter the first hundred days of President 
Biden’s administration, to learn that his role model is Franklin Roosevelt. Then again, one can-
not but be a bit leery of the aspiration’s likely fulfillment. It calls to mind the response of the 
Archbishop of York to the remark that “what we need are a few more people like Tawney”: 
“There are no more men like Tawney” (Gaitskell, 1964, pp. 211, 214).
It would be immodest, if not worse, to think of ourselves as agents of philanthropy, lovers of 
humankind, on the order of the Marshall Planners, much less that of their leaders, humanitarian 
heroes like Roosevelt, Tawney, and Marshall himself. Then again, we would do well to remem-
ber that we may stand on their very shoulders and, so standing, see even further and clearer than 
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they could. So, too, we may build upon the foundations they and their fellow laborers have laid. 
And we would do well to remember words in which they themselves must have taken comfort, 
in their time, a time far more fraught than even our own:
Therefore, since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us also lay 
aside every weight and sin that easily distracts, and let us run with perseverance the 




 My thanks to Kat Klepfer of the F.S.U. College of Law Research Center and Peter Meisenbacher 
(F.S.U., J.D. 2022) for their invaluable research assistance. My thanks, too, to my editors for allowing 
me to post on SSRN, under the same title and with the same text, a version of this chapter that lets me 
indulge United States law academics’ over-fondness for fulsome footnotes.
 1 The Report follows Social Origins Theory itself in using the terms “social democratic” and “liberal.” In 
view of the different meanings of “liberal” in the United States and the rest of the world and the sadly 
negative connotations of “social democracy” in the United States, I will use instead the terms “Nega-
tive Liberal” and “Positive Liberal,” respectively. Positive liberty as used here actually comes closer to a 
third alternative, republican liberty. See Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 16–21.
 2 Perhaps most fittingly, in Bedtime for Bonzo, he played second fiddle to a show-stealing chimpanzee.
 3 It has to be noted – yet again, very much to its credit – that, although the OECD seems never to bite, 
it has shown an admirable willingness to bark, sometimes rather insistently. Thus, in its OECD PPD, it 
offers a number of recommendations to donor foundations that are a long way from obsequious. PPD 
at 116–119 (“Recommendations for Foundations”). And, as we have already seen, the OECD has also 
pointed out to donor nations the need to address the risk of giving too much influence to a relatively 
small number of mostly North American donor foundations. PPD at 120.
 4 And yet, even as I thus reconcile myself with my hosts, do I not pose a final, perhaps fatal, paradox? 
In highlighting our common commitment to the Positive Liberal vision of the Marshall Planners, do 
I not risk undermining that very position? In articulating our shared commitment to Positive Liberal 
State action as the first-best solution to humanity’s largest problems, and private philanthropy a distant 
second, am I not playing into the very hands that would denounce us all as “socialists” and “internation-
alists”? For my response, which requires a bit of an excursion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see the Appendix 
to the version of this chapter posted on SSNR, note 1, supra.
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WHY FISCALLY ENCOURAGE 
PHILANTHROPY? 
Analyzing discourses and issues of political 
actors who legislate on philanthropy in 
Switzerland
Caroline Honegger, Romain Carnac, Philip Balsiger  
and Alexandre Lambelet
Introduction1
Philanthropy, that is, the giving of money (or time) for public purposes, is often co-financed 
by public authorities through tax exemptions to the benefit of public utility organizations 
and donors. Philanthropy is thus not only a social practice but also as a public policy tool 
(Steinmo, 1986; McDaniel, 1989; Salamon, 1989; Howard, 1993) whose development and 
support by public authorities has been the subject of much controversy (Brilliant, 2000; 
McGravie, 2003; Reich, 2018; Zunz, 2011). Studies have shown that the institutional 
underpinnings of philanthropy vary depending on different non-profit regimes (Salamon 
and Anheiner, 1998; Salamon and Toepler, 2000; Layton, 2015); at the same time, a trend 
towards increased public and fiscal encouragement of philanthropy has been observed in 
many countries (Lambelet, 2014).
Charities and their advocates agree on the importance of fiscal incentives to promote 
donations (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; Layton, 2015), but there are vivid debates about 
the economic effectiveness of incentives and their legitimacy from a democratic point of 
view (OECD, 2020). Many studies, in particular by economists, have analyzed whether 
tax exemptions are more or less efficient than direct subsidies and whether fiscal incen-
tives crowd out other forms of giving (Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009; Bakija and Heim, 
2011; Lideikyte Huber, 2020; Monnet and Panizza, 2017). Other authors have discussed 
tax exemptions’ legitimacy in terms of justice, revealing the problem of the potential non-
alignment between the beneficiaries of donations and the goals of public policies (McDaniel, 
1989), as well as the effects that tax exemptions may have on the democratic functioning of 
countries, in particular because of the plutocratic bias linked to exemption systems (Thaler, 
2010; Reich, Cordelli and Bernholz, 2016; Leat, 2016; Reich, 2018; Saez and Zucman, 
2019; Cagé, 2020).
Yet while political philosophers have discussed the possible justifications or rationales of fiscal 
incentives for philanthropy and philanthropic giving (Benshalom, 2008; Reich, 2018), there are 
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few empirical studies looking at how political actors justify the use of fiscal tools to encourage 
philanthropy. How do they conceive of the role of philanthropy, and what arguments do they 
use to justify the legal and tax treatment that governs it? Taking Switzerland as a case study, 
this chapter opens this ‘black box’ in order to know more about the motivational dynamics 
of increasing (or not) tax expenditures for charitable giving and volunteering and widening the 
boundaries of what is recognized as being of public interest and should benefit from tax incen-
tives. Since political actors are the ones who make the legislation that governs philanthropic 
practices and decide on the tax exemptions from which these organizations and donations may 
or may not benefit, it is crucial to question these actors in order to understand the place of 
philanthropy today.
Through a qualitative study of 48 interviews with Swiss political actors (parliamentar-
ians and members of cantonal executive bodies), the chapter analyzes how these actors 
problematize philanthropy2 and decide on the legislative developments that should frame it. 
Switzerland’s non-profit regime can be characterized as ‘liberal’ (Helmig et al., 2017) or as 
between a liberal and social-democratic model (Schnurbein and Perez, 2018), with a large 
third sector, large subsidies from public authorities (Helmig, Lichtsteiner and Gmür, 2010), 
deductible donations for donors and a broad eligibility for organizations (Lideikyte Huber, 
2018).3 In comparison with other countries (European Foundation Center, 2015), not all 
non-profit organizations are tax exempt and can benefit from tax-deductible donations: 
Sports clubs or self-help organizations are excluded. And although philanthropic organiza-
tions have to be registered officially, no further public reporting obligations exist. Since 
the early 2000s, there have been a few important reform proposals, most aiming at further 
liberalization (to broaden the type of organizations that can benefit from the recognition 
of public utility, to fiscally support volunteering or to increase tax incentives for dona-
tions) but some also seeking to increase the transparency of philanthropic organizations. 
In this context of a liberal regime, we found that to speak about the fiscal encouragement 
of philanthropy, political actors’ reasons for supporting philanthropy are diverse and refer 
to very different realities of philanthropic organizations. The analysis identifies five ways 
of framing philanthropy: civic, liberal, pragmatic, wary and critical. We also see, however, 
that while political actors draw on different rationales and frame the issue differently, argu-
ments related to the efficiency of philanthropic giving are most commonly used to justify 
fiscal incentives.
The next two sections detail the theoretical framework and the methodological approach 
used in this chapter. The following empirical part proceeds in two steps: A first part presents 
the arguments used by political actors and groups them into four rationales they refer to. A sec-
ond part analyzes the interviews to develop a typology of five frames Swiss political actors use 
when speaking about philanthropy and tax exemptions. Because we have observed that these 
frames are linked with the experiences of the third sector the political actors have, we will 
discuss the link between their way of framing the issue and the positions they have in the third 
sector and as political actors.
Conceptual framework: rationales, frames and arguments
Approaches on philanthropy by political philosophers have shown different rationales, that is 
to say ‘higher common principles,’ that can be viewed as ensembles of higher-order meanings 
people (including political actors) have to deal with (for example, in a democracy: liberty 
or equality). In his theoretical and philosophical work on philanthropy, Benshalom (2008) 
Honegger, Carnac, Balsiger and Lambelet
40
identifies two rationales for the deductibility of donations: 1) they encourage more and/or 
better spending of public goods; 2) they are desirable because they allow taxpayers to ‘vote 
with their dollars’ and to express their preferences regarding the allocation of public goods in 
society. More recently, Reich (2013, 2018) distinguished three rationales: 1) a ‘tax base ration-
ale’ that stems from the principle that donations for public-interest organizations are voluntary 
means of giving up part of one’s income for the public good. Consequently, this donation 
should not be taxed. 2) An ‘efficiency rationale’ based on the idea that the state can encour-
age philanthropic activity in order to stimulate the production of collective goods of greater 
social value than those that the state alone can produce. 3) A ‘pluralism rationale’; In this argu-
ment, the tax exemption is justified by its role in the promotion of a diversified, pluralist and 
decentralized third sector, the basis of a liberal democracy. This argument also contends that 
pluralism, while decentralizing political decision-making, also favors the emergence of new 
and innovative solutions.
These rationales are interesting for understanding the kind of conceptual debates in which 
philanthropy is caught. But they tell us little about how political actors respond concretely 
to proposals for legislative or tax changes that surround the issue of philanthropy. Coming 
out of theoretical debates, this chapter goes one step further to study the concrete frames the 
political actors who make the laws governing philanthropy use. Following a constructivist 
approach in the field of social problems research, we want to study, in this chapter, the more 
specific frames (Goffman, 1974; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Reese, Gandy and Grant, 
2001) political actors use concretely when they have to speak on philanthropy. Frames are 
articulations of arguments that can be drawn from the different rationales and that shape the 
meaning individuals give to the problems they face. Frames can be linked with rationales, 
but it is the arrangement or hierarchy of the elements drawn from the latter that makes dif-
ferent frames specific and that promote particular definitions of legitimacy or conceptions 
of the common good. If the frames are different from the rationales identified by political 
philosophy works, it is because, for political actors, philanthropy does not exist outside – or 
is not thought of independently of – particular conceptions of the state, taxation or the func-
tioning of democracy. They do not think of philanthropy as an isolated phenomenon but 
read philanthropy together with other questions that also involve the place of the state or the 
equality between citizens.
We thus have to look at the arguments used by the political actors during the interviews, at 
the pros and cons of tax incentives in favor of philanthropy or the pros and cons of the enlarge-
ment of the type of organizations that can benefit from them. Doing so, we use an inductive 
approach to identify the rationales political actors rely on in their arguments. We then study 
how political actors combine different arguments and standards of evaluation in order to pro-
duce frames. Constructivist approaches in the field of social problems research have shown how 
different actors frame problems and public policies in different ways (Best, 2008). We see frames 
as a ‘central organizing idea (. . .) for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue’ 
(Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). They are at the center of ‘interpretative packages’ that 
‘give meaning to an issue’ (ibid.). In other words, frames as interpretative packages combine 
different elements – arguments referring to different rationales, representations of the respec-
tive role of the state and civil society, views of the policy-making process, conceptions of the 
public interest, and so on – in a specific way. Using this type of analysis, our goal is to uncover 
the different interpretative packages underlying discourses on philanthropy in a liberal welfare 
state like Switzerland.
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Methods and data
Using the term ‘public utility’ in the search engines of the parliaments at the federal level and 
in three cantons,4 we have listed the proposals for reform of tax exemptions for philanthropy 
over the period from 2000 until 2018, that is, 39 interventions at the federal level and the 
same number at the cantonal level for the three cantons. They concern themes as varied as the 
thresholds of deductibility of donations to philanthropic organizations, the calling into question 
of fiscal advantages for major sports federations, the opportunity to permit volunteers to enjoy 
tax reductions, the improvement of Switzerland’s attractiveness in the sector of philanthropy, the 
recognition of the public interest of cultural organizations or of political parties, the possibility 
of spreading an exceptional donation over a number of fiscal years and the fight against tax fraud 
and money laundering in non-governmental organizations. Since these themes have a common 
denominator of questioning the definition of philanthropy and the fiscal and legal framework 
from which it must benefit, debates on these different parliamentary objects were incorporated 
into the body of the research.
On the basis of this data, we identified the political actors who played a leading role, 
either because they made an intervention or participated significantly in political debates or 
because, at this point in time, they occupied a key position (president or vice-president of 
the tax commission, state councilor in charge of the Department of Finance, etc.). Of the 88 
individuals thus identified, 48 responded favorably to our interview request. They belong to 
different bodies, political formations and cantons. With these political actors, we conducted 
semi-directive interviews, following a single grid, for a period of time ranging from 40 min-
utes to 3 hours. In the grid, we focused on discussing the intervention they were involved in 
and asked more general questions about philanthropy and tax exemption policies. In a first 
step, we used content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004) to list all the arguments given in favor of 
or against tax exemptions. We then analyzed this list to identify what underlying rationales 
they build upon. This led us to class them into four groups. In a second step, we analyzed 
the interviews internally and in comparison with each other to characterize the way each 
interviewee frames philanthropy. In this step, we intersected discursive data on arguments 
and opinions given by interviewees with elements objectifying their personal trajectories 
and political, professional and community engagements. This led us to the development of a 
typology around five interpretative frames, related to different views of philanthropy.
Arguments for and against tax incentives for philanthropy: 
underlying rationales
Interviewing political actors on the theme of tax incentives for philanthropy first led to aston-
ishment at the great diversity of their remarks: Not only do their positions and arguments differ, 
but they rarely speak about the same object. Nonetheless, there are some recurring themes in 
the discourse. The systematic coding of the interview transcripts allowed us to extract argument 
types which point at four distinct categories. Each of these categories evaluates the tax measures 
supporting philanthropy in light of a different rationale: The first category assesses the measures 
discussed from the point of view of (fiscal) justice, the second evaluates their efficiency, the third 
takes democracy as a frame of reference and the last judges them through the prism of virtue. 
The left side of Figure 2.1 lists the arguments identified and the rationale they refer to. For each 
of these categories, we illustrate the layout of themes and arguments, with an emphasis on some 
salient tendencies amongst the interviews.
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Justice
The donation is another way to pay one’s taxes: through directly supporting social goods that the state 
will not be financing.
The normal taxation system is ‘confiscatory’; unfair; anything that allows one to ease the burden is  
good.
Deductions are not fair because they advantage certain taxpayers (the more fortunate ones).
Deductions may be diverted from their original purpose and used as an instrument of fiscal 
optimizations.
Efficiency
It is in the state’s interest to maximize the volume of donations to philanthropic organizations/one has to 
look for the money where it can be found.
Incentives are effective in increasing the number and the size of donations.
Philanthropic organizations are less expensive than state services in certain domains, especially thanks to 
volunteer work.
Philanthropic organizations are more effective, more reactive, closer to the grassroots than state services 
in certain domains.
The state, on its own, lacks the means to provide all the public and social services desired.
It is necessary to put forward a system of advantageous tax deductions to be more attractive than rival 
cantons/countries.
Certain social problems cannot be resolved by philanthropy since they are not very visible or evoke little 
sympathy.
Tax deductions tend to aggravate inequalities in preventing redistribution.
Deductions generate major fiscal losses; they empty state coffers.
Virtue
It is fair that those who give to good causes be recompensed/thanked by the collectivity.
The role of the state is to recognize, highlight and recompense virtuous behavior.
A donation is never disinterested; one always receives in return psychological, symbolic or social 
gratification.
It is immoral or antisocial to not pay taxes; the principle of universality of taxation is symbolically 
important and must be respected.
Democracy
The tax incentive is a means to support the dynamism of the third sector/civil society/private initiatives, 
which are good in themselves.
The deductibility of donations gives decision-making power to citizens, who ‘vote for projects’; this is a 
mechanism of direct democracy.
It is not desirable that the state concentrate all the decision-making power and means of implementing 
social policies in its own hands.
Philanthropic organizations escape democratic control; their actions are not controlled or are 
insufficiently controlled by political authorities.
Figure 2.1 Collection of arguments according to rationales and types of framing
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Justice
The tax exemption for philanthropy is generally presented as obvious by Swiss politicians: ‘it 
would be ‘completely absurd and . . . scandalous to work not for profit and then have to pay 
taxes’ (Interviewee 28, VE).5 Similarly, it would be unfair to pay taxes on money which one had 
given away: ‘the people who give this away no longer have this money in their own bag’ (Inter-
viewee 42, PEV). This perspective, which comes back to what Reich (2013) calls ‘tax-base 
rationale’, considers that, for the donation affecting the tax base, the latter must be calculated 
after the donation and not before. Finally, the donation often seems like another means of pay-
ing one’s taxes, since one is financing social goods that the state will not then have to finance. 
Therefore, the focus is the equitable treatment of the donor; it would not be fair to make some-
one pay tax on a sum of money given to a public-interest organization.
The rationale of fiscal justice as it appears in the Swiss political discourse contains further 
arguments: For instance, some politicians see tax incentives for philanthropy simply as a means 
of providing tax relief: ‘the more we can lower it, the better’ (Interviewee 18, PLR) and ‘the 
state’s appetite for taxes is exaggerated’ (Interviewee 31, UDC). Other politicians use arguments 
referring to fiscal justice to criticize fiscal advantages. To them, deductions are an instrument of 
fiscal optimization, and the donation becomes ‘a means to avoid taxes,’ especially for the ‘ultra-
rich’ (Interviewee 29, PDC). Some politicians also emphasize that the risk of creating unfair 
situations is increased by the fact that deductions, due to the role of progressive tax rates, benefit 
the wealthiest taxpayers more.
Efficiency
The second rationale identified roughly overlaps with what Reich calls ‘subsidy rationale’. 
Here, the idea is that the state encourages philanthropic activity in order to stimulate the pro-
duction of a collective good of greater social value than if the state alone had done this. The 
encouragement is thus effective in promoting the public good; what matters is the impact of the 
donation. This argument is part of the classic critique of government, especially advanced by 
proponents of new public management, who see the public sector as being slow, bureaucratic 
and unresponsive to the needs of its beneficiaries, as opposed to the private sector, which is 
closer to the people, more reactive and more results oriented.
The efficiency rationale as it appears in the Swiss political discourse on philanthropic organi-
zations covers a wide range of arguments, which all converge on the objective of maximizing 
the quantity and quality of services delivered for the least possible cost to the state. Efficiency 
refers to two different notions (Monnet and Panizza, 2017): treasury efficiency (purely from a 
budgetary perspective, measured by comparing the amounts foregone by the public treasury 
due to deductions and the amounts of donations to public-interest organizations due to this fis-
cal encouragement) and social efficiency (which cross-references the loss of fiscal tax revenues for 
the state, the quality of social goods produced and the cost to the state if it had had to produce 
them). These two dimensions of efficiency can be found in the discourse of political actors: 
Thus, one can distinguish, on the one hand, the arguments which proceed from a budgetary 
rationale and those which relate to the effectiveness of tax incentives in financing public-interest 
organizations and, on the other hand, those bearing on the efficiency of these organizations 
themselves, that is, their capacity to deliver more and better services than the state could pro-
vide, at a fixed cost.
Arguments referring to efficiency are also used by Swiss politicians to criticize tax incen-
tives for philanthropy. Some of them highlight the fact that certain social problems cannot be 
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resolved by philanthropy since they are not very visible or evoke little sympathy, while others 
emphasize the fiscal losses generated by tax deductions and the negative consequences for the 
state budget. Another critique expressed by Swiss politicians refers to the fact that tax deduc-
tions tend to aggravate inequalities by preventing redistribution.
Democracy
The third rationale identified, that of democracy, also covers arguments in favor of tax incentives 
for philanthropy and criticisms of this measure. It corresponds approximately with what Reich 
calls ‘pluralism rationale’. In this argument, the tax exemption is justified by its role in the pro-
motion of a diversified, pluralist and decentralized third sector, the basis of a liberal democracy. 
This argument also contends that by decentralizing political decision-making, one favors the 
emergence of new and innovative solutions. However, democracy is also used as an argument 
by some politicians to contest the fiscal encouragement of philanthropy. The third sector is 
denounced as escaping the control of political authorities and therefore of democracy. Through 
the mechanism of tax relief, the sector’s financing escapes the ‘political, public and democratic 
realm’ (Interviewee 40, PS) and ‘the state loses control of its public policy’ (Interviewee 47, PS).
This phenomenon is reinforced by the lack of transparency, the activity of foundations being 
described at times as ‘completely opaque’ (Interviewee 9, POP), and by the ‘lobbying’ (Inter-
viewee 45, PS) of the sector of foundations which contributes to removing even more demo-
cratic control.6 Finally, in ‘permitting people or entities with the means to not contribute to the 
common pot’ (Interviewee 40, PS) to ‘circumvent the state . . . in deciding themselves where 
to put their dough’ (Interviewee 47, PS), it is the very democratic culture itself which is threat-
ened: The risk is then that of seeing a form of ‘individual democracy’ emerge (Interviewee 40, 
PS) which would reject the redistributive dimension of taxes.
Virtue
In addition to the three rationales identified by Reich, a fourth category of argumentation 
referring to the principle of virtue appeared in the discourse of Swiss political actors on phil-
anthropic activities. A priori, philanthropic activity usually plays a very positive role in moral 
terms, and the political actors interviewed do not really disagree with this widely held view. 
Public-interest efforts are often defined as ‘helping people’ (Interviewee 5, VE) and are linked 
to the idea of ‘gift of self ’ (Interviewee 3, PDC). Some people base this on ‘Christian values’ 
(Interviewees 30, PLR, and 36, VE) and others more generally on the ‘concern for other peo-
ple’ (Interviewee 33, PS). From this perspective, which takes moral evaluation of the ‘altruistic’ 
commitment as its point of departure, plans for tax relief for philanthropy are defended as a 
means to highlight those who do good, whether public interest organizations, generous donors 
or volunteers.
Thus, the fact that philanthropic activity is considered virtuous justifies it being ‘treated in 
a special way’ (Interviewee 39, PDC) by the state. The donation of money to public-interest 
organizations is perceived as an integral part of this philanthropic activity. Unlike taxes, which 
constitute an obligatory contribution to the common good, the donation is part of an ‘inter-
personal’ relation (Interviewee 25, PDC). ‘There is a stronger human gesture which is not at all 
anonymous’ (Interviewee 36, VE).
Another virtue of the donation is also related to what it gives the donor: ‘The donation 
benefits the recipient, in addition to the one who gives’ (Interviewee 36, VE). This holds true, 
too, for the donation of time. One political actor, smiling, refers to ‘a study which shows that 
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the more volunteer work you do, the happier you are in life’ (Interviewee 30, PLR). Yet many 
political actors deplore the fact that awareness of the mutual advantage of altruistic commitment 
has tended to fade away. The prevailing perception of those interviewed is that we are living ‘in 
a society where people are increasingly individualistic’ (Interviewee 3, PDC). Consequently, it 
is necessary for the state to guide them towards the path of charitable works, and tax benefits 
serve this purpose. However, certain remarks made during the interviews serve to tarnish the 
popular image of the noble philanthropist. Thus, philanthropic organizations are accused of 
‘making money from the suffering of others’ (Interviewee 1, PEV). As for the donation itself, 
it is sometimes depicted as a means of enhancing an individual’s ‘personal prestige’ (Interviewee 
37, VE) or of ‘giving oneself a reputation as a benefactor’ (Interviewee 47, PS), with the dona-
tion seen as a ‘marketing’ tool (Interviewee 40, PS).
Another critique, on the question of virtue, arises with regard to tax incentives for philan-
thropy: that it is immoral that some not pay taxes, whatever the reason. Here, indeed, the very 
principle of tax incentives as a tool of public policy is being criticized: ‘taxation should not 
be jeopardized’ (Interviewee 36, VE). The problem with deductions and exemptions is that 
they create a multitude of specific fiscal situations liable to threaten this principle of universal 
taxation.
Five frames on philanthropy
As the analysis so far has established, political actors refer to a wide range of arguments to 
express their positions for or against tax advantages for philanthropy. However, all these argu-
ments are not drawn upon in an identical fashion in each interview; the political actors select, 
combine and rank-order them according to different modalities. The coding of the interviews 
allows us to see a structure behind this diversity: it brings out various recurring argumenta-
tive patterns, which define five types of frames on philanthropy. Their graphic representation 
permits us to visualize their differences (see right half of Figure 2.1) but also the basis of ideas, 
values and representations that they share.
The left side of Figure 2.1 classifies the arguments of political actors as presented in the first 
part of this chapter by rationales, in favor of fiscal advantages (bright) and opposed (dark). Each 
trait linking an argument to a frame signifies that this argument is employed by the majority of 
political actors using this frame: for example, the majority of the political actors whose discourse 
is ‘liberal’ use the first positive argument of the justice category, ‘The donation is another means 
of paying one’s taxes’. In this same category, the negative argument ‘deductions may be diverted 
from their original purpose’ is used by the majority of those whose discourse is ‘wary’, as well 
as most of those whose discourse is predominantly ‘critical’.
Figure 2.1 reveals that political actors largely share a positive view of fiscal advantages for 
public-interest organizations: Three of the five frames are based exclusively on arguments in 
favor of these measures; and these three frames were employed by 38 political actors, that is, 
79% of all political actors interviewed. It follows that arguments in favor of fiscal advantages are 
much more often employed (there are 23 uses of positive arguments, marked by horizontal lines 
towards the bright cases) than counterarguments (10 uses of negative arguments). Analysis of 
Figure 2.1 then shows an overwhelming predominance of the rationale of efficiency in political 
actors’ discourse: out of a total of 33 uses of arguments in the five categories, more than half fall 
into this category. It is principally in reference to this rationale that the role and place of Swiss 
philanthropic organizations and the legitimacy of fiscal measures designed to support them 
are evaluated. Even in the discourse of political actors more critical of or even hostile to tax 
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incentives for philanthropy, efficiency structures the frame of reference of their argumentation 
and tends to be seen as obvious.
While political actors largely approve of fiscal advantages for public-interest organizations, 
based particularly on efficiency arguments, they do not all do so for the same reasons. In the first 
type of discourse, the ‘civic’ frame, fiscal advantages are perceived as a means of supporting the 
third sector. In the ‘liberal’ frame, these advantages serve to reduce taxes and the ascendancy of 
the state, and in the ‘pragmatic’ frame, they represent a measure of good management of public 
finances rather than an option reflecting a political orientation. To these first three categories 
can be added two frames composed essentially of negative arguments: In the ‘wary’ frame, the 
fiscal advantages constitute a risk factor for abuse and fraud; the ‘critical’ frame, for its part, 
interprets these advantages as undermining equality (between taxpayers and between organiza-
tions). Finally, each of these frame types is distinguished by a particular view of philanthropic 
organizations, linking them to a specific issue. We now propose to examine them in greater 
detail.
Fiscal policies in favor of public-interest organizations, a solution  
to support the dynamism of civil society: the ‘civic’ frame
‘Civic’ discourse frames fiscal advantages for philanthropic organizations as a good way to sup-
port the third sector. Many political actors adopting this frame are thus favorable to broadening 
the criteria of philanthropic organizations and to raising the threshold of deductibility of dona-
tions to them. Some of those employing this discourse, however, are less enthusiastic about the 
idea of such increases, fearing significant losses of revenues for the state and worrying about the 
social injustice caused by such a measure. Therefore, a number of those interviewed, notably 
on the left, explain that the choice between these two options constitutes a dilemma for them.
In addition to drawing upon the category of efficiency, the ‘civic’ frame is primarily com-
posed of positive arguments from the value categories of democracy and virtue. Regarding the 
value of democracy, ‘civic’ discourse highlights pluralism in society and sees the associative life 
as a guarantee of that. Tax incentives are then perceived as a condition for this associative dyna-
mism and should be extended, for example, to all types of associations, to increase the means 
at their disposal:
Numerous sports clubs would have fewer problems if you could say, at the end of the 
year: ‘Let’s make a donation of 10,000 francs and we will then be able to deduct that 
from our taxes’. . . . Maybe there is a person here and there who would really like to 
make a donation, because, in fact, it is very attractive if one can deduct it all.
(Interviewee 43, PLR)
Political actors with this frame also stress the fact that it is not desirable that all decision-making 
power and all means available for establishing social policies be concentrated in the state. They 
prefer ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, stemming from civil society, to the verticality of state power:
The state cannot be everywhere. This is not its role! . . . Otherwise, we cannot escape; 
we find ourselves caught in the tentacles of an expanding state.  .  .  . A bit like in 
France, where, in fact, the system has become completely blocked because the state 
is ubiquitous.
(Interviewee 5, VE)
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As for virtue, political actors with this frame agree on the fact that it is fair that those who 
give to good causes be recompensed and that the role of the state is to recognize and promote 
virtuous behavior. ‘Civic’ discourse is that which most emphasizes the virtuous nature of tax 
benefits.
This frame is that of a very heterogeneous group of political actors in terms of their party 
affiliation: we find amongst them as many political actors of the left as those of the right. Among 
the 16 political actors with this type of discourse, we find 8 from left-wing parties – one Parti 
ouvrier populaire (POP), three Parti socialiste (PS), four Greens, 4 from the center – one Parti 
évangélique suisse (PEV), three Parti démocrate-chrétien (PDC) – and 4 on the right – three 
Parti liberal-radical (PLR) and one Union démocratique du centre (UDC). These political 
actors are characterized by the fact that they are very committed to the world of associations 
and foundations. This commitment is an integral part of their identity: during interviews, they 
often refer to this, even before mentioning their political mandates. Particularly preoccupied 
by the difficulties encountered by small organizations (which they have generally observed in 
the context of their own involvement), they especially regret the administrative burden for the 
organizations incurred in the increased requirements of control, as well as the difficulties of 
recruiting volunteers. A number of them have, moreover, intervened in the political debate to 
ask for fiscal advantages for volunteers.
Fiscal policies in favor of public-interest organizations, a means of 
reducing taxes and limiting the role of the state: the ‘liberal’ frame
In the ‘liberal’ frame, the tax exemption of donations to philanthropic organizations is 
perceived, above all, as a means to limit public expenditures, taxes and state power. The 
common objective of these parliamentarians being ‘a maximum reduction in taxes’ (Inter-
viewee 14, UDC), they consider, on the one hand, that the threshold of deductibility of 
donations is too low and, on the other hand, that it would be desirable to broaden the cri-
teria of public-interest organizations: ‘Yes, I would like to develop as many tax deduction 
schemes as possible. . . . Every Swiss franc that is not controlled by the State is actually a 
gain’ (Interviewee 31, UDC).
The ‘liberal’ frame combines different positive arguments from the categories of efficiency 
and democracy, as well as that of justice. Moreover, this is the only frame in which this category 
is drawn upon to favor tax incentives: the arguments which claim that ‘a donation is another 
means of paying one’s taxes, because it allows for the direct financing of social goods which 
the state will not be able to finance’ and that ‘the usual tax system is “confiscatory” and unjust, 
and anything which serves to alleviate this is good’ are central. As one politician said: ‘People 
give money, and then some of this money comes back into state coffers. For me this [is] absurd’ 
(Interviewee 7, UDC).
This discourse focuses on the onerousness of the ‘state bureaucracy’: Philanthropic organiza-
tions are described as less expensive and more efficient than state services. The argument of tax 
competition is also more often drawn upon than in the other types of discourse, principally in 
raising the threat of major taxpayers going elsewhere.
These tax measures are also presented as a mechanism of direct democracy. They must per-
mit ‘the giving of greater liberty to individuals’ (Interviewee 19, PLR) and are opposed to ‘the 
optic of the left which considers that only policy or politics is capable of having the wisdom to 
know where to put the money’ (ibid.). Tax even constitutes a danger: ‘There is no longer indi-
vidual responsibility. If worst comes to worst, it’s communism! . . . We trust the state, and then 
after there’s shouting because they have to raise taxes’ (Interviewee 7, UDC).
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This ‘liberal’ frame is particularly widespread on the right of the political chessboard. It is 
utilized by ten political actors, five of whom belong to the PLR and five to the UDC. They are 
generally not very involved in the third sector.
Tax policies in favor of public-interest organizations, a measure of 
good management of public funds: the ‘pragmatic’ frame
The ‘pragmatic’ frame presents tax exemptions for donations as a measure of good management 
and defends a ‘moderate’ approach in order to depoliticize the debate and avoid ‘ideological 
postures’. The desire to find a ‘happy medium’ and avoid the ‘extremes’ generally translates into 
an attachment to the existence of a threshold of deductibility, even if the existing threshold is 
sometimes considered a little low.
Very clearly dominated by positive arguments from the value of efficiency, this frame is 
based, in particular, on two key arguments: ‘you have to take the money where you find it’ 
and ‘the state alone cannot assume responsibility for every desirable policy’. Then, the idea of 
public-private complementarity often comes up as a ‘common sense’ position, ‘to everyone’s 
advantage’. The financing of public or para-public institutions (such as universities or hospitals) 
is often cited as an example:
Let’s imagine that I win 20 million in the lottery. . . . If I were living in the canton of 
Baselland [a canton in which one may deduct up to 100% of one’s income], I could 
probably use this 20 million to serve a public interest organization without paying 
any tax. That could be the University of Basel, maybe with certain demands, like, for 
example: I would like this to be used in X or Y medical research. . . . In all the other 
cantons [where one can only deduct between 5 and 20% of one’s income] I could not 
do the same thing, because I would first have to pay taxes.
(Interviewee 38, PLR)
The predominance of the category of efficiency over other argumentative categories is expressed 
in the discourse through the demand for a ‘utilitarian’ stance: ‘the goal is not to have greater 
fiscal justice . . . ; it is only to have more donations’, this justifying ‘[making] an exception to 
the principle of taxation based on the amount of income or fortune [and admitting] that this 
taxation could be somewhat reduced with the goal of encouraging grants and donations’ (Inter-
viewee 21, PLR).
While this frame is often critical of fiscal competition, it takes seriously the issue of ‘attrac-
tiveness’, in particular among members of cantonal executive bodies. Thus, a state councilor 
in charge of finances presents his mission as being a manager before being a politician: He 
explains that the dominant policy objective of tax exemptions is to ‘maintain the tax substance’ 
(Interviewee 8, PDC), that is, tax revenues, which he reminds us are dependent in large part 
on the wealthiest taxpayers. Proposing to these taxpayers advantages such as the possibility of 
deducting their philanthropic donations is a means of avoiding their departure for cantons with 
lower tax rates and at the same time allows the state to make substantial savings, since the third 
sector benefits from resources which allow it to carry out missions which would not be taken 
on by the public service. And, like those adhering to the ‘civic’ discourse, the ‘pragmatic’ ones 
think that tax incentives are a means of supporting dynamism in civil society and thus perceive 
them as inherently positive.
Parties from the center and the right, in particular the PLR, are overrepresented among 
those who adopt this discourse: among the 12 political actors with a ‘pragmatic’ frame, 7 are 
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part of the PLR (the majority among them come from the former Radical Party), 2 from the 
PDC, 1 from the PBD, 1 from the PS and 1 from the Greens. This type of discourse is also most 
frequently heard, independently of party attachment, among political actors with executive 
responsibilities (cantonal ministers of finance), presidents/vice-presidents of tax commissions 
and members of the Council of States; these positions predispose them to adopt a discourse 
which puts ‘the interest of the canton’ in the forefront rather than the defense of a given politi-
cal vision.
Fiscal policies in favor of public-interest organizations, a risk factor 
for abuse and fraud: the ‘wary’ frame
The ‘wary’ frame tends to present fiscal advantages for public-interest organizations as a risk: 
characterized by suspicion, it is focused on fraud, abuse and dysfunction. The criticism does not 
center on the principle of philanthropy or that of tax incentives in general but only on certain 
problematic aspects of the functioning of the third sector and of taxation. In this sense, the leg-
islators whose discourse is of this type are not very interested in the question of the deductibility 
of donations and of the maximum thresholds for this.
Instead, they often turn their attention to ‘scandals’ of which they have become aware, and 
their remarks frequently take the form of commentary on the events of the day. For example, 
with respect to the risk of tax evasion:
What is very difficult in these questions is that they are not going to tell you the truth. 
It’s true that tax evasion by means of foundations. . . . I question this. Still, there are 
some indications that prove that it’s true. You tell me that they’re obliged to say to 
whom they have donated but there can be some false statements; they can fiddle with 
the accounts. . . . Then, it’s almost impossible to verify.
(Interviewee 45, PS)
This frame is essentially based on two negative arguments which belong to the categories of 
justice and of democracy: ‘Deductions may be diverted from their purpose and used as an 
instrument of fiscal optimization’ and ‘Philanthropic organizations escape democratic control; 
their actions are not controlled or not controlled sufficiently by the political authorities’. This 
is maintained by a small number of political actors, gravitating around the center-left (one PS, 
one Greens, one PEV and one PDC). Two of them filed interventions against the exemption 
for major sports federations, developed in the particular context of the European Championship 
of football organized in Switzerland in 2008.
Finally, we will note that, while these politicians are very critical of abuses and question the 
criteria for recognizing public-interest organizations, they are rather reticent in terms of requir-
ing more significant controls; in particular, they are afraid of the excess of the administrative 
work for the small associations. One explanation of this paradox can probably be found in the 
fact that these political actors divide the third sector into categories: for them, there are the 
‘good organizations’ and, on the other side, the ‘bad’ ones. This division into good and bad is 
expressed in various ways by political actors, with other dualities, for example, large organiza-
tions vs. small ones or foundations vs. associations.
There are private law organizations where there is not even control of the surveillance 
of foundations.  .  .  . So, while other organizations which are also tax exempt, like, 
for example, the railway museum in Zurich, of which I was the president until just 
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last year. . . . There, I also saw what the canton demands in order to receive this tax 
exemption. We have to report on everything that we earn with this steam locomotive, 
guarantee perfect accounting, everything must be invested, there is no compensation 
for the people who get up at 4 in the morning to warm up these steam locomotives 
and who return in the evening with a dirty face at any hour. . . . That’s different, . . . 
there, that’s perfectly alright. But in the case of organizations who operate as a kind of 
business, at the international level . . ., that’s problematic.
(Interviewee 1, PEV)
Fiscal policies in favor of public-interest organizations, a vector of 
political, economic and social inequality: the ‘critical’ frame
Finally, those who hold to the ‘critical’ frame are the only ones to condemn the fiscal measures 
encouraging philanthropy. For them, they constitute a violation of equality between individuals 
(rich and poor) and between organizations (those who can easily collect donations and those which 
defend less popular causes). Therefore, they are strongly opposed to political plans to increase the 
threshold of deductibility of donations or to extend the domain of public-interest organizations.
The ‘critical’ frame combines a multitude of negative arguments from each of the four cat-
egories. The concern with equality and universalism leads to criticism of the fact that the deci-
sions of public-interest organizations escape democratic control:
Instead of paying taxes, you decide where the money goes; so, this contradicts the 
democratic principle. The democratic principle means that the public authority col-
lects the money for the basics and decides on how much goes to schools, how much 
to roads, how much to hospitals.
(Interviewee 36, VE)
‘Critical’ discourse especially stresses tax losses due to tax exemptions and deductions – an issue 
relegated to the background in the other types of discourse:
Should we limit this? Yes, probably, because the canton’s budget simply must be put in 
order. When there’s nobody left to pay taxes because everyone. . . . This is certainly 
not desirable.
(Interviewee 12, PS)
To criticize tax advantages, this discourse draws from the category of virtue, claiming that the 
failure to pay taxes is an immoral or unsociable act and that the principle of universality must 
be respected. However, it is interesting to observe that the ‘critical’ discourse does not go as far 
as to question the idea that ‘the state on its own lacks the means to provide all desirable public 
and social services’, which seems to be a view on which all agree.
This frame is that of a small number of politicians who all belong to parties of the left (four 
PS, one Greens and a POP) and are very active in the associative environment. Their position in 
the field of public-interest organizations (often close to umbrella organizations and association 
networks) and/or their experience with social work makes them more sensitive to questions 
related to financing and to the independence of associative structures. Quite isolated on these 
matters – including in their own parties – they deplore the fact that they are not understood by 
their colleagues, who, for lack of having invested sufficient time to grasp the profound political 
issues related to these technical fiscal questions, ‘just don’t get it’ (Interviewee 36, VE).
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Discussion: philanthropy, the product of an accumulation rather 
than a confrontation of arguments
Examining the discourse of politicians allows us to show the way in which ‘philanthropy’ as a 
political object is constructed by the actors who legislate on the subject. These empirical results 
also lead us to enrich the theoretical literature on philanthropy and tax exemptions and to ques-
tion a number of its assumptions, in particular with regard to two aspects: the rationales the 
discourses refer to and the role played by different representations of philanthropic organizations 
to explain variations in the way political actors frame tax exemptions for philanthropy.
In terms of rationales, the Swiss case shows the use of varied argumentation based on four 
rationales: fiscal justice, efficiency, democracy and virtue. While the first three rationales have 
been identified in other studies – Benshalom (2008) discusses efficiency (to encourage more 
and/or better spending of public goods) as well as civism or commitment (to allow taxpayers to 
express their preferences regarding the allocation of public goods in society), and Reich (2018) 
adds the question of tax justice – a fourth rationale appears in the comments of our interview-
ees. In this type of argumentation, the act of philanthropic giving as such is seen as inherently 
virtuous, and it is for this reason that it is seen as worthy of recognition and encouragement by 
the state. Contrary to the other rationales, which build on a broader general principle to which 
philanthropy contributes, the rationale of virtue recognizes the value of the act for itself.
The study also gives empirical insight into which rationales are used most often. It suggests 
that among the various rationales, efficiency is by far the most important, mobilized in all the 
identified discourses – well before those of democracy and justice. Philanthropy then seems to 
benefit from a more general trend – which goes beyond this single object – which sees politi-
cians increasingly relying on purely economic concepts (Lebaron, 2013, p. 11; Weil, 2017) and 
which profoundly modifies the decision makers’ perception and appreciation of social realities: 
efficiency rather than justice. But beyond this general trend, this finding also indicates that 
political actors apply the efficiency lens to a broader range of objects than what is commonly 
discussed in the literature. Most studies focus on the financial efficiency of tax incentives, but 
for many political actors, efficiency also relates to the greater capacity of philanthropic organiza-
tions to achieve their goals. If the discourse of efficiency occupies such a place, it is also because 
it mixes these two different dimensions which, as this study shows, are less seen as diverse and 
potentially contradictory than working together in favor of legal and fiscal reforms.
The second contribution of this study concerns the role of representations of philanthropic 
organizations for the frames political actors use to argue about it. The existing literature dis-
cusses the question of ‘why fiscally encourage philanthropy’; the focus is on the distribution 
effects of tax exemption. Yet if we look at political actors’ discourses, we see that beyond parti-
san cleavages on purported benefits of fiscal tools, their positions and arguments are very much 
related to the very heterogeneous depictions of philanthropy. As our interviews show, the ways 
of depicting philanthropy usually seem to be piecemeal and limited. This is as if, in the absence 
of established discourse on what this sector of public-interest organizations really is, each indi-
vidual approached this through their own personal experience and with respect to their own 
preoccupations. This phenomenon is maybe particularly pronounced in the debates on public 
interest, because the third sector is an extremely plural one. It is composed of structures that 
are sometimes so different from one another that, strictly speaking, they do not have much in 
common. A great variety of organizations active in many different domains populate this sector 
in Switzerland: from small environmental NGOs to the Red Cross; from theater associations 
and local football clubs to huge international sports organizations like FIFA or UEFA, which 
are considered of public interest in Switzerland.
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The perception of the third sector and even the definition of public interest by Swiss 
politicians depend therefore widely on the type of organizations that they have in mind. 
The parliamentarians may or may not be involved in associations or foundations; some raise 
this question in thinking about donors, while others are thinking about the beneficiaries. 
When they think about these donors, some think about those who make monetary dona-
tions, while others, on the contrary, speak about those who give their time in volunteer 
activities. When they think about beneficiaries, some think of public and para-public estab-
lishments (such as universities or hospitals), others of small local associations, while still 
others make reference to the major international sports organizations. Some broached the 
subject because they were personally confronted with a practical incomprehension in the 
context of an involvement in public-interest organizations, while others interject following 
a media scandal or to make themselves the spokesperson for an association of public-interest 
organizations.
It is the way actors delimit the subject, in this case philanthropy, which matters when one 
wants to understand the positions taken and the frames used. The politicians adopting a ‘wary’ 
frame, for example, are not fundamentally opposed to tax incentives for philanthropy. They are 
simply interested, for one reason or another, in big international organizations and the sup-
posedly negative effects of their fiscal advantages. Or, to take another example, the ‘pragmatic’ 
frame is mainly adopted by executive politicians at the cantonal level. When they speak of 
public interest, they think of organizations they encounter in their day-to-day work: During 
interviews, they speak of donations made for research but also of para-public organizations like 
regional home care services. Politicians embracing a ‘civic’ frame, on the other hand, are espe-
cially committed to the world of associations and foundations and are personally involved in the 
non-profit sector, mainly in small organizations. The lens through which they approach public 
interest as a political object is the concrete challenges encountered by these organizations and 
the strategies to facilitate their work.
In sum, while the literature often seems to confine the issue of philanthropy to the question 
of tax incentives for donations, our study shows, on the contrary, that when political actors 
think about philanthropy, they do not only think about donations (or donors) but just as much 
about philanthropic organizations, which are also tax exempt. Is it the fact that FIFA and UEFA 
have their headquarters in Switzerland? The question of their tax exemption is omnipresent, 
as is the comparison of their status vis-à-vis small sports clubs whose social utility seems no less 
important. As a counterpoint to a literature that most often focuses only on tax exemptions for 
donations, this study shows the extent to which, for political actors, the discussion on the legal 
and fiscal frameworks governing philanthropy concerns just as much – and even more impor-
tantly – the equity between organizations that benefit or not from these exemptions and the 
justification of these exemptions for such organizations.
Notes
 1 The authors would like to thank the attentive reviewers of a previous version of this chapter for their 
insightful comments.
 2 The term ‘philanthropy’ does not have a legal definition in Swiss law. Regarding direct taxes, Swiss 
federal law exempts legal entities that are pursuing public-service or public-interest purposes from the 
federal income tax on profits that are exclusively and irrevocably affected to such purposes (Art. 56 lit. 
6 LIFD) and allows donations in favor of these entities to be deducted of income (or net profit) up to a 
maximum of 20% (Art. 33a and 59 let. c LIFD). In the present analysis, the term ‘philanthropy’ is used 
in its two possible linguistic meanings, that is, regarding the taxation of 1) philanthropic organizations 
and of 2) philanthropic transfers of funds or other property (donor taxation).
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 3 Regarding direct taxes, Switzerland exempts legal entities that have: 1) purpose of general interest, 2) 
unlimited circle of beneficiaries, 3) exclusive and irrevocable contribution of the funds, 4) disinterest 
and 5) actual non-profit activity.
 4 We focused on the parliamentary activity of three cantons in particular: Geneva, Neuchâtel and 
Baselland. These three cantons were chosen due to different limits on the deductibility of donations 
which they adopted or modified in the 2000s (5% of taxable income or profits in Neuchâtel, 20% in 
Geneva and no limit in Baselland).
 5 For a detailed list of the interviewees and their interventions, we refer the reader to Lambelet et al. 
(2021). We indicate here the political party of the interviewees using party acronyms. Switzerland has 
a multiparty system whose political parties can be categorized in three groups. Parties of the left: POP 
(Parti ouvrier et Populaire [Swiss Labour Party]), PS (Parti socialiste [Social Democratic Party]), VE 
(Les Verts [Green Party]). Parties of the centre: PDC (Parti démocrate-chrétien [Christian Democrats]), 
PEV (Parti évangélique [Evangelical People’s Party]), PBD (Parti bourgeois-démocratique [Conserva-
tive Democratic Party]). Parties on the right: PLR (Parti libéral-radical [The Liberals]), UDC (Union 
démocratique du centre [Swiss People’s Party]).
 6 In contrast with the long US tradition of making public financial forms and annual reports, Swiss foun-
dations have to report only to the state supervisory authority, which does not make the information 
public (Schnurbein and Perez, 2018).
References
Ariely, D., Bracha, A. and Meier, S. (2009). ‘Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary 
incentives in behaving prosocially’. American Economic Review, 99(1), pp. 544–555.
Bakija, J. and Heim, B. T. (2011). ‘How does charitable giving respond to incentives and income? New 
estimates from panel data’. National Tax Journal, 64(2, Part 2), pp. 615–650.
Bekkers, R. and Wiepking, P. (2011). ‘A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight 
Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving’. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 40(5), pp. 924–973.
Benshalom, I. (2008). ‘The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions’. Indiana Law Journal, 84, 
pp. 1047–1097.
Best, J. (2008). Social Problems (1st ed.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
Brilliant, E. (2000). Private Charity and Public Inquiry: A History of the Filer and Peterson Commissions. Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Cagé, J. (2020). The Price of Democracy: How Money Shapes Politics and What to Do About It. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
European Foundation Center. (2015). Comparative Highlights of Foundation Laws. Bruxelles: EFC.
Gamson, W.A. and Modigliani, A. (1989). ‘Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: 
A Constructionist Approach’. American Journal of Sociology, 95(1), pp. 1–37.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organisation of Experience. New York, NY: Harper.
Helmig, B., Gmür, M., Bärlocher, Ch., von Schnurbein, G., Degen, B., Nollert, M., Wojciech Sokolowski, 
S. and Salamon, L. (2017). ‘Switzerland: A Liberal Outlier for Europe’. In Explaining Civil Society Devel-
opment: A Social Origins Approach. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 131–142.
Helmig, B., Lichtsteiner, H. and Gmür, M. (2010). Der Dritte Sektor der Schweiz: die Schweizer Länderstudie 
im Rahmen des Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) (1. Auf.). Bern: Haupt Verlag.
Howard, Ch. (1993). ‘The Hidden Side of the American Welfare State’. Political Science Quarterly, 108(3), 
pp. 403–436.
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.
Lambelet, A. (2014). La Philanthropie. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Lambelet, A., Balsiger, P., Carnac, R. and Honegger C. (2021). Reconnaître l’utilité publique. Parlementaires et 
personnel des administrations fiscales face à la philanthropie en Suisse. Lausanne: HETSL Editions.
Layton, M. (2015). ‘The Influence of Fiscal Incentives on Philanthropy Across Nations’. In Wiepking, P. and 
Handy, F. (eds). The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 540–557.
Leat, D. (2016). Philanthropy Foundations, Public Good and Public Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lebaron, F. (2013). ‘Pour une sociologie de la production et de la diffusion des discours économiques: 
Réflexion à partir de l’exemple de la notion de modèle social’. In Temmar, M., Angermüller, J. and 
Lebaron, F. (eds). Les discours de l’économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 13–32.
Why fiscally encourage philanthropy?
55
Lideikyte Huber, G. (2018). ‘Philanthropy and Taxation: Swiss Legal Framework and Reform Perspec-
tives’. Expert Focus, 3, pp. 209–213.
Lideikyte Huber, G. (2020). ‘Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving as a Policy Instrument: Theoretical 
Discussion and Latest Economic Research’. World Tax Journal, 12, p. 3.
McDaniel, P.R. (1989). ‘Tax Expenditures as Tools of Government Action’. In L.M. Salamon (ed). Beyond 
Privatization: The Tools of Government Action. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, pp. 167–195.
McGravie, M. (2003). ‘The Dartmouth College Case and the Legal Design of Civil Society’. In Fried-
man, L. and McGravie, M. (ed). Charity, Philanthropy and Civility in American History. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–105.
Monnet, N. and Panizza, U. (2017). A Note on the Economics of Philanthropy. IHEID Working Papers No. 
19. Genève: Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
OECD. (2020). Taxation and Philanthropy. OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 27. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/df434a77-en
Reese, S.D., Gandy, O. and Grant, A.E. (eds). (2001). Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our 
Understanding of the Social World. New York, NY: Routledge.
Reich, R. (2013). ‘Philanthropy and Caring for the Needs of Strangers’. Social Research: An Internal Quar-
terly, 80(2), pp. 517–538.
Reich, R. (2018). Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy and How It Can Do Better. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reich, R., Cordelli, C. and Bernholz, L. (eds). (2016). Philanthropy in Democratic Societies: History, Institu-
tions, Values. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Saez, E. and Zucman, G. (2019). The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them 
Pay. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
Salamon, L.M. (1989). ‘The Changing Tools of Government Action: An Overview’. In Salamon L. (ed). 
Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
Salamon, L.M. and Anheiner, H.K. (1998). ‘Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit 
Sector Cross-Nationally’. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9(3), 
pp. 213–248.
Salamon, L.M. and Toepler, S. (2000). The Influence of the Legal Environment on the Development of the Non-
profit Sector. Working Paper Series No. 17. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Institute for 
Policy Studies/Center for Civil Society Studies.
Schnurbein von, G. and Perez, M. (2018). ‘Foundations in Switzerland: Between the American and the 
German Cases’. American Behavioral Scientist, 62(13), pp. 1919–1932.
Steinmo, S. (1986). ‘So What’s Wrong with Tax Expenditures? A Reevaluation Based on Swedish Experi-
ence’. Public Budgeting & Finance, 6(2), pp. 27–44.
Thaler, R. H. (2010). ‘It’s Time to Rethink the Charity Deduction’. The New York Times, 18 December.
Weil, S. (2017). 25 Jahre New Public Management in der Schweiz. Zehn Gestalter erzählen. Cahier de l’IDHEAP. 
Cahier de l’IDHEAP 300. Lausanne: IDHEAP.
Zunz, O. (2011). Philanthropy in America: A History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
56DOI: 10.4324/9781003139201-5
1 Introduction
The practice of philanthropy has been sitting uncomfortably with the credentials of the liberal 
democratic state. One of the main concerns has been with the uneven distribution of political 
power that philanthropy may entail when the state’s political agenda and priorities respond to 
the particular interests of some wealthy donors rather than to the general interests of the citi-
zenry (Cordelli 2016; Greaves and Pummer 2019; Lambelet et al. 2019; Reich 2018). To the 
extent that philanthropy exposes the state’s political agenda to the uneven influence of certain 
(individual or corporate) personal agendas, it may even be censored as a form of political cor-
ruption (Ceva and Ferretti 2021, 2018, 2017).
Philanthropy can perform many functions in society. It can, for example, address resources 
to socially innovative practices (e.g., sponsoring new research and start-ups), alert to neglected 
causes or issues that have fallen out of the state’s political agenda (e.g., supporting environmen-
tal initiatives), or act quickly to address unexpected social needs (e.g., financing infrastructures 
to deal with a health emergency). Against this composite background (for an overview, see 
Anheier 2018), this chapter adopts a normative point of view to discuss the justification of 
tax incentives for philanthropy when philanthropy performs one particular function. This is a 
remedial function that philanthropy may be called to perform in the face of institutional failures 
in the nonideal circumstances of concrete public institutional action. Ideally, public institutional 
action should be capable of developing and pursuing a political agenda that caters to shared 
needs (and adjudicates between competing ones). However, in the nonideal circumstances of 
concrete public institutional action, public institutions may fail, and philanthropic initiatives 
might inject valuable skills and resources, thus compensating (at least in part) for some insti-
tutional failures. The announcement of the commitment of such eminent philanthropists as 
Bill Gates in the immediate afermath of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak to finance the 
production and distribution of vaccines is but one recent illustration of philanthropy’s possible 
remedial function. Insofar as philanthropy can play this remedial function, the state seems to be 
justified to incentivise it in nonideal conditions. But when these incentives occur through taxa-
tion, they may have the adverse effect of draining resources from the state, thus further undercut-








In this chapter, I set out to assess the fear that offering tax incentives for philanthropy may 
trigger vicious institutional short-circuits by discussing the justification of philanthropy from 
the point of view of a liberal democratic institutional ethics. I start from a conception of this 
institutional ethics as grounded in the normative idea of ‘office accountability’, the idea that 
officeholders in public institutions should always be in the position of justifying the rationale 
of the agenda they pursue by their conduct in their institutional capacity as coherent with the 
terms of their power of office mandate (§2). A public institution that realises office account-
ability can draw on the interrelated action of officeholders as an internal resource to sustain its 
functioning. When there is a deficit of office accountability, this internal mechanism fails, and 
remedial action should be taken. I proceed (§3) by distinguishing between two types of remedial 
action of this sort, internal and external, and present philanthropy as an instance of this latter 
(§4). I  then argue that remedial philanthropic initiatives may be justified within this ethical 
framework insofar as they occur in such a way that enhances their compatibility with a com-
mitment to office accountability. Failing this condition, such philanthropic initiatives risk being 
disqualified as a form of political corruption (§5).
This discussion serves as a basis for exploring the boundaries of the justification of tax 
incentives for a particular set of philanthropic initiatives. While this argument has thus a lim-
ited scope, it points at a circumscribed but significant domain of institutional action where the 
allegiance between the state and philanthropy is fully (albeit nonideally) justified. Within this 
particular domain, I will argue, remedial philanthropic initiatives play the important instrumen-
tal function of upholding public institutional action from the outside public institutions when 
the interrelated action of officeholders fails to sustaining it from their inside.
2 Institutional functioning and the ethics of office accountability
To describe an institution means to describe the action of a group of agents, the officeholders, 
who act in a special capacity in virtue of the powers entrusted to the institutional roles they 
occupy.2 The discussion in this chapter mainly concerns the functioning of public institutions; 
but this basic description applies to any kind of institution understood as a system of roles. 
More specifically, institutions are not just a set of procedural mechanisms and formal rules, nor 
may institutional action be identified straightforwardly with the joint action of individual insti-
tutional members. An institution is a system of interrelated embodied rule-governed roles (the offices) 
to which powers are entrusted with a mandate (Ceva and Ferretti 2021, 2018). Let us pause to 
consider the elements of this definition.
First, notice that each role within an institution is established and governed by a set of rules 
(the constitutive rules of an institution), which spells out the normative powers (the rights and 
duties) and the tasks associated with each role. Second, take note that each role is embodied in 
the sense that it is occupied by a human person (the officeholder), whose conduct in her insti-
tutional capacity is governed by the constitutive rules of an institution. Consider, third, that the 
embodied rule-governed roles of an institution are interrelated in the sense that the capacity of 
each officeholder to exercise her powers of office and perform her tasks structurally depends on 
the other officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. Finally, note that an institution 
is grounded in a raison d’être which comprises the normative ideals that motivate its establish-
ment and, consequently, its internal structure of roles and related tasks. An institution’s raison 
d’être informs what powers are entrusted to the various institutional roles with what mandate. 
From all this, it follows that to see whether an institution functions, we should be looking at 
the officeholders’ interrelated conduct in their institutional capacity, whether the occupants of 
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institutional roles exercise their powers of office in keeping with an agenda whose rationale is 
coherent with the terms of their power mandate.
It is important to point out that the very fact of occupying an institutional role entrusts 
people with normative powers, in the form of rights and duties, that they do not normally 
have (Rawls 1955; Searle 1995). As a university professor, I have the right to demand that cer-
tain people, the students, read and write certain things and to assess their performance on that 
ground; correspondingly, the students have a duty to read and write what I demand of them 
and a right to expect a fair evaluation of their work. This set of normative relations does not 
normally hold between people as ‘bare agents’ – I can recommend a book to friend, but I can-
not demand that she read it and write a commentary about it. Institutional membership therefore 
creates an order of rights and duties that binds together the occupants of institutional roles and 
regulates their interactions inside an institutional context. This internal perspective is of para-
mount importance for the discussion in the chapter; we will revisit it in §3.
There is a further important point about the nature of institutions to revisit: all roles in an 
institution are interrelated. As anticipated, the interrelatedness of institutional roles means that 
the performance of any officeholder in her institutional capacity structurally depends on the 
performances of the other officeholders and the uses they make of the powers entrusted to 
their roles. To understand officeholders’ actions, and assess the uses of powers they make, it is 
essential to see them in the context of and as interrelated with the other officeholders’ actions 
and the performance of their tasks. This perspective of interrelatedness gives meaning to the 
officeholders’ actions in their institutional capacity, whose interrelated work is definitive of 
institutional action. So, for example, to assess the functioning of an authority responsible for the 
marketing of new drugs, it is not enough to look at its statutory regulations and the formal rules 
that govern its procedural mechanisms on paper. We need, rather, to look at the interrelated 
conduct of the holders of the various offices implicated in the authorisation procedure, from 
those entrusted with the power to seek experts’ opinions on the health risks of the drug or on 
its marketability, including those who are called to collect and analyse those opinions, down to 
those responsible for signing off the final authorisation. None of these tasks can be appropriately 
understood, exercised, or assessed in isolation, as the failure of one of them may cause the failure 
of all the others and therefore of the entire institution (for example, when a decision on a drug’s 
marketability is based on a more or less intentionally biased analysis of the experts’ opinion). 
To understand and assess an institution means, therefore, to look at how it works in practice 
through the interrelated action of the officeholders. To wit, this understanding and assessment 
require taking an internal perspective capable of offering an insight about the actual interrelated 
conduct of the officeholders in the exercise of their institutional tasks.
From the general consideration regarding the interrelatedness of institutional roles, two more 
specific claims follow. Fist, the functioning of an institution depends on the capacity of the 
officeholders’ interrelated action to honour the raison d’être of their institution by acting in 
keeping with the terms of their power mandate. Second, the exercise of one officeholder’s rights 
and duties in her institutional capacity (as established by the power mandate entrusted to her 
role) structurally and fundamentally requires that the other officeholders perform their rights 
and duties in keeping with the terms of their power mandate. The main entailment of this 
claim is that, when officeholders act in their institutional capacity, they are mutually accountable 
for the uses they make of their powers of office. This is the idea of ‘office accountability’ (Ceva 
2019). Office accountability is thus the pivot of an institutional ethics of office because it is the 
normative practical principle that ought to guide the action of officeholders in their institutional 
capacity. Taken together, these claims result in the statement that the functioning of an institu-
tion is premised on an institutional ethics of office accountability.
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What we have seen so far is sufficient to qualify a necessary condition for an institution to 
be well functioning. A well-functioning institution is necessarily one in which the officeholders 
are in the position of giving each other an account of the rationale of the agenda that underpins 
the uses they make of their power of office when they act in their institutional capacity and show its 
coherence with the terms of that power mandate (see also Applbaum 1999; Ceva and Ferretti 
2021; Emmet 1966; Winston 1999). We can now get a better grasp of the meaning of the con-
dition that officeholders are mutually accountable when they act in their institutional capacity as 
a requirement of an institutional ethics of office. Notably, office accountability is the centrepiece 
of a set of normative prescriptions that guide the officeholders’ interactions inside an institutional 
context. As participants in such a context, officeholders share the normative standing to require 
one another to ‘give an account’ of their action (see also Bovens, Goodin and Schillemans, 
2014, p. 6). I call this ethics of office ‘institutional’, as it refers to the terms of mandate within 
an institution and is, thus, different from the ‘personal’ ethics that may guide people’s interaction 
in other capacities, for instance, as friends or lovers.
3 Institutional failures and their internal correction
To summarise the argument so far, a well-functioning institution is one sustained by an insti-
tutional ethics of office accountability; it is an institution where the officeholders are in the 
position of giving to each other an account of the rationale of their action in their institutional 
capacity which is coherent with the terms of their power mandate. In so doing, their interre-
lated conduct can uphold the raison d’être of their institution. An institution that realises office 
accountability can draw on the interrelated action of officeholders as an internal resource to 
sustain its functioning. In this sense, think of institutional functioning as that of a sports team, 
structured according to various rule-governed interrelated specific roles, which are definitive of 
the team’s action. In this context, what a player does (how she makes use of the powers given to 
her by occupying a certain role) necessarily affects the action of the whole team and its capacity 
to perform its function.
Unfortunately, in the nonideal circumstances of concrete institutional action, institutional 
functioning hardly ever proceeds so smoothly. In many circumstances, institutions may fail, 
including because of a lack of material resources, incompetence, systemic inefficiencies, as a 
result of the malicious intent of some bad apple, or because of the deterioration of the institu-
tional patterns of officeholders’ interaction (Ferretti 2019; Ceva and Ferretti 2021). For instance, 
institutions may fail as the summative result of the officeholders’ individual actions. When 
several officeholders individually fail to perform their tasks (on various grounds), the institution 
as a whole may fail. Consider the example of a border control agency where a good number 
of inspectors regularly allow bulk cash smuggling, so that the borders supposedly controlled by 
the agency become a safe channel for money smugglers, and an informal bribe-and-smuggle 
practice becomes characteristic of the work of the entire agency. This practice, initiated by 
the discrete actions of a number of individuals, impairs the agency’s functioning as a whole by 
working from its inside.
On a different count, an institutional failure may depend on the particular morphology of 
the interrelatedness of roles within an institution. Consider, for example, the case of an author-
ity for the marketing of new drugs (Ceva and Ferretti 2021, pp. 65–67). The officeholder who 
has the task of selecting the experts to seek advice on the drug’s weighted dangers is the husband 
of the head of a pharmaceutical company that is leading the research on the drug. He selects 
the experts in such a way to obtain a favourable advice on its safety. Now, some of this office-
holders’ colleagues who have not been involved in the selection procedure are called to decide 
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on the drug’s marketability. Per their power mandate, they base their judgment on the experts’ 
report and find evidence in support of the marketing authorisation. In doing so, the market-
ing officeholders act according to the rules of their office. However, the rationale of the entire 
institutional action has been compromised by the behaviour of the first officeholder, who acted 
in the pursuit of a familistic agenda that is totally extraneous to the rationale of his power of 
office mandate (which is certainly not that to favour his dear and near ones by his institutional 
action). Because of the interrelatedness of institutional roles, the officeholders responsible for 
the marketing authorisation procedure can function or fail only together. Because, as seen in the 
previous section, an institution is a system of interrelated rule-governed embodied roles, and the 
assessment of institutional action is the assessment of the officeholders’ interrelated conduct, 
when this latter fails, the institution itself fails.
The illustration of institutional failures suggests the importance for institutional functioning 
that officeholders be constantly vigilant not only as concerns their own conduct but also, and 
perhaps most importantly, with respect to the conduct of the other occupants of institutional 
roles in their institutions. The primary resource for counteracting institutional failures should 
therefore come from the inside of an institution. This thought reinforces the idea that insti-
tutional functioning (and the correction of institutional failures) is first and foremost a matter 
of an institutional ethics of office accountability. As seen, at the core of this institutional ethics 
is a general commitment to making officeholders mutually accountable for their conduct in 
their institutional capacity. I want to add now that, whenever a deficit of office accountability 
is suspected, this general commitment translates into the specific requirement that officeholders 
engage in good faith in practices of answerability.
To ensure its functioning and address possible partial or systemic failures, institutions should 
set up internal answerability practices through which officeholders may call on each other 
to honour their professional duties and sustain institutional action as an interrelated body of 
agents. Such practices may include organisational codes of conduct, transparency mechanisms, 
and whistleblowing (Ceva and Bocchiola 2018). These practices are aimed at establishing and 
assigning retrospective and prospective responsibilities for institutional failures to officeholders, 
severally and as interrelated agents (for instance, per the summative and morphological patterns 
of interaction illustrated previously). This exercise is crucial to engage officeholders in a com-
municative practice, thus calling them to respond to the threats that their conduct may pose to 
the capacity of their institution to be faithful to its raison d’être. By engaging in this practice, 
officeholders can either rebut, in part or in full, or accept their implication in institutional 
failures and also take up the prospective responsibility of sustaining the functioning of their 
institution in the future.
4 Institutional failures and their external correction:  
the contribution of philanthropy
While the presence of internal answerability practices is essential to mobilise an institution’s 
internal resources of self-correction, sometimes the relationships between officeholders and 
their dynamics of interaction are compromised to an extent that makes the resort to exter-
nal resources necessary, too. To be sure, for starters, in any institutional setup, officeholders 
are generally expected to respond for their institutional action to third-party authorities such 
as the judiciary or, in a democracy, the citizenry. In some such major instances of institu-
tional failure as in cases of systemic corruption, for example, it seems hard to imagine that 
an entrenched system of dysfunctional interactions that is prey – say – to clientelism or other 
forms of regulatory capture may be transformed without an external ‘shock’. This predicament 
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may be due to very high peer pressure to maintain the corrupt network in place to salvage the 
privileges of sharing the profits that derive from a well-established network of personal con-
nections, which sometimes also sees collusion with organised crime. A change of pace requires 
a substantial transformation, possibly including the appointment of new officials with a clean 
personal record.
On other occasions, external hurdles may join such internal obstacles as the deterioration 
of the officeholders’ relationships dynamics to exacerbate the difficulty of initiating the office-
holders’ reaction to institutional failures. Relying on an institution’s internal resources of self-
correction might prove particularly difficult in circumstances plagued by a scarcity of material 
resources or the lack of the infrastructural and planning capacity to implement certain actions 
in a given territory; external and extraordinary circumstances, including natural calamities or 
a pandemic, may strain the context in which officeholders operate and undercut their capac-
ity to undertake corrective actions by their own efforts. When such factors impinge upon the 
functioning of public institutions and their internal reactive resources, as it were, philanthropic 
individual and corporate initiatives may enter the picture to sustain public institutional action. 
Such nonideal circumstances thus provide a fruitful context to explore the justification of a 
particular form of philanthropy consisting of remedial initiatives.
In broad brushes, I take philanthropy as essentially characterised by the voluntary commit-
ment of someone’s private resources for the pursuit of some public goal (or to sustain an agency 
engaged in such a pursuit).3 Philanthropic initiatives are manifold. They may be individual, 
in the form of gifts by single wealthy donors, or corporate, when they see the engagement of 
charitable organisations or private foundations. Philanthropy may not only take many different 
forms, but it can perform various functions in society that are more or less complementary to 
the action of public institutions (see, e.g., Anheier 2018). I shall expound on and revisit the 
many possible functions of philanthropy in the next section. I would like to draw the reader’s 
attention now to one particular function that philanthropy may perform in the context of the 
nonideal circumstances of institutional action we have just seen. An immediate illustration 
of this particular function comes by observing the COVID-19 pandemic context, which has 
clearly opened a window on one particular form of philanthropy’s contribution to public insti-
tutional action. In that exceptional context, nonprofit agencies, foundations, or single donors 
have sustained the development (and committed to the distribution) of vaccines, as well as 
offering contributions for the assistance of the most vulnerable sectors of the population (e.g., 
homeless people or the elderly). This contribution has proved particularly important given the 
difficulties of coordinating and activating prompt institutional responses to an unprecedented 
and (partially) unforeseeable emergency. For example, philanthropy’s contribution has been 
crucial in this sense to complement and sustain the action of public institutions, which has 
sometimes left vulnerable minorities behind in an effort to manage the sanitary situation for 
the majority of the population. This particular complementary function qualifies what I call 
‘remedial philanthropic initiatives’.
To be true, philanthropy’s complementary contribution to public institutional action is 
far from being a novel phenomenon that emerged in the pandemic times. From being pri-
marily a church- or religion-based initiative, philanthropy has gradually come to permeate 
many domains traditionally the preserve of public institutional action, including education, 
health, arts, science, and innovation, as well as the protection of people’s social and civil rights 
(Bremner 1988; Hall 2006). Because of its enhancing contribution to many domains of peo-
ple’s personal, social, cultural, and political life, the role of individual philanthropists and of 
philanthropic foundations may be seen as an important complement to the action of pub-
lic institutions. In a democracy, philanthropy may have the additional value of sustaining and 
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moving forward specific projects or endeavours that might be too marginal or controversial to 
be pursued by public institutional action or whose priority is not recognised by the political and 
social majority of citizens. The action of advocacy and social campaigning that may be sustained 
by philanthropic initiatives may thus contribute also to enrich the democratic public sphere and 
contribute to a pluralistic political discourse in keeping with one of the pivotal commitments of 
a democratic institutional setting (Reich 2016, pp. 73–76, 2018).
In view of these positive grounds for the assessment of philanthropy’s contribution to 
public institutional action, good reasons seem to hold to justify the public incentivisation of 
philanthropic initiatives, especially in nonideal circumstances that threaten the functioning of 
public institutions (both from the inside and the outside, as seen previously). Incentives for 
philanthropic initiatives may be manifold, but they almost ubiquitously include provisions of 
tax incentives for private and corporate donors. Tax incentives may take the form of either tax 
reductions or tax credits, and they may concern either income or estate taxes. Moreover, tax 
incentives may come in degrees depending on the fiscal level where they occur – federal, state, 
or local (see Greene and McClelland 2001). Among the countries where tax incentives for phi-
lanthropy are sizable and widespread are certainly the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom. But Switzerland, where philanthropy is a major instance of the general commitment 
to subsidiarity, also provides an illustration of the multiple layers of this mode of incentivisation 
for philanthropic initiatives. In the confederation, tax deductions for philanthropic donations 
apply to foundations and individual citizens. Philanthropic foundations enjoy a total tax exemp-
tion from the federal income tax and may also benefit from variable tax exemptions on a can-
tonal and communal level. These exemptions may concern the income and/or capital tax and 
the real estate income tax as well as the inheritance tax. The exemptions for individual citizens 
who donate to philanthropic foundations apply at the same twofold federal (up to 20% of the 
total taxable income) and cantonal/ municipal level.
However, the story of the supposed allegiance between philanthropic and public institu-
tional actions is far from being rosy. In periods of fiscal austerity and political polarisation, the 
choice of what social causes and interests to promote and prioritise is particularly arduous, and 
philanthropic initiatives may seem a way to force the hands of public institutions in particular 
directions, as they sidestep the ordinary democratic process for giving political orientation. 
The criticism may be pressed to the point of pinpointing the essential incompatibility between 
democracy and philanthropy as an instance of plutocracy (Reich 2013). The question concerns 
whether and to what extent democracies may afford the condition that private property and 
wealth become the guidance for the promotion and prioritisation of public purposes, thus 
sanctioning the influence of background inequalities on public decisions. The very freedom of 
philanthropic initiatives to choose what issues to press and sustain by the employment of private 
funds is frequently indicated as a source of democratic risk. Sometimes pet causes or marginal 
cultural initiatives may erratically get pride of place, overshadowing more urgent economic or 
social needs. Moreover, there is a risk of cacophony, as the most disparate initiatives may attract 
donors’ idiosyncratic support, thus causing inefficient expenditures that a careful political strat-
egy of coherent public investments could easily avoid. The underlying fear concerns a general 
lack of public control and transparency on philanthropic initiatives that risks exposing public 
institutional action to private and partisan interests, outside the usual mechanisms of checks and 
balances proper of a democracy.
These shadows over the justifiability of the allegiance between philanthropic and public 
institutional action have also cast more than a doubt concerning the justification of such forms 
of support as tax incentives for private (individual or corporate) donors. At a basic individual-
centred level, one may ask why and to what extent the state is ever justified to subsidise (with 
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a loss of tax revenue) people’s exercise of their freedom to give their private money away (see 
Reich 2011). To use Rob Reich’s eloquent words, in reference to the American context, 
philanthropy
is not just the voluntary activity of a donor, the result of people exercising a freedom 
to do what they wish with their private property. Philanthropy . . . is generously tax 
subsidized. . . . So foundations do not simply express the individual liberty of wealthy 
people. Citizens pay, in lost tax revenue, for foundations, and, by extension, for giving 
public expression to the preferences of rich people.
(Reich 2016, pp. 70–71)
But this individualistic, broadly liberal questioning does not exhaust the qualms with justify-
ing tax incentives for philanthropy. From the institution-centred internalist perspective I have 
adopted in this chapter, more can be said to explore the possible tensions between philanthropic 
and public institutional action. For starters, there is a risk that by ‘throwing money at’ certain 
causes, philanthropy more or less subtly interferes with an institution’s self-control on how its 
action furthers its grounding ideals (and perhaps even questions such ideals on grounds of pleas-
ing the philanthropist). Also, philanthropy may endanger the mutuality of the accountability 
relations we have seen as pivotal to an institutional ethics of office. To be sure, any philanthro-
pist would want to know what has been done with their money and so hold the officehold-
ers accountable to them in ways in which the philanthropists are not really accountable to the 
officeholders (in view of their freedom to donate for causes of their choosing). Finally, especially 
when philanthropy steps in to respond to institutional failures, tax incentives for philanthropy 
may come under attack as the source of a potential viciously self-defeating institutional short-
circuit. Fiscal benefits of this kind, especially if widespread, may have the adverse effect of 
draining resources from the state, thus further undercutting public institutional action. An insti-
tutional short-circuit may thus occur by which public institutional action risks being entangled 
in a viciously self-defeating circularity, thus surrendering its raison d’être.
In the remainder of the chapter, I address these criticalities concerning the justification of the 
allegiance between philanthropic and public institutional action and the sanctioning of such an 
allegiance by means of tax incentives. I will do that with reference to a specific remedial func-
tion that philanthropy may perform in the face of institutional failures within the framework 
of an institutional ethics of office accountability (as presented in the first part of the chapter).
5 Remedial philanthropic initiatives as external props  
for public institutional action
The question of whether tax incentives for philanthropy are justified necessarily depends on 
the answer we give to the more general question of the justification of the very place of phi-
lanthropy in the context of public institutional action. I want to suggest a particular answer 
to this general question with reference to a specific remedial function that philanthropy can 
perform within the institutional ethics of office accountability I  have presented in the first 
part of the chapter. I have argued there that the key structural feature for having a functioning 
public institution is that the officeholders within it always act in their institutional capacity for 
the pursuit of an agenda whose rationale may be vindicated as coherent with the terms of their 
power mandate. This thought is summarised in the normative idea of office accountability. The 
commitment to office accountability is key to institutional functioning because it emphasises 
the importance of officeholders’ mutual reliance to uphold by their interrelated action the 
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raison d’être of their institution. As we have seen in §3, when public institutional action fails, 
office accountability grounds the expectation that officeholders be ready to engage in practices 
of institutional answerability as a self-reflective communicative exercise aimed to gain a shared 
understanding of what went wrong and how it could be remedied.
However, sometimes internal or external hurdles may impair the mobilisation of an institu-
tion’s internal resources of self-correction. When these predicaments occur, the prompt for 
remedial action may well come from outside a failing public institution. My suggestion is that 
one important ground for the justification of philanthropy emerges whenever philanthropy 
takes on such a remedial function in the face of failures of public institutional action. This is a 
normative, not a descriptive, claim, and, most importantly, it concerns a particular set of philan-
thropic initiatives. Of course, we may have philanthropic initiatives of other kinds that claim 
for themselves either a more or a less ambitious role. More ambitious philanthropic initiatives 
would claim a more pronounced action-guiding function as they offer their support for activi-
ties aimed at (re-)orienting political action or (re)setting political priorities (e.g., through advo-
cacy or lobbying).4 Other forms of philanthropy may have greater modesty as they operate to 
sustain ‘additional’ activities that are normally not considered definitional of public institutional 
action (e.g., artistic activities or sports events).5 Of course, we may have reasons to cherish (or, in 
fact, dread) philanthropy even under such richer or more modest descriptions. We should also 
be mindful of the general liberal presumption in favour of people’s freedom to dispose of their 
own personal resources as they see fit (within basic limits such as those set by the harm princi-
ple). My argument is more specific. Whatever we may think about the general complementarity 
between philanthropy and public institutional action (in a democracy or more in general), there 
are reasons for justifying certain philanthropic initiatives in the nonideal circumstances of insti-
tutional failures, which require an external prop to be addressed and redressed in ways capable 
of sustaining institutional functioning.
To the extent that philanthropy serves this circumscribed but important remedial role for the 
functioning of the public institutional system, it is justified, and so are provisions that incen-
tivise it, including by means of tax incentives. The simple thought behind this seemingly bold 
claim is that taxation should serve to sustain the basic functioning of public institutions; there is 
nothing surprising about this thought, as we normally accept that taxpayer money is used, inter 
alia, to pay officeholders’ salaries and cover the indirect costs of their action (by catering to their 
working tools and facilities). To the extent that some philanthropic initiatives target failures of 
public institutional action, they attend to a sufficiently analogous role of propping up institu-
tional functioning from the outside. From this point of view, there does not seem to be anything 
outrageous in the thought that those who use their own private resources to this end should be 
sustained, encouraged, and relieved from paying twice, as it were, for their contribution to the 
functioning of the public institutional system in which they partake.
The claim can be made in yet stronger terms. To the extent that a well-ordered society rests 
on a network of functioning public institutions, we can safely say that all those who value liv-
ing in such a society have reasons to be vigilant about and responsive to institutional failures 
that may threaten the general social order. When the officeholders, who are directly implicated 
in the action of public institutions, fail to sustain institutional functioning by their interrelated 
conduct, the members of that society acquire a reason to act to ensure that the institutional sys-
tem as a whole is functioning, which entails their having reasons to sustain public institutional 
action by their conduct, including through donations. Because such donations become a crucial 
prop for institutional functioning, they are not only justified, but there are general reasons to 
incentivise them (e.g., through tax benefits). Seen in this light, remedial philanthropic initiatives 
do not necessarily indicate the surrender of public institutional action or the ‘outsourcing’ of 
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citizens’ responsibilities to some private provider (Beerbohm 2016). Insofar as philanthropists 
are members of a well-ordered society, they have stakes and certain obligations in upholding 
the functioning of the public institutional system. Many (but not all) of their initiatives may 
therefore be rightfully justified and incentivised in this contributive spirit.6
Two corollaries immediately follow from my claim about the justification of remedial phil-
anthropic initiatives and their incentivisation. The first corollary concerns the site of my pro-
posed normative view. The argument I have offered for the justification and incentivisation of 
philanthropy is situated within a nonideal theory of institutional action. In ideal circumstances, 
characterised by a perfect officeholders’ compliance with office accountability, the functioning 
of public institutions rests on internal resources, as it relies upon the officeholders’ interrelated 
action. Deficits of office accountability in the officeholders’ conduct trigger institutional dys-
functions that undermine the capacity of an institution to engage in a reflexive process of self-
correction. These threats to institutional functioning mark the transition to a nonideal situation, 
which sets the condition for initiating a corrective action of institutional dysfunctions to (re-)
establish office accountability. I have suggested that we can understand and justify the remedial 
role of philanthropy and of provisions intended to encourage it in these conditions as an exter-
nal prop for institutional functioning.
This first corollary signposts one specificity of the argument I have put forward in this chap-
ter: Specific measures to sustain certain philanthropic initiatives through (fiscal) incentives are 
justified as a remedial (possibly transitory?) measure in support of the action of public institu-
tions when office accountability fails to sustain institutional functioning from the inside of those 
institutions. The incentivisation of remedial philanthropic initiatives through the investment of 
public funds (e.g., in the form of subsidies granted through tax benefits) is thus a measure justi-
fied in special nonideal circumstances. This said, to the extent that such nonideal circumstances 
are frequent (and easily predictable) in normal politics (whereas ideal conditions are hardly ever 
satisfied), the incentivisation of remedial philanthropic initiatives may be rightfully considered 
part of the ordinary business of a well-ordered society.
The second corollary of my proposed normative view of philanthropy concerns the type of 
philanthropic initiatives that are justifiably the object of incentives. The type of philanthropy 
justifiable on the institution-centred grounds I have presented (and for which tax incentives are 
equally justified) is that specifically targeted at enhancing institutional functioning by remedy-
ing the failures of the officeholders’ interrelated action and that is itself informed by an agenda 
whose rationale may withstand public scrutiny as coherent with the raison d’être of the institu-
tion in question.7 This corollary has two specific implications. First, as anticipated, whatever 
specific form they take, remedial philanthropic initiatives are justified within this framework 
insofar as they contribute to remedying deficits that may make a public institution fail its raison 
d’être. Justifiable remedial philanthropic initiatives should aim at upholding office accountability 
by sustaining officeholders in their effort to discharge their tasks, exercise their powers of office 
in keeping with the terms of their power mandates, and therefore uphold the raison d’être of 
their institution. This implication is not to suggest that other forms of philanthropy are neces-
sarily unjustifiable on any normative ground. What it certainly means is that the normative 
resources for justifying them must be found elsewhere.
Moreover, remedial philanthropic initiatives may be justified within this institutional frame-
work insofar as they are organised in such a way that enhances the compatibility with a 
commitment to office accountability. To wit, philanthropic initiatives should themselves be 
moved by the pursuit of agendas whose rationale may be vindicated as coherent with the rai-
son d’être of the targeted institution. This requirement is of the utmost importance to resist 
two allegations that may be levelled against philanthropy. The first concerns the frequently 
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heard challenge that philanthropy is unjustifiable, as it defies normal standards of accountability 
(Reich 2016, pp. 68–69). Because, by definition, philanthropy consists in a voluntary donation 
of private resources, donors are (and claim to be) characteristically free to choose the causes they 
want to support and, in so choosing, they are not expected to respond to any particular public 
commitment, democratically deliberated agenda, or – in fact – constituency. This characteristic 
unboundedness of philanthropic action has often been presented as a source of tension with the 
democratic ethos. The argument I have offered in this chapter shows that there are in fact solid 
normative bases to justify and incentivise certain forms of philanthropy that honour a specific 
form of office accountability. For instance, one may think of ways to engage officeholders to 
draw up a list of institutional problems that need outside help from which philanthropists can 
choose. In this way, philanthropists’ commitment to office accountability could be enhanced 
in keeping with the commitment to maintaining the officeholders’ responsibility engaged.8 
Philanthropists might still not be accountable in the same sense in which elected officials are 
accountable to their constituency in a democracy. But this does not mean or entail that they can 
do away with being called to account for the causes they choose or claim for being recognised 
and supported only to the extent that they pursue certain causes in certain ways.
Second, the specifications I have hitherto introduced are geared to ensuring that remedial 
philanthropic initiatives uphold without hijacking public institutional action, thus steering clear 
of the allegation of being tantamount to a form of corruption. Quite apparently, philanthropy 
runs the risk of being categorised as a form of corruption on either of the primary understand-
ings of this pathology of the public function in the current philosophical debate. On one count, 
philanthropy may be viewed as a form of ‘institutional corruption’ to the extent that public 
institutions become dependent on the undue influence of the donors’ private interests, thus 
compromising their integrity as they are distracted from the pursuit of the public good (Lessig 
2013, 2018; Miller 2017; Sandel 2012; Thompson 2018). But philanthropy may also be seen 
as instantiating a form of ‘political corruption’ insofar as it advocates for certain partisan causes 
that pressure officeholders to make use of their powers of office in ways incoherent with the 
terms of their mandate (Ceva and Ferretti 2021, 2018). The restricted view and justification of 
philanthropy I have laid out in these pages has the resources to resist both allegations because 
it does not lend support to the justification (let alone the incentivisation) of philanthropic ini-
tiatives that have the ambition of either giving new direction to public institutional action by 
playing with its agenda or in fact accomplishing certain tasks instead of public institutions. To 
steer away from the risk of initiating viciously self-defeating institutional short-circuits, remedial 
philanthropic initiatives are themselves justified and may be justifiably incentivised when they 
work as an external prop to enable officeholders to perform their tasks and uphold the function-
ing of their institution, not when they replace their actions.
While my defence of philanthropy and its incentivisation is conditional and targeted to 
specific types of initiatives, it is by no means marginal or residual. There are many instances of 
philanthropy that could qualify (whereas some, as seen previously, are excluded). For example, 
a growing number of foundations has long recognised the importance of investing in lead-
ership development, capacity-building, and innovation. While this recognition has primarily 
originated and been consolidated in the domain of private corporations, it also matters for 
governmental action. The Broad Foundation,9 for example, is characterised by a commitment 
to developing leadership- and capacity-building programmes for government employees. In 
particular, the Broad Residency in Urban Education and the Broad Superintendents Academy 
have gradually come to uphold the American public educational system as concerns the provi-
sion of training for central-office executives. By upholding the development of officeholders’ 
skills, this action seems to qualify as a form of external prop for public institutional action along 
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the lines I have suggested previously. Because public education is one of the main government’s 
expenditures, the support of this type of philanthropic action through such incentives as fiscal 
benefits seems by no means misplaced.
Remedial philanthropic initiatives may also work to support the working of political pro-
cesses. Another example from the American context is helpful here. In 2007, five major foun-
dations joined forces to examine the hurdles in the decision-making process that were causing 
the California state government to make fewer and fewer major policy and budgetary decisions. 
The joint efforts of these foundations managed to attract more than $30 million from private 
donors willing to launch California Forward,10 a bipartisan organisation aimed to promote 
actions of revision and enhancement of the state government’s capacity to make pragmatic, fis-
cally sound public policy decisions capable to respond to Californians’ claims and needs. Also 
in this case, we can see a remedial philanthropic initiative that, far from forcing the hand of 
public institutions into specific directions, contributes to making officeholders more respon-
sive to popular demands, coherently with the raison d’être of a governmental institution in a 
democracy. In this case, too, philanthropy seems to perform an important remedial task, which 
is reasonable to incentivise, as it upholds an institutional ethics of office accountability, thus 
propping public institutional action.
These two examples serve the illustrative purpose of showing how the institution-centred 
argument I have presented in this chapter, while targeted at specific types of philanthropic ini-
tiatives in the nonideal circumstances of public institutional failures, may make some normative 
space for the justification of philanthropy and its incentivisation within an ethics of institutional 
action for democracies. The main claim I have defended in the chapter is that when remedial 
philanthropic initiatives are within the boundaries of office accountability, they fall short of 
generating any viciously self-defeating institutional short-circuit. What is more, there are gen-
eral normative reasons to uphold remedial philanthropic initiatives that meet this condition as a 
means to uphold public institutional action from the outside a public institution when the inter-
related action of officeholders fails to sustain it from the inside.
Notes
 1 An earlier version of this chapter was discussed at the Taxation and Philanthropy conference organised 
by the Geneva Centre for Philanthropy. I am particularly grateful to Pamala Wiepking for the com-
ments offered on that occasion. I am indebted also to Andrei Poama for his detailed written comments 
on an earlier draft.
 2 For a classic presentation of an institution as a ‘pattern of roles’, whereby roles are capacities ‘in which 
someone acts in relation to others’, see Emmet 1966. For an overview, see Miller 2014.
 3 For an analytical philosophical discussion of what philanthropy is see Reich, Cordelli and Bernholz 
(2016), where philanthropy is presented as an act or a structure consisting of a ‘voluntary donation 
aimed at providing some other-regarding or prosocial benefit’ (p. 7).
 4 For example, Reich (2016, pp. 73–81) defends the role of foundations in democracies on the ground 
that the freedom of philanthropic initiatives may enrich the pluralism of the political agenda and 
enhance the discovery capacity of the payoffs of new approaches to social policy precisely by virtue 
of the foundations’ more ambitious function of giving visibility to marginal or neglected causes and 
resources for social innovation.
 5 In this spirit, for instance, Pevnick (2016, pp. 232–238) sees philanthropy as a particularly apt provider 
of cultural goods. Because of the egalitarian commitment that should inform the direct action of 
democratic governments, the support of particular cultural initiatives may be discriminatory or disre-
spectful. However, for Pevnick, insofar as we recognise the importance of furthering cultural interests, 
philanthropists may perform this role free from the constraint of government action.
 6 In this sense, my argument can be seen as addressed to the justification of what Horvath and Powell 
(2016) have called ‘contributive philanthropy’, as distinguished from ‘disruptive philanthropy’, which is 
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instead ‘an activity that through the magnitude of donations either explicitly or by consequence alters 
the public conversation about which social issues matter, and specifies who is the preferred providers of 
services to address these issues without any engagement with the deliberative processes of civil society’ 
(p. 90).
 7 This restriction concerning the type of justifiable philanthropic initiative goes in the direction of taking 
issue with what Cordelli (2016) has called the ‘discretionary view’ for which philanthropy should be 
the expression of individual free decisions to support whatever cause is closer to their hearts, as it were 
(p. 245).
 8 I owe this suggestion to Andrei Poama.
 9 See https://broadfoundation.org. Discussions in this direction are happening in Europe, too, where the role 
of philanthropy as a complement to state’s action has so far been less explored – see, for example, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee (EESC)’s 2019 opinion on ‘European philanthropy: An untapped 
potential’, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/euro 
pean-philanthropy-untapped-potential-exploratory-opinion-request-romanian-presidency
 10 See https://www.cafwd.org
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1 Introduction
In both ordinary language and in economics, “gifting” refers to diverse acts, such as the exchange 
of in-kind gifts (such as “Christmas gifts”), monetary transfers to philanthropic organizations, 
organ donations, bequests, giving alms to beggars, and so on, apart from volunteering activi-
ties, care-giving acts such as child-rearing, and exchanging favors between friends or spouses. 
While these activities are often grouped within the same term, it is worth questioning whether 
they have anything in common (Zimmerman 1990, pp. 477–507; Martin 1994; Daly 2012; 
Elder-Vass 2020). In this chapter, I use gifting to imply a unilateral transfer of a certain amount 
of money to a non-profit cause. Signing a check to the Red Cross, alumni making donations 
to their alma maters, contributing to public radio, religious tithes, patronage of the arts, taking 
the “Giving (what you can) pledge,” and so on are all instances of gifting. For simplicity, I con-
sider “gifting” a three-pronged act, involving a “gift-giver,” a “gift-receiver” or a giftee, and the 
amount of money transferred between these two parties.
From a behavioral perspective, gifting is often considered incompatible with the conven-
tional model of economic agents acting to maximize their “utility,” which refers to qualities that 
make a particular action subjectively profitable or preferable to these agents. Thus, the gifting 
puzzle stems from the fact that gifting is inherently unprofitable, which is exemplified through 
its three widely recognized features. The first is the transfer of a certain amount of money 
from a gift-giver to a receiver,1 which precludes the former from any form of self-expenditure. 
A gift necessarily involves a loss in consumption. The second feature of gifting is that it con-
stitutes of a unilateral transfer of money, unlike bilateral transfers that are central to economic 
exchanges. Therefore, a gift-giver’s loss in consumption is not compensated by any goods or 
services received in return. The third feature is that gifting involves a voluntary transfer, unlike 
taxation, which involves a compulsory transfer of money. The gifting puzzle asks why rational 
consumers, who are competent in conducting a cost-benefit analysis, would consider undertak-
ing such an unproductive activity instead of avoiding their losses. Neglected for a long time,2 
the gifting puzzle has recently inspired a variety of solutions, which are discussed in this chapter.
The existing literature proposes three solutions to the gifting puzzle. One is to concede 
that the act of gifting is unproductive and yet that it does not refute the model of utility 






ever constant self-interest” as “the expression of the most original and most general forces and 
impulses of human nature” (1985, p. 86). Menger admits that “[g]oodwill toward others” leads 
people to “not protect their economic interest at all in some cases, and in some cases incom-
pletely” (1985, p. 71), and that real agents do not always guide “their economic activity exclu-
sively by consideration of their individual interests” (1985, p. 83). If acts of gifting are such cases, 
they should be treated as not falling within the scope of the dogma of constant self-interest, 
rather than as exceptions to the latter behavioral rule.
However, it is not obvious that the acts of gifting are not a relevant subject matter for the 
economic realm. No less than exchanges, gifting is arguably a significant concept of economics, 
traditionally defined as the science of allocation of scarce resources (Robbins 1935). If so, acts 
of gifting do not exemplify the limitations of the attempt to apply maximizing utility theory to 
the most varied aspects of human behavior. Rather, what acts of gifting reveal is that the latter 
theory may fail at heart.
A second way to attempt to solve the gifting puzzle will examine the hidden motivation of 
gift-givers, which has been the focus of several studies. Consider, for example, Julie’s donation 
of 100 CHF to the Red Cross. While it is possible that her donation is motivated by an expec-
tation of making a difference to the health condition of the medically poor, she could also be 
motivated by her desire to be seen by others as a concerned benefactor (West 2004), to conform 
to peer pressure (Shang and Croson 2009), to attract the members of the opposite sex (Landry 
et al. 2005), “to gratify an inner audience” (Elster 2006), or to “buy” salvation. If self-interested 
motivations can “mimic” altruistic ones (Elster 2006) so that altruistic actions bear no trace of 
their motivations, it is vain, one may conclude, to investigate whether acts of gifting conform 
with the theory of utility maximization.
Against this strategy, one may reply that the gifting puzzle is not the epistemological problem 
of discerning what truly, despite confounding appearance, motivates real donors. The puzzle 
is rather to figure whether someone can consistently maximize his utility by gifting – not to 
reckon whether one can ever be certain about whether that is the case. The gifting puzzle is the 
theoretical puzzle of trying to reconcile an apparently unprofitable course of action within the 
constraints of a theory that assumes that economic agents tend to prioritize the most profitable 
course of action.
A third way to attempt to provide a solution to the gifting puzzle is to argue that the puzzle 
itself rests on a misconstruction of the concept of gifting. Those who employ this strategy argue 
that once gifting acts are recognized for what they truly are, they turn out to be the productive 
activity that a rational economic agent may prefer to perform after a cost-benefit analysis (Sec-
tions 2–4). Still another way of dealing with the gifting puzzle is to argue that the puzzle itself 
rests on a narrow definition of “utility” and that expanding its definition would clarify that the 
act of gifting does enable utility maximization (Sections 5–8). The following sections present an 
in-depth analysis of these last two strategies.
2 Gifting need not be costly
The gifting puzzle rests on the assumption that gifting is unattractive because it is inherently 
costly. Conventional economic theories also perpetuate the idea that gifting cannot occur with-
out incurring some cost. For example, the charity law assumes that individuals respond to the 
“price”3 of gifting; therefore, a favorable tax treatment incentivizes gifting by making it less 
costly. The claim that gifting is costly also appears in ethical debates on the moral obligation of 
charity. For example, Peter Singer assumes that gifting must involve a certain amount of “sacri-
fice”, which, according to him, one is individually morally obligated to bear if doing so enables 
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an increase of the total wellbeing (1972). Effective altruists, who insist on making donations to 
cost-effective charities that provide the highest benefits or goods per unit of currency received, 
also assume that gifting is costly (MacAskill 2015). Furthermore, the so-called “demandingness 
objection” to the utilitarian approach also relies on the same assumption while also presupposing 
that the cost of gifting borne by the well-off is more important than that borne by the poor (in 
terms of death rates, disease, poverty, etc.; McElwee 2017). Another common claim is that one’s 
duty to donate is limited by the cost one has already incurred (Kamm 1992, p. 356). The costli-
ness of gifting is assumed even by those who argue that gifting is not as demanding (or costly) 
as one may intuitively presume (MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord 2018). In sum, the diverse 
viewpoints on the nature and extent of our duty to donate hinge on an uncontested assumption 
that such a duty cannot be fulfilled without incurring some cost.4
Nevertheless, one may object that gifting need not be inherently costly and, therefore, 
the unproductive choice that a rational consumer should disprefer. The claim that gifting 
entails a consumption loss relies on the assumption that the utility derived from spending 
n+1 unit of one’s money is always greater than that derived from gifting the same.5 However, 
the decreasing marginal value of money implies that not all donors are equally burdened by 
the cost of gifting. In particular, ultra-rich donors are most likely to be spared of the costs of 
gifting. Excessive wealth helps these donors satisfy most of their desires; therefore, between 
two competing uses of an additional unit of their wealth, spending money on themselves may 
not necessarily lead to greater utility than gifting it to others. This implies that gifting by the 
wealthy does not destroy utility, as supposed by the gifting puzzle. Therefore, one solution 
to the gifting puzzle is to determine cases where gifting is nearly costless, thus making it a 
rational choice.
In practice, whether the unequally distributed cost of gifting determine the rates of tax 
breaks warrants greater examination. In many countries, the variable costs of each donor’s per-
unit donation amount is not a relevant consideration in determining the country’s tax incen-
tive rates. Lambelet et al. (2019) explain that in Switzerland, since the tax deduction offered 
to donors lowers their taxable income by the donation amount, “the financial benefit (of a tax 
deduction) proportionally increases according to the income and the tax-bracket of the person” 
(p. 35). For instance, a donation of 5,000 CHF will incur a cost of 4,867.01 CHF to someone 
with a federal taxable income of 50,000 CHF, and 4,450 CHF to someone with a federal tax-
able income of 150,000 CHF (Lambelet et al. 2019, p. 35). Therefore, given the decreasing 
marginal utility of money, this country follows the system of lowering the burden of the cost 
of gifting, the greater the benefit of tax deductions. Scholars have debated the rationale behind 
such a tax policy and object to its “plutocratic bias” (Reich 2018, p. 120; Lambelet et al. 2019). 
If tax breaks are meant to make gifting cheaper, they are also designed to favor those who are 
already less affected by its financial costs. There is here a trade-off between the efficiency of a 
system that intends to increase the distribution of public goods by encouraging wealthy indi-
viduals to increase their donation amounts in absolute terms and the fairness of a system that 
ascribes them greater power.
The previous solution to the gifting puzzle involves rejecting the assumption that gifting 
is costly due to the negligible cost incurred by ultra-rich donors. This solution is unsuitable 
because it unduly restricts rational gifting to billionaires. It entails that other profiles of donors, 
those whose desires are chronically left unsatisfied by their more modest income but who 
nonetheless choose to gift, fail to act rationally. However, the claim that only the ultra-rich can 
rationally choose to gift is to posit a very demanding condition. Therefore, before conceding it, 
we must examine the possibility that gifting could also be the rational choice for those less for-
tunate donors who have to bear its costs.
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3 Gifting is an act of consumption
The gifting puzzle relies on the assumption that utility accrues to an agent through the con-
sumption of physical goods such as foodstuff, medicine, cars, and houses. However, as Ariely 
and Norton (2009) argue, consumption may also include consumption of “concepts,” through 
activities such as reading information or blogs, listening to gossip, and hearing stories. Addition-
ally, “conceptual consumption is implicated in even the most basic consumption acts, such as 
eating or drinking, and is therefore paramount” (Ariely and Norton 2009, p. 477). They state 
that the experience of eating a chocolate chip cookie, for example, is not just a case of physical 
consumption but also a case of conceptual consumption in view of the number of thoughts 
elicited by the act of consumption. They further explain:
In this example, notice that regardless of the questions the consumer asks – the con-
cepts brought to mind – the physical consumption object (the cookie) remains exactly 
the same; conceptual consumption, on the other hand, will be markedly different 
depending on whether consumers are thinking about a goal to lose weight as com-
pared to a desire to promote fair labor practices.
(Ariely and Norton 2009, p. 477)
Thus, however loosely defined, the notion of conceptual consumption encapsulates certain 
“psychological aspects of consumption.”
According to Ariely and Norton, gifting is a case “where physical consumption is sacrificed 
for the sake of conceptual consumption.” They argue:
From our perspective, charitable donations offer an interesting case of foregoing posi-
tive physical consumption, since any donation to another person necessarily precludes 
givers from using that money to pursue their own happiness . . . they do so to engage 
in conceptual consumption, to consume a view of themselves as altruistic individuals, 
leading to the benefit of increased well-being.
(Ariely and Norton 2009, p. 487)
If a conceptual consumption of a moral satisfaction can compensate for the loss from a physi-
cal consumption, the option of gifting would then become profitable to a rational consumer.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned solution to the gifting puzzle does not withstand scrutiny. 
This is because the boundaries of what is “consumable” have some restraints, which can rule 
out a good self-image or moral satisfaction as a genuine act of consumption. In his discussion of 
conceptual disappointment, Albert Hirschman notes that
[o]riginally we consumed turnips and candles whereas we owned and used gowns and 
carriages; but with time (and the progress of macroeconomics), consumption came to 
refer to all the goods and services people produced or purchase for their own goods.
(2002, p. 30)
A “consumable” item was first a “non-durable good,” that is, a good that “deteriorates in 
the performance of its function” (Hirschman 2002, p. 29). Later, the category of “consuma-
bles” was extended to also include durable goods (e.g., cars and houses). However, even with a 
less restricted definition, not anything can be counted as a consumable item. Consumables are 
things that are “transferable,” that have the capacity to a life of their own, and that can be owned 
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and piled up. But if a consumable is that sort of physical “thing,” it cannot be the intangible, 
psychological experiences that sometimes accompany an act of physical consumption, including 
the gift-giver’s enjoyment of a good opinion of oneself. In sum, I argue that the term “concep-
tual consumption” misconstrues the concept of consumption and its introduction represents a 
failed attempt to subsume acts of gifting under the latter category.
4 Gifting as another form of economic exchange
According to Kenneth Boulding, what makes gifting a puzzle for economists is that it fails to 
display the quid pro quo involved in most economic exchanges (Boulding 1962). Boulding 
argues:
Exchange is a reciprocal transfer. Philanthropy, apparently, represents a unilateral trans-
fer. In an exchange, something is transferred from party A to party B and something 
else from B to A. The ratio of these two quantities is, of course, the ratio of exchange 
and if one of the exchangeables is money, then this ratio is a price. The price system is 
a basic one for the economist and he tends to regard society as being organized by it. 
This is true even in national income economics for money income always represents 
quantity of commodity multiplied by its price. In a single transfer or gift, however, 
there is no price, for nothing is given in exchange. The economist, hence, feels rather 
at sea. When he finds himself in an area of social life which is apparently priceless, he 
hardly knows what to do.
(1962, p. 57)
Some scholars have objected to Boulding’s definition of gifting as a unilateral transfer of 
money in light of the various “private benefits” that gift-givers often receive from their benefi-
ciaries in return. Lisa Vesterlund lists several types of counter-gifts (or “benefits,” “quid pro quo 
contributions”) such as of
recognition, welcoming or thank-you gifts, membership benefits like free tickets to 
events, updates on shows and exhibits  .  .  . large contributors may have buildings 
named after them, receive exclusive dinner invites, be invited to have lunch with 
powerful politicians, and so on.
(2004, p. 573)
In light of these reciprocal gestures, Vesterlund concludes that “the choice to give is not con-
ceptually different from any act of purchasing a good” (2004, p. 573). From this point of view, 
gifting is a sub-case of economic exchanges and can be potentially profitable as the latter.
Nevertheless, one may insist on not conflating gifting with exchanging. Consider the case 
of donors who choose to contribute to gain membership into a club or a certain social circle. 
Vesterlund argues that in this case, the donation is equivalent to the payment of a “membership 
fee” to be part of the community surrounding the charity (2004 p. 173), because it involves 
the bilateral, mutually related kind of transfers that pertain to economic exchanges. However, 
a donation that is followed by a good in return (in the form of a club membership) need not 
constitute as a “payment” for that good. Additionally, these counter-gifts are not mandatory or 




The difficulty in sorting out gifting from an exchange arises from the fact that both 
acts can be performed simultaneously. Consider, for example, tipping. Diego Gambetta 
implicitly endorses that tipping is an instance of an economic exchange by defining it as 
“the discretionary payments we make to certain occupations over and above the price of 
service” (2014). Thus, according to Gambetta’s definition, tipping is an overpayment for 
the price asked and is still a part of the consumer’s purchase of the server’s services.6 Alter-
natively, tipping may be approached as an instance of gifting. The amount of money tipped 
is not price-tagged and therefore is not part of the amount of money that the consumer is 
committed to transfer.
Why one should consider the transfer of a good from A  to B followed by a transfer of 
another good (or service) from B to A as two separate gifts rather than a single instance of a 
trade remains a relevant question. A successive transfer from a gift-giver to a receiver and vice 
versa is not a sufficient justification for subscribing to such a reductionist view. Moreover, unlike 
a trade, an expectation of receiving something in return is not a precondition for gifting. Here, 
while the non-satisfaction of these expectations can cause a disappointment, all a gift-giver can 
do is express it and maybe remind the recipient of the prevalent norms of social reciprocity. In 
contrast, traders have the right to coerce their recipients to fulfill their obligations by rightfully 
demanding them to transfer the good (or payment) in exchange for their payment (or good) 
while reserving the right to claim their share of the transfer.
Proponents of the reductive view typically respond that counter-gifting is no less obligatory 
than paying for a good that one intends to purchase. Following Marcel Mauss, they argue that 
norms of reciprocity make counter-gifting compulsory. Elder-Vass (2020) objects to this view 
and argues that, unlike in trade, the norms of reciprocity that govern counter-gifting are not 
truly “compulsory.”
If I give you a birthday present, it is entirely possible that you will later give one to 
me, and the fact that I gave you one may influence you to reciprocate, but the original 
gift does not create a binding requirement to do so. By the time my birthday comes 
around, we may have drifted apart, or you may be too poor to buy me a gift, or too 
ill to buy me a gift, or just too mean to buy me a gift, and there is no sanction that 
compels you to do so.
(2020, p. 681)
Elder-Weiss claims that gifting, unlike economic exchange, does not require “a compulsory 
transfer in return” (2020, p. 681). However, a failure to reciprocate a gift may at times trig-
ger indirect sanctions that are so harsh that counter-gifting may become a requirement. What 
distinguishes gifting from exchanging, I submit, is that only the latter involves an offer, that is, 
a conditional promise (Massin and Tieffenbach 2017). In the conceptual analysis we proposed 
of an economic exchange, we argue that when a seller price-tags an item, what she actually 
does is make a promise to whomever is willing to consider her offer that, if he transfers to her 
the price-tagged amount of money, she will transfer the good to him. To accept this offer, we 
further suggested, is something that is done by simply satisfying the condition of the promise 
through a voluntary transfer of the requested amount. Transferring the money simultaneously 
activates the seller’s obligation to deliver the good while giving the buyer a rightful claim on that 
good. In sum, the seller’s obligation to transfer the good is grounded on a conditional prom-
ise to deliver it to anyone who satisfies the condition of transferring the requested amount of 
money. Doing so entitles the buyer to receive the good purchased. In contrast, a gift-giver and 
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a giftee do not share a similar obligatory and reciprocal relationship; a gift-giver is not obligated 
to provide a gift nor entitled to receive a reciprocal counter-gift from a giftee.
The question of whether a thank-you gesture for a donation disqualifies it from being tax-
deductible is worth asking because the eligibility of receiving a tax incentive on a charitable 
transfer is conditional upon satisfying the legal definition of charity (Harding 2013). There is a 
“not for profit” requirement (Lideikyte Huber 2018), which could potentially exclude donors 
from receiving certain types of goods and services as quid pro quo. Some legislation stipulates 
that the “fair market value” of the counter-gifts ought to be “insubstantial” and should not 
exceed 2% of the donation. However, this condition may not strictly guarantee the “non-profit” 
dimension of the donation. As marginalist economists have discovered, an inverse preference for 
each other’s good is sufficient to characterize the related exchange as subjectively profitable to 
both parties. For someone dying of thirst in the desert, paying 1,000 USD to a Bad Samaritan 
for a glass of water is beneficial, despite being overpriced. The glass of water is not a counter-
gift for a payment of 1,000 USD, even if its real market value is “insubstantial.” Moreover, the 
fair market value of counter-gifts is not always readily available. Suppose a donor donates their 
private collection of avant-garde art to a prestigious art institution, which in turn rewards them 
with favorable publicity by inscribing their name on the entrance of the institutional building. 
In this case, what is the “fair market price” of the favorable publicity in response to the price of 
the art collection donated to the institution?
Determining whether counter-gifting always turns gifting into an economic exchange (thus 
casting doubt on its tax deductibility) requires an examination of the constitutive elements of 
such an exchange. Consider two scenarios of a donor enjoying a private concert for a donation 
made to an opera foundation. The first case involves an ex ante promise of the private concert, 
conditional upon the transfer of the donation amount. Here, the concert is a service that the 
foundation sells to its benefactors in the misleading form of a counter-gift. In contrast, in the 
second case, the concert is provided ex post. As described by Reinhard Zimmerman:
A benefit may have been transferred as a remuneration for a certain service rendered 
by the other party or as a reward for an act of rescue, or the donor may have wished 
to induce the donee to act in a certain way or to produce a certain result. In this latter 
instance, the donor will often impose a charge on the gift (donatio sub modo), with 
the result that the transaction includes a strong element of exchange.
(1990, pp. 477–478)
According to Zimmerman, these ambiguous cases require an examination of the transfer of 
gratuitous benefits. He also argues that the charity law requires an acute understanding of the 
definition of a donation and its differences with other forms of transactions, such as economic 
transactions. Hopefully, some of the observations made in this section have contributed to high-
lighting the conceptual boundaries between these two notions.
5 Utility as mere representation of preferences
Thus far, I have assumed that a utility maximizer evaluates the personal costs and benefits of 
various courses of actions and chooses the least costly (or the more beneficial) of these. The 
implicit assumption has been that the more “utility” an individual derives from a certain course 
of action, the better off she is. John Broom disagrees with those economists who tacitly endorse 
such a definition of the notion of “utility” (1991). As he argues, such an erroneous defini-
tion may have stemmed from an ambiguity in the word “utility” itself. According to Broom, 
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the “official meaning” of utility is “the value of a function that represents preferences,” which 
refers to any aspects of an option that make it preferable (for whatever subjective reasons) to 
another option. However, due to a shift in meaning, utility has instead come to refer to the 
“good,” “pleasure,” “benefit,” “happiness,” “satisfaction,” “well-being,” and “welfare” produced 
by certain actions for those who perform them.7 One argument Broom offers for the official 
(or value-neutral) definition of utility is that it accommodates the “preferences that are partly 
altruistic: directed toward the good of others” (1991, p. 5). An altruistic preference for gifting 
does not necessarily bring any benefits, even if acting on such preference does bring oneself 
a certain amount of utility. Therefore, the official meaning provides a solution to the gifting 
puzzle by freeing the gift-givers from the need to identify the aspects of gifting that could 
make it beneficial or costly for them. This conception of utility is advantageous because it is 
accommodative of widely different donor profiles, from the self-interested donor (who finds it 
onerous to donate more than 100 CHF to the Red Cross annually) to the generous one (who 
enjoys spending 50% of their annual income in humanitarian aid). Supposing both have the 
same annual income and can both derive utility from gifting, their donation amounts will be 
widely different based on the threshold at which they stop deriving more utility from donating 
their next 10 CHF.
However, endorsing the official meaning of utility has three unappealing implications. As 
previously discussed (Guth and Kliemt 2007; Engelen 2017), one implication is that it deprives 
the notion of utility of any substantial explanatory power. On the official meaning, the option 
of gifting is not preferred because it has a high utility. Rather it is because the option of gift-
ing is preferred (for whatever subjective reasons) that it has a high utility. There is a reverse of 
the natural order of the explanation, which appears to be the most significant objection against 
endorsing the official meaning.
Second, the official meaning precludes gift-givers (or any agent) from making a wrong deci-
sion, because an individual’s preference for A over B does not mean that A is the better option 
than B. Once the preferences are understood as not tracking the betterness of an option, they 
cannot be disputed, and the grounds for assessing whether they rationally motivate gifting (or 
any action) is lost. However, if the donors (or for that matter, any economic agents) are immune 
from error, maximizing utility theory can no longer be used to assess the rationality of human 
actions. Interestingly, the immunity is a point in favor of utility theory when it is applied to 
the preferences that motivate the buying and selling of goods and services. In the latter case, 
merely having a preference for the other trader’s good suffices to make it rational to choose to 
buy it. As Austrian economists have shown, the productivity of exchanges merely depends on 
the exchangers’ inverse valuations of each other’s goods (Massin and Tieffenbach 2017). Apart 
from the risk of a long-term bankruptcy from having inconsistent preferences, the exchangers’ 
preferences cannot be wrong. In contrast, absent a good (or a service) from either the giftee or 
from any third party that could make their act of gifting expectedly profitable, gift-givers do 
not enjoy the same immunity.
The third implication is that the official meaning of utility is at odds with the practice of 
determining particular taxation rates (Barry and Lawford-Smith 2019). Consider the example 
of a price-sensitive individual who is deeply affected by the cost of gifting 100 CHS annually 
versus someone who derives a moral satisfaction from gifting 50% of their income during the 
same period. Barry and Lawford-Smith note that using the proportional (and subjective) impact 
of the cost of gifting on the donors to grant the miser a greater tax deduction seems unfair. 
Although the official meaning of utility, as endorsed by Broom and others, would solve the 




6 Utility derived from being seen as gifting
An alternative way of addressing the gifting puzzle is to analyze yet another over-restricting 
assumption about how utility accrues to gift-givers. The assumption is that utility can only 
be derived from performing an action, such as eating cake or playing tennis, or more leisurely 
activities, such as sleeping or watching movies. Note that an agent receiving utility need 
not be the one to perform the utility-creating action. Instead, utility may be derived from 
someone else’s actions – for example, from being massaged, consoled, entertained, or told 
the truth. Philipp Pettit refers to such categories of goods as “action-dependent goods,” that 
is, “goods I get by grace of what I or others do” (1993, p. 331). However, besides action-
dependent goods, as Pettit stresses there are “goods I get by grace of what I or others think,” 
which he names “attitude-dependent goods” (1993, p. 331). These are the goods that one 
enjoys by virtue of others’ favorable attitude toward oneself and result from others’ positive 
opinions. Pettit also stresses that attitude-dependent goods are not as easily tractable as action-
dependent goods; this is because giving or receiving positive attitudes from others cannot be 
determined at will.
However, attitude-dependent goods are quite useful in determining donors’ hidden motiva-
tion. Several scholars have empirically tested and established the impact of prospective attitude-
dependent goods (such as a favorable reputation) over donor’s actions. The effects of being 
watched (Brook et al. 2006), eye contact with a solicitor (Bull and Gibson-Robinson 1981), 
being questioned (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2017), and, correlatively, the statistical pau-
city (1%) of anonymous donations all point to the motivating power of attitude-dependent 
goods. However, since the desire to be admired is often condemned, a donation driven by such 
a desire could be self-defeating. Nevertheless, once it is recognized that gifting could lead to 
positive recognition from others, it can become a profitable activity, making it the valid content 
of an economic preference. A utility maximizer will choose to gift if the value ascribed to gain-
ing others’ favorable opinions offsets the costs of gifting.
However, focusing on the motivating role of attitude-dependent goods cannot solve the 
gifting puzzle, because such goods are only contingently related to acts of gifting. Surely, it 
is often the case that when someone deliberates as to whether she should or should not gift 
her money,
1 she believes that others will find the gesture admirable,
2 she is seen as someone admirable if she gifts her money,
3 others who see her as admirable will express a positive opinion about her if she gifts her money,
4 she enjoys being seen and publicly described as someone who is admirable,
5 those who see her are sufficiently influential share their good opinion of the donor to elicit 
further commitments to gifting,
6 and, in view of 1–5, she assesses gifting to be the best possible option.
However, aspects 1–5 are contingent claims that may apply only to some cases of gifting and 
not all. Several factors could disrupt the donors’ expectations of eliciting public admiration. For 
example, the act of gifting may not be sufficiently visible in the public eye; those who see gift-
givers as admirable may not openly express their view; or those who were expected to see gift-
givers as admirable may instead express contempt toward them. The contingency of a favorable 
public image challenges the assumption that the expected productivity of gifting in terms of a 
good image is inherently profitable.
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7 Utility derives from other’s wellbeing (“pure altruism”)
The gifting puzzle itself can be criticized as hinging on a restricted view of the conditions that 
determine a gift-giver’s utility. In particular, it assumes “self-centred welfare,” as defined by 
Amartya Sen as “a person’s utility depends on his or her own consumption, which rules out 
sympathy or antipathy toward others” (2007, p. 18). Additionally, he notes that a utility maxi-
mizer can simultaneously be sensitive to others’ welfare (also see Arrow 1972, p. 348), which 
happens when sympathy for others’ welfare attunes one’s welfare toward others. Thus, Sen’s 
concept of an “other-centered welfare” could help to solve the gifting puzzle. If a gift-giver’s 
welfare is tuned to others’ welfare, the opportunity of relieving others’ suffering also helps to 
relieve one’s own suffering, which provides the donor with indirect benefits. The following 
testimony by Thomas Hobbes on how pity and compassion motivate a gift-giver to give alms 
to a beggar can be considered an example of an other-centered welfare:
One time, I remember, going into the Strand. A poor and infirm old man craved his 
alms. He beholding him with eyes of pity and compassion, put his hands in his pocket, 
and gave him 6d. Would you have done this if it had not been Christ’s command? Yes, 
because I was in pain to consider the miserable condition of the old man, and now my 
alms, giving him some relief, does also ease me.
(John Aubrey, Brief Lives 2015, pp. 158–159)
The capacity to find relief in others’ relief makes gifting a rational choice if, by one’s own 
calculation, the relief thus compensates one’s consumption loss. Once other-centered welfare is 
granted, gifting can become the kind of productive activity that a competent cost and benefit 
agent will rightly engage in.
However, some economists argue that donors cannot be rationally motivated to find relief 
in others’ relief. This is because if everyone had a “purely” altruistic disposition, the outcome 
of everyone’s gifting becomes a “public good,” or a good that is both non-excludable (each can 
find relief in through another donor’s gift-giving) and non-rival (one individual’s relief is not 
derived at the cost of another person’s relief). This situation displays the characteristics of the 
prisoner’s dilemma situation, where free-riding on others’ contributions becomes the rational 
course of action.
It is worth emphasizing that this objection to the hypothesis of other-centered welfare (a.k.a. 
“pure altruism”) introduces two additional assumptions. One assumption is that gifting is a stra-
tegic choice that donors make by considering other’s actions. The second assumption is that an 
individual act of gifting is insufficient to make a significant difference with regard to the desired 
outcomes. Under these assumptions, gifting could either entail an enjoyment of benefits with-
out incurring any costs or may render the cost of giving futile if the total amount of donations is 
insufficient to bring about the desired benefits. However, none of these assumptions inform the 
gifting puzzle, as this puzzle does not consider the act of gifting an interactive choice. Gifting is 
presumed to be both an individual act and an act that is instrumentally powerful by itself. Fol-
lowing effective altruists, I assume that, unlike a single vote in a country’s presidential election, 
a single act of gifting can make a significant difference to meet a desired outcome (MacAskill 
2015). Therefore, an other-centered welfare cannot be challenged as a solution to the gifting 
puzzle for giving rise to a collective action problem.
A more relevant objection to other-centered welfare (“pure altruism”) as a solution to the 
gifting puzzle is that it construes an individual’s act of gifting as a means of relieving his or her 
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own pity or compassion. Means are fungible, such that an individual would prefer to address his 
or her pity or compassion through the cheapest means possible. Consider again Hobbes’ act of 
charity and suppose, as a variant of Jon Elster’s guilt-erasing pill argument (1998, p. 303), that 
an individual can relieve the painful pity he has for the beggar by swallowing a “pity-erasing 
pill” at no cost. The pill is free and functions to make an individual insensitive to the misery of 
the beggar, and therefore it is a rational means to avoid the personal cost of gifting. However, 
someone who is sensitive to others’ suffering will only swallow the pill if he or she considers 
their pity a pointless cost. While taking the pill or ignoring the beggar’s condition remains a 
worthwhile option, a rational individual would consider pity an affective disposition of one’s 
moral worth and will find the inability to act on such a disposition morally unattractive. The 
trade-off between the benefit of finding relief in others’ relief on the one hand and losing con-
sumption power on the other is complicated by the prospect of canceling such moral disposition 
upon taking the pill.
In short, other-centered welfare cannot solve the gifting puzzle, because it wrongly presup-
poses that an individual moved by a sympathy toward the needy will weigh the impact of pity 
on his or her choice similar to weighing the loss of consumption.
8 Utility derives from gifting itself (“impure altruism”)
In economic theory, preferences are often outcome-oriented. Option A will be preferred over 
option B if it brings about better outcomes than option B. Per standard definitions, an indi-
vidual’s preferences depend on the output of her or his action. Purchasing, say, a bottle of wine, 
is an inherently costly means to reach the ultimate utility-supply state of drinking the wine. So 
far, the same means-end relationship has been taken to apply to acts of gifting: transferring one’s 
money, it was assumed, entered the negative side of the calculation. Gifting, thus construed, is 
doomed to remain a non-profitable activity, because any external private benefits gleaned from 
the act are contingently related to its performance.
Could economic preferences be construed to bear on the action itself, regardless of out-
comes? In a series of influential articles, Andreoni (1989, 1990, 2006) departed from the utility 
maximization model to propose that the act of gifting, apart from its consequences, directly 
enters an individual’s utility function8 and can elicit utility by itself through a feeling of a “warm 
glow” or inner satisfaction. However, this only happens when the warm glow derived from gift-
ing offsets its costs. Unlike prestige or any other extrinsic incentives, the desire to experience 
this feeling makes gifting intrinsically rewarding, as it only depends on the gift-giver’s disposi-
tion to derive a certain hedonic experience from the performance of the act of gifting itself.
The warm glow that donors derive from gifting often appears in the debate surrounding 
tax deductions for philanthropic donations and is used to challenge the view that donations 
are conceptually different from personal consumption. Proponents of the opposite viewpoint 
claim that donating one’s money is not equivalent to personal consumption, which justifies 
discounting donations from taxable income. Andrews (1972) argues that donations are not acts 
of consumption because they are not a “preclusive” use of one’s money (pp. 362–363). Rob-
ert Reich objects that “whatever a person decides to do with [his or her] resources – spend it 
on luxury goods or give it to charity – is, by definition, tautologically, consumption” (2011, 
p. 180). However, Reich’s argument that a transfer of money from A to B can be categorized as 
A’s consumption only if the transfer results in a purchase of a good or a service sold by B can be 
objected to on the grounds that a gift-giver and giftee’s relationship is different from a buyer-
seller relationship, as discussed in Section 4.
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Nevertheless, Reich argues that the satisfaction received from gifting leads toward refut-
ing the distinction between gifting and consumption. Even if, as Reich first concedes, the 
warm glow is “non-preclusive” since “purchasing joy through a charitable contribution does 
not diminish the ability of others to do the same,” Reich also claims that experiencing the 
warm glow amounts to “consuming the benefit of altruism” (2011, p. 180). As far as “a warm 
glow is undeniably private rather than public,” experiencing it makes donations genuine acts of 
consumption.
However, the distinction between the pleasure of consumption and the warm glow from 
gifting is significant enough to challenge this claim. As has been stressed before, warm-glow 
givers are not moved by how the donations help others but by what their donations reveal 
about themselves. In contrast, pleasure consumption accrues on consumers upon eating the 
meal, driving the new car, or wearing the newly bought clothes and not just by transferring 
the money required for purchasing these goods. Therefore, the pleasure of consumption is the 
pleasure of actually making use of goods. These are two conceptually distinct pleasures.
What the pleasure of gifting precisely amounts to requires further analysis, especially on 
whether it can be described as a feeling, an emotional state, or a mood. As James Andreoni 
admits, “the warm-glow hypothesis provides a direction for research rather than an answer to 
the puzzle of why people give – the concept of warm-glow is a placeholder for more specific 
models of individual and social motivations” (Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman 2017).
Bodner and Prelec (2002) propose viewing the warm glow as “acts of self-signaling” defined 
as “acts done partly for gathering information about oneself.” A case in point is a proud donor 
who sees gifting as proof of his or her capacity to suppress a selfish desire to spend money on 
oneself. The warm glow would then constitute the egocentric satisfaction from the proof of 
one’s moral worth demonstrated through one’s act of gifting.
While the warm glow provides a promising solution for the gifting puzzle, it is worth stress-
ing that this hypothesis comes with a substantive revision of the traditional model of utility 
maximization. Because it hinges on consumption loss, utility (the warm glow) and disutility 
(consumption loss) are no longer independent features of the same course of action. This is 
because the private benefit of gifting does not come despite the costs but because of these costs, 
which is an important departure from the theory of utility maximization. Instead of treating 
them as unrelated features of the same act, a donation’s utility is considered to rely on its disutil-
ity. One may even ask whether gifting becomes more profitable by being costlier.
Some scholars question whether the warm glow can be the treated as a rational aim of 
gifting. One skeptical answer is that, as in any case of pleasure-seeking, gifting for the sake of 
experiencing the warm glow is doomed to fail. The reason gifting for the sake of the warm 
glow is self-defeating, skeptics argue, is that the enterprise turns into the aim of giving what can 
only come as its by-product (Feinberg 2007; Elster 2011). However, whether it is vain to aim at 
getting a warm glow from one’s philanthropic contribution requires a better understanding of 
this phenomenon (Tieffenbach 2019).
9 Conclusion
Economic models explain self-serving human behavior through utility maximization, where 
individuals maximize their utility by choosing the most productive course of actions after a cost-
benefit analysis. While this model is valuable for explaining individuals’ purchase decisions for 
specific goods or services, it has been found to be ill suited to explain why they would voluntar-
ily gift some of their financial resources. This chapter critically reviewed various solutions to the 
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gifting puzzle by examining whether conventional economics models can accommodate gifting 
acts. Some of these solutions that seek to either exclude or integrate gifting within the scope 
of economics or seek to blur the conceptual boundaries between gifting and trading have been 
proved mostly conservative. In contrast, more fruitful ways of addressing this conundrum consist 
of broadening the notion of economic preferences to make it theoretically possible to maximize 
one’s utility by gifting. I have also discussed the relevance of some of these strategies to the 
practice and justification of the tax deductibility of philanthropic donations. These fiscal advan-
tages are granted on certain conditions such as the transfer of financial resources and should be 
made for a non-profit activity of general interest with non-preclusive uses (Lideikyte Huber 
2018, p. 20). This, in turn, relies on the theoretical and practical differences between donations 
and other economic activities such as paying for, consuming, exchanging, or bartering goods 
or services. Therefore, while there are many reasons for inciting gifting, there are also plenty 
of reasons for policing the related voluntary and unilateral transfer of resources, both of which 
require an accurate and consensual understanding of what gifting fundamentally is. Despite the 
difficulties of drawing accurate conceptual boundaries between these notions, I have also high-
lighted the drawbacks of lumping these notions together.
Among the various solutions for the gifting puzzle, the hypothesis of the warm glow could 
be the most promising, provided that its concept is thoroughly clarified. However, this hypoth-
esis has a negative strategic implication for the gifting puzzle. That is, if the warm glow is treated 
as the pleasure derived from the conscious choice of foregoing one’s consumption power, then 
it implies that utility and disutility of gifting are the two sides of the same coin.
Notes
 1 The assumption that a “giftable” item is “transferable” is both widespread and uncontested. It imposes 
two constraints on a gift, namely that it can be owned exclusively and retained over a long period. 
I have recently argued that these two conditions fail to accommodate gratuitous work as bona fide 
instance of gifts (Tieffenbach, 2020, “The Metaphysics of Gifting,” unpublished manuscript).
 2 Mirowski (2001). According to Robert Garnett, the neglect of philanthropy is due to an increasing 
faith in market exchanges as the most important mechanism of wealth redistribution in contrast to 
charity and other forms of philanthropic giving, which are seen as “outmoded, inefficient, and ad hoc” 
(Garnett 2010, p. 112).
 3 Lisa Vesterlund rightly stresses that the term “price,” when applied to donations, does not have the 
same meaning as the price of a commodity on sale. As she explains, “[t]ypically the price of an object 
refers to what we must pay to obtain a particular good. For charitable giving, the price of giving refers 
to what it costs us to give the organization an additional dollar” (2004, p. 569). However, if the “price 
of gifting” is just the consumption loss incurred by the donors, the term misguidedly assimilates dona-
tions to other forms of payment. See Section 4 of the present chapter for an extended discussion of this 
topic.
 4 Apart from the loss in consumption, the cost of gifting also comprises an opportunity cost of spending 
scarce time or effort. This chapter does not examine the opportunity cost of gifting while discussing 
the gifting puzzle.
 5 The full sentence is “an individual will always derive more utility from spending n+1 unit of her 
money on a good, which possesses the quality that is needed for satisfying an unsatisfied desire of him 
than from gifting it.”
 6 Tipping can be correctly described as a form of payment only when it is institutionalized into a service 
charge, making it a part of the price paid for a service.
 7 Likewise, Daniel Hausman and Michael S. McPherson stress the same misconception of the notion of 
utility and write that “utility does not refer to usefulness or pleasure. A utility function is only a way of 
representing a preference ranking – that is, a ranking of alternatives with respect to everything relevant 




 8 Kenneth Arrows comes close to that hypothesis when, discussing altruistic motivations of blood dona-
tions, he conceives of cases where “the welfare of each individual depends not only on the utilities of 
himself and others but also on his contributions to the utilities of others” (1972, p. 348).
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Introduction
Research on tax deduction for philanthropic purposes has developed in two main directions. 
First, following the concept of different countries belonging to non-profit regimes (Salamon 
and Anheier, 1998), the literature tends to highlight the ‘crowding out’ effect of high govern-
ment expenditure on private philanthropic donations (Abrams and Shitz, 1978). Conversely, 
Arts and van Oorschot (2005) argue that high government expenditure coincides with a strong 
civil society. Second, the low price elasticity of donations (Fack and Landais, 2009) highlights 
that the majority of donations and higher gifts are concentrated at the top of the income dis-
tribution, eliciting sharp criticism about the plutocratic bias (Cagé, 2020). These developments 
resonate with critiques from the American context, on which the bulk of research on this sub-
ject is focused – most notably by Rob Reich (2018).
Economists focus on income and wealth as criteria for socio-economic inequality. However, 
occupational background matters for analysing income, wealth accumulation, and social status. 
Occupational backgrounds are important, as they define the hierarchy of autonomy at work and 
prestige, as argued by Goldthorpe (1996); these backgrounds also frame structured and stabilised 
perceptions of oneself and the world at large. Sociologist Michèle Lamont (2002) examines the 
different sets of values embraced by working-class members and managers in France and in the 
United States. The present chapter asserts that class is important with respect to perceptions of 
tax deduction for philanthropy. Thus, the diversity of relationships that donors at the top of the 
socio-economic ladder of France have with tax deductions is highlighted.
To do so, I draw on a qualitative set of ethnographic observations and semi-structured inter-
views with donors who created family foundations and enrolled them as big philanthropic players 
in France. These organisations have peculiarities which are detailed later in the chapter. These 
peculiarities allow an in-depth preliminary analysis of the diverse perceptions of tax deductions.
The cultural sociology of the relationship between tax  
deductions and donations
This section distinguishes this study from others on the impact of tax incentives for philanthropy 
in France. The latter are based more in economics and stem from the question regarding the 
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relationship between public provision and private funding of the common good. Two concepts, 
namely the ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ effects, are defined in this field. France’s position 
in cross-country comparison in terms of the share of GDP devoted to publicly financed social 
provision is high. It is among the countries with a low rate of donors, low percentage of phil-
anthropic donations relative to the GDP, and, most significantly, low number of foundations 
related to the population (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). It is therefore quite logical that few 
researchers have studied the impact of tax deductions on philanthropy in this context. Fack and 
Landais’s (2009) analysis shows that the efficacy of tax deductions is dubious. However, they 
also show that the higher the donor is in the income distribution, the greater is the impact of 
tax incentives on them. These two studies are dated and neither provide insights on the rapidly 
growing field of philanthropy nor illuminate the meaning-making processes through which 
donors perceive the role and the legitimacy of private funding for the common good as well as 
tax deductions for philanthropic giving (Box 5.1).
Box 5.1 Tax deduction for philanthropic giving in France
All organisations defined as “d’intérêt general” (general interest) are eligible for donations that can 
be deducted from the donor’s taxes. There are three main incentives:
• For private individual donors: a tax deduction of 66% of the amount of the donation, up to a 
maximum of 20% of the taxable income;
• For companies: a corporate tax deduction of 60% of their donations, up to a maximum of 
0.5% of their annual turnover (Source: French General Tax Code (CGI), articles 200 & 238b;
• For individuals who own a real estate whose net worth is 1.3 million€+: a tax deduction of 
75% the amount of the donation, up to 50,000€. The wealth tax is the result of reform that 
took place in 2018. Before 2018, the wealth tax concerned individuals who own a patrimony 
worth 1.3 million€+ be it composed of financial or real estate assets.
In this chapter, I will focus on this last tax deduction on a wealth tax that concerns the top 3% 
of wealth concentration in France.
Broadening the scope and considering a wider set of tax deductions makes more data available. 
Sociologist and political scientist Alexis Spire (2018) presents one of the key insights provided by 
quantitative research. Using data representative of the adult population, he shows that those who pay 
more taxes also are, counterintuitively, those who accept higher taxation by the state. This paradox 
is resolved when tax deductions are considered because the wealthiest can take advantage of a wide 
range of tax deductions and exemptions for housing interest rests or repairs, for instance, home help 
services. This category consists of philanthropic donors. The most important thing is to consider, 
following Bourdieu’s view (1979), that class does not only secure access to economic resources but 
also frames one’s perceptions of themselves and of others; of one’s identity and correlatively of their 
position in the outside world. The two are closely related in Bourdieu’s relational sociology of posi-
tions in a field analysis. Empirically, Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural capital can help create a better 
understanding of why philanthropy matters as a tool of distinction for the elite (Ostrower, 1995).
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Spire (2018) provides important insights on the social stratification of the relationship 
between philanthropy and tax deduction as a general category. However, the study does not 
analyse the variety of meaning-making processes associated with tax deduction for philanthropy. 
Therefore, I  turn to a different analytical lens, using the tools of cultural sociology. Cultural 
sociology is a very dynamic field of research, notably in the American context, where the 
‘Culture’ section of the American Sociological Association has evolved into one of the most 
important sections in quantitative terms. To provide a general overview of this field, it can be 
said, like Mohr et al. (2020:3) did, that:
Over the past few decades, cultural sociologists have amassed an impressive array 
of theoretical insights and modes of empirical investigation about how people cre-
ate and interpret the meaning of the world around them. A central theme of this 
work is unpacking what meaning-making actually entails. Culture has turned from 
something that everybody in a given society has – whether that society is defined 
by national boundaries, language, or history – into a more stratified and segmented 
category. In this view, culture is not only the environment that enables the mean-
ingfulness of social life but also a more specific set of scripts, narratives, embodied 
practices and schemas.
Among the various concepts put forward by this subject, I focus on ‘frameworks’. This concept, 
inspired by sociologist E. Goffman’s work (1974), can be defined as proposed by Lamont, Hard-
ing, and Small (2010):
How people act depends on how they cognitively perceive themselves, the world or 
their surroundings.
Cultural sociology aims at giving room to a variety of perceptions of one set of practices or 
institutions. More recently, cultural sociology has been blended with a neo-institutionalist 
agenda to broaden the understanding of inequality in the post-Piketty era (Lamont and 
Pierson, 2019). In our field of research, several studies show the relevance of this conceptual 
toolbox to create a better understanding of philanthropy. In her research on the anxieties 
of affluence, Sherman (2017) highlights the different meanings that wealthy families accord 
to philanthropy. Luna Glucksberg has studied the role of philanthropy in framing unequal 
gender relationships among the wealthiest families and how family offices have been used 
to secure a dynastic transmission of wealth (Glucksberg and Burrows, 2016). However, 
few studies have focused on the perception of tax deductions by families who benefit from 
them. From 2015 to 2017, I led in-depth ethnographic research, which provides elements 
to enrich our understanding of these processes. The bulk of this research draws on the 
seminal works of Lamont, which underline that class shapes perceptions and frameworks 
and self-understanding, as well as the perceptions of the world (2002). Precisely, the study 
of socioeconomics has become a more integrated field and has underlined the causal power 
of class on positions in the income distribution. This power remains strong and continues 
to grow over time (Albertini, Ballarino, and de Luca, 2020). We hypothesise that class is 
also important in shaping subjective views and is therefore important in shaping views on 
tax deductions. The distinction between small entrepreneurs and managers and profession-
als helps explain the diversity of meanings related to tax deduction for philanthropy among 




My starting point is the idea that ‘to study how individual giving responds to governments, 
information about the individual level of donations is required’ (De Wit, Neumayr, Handy, and 
Wiepking, 2018:2) Few studies examine the formation of the cognitive mechanisms through 
which tax deductions for donations are perceived by individuals. To examine these mecha-
nisms, I  draw on a long-term ethnographic study led by one of the key French players in 
philanthropy. Through its grants, this foundation has funded a wide variety of non-profits and 
non-governmental organisations dedicated to fighting poverty and social exclusion in France 
and the world. Furthermore, it shelters small foundations created by wealthy families. It del-
egates its own entitlement to the maximum tax deduction available to them for individuals 
and households in France, 75% (up to 50,000€ on wealth tax). Only foundations recognised 
by the French Council of State, which is in charge of authorising the incorporation of non-
profit organisations, can benefit from this deduction. Families who neither have the expertise 
nor the time to go through this very complex and time-consuming procedure are provided 
enrolment by big foundations which are already incorporated as ‘RUPs’ (reconnues d’utilité 
publique/recognised public-interest organisations). As a historian specialising in examining this 
procedure, Chloé Gaboriaux explains that the ‘RUP’ status has a centuries-long legacy in the 
French law system:
In France, ‘Reconnaissance d’utilité publique’ (RUP) has for a long time been the 
only way for foundations – endowment funds managed by a board of trustees – to 
exist and for associations – a group of people working together to achieve a com-
mon set of goals – to acquire a legal entity. It stems from a very ancient principle of 
medieval Roman law, which says that an organization cannot exist and act as a moral 
entity without being authorized by the State. In the 19th century, associations with 
more than 20 members could not be established without a prefectoral authorization 
(Article 291 of the Penal Code of 1810) and needed RUP to acquire legal capacity (or 
incorporation) – in order, that is, to hold property in their own name and to exist as 
a collective entity before the law.
(2019)
I draw on a long-term ethnographic study of a group of wealthy Parisian families who enrolled 
their foundations under the main foundation of interest. The relationship established with the 
foundation should be considered in order to understand how the material was collected. This 
foundation first asked me to lead the study with the explicit aim of interviewing some of the 
most important families among its clientele to anticipate the effects of a reform regarding the 
wealth tax on philanthropic donations. The foundation’s manager wanted to know who, among 
its donors, would continue donating after a sharp decrease of charitable contribution deduction.
For two years, I was allowed to attend confidential meetings between donors and the staff 
regarding grant strategy, investments regarding the foundation’s financial assets, expertise, and 
mentoring. I also attended most events organised for the donors’ welfare, which included din-
ners, private concerts, work gatherings, and special events. These observations allowed me to 
obtain inside knowledge of the daily activities of the foundation and afforded me a certain level 
of familiarity with the families, which would be interviewed at the second step. In the late 
2010s, the wealth tax was heavily criticised for imposing a burden on wealth, and it resulted 
in wealthy families leaving the country and creating businesses abroad. These arguments have 
been very important in conceptualising the wealth tax that was supported by Macron during 
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the first year of his term, despite the fact that there is little evidence supporting them. Big 
foundations were nervous about the effects of such a possible outcome and were consequently 
willing to better know the families enrolled to be able to navigate these legal transformations. 
This prompted the foundation to open their doors to me. Therefore, in the semi-structured 
interviews, I  focused on the donors’ perceptions of the tax deduction. The questions were 
about the size and composition of wealth, structure of investments (housing, risky and non-
risky financial assets), philanthropic strategy developed, and relationship with the sheltering 
foundation. A sample of twenty families was constituted progressively, and I recorded inter-
views of more than two hours with each of them. I was able to follow five families more 
closely and had regular follow-up interviews and meetings with them at their homes. These 
families were selected because they presented very diverse objective as well as subjective fea-
tures. The size of their wealth varied considerably, ranging from retired professionals who had 
accumulated wealth during their working years to industrial heirs or players in the financial 
sector. However, such a small dataset had obvious limitations and thus cannot be considered 
representative of wealthy French donors. The sample comprises organisations affiliated with a 
foundation having a peculiar position in the philanthropic sector. Being relatively open socially 
and liberal religiosity are the key features that distinguish the interviewed families from other 
philanthropists in France.
Results
This study draws on a qualitative subset of semi-structured interviews. Therefore, it does not 
aim at providing a representative picture of the way donors perceive the tax deduction they 
are benefited by. However, these data help create a better understanding of the arguments that 
structure the perceptions of philanthropy among the subgroups of donors that adopt different 
frameworks and of how their support of the common good is related to a wider perception of 
the role of the state.
a  A critic of the wealth tax
The first subgroup was strongly and explicitly opposed to the principle of a wealth tax. The 
legitimacy of this fiscal tool was heavily contested. At the time when the fieldwork was under-
took, the wealth tax (Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune) was being criticised. This political context 
may have, therefore, favoured the expression of such a critique. The wealth tax was regarded as 
a predation by the state vis-à-vis entrepreneurs’ legitimate gains:
People simply hate paying taxes. There is an extreme polarization on the wealth tax 
as you have to pay a share of your wealth yearly. For entrepreneurs like me who have 
worked to accumulate wealth, it is senseless to give it to a spendthrift state.
This kind of opinion is rarely expressed so bluntly. However, one should not underestimate the 
fact that it represents the collective view of a social group about the wealth tax. In her ethno-
graphic research on the family offices that take care of the wealth of families, sociologist Camille 
Herlin-Giret notes the insistence on tax optimisation through various legal schemes (2019). 
Among these, some private bankers or family office employees recognise that the motivation 
for some philanthropic givers does not go far beyond the avoidance of the wealth tax. Taxpayers 
prefer to pay 25% more rather than pay the remaining percentage (75%) to the state. Donating 
is, in this case, an ideological statement. It structures networks of friends and family members. 
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As mentioned by a family foundation leader, the wealth tax avoidance helps structuring a net-
work of donors. The leader details the annual contribution of one of his sons:
Among the six children of the family, one started his own business, which grew 
rapidly. It boomed over the years; he then sold the company. His cheque to the 
foundation represents his wealth tax. It is the most important resource of our 
foundation.
Another one clearly relates the occupational status of an entrepreneur with the avoidance of 
taxes:
Pay less tax. It is really the first motivation of entrepreneurs, therefore, it goes together.
A key feature of this framework is denying a sense of generality to the state. The state is personi-
fied to lower its legitimacy regarding tax raises on behalf of the people:
It is a bit senseless to give money to Mr Hollande or Mr Sarkozy. I prefer to make my 
choices.
Political leaders seem to view taxes as personal gains rather than contributions to the state’s 
budget. State-sponsored taxation is considered an illegitimate predation by entrepreneurs who 
have spent their lifetime running businesses.
b A search for efficacy
Although various frameworks can be mixed in the discourse of a single interviewee, a second 
group of donors refers not so much to a refusal of the legitimacy given to tax but rather to a will 
to secure a greater efficiency of the money donated. As a matter of fact, donors often mention 
a consideration for impact. They want their money to be useful to the community and consider 
that private provision is a better means to achieve this goal. This is consistent with Bekkers and 
Wiepking’s (2011) explanation of philanthropy driven by the quest for efficiency. Even though 
I do not focus on the motivations of donors per se and the way they perceive the tax deductions 
they are entitled to, my findings converge with those from a wide body of literature. Vis-à-vis 
tax deductions, the most important point is that donors do not value the absolute efficacy of 
their donation but rather the relative efficacy of their donation vis-à-vis the same amount of 
money dedicated to tax.
They think that the state has failed, and that poverty and inequality are growing. Pay-
ing taxes equals subsidizing a machine that is also broken. Donors are willing to pay a 
little bit more in order to have an impact on the ground thanks to the non-profits they 
have chosen and projects they know about.
Efficacy is therefore a strong element of the donor’s perception of tax deductions for philan-
thropic purposes. They allow philanthropists to choose projects and to fund non-profits that 
emulate corporate values because they think that, however controversial this view might be, the 
latter are more prone to helping people to move out of poverty, for instance. While explain-
ing to me the core principles driving his own foundation, a donor underlined the distinction 
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between an environment that provides money and creates dependency and an environment 
which creates social mobility through training:
Our principle states that if a person is unwilling, even if the environment provides 
them with resources, they will not change their fate. Conversely, if a person is will-
ing but the environment is not conducive, they will be impotent. . . . My foundation 
is not dedicated to give a hand-out or to send cash to southern countries. We want 
people to thrive and lift the barriers that keep them from doing so.
Similarly, managers and professionals tend to think that tax deductions allow a greater efficacy 
for the money donated. They highlight the fact that the non-profits they fund replicate the 
impact measurement strategies (through the use of metrics) which they consider essential for 
running a corporation successfully. They are interested in the technicalities of implementation 
and often closely know the leaders of the non-profits. Tax deductions allow them to be involved 
in various projects and initiatives dedicated to eradicating poverty in France and abroad.
This last example shows how efficacy and values are intertwined. A last set of donors, often, 
if not always, the wealthiest of the families, tend to value the fact that through tax deductions, 
the state is providing a recognition of their own values, hence contributing to genuine pluralism.
c Values and authenticity
Tax deductions are a form of recognition of different sets of values by the state. This perception 
is common among families which are wealthy enough to continue giving without tax deduc-
tions. Moreover, one could argue that because they are high enough in income distribution, 
they are concerned not only for their positions but have also developed a concern for the wel-
fare of the philanthropic sector itself. Therefore, their position vis-à-vis tax is both detached, 
because the social status and intrinsic gratifications attached to philanthropy do not depend on 
these tax deductions, and concerned, because they have a strong interest in influencing pub-
lic choices. They can afford to give without being supported. However, they attach extreme 
importance to the fact that through tax deductions, the state is promoting a kind of pluralism, 
which is difficult to find in other fields of public intervention. This is consistent with the fact 
that for civil society organisations, non-profits, and foundations alike, government subsidies are 
seen as a ‘seal of approval’ (Schiff, 1990). During an interview, a foundation leader told me that:
The label is very important. Getting recognition for our contribution to the common 
good matters a lot. It makes the project credible for partners and sponsors. It is also a 
way to acknowledge that we are doing good work and that there is room for the kind 
of initiatives we have launched.
We are entitled and have supported promoting a certain vision of the world and of 
how its problems should be settled. We are not particulars, we are acting by our own 
convictions, on behalf of the state. In poverty relief, religious convictions are crucial.
The attachment to pluralism is very close to an argument put forward by Rob Reich. In his 
book, as in previous works, he asks if fiscal support for philanthropy and, ultimately, the con-
tributions philanthropic foundations make to democracy can be justified and, if so, how. He 
believes they are. He considers two arguments often put across in this debate: that of pluralism 
and that of discovery. The argument on pluralism expresses that foundations contribute to a 
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pluralistic conception of the common good and diversify the agents involved in defining it, 
making it possible to overcome a univocal and centralised conception of the public interest. 
However, while this argument is acceptable to a degree, it suffers a rather obvious plutocratic 
bias. The discovery argument argues that, contrary to the state and market, philanthropy can 
invest for the longer term and help discovering new paths, as in science, where interests are 
detached from immediate outcomes.
Even if it was possible to identify this plutocratic bias in the data I collected, I do not wish 
to make an argument for or against philanthropy. I simply wish to show that the attachment to 
pluralism is related to Catholic faith and a will to see Catholic welfare services as contributing 
to the common good. In a republic with a strong commitment to a neat distinction between 
religion and public affairs labelled and put forward under the banner of the defence of ‘Laïcité’, 
(secularism), tax deductions convey a discreet yet subjectively and objectively important con-
tribution to a pluralistic implementation of various organisations. With the exception of the 
Foundation of France, the main players of the philanthropic sector are influenced by religion, 
be it a liberal or conservative Catholicism, Judaism, or Protestantism. This point is, therefore, 
a more general one: religious domination structures the philanthropic sector. This is also a 
point that is valid in the ‘longue durée’ (long duration) of history, as research has shown that 
the philanthropic networks of the 1900s Paris displayed, in a country heavily fragmented by an 
open crisis between the Republican State and the Catholic church, a peaceful coexistence of 
Republican and Catholic elites (Topalov, 2020).
Discussion
These results bring a descriptive and value-added view on the diversity of perceptions of tax 
deduction for philanthropic purposes displayed by a small set of donors enrolled in a liberal 
Catholic foundation. These results must be considered carefully, given the limitations of the 
qualitative sample, and must be contextualised against an era when the bulk of the wealth tax 
was still in place – which is no longer the case today. Nonetheless, they do provide insights 
on philanthropic initiatives and on the way donors perceive the tax deductions they benefit 
from. Understanding state support through fiscal deductions is not the same as understand-
ing the motivations of donors, which are significantly more diverse. Obviously, studying the 
perceptions of tax deduction enhances the importance of the latter and may suggest that they 
are key for motivating donors as well as for unfairly obscuring the concern for the needs of 
those helped or the peer pressure to donate. However, as has been seen after the introduction 
of the wealth tax, tax deductions are crucial for forming positive perceptions of philanthropic 
donation.
A second value-added factor is to bring class back in the way we relate these perceptions with 
specific subgroups. Once again, I do not have the means to show a causal relationship between a 
given class and a given framework. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that among the groups 
overrepresented at the top of the income and wealth distribution, two different frames of per-
ception of tax deductions appear, and they are closely related to two different occupational 
backgrounds. On the one hand, the blunt dismissal of the legitimacy of the wealth tax comes 
from entrepreneurs, be they small or big. This is consistent with the longstanding political posi-
tioning of this group to defend oneself against taxation as well as mandatory social protection. 
On the other hand, professionals and managers who implement – or have implemented when 
retired – bureaucratic or economic rationality in their corporations display a strong attachment 
to efficacy and consider that the efficacy of donations privately is higher than when the state 
implements social services. As has been seen in the critique of cash transfers, consideration for 
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values is not separated from consideration of efficacy. However, a specific subgroup, consisting 
of families with higher and more dynastic wealth, values tax deductions for their contribution 
to pluralism.
The latter finding has several important theoretical implications. For more than a decade, 
European sociology in general, and British sociology in particular, has debated the definition of 
class. Does the ‘employment aggregate approach’ (Crompton, 1993) capture a social stratifica-
tion where wealth inequality plays a bigger role, as has compellingly been shown by Piketty 
(2014)? He argues that a social class map needs to take wealth into account for determining 
class (2020). This can lead to what Savage et al. (2013) called a new class map, inductively built 
and considering various dimensions of capital. This study aims to contribute to this agenda 
by taking another route, which is continuing to use occupations to examine class but doing it 
via cultural sociology, because it helps distinguish various meaning-making processes related 
to wealth through the study of the relationship the wealthy have to wealth tax. The aspects 
of economic capital as well as occupational status (former or current) appear to be salient in 
framing philanthropists’ relationship to the wealth tax. These preliminary results call for a more 
integrated research agenda on the intertwining of class and wealth. It could provide additional 
knowledge in two main directions: on the one hand considering the impact of wealth all along 
the socio-economic ladder and, on the other, as this study shows, distinguishing the diverse 
social worlds that are composed by the top 1% of the income and wealth distribution. In this 
context, a predominantly qualitative, culturally sociological approach could contribute to high-
light the varieties of meaning-making processes related to class at the top of the socio-economic 
ladder and conversely to make room for the multidimensional effects of wealth on class-based 
perceptions of oneself, other people, and the world at large.
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1 Introduction
As documented by the OECD (2020), many governments award fiscal privileges to the organisa-
tions they have granted “charitable” or “public-benefit” status.1 To be eligible for this status and 
these privileges, the organisations must pursue certain purposes and undertake or forgo certain 
activities.2 In defining those activities, governments typically distinguish charitable from politi-
cal ones and require the organisations to forgo forms or levels of the latter. Such requirements 
raise questions not only about why governments consider some political activities incompatible 
with charitable status and its fiscal privileges but also about what they intend to accomplish by 
restricting them. Do they intend to regulate the definition of charitable purposes and the types 
of activities that may advance them and hence take an approach specific to charitable organisa-
tions? Or do they intend to regulate the donations of individuals, groups and corporations that 
privately finance political activities and hence take a more general approach that is consistent 
across both the political entities and charitable organisations performing them?
This chapters addresses these questions of why and what. The answers are particularly rel-
evant to governments intending to pursue the second task – that of comprehensively regulating 
the use of private monies to finance politics. The importance of that task has received inter-
national attention given the challenges to democracy that could arise, particularly in an era of 
increasing income inequality (OECD 2016). To date, however, that attention has focused on 
the private financing of political entities – parties, candidates or independent political outfits – 
rather than the private financing of political activities as performed across a broader range of 
organisations, including charitable ones. The problems of such a narrow focus can be inferred 
from the “hydraulics” of political monies as described by Issacharoff and Karlan (1999) – a 
phenomenon that can turn regulatory reform into “a graveyard of well-intentioned plans gone 
awry . . . [where] reforms could exacerbate the very political pathologies they are designed to 
combat. Far from making politics more accountable to democratic control, they may make it 
less so” (1705–07) – for reasons akin to the laws of physics. In their judgement:
It doesn’t take an Einstein to discern a First Law of Political Thermodynamics – the 
desire for political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different 
forms – nor a Newton to identify a Third Law of Political Motion – every reform 
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effort to constrain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those 
with power to hold onto it. . . . Our account, then, is “hydraulic” in two senses. First, 
we think political money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears 
into thin air. Second, we think political money, like water, is part of a broader ecosys-
tem. Understanding why it flows where it does and what functions it serves when it 
gets there requires thinking about the system as a whole.
(1705, italics added)
As described here, that broader system comprises not only political entities but charitable organ-
isations as well.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part 2 structures and summarises the debates in the char-
ity finance literature on whether charitable organisations receiving fiscal privileges and relying 
on private donations should forgo at least some political activities. Part 3 structures and sum-
marises the debates in the campaign finance/political finance literature on whether political 
entities should forgo at least some private donations. Part 4 identifies in each literature the same 
opposing pairs of political ideologies and models of democracy – egalitarianism and deliberative 
democracy versus libertarianism and pluralism – of which the first pair supports more restric-
tions on both the political activities of charitable organisations and the private donations to 
political entities, and the second pair supports fewer restrictions. To see whether governments 
take similarly restrictive or permissive stances toward regulating the private financing of politi-
cal activities by charitable organisations and political entities, Part 5 categorises and compares 
the approaches of 16 countries. In some countries (e.g., Canada, Italy, Singapore), the stances 
appear similar, as would be the case with governments regulating not charitable organisations 
and political entities specifically and separately but rather the private financing of politics gener-
ally and comprehensively. However, in other countries (e.g., India, United States) the stances 
appear very different. For the rest, various degrees of difference hold, suggesting that most 
of the sampled governments interpret and respond differently to the use of private monies to 
finance political activities depending on the organisation or entity performing them – and thus 
either fail or do not intend to regulate that use comprehensively and consistently. Part 6 offers 
several explanations for why such differences might exist and draws inferences for governments 
intending to be comprehensive.
2 Framing the debate in the charity finance literature: are political 
activities incompatible with charitable status?3
The legal literature on charity finance literature focuses on the regulation and resourcing of 
organisations officially recognised as charitable. The central debate within that literature con-
siders whether such organisations, which receive fiscal privileges and rely on private donations, 
should forgo political activities. It can be framed according to whether charitable and political 
purposes are incompatible, either because charitable purposes and activities are inherently dif-
ferent from political ones, or because political activities performed by charitable organisations 
would harm charitable or political purposes. Here, charitable purposes are interpreted as being 
to improve societal wellbeing by providing persons in need or society in general with certain 
publicly beneficial goods and services otherwise not available from government or the for-profit 
sector. Charitable activities are limited to the direct provision of those goods and services. Politi-
cal purposes are interpreted systemically as being to establish, uphold and operate the principles 
and institutions that compose the official processes whereby legitimate collective decisions are 
made. Political activities are limited to the ones potentially available to charitable organisations. 
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They include attempts to affect the formation of governments by influencing the outlook 
and actions of potential voters and volunteers in elections (electioneering). And they include 
attempts to affect the decisions of governments by influencing either the outlook and actions 
of the community at large (advocacy) or the outlook and actions of elected and government 
officials (lobbying).
The debate over inherent incompatibilities
Some scholars and practitioners argue that political activities are inherently different from chari-
table ones. Under common law, political purposes and activities have traditionally been deemed 
non-charitable for reason that courts could not or should not determine whether any prescribed 
change in law or government would be for the public benefit (Chisolm 1990, 344–346; Brun-
son 2011, 140; Colinvaux 2012, 702–703). In those terms, prohibiting charitable organisa-
tions from performing political activities constitutes a form of “border control” to distinguish 
the organisations that deserve fiscal privileges from those that do not (Carroll 1992, 253–254; 
Simon, Dale and Chisolm 2006, 284–288; Tobin 2007, 1330; Colinvaux 2012, 704, 709–712). 
Charitable activities are publicly beneficial and capable of generating “positive externalities” 
which benefit individuals and groups broadly. In comparison, political activities are only of 
private benefit and capable of generating “negative externalities” which harm the individuals 
or groups aligned with opposing causes (Buckles 2007, 1086, 1091–1092; Tobin 2007, 1336). 
Charitable activities are noble and ennobling, whereas political activities are sullied and sullying 
(Houck 2003, 85–86; Colinvaux 2012, 706–707, 756; Crimm and Winer 2013, 106). If under-
taken, they would debase charitable organisations – whether actually or in the public eye – as 
well as compromising and corrupting their executives and board (Dessingue 2001, 925–926; 
Tobin 2007, 1319–1323, 1329–1330, 1337, 1341–1342). Just as politicians and governments 
should not “do politics and government” through charities, charities should not “do charity” 
through politics and government (Parachin 2016, 1075–1077).
There are arguments that counter these. The observation that political purposes are not legally 
charitable does not prevent political activities from being instrumental to charitable purposes 
(Chisolm 1990, 346–347; Carroll 1992, 252–253; Houck 2003, 4–8; Buckles 2007, 1090; 
Brunson 2011, 141–142). Moreover, political activities might generate public benefits through 
legitimising collective decisions, fostering citizenship and social capital or facilitating peaceful 
transitions of power. On the other hand, charitable activities – say, in areas of religion, repro-
ductive health, human rights or the environment – might be as rivalrous as political activities, 
such that one cause’s gain imposes another’s loss (Chisolm 1990, 350–355; Buckles 2008, 1111–
1112). Both the charitable and political sectors focus on the definition and promotion of the 
common good – concepts of which might differ as much within each sector as between them 
(Dunn 1999, 306–307). Besides, separating the two sectors would undercut the strength that 
each could draw from their interdependence and sharing of means (Salamon and Toepler 2015).
The debate over the harm to charitable purposes caused by charitable 
organisations performing political activities
Some argue that political activities performed by charitable organisations would harm soci-
etal wellbeing. The benefits of such activities are uncertain, whereas the administrative and 
resource costs are immediate and concrete (Buckles 2008, 1087; Galle 2013, 1561, 1576–1580). 
Politically motivated and monied donors increase the risk of political capture that would nar-
row the organisation’s priorities, making it partisan and thus less able to collaborate with others 
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in pursuing a common purpose – say, the relief of poverty (Tobin 2007, 1329–1330; Buckles 
2008, 1110; Colinvaux 2012, 754; Galle 2013, 1610; Wolpe 2017). By steering a transformation 
toward greater political involvement, the organisation’s executive could benefit professionally, 
gaining notoriety and opportunities for advancement (Buckles 2008, 1098–1106; Galle 2013, 
1604–1607). Hence, the decision of whether to undertake political activities should not be left 
to their discretion and abilities to persuade the board but rather constrained by regulation.
There are arguments that counter these. The executive and board, not the government, 
are best able to judge the mix of activities that would best allow the organisation to advance 
its charitable purpose (Clark 1960, 465–466; Buckles 2008, 1087, 1099–1101; Brunson 2011, 
142). By their nature, charitable purposes involve ideas that are controversial and disputable 
(Sacks 1960, 528–533). Pursuing them requires entering those controversies, publicly endors-
ing what is good and admonishing what is bad (Klapach 1999, 506, 538; Colinvaux 2012, 
699–700). As to the encroachment of monied interests or the risk of capture: such challenges 
confront all charitable organisations, regardless of their political involvement. Instead, that 
involvement might help deflect one form of co-optation: the silence preferred by government 
(Garnett 2001, 797–798; Buckles 2008, 1091–1094; Brunson 2011, 149).
The debate over the harm to political purposes caused by charitable 
organisations performing political activities
Some argue that political activities performed by charitable organisations would harm the dem-
ocratic processes whereby collective decisions are made. Those processes rely on a conceptual 
framework that all citizens can endorse: the common ground offered by secular (as opposed 
to irreligious) public reason (Audi 1993, 687–697; Rawls 2005). And they benefit from terms 
of deliberation that are dispassionate, allowing differences to be aired and understood with-
out foreclosing compromise or agreement (Galle 2013, 1584–1585). The political involve-
ment of charitable organisations  – particularly those that are dedicatedly religious or single 
issue – threatens that common ground and those terms. It could make public dialogue more 
fragmented and inflammatory, the decision-making processes more deadlocked, politics more 
sectarian and policies less coherent – fostering political disengagement among citizens (Galston 
1993, 1315–1317; Tobin 2007, 1326–1329; Trotter 2012, 21; Cafardi, 2005, 538–542; Galle 
2013, 1583–1585). By avoiding political involvement, charitable organisations are better able 
to cultivate an educated and discerning electorate. Within their areas of expertise, they would 
serve as independent and trusted clearing houses of political information and interpretation, 
relied upon to highlight important issues and outline alternative positions and their implica-
tions – without taking sides (Tobin 2007, 1337; Galle 2013, 1628–1629). Again, however, the 
organisation’s executive could benefit professionally from undertaking political activities. Thus, 
to protect and promote systemic political purposes, the decision of whether to undertake them 
should be constrained by regulation.
There are arguments that counter these. Liberal democracies rely upon public debate that 
does not suppress from the outset certain convictions or world views – including ones rooted 
in religious or single-issue perspectives (Habermas 2006, 6–12; Dworkin 2016, 63–66). Those 
perspectives might morally inform and enrich the debate, as well as be informed and broadened 
by it (Dessingue 2001, 923–925; Garnett 2001, 798–801; Habermas 2006, 18–20; Totten 2007, 
310–313). Religious convictions are no more prone to making debate more fractious and intol-
erant than are certain secular ones (McConnell 1999, 648–656). Rather than contributing to 
political disengagement, the political involvement of charitable organisations might forestall it 
by recruiting an otherwise disaffected citizenry (Dunn 2008). It could balance the presence of 
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business organisations or bring to the fore otherwise overlooked problems that are longer term or 
affect the disadvantaged (Chisolm 1990, 348–349; Houck 2003, 84; Buckles 2008, 1108–1109; 
Colinvaux 2012, 705; Galston 1993, 1318–1322, 1335–1353; Parachin 2016, 1070–1071). 
Moreover, regulations limiting the types and levels of political activity available to charitable 
organisations could contravene constitutional rights by encumbering freedom of speech or 
religion (Chisolm 1990, 320–337; Carroll 1992, 254–259; Klapach 1999, 513–519; Guinane, 
2007; Leff 2009, 685–696; Brunson 2011, 145–147; Galston 2011, 903–911, 918–928; Weitzel 
2011, 157–158; Fresco 2012, 3026–3045; for a retort, see Tobin 2007, 1342–1349).
3 Framing the debate in the political finance literature: are private 
donations compatible with democratic principles?
The legal literature on political finance focuses on the regulation and resourcing of election-
eering by political parties and candidates. The central debate within that literature considers 
whether the protection of liberty or equality should determine how the private donations to 
such entities are regulated. The scholars and practitioners who uphold political liberty argue 
that the donations of natural and legal persons constitute speech, enabling them to express their 
support for a political entity and signal its intensity (BeVier 1994, 1277; Sullivan 1997, 671–
675; Redish 2001, 125–128; Smith 2001, 109–121; Samples 2006, 31–40). Moreover, unlim-
ited campaign spending allows political parties and candidates to deal with more issues, handle 
them at greater depth and reach wider audiences. Constraining who spends and the amounts 
spent would leave the electorate less informed and introduce arbitrary judgements over what 
types and amounts of information are excessive (ibid, 1266–1267, 675–678, 135–136, 41–45, 
175–179). Thus, to protect the freedom of speech and the benefits of unrestrained informa-
tion, those who uphold liberty recommend a “liberalising agenda” for the regulation of political 
finance (Samples 2006, 266–297): one that would allow natural and legal persons to give and 
political entities to spend whatever they wish and one that would reduce or remove public 
funding, thereby neither imposing this burden on taxpayers nor compelling them to support 
candidates apart from those of their choosing.
There are arguments that counter these. Money is a form of property that purchases things 
other than speech; hence, giving and spending are acts tied to property rights that can be regu-
lated without regulating speech per se (Wright 1976; Hellman 2011). In the context of election-
eering, the purpose of free speech is not to create an unregulated “marketplace of ideas” easily 
dominated by those with greater resources but to support a public discourse among political 
equals, each having the same opportunity to speak and be heard (Sunstein 1993, 244–250; Fiss 
1996, 15–16). More information does not make the electorate more informed. The communi-
cations and causes backed by greater resources will “drown out” the others, thereby narrowing 
the range of issues that occupies the electorate’s attention (Rawls 1971, 225; Wright 1982, 
624–625).
The scholars and practitioners who uphold political equality argue that it is threatened by 
income inequality – echoing the concerns of the OECD (2016). Income conveys influence, 
encouraging or enabling individuals to be more politically active, whether by donating, vol-
unteering, communicating with peers or candidates, voting or running for office (Raskin and 
Bonifaz 1994, 1174–1183; Overton 2004, 85–104; de Figueiredo and Garrett 2005, 627–634). 
Natural or legal persons make campaign donations either for the “consumption” purpose of 
endorsing the image projected and the policy platform put forward or for the “investment” 
purpose of altering that platform to serve their interests (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Sny-
der 2003). Candidates and parties that rely on donations could adjust their platforms to attract 
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the support of those most able and willing to give (Hasen 1996, 8–35; Garrett and Smith 2005, 
296–299; Issacharoff 2010, 126–130). Greater donations enable them to mount campaigns that 
could broaden their appeal by shifting political messaging away from platforms that ignore the 
poor and toward the symbols and personal qualities that promote their own image or demean 
that of their opponents (Mazo 2014, 284; Fowler, Franz and Ridout, 2016, 141–147). Such 
strategies would be reinforced by sections of the electorate being politically alienated and apa-
thetic or malleable and credulous (Dworkin 1996; Ortiz 1998; Hardin 2004; Achen and Bartels 
2016). Thus, to prevent income inequality from skewing political participation, platforms and 
powers of persuasion, those who uphold equality recommend regulations that would provide 
greater public funding for party and candidate campaigns, as well as measures to increase the 
number of individuals donating, level up or level down the amounts they donate, cap or prohibit 
the donations or expenditures of corporations and independent political outfits and encourage 
or require limits on campaign spending (Foley 1994; Hasen 1996; Briffault 1999; Ackerman and 
Ayers 2002; Cmar 2005; Sarbanes and O’Mara 2016).
Again, there are arguments that counter these. As a source of influence, income is not 
unique, somehow illegitimate or necessarily skewed across the political spectrum; besides, 
efforts to neutralise its effects would simply enhance the relative effects of other unevenly dis-
tributed sources (BeVier 1994, 1266–1269; Sullivan 1997, 680; Redish 2001, 9; Smith 2001, 
45–48, 79–83, 201–213; Samples 2006, 131–134, 140–145). There are no clear standards to 
measure the extent to which platforms and persuasive powers favour the wealthy. And even 
if they were, there is no clear evidence of this being attributable to private donations (ibid, 
1268–1269, 675–685, 48–63, 121–136, 213–215, 88–106).
4 Linking the political and charity finance debates
The central debates of the charity finance and political finance literatures have been conducted 
in relative isolation. And yet in each one, can recognise the same opposing pairs of political phi-
losophies and models of democracy: libertarianism and classical pluralism versus egalitarianism 
and deliberative democracy.4 Libertarianism and classic pluralism underlie not only the political 
finance arguments that uphold liberty but also the charity finance arguments countering the 
claims that the political activities of charitable organisations would harm political purposes. 
Both sets of arguments place importance on freedom of speech and conscience for natural and 
legal persons and thus oppose limits to that freedom apart from ones needed to prevent violat-
ing the rights of others (Mill 2003, 139; Vallier 2018, 402).5 Such freedom extends to persons 
being able to give to charitable organisations and political entities and to those organisations 
and entities being able to perform political activities and spend on them. Both sets of arguments 
envisage those organisations and entities joining other groups and associations, each working 
with distinct priorities and specialised information, striving to promote its cause and frustrate 
the causes of others and adding to the array of competing interests and demands that ultimately 
needs to be adjudicated either by the electorate to form a government or by the government to 
formulate policy (Dahl 1956, 131–135; Held 2006, 158–169).6 Such competition and bargain-
ing across groups can operate alongside the “passive acquiescence or indifference of a majority 
of adults or voters” (ibid, 133; 166).
In comparison, egalitarianism and deliberative democracy underlie not only the political 
finance arguments that uphold equality but also the charity finance arguments that support the 
claims that by performing political activities charitable organisations would harm political pur-
poses. Both sets of arguments envisage all citizens having equal opportunities to follow and par-
ticipate in processes of reasoned and reflective public discourse and decision-making. Although 
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such processes would not necessarily eliminate differences in priority or outlook, they could 
accommodate them and lead to decisions and actions that could be understood by and justi-
fied to all (Rawls 1971, 221–234, 239 n 23; Held 2006, 231–255).7 In spite of these common 
elements, each set of arguments has a different focus. That from political finance recommends 
regulations to restrict the giving to and spending of political entities in order to counter the 
threats that income poses to political equality.8 In contrast, the set from charity finance recom-
mends regulations to restrict the political activities available to charitable organisations in order 
to counter threats to public reason, dispassionate discourse and citizen discernment.9
5 Categorising and comparing international approaches to 
regulating privately financed political activities
How can one characterise international approaches to regulating the private financing of politi-
cal activities? To address that question, this part categorises and compares the approaches taken 
by a sample of countries to regulate the political activities that charitable organisations may 
perform and the private donations that political entities may receive. The sample comprises 16 
democracies from Europe, Africa, the Americas and Asia-Pacific; half are common-law juris-
dictions (Australia, Canada, England-Wales, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Singapore and the United 
States) and half civil-law (Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal and Sweden); 
four are middle income (Brazil, India, Kenya and Nigeria) and the rest high income. All 16 
countries provide charitable organisations and political entities with fiscal privileges that include 
exempting their income from taxation. And, as presented in Table 6.1, all 16 permit private 
donations from individuals and corporations to charitable organisations, and indeed encour-
age them by offering at least some donors tax credits, deductions or matching grants. For 
these organisations, regulating their use of private monies to finance political activities involves 
restricting the types and levels of activities they may perform. All of the countries also permit 
private donations from individuals to political entities. Some permit donations from corpora-
tions. And some encourage certain donations again by offering donors tax credits or deductions. 
For these entities, regulating their use of private monies to finance political activities involves 
restricting the levels and sources of donations they may receive. As outlined in the following, 
the regulatory approaches taken by each country in limiting both the activities of charitable 
organisations and the donations to political entities can be characterised by stances that are 
either more permissive, in keeping with libertarianism and pluralism, or more restrictive, in 
keeping with egalitarianism and deliberative democracy. To be sure, these stances are based on 
actions or indicators that are stated in legislation or regulatory guidelines rather than on what is 
necessarily enforced or followed. And inevitably the job of assigning them requires discretionary 
judgement. Nevertheless, patterns emerge across what are at least practices de jure.
Regulating the political activities of charitable organisations
Table 6.2 describes the regulatory treatment of electioneering, advocacy and lobbying by chari-
table organisations as being either prohibited, restricted, permitted conditionally or permitted 
with no formal limitations. In general, the limitations placed on electioneering are at least as 
great as those on advocacy and lobbying. They are greatest – amounting to prohibition – in 
Canada, Germany, India, Mexico and the United States. They are lowest in Italy, Portugal, 
Singapore and Sweden: registered nonprofit third sector entities in Italy may donate to politi-
cal parties but are subject to transparency requirements if the amounts exceed €5,000; asso-
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Table 6.2  Regulatory treatment of political activities performed by charitable organisations
Country ← More egalitarian/deliberative restrictive More libertarian/pluralist permissive →




Brazil Electioneering2 Advocacy, lobbying3










Japan Electioneering13 Advocacy, lobbying
Kenya Electioneering14 Advocacy, lobbying15 Electioneering16
Mexico Electioneering17 Advocacy, lobbying18







U.S. Electioneering24 Advocacy, lobbying25
 1 Advocacy and lobbying are charitable if undertaken by a charity to further its charitable purpose (Aid/
Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42). The Australian Charities and Not-
for-Profits Commission recognises “campaigning” as a legitimate way of furthering a charity’s charita-
ble purpose. This includes supporting the stance of a political party or candidate on an issue without 
promoting or opposing a particular party or candidate per se (ACNC, Charities, elections and advocacy 
April 2016). Charities making “electoral expenditures” above tiered thresholds must disclose them at 
different levels of detail to the Australian Electoral Commission (Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918).
 2 Public Interest Civil Society Organisations (PISCOs) may not participate in political campaigns or 
support political parties or politicians (Law 9.790/99 Article 16). Corporate donations to any PICSO 
cannot be deducted from taxable income (Law 13.019/2014 Art. 16-C).
 3 Brazilian law generally imposes no restrictions on – or protections of – the ability of civil society organ-
isations to lobby or advocate (International Centre for Non-for-Profit Law. Civic Freedom Monitor – 
Brazil, July 2020: https://www.icnl.org/resources/civic-freedom-monitor/brazil#glance accessed 20 
September 2020).
 4 Charities may not devote any of their resources to the direct or indirect support of, or opposition to, 
any political party or candidate for public office [Income Tax Act Section 149.1 (6.1), (6.2)].
 5 Advocacy and lobbying constitute “public policy dialogue and development activities” that are chari-
table if undertaken by a charity to further its charitable purpose (Canada Revenue Agency, Guidance 
Reference number CG-027, 21 January 2019).
 6 The Charity Commission for England and Wales recognises advocacy and lobbying as ways a charity 
may further its charitable purpose and permits charities to focus most of their resources on those activi-
ties for a finite period (Campaigning and Political Activity Guidance for Charities, publication CC9). 
To further its charitable purpose, a charity may engage with political parties and candidates and endorse 





 7 General interest associations may engage in political activities, whereas public utility associations and 
foundations may not primarily engage in them (State Council Opinion No. 322894, 13 June 1978). 
These organisations cannot directly fund the campaign activities of parties or candidates (Article 11.4, 
Law No. 88–227 of 11 March 1988; Electoral Code L.52–8).
 8 Tax-privileged organisations may not use their assets for the direct or indirect benefit of political parties 
(General Fiscal Law Article 55–1).
 9 Tax-privileged organisations may comment publicly on and communicate with legislators about poli-
cies related to their tax-privileged purposes (General Fiscal Law Articles 52, 55–1).
10 The governing documents of institutions established for charitable purposes must prohibit the use of 
assets for purposes other than charitable ones [Income Tax Act Section 80G 5(ii)]. Indian courts hold 
political purposes or activities not to be charitable [e.g., CIT v. All India Hindu Mahasabha [1983] 140 
ITR 748 (Delhi)].
11 Institutions established for charitable purposes are not prohibited from communicating with legislators 
on issues tied to their purpose or to “general public utility”, provided such activities remain incidental 
to achieving their charitable objects.
12 There are no formal limits to registered nonprofit third sector entities performing political activities to 
further the general interest they serve (Legislative Decree No. 117 of 3 July 2017). However, such enti-
ties are subject to the same transparency requirements as political parties (i.e., submitting their budget 
to the relevant parliamentary committee) if they donate in cash or kind more than €5,000 to political 
parties, political movements or to persons holding a position in government or elected office (Legisla-
tive Decree No. 34 of 28 June 2019).
13 Special Nonprofit Corporations are prohibited from “promoting, supporting, or opposing a political 
principle” and from “recommending, supporting, or opposing a candidate for public office, a per-
son holding a public office, or a political party” [Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities 25 
March 1998 Article 2–2(ii b,c)]. Otherwise, nonprofit organisations may engage in political activities as 
means to pursue their authorised purposes.
14 The yet-to-be enacted Public Benefits Organisations Act 2013 defines a registered organisation as 
“autonomous, nonpartisan, non-profit making” [Sect. 5(1)] that “may not engage in fundraising or 
campaigning to support or oppose any political party or candidate for appointive or elective public 
office, nor may it propose or register candidates for elective public office” [Sect. 66(3)].
15 The yet-to-be-repealed Non-Governmental Organisations Co-Ordination Act 1990 does not prohibit 
advocacy or lobbying, whereas the pending Public Benefits Organisations Act 2013 explicitly endorses 
them, defining “public benefit activity” as “an activity that supports or promotes public benefit by 
enhancing or promoting the economic, environmental, social or cultural development or protecting 
the environment or lobbying or advocating on issues of general public interest or the interest or well-
being of the general public or a category of individuals or organisations” [Section 2(1)].
16 In contrast with the PBO Act 2013, the NGO Act 1990 prohibits a registered organisation from affili-
ating with political entities established outside Kenya (Section 21–1b) but does not prohibit affiliations 
with domestic entities or political activities “for the benefit of the public at large and for the promotion 
of social welfare, development charity or research in the areas inclusive of, but not restricted to, health, 
relief, agriculture, education, industry and the supply of amenities and services” (Section 2).
17 Nonprofit organisations authorised to receive deductible donations must fulfil “their social object, 
without being able to intervene in political campaigns or get involved in activities of propaganda” 
[Income Tax Act 2013 Article 82(II)].
18 Such organisations “may carry out activities designed to influence legislation, provided that such activi-
ties are not remunerated and are not carried out for of persons or sectors who have made donations to 
them” [Ibid., Article 82(III)].
19 The Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 Section 38(2) prohibits companies limited by guarantee 
from making “a donation or gift of any of its property or funds to a political party or political associa-
tion, or for any political purpose” but does not prohibit other forms of nonprofit organisations from 
endorsing political parties or candidates.
20 Institutions or bodies authorised to receive deductible donations are not formally prohibited from advocacy 
or lobbying; however, certain subjects are or could be excluded. The Constitution of Nigeria Sections 39, 
40 guarantee rights to receive and impart information and to assemble freely and associate, but Section 45(1) 
permits restricting these rights “in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or pub-
lic health”. The Criminal Code Act 1916 Section 62 declares unlawful any society for “interfering with, or 
resisting, or encouraging interference with or resistance to the administration of the law”. More specifically, 
the Same Sex Marriage Act 2014 Section 5(3) makes it an offence for a person or group to support “the 
registration, operation and sustenance of gay clubs, societies, organisations, processions or meetings”.
21 There are no formal limits to private institutions of social solidarity or public utility associations and 
foundations engaging in political activities to further their purposes of social interest. Associations and 
foundations may engage with political parties but not elaborate a political program or run candidates 
for election (Decree Law no. 594/74 Article 12).
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presenting a political platform or running candidates; both Institutions of a Public Character 
in Singapore and registered nonprofit organisations in Sweden face no formal limitations on 
political activities related to their charitable purposes. The treatment of electioneering in the 
other seven countries appears intermediate. In Brazil, Japan and Nigeria, it is restricted in that 
any prohibitions apply only to specified organisations: Public Interest Civil Society Organisa-
tions in Brazil, Special Nonprofit Corporations in Japan and companies limited by guarantee in 
Nigeria. In Australia, England and France, organisations may campaign to support or oppose 
the policies or positions of parties and candidates on condition that this furthers their charitable 
purposes or general interests and that their support or opposition does not apply to the parties 
or candidates per se. For Kenya, the status of electioneering is uncertain: under the non-repealed 
1990 Non-Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Act (Section 21(1b)), they must only 
avoid affiliations with “political entities established outside Kenya”, whereas under the not-yet- 
ratified 2013 Public Benefits Organisations Act (Section 66(3)), registered organisations “may 
not engage in fundraising or campaigning to support or oppose any political party or candidate” – 
raising concerns that the proposed legislation seeks to silence the charitable sector on issues 
related to the International Criminal Court or politicians’ salaries (Churchill 2013).
With respect to advocacy, the limitations are as least as great as those on lobbying. They are 
greatest in India and to a lesser degree in the United States: Indian courts prohibit advocacy, 
considering it non-charitable for reason that they could not or should not decide if a change 
in law would be for the public benefit; American religious institutions and foundations can 
make no expenditures to influence legislation, and other charitable organisations can only make 
“insubstantial” expenditures. In Australia, Canada, England, France, Germany, Japan, Kenya, 
Mexico and Nigeria, advocacy is permitted on condition that it further the charitable, tax-
privileged, authorised or general-interest purposes of registered organisations. That said: in 
England and France, there are limits to the share of resources that can be so devoted; in Mexico, 
advocacy cannot be at the behest of donors; and in Nigeria, certain areas of policy (e.g., those 
related to sexual orientation) are ruled out by law. There are no formal prohibitions or condi-
tions on advocacy in Brazil, Italy, Portugal, Singapore and Sweden. In general, the treatment 
of lobbying follows that of advocacy, India being the exception. There, although advocacy is 
prohibited, lobbying is permitted on condition that the issues be tied to the organisations’ chari-
table purpose and that the activity remain incidental.
Regulating private donations to political entities
Table 6.3 describes the regulatory treatment of private donations to political entities, using indi-
cators that represent either a permissive stance tied to libertarianism and classical pluralism or a 
restrictive stance tied to egalitarianism and deliberative democracy. The indicators representing 
a permissive stance are: high or no limits on private donations to political candidates and parties 
from individuals, corporations and other entities; high or no limits on anonymous donations; 
high or no limits on third-party election spending; and limited or no public funding for election 
22 There are no formal limits to Institutions of a Public Character engaging in political activities to further 
their charitable purposes.
23 There are no formal limits to nonprofit organisations engaging in political activities.
24 Public charities and private foundations cannot participate in any campaign for elective or appointive 
public office [Internal Revenue Code [1986] §501(c)(3)].
25 Churches and foundations cannot make lobbying or advocacy expenditures to influence legislation; 
other organisations can make “insubstantial” expenditures calculated as percentages of “exempt purpose 
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(Continued)
 9 CAD 350,000 overall, of which no more that CAD 3,000 can be spent for or against any candidate 
(Canada Elections Act 2000 Section 350(1)).
10 Parties and candidates must report the identities of donors to confirm they are among those “permis-
sible” [Parties and Referendums Act 2000 Section 54(2)].
11 Political Parties and Referendums Act 2000 Article 54.
12 Parliament annually distributes ₤2M across parties for the purpose of policy development (https://
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/financial-reporting/donations-and-
loans/public-funding-political-parties accessed 20 September 2020).
13 Political Parties and Referendums Act 2000 Article 85.
14 Limit is €7,500 for a party, €4,600 for a candidate (Law No, 88.227 11 March 1988 Article 11.4). 
Contributions receive a tax credit.
15 Donations from legal persons, except other political parties, prohibited (Law No. 88.227 11 March 1988 
Article 11.4).
16 Law No. 88.227 11 March 1988 Article 119.
17 Donors must be identified if donation exceeds €150 (Law No. 88.227 11 March 1988 Article 11.4).
18 Public benefit, benevolent or church-related nonprofit organisations prohibited (Political Parties Act Section 2).
19 Formula depends on number of votes received in last election and the donations up to €3,300 from 
individuals (Political Parties Act Section 18).
20 Donors must be identified if donation exceeds €500 and disclosed if annual total exceeds €10,000 
[Political Parties Act Section 25(2,3)].
21 There are no limits to the donations from individuals, but the amount eligible for a deduction is capped 
at €1,650 (Income Tax Act Articles 10b).
22 Corporations must be headquartered in the European Union or be more than 50% owned by citizens 
of the European Union (Political Parties Act Article 2).
23 Trade unions not prohibited.
24 Contingent upon the candidate’s campaign spending not exceeding prescribed limit [Representation of 
the People Act Sections 77, 123(6) and Conduct of Election Rules Section 90].
25 There is neither a limit to the donations from individuals nor a cap on the amount that can be deducted 
(Income Tax Act Section 80GGB).
26 There is neither a limit to the donations from corporations in existence for more than three years nor a 
cap on the amount that can be deducted (Companies Act Section 182, Income Tax Act Section 80GGC).
27 Trade unions not prohibited.
28 Parties and candidates not required to disclose total contributions.
29 Donors must be identified if donation exceeds €500 (Law No. 3/2019).
30 Candidates’ contributions limited to €100,000, as for individuals’ donations.
31 Donations from individuals are limited to €100,000, of which a cap of €30,000 can receive a credit of 
26% (Legislative Decree No. 13 of 21 February 2014 Article 10).
32 Donations from corporations are limited to €100,000, of which a cap of €30,000 can receive a credit 
of 26% (Legislative Decree No. 13 of 21 February 2014 Article 11).
33 Trade unions or nonprofit organisations not prohibited.
34 Legislative Decree No. 149 of 28 December 2013.
35 Total funds calculated as ¥250 yen per capita are distributed among parties according to their number 
of Diet seats and their proportion of the total vote (Political Party Subsidies Act Articles 3, 7, 8).
36 Identity of donors must be disclosed for donations exceeding ¥50,000 [Political Funds Control Act 
1948 Articles 12, 22(6)].
37 Contingent upon candidate’s campaign spending not exceeding prescribed limit (Public Offices Elec-
tion Act Article 194).
38 Donations from individuals are limited to ¥20M, of which a cap of 40% of taxable income exceeding 
¥2,000 can be deducted [Political Funds Control Act Article 21–3(2)].
39 The limits for corporate donations range from ¥7.5M to ¥30M depending on its capitalisation (Political 
Funds Control Act Article 21–3).
40 The limits for trade union donations range from ¥7.5M to ¥30M depending on its membership (Politi-
cal Funds Control Act Article 21–3).
41 Outside of an election, parties receiving at least 3% of the votes cast in the previous election and having 
no more than two-thirds of its registered office bearers of the same gender receive annual payments 
from a Political Parties’ Fund, 80% of which are proportional to the distribution of votes across those 
parties (Political Parties Act 2011 Section 25).
42 Elections Campaign Financing Act 2013 Section 13.
43 Contingent upon candidate’s campaign spending not exceeding prescribed limit (Election Campaign 
Financing Act 2013 Section 18).
44 No individual or corporate donor may donate more than 5% of a party’s expenditures as recorded in 
the audited accounts of the previous year (Political Parties Act 2011, Section 28–2, 3). For an election 
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campaign, no single course shall donate more than 20% of total contributions received by a party or 
candidate (Election Campaign Finance Act 2013 Section 12).
45 Trade unions or other organisations can contribute to a candidate or party with their written consent 
(Election Campaign Financing Act 2013 Section 15).
46 Parties or candidates receive no public funding (Election Campaign Financing Act 2013 Section 14).
47 General Law on Political Parties 2014 Articles 54.
48 Trade unions and religious or social organisations are among those that cannot contribute [Electoral 
Auditing Rules 2018 Article 401(1)].
49 Total funds to support political parties are calculated annually by multiplying the total number of citi-
zens in a federal or local registry times 65% of the minimum wage there. Thirty percent of the total is 
allocated equally across the parties and 70% in proportion to the distribution of votes in the last elec-
tion. In an election year, the amount is increased by 50% (Political Constitution of the United Mexican 
States 2016 Article 41; General Law on Political Parties 2014 Articles 51).
50 General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures 2020 Article 159.
51 General Law on Political Parties 2014 Articles 55, 56; Electoral Auditing Rules 2018 Article 121.
52 No individual may annually donate more than .5% of the expenditure ceiling from the previous elec-
tion, with total contributions from individuals and candidates not exceeding 10% of that ceiling in an 
election year [General Law on Political Parties 2014 Articles 56(2)].
53 Corporations cannot donate to political parties [Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 Section 38(2)]. 
Annual donations from individuals and corporations to candidates are limited to ₦1M. Individuals can 
donate to political parties, which must record their names and addresses if the donation exceeds ₦1M 
[Electoral Act 2010, Section 91(9), 93(2b)].
54 Nonprofit organisations – specifically, companies limited by guarantee – are an exception: they are 
prohibited from donating to political parties [Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 Section 38(2)].
55 Parties are prohibited from anonymous donations, but not candidates (Electoral Act 2010 Sections 92, 93).
56 Donations from legal persons prohibited (Law No. 19/2003 20 June 2003 Article 8).
57 Law No. 19/2003 20 June 2003 Articles 5, 16, 17, 18.
58 Law No. 19/2003 20 June 2003 Article 8.
59 Law No. 19/2003 20 June 2003 Articles 7, 16(4). Donations from individuals are limited to 25 times 
the annually adjusted “social support index” for a party, or 60 times for an election campaign or a presi-
dential candidate. For 2020, the index was €438.81.
60 Candidates can receive donations only from the party for which they are standing (Political Donations 
Act 2011 Section 2).
61 “Permissible donors” comprise individuals who are citizens of Singapore and at least 21 years old, and 
Singapore-controlled corporations (Political Donations Act 2011 Section 2).
62 Trade unions are an exception: political objects are not among those on which they can spend (Trade 
Unions Act 1992 Section 2).
63 Parties and candidates can accept anonymous donations under SD 5,000, allowing multiple donations 
below threshold (Political Donations Act 2011 Section 2).
64 Parties receive a fixed grant for each seat in the Rikstag won in the last two elections to support their 
secretariats, as well as basic and supplementary support for their Parliamentary activities: the former 
being a fixed amount for each party receiving at least 4% of the votes cast, the latter a per-seat amount 
that is higher if the party is not represented in the government (Act on State Support for Political Par-
ties 8 December 1972 Sections 3, 6, 8).
65 Anonymous donations are prohibited above 0.05 price base amount (Act on Transparency of Party Financ-
ing 15 February 2018 Section 9). For 2020, the annually price-adjusted price base amount was 47,300kr.
66 The Act on Transparency of Party Financing 15 March 2018 outlines the reporting of donations but 
places no limitations on their source or amount.
67 Contributions to parties or candidates by corporations or trade unions are prohibited (Title 2 U.S. Code 
Section 441b).
68 Candidates, political parties and political action committees must identify donors for contributions 
above USD 200 (United States Code Title 2 Paragraph 434b).
69 There is no ceiling on the aggregate contributions of a single donor to different candidates, national 
party committees and independent third parties (McCutcheon v FEC [2014] 572 US 185).
70 There is no ceiling on the contributions of corporations and trade unions to independent and uncoor-
dinated political action committees (Citizens United v FEC [2009] 588 US 310; SpeechNow.org v FEC 
[2010] 599 F3d 686).
71 For presidential campaigns: the federal government will match up to USD 250 of an individual’s total 
contributions to an eligible primary candidate; each major political party receives USD 4M (circa 1974 
adjusted for inflation) to finance its national nominating convention, and the candidate for each major 
party is eligible for USD 20M for campaigning on condition of refusing private contributions – and 
offer declined in recent history (Title 26 US Code Sections 9001 to 9042).
Table 6.3 (Continued)
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campaigns. Conversely, the indicators representing a restrictive stance are: no or limited private 
donations to political candidates and parties from individuals, corporations and other entities; 
limited or no anonymous donations; limited or no third-party election spending; and significant 
public funding for election campaigns.
The stances of Canada and France appear egalitarian and restrictive. Corporate and trade union 
donations are prohibited; donations from individuals receive a tax credit and are limited, albeit at 
higher level in France; and public funding for campaigns is significant. The only exception is the 
amount of spending by unaffiliated non-party (i.e., third-party) political outfits: Canada sets a rela-
tively high limit (CAD 350,000), whereas France imposes no limits. In contrast, the stances of 
England, India, Italy, Nigeria, Singapore and the United States appear libertarian and permissive. 
Public funding for campaigns is limited or nonexistent, and spending by third parties is unlimited. 
Individual and corporate donations are permitted, with no limits in England, India, Singapore and 
the United States (for individuals’ aggregate donations and for corporate donations to political action 
committees) and high limits in Italy and Nigeria (for donations to candidates, not parties). The 
stances of the other countries appear intermediate. Those of Brazil, Mexico and Portugal tilt toward 
the egalitarian: although the limits on donations from individuals are high, and there are no limits on 
third-party spending in Brazil, all three countries prohibit corporate donations and provide signifi-
cant public funding. In comparison, the stances of Australia, Germany, Japan, Kenya and Sweden tilt 
toward the libertarian. All five countries provide significant public funding; however, they set high or 
no limits on the spending of third parties and donations from individuals and corporations.
Comparing regulatory approaches toward charitable organisations 
and political entities
In regulating the use of private monies to finance political activities, do governments take a 
similar approach regardless of whether those activities are performed by charitable organisations 
or political entities? To address that question, Table 6.4 categorises and compares the regulatory 
stances of each country, inferring these from the assignment of indicators in Table 6.2 and the 
assignment of gradations in Table 6.3 for which the treatment of electioneering receives greatest 
weight. The range of stances follows a rough continuum running from a strong to weak restric-
tive stance and from a weak to strong permissive stance.
Similar approaches appear for Canada, Italy and Singapore. In regulating both political enti-
ties and charitable organisations, Canada adopts a relatively strong restrictive stance: it encour-
ages but limits the donations of individuals to political entities, prohibits corporate donations 
and offers substantial public funding for campaigns; in addition, it prohibits charities from elec-
tioneering but permits advocacy and lobbying on condition that they further the organisa-
tions’ charitable purpose. Italy and Singapore adopt a relatively strong permissive stance in both 
contexts: they permit and place no limits on the donations of individuals and corporations to 
political entities and provide no or little public funding for campaigns; in addition, they place 
slight or no formal limits on the political activities available to registered nonprofit third-sector 
entities or Institutions of a Public Character. In contrast, very different approaches appear for 
India and the United States. In regulating political entities, both adopt a relatively strong per-
missive stance. But in regulating charitable organisations, they adopt a relatively strong restric-
tive stance: both prohibit electioneering but permit lobbying on condition that it further the 
organisations’ political purpose and remain insubstantial; India prohibits advocacy, whereas the 
United States permits it conditionally. For the other 11 countries, varying degrees of difference 
appear between the stances they take toward regulating the use of private monies to finance 
the political activities of charitable organisations and political entities. Some countries – such as 
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France and Portugal – take a more permissive stance toward charitable organisations, whereas 
others – such as Germany and Nigeria – take a more restrictive stance.
6 Implications for the regulation of privately financed  
political activities
For all but three of the sample countries, the stance toward regulating the political activities 
performed by charitable organisations differs from the stance toward regulating the private 
donations received by political entities. Such differences suggest that what matters most to those 
governments is not the general task of regulating the use of private monies to finance political 
activities. Accounting for this on a country-by-country basis exceeds the scope of this chapter. 
However, a range of considerations could conceivably contribute to differences between the 
regulatory stances – considerations apart from the opposing pairs of political philosophies and 
models of democracy that, if applied consistently, would result in the stances being similar.
By way of illustration, governments might take a relatively more restrictive stance toward chari-
table organisations if they interpret charitable purposes and activities as being inherently different 
from political ones or if they envisage political activities performed by charitable organisations as 
harming charitable purposes – positions found in the charity finance literature, as outlined in part 2. 
Alternatively, governments might perceive civil society and the charitable organisations within it as 
rivalling its own abilities to mobilise and represent the interests and values of citizens. In recent dec-
ades, for example, multiple countries have introduced laws and regulations that restrict the operations 
of civil society and curtail international funding – allegedly to protect and enforce state sovereignty 
against foreign influence, promote accountability, co-ordinate sources of aid and prevent money 
laundering (Rutzen 2015). Or it could be that governments perceive the prominence of very rich 
philanthropists as generating forms of philanthropy that are “disruptive” or plutocratic – ones that 
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threaten democracy by enabling the rich to have a disproportionate say in which public purposes 
receive attention and which public programs receive resources (Horvath and Powell 2016; Saunders-
Hastings 2018). Such governments might see a need “to craft, through various policies and social 
norms, a framework that domesticates plutocrats to serve democratic ends” (Reich 2019, 28) – a 
framework that could include restricting the political activities that charitable organisations perform.
On the other hand, governments might take a relatively more permissive stance toward charitable 
organisations if they perceive them as advancing democracy. Theorists of civil society typically pre-
sent it as playing two broad roles: that of producing and delivering goods and services which com-
plement those of the market and state and that of assembling and expressing the collective priorities 
and interests of individuals, groups and communities which compose society (Rathgeb Smith and 
Grønbjerg 2006, 223–238). Those who focus on the latter role typically refer to Tocqueville’s 19th-
century portrayal of American voluntary associations encouraging and enabling individual citizens 
to find common cause, as well as joint opportunities for them to promote the social good (Clemens 
2006, 207–217). Thus, governments might take a more permissive stance toward charitable organi-
sations if they perceive them as facilitating democracy – a role that could be strengthened by giving 
them a greater voice in the processes by which collective decisions are structured, debated and made.
Finally, it might be that governments are simply unwilling or unable to define clear policy 
goals and act on them comprehensively – whether such goals are to promote particular pairs of 
political philosophies and models of democracy, respond to certain incompatibilities between 
charitable organisations and political activities, suppress the abilities of charitable organisations to 
undercut state authority or strengthen their abilities to engage citizens in democratic processes. 
The individuals who set the policy agenda, or design and implement regulations, might variously 
seek to please certain stakeholders, pursue personal advantage or resist change. Their information 
and knowledge might be incomplete or inaccurate. And their administrative capabilities might be 
limited, such that any reforms are piecemeal, patching new elements onto previous regimens or 
stretching existing instruments and procedures to handle goals or conditions for which they were 
not meant. In other words, governments might exercise a low level of policy design (Howlett and 
Mukerjee 2014). If so, then they might be inconsistent in how they approach regulating the use 
of private monies to finance the political activities of charitable organisations and political enti-
ties simply because they have neither the incentives, knowledge nor capabilities to do otherwise.
As noted in the introduction, the use of private monies to finance political activities has received 
international attention given the possible risks to democracy (OECD 2016). Regulating that use 
effectively and comprehensively is made more complex by the wide range of entities and organisa-
tions that compose the broader system able to perform political activities and finance them privately 
(Issacharoff and Karlan 1999). Several of the 16 countries included in this chapter evidently seek 
to restrict the use of private monies to finance political entities by prohibiting donations from legal 
persons, limiting those from natural persons and providing public funding. For Canada and to some 
extent Mexico, their restrictive stances toward political entities are matched by those toward charitable 
organisations, suggesting that their regulatory approach applies consistently across the broader political 
system. But this is not the case for France, Portugal and to some extent Brazil: although their stances 
toward political entities are restrictive, those toward charitable organisations are relatively permissive, 
leaving open a channel for private monies to flow into the broader political system. Several of the 
countries evidently do not seek to restrict the use of private monies to finance political entities. For 
Italy, Singapore and to some extent England, their permissive stances toward political entities are 
matched by those toward charitable organisations, again suggesting consistency in their regulatory 
approach. However, should any of those countries pursue regulatory reform to restrict the use of 
private monies to finance politics, then – following the hydraulics arguments of Issacharoff and Kar-




 1 The title of this status varies across countries. For the sake of brevity, I refer to the organisations and their pur-
poses and activities as “charitable” – despite this term having legal meaning only in common law jurisdictions.
 2 For a comparison of practices across eight countries circa 2012, see Carmichael (2016).
 3 Parts 2 and 3 draw from the more detailed account in Carmichael (2020).
 4 The contending philosophies – egalitarianism and libertarianism – distinguish the Supreme Courts of 
Canada and of the United States in their decisions over the constitutionality of political finance regula-
tions (Carmichael 2020, n 110).
 5 Within the political finance literature, see BeVier 1994, 1277; Sullivan 1997, 671–675; Redish 2001, 
125–128; Smith 2001, 109–121; Samples 2006, 31–40. Within the charity finance literature, see Chi-
solm 1990, 320–337; Carroll 1992, 254–259; Klapach 1999, 513–519; Guinane, 2007; Leff 2009, 685–
696; Brunson 2011, 145–147; Galston 2011, 903–911, 918–928; Weitzel 2011, 157–158; Fresco 2012, 
3026–3045.
 6 Within the political finance literature, see BeVier 1994, 1274–1275; Sullivan 1997, 681–682; Wright 
1976, 1015–1017. Within the charity finance literature, see those cited previously who counter the 
argument that charitable organisations harm political purposes by performing political activities.
 7 Within the political finance literature, see Wright 1976, 1017–1021; Sunstein 1993, 241–252.
 8 Within the political finance literature, see those cited previously who hold political equality paramount.
 9 Within the charity finance literature, see those cited previously who support the argument that chari-
table organisations harm political purposes by performing political activities.
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The application of the word ‘charity’ in this connection is not confined to the 
objects that come within the quaint catalogue of the Statute of Elizabeth, but applies 
also to cases analogous, and what seems to be more alarming, to cases analogous to 
cases which have been adjudged to be analogous, thereby making the development 
of the law perpetual . . . the pursuit of these analogies obviously requires caution 
and circumspection.
(Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire  
Agricultural Society (1927) 13 TC 58: 65 per Rowlatt J)
1 Introduction
The not-for-profit (NFP) sector in Australia, as elsewhere, is incredibly diverse. In addition to 
diversity related to purpose, there are significant differences related to size, legal form, reliance 
on volunteers and/or employees and geographic coverage. Those differences are also reflected 
in charities, an important subgroup of NFPs. Another possible difference relates to whether 
the entity has members. Some NFPs have ‘members’ and some do not. Indeed, some NFPs are 
deliberately established and operated for the benefit of members, for example, social clubs and 
societies, and might appropriately be referred to as ‘member benefit organisations’. Some chari-
ties also have members, but a distinguishing feature of charity is that the charity must provide 
‘public benefit’. If there are any benefits to members of the charity, they must be incidental to 
the public benefit. This means that although having members does not preclude the entity from 
being a charity, it does raise the question about whether those members are receiving benefits 
and, if so, whether those benefits are incidental.
The federal taxing statute, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997), provides a 
number of tax concessions to charities, but it also provides concessions to many NFPs that are 
not charities (non-charitable NFPs). Given that legislative scheme, it is interesting to consider 
why entities that appear to be primarily for the benefit of members, and perhaps eligible for 
income tax exemption, would seek to be classified as charities and why courts or regulators 
would extend charitable status to entities that appear to be covered by specific legislative provi-
sions. This chapter considers some different types of membership-based NFPs and asks whether 
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they are appropriately ‘charities’ for federal, and perhaps state and territory, tax purposes. The 
Australian experience demonstrates that having information about tax-preferred entities, as 
now occurs as a result of a searchable register, allows questions to be raised about eligibility and, 
indeed, suitability for those concessions.
This chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2 will consider the different types of NFP 
membership-based entities. Section 3 will consider the legislative context for the granting of tax 
concessions to charities and to non-charitable NFPs. Section 4 will consider what is required 
to be a charity under the Charities Act 2013 (Cth) (Charities Act). Section 5 will consider 
three case studies of membership-based entities that have sought relief as charities – agricultural 
associations, business associations and professional associations. Section 6 will draw some con-
clusions and offer some suggestions for reform going forward.
2 Different types of membership-based entities
One of the problems of examining membership-based entities that receive tax concessions is 
that there is little data collected on this characteristic, and, indeed, little has been written about 
the significance of a NFP entity having members. Neither the Australian charities regulator, 
the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC), or the Australian Taxa-
tion Office (ATO) collect data on how many entities have members. Analysis from the United 
States suggests that approximately 33% of all NFPs have members and that this increases to 
60% if religious congregations are included (Tschirhart 2006). A report of the Charity Com-
mission for England and Wales in 2004, based on a survey of registered charities, found that 
44% of charities surveyed had members (Charity Commission for England and Wales, 2004, 
p. 44). The report also noted that 80% of charities surveyed had voting members (ibid: 5), 
meaning that the membership had some say in the governance of the charity.1 The charities 
that had both voting and non-voting members used a variety of terms to refer to non-voting 
members, such as ‘sponsors’, ‘friends’ and ‘associate members’ (ibid: 44). There are currently 
approximately 140,000 non-charitable NFPs in Australia in receipt of some tax concessions2 
and 58,800 charities,3 but it is not possible to say what percentage of those entities are mem-
bership-based.4 It is however clear that some entities, in receipt of tax concessions will be 
membership based. Indeed, this is contemplated by the governance standards set out in the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Regulations 2013, which mandate disclosure by the 
entity to members.5
A NFP entity may have members or may be formed without members. It seems likely, 
however, that the majority of non-charitable NFPs will have members, such as sporting clubs 
and community service organisations. On the other hand, it seems likely that many registered 
charities will not have members, such as hospitals and educational institutions. Although there 
is no data available on either non-charitable or charitable NFP membership, two factors may 
give an indication, that is, the type of charity and the legal form of the entity. According to the 
latest Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Charities Report (2018), the most 
significant types (or sub-types) of charities are religious entities, educational entities and welfare 
and public benevolent institutions (PBIs). While many religious entities will have congrega-
tions, educational entities and welfare entities are unlikely to. On the other hand, other types 
of entities such as cultural, environmental, human rights, animal protection and reconciliation-
focused entities are more likely to have members. In relation to legal form, unincorporated 
associations6 are likely to have members; incorporated entities (either companies limited by 
guarantee or incorporated associations) may generally choose whether to have members beyond 
some statutory minimums, and trusts will not have members.
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Membership structures do ensure some accountability of the entity and its officers. This 
can be an issue for NFP entities where the membership does not have the same sort of interest 
as shareholders in a company and may not, therefore, provide the same level of accountability. 
Where charities have a choice about ownership structure, it may be that adopting a closely held 
membership structure will avoid the need to comply with ACNC Governance Standard 2 relat-
ing to accountability to members. This suggests that there are tensions between accountability 
and the additional costs that this imposes.
Of more significance is whether the membership confers benefits on members, with or 
without also conferring governance authority. It is possible to identify at least three scenarios: 
where membership does not confer any benefits (e.g., where the member is effectively a donor 
or supporter of the entity), where membership confers minor benefits (e.g., access to a newslet-
ter or reduced entry to events) and where membership confers significant benefits (e.g., a social 
club where members receive reduced prices on goods and services).
Some common types of NFP membership-based entities include the following:
• Community service organisations (CSOs),
• Professional and business associations,
• Non-distributing co-operatives,
• Self-help groups and
• Sporting and recreational clubs.
It is useful to consider how these different types of entities might be taxed, either as charities or 
as non-charitable entities.
Community service organisations
A CSO is the term used to describe an organisation that is income tax exempt under s 50–10 of 
the ITAA (1997). The exemption applies to a ‘society, association or club established for com-
munity service purposes (except political or lobbying purposes)’. The exemption was included 
in the legislation in 1990, with the Explanatory Memorandum noting that ‘many entities are 
not charitable, and so such bodies as the traditional community service clubs – Apex, Rotary, 
Lions, Zonta, Quota and the like have not qualified for exemption’ (Explanatory Memoran-
dum, Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1990 (Cth): 20). The Explanatory Memorandum 
addressed what was intended to be covered by the exemption:
The words ‘for community service purposes’ are not defined but are to be given a 
wide interpretation. The words are not limited to those purposes beneficial to the 
community which are also charitable. They extend to a range of altruistic purposes. 
The words would extend to promoting, providing or carrying out activities, facili-
ties or projects for the benefit or welfare of the community, or of any members of 
the community who have particular need of those activities, facilities or projects by 
reason of their youth, age, infirmity or disablement, poverty or social or economic 
circumstances.
(ibid: 21)
The Explanatory Memorandum also noted that organisations such as the Country Women’s 
Association of Australia and its constituent Associations would be exempt under the provision. 
It might be thought that the reason these types of entities would not be charities is because 
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they also provide benefits to their members. Despite that – and based on the examples in the 
Explanatory Memorandum – the government wanted to extend tax exemption to them but did 
not deem them charities.
Professional and business associations
An association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, will be a company for tax purposes 
(ITAA 1997: s. 995-1)7 and, in the absence of an exemption, will generally be liable to pay 
tax on taxable income even though it is NFP. There is no specific exemption from income tax 
for professional associations, although employer and employee associations are exempt (ibid: 
s. 50–15) (the exemption also covers trade unions). These types of entities may be able to 
rely on the principle of mutuality to exclude payments received from members from taxable 
income.8 Some professional associations have been able to become registered charities (for 
example, the Law Institute of Victoria is an ACNC-registered charity), but the state and ter-
ritory tax concessions have generally not been extended (see business association cases subse-
quently, Section 5).
Non-distributing co-operatives
Co-operatives are companies for tax purposes (ibid: s. 995–1). Distributing co-operatives can 
either pay members franked dividends or claim a deduction for payments to members (Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 1936): ss. 117–120). A non-distributing co-operative 
(e.g., a child care co-operative) may be a charity if it meets the definition in the Charities Act 
(2013, see Section 4). The case of Co-operative Bulk Handling Limited (CBH), discussed in 
the following, considers the notion of a non-distributing co-operative.
Self-help groups
Self-help groups are likely to be unincorporated associations formed primarily for the benefit 
of members. Whatever the legal form, such an entity will be a company for tax purposes (ITAA 
1997: s. 995–1). Self-help groups were described in the Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of 
Charities and Related Organisations (Charities Definition Inquiry Report) as:
[M]ade up of and controlled by people who are directly affected by the particular dis-
advantage, discrimination or unmet need that draws the members together.
(Sheppard, Fitzgerald and Gonski 2001: 126)
Examples given were groups formed by people directly or indirectly affected by a disease or 
disability but could also include a community centre or neighbourhood house which through 
mutual support assists people seeking to overcome some form of economic or social disadvan-
tage (ibid). The Charities Definition Inquiry Report recognised that many such groups would 
have difficulty meeting the ‘public benefit’ requirement of being a charity and recommended 
that if certain conditions were met, such entities should be regarded as having met the public 
benefit test (ibid: 127). This recommendation finds form in the Charities Act s 10, which 
provides that if the entity has an open and non-discriminatory membership and the entity is 
made up of, and controlled by, individuals who are affected by the disadvantage, discrimina-
tion or need, the requirement in s 5 that a purpose of an entity be for the public benefit can 
be disregarded.
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A self-help group will therefore need to be NFP and demonstrate a charitable purpose but 
will not be required to demonstrate that there is public benefit. Other self-help groups, for 
example, a public speaking club that seeks to help to improve the self-esteem of members, will 
not qualify, as it will not be able to demonstrate the requisite charitable purpose (ibid: 126).
Sporting and recreational clubs
Sporting and recreational clubs, societies or associations will, regardless of legal form, be com-
panies for tax purposes (ITAA 1997: s. 995-1). Some clubs may be income tax exempt under 
s 50–45 of the ITAA 1997, that is, a society, association or club established for the encourage-
ment of animal racing, art, a game or sport or literature or for musical purposes. Such clubs are 
unlikely to be charities, as their purposes are not recognised as charitable. It has been argued 
that amateur sport should be recognised as charitable in line with the position in England, Wales 
and Scotland (Batrouney and Lee 2018: 41–44). Many clubs that do not come within s 50–45, 
for example, social clubs, will be able to rely on the principle of mutuality9 to exclude payments 
from members in their taxable income.
3 Tax treatment of charities and non-charitable NFPs
The notion of what constitutes a charity will be considered in more detail in Section 4. This part 
considers the tax concessions that are available to charities and to NFPs that are not charities.
Charities
A registered charity, that is, a charity as defined in Charities Act s 5, that is registered under the 
Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25–5 (ACNC Act), will 
be entitled to a range of Commonwealth tax concessions. The most significant, for the purposes 
of membership entities,10 are:
• income tax exemption,
• refunds of franking credits, and
• fringe benefits tax (FBT) concessions.
Income tax exemption arises under s 50-5 of the ITAA 1997. A  registered charity will be 
exempt from income tax on all income – ordinary income and statutory income (ITAA 1997: 
s. 50-51). Ordinary income includes income from business and investment income, for exam-
ple, interest, rent and royalties.11 Statutory income includes amounts that are income under a 
statutory provision (ibid: s. 6-10), for example, capital gains (ibid: pts. 3-1 and 3-3) and divi-
dends (ITAA 1936 (Cth): s. 44). Unlike many other countries, trading or business income is also 
exempt. There are a number of conditions that must be satisfied: for example, the ‘in Australia’ 
condition (ITAA 1997: s. 50-50(1)(a)).
A registered charity may also be entitled to refunds of franking credits (ibid: divs. 67, 
207), where the entity receives dividends from a corporation that has paid sufficient tax to 
enable a shareholder to claim a credit for the tax paid. The receipt of a franked distribution12 
by a tax-paying shareholder would allow the franking credit to be offset against any tax liabil-
ity (ibid: s. 207-220). In the case of tax-exempt entities that have no liability to pay tax, the 
franking credits could potentially be wasted. However, ‘charities’, but not other NFPs unless 
they are deductible gift recipients under div 30 of the ITAA 1997 (ibid: ss. 67-25, 207-115), 
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are entitled to claim a refund of the amount of tax paid by the distributing company. Many 
philanthropic trusts that invest corpus to produce a return in order to make grants rely on the 
refunds of franking credits as a major source of revenue, but other, probably larger, charities 
also derive significant benefit from this concession. The ability of charities to claim these 
refunds is likely a major reason a NFP entity might seek to become a charity.
A further concession available to income tax-exempt entities that have employees arises 
under the Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth) (FBTAA). A subgroup of entities are 
entitled to an exemption from FBT: PBIs, health promotion charities, public and NFP hospitals 
and public ambulance services are exempt from the tax, subject to caps (FBTAA: ss. 5E, 57A). 
There are also a number of concessions for religious practitioners and religious entities (ibid: 
s. 57). Most registered charities that do not come within the exemption are, however, entitled 
to a rebate of 47% of the FBT otherwise payable, subject to caps (ibid: s. 65J). Some chari-
ties are excluded from the exemption and the rebate, including charities that are considered 
government-controlled entities, such as universities (ibid: s. 65J(1)).
A charity, as that term applies at common law (see Part 3), may also be entitled to tax con-
cessions at the state and territory level. Perhaps the most significant of the concessions is the 
exemption from payroll tax – a tax imposed on the employer’s total payroll.13 Some charities, 
notably universities, are generally excluded from the exemption (perhaps reflecting the fact the 
federal government rather than state government, has fiscal responsibility for universities), and 
there are also requirements relating to the nature of the work being performed.14 There are also 
other state and territory tax concessions for charities (subject to some exceptions) such as from 
land tax,15 municipal rates,16 and stamp duties.17
The legislative scheme in Australia since the first income tax legislation has been to have a list 
of eligible types of entities that are income tax exempt, including but not limited to charities.18 
It has been suggested that this may have been because the drafters assumed that charity would 
have its ordinary meaning (Chesterman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1923) 32 CLR 362). 
That approach was disabused by the Privy Council in 1925 (Chesterman v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1925) 37 CLR 317), but the legislature continued to spell out the types of entities 
that were eligible, including some types that would clearly come within the technical meaning 
of charity – such as religious entities and public educational institutions.
Non-charitable NFPs
As noted previously, a range of other types of NFP entities that would generally not qualify as 
charities are also entitled to exemption from income tax, including:
• CSOs (ITAA 1997: s. 50-10);
• employer and employee associations (ibid: s. 50-15);
• associations for the promotion of primary and secondary resources and tourism (ibid: s. 
50-40); and
• sporting, cultural and recreational associations (ibid: s. 50-45).
According to the ATO, there are approximately 200,000 NFPs that are eligible for income tax 
exemption under div 50 (ATO-supplied data – see n 2).
Non-charitable NFPs that are not income tax exempt under div 50 of the ITAA 1997 may 
be able to rely on the common law principle of mutuality. For example, a social club that 
receives monies from members either as membership dues, or for goods and services, will not 
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be required to include those receipts as assessable income. A non-profit company that earns less 
than $A417 will not pay tax (Income Tax Rates Act 1986 (Cth): s. 23(6)). There may also be 
a specialist regime available, for example, for co-operatives (ITAA 1936: ss. 117–120) or small 
credit unions (ibid: s. 23G). Being income tax exempt also allows an entity to access FBT con-
cessions, notably the FBT rebate of 47% of FBT payable (FBTAA: s. 65J).
However, the other concession available to charities, refunds of franking credits (ITAA 1997: 
divs. 67, 207), is not available to most non-charitable NFPs. As noted previously, this may pro-
vide an incentive to seek charitable status.
Some state and territory concessions, such as the payroll tax exemption, are only available 
to charities. This may be another reason a NFP entity could wish to be treated as a charity. For 
example, in Victoria, the payroll tax exemption is available to ‘a religious institution; a public 
benevolent institution or a non-profit organisation having as its whole or dominant purpose 
a charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or patriotic purpose (but not including a school or an 
educational institution’ (Payroll Tax Act 2007 (Vic): s. 48(1)). Interestingly, some states and ter-
ritories have responded to the expansion of fourth-head charities by restricting the concessions. 
This is discussed further in the following.
4 Meaning of charity for federal tax purposes
The meaning of the term ‘charity’ differs for federal tax purposes and for state and territory 
tax purposes. This is because in 2013, the federal government enacted a statutory definition in 
the Charities Act. The states and territories still rely on the common law meaning of the term. 
Despite this, there is a fair amount of commonality, since the aim of the Charities Act was said 
to be to restate the common law,19 but the legislature also took the opportunity to ‘modernise’ 
the definition (Explanatory Memorandum, Charities Bill 2013 (Cth) 2013: 3). To be a charity 
either under the statute or at common law, the entity must:
• be not for profit,
• have a charitable purpose and
• be for the public benefit.
i Not-for-profit requirement
This requirement is common to the Charities Act and the common law. The requirement is 
also common to non-charitable and charitable entities. The term ‘NFP’ is not defined, although 
in 2012, there was a proposal to include a definition in the tax legislation (Tax Laws Amend-
ment (Special Conditions for Not-for-Profit Concessions) Bill 2012 (Cth)). A decision not to 
proceed was made following a change of government (Sinodinos 2013). In any event, the NFP 
requirement is fairly easily satisfied. The entity simply needs to demonstrate that it does not 
distribute any profit or surplus to persons or entities associated with the entity. It is usual to 
include standard non-distribution clauses in the governing documents (Commissioner of Taxa-
tion 1997).
Although charities and non-charitable NFPs are required to have non-distribution require-
ments, as Dal Pont notes, distributions of profits may occur other than as a result of a formal dis-
tribution of profit, for example, as payments to management or staff or to suppliers or associates 
(2017). This is significant where an entity has members, as it is necessary to consider whether 
there are informal distributions to those members.
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ii  Charitable purpose
Charities at common law, and under the Charities Act, must have a charitable purpose. In both 
cases, the purpose or purposes must be exclusively charitable. At common law, this is said to 
require the charitable purpose be the sole purpose. This means that if the entity has another pur-
pose which is not charitable, it will not be a charity. This apparently strict requirement has been 
ameliorated to some extent by an acceptance that the entity may have purposes that are merely 
incidental or ancillary to its main charitable purpose. Where a charity has more than one purpose, 
it is therefore necessary to consider whether any of its purposes are non-charitable and, if so, 
whether any non-charitable purpose can appropriately be described as ‘incidental or ancillary’.
The recognised categories of purpose at common law are: relief of poverty, advancement 
of education, advancement of religion and other purpose beneficial to the community that are 
‘within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth 1601’ (Commis-
sioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531) (Pemsel). The latter category, 
sometimes referred to as the ‘fourth head of charity’ (Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539: 556–557, para. 46), is the one most often relied on by member-
ship entities seeking to establish charitable status.
The Charities Act expanded the categories of ‘charitable purposes’ beyond health, educa-
tion, welfare and religion to include culture, reconciliation, human rights, security and safety, 
animal welfare and the environment. It also includes:
(k) any other purpose beneficial to the general public that may reasonably be regarded 
as analogous to, or within the spirit of, any of the [stated] purposes.
(Charities Act: s. 12(1))
The list of charitable purposes in the Charities Act was compiled over a considerable period 
of time, starting with the Charities Definition Inquiry Report in 2001 (Sheppard, Fitzgerald and 
Gonski 2001). Interestingly, although the Inquiry considered one option of including a purpose 
of ‘the promotion of community development to enhance social and economic participation’, 
there was no express reference to promotion of agricultural, business or professional associa-
tions. Paragraph (k) serves the same purpose as the fourth head at common law and allows 
courts, and presumably the regulator, to determine that even though a purpose is not expressly 
referred to, it may be charitable, if it is reasonably analogous to the listed purposes. The ‘fourth 
head’ has been relied on in a number of cases involving membership-based NFP entities that do 
not fall within the recognised categories.
iii  Public benefit
The third requirement for an entity to be a charity is that it needs to satisfy the requirement of 
public benefit. This requires identification of benefit or benefits and consideration of whether 
the benefits satisfy the public element. Where the relevant charitable purpose is para. (k), there 
seems to be some overlap between the requirements. Dal Pont’s view is that the extent to which 
the phrase ‘beneficial to the community’ can be equated with the phrase ‘public benefit’ is 
unclear (2017: para. 11.4). What is clear is that under both phrases, there must be ‘benefit’, and 
the benefit must be available to the ‘public’.
Certain purposes are presumed to be for the public benefit. This is stated in s 10 of the 
Charities Act and appears to go further than the common law presumption that applied to 
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the ‘public’ element rather than the ‘benefit’ element. Where the public benefit cannot be 
presumed, it must be demonstrated. In Grain Growers Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Rev-
enue [2015] NSWSC 925, Black J did not believe it was necessary to require proof of benefit 
despite counsel for the Commissioner for State Revenue arguing that it was required. Black J 
concluded that:
I can, without specific proof, infer that agricultural activity benefits society gener-
ally, and Australian agricultural activity benefits Australian society generally, and no 
evidence was led to suggest that the benefit that has previously existed in such activity 
has ceased to exist.
(ibid: para. 27)
Black J did, however, refer to evidence of the value of the grain industry to the Australian 
economy, including that the Australian grain industry contributes approximately $15 billion to 
Australia’s exports and approximately $26 billion to Australia’s gross domestic product, presum-
ably on an annual basis (ibid).
The benefit element
According to s 10 of the Charities Act, the ‘benefit’ can be tangible or intangible but must 
be identifiable and must take into account any possible detriment. One commentator, Pro-
fessor Rossman, has considered the benefit of a type of entity in the United States called 
a ‘regional economic development organisation’, which he describes as ‘running venture 
capital funds, recruiting companies to major metropolitan areas, providing technical assis-
tance to business owners, and in a multitude of other ways facilitating targeted economic 
growth in urban, suburban, and rural areas throughout the country’ (2014: 1457). Although 
Rossman accepts that these entities might have social value, he is critical of the acceptance 
of indirect or remote benefits, which he describes as ‘trickle down’ benefits, as such enti-
ties are recognised as charities even though they are providing direct assistance to for-profit 
businesses (ibid: 1459). A number of recent cases appear to adopt this ‘trickle down’ notion 
of benefit.
The public element: public or a section of the public
At common law, the public element has been interpreted to include ‘a sufficient section of the 
community to amount to the public’ (Lloyd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 93 CLR 
645: 662, 667, 670). Under the Charities Act, the benefit must be available to the public or a 
section of the public (Charities Act: s. 6). The sub-heading in s 6 refers to the benefit being 
‘widely available’. The reference to a section of the public means that it is necessary to identify 
whether a group of individuals constitutes a section of the public or whether they are a group 
of private individuals. This has been said to require that the section of the public must be suffi-
ciently defined and identifiable by some quality of a public nature. In any event, the cases in the 
next part do not rely on the membership constituting a section of the public but rather argue 
that the benefit that arises from the promotion of agriculture, or from a business or professional 




Any private benefit must be incidental
The public benefit requirement for charity is sometimes expressed as prohibiting private profit 
or private benefit. This will exclude entities that may be formed for otherwise charitable pur-
poses where the profits accrue to private individuals, for example, for-profit schools or for-
profit hospitals. It will also exclude clubs or societies where the benefit is only available to the 
members, for example, a social club. In this way, the requirement of public benefit is linked to 
the notion that private profit or gain is inconsistent with the notion of charity.
In Taxation Ruling 2011/4 (2011: para. 258), the Commissioner notes that:
Private benefits that are no more than incidental or ancillary to a purpose of benefiting 
the community do not detract from the charitable status of an institution. Benefits are 
incidental if they are a minor by-product of activities undertaken to carry out the institution’s pur-
pose. They are ancillary if they are conferred only as a means of achieving an institution’s chari-
table purpose. The greater the scope to provide private benefits, the greater the concern 
that the purpose is not to benefit the public, but to provide those private benefits.
(emphasis added)
In this regard, it is important to emphasise that the test is not whether the private benefits are 
minor in nature but whether they are incidental to achieving the main (charitable) purpose. 
However, the size of the benefits may indicate something about the purpose of the entity.
5 Stretching the concept of charity – case studies
There have been a number of cases recently dealing with whether different types of member-
ship-based entities are charities in Australia. These cases relate to: agricultural associations, busi-
ness associations and professional associations.
a  Agricultural associations
The importance of agriculture in Australia is of long standing.20 Tax relief for agricultural asso-
ciations in Australia can be traced to a specific exemption being included in the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1922 (Cth) (ITAA 1922). It provided an exemption for:
[A]ny society or association not carried on for the purposes of profit or gain to the 
individual members thereof, established for the purpose of promoting the develop-
ment of the agricultural, pastoral, horticultural, viticultural, stock-raising, manufac-
turing or industrial resources of Australia.
(ITAA 1922: s. 14(1)(j))
This was in addition to the existing exemption for the income of a religious, scientific, charitable or 
public educational institution (ibid: s. 14(1)(d)), which suggests that the legislature did not believe 
that agricultural associations would be charities. The income tax exemption for agricultural and 
similar associations is now in s 50-40, item 8.2 of the ITAA 1997, which provides an exemption for:
a society or association established for the purpose of promoting the development of 
any of the following Australian resources:
(a) agricultural resources;
(b) horticultural resources;








The exemption is subject to a ‘special condition’ that the society or association be ‘not 
carried on for the profit or gain of its individual members’ (ITAA 1997: s. 50-40(1) item 
8.2). The fact that this is now a condition rather than the initial requirement may dilute its 
significance.
It is not clear when agricultural associations started to be recognised as charities in Australia. 
Until 2000, entities self-assessed their entitlement to income tax exemption and, generally, 
it would not have made much difference whether the entity was a charity or exempt under 
the specific exemption. In 2012, the ACNC grandfathered all of the charities that had been 
endorsed by the ATO. The ACNC Register lists a number of entities that have the stated 
purpose of ‘promoting the development of agricultural resources’. For example, there are 
more than 140 entities with the words ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’ in their name, many of 
which run annual shows. But there are also entities that provide significant benefits to their 
members and are nevertheless recognised as charities. It is interesting to consider how this has 
come about.
The main case that has been relied on for recognising societies and associations for the 
promotion of agriculture in Australia as charities is the United Kingdom Court of Appeal case 
of Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 1 KB 611. The case 
involved a society formed in 1837 to hold an annual show for the exhibition of farming stock, 
implements and so on and for ‘the general promotion of agriculture’. The Society sought an 
exemption from income tax with respect to income from its investments – this was because 
the exemption in the United Kingdom does not apply to trading or business income. At the 
first instance, Rowlatt J decided against the Society, essentially on the basis that the society 
was formed for the private enjoyment of the founders and members rather than for charitable 
purposes (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society (1927) 13 TC 58)). 
In reaching his conclusion, his Honour accepted that agriculture was of ‘great importance’ 
and ‘should be promoted’, but he cautioned that to be a charity, there must be ‘a real public 
charitable object’ (ibid: 67). The Court of Appeal took a different view and concluded that 
the ‘right interpretation to be given to this society is that it has been formed for improvement 
of agriculture as a whole’ (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 
1 KB 611, 612).
Several comments can be made about this case. First, it should be noted that the cases relied 
on by the Court of Appeal were wills and trust cases, not taxation cases. It should also be noted 
that the cost to revenue in the United Kingdom of granting the exemption is much less, as it 
only applies to investment income and trading income of charities is subject to tax. Finally, it 
can be noted that the same facts are capable of quite different interpretation. Rowlatt J, contrary 
to the view of the Court of Appeal, decided that the members of the society were promoting 
their own businesses ((1927) 13 TC 58, 68)).
There are few Australian cases dealing with these types of entities under the income tax leg-
islation, possibly because of the specific exemption in the income tax legislation since 1922 for 
societies and associations engaged in ‘promotion of agriculture’. There was an obiter reference 
to the promotion of agriculture in the case of (Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (Qld) v Federal 
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Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 659, a case concerned with whether the production 
of law reports came within the fourth head of charity under the Pemsel case. Barwick CJ noted:
Agriculture partakes of that fundamental social quality which can give a charitable 
nature to a trust or purpose relating thereto which is beneficial to the community.
( (1971) 125 CLR 659: 669)
The High Court also referred to this purpose in a case dealing with a bequest in (Royal National 
Agricultural and Industrial Association v Chester (1974) 3 ALR 486). The bequest was to establish 
an event for pigeon racing. The High Court acknowledged that the society was itself charitable 
((1974) 3 ALR 486: 487). But the Court concluded that:
[T]he breeding of pigeons for racing cannot, either by analogy or by reason of the 
character of the activity itself, be said to be of benefit to the community in a sense 
within the preamble.
(ibid: 489)
The Federal Court returned to the issue of agricultural associations in (Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation v Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd (2010) 189 FCR 322) (FCT v CBH). The issue in this 
case was not whether CBH was a charity but whether it was entitled to income tax exemption 
under ITAA 1997 s 50-40, item 8-2, that is, whether it was ‘a society or association established 
for the purpose of promoting the development of Australian agricultural resources; and not 
carried on for the profit or gain of its individual members’. This is significant because it means 
that there were only two matters being considered: whether CBH had the purpose of ‘promot-
ing the development of Australian agricultural resources’ and whether CBH was established 
‘for the profit or gain of its individual members’ (FCT v CBH: 335, para. 59). It did not need 
to consider whether ‘the promotion of the development of agricultural resources’ was a chari-
table purpose, that is, whether it was ‘beneficial to the community’ or for the ‘public benefit’. 
The Commissioner had previously issued private rulings in 1971 (and 1996) that accepted that 
clauses in CBH’s constituent documents preventing distributions to members, including on 
winding up, meant that CBH was entitled to the exemption under s 50-40 (ibid: 330–331, 
paras. 41–43). In 2008, the Commissioner reviewed the entitlement of CBH to the exemp-
tion, arguing that much had changed since 1971 and that the size and scope of the activities of 
CBH now meant, inter alia, that CBH was not ‘established for the purpose of promoting the 
development of Australian agricultural resources’ and that CBH did not satisfy the requirement 
that it was ‘not carried on for the profit or gain of its individual members’ in their capacity as 
members (ibid: 328–329, para. 34).
In relation to the first issue, the majority, Mansfield and McKerracher JJ, noted that CBH had 
significant revenue and a number of commercial subsidiaries (ibid: 332, para. 48) but concluded 
that the primary objective of CBH was promoting the development of the Western Australian 
grain industry, thereby advancing Australia’s competitiveness in grain export markets (ibid: 340, 
para. 76). In relation to the second issue, the majority noted that members would ‘gain’ from the 
activities of CBH but said that this was also the case for non-member growers (ibid: 344, para. 
95). Further, they noted that where an entity satisfied the first limb (the ‘broader community 
objective’), the fact that there were ‘incidental gains or benefits’ to members did not disentitle 
the entity to the exemption (ibid: 343–343, para. 94).
Siopis J dissented (ibid: 350–355, paras. 117–153). He noted that the purpose of pro-
moting agriculture was not included in the objects listed in the constituent documents of 
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CBH (although it is now: Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd Rules 2021: cl. 3.2(a)) and that 
the emphasis in the documents (and in operations) was on conducting the business of bulk 
handling as its core activity (FCT v CBH: 350, para. 123). Further, he noted that CBH is 
the parent company of a sophisticated international conglomerate which, through subsidiar-
ies, holds investments in flour milling operations in South East Asia as well as shipping and 
container transportation (ibid: 351, para. 130). That is, CBH is concerned with conducting 
a business rather than having a broader purpose of promoting Australian agriculture (ibid: 
352, para. 132). In his view, the business was carried on for the financial gain of its members 
despite the fact that some non-members also used the services (ibid: 355, para. 152). Siopis 
J noted that 90% of customers were members and accounted for 95% of business (ibid: 355, 
para. 151).
Perhaps what is most surprising about the majority judgment is the conclusion that any ben-
efits to members were ‘incidental’. It seems that the fact that there were some non-members 
that used the services, as well as members, was important in this regard (ibid: 349, para. 112), 
but, as Siopis J said, the vast majority of business was conducted with and for members. In any 
event, CBH was retrospectively endorsed by the ATO in 2014 as a charitable institution, with 
effect from 1 July 2000 (CBH 2019: 71).
The recognition of CBH as a charity, now a charity registered by the ACNC, seems 
to stretch the notion of charity in a number of ways. First, CBH runs a business that is an 
end in itself. The size of the business is remarkable – in 2019, CBH had gross revenue of 
$748 million and a ‘surplus’ of $101 million (CBH 2020). This puts it in the very highest 
category of registered charities by size – ‘extra-large’ – with only 0.4% of charities having 
revenue in excess of $100 million (ACNC 2018: 4). CBH also has assets of $1.9 billion 
(CBH 2020). It has 15 wholly owned subsidiaries and 2 associated companies (ibid). Of 
course, many charities run businesses and then apply the profits or surplus towards chari-
table objects; for example, Word Investments Ltd applied the profits to advance a religious 
purpose (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 204), and 
universities apply their profits to advance education, but CBH does not apply its revenue for 
a charitable purpose. Second, the labelling of this significant business enterprise as a charity 
blurs the lines between the charitable and the for-profit sector. The ATO has released data 
about the non-payment of tax of many of Australia’s largest companies, and in 2013–14, 
CBH was the second largest company to pay no tax (Janda and Anderson 2016).21 Third, 
CBH wholly owns a large number of commercial subsidiaries that do pay tax (CBH 2019: 
79). However, when they distribute those taxed profits as franked dividends to CBH, CBH 
is entitled to claim refunds of franking credits as a charity (ITAA 1997: divs. 67, 207), 
meaning that the profits of the commercial subsidiaries may be effectively tax free. Fourth, 
CBH has contemplated changing its structure and potentially becoming a listed company. 
In 2016, a company offered to acquire the interests of members of CBH for $1 billion in 
cash and scrip (Shepherd 2016). The fact that such a bid was entertained by the board sug-
gests that it is clearly looking at ways to maximise the value of the company rather than to 
promote agriculture. Fifth, although, as a company limited by guarantee, CBH does not pay 
dividends, it has operated a program, now called the Grower Patronage Rebate Program, 
since June 2013 (and a variation on this program in the 2009–2011 income years) where 
amounts are distributed to growers (including the small percentage of non-member grow-
ers) to effectively reduce the amount they pay for the service CBH provides (Grain Central 
2019). Although this would not be unusual in a distributing co-operative, it seems anoma-
lous that these distributions would not indicate that there is a gain or benefit to members 
that is more than incidental.
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In 2017, the Productivity Commission was critical of the granting of charitable tax conces-
sions to agricultural trading companies. The Productivity Commission recommended that:
The Australian Government should legislate to exclude agricultural commodity trad-
ing companies from being granted charity status and receiving the associated tax 
concessions.
(Productivity Commission 2016: 44)
b Business association cases
Starting in 2012, there were a number of cases involving state-based Chambers of Commerce 
claiming eligibility for various state tax concessions. In Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc 
(WA) v Commissioner of State Revenue (2012) 82 SR (WA) 204 (CCI v CSR), the Administrative 
Tribunal of Western Australia was asked to consider whether the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry was a ‘charitable body or organisation’ for the purposes of the exemption from payroll 
tax.22 The legislation defined a charitable body or organisation as one that was ‘established or 
carried on for charitable purposes’ (Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA): glossary). The 
Chamber argued that its activities were carried on mainly for the promotion of trade and com-
merce in Western Australia – a purpose that it argued was beneficial to the wider community, 
not simply its members.
The Tribunal considered cases such as (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural 
Society [1928] 1 KB 611) as well as more recent cases, such as FCT v CBH (which, as noted, 
was not a case about charity). Chaney J accepted that the Chamber devoted extensive resources 
to the provision of services to its members and to business generally (CCI v CSR: 229, para. 
90). However, his Honour concluded that the Chamber’s main purpose was the promotion of 
trade and commerce in Western Australia, not serving the private interests of its members (ibid: 
229–31, paras. 90–99). The decision in CCI v CSR is a first instance decision and therefore not 
binding on courts in other jurisdictions, although such decisions may be persuasive.23
The decision in CCI v CSR encouraged similar organisations in other jurisdictions to claim 
exemptions with mixed results. In (Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd v Commis-
sioner of State Revenue (2015) 108 ACSR 334), the issue was whether the Queensland Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry (QCCI) was entitled to an exemption from payroll tax. The case 
did not consider whether QCCI was a charitable institution; rather, it appears to have been 
accepted that QCCI was a charitable institution (ibid: 340, para. 18).24 The case was concerned 
with whether ‘under its constitution . . . no amount [was] to be distributed, paid or transferred 
by way of bonus, dividend or other similar payment to its members’ (Taxation Administration 
Act 2001 (Qld): s. 149C(5)). The Commissioner argued that these requirements were not satis-
fied because there were no express provisions in QCCI’s constitution to that effect ((2015) 108 
ACSR 334: 340, para. 21). Despite that, Jackson J held that QCCI was entitled to registration 
as a charitable institution (ibid: 351, para. 94).
In (South Australian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce & Industry Inc v Commissioner of State 
Taxation [2017] SASC 127), the Chamber was claiming an exemption from payroll tax as a 
charitable entity. Blue J concluded that it was not a charity. He accepted that advancement 
of trade or commerce (or agriculture) can be a charitable purpose, referring to Commis-
sioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 1 KB 611 ([2017] SASC 127: 
37–38, paras. 123–124). He also noted that an entity would not be disqualified if it provided 
incidental benefits to its members (ibid: 49, para. 163). However, if its main purpose was to 
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benefit members, the entity would not be charitable (ibid). After reviewing the constitution 
of the Chamber [which he noted was amended in 2012 ‘to enhance the prospects of the 
Chamber obtaining tax advantages’ (ibid: 7, para. 32)] and its activities, he concluded that the 
dominant purpose was to advance the interests of its members – South Australian business 
entities (ibid: 61, para. 217). Blue J recognised that this result was at odds with CCI v CSR 
but distinguished that case on the facts, noting that the South Australian Chambers’ policy 
advocacy activities were of less significance than its counterpart in Western Australia and that 
the member services provided by the South Australia Chamber were too substantial to be 
considered ancillary to any charitable purpose of the Chamber (ibid: 64, paras. 231–233, 78, 
para. 298). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia affirmed the decision 
(South Australian Employers’ Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc v Commissioner of State Taxa-
tion [2019] SASCFC 125). It should be noted that following these decisions, several jurisdic-
tions amended their legislation to exclude ‘trade, industry or commerce’ bodies (as well as 
some other types of entities) from the charitable tax concessions. These changes are discussed 
in Section 6.
c Professional associations
A professional association is a body of persons engaged in the same profession that is formed to 
promote the interests of its members in the profession. Professional associations often act as a 
peak body for professionals working in the same or similar fields, representing the interests of 
members to government and the community. These associations may control the ability to act 
in a profession to members who have satisfied certain requirements. They will typically assist 
members through ongoing professional development and seek to maintain standards within a 
profession, exercising quality control and carrying out research. Although the nature of the 
entity and the activities it engages in will vary, a professional association, invariably, has as one 
of its purposes the promotion of the interests of its members.
The case that is often referred to as authority for income tax exemption for professional 
associations is a United Kingdom decision, (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Forrest (1890) 
15 App Cas 334), concerning a civil engineers association. The case was concerned with an 
exemption from tax which applied to ‘property which, or the profits or income whereof ’ 
that were ‘applied for any purpose connected with any religious persuasion, or for any 
charitable purpose, or for the promotion of education, literature, science, or the fine arts’ 
((1890) 15 App Cas 334: 337). The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) was incorporated 
by Royal Charter in June 1828, and its ‘objects’ were stated to be ‘for the general advance-
ment of mechanical science, and more particularly, for promoting the acquisition of that 
species of knowledge which constitutes the profession of a civil engineer’ (ibid: 345). The 
issue was whether the Institution was established for the promotion of science. There was 
no discussion about whether the Institution might also be charitable. A majority in the 
House of Lords concluded that the entity was a scientific institution. In 1931, the status of 
ICE was again considered, this time under the Income Tax Act 1918 (UK) which provided 
an exemption to an entity that was formed ‘for charitable purposes only’ in ([1932] 1 KB 
149). Although there was not much discussion of the term ‘charitable’, it was noted that 
the fact ‘that the promotion of science is a charitable object is not disputed’ ([1932] 1 KB 
149: 177).
In 1952, the House of Lords considered whether a professional medical association was a 
charity in (Royal College of Surgeons of England v National Provincial Bank Ltd [1952] AC 631); 
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however, this was not a tax case but a case concerned with whether a bequest was charitable and 
therefore valid. The House of Lords held that:
All indications point to the object of the College being the advancement of knowl-
edge and skill necessary for surgery and not the advancement of the professional posi-
tion of its individual members.
( [1952] AC 631: 661)
In 1943, the Australian High Court considered whether the Royal Australasian College of 
Surgeons was entitled to income tax exemption not as a charity but as a scientific institu-
tion under ITAA 1936 s 23(e) (now s 50-5 item 1.3 of the ITAA 1997) (Royal Australasian 
College of Surgeons v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1943) 68 CLR 436). The High Court 
unanimously decided that the College was a scientific institution and did not need to con-
sider whether it was a charity. The Royal Australasian College of Surgeons is now a registered 
charity.
In 2008, in (Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 
170 FCR 318), the Federal Court was asked to consider whether the Victorian Women Law-
yers’ Association Inc (VWL) was entitled to income tax exemption either as a charity or as a 
community services organisation. The case was heard by French J just prior to taking up his 
appointment as Chief Justice of the High Court. French J noted that under the fourth head, he 
was required to find a purpose that was beneficial to the public and analogous to the spirit and 
intendment of the Preamble, noting that this required some direct and general benefit to the 
community. He also noted the need to find a public benefit and not just the creation of private 
benefits. After considering the constituent documents of the association and its activities, he 
found them to be charitable, commenting that VWL:
[W]as established to overcome a well-known social deficit, namely the substantial 
under-representation of women in the legal profession, in its upper reaches and in the 
judiciary.
(ibid: 352, para. 148)
He noted the activities of the Association, including the social and networking functions – 
which would normally mark an association as being for the benefit of members, but said that 
‘they were . . . directed to the larger object and in many cases to a larger audience, the legal 
profession in Victoria’ (ibid: 352, para. 149). One reading of the case is that French J was so 
impressed by the ‘worthy’ purpose that he was prepared to overlook the fact that the members 
did receive benefits in the form of career advancement. VWL is now a federally registered 
charity.
Finally, in 2015, in (Law Institute of Victoria v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] VSC 604), 
a professional association representing the state’s lawyers, which at the time of the case had 
18,120 members and more than 100 staff, argued that it was entitled to an exemption from 
payroll tax as a NFP entity with a sole or dominant charitable purpose. Digby J concluded that 
the nature of the regulatory and membership activities meant that the Law Institute of Victoria 
(LIV) could not be charitable. He also noted that the considerable amounts of money gener-
ated by the regulatory and membership activities suggested they could not be ‘minor, ancillary, 
incidental, supplemental or subsidiary’ to charitable objects. It is of interest to note that LIV was 
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and is a registered charity for federal tax purposes. Digby J noted this but said it provided ‘no 
assistance’ because:
[T]hat recognition and registration was achieved pursuant to a separate and distinct 
framework and criteria.
([2015] VSC 604: 40, para. 130)
6 Conclusions and possible solutions
Consideration of these three case studies raises a number of issues. First, they demonstrate that 
membership-based entities have at least the possibility of ‘private’ benefits. This is not neces-
sarily true in all cases – members may receive no benefit and may perform important oversight 
functions in relation to the entity and its officers. But membership should at least raise a red flag 
that should be investigated to see if there is private benefit. A second issue concerns the judicial 
function and perhaps the role of a regulator tasked with determining whether the entity is a 
charity or is otherwise eligible for tax relief. There are really two sub-issues here: first, although 
the requirements for eligibility are clear, there is a level of discretion for the decision-maker as 
to whether those requirements are met. This is particularly the case with the fourth head of 
charity, where the test of ‘beneficial to the community’ is so broad that almost any worthwhile 
purpose could fall within it. A second sub-issue in relation to determining eligibility is that the 
use of wills cases to determine eligibility for tax relief results in an expansion of the categories 
of charity, even though the relevant policy considerations are quite different. A third issue is 
that the doctrine of precedent, and what might be described as ‘creeping assumptions’, has 
blurred the lines between for-profit and NFP entities. The initial case discussed, involving the 
Yorkshire Agricultural Society (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society 
[1928] 1 KB 611), involved a small society in the United Kingdom holding agricultural shows, 
with very little taxable income, performing what might be viewed as educational activities, 
but has led to a very large and profitable entity, CBH, being found eligible for tax relief as a 
non-charitable entity (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd (2010) 
189 FCR 322) that then somehow became a registered charity eligible for additional tax relief. 
That case also demonstrated how difficult it is to remove a tax concession once it has been 
granted. A fourth issue relates to the absence of tax policy analysis in relation to the conces-
sions. Tax concessions are equivalent to a government spending program, and it is legitimate 
to have regard to the ‘cost’ of those concessions. For example, the significant revenue of CBH 
(and its subsidiaries) should be a matter of legitimate concern to decision-makers in deter-
mining whether such an entity is providing public benefits that would justify those conces-
sions. Similarly, when LIV applied for an exemption from Victorian payroll tax (Law Institute 
of Victoria v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] VSC 604), it should have been a legitimate 
concern that LIV had more than 100 employees and that the cost of exempting such an entity 
was relatively high. By contrast, the amount of revenue forgone in the Yorkshire Agricultural 
Society case (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Yorkshire Agricultural Society [1928] 1 KB 611) 
and in the VWL case (Victorian Women Lawyers’ Association Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 
170 FCR 318) was relatively small. In none of these cases was there any consideration of the 
underlying tax policy issue. Finally, the cases demonstrate a growing disparity concerning the 
federal government and the states and territories on the meaning of charity. This is likely to 




These three case studies demonstrate that although the requirements for charity can be 
clearly enunciated, the application of the tests by judges and regulators is subjective and that if 
the decision-maker accepts that the purpose is ‘worthy’ or even worthwhile, they may overlook 
the possibility of private benefits arising to members. This may require the tests for charity to 
be made more rigorous. Three possible ways of seeking to ensure that charities do not provide 
benefits to their members could be:
 i Changing the definition of charity for tax purposes to include benevolence or altruism,
 ii Requiring membership-based entities to demonstrate altruism/public benefit, or
iii Excluding certain membership-based entities from concessions (as has occurred in some 
states and territories).
i Benevolent or altruistic charity
The idea of restricting the notion of charity to those entities that are directed at helping others is 
not new. It is likely what the legislatures had in mind in colonial times and early in the Federa-
tion, when the concessions were granted to ‘public benevolent institutions’ and ‘public charities’ 
as well as religious and public educational institutions. The current position is that PBIs receive 
some tax concessions that are not available to other charities, that is, deductible gift recipient 
status and the FBT exemption.
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Charities Definition Inquiry Report. The Report recom-
mended that the public benefit test be strengthened by requiring that the dominant purpose of a 
charitable entity must be altruistic (Sheppard, Fitzgerald and Gonski 2001: rec. 7). The Report noted 
that the dictionary meaning of that term is ‘unselfish concern for the welfare of others’ or ‘regard for 
others as a principle for action’. By including altruism or benevolence in the definition of charity, 
many of the entities that are in reality member serving would be removed from the notion of charity. 
Of course, this would not preclude the grant of tax exemption if a case could be made.
ii A requirement to demonstrate public benefit
A precedent for requiring certain entities to demonstrate public benefit can be found in the 
United States. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imposes a requirement on ‘charitable hos-
pitals’ that, to qualify as income tax exempt, a hospital must:
• demonstrate that it provides benefits to a class of persons that is broad enough to benefit 
the community, and
• operate to serve a public rather than a private interest (IRS 2020).
The inclusion of this requirement (termed the ‘Community Benefit’ requirement) did not stem 
from concern about membership interests but rather because of concern that doctors might 
establish hospitals that treated only their own patients.25 IRS Revenue Ruling 69–545 (1969) 
provides the following factors that demonstrate community benefit, including:
• operating an emergency room open to all, regardless of ability to pay;
• providing hospital care for all patients able to pay, including those who pay their bills 
through public programs such as Medicaid and Medicare;
• using surplus funds to improve facilities, equipment and patient care; and
• using surplus funds to advance medical training, education and research.
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The interesting feature of such a test is not so much what is required but that the hospital (or 
other charity) has the onus of establishing that it meets the public benefit requirement.
iii Excluding some membership-based entities  
from concessions
Following the decision in 2012 granting charitable status to the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Western Australia (CCI v CSR, 2012), several jurisdictions enacted legislation 
excluding certain entities from state and territory tax concessions. For example, in Western 
Australia, the definition of ‘charity’ excludes a ‘relevant body’ which is defined as:
• an industrial association;
• a professional association; or
• a body that promotes trade, industry or commerce (Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002 
(WA): s. 42A).
The term ‘promotes trade, industry or commerce’ is defined to include ‘carrying out an under-
taking a purpose of which includes the promotion of, or the advocacy for, trade, industry or 
commerce, whether generally or with respect to any particular kind of trade, industry or com-
merce’ (ibid: glossary).
Similar provisions have been enacted in the Australian Capital Territory (Taxation Adminis-
tration Act 1999 (ACT): s. 18B) and in the Northern Territory (Revenue and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2015 (NT): s. 48B). In each of these jurisdictions, it is possible to apply to the 
commissioner for a determination that the organisation is a charity ‘within the first three heads’ 
set out in the Pemsel case. This effectively requires the entity to demonstrate that it provides 
public benefits.
It is of course open to any jurisdiction to grant tax concessions to such entities in the same 
way that the federal tax acts provide concessions to non-charitable NFPs. But by imposing 
some limits on fourth-head charities, we may avoid the ever-growing number of entities that 
are regarded as ‘charities’ and in that way restore integrity to the term.
Notes
 1 In a recent case in the United Kingdom, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (UK) v Attorney-General 
[2020] UKSC 33, the Supreme Court held that in some circumstances, members of charities may owe 
fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the charitable company. The case was concerned with 
highly unusual circumstances involving the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation and the break-
down of the marriage of the two trustees/directors. A resolution approving a grant to a new charity to 
be controlled by one spouse needed statutory approval by the members. The one independent member 
was ultimately held to owe a fiduciary duty (and was required to vote on the resolution in accordance 
with a direction by the lower court).
 2 Data provided by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) as at April 2020. The figure refers to entities 
that have an active Australian Business Number registration that self-assess as income tax exempt. The 
ATO also states that there are an additional 56,000 registered charities and approximately 8,000 NFP 
entities that are taxable, making a total of approximately 205,000 NFP entities that interact with the 
federal tax system.
 3 Data provided by the ATO as at April 2020. The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commis-
sion (ACNC) website states that as at January 2021, there are 58,783 registered charities (ACNC 
2021).
 4 One category of charities, those that are on the Register of Environmental Organisations, must have 
at least 50 individual members (ITAA 1997: s. 30–275(1)(b)).
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 5 Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Regulations 2013, reg 45.10 Accountability to Members.
 6 An unincorporated association is an informal group of individuals. An unincorporated association may 
be a charity (Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth): s. 205.5) and in 
the absence of an exemption will be taxable as a company (ITAA 1997 (Cth): s. 995-1).
 7 ‘Company’ means a body corporate or any other unincorporated association or body of persons but 
does not include a partnership.
 8 The common law principle of mutuality provides that where a number of persons contribute to a com-
mon fund created and controlled by them for a common purpose, such as a social club, any surplus aris-
ing from the use of that fund for the common purpose is not income. The principle does not extend 
to include income that is derived from sources outside that group, so that receipts from non-members 
will be taxed as income.
 9 The mutuality principle has the effect that amounts paid by members of a club or association to the 
club or association are not income of the entity. Amounts received from non-members will, however, 
be assessable as income. It has been accepted that the principle applies in Australia (The Social Credit 
Savings and Loans Society Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 560 per Gibbs J, 
referring to The New York Life Insurance Co v Styles (Surveyor of Taxes) (1889) 14 App Cas 381 and The 
Bohemians Club v Acting Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 24 CLR 334).
 10 A further concession for some charities is the ability to receive gifts that are deductible under div 30 of 
the ITAA 1997. This is unlikely to be available to NFP entities that provide benefits to members.
 11 Ibid s. 6–5 describes ordinary income as income according to ordinary concepts.
 12 Ibid s. 995-1 defines a franked distribution as a distribution franked in accordance with s. 202-205.
 13 Payroll Tax Act 2011 (ACT); Payroll Tax Act 2007 (NSW); Payroll Tax Act 2009 (NT); Payroll Tax 
Act 1971 (Qld); Payroll Tax Act 2009 (SA); Payroll Tax Act 2008 (Tas); Payroll Tax Act 2007 (Vic); 
Pay-Roll Tax Assessment Act 2002 (WA).
 14 For example, in Victoria, the wages must be paid or payable to a person engaged exclusively in work 
of a religious, charitable, benevolent, philanthropic or patriotic nature for the institution or non-profit 
organisation (Payroll Tax Act 2007 (Vic): s. 48(1)(b)).
 15 Land Tax Act 2004 (ACT); Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW); Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld); Land 
Tax Act 1936 (SA); Land Tax Rating Act 2000 (Tas); Land Tax Act 2005 (Vic); Land Tax Act 2002 
(WA) (the Northern Territory does not have a land tax).
 16 Rates Act 2004 (ACT); Local Government Act 1993 (NSW); Rates Act 1971 (NT); Local Govern-
ment Act 2009 (Qld); Local Government Act 1999 (SA); Local Government Act 1993 (Tas); Local 
Government Act 1989 (Vic); Local Government Act 1995 (WA).
 17 Duties Act 1999 (ACT); Duties Act 1997 No 123 (NSW); Stamp Duty Act 1978 (NT); Duties Act 
2001 (Qld); Stamp Duties Act 1923 (SA); Duties Act 2001 (Tas); Duties Act 2000 (Vic); Duties Act 
2008 (WA).
 18 The Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) s. 11(1)(d) provided an exemption for the income of a 
religious, scientific, charitable or public educational institution.
 19 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charities Bill 2013 (Cth) noted that ‘the statutory definition 
generally preserves the common law principles by introducing a statutory framework based on those 
principles but incorporating minor modifications to modernise and provide greater clarity and cer-
tainty about the meaning of charity and charitable purpose’ (2013: 3).
 20 Historian F. K. Crowley in 1973 noted that ‘Australian farmers and their spokesman have always 
considered that life on the land is inherently more virtuous, more healthy, more important and more 
productive, than living in the towns and cities’ (Crowley 1973: 77–78).
 21 In 2017–18, 710 companies did not pay any tax, including CBH (Khadem 2020).
 22 The Tribunal was also asked to consider whether, if an exemption applied, this would apply to all of 
the wages paid by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This issue is discussed in the following.
 23 Although the position may be otherwise with respect to courts of appeal Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v 
Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89.
 24 There was no discussion about why it was common ground that QCCI fell within s 149C(3); however, 
it is assumed that this was due to the Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia decision in CCI v CSR  
discussed previously.
 25 The IRS (2020) notes that ‘a hospital that restricts its medical staff privileges to a limited group of phy-
sicians is likely to be operating for the private benefit of the staff physicians rather than for the public 
interest’.
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While various specific rationales remain contested, in broad terms, many people would accept 
that charitable donation concessions are provided to support the charity sector. Support is 
provided to increase the sector’s production of particular goods and services and to generate 
process benefits from the way that charities operate, such as pluralism and altruism. In other 
words, support is provided to achieve public benefit. However, I argue that in many common 
law jurisdictions, especially the United States and Canada where revenue authorities are the 
primary charity regulators, regulation of charities and donors by revenue authorities promotes 
donor autonomy and control to the detriment of public benefit.
At first glance, this seems strange, especially given tax authorities’ goal of protecting the tax 
base. However, tax regimes and tax authorities often weigh donor autonomy against the public 
interest, viewed as tax base protection. They thus focus on the leakage of private benefits to 
donors that have some monetary value. Yet donor control extends well beyond donor extraction 
of charity resources to include the selection of charitable projects or charity grant recipients, 
the concomitant allocation of foregone public tax dollars to those projects and the manner in 
which such projects or charities are to be conducted. In contrast, sector-specific regulators, such 
as charity commissions in Australia or England and Wales, tend to balance donor autonomy 
against the public interest viewed through the lens of the proper administration and effective use 
of charity property. This perspective potentially permits greater attention to the more intangible 
values and interests that donors may wish to project into the future through charities (Chan 
2016: Ch 5; Picton 2018: 192, 196–201).
To investigate the issue, this chapter will look at five areas. First, regulation of the benefits 
that a donor receives in return for making a gift – an area that tax regulation should be well 
placed to police. Second, general operational tax rules. Third, the tax law distinction drawn 
in some jurisdictions between public and private charities, which starts to address questions of 
donor control but remains focused on private benefits. Fourth, tax restrictions on political activ-
ity, which form an exception to the suggestion that tax law is primarily focused on restricting 
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private benefits. Fifth, the tools available to tax regulators to deal with ineffective use of charity 
assets as compared with those available to sector-specific regulators.
Before doing so, the chapter discusses the rationale for charitable donation concessions and 
the tension between protecting donor autonomy and promoting public benefit. It also outlines 
concerns about material donor control over donated funds, most particularly the risk that this 
poses for democratic institutions. The chapter concludes with some exploratory thoughts on 
reforms.
2 The tension between protecting donor autonomy (hence control) 
and promoting public benefit
Our legal institutions, such as property law and tax law, both shape and are shaped by societal 
norms and behaviour. Principles such as donor autonomy to freely dispose of property apply 
and are expressed within these institutions and are thus moulded by those institutions (Reich 
2018: ch 1; Saunders-Hastings 2018: 157–158). Donor autonomy is therefore not absolute but 
regulated in certain ways by tax and related laws. For example, donors have freedom to choose 
their preferred project amongst the universe of charitable purposes – whether by selection of 
an existing charity or by creation of a new charity. The legal form of the selected charity can 
make it easier or harder for future generations to alter that purpose. Rather than a charity that 
directly carries out its purposes, the recipient charity might be an intermediary foundation, 
providing further flexibility as to the time at which the donation is ultimately used and as to the 
selection of recipients. Further, donors have some ability to control the manner in which the 
charitable project is conducted by imposing gift restrictions under contract, trust or property 
law; by writing those restrictions in a charity’s constitution or trust deed; or by holding a seat 
on the charity’s board or governing body.
To understand how tax law expresses donor autonomy and addresses donor control, we 
might think it relevant to understand the rationale underlying charitable donation concessions. 
As noted by Brody (and recently by the OECD), there is ‘no single, unified and coherent tax 
policy with respect to non-profit organizations – and no single rationale’ (Brody 2018: 484; 
OECD 2020: 22). Nevertheless, when introducing income taxes, legislators have typically sug-
gested that donors would reduce their gifts unless a concession was provided (Colinvaux 2018: 
445; Brody 2010: 603). Commentators have linked this reason to ‘subsidy theories’ that focus 
on the role of tax concessions in supporting the achievement of ‘public benefit’ by charities 
(Colinvaux 2018: 445; Duff 2014: 208–214; OECD 2020: 22). I intend to refer broadly to such 
subsidy theories – being support for the positive externalities of charities, not merely subsidies 
to finance goods that government would otherwise be expected to provide. For the purposes 
of this chapter, the positive externalities encompass the public benefits not just from inducing 
charities to produce goods and services such as health care, education and welfare but also pro-
cess benefits from the manner in which charities operate, such as charities’ role as sites of collec-
tive and political action, as well as in the promotion of pluralism or altruism (O’Connell 2018: 
395; Atkinson 1997: 403; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986: 86–87; Hemel 2020: 147–148; Chia 
et al 2011: 17–20). This link seems especially apt in the many jurisdictions that make donation 
concessions broadly available to most charities (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Canada), 
such that there is substantial overlap between the tax-exempt charities and the donation conces-
sion charities (Colinvaux 2018: 447).
Some writers supporting the subsidy theory link with donation concessions also suggest 
that encouraging donations where taxpayers are able to direct support to the charities of their 
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choice can itself promote pluralism and civic participation (Krever 1991: 11–13; Duff 2014: 
213–214). However, donation concessions structured to provide the most benefit to the wealthy 
(especially so in the United States) undermine equality of opportunity (Fleischer 2018), reduc-
ing the degree of added pluralism (Reich 2018: 132–133; Duff 2014: 216–217). Conceiving 
of public benefit as including process benefits highlights the independence of the charity sector 
from government, in that the process benefits arise from voluntary selection and/or association 
rather than government administration. Further, the very form of donation concessions typi-
cally involves indirect, not direct, government support and oversight, again emphasising sector 
independence and autonomy (Gergen 1998: 1399–1403).
Finally, it has also been suggested that the income tax deduction can be justified on the basis 
that the donated income never formed part of the tax base, but many commentators dispute this 
by regarding donations as voluntary personal consumption of the donor’s income (Duff 2014: 
204; Krever 1991: 5–8).
In summary, donation concessions are intended to achieve public benefit but to operate in a 
manner that leaves substantial autonomy with donors and charities, not least to avoid disincenti-
vising donations. This reflects the general charity law interplay between respecting donor intent 
and overriding donor intent to achieve a greater or fairer public benefit (Dal Pont 2017: [6.6]; 
Chan 2016: 53–54; Mulheron 2006: 87–89). Accordingly, I do not propose that tax regulators 
should have unfettered ability to impose their views on charities about how those charities 
could more effectively use their resources to achieve public benefit.
Nevertheless, there is some basis for worrying that the balance under income tax rules has 
shifted too far in favour of donor control and away from public benefit. Reich, Lechterman 
and Vallely, amongst others, have identified growing inequality, in combination with generous 
charitable donation tax concessions, as resulting in increased control of the charity sector and 
its activities by a wealthy elite (Reich 2018; Vallely 2020; Lechterman & Reich 2020: 184). In 
particular, they warn about the potentially anti-democratic nature of intermediary foundations.1 
See also OECD 2020: 23. Saunders-Hastings adds to this criticism by suggesting that tax legis-
lation, amongst other laws, privileges elite donor views about public benefit over the views of 
others (2018: 150, 157; see also Pevnick 2013).
Horvath and Powell provide material examples of extensive control exercised over philan-
thropic undertakings by some of the wealthiest philanthropists such as Gates, Zuckerberg and 
Bloomberg (Horvath & Powell 2020: 117). They suggest that there has been a return to exten-
sive donor involvement in philanthropic endeavours and infusion of the business practices that 
proved so successful for the donors in the corporate world – reflecting a return to practices from 
the time of Carnegie and Rockefeller (Horvath & Powell 2020: 117). This was a time when 
the U.S. Congress became concerned about and legislated to regulate the activities of private 
foundations. From an empirical perspective, Teresa Odendahl highlighted several decades ago 
that elite philanthropy ‘support[s] institutions that sustain their culture, their education, their 
policy formulation, their status – in short, their interests’ and that this involves ongoing con-
trol over donated funds (1990: 232). More recently, and in keeping with these findings, Susan 
Ostrander has identified material donor control over donated funds from analysis of the United 
States professional adviser literature (2007).
If a small group of donors is permitted material control over their donated assets, in addi-
tion to the potential harm to democratic institutions, there are further potential detriments to 
public benefit. Lester Salamon’s ‘philanthropic paternalism’ describes one drawback, in that 
donors impose their preferences on the public, in contrast to the community discussion about 
public benefits that should be pursued (1987: 41). This has also been characterised as a fail-
ure to build mutual relationships between givers and receivers and the community bonds that 
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some justifications for the charity sector emphasise (Vallely 2020: 466–467, 672–673; Ostrander 
2007). There is also an intergenerational dimension, with Fleischer worrying that control over 
donated assets can enable the intergenerational transfer of political and economic power (2018: 
440. See also Odendahl 1990: 4–5, 232). Further, permitting donors in the current generation 
too much autonomy may breach principles of intergenerational justice about the balance of 
autonomy between generations (Murray 2021).
Charitable donation concessions are also very large (e.g., US$48.3billion in the United States 
in 2019 [Treasury (US) 2020], $AU1.8bn in Australia in 2019 [Treasury (Au) 2020]), such that 
material public benefit should be expected for the material amounts of tax foregone. As well, 
charitable donation concessions typically benefit wealthier donors to a greater extent.2 This may 
be because they constitute a deduction in the context of a progressive income tax system, thus 
providing a larger tax benefit to higher-rate taxpayers (e.g., Australia, United States), although 
larger tax benefits are still effectively provided to higher income earners under the UK’s hybrid 
Gift Aid concessions and (assuming that they donate more) under Canada’s two-tiered credit 
system. In the United States, in particular, the high standard deduction under the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 has been estimated to mean that only 9% of taxpayers will now itemise – and 
thus gain a benefit from – their charitable donations (Colinvaux 2019: 1007–1008). Further-
more, the United States provides stunningly concessional treatment for donations of appreci-
ated assets – assets such as company shares whose value reflects unrealised capital gains. A gift 
of such assets potentially enables a deduction based on the fair market value of the asset but 
with the donor not required to bring into assessable income the difference between the asset’s 
tax cost and its fair market value (Brody 2018: 500). Canada and the United Kingdom adopt a 
similar approach for a more limited class of assets (such as listed company shares – and, in the 
United Kingdom, land) (Duff 2014: 199; Henderson & Fowles 2015: [20–038], [20–046]; Spe-
cial Senate Committee on the Charitable Sector 2019: 108), and the Canadian Special Senate 
Committee recently recommended a trial extension to all company shares and to land. Australia 
generally imposes capital gains tax on inter vivos gifts of property3 but would potentially provide 
a corresponding deduction for the market value of the donated property (Income Tax Assess-
ment Act 1997 (Cth) div 30).
3 Tax regulation of donor control
Chan has argued, in relation to the Canada Revenue Agency, that tax regulation and tax 
regulators seek to balance donor autonomy against the public interest in guarding the breadth 
and integrity of the tax base (2016: Ch 5). Similar assertions have been made of charity tax 
regulators in the United States and, before the introduction of Australia’s charity commission, 
of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) [Colinvaux 2018: 454; Treasury (Au) 2011: 29]. On 
the other hand, regimes for sector-specific regulators, such as charity commissions in Australia 
or England and Wales, tend to balance donor autonomy against the public interest viewed 
through the lens of the proper administration and effective use of charity property, which 
potentially permits some greater attention to the more intangible values and interests that 
donors may wish to project into the future through charities (Chan 2016: Ch 5; Picton 2018: 
192, 196–201). Given the controversial nature of some of the wider questions of public inter-
est in the effective use of charity property, as opposed to tax base protection (Colinvaux 2018: 
454), it is also understandable that tax authorities may shy away from these broader notions of 
public benefit. Some of these structural barriers are investigated further in the following. First, 





Tax laws frequently provide significant attention to charitable donations to ensure that the 
donor does not receive a material benefit in return, or at least no benefit with respect to 
amounts that are being claimed as deductions or credits (O’Connell 2018: 413–414; Chan 
2016: 113–117). Potentially this means that tax regulators are well placed to monitor control 
rights obtained by donors. By way of example, in Australia, the income tax law requires either 
a ‘gift’ (interpreted by the case law to mean that the donor receives no material benefit or 
advantage by way of return) (ATO 2005: [37]–[44], [142])4 or certain contributions for a right 
to participate in a fundraising event or by way of bid at a charity auction, in which case the 
deduction is only the difference between the contribution and the market value of the right to 
participate or the charity auction goods [Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 30–15(1)]. 
On their face, these provisions are very broad. However, much of the ATO guidance indicates 
that breach would occur where something of economic value is received in return and that ben-
efits such as networking opportunities, public recognition and reporting on the use of donated 
funds, are not captured (ATO 2005: [170], [186], [196], [202]).5 Nevertheless, the ATO does 
move beyond marketable benefits to also consider that membership rights and other things that 
have value to the donor would be caught.6 Additionally, an anti-avoidance provision denies a 
deduction where the donor or an associate obtains a right, privilege or benefit other than the 
benefit of a tax saving [Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 78A(2)(c), 78A(3)]. The 
provision is also deemed to apply where the charity recipient does not immediately receive or 
have the unconditional right to retain custody and control of the property or does not obtain an 
immediate, indefeasible and unencumbered legal and equitable title to the property. While the 
ATO expressly notes that these provisions extend beyond ‘pecuniary’ and ‘proprietary’ benefits, 
the ATO considers that the goal of the provisions is to ensure that ‘the benefit to the fund will 
equal the deduction allowed to the taxpayer’ and that they are not intended to apply to ‘genuine 
gifts made in ordinary circumstances’ (ATO 2005: [206]–[207]). While reflecting donor control, 
it is difficult to characterise donor conditions on use of funds for certain purposes within the 
recipient’s overarching purposes or that require expenditure at a particular time as involving the 
return of a material benefit to the donor (see, e.g., Silver 2021), though unless care is taken, 
the form of the conditions may raise risks as to receipt of an unencumbered title (see, e.g., 
O’Connell 2020: 382–383).7
In the United States, deductions under Internal Revenue Code §170 are available for gifts 
(a transfer of property without consideration) or contributions to most §501(c)(3) charities8 but 
with the amount of the deduction limited by the market value of benefits received in return 
(26 CFR §1.170A-1; Fishman, Schwarz, & Mayer 2015: 775–782). Treasury Regulation CFR 
§1.170A-1(h)(2) focuses especially on the fair market value of benefits received in return, and 
CFR §1.170A-13 excludes benefits with an ‘insubstantial value’, such as minor annual mem-
bership rights or tokens bearing the charity’s logo [26 CFR §1.170A-13(f)(8); IRS 1990]. 
This indicates that hard-to-value rights to require a charity to use funds for purposes within its 
overarching charitable purposes or to be expended at a particular time do not sit easily as ben-
efits received in return (Eason 2007: 701–702; Colinvaux 2016: 26–30; Hopkins 2014: 503). 
However, retained rights to provide ongoing directions to a charity as to the specific applica-
tion of donated property (e.g., choice of recipients of charity services) are likely to breach the 
tax requirements on the basis that they reduce or eliminate any contribution in the first place 
or that they are benefits that materially reduce its value (Eason 2007: 702–703; Hopkins 2014: 
505–508).
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It is perhaps not surprising, then, that gift agreements do generally permit material condi-
tions or restrictions on the use of funds, many running to tens of pages (Eason 2007: 698–707; 
Innes & Boyle 2006: 72–74). Further, donors could avoid many of these requirements by first 
setting up a charity before making a donation. If the constitution or trust deed of the charity 
sets out the preferred purposes, including rules as to when those purposes should be pursued, 
it is then simply a matter of making a gift (albeit, as discussed further subsequently, gifts to 
privately controlled charities are often afforded less generous tax concessions and are subjected 
to more restrictions) to an existing charity that happens to accord with the donor’s views and 
permits control by way of intergenerational protection of the charitable purposes set out in the 
constituent documents. Further (and again subject to the public/private charity distinction), 
donors may retain actual control of the charity to which they donate.
3.2 General organisational and operational rules and control
Other than gift transactions, tax regulators typically pay close attention to charities at the point 
of registration. As the technical meaning of ‘charity’ requires that a charity have certain chari-
table purposes and be for the public benefit, this requires some attention at the initial stages 
to matters of public benefit and hence means that donors do not have completely unfettered 
autonomy to determine their projects – they must be charitable. We might now question how 
rigorous this screening process is in the United States for organisations filing a form 1023-EZ.
Further, most jurisdictions do include some sort of general operational test in their tax 
rules. In Australia, to be eligible for income tax exemption, a charity must be registered as such 
by the federal charities commission, the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commis-
sion [Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s50–55], and meet several special tax conditions, 
including that the charity must ‘comply with all the substantive requirements in its governing 
rules’ and ‘apply its income and assets solely for the purpose for which [it] is established’ [Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss50–51, 50–50(2)].
Similarly, United States charities are subject to an ‘operational’ test due to the wording of 
Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3).9 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has interpreted this 
requirement for organisations that raise and pass on funds to other charities (and potentially 
organisations that both raise funds and directly pursue their charitable purposes, such as uni-
versities) as requiring the organisation to distribute or expend assets ‘commensurate in scope 
with its financial resources’ (IRS 1964, 1989: 13–16). In Canada, to be a tax-exempt ‘charita-
ble foundation’ requires ‘a corporation or trust that is constituted and operated exclusively for 
charitable purposes’, while a tax-exempt ‘charitable organization’ is ‘an organization, whether 
or not incorporated . . . all of the resources of which are devoted to charitable activities carried 
on by the organization itself ’ [Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, s149.1(1)]. This is a very general 
and vague test (Man 2011: 25–26) and seems chiefly concerned with whether ongoing activities 
are consistent with the organisation’s charitable purpose (Ontario Law Reform Commission 
1996: 288; Innes & Boyle 2006: 16–17).
The UK tax legislation contains no blanket income tax exemption for charities. Instead, 
specific categories of income and gains are rendered exempt, with the exemptions applying 
to most types of income and gains (HMRC 2020: Annex i, Kessler, Wong & Birkbeck 2019: 
285–286). Other than minor exceptions (see Kessler, Wong & Birkbeck 2019: 136–137, 142, 
162), and some minor changes in wording, each of the exemptions only applies to income 
or gains so far as the income or gain is ‘applied to charitable purposes only’ or ‘applied for 
charitable purposes’ [Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK) c 4, pt 11 chs 2–3; Income Tax Act 
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2007 (UK) c 3, pt 10; Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (UK) c 12, s 256(1)]. This is 
virtually identical to the Australian ‘application-for-purposes’ requirement. In addition, the 
UK rules contain a set of ‘charitable expenditure rules’, which, in broad terms, reduce the 
income tax exemptions to the extent that a charity has a ‘non-exempt amount’ for a tax year 
[Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK) c 4, s 492; Income Tax Act 2007 (UK) c 3, s 539; Taxation 
of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (UK) c 12, ss 256(3), (3A)]. The aim is to address the fact that, 
unlike the Australian provisions, the UK primary exemption provisions focus only on a char-
ity’s income or gains, not misapplication of its other assets (HMRC 2020: Annex ii). To have a 
‘non-exempt amount’, a charity must have, among other things, ‘non-charitable expenditure’ 
for the relevant tax year [Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK) c 4, s 493; Income Tax Act 2007 
(UK) c 3, s 540; Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (UK) c 12, ss 256(3), (3A)]. The 
definition of this phrase includes a range of listed items, including ‘expenditure’ that is ‘not 
incurred for charitable purposes only’ [Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK) c 4, s 496; Income 
Tax Act 2007 (UK) c 3, s 543].
These tests focus on whether charity assets are being properly administered. While there is 
some overlap, they are not concerned with the broader question of whether a charity is effec-
tively using its assets to achieve public benefit. For example, in the context of accumulation of 
charity assets, the tests seem ill equipped to stop donors from directing charities to save for the 
future and so project their views well into the future. As set out by Murray (2015), for reasons 
of policy and doctrinal analysis, the Australian ‘application-for-purposes’ test is better charac-
terised as being focused on maladministration that affects whether funds are used to promote 
a charity’s purpose. Excessive accumulation or other ineffective uses of charity assets might 
amount to maladministration where they involve an exercise of power by charity controllers in 
a way that breaches their duties. However, the starting point is to identify a breach of duty, and 
a decision to use assets in a less effective way than is possible will not necessarily amount to a 
breach. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, the application for purposes test has been accepted 
by commentators and the HMRC as being focused on a class of failures to comply with the 
charity’s rules (Kessler, Wong & Birkbeck 2019: 142–146).
Similarly, in Canada, ‘operating’ an entity for charitable purposes and ‘devoting’ funds to 
‘charitable activities’10 are sufficiently broad as to encompass an application of funds by way 
of accumulation (such that they do not impose a temporal requirement to directly spend or 
distribute funds: Innes & Boyle 2006: 16–17), or to encompass a range of uses that promote 
the charitable purpose but that are not the optimal use of funds. The United States operational 
test is differently worded to, and has less clearly defined boundaries than, the Australian focus 
on maladministration. However, it is arguable that a test focused on whether an entity ‘engages 
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of [its] exempt purposes’ ought to be 
construed in the same way as the Australian ‘application-for-purposes’ test, since both examine 
whether acts are in furtherance of the charitable purposes. This would appear to leave scope 
for a range of acts that further a charitable purpose but do so in ways that less effectively gen-
erate public benefit. In any event, even if the IRS’s ‘commensurate in scope’ interpretation is 
accepted, commentators suggest that the test would only apply to accumulation in very narrow 
circumstances, for instance, where distribution/expenditure rates are extraordinarily low or 
controllers have breached their duties by diverting material funds to their own private benefit 
(Siegel 2009: 11–12, 16; Simon, Dale & Chisolm 2006: 283).11
The United States also applies penalty taxes, and potentially revocation, where ‘disqualified 
persons’ receive ‘excess benefits’ from public charities (Internal Revenue Code §4958). An 
excess benefit arises where the value of the economic benefit provided by the charity exceeds 
the value of any consideration provided by the disqualified person (e.g., a low/no-interest 
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loan) [Internal Revenue Code §4958(c)(1)(A)]. Disqualified persons include people in a posi-
tion to exercise substantial influence over the charity’s affairs (and their associates), such as a 
board member or trustee, a CEO and most likely a founder or substantial contributor [26 CFR 
§§53.4958–3(c), 53.4958–3(e)(2)(i) and (ii)]. Disqualified persons should thus include donors 
who exercise control in relation to the charities that they found or to which they donate. How-
ever, the rules are focused on economic benefits received by donors (Mayer 2012: 88), not on 
difficult-to-value rights to project the donor’s views (see 26 CFR §§53.4958–4). A similar com-
ment could be made about the Canadian undue benefit penalty taxes [Income Tax Act, RSC 
1985, c 1, s 188.1(4)]. ‘Undue benefit’ is defined broadly to include the ‘amount’ of property 
or rights conferred by the charity and would apply to a proprietor, trustee, member, settlor or 
major contributor to a charity [Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, s 188.1(5)]. While the Cana-
dian provisions are broader, the need to identify an ‘amount’ and to calculate a penalty based on 
this amount also suggests that the Canada Revenue Agency is unlikely to apply the provisions 
to hard-to-value rights. Again, to similar effect, the Australian public and private ancillary fund 
rules impose penalties where benefits are provided to those with some ability to control the 
fund, such as directors of the trustee company, founders and donors [Taxation Administration 
(Private Ancillary Fund) Guidelines 2019 (Cth) r22; Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 
(Cth) r42]. The penalty must be calculated based on the ‘amount’ or ‘value’ of the benefit pro-
vided. Moreover, the provisions would not seem to apply where control rights are not received 
from the charity but are instead built into the charity’s formational documents – such as the 
voting rights of a member or the articulation of a particular charitable purpose and means of 
pursuing that purpose.
3.3 Public/private charity distinction
An important distinction that is made in several jurisdictions in policing issues of control is to 
have separate regimes for public charities and more restrictive rules for more tightly controlled 
private charities/foundations. The United States, for instance, distinguishes ‘private founda-
tions’ from public charities. Private foundations are, in a broad sense, charities that raise their 
funds from a limited pool of persons rather than the general public and are controlled by a 
restricted range of persons (Simon, Dale & Chisolm 2006: 269).12 In keeping with the 1965 
Treasury Report on private foundations, extra requirements apply to private foundations that 
seek to eliminate private benefits for donors (Fremont-Smith 2004: 76–80; Mayer 2012: 87). 
A range of penalty taxes may be imposed on the private foundation and/or its controllers moti-
vated largely by concerns around private benefits: provisions concerning self-dealing, excess 
(i.e., non-portfolio) business holdings and investing in a manner that jeopardises carrying out 
the charitable purpose (Internal Revenue Code §§4941, 4943, 4944). These rules go some way 
to replicating controller duties of loyalty and care (Fremont-Smith 2004: 264–300). However, 
the rules are also intended to extend beyond private benefits to constrain control in various 
ways (Fremont-Smith 2004: 76–80). Several measures discourage attempts to direct excessive 
accumulation, as foundations must typically make annual distributions of 5% of ‘the fair market 
value’ of their net investment assets (Internal Revenue Code §4942). Private foundations are 
also subject to a 2% excise tax on net investment income [Internal Revenue Code §4940(a)], 
although the rate drops to 1% for foundations that sufficiently increase their distributions [Inter-
nal Revenue Code §4940(e); and see also Fremont-Smith 2004: 264–265]. Engaging in certain 
‘taxable expenditures’, such as payments for political campaigns and lobbying, can potentially 
also result in excise taxes (Internal Revenue Code §4945). Further, donation concessions for 
donations to private foundations are less generous (Madoff 2016: 166–167; Hemel 2020: 159), 
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and disclosure and international grant-making requirements for private foundations are more 
onerous than for public charities (Hemel 2020: 159; OECD 2020: 124–125).
Australia also distinguishes between public and private ‘ancillary funds’ and between ancillary 
funds (which are subject to a disbursement quota) and other (public) deductible gift recipient 
charities (which are not subject to a disbursement quota). Australian charities do not auto-
matically qualify for donation concessions. However, charitable trusts in the form of public 
or private ancillary funds can qualify as deductible gift recipients [Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (Cth) s 30–15(1) item 2]. The public/private distinction relates to the range of per-
sons who may donate to and administer the trust [Taxation Administration (Private Ancillary 
Fund) Guidelines 2019 (Cth) rr8(c), 12, 24; Public Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 (Cth) 
rr14, 44–45]. Ancillary funds are thus philanthropic intermediaries that receive donations and 
then (eventually) distribute them to other deductible gift recipients.13 Public ancillary funds are 
subject to a less demanding disbursement requirement: 4% (5% for private ancillary funds) of 
the market value of the fund’s net assets as at the end of the preceding financial year [Taxation 
Administration (Private Ancillary Fund) Guidelines 2019 (Cth) r15; Public Ancillary Fund 
Guidelines 2011 (Cth) r19]. The public and private ancillary fund guidelines are otherwise very 
similar, containing rules as to the trustees’ degree of care; the need for a member of (private), or 
a majority of (public), the decision-making committee of the fund to be persons with a degree 
of responsibility to the community; exclusion from control of a fund for persons convicted of 
indictable taxation offences; limits on trustee indemnification; disclosure of related party trans-
actions, along with restrictions on such transactions; and various investment limits [Taxation 
Administration (Private Ancillary Fund) Guidelines 2019 (Cth) rr12, 14, 18(3), 21, 22; Public 
Ancillary Fund Guidelines 2011 (Cth) rr 13–14, 16, 18, 26.2, 33–40, 41–42].
Canada also differentiates private from public foundations and public charities, with private 
foundations restricted in their ability to carry on business activities or to incur debts not linked 
to their charitable operations, restricted in their ability to make non-arms-length investments 
and subject to excess corporate holdings restrictions and donation concessions being slightly less 
generous for donations to private foundations (Gillen, Smith & Waters 2012: [14.III]; Income 
Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, ss 38, 149.1(4), 188.1, 189.1). It appears that the main concern with 
private foundations has been the potential for donors to claim donation concessions but to then 
maintain some personal benefit from donated property rather than genuinely applying assets to 
foundation grant expenditure (Gillen, Smith & Waters 2012: [14.III]). All Canadian charities 
registered for income tax and donation concession purposes are subject to a disbursement quota 
of 3.5% [Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, ss 149.1(2)(b), (3)(b), (4)(b)], with that rate applying 
to the average value of property not used directly in charitable activities or administration over 
the preceding 24 months (i.e., investment assets).14 The United Kingdom does not employ a 
public/private charity tax distinction but does have tainted donation rules that apply where the 
donor enters into an arrangement with a recipient charity that results in a financial advantage to 
the donor or an associate [Corporation Tax Act 2010 (UK) c 4, pt 21C; Income Tax Act 2007 
(UK) c 3, pt 13, ch 8; Kessler, Wong & Birkbeck 2019: Ch 7].
One issue with private foundation restrictions is that they are only partially effective in limit-
ing donor control. In particular, the payout rules are set so low as to enable perpetual existence 
of private foundations – enabling donors to project their views far into the future. And, as dis-
cussed by Murray (2021: Ch 7), if the timing of benefit provision is the issue, payout rules do 
not necessarily fit with intergenerational justice as a principled basis for approaching the timing 
issue. Further, lobbying expenditure could simply be provided by way of a (non-earmarked) 
grant to a third-party organisation to circumvent the United States taxable expenditure rules 
(Fremont-Smith 2004: 280–281).
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More fundamentally, ‘donor advised funds’ (DAFs), which are seeing increasing use in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia (Charities Aid Foundation 2020; Murray 
2020), represent a breaking down of this distinction. A DAF is a named management account 
within a charitable foundation (usually a public charitable trust or corporation).15 A  donor 
makes a gift of property to the charitable foundation and typically obtains a tax deduction 
or credit. While the donor retains no ownership interest in the property transferred and has 
no legal power to direct the charitable foundation’s dealings with the property, the charitable 
foundation provides administrative and investment assistance to the donor and gives the donor 
advisory privileges about how it should deal with the donated property. The charitable founda-
tion thus often acts in accordance with the donor’s wishes about when and to whom to distrib-
ute. The commercial imperative for charitable foundations to act in accordance with donors’ 
wishes is emphasised where financial services firms provide DAF services as part of their wealth 
management operations, which is the case for some of the largest DAF sponsors such as Fidelity 
Charitable and Goldman Sachs Philanthropy Fund. In essence, a DAF is a public charity but 
with some of the features of donor control that might otherwise be accessed via use of a private 
foundation. The existence of DAFs also permits United States and Canadian private founda-
tions to effectively avoid their payout rules, as they are permitted to distribute to DAFs (Murray 
2020: 271–272, 293–296).
It should be emphasised, as demonstrated by the Fairbairn v Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift 
Fund lawsuit,16 that donors have less control over a DAF than over a private foundation of which 
they are the trustee or a director of the trustee company. Thus, despite their recent stratospheric 
growth, reliance on DAFs may diminish, so leaving a material public/private foundation dis-
tinction in place. Further, Australia and Canada apply disbursement requirements to both public 
and private foundations (indeed, all tax registered charities in Canada). The United States has 
also taken some steps to maintain the public/private charity distinction as a result of Pension 
Protection Act 2006 reforms that apply additional self-dealing rules to DAF providers, moving 
them closer to the treatment of private foundations (Lehmann 2007: 35–37). However, the 
additional excise taxes on excess benefits transactions, taxable distributions, prohibited benefits 
and excess business holdings appear largely aimed at benefits derived by donors, their advisors 
and their affiliates (Mayer 2012: 87). They are not aimed at broader issues of control and timing 
of benefit provision to ultimate charity beneficiaries (Madoff 2016: Ch 6).
3.4 Political activities
Whether charities ought to be able to engage in campaigning or political lobbying activities is 
a controversial topic in many jurisdictions (O’Connell 2018: 408–409). It extends well beyond 
questions of donor control. However, political activities are considered in this chapter, as they 
provide a relatively unusual instance of tax rules that seek to restrict the projection of donor 
views. Examining the political activity rules provides insight into whether this type of tax rules 
is likely to be a successful way of policing intangible control rights held by donors.
Where donations are made to charities in order to carry out political activities, they can be 
seen – amongst other things – as a projection of donor views and as an attempt to control the 
use of donated funds to influence public debate and the choice of public benefits pursued. As 
asserted by Emma Saunders-Hastings, commentators frequently underestimate the similarities 
between electoral campaign spending by elites and ‘elite philanthropy’ in the sense that philan-
thropic donations can act as alternative means of achieving political influence (2018: 150–151). 
One response, in the United States and, until recently, Canada, has been to limit charity lobby-
ing and to prohibit charity campaigning (that is, electioneering) through tax rules. For instance, 
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in the United States, §501(c)(3) Internal Revenue Code provides that for charity registration, 
‘no substantial part of the activities of [the charity] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting to influence legislation’, with some ability to elect out of this vague test into a more 
certain cap or percentage of expenditure test under §501(h), though the caps are relatively low, 
going up to only the lesser of 20% or $1m of expenditure. In relation to campaigning, §501(c)(3) 
states that the charity must ‘not participate in or intervene in . . . any political campaign on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office’. In Canada, the case of Canada 
Without Poverty v A-G (Canada) (2018) ONSC 4147 has led to legislative amendments that 
retain a prohibition on campaigning [Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, ss149.1(6.1) and (6.2) 
provide that a registered charity must not ‘devot[e] any part of its resources to the direct or 
indirect support of, or opposition to, any political party or candidate for public office’] but 
that expressly permit non-partisan ‘public policy dialogue and development activities’ – that is, 
political advocacy [Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1, ss149.1(1), (10.1)].
Constraining tax support in this way is not an attempt to protect tax base integrity but rather 
a weighing of the benefits and detriments to the public from supporting political activities that 
advance a charitable purpose and protecting the independence of the charity sector and gov-
ernment (Colinvaux 2018: 448–449). Given the odd role that this imposes on tax regulators, 
note that the United States and Canadian experience provides some evidence of the difficulties 
in employing tax regulation of campaigning activities (see also O’Connell 2018: 413–414). For 
instance, although interpreted broadly in the Treasury regulations, the United States campaign 
restriction is not always robustly enforced, with the United States IRS still reeling from the 
fallout over its targeting of politically aligned charities (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer 2015: 463–
497; Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 2017). President Trump also issued 
a vaguely worded executive order to the IRS requesting that it not take compliance action 
against campaigning by religious organisations (Exec Order No 13798, 3 CFR 346 2018). 
Furthermore, the United States institutional response has included the creation and expansion 
of tax concession categories for political lobbying and campaigning entities (Internal Revenue 
Code §527 political organisations) that can remain connected in various ways with registered 
charities – for example, via Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(4) social welfare organisations and 
§527 political action committees (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer 2015: 494–502; Hopkins 2019: 
399–400). Moreover, this is in the broader United States context of the existence of some gen-
eral electoral law regulation of campaign financing but with that regulation materially limited 
by the Citizens United decision (Citizens United 558 US 310 (2010)), which effectively removed 
caps on not-for-profit and for-profit corporation electoral expenditure (Fishman, Schwarz & 
Mayer 2015: 502–506). In Canada, the Canada Without Poverty case resulted from the imposi-
tion of increased political activity reporting and audits by the Canada Revenue Agency, which 
has led to a partial governmental about-face and much public criticism of (and support for) the 
Agency (Parachin 2016: 1048, 1050–1054).
In keeping with Saunders-Hastings’s reflection on the similarities between ‘elite philan-
thropy’ and campaign finance, rather than relying on tax rules and tax regulators, it may make 
more sense to police charity political activities and associated issues of donor control through 
campaign financing/electoral legislation and regulators like the Federal Election Commission in 
the United States. In Australia, for example, while the approach is not perfect (see, e.g., Beard 
2019: 40–42), Australian electoral legislation requirements apply across the board to charities 
and other non-party political actors [Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) pt XX]. If elec-
toral expenditure (being certain expenditures on matter communicated or intended to be com-
municated for the dominant purpose of influencing the way electors vote in a federal election) 
thresholds are exceeded, then the relevant entity must register and report donations used for that 
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expenditure to the Australian Electoral Commission. Entities that meet ‘third party campaigner’ 
or ‘political campaigner’ thresholds are also required to disclose their ‘electoral expenditure’, 
which is to be placed on a public ‘transparency register’ [Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
(Cth) pt XX div 1A and div 5A].17
The difficulties that regulation of political activities poses for tax regulators are reflected in 
the next section, which examines more generally the structural barriers that inhibit tax regula-
tors from policing donor control for the public benefit.
3.5 The tools of tax regulators versus charity commissions and other 
structural barriers to encouraging public benefit
Commentators such as Chan and O’Connell have suggested that some tax regulators are not 
well established to monitor the ‘public-welfare compliance’ of charity projects (Chan 2016: 
113–117; O’Connell 2018: 416).18 However, this is only partly due to lack of provisions focus-
ing on the operation of charities. As we have explored previously, there are a number of opera-
tional tests that apply under tax legislation, but the general operational tests largely focus on 
whether a charity is properly administering its assets, not the further question of whether it is 
effective in its use of assets – and the issue of whether donor control is impeding effectiveness. 
Rules precluding benefits in return for gifts hold some promise for regulating control rights on 
gifts to existing charities. However, they typically require tax regulators to form a view of the 
value of such difficult-to-value rights and, in practice, do not appear to be impeding substantial 
gift agreements under which donors specify the use of their donated funds. Minimum distribu-
tion requirements for private foundations (and public foundations in Australia and all charities 
in Canada) impose some limits on donor ability to project their views into the future, though 
the distribution rates are set sufficiently low that no charity is likely to be forced to terminate. 
The political activity rules also constrain activities, but in a very porous way.
Given that they typically have tools available to deal with some aspects of the ‘public welfare 
compliance’ of charity projects, a portion of the criticisms levelled at tax regulators must relate 
to their practical administration of the tax rules. Part of the problem is that tax regulators, unlike 
charity commissions, do not have an institutional focus on charities (Owens 2017: 82; Boris & 
Lott 2017: 97; Gillen 2016: 136, 156–157). The IRS is also underfunded to regulate charities 
and is still suffering from its regulation of political activities, as discussed previously (Ascher 
2014: 1597; Owens 2017: 91). The Canada Revenue Agency has also been affected by its own 
political activity audits and by perceptions of bias in its role as charity regulator arising from its 
role as a tax collector (Wyatt 2017: 148–153; Special Senate Committee on the Charitable Sec-
tor 2019: 109). Inaction for these reasons will be difficult to resolve, though making it easier to 
act through more express and better calibrated tools would potentially help.
Second, what is also missing are tools to reform the use of charitable assets to reduce donor 
control so that they can be applied more effectively. This is not a call for an unbounded tax 
regulator power to direct the use of charity assets but for a more structured ability to intervene. 
Administrative/deviation schemes (which alter the administrative machinery of a charity) or cy-
près schemes (which vary the charitable purpose) are key ‘mechanism[s] by which to prescribe 
the means to pursue charitable objects and, crucially, to ensure that those objects remain capable 
of fulfilment over time’ (Dal Pont 2017: [14.6]). They help ensure the effective use of charity 
assets and can be accessed by state and provincial attorneys-general and, in some cases – as for 
the Charity Commission for England and Wales generally and for the Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission in more limited circumstances – by charity commissions. How-
ever, many commentators have noted the patchiness of regulation at the level of the United 
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States and Canadian states and provinces (de March 2017: 127–128; Fremont-Smith 2004: 53; 
Brody 2004: 946–950). Additionally, the availability of cy-près schemes is more limited in many 
United States jurisdictions19 than in Australia or England and Wales and is far more limited in 
Canada, where cy-près variation is largely limited to the common law circumstances of ‘impos-
sibility’ or ‘impracticability’ of purpose (Gillen, Smith & Waters 2012: [14.VI.B]). In Australia 
and in England and Wales, cy-près can be obtained where the charitable purposes have ‘ceased 
to provide a suitable and effective method of using the trust property’ having regard to the ‘spirit 
of the trust’ or ‘appropriate considerations’,20 or where it is ‘impossible, impracticable or inex-
pedient’ to carry out the purpose.21
Commentators have noted that even the current expanded administrative scheme and cy-
près provisions could go further in limiting donor control and that this could be achieved in 
ways that retain a degree of respect for donor autonomy (Murray 2021; Picton 2018). For 
example, this could be achieved by allowing a set time period for greater donor control during 
which the existing administrative scheme and cy-près scheme rules apply, followed by a broad-
ening of the circumstances in which the effective use of assets to achieve public benefit trumps 
donor intent.
4 Reform and conclusion
In considering reforms, it is important to remember that the donor autonomy/public benefit 
balance includes a potential reduction in public benefit if donors give less property because 
their autonomy is diminished.22 Further, if the public benefit achieved by charities is viewed as 
potentially including a range of process benefits linked to the private pursuit of public purposes, 
then we should favour reforms that are more consistent with the independence of charities from 
government.
One relatively minor reform would be to strengthen the public/private charity distinction 
that is made for various tax purposes in the United States, Canada and Australia so that it better 
accounts for donor advised funds. The public/private charity distinction is not currently made 
in the United Kingdom and could be considered as an additional tool to regulate private control 
of charities.
More fundamentally, in jurisdictions such as the United States and Canada, where the tax 
authority is the primary charity regulator, a further step could be to provide the tax author-
ity with access to tools to modify a charity that mirror the administrative scheme and cy-près 
provisions. This may not always require new provisions. For instance, it may be that legislative 
extensions of cy-près or administrative schemes already provide open standing or broad standing 
for interested persons in some jurisdictions (American Law Institute 2020: §94 cmt g; Mur-
ray & Wesson 2020: 1338–1342). It may also be arguable at common law that interested persons 
extend beyond charity trustees/directors and attorneys-general to tax regulators (American Law 
Institute 2020: §94 cmt g; Murray & Wesson 2020: 1338–1342). Thus, it may be possible to 
provide tax regulators with standing – or confirm the existence of standing – to apply to court 
to use existing cy-près and administrative scheme mechanisms. This could even assist in juris-
dictions such as Australia that have a charity commission but where cy-près and administrative 
scheme reform has chiefly been the domain of state attorneys-general (McClure et al 2018: 34).
This approach would be more consistent with the independence of the charity sector and 
the autonomy of donors than a confiscatory tax or the imposition of caps on the quantum of 
donations to individual charities.23 That is because it would still leave decision-making with the 
charity board once the administrative or cy-près variation has been applied. As administrative 
scheme and cy-près provisions already contain elements that seek to protect donor intent to 
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some degree (whilst balancing it against the public benefit achieved by the variation), concerns 
about loss of donor autonomy and reduced donations should be ameliorated.
However, unlocking new powers for tax regulators does not necessarily mean that they 
will want them or will use them. In particular, the proposed reform would do little by itself to 
address tax regulators’ lack of institutional focus on charities, lack of funding to regulate charities 
or perceived revenue bias. Nevertheless, clearly identifying new powers may overcome some 
lack of institutional focus. Further, if the IRS or Canada Revenue Agency better supported 
state and provincial regulators through coordinated action and education, this would be appeal-
ing on the basis of federalism and would fit with more recent academic work on charity regula-
tion within a federation (Mayer 2016: 944–945; Simon, Dale & Chisolm 2006: 270). This is 
not likely to prove easy; indeed, even after the Pension Protection Act 2006 expanded the IRS’s 
ability to disclose information to state regulators, information-sharing arrangements between 
the IRS and state regulators appear virtually non-existent (Owens 2017: 83; Boris & Lott 2017: 
106). However, a coordinated approach has the potential to reduce the cost of action for a tax 
regulator, since it can also rely on the contribution of some resources by state regulators. The 
involvement of non-revenue authorities could diminish a perceived revenue bias of regulatory 
action. Further, establishing regular interactions and information sharing with state and provin-
cial regulators – for example, under inter-agency memoranda of understanding – also has the 
potential to generate a base level of institutional focus on charities.
Finally, tax regulators could also better support or encourage charity trustees and directors to 
themselves access administrative or cy-près schemes so as to remove donor controls. This would 
be even more consistent with the autonomy of the charity sector from government. However, 
it is not proposed as the primary approach, as it is subject to the risk of jurisdiction-shopping by 
donors keen to find a jurisdiction in which there is little scope for action by trustees or directors.
Notes
 1 Reich also outlines functions that charitable foundations could potentially form that would be consist-
ent with democratic institutions: the social innovation and problem solving that foundations and some 
other charities can engage in due to the long-term and risky approaches that are open to them as a 
result of limited accountability mechanisms and lack of a profit motive or political cycle: Reich 2018: 
152–153, 159–166.
 2 For recent overviews of charity donation concessions across these jurisdictions, see Martin 2018; 
O’Connell 2018; Colinvaux 2019.
 3 Capital gains arising from testamentary gifts are disregarded, but generally no corresponding deduction 
is provided either: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 30–15(2), 118–160.
 4 Similarly, in the United Kingdom for Gift Aid, there must be a ‘gift’, and the Gift Aid provisions also 
require that there be no ‘benefit’ for the donor associated with the gift: Kessler et al 2019: ch 15. Sec-
tions 110.1(1) and 118.1 of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (Canada) also require a ‘gift’ in order 
for a charitable deduction or credit to be available, though the provisions are premised on a gift exist-
ing to the extent of an ‘eligible amount’ which exceeds an advantage received by the donor: s248(31); 
Canada Revenue Agency 2020.
 5 In the United Kingdom, see also Kessler et al 2019: ch 15; HMRC 2020: ch 3, [3.19].
 6 See the HMRC’s more forgiving approach to membership rights (HMRC 2020: ch 3, [3.37]).
 7 While the imposition of a trust or a charge on the property would breach the provision, the creation 
of a contractual personal obligation on the charity in the form of a condition subsequent would appear 
to be permissible.
 8 §501(c)(3) public safety organisations are excluded.
 9 The provisions and the regulations [26 CFR §§1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)] refer to organisations ‘organized 
and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes’ and provide that ‘An organization will be 
regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in 
activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An 
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organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in further-
ance of an exempt purpose’.
 10 The Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted ‘charitable activities’ by reading in a charitable purpose 
requirement, noting that it is ‘the purpose in furtherance of which an activity is carried out, and not 
the character of the activity itself, that determines whether or not it is of a charitable nature’: Vancouver 
Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v MNR [1999] 1 SCR 10, [152] (Iacobucci J).
 11 The IRS’s main concern appears to be that charitable assets will be diverted to private purpose (e.g., as 
remuneration payments to controllers): IRS 1989: 14–15.
 12 ‘Private Foundations’ are actually defined in Internal Revenue Code §509(a) as a remainder category. 
That is, all §501(c)(3) organisations that do not fall within four categories of public charities: ‘tradi-
tional public charities’ under §509(a)(1), charities that largely support themselves from sources other 
than investment income under §509(a)(2), ‘supporting organisations’ under §509(a)(3) that are closely 
linked to another public charity and ‘testing for public safety’ organisations under §509(a)(4).
 13 Although they are not permitted to distribute to other ancillary funds.
 14 Minimum property value thresholds apply, such that the rate is 0% below the threshold.
 15 As to the characteristics of DAFs, see Special Senate Committee on the Charitable Sector 2019: 
109–113; Internal Revenue Service 2019; Hussey 2010: 60–61, 64–65; Internal Revenue Code 
§4966(d)(2).
 16 2018 WL 6199684 (ND Cal 2018). The dispute relates to the speed with which Fidelity Charitable 
disposed of donated shares.
 17 Additional restrictions apply to foreign donations.
 18 O’Connell notes tax regulators’ ability to determine initial eligibility but greater difficulty in monitor-
ing ongoing fulfilment of mission, especially where the entity is not paying any tax.
 19 Statutory extensions are less widespread and more varied in the United States, but many states have 
adopted grounds such as a purpose becoming ‘wasteful’, ‘inexpedient’ or ‘prejudicial to the public 
interest’: Ascher et al 2006: §39.5.
 20 Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW) s9(1); Charities Act (UK) s 62(1)(e)(iii); Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) 
s105(1)(e)(iii); Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s69B(1)(e)(iii); Variation of Trusts Act 1994 (Tas) s5(3)(e)(iii); 
Charities Act 1978 (Vic) s2(1)(e)(iii).
 21 Charitable Trusts Act 1962 (WA) s7(1)(a); Variation of Trusts Act 1994 (Tas) s5(2); Charitable Trusts 
Act 1957 (NZ) s32(1).
 22 The existence and extent of this reduction is contested. Studies on donation concessions suggest that 
they generally have a small impact on amounts donated: Heist 2019; Reich 2018: 121–122. On the 
other hand, reduced giving by plutocrats might actually be of public benefit by permitting a greater 
plurality of voices: Saunders-Hastings 2018: 159.
 23 Such a cap could be an effective restraint on donor control (Odendahl 1990: 239).
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PART II
Taxes, efficiency, and donor 
behavior




Most OECD governments offer tax-favorable treatment to charitable donations. In the United 
States, charitable donations are deducted from taxable income; France offers a non-refundable 
tax credit with a 66% subsidy rate, while the UK Gift Aid scheme offers a mix of a ‘match-
style’ incentives and deductions. We document the different schemes systematically in Section 2 
subsequently. One aim in tax-favoring giving is to encourage donations and support charities. 
Two important questions for policy-makers are: 1. Are tax incentives, which come at a cost of 
tax revenue foregone, the best tool for increasing charity incomes, compared to an alternative 
of funding grants directly to charities? 2. Is subsidizing charitable donations better than the 
government providing services directly? Addressing these questions requires an understanding 
of the effect of tax incentives on charity incomes (tax efficiency) and the wider impact of tax 
incentives for the level and composition of public goods and services (social efficiency). These 
issues are the focus of this chapter, and our discussion brings together several themes from 
other chapters in this volume (see also Andreoni, 2006a; Fack and Landais, 2016; Andreoni and 
Payne, 2013).
We first discuss the tax efficiency of tax incentives for charitable donations (Section 3). By 
tax efficiency we mean whether the government can increase charities’ incomes by ‘spending’ 
tax revenue on tax incentives rather than on grants (see Steinberg, this volume). We include a 
discussion of insights from behavioral science (see Cutler, Adena, and Ugazio et al., this volume) 
for improving tax efficiency.
We next discuss the social efficiency of tax incentives (Section 4). This moves the discussion 
away from the ‘income pie’ to the ‘output pie’ (see Lohse and Scharf, this volume; Saez, 2004; 
Diamond, 2006). We touch briefly on a couple of aspects that have not featured prominently in 
economic discussions of tax incentives for donations, including the benefits of civil society and 
wider support for taxes and public spending.
We end with a brief discussion of large gifts in Section 5. The past decades have seen an 
increasing concentration of giving in the United States, which means that discussion about tax 
subsidies for giving increasingly leads to a discussion about tax subsidies for large gifts. Consid-
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Three current challenges make discussion of these issues very topical. First, there is a docu-
mented stagnation of giving and a decline in the number of givers in countries such as the 
United States (Osili et al., 2019) and United Kingdom (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012). The 
share of Americans who do not give has been rising in recent years, with an accelerated trend 
following the 2008 financial crisis. Meer et al. (2016) report that in 1960, under 5 per cent of 
itemizing households reported no contributions. In 2016, the share had quadrupled to about 
20 per cent. Second, there is an increasing concentration of giving in the hands of a few (rela-
tively rich) donors, whose donations may be distributed differently than those of the general 
population (Duquette, 2020; Duquette and Mayo, this volume). Finally, the current COVID 
pandemic may reduce (and/or redirect) donations at the same time as sharply increasing social 
need. The wealth of many of the world’s billionaires has also increased by an estimated 20 per 
cent during the pandemic, leading many to ask how the super-wealthy – whether through taxes 
or philanthropy or both – can be part of the solution to the many social and economic problems 
that COVID has created.
2 Giving and the tax treatment of donations out of income
2.1 Giving
Table 9.1 shows that donating to charity is a widespread activity in most OECD countries: more 
than half of the population gives in one-third of the 38 countries listed. These numbers suggest 
high levels of engagement in philanthropy across the population, but a recent study by Rooney 
et al. (2020) finds that a static lens (i.e., looking at a snapshot of who gives in a single year) may 
be misleading because many donors give infrequently and not in every year. In their analysis of 
giving data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Rooney et al. find that half the U.S. 
population (more than half of those who donate) are ‘switchers’ who move in and out of donat-
ing over time. This means that more people have ever given than the static lens suggests but 
that there is a smaller number of regular donors who give every year. Regular donors typically 
donate larger amounts conditional on their other characteristics and, indeed, whether some-
one is a regular or switcher donor has greater predictive power for how much they give than 
observable characteristics. Greater understanding of what characterizes these different groups 
of donors (regular donors versus switchers) would be helpful for charities and policy-makers.
Turning to amounts donated, the United States tops the rankings – by some margin – for 
the amount donated as a share of GDP (at 1.44 per cent). Outside the United States, the value 
of donations (for the countries for which the information is available) is below 1 per cent GDP. 
New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands make up the “top five.” As 
discussed further in the following, the trend in the United States has been towards greater con-
centration of giving. The share of the population that gives is in decline, and the share of total 
giving accounted for by big givers has been increasing (Duquette, 2020). There is evidence of 
similar trends in the United Kingdom (Charities Aid Foundation, 2012).
In every country, giving as a share of GDP – and the level of public goods and services 
funded out of private donations – is dwarfed by government spending. However, donations 
play a crucial role in the provision of public goods and services in many ways. They are criti-
cal to some services – for example, the UK lifeboat service, which carries out sea rescues, is 
funded entirely in this way; private donations also represent around one-quarter of total fund-
ing for international aid in the United Kingdom/United States. The COVID pandemic has 
also revealed the crucial importance of, for example, privately funded food banks in meeting a 
dramatic and sudden increase in need.
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Table 9.1 Summary of tax incentives
% who Giving as Gini GovExp Tax relief Cap on value of Floor to tax relief
give % GDP as share of donations attracting relief
GDP
Argentina 18% 0.414 0.263 Deduction 5% annual earnings  
Australia 68% 0.23% 0.344 0.270 Deduction A deduction cannot AUD 2
add to/create a tax 
loss
Austria 53% 0.14% 0.297 0.456 Deduction 10% total income  
Belgium 39% 0.274 0.414 Credit Donation amount may EUR 40 per 
not exceed 10% of institution
global net income 
nor EUR 375,350 
per spouse
Bulgaria 16% 0.404 0.324 Deduction 65% taxable income  
(after the deduction)
Canada 63% 0.77% 0.333 0.173 Credit Up to 75% of net  
income can be 
claimed
Chile 44% 0.444 0.222 Credit Credits received for  
donations to charity 
and education, 
culture, and sport 
are limited at 20% 
of the amount of 
the donation subject 
to beneficial tax 
treatment or UTM 
320 (approx. USD 
20,558)
Colombia 22% 0.504 0.302 Credit Credit received is  
limited to 25% of 
the income tax 
liability
Czech 22% 0.04% 0.249 0.329 Deduction 15% of taxable income 2% of the tax base 
Republic or CZK 1,000
Estonia 20% 0.304 0.024 Deduction EUR 1 200 and  
50% of the taxable 
income
Finland 42% 0.13% 0.274 0.399 Deduction EUR 500,000 EUR 850
France 27% 0.11% 0.316 0.483 Credit 20% taxable income  
Germany 49% 0.17% 0.319 0.279 Deduction 20% total amount of  
income
Greece 7% 0.344 0.488 Credit Donation amount may EUR 100
not exceed 5% of 
taxable income
Hungary 20% 0.306 0.439 Allocation    
India 24% 0.37% 0.357 0.166 Deduction 10% of gross total  
income
(Continued)
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% who Giving as Gini GovExp Tax relief Cap on value of Floor to tax relief
give % GDP as share of donations attracting relief
GDP
Indonesia 69% 0.378 0.149 Deduction 5% from current net  
income
Ireland 69% 0.22% 0.328 0.251 Matching    
Israel 51% 0.39 0.365 Credit The credit cannot  
exceed 30% of 
taxable income or 
NIS 9,000,000
Italy 38% 0.30% 0.359 0.423 Deduction 10% of the taxable  
credit income
allocation
Japan 23% 0.12% 0.329 0.169 Deduction 40% of total income JPY 2 000
credit
Latvia 25% 0.356 0.429 Deduction EUR 600 and 50% of  
the annual taxable 
income
Lithuania 12% 0.373 0.095 Allocation    
Luxem- 51% 0.349 0.392 Deduction EUR 1,000,000 or EUR 120
bourg 20% of net income
Mexico 20% 0.03% 0.454 0.210 Deduction For donations to  
private institution: 




institutions: 4% of 
last year’s cumulative 
income
Netherlands 71% 0.30% 0.285 0.390 Deduction 10% of the total 1% of total 
income income and 
over EUR 60.
New 65% 0.79% 0.308 Credit Total amount of the NZD 5
Zealand donation may not 
exceed 100% of 
taxable income
Norway 0.11% 0.27 0.396 Deduction NOK 50,000 NOK 500
matching
Portugal 20% 0.338 0.414 Credit The credit cannot  
allocation exceed 15% of tax 
liability (no limit for 
donations to public 
institutions)
Romania 20% 0.36 0.313 Other    
Singapore 48% 0.39% 0.149 Deduction No limits  
matching





% who Giving as Gini GovExp Tax relief Cap on value of Floor to tax relief
give % GDP as share of donations attracting relief
GDP
Slovenia 36% 0.242 0.403 Deduction 0.5% of taxable  
allocation revenue
South 18% 0.63 0.345 Deduction 10% of taxable income  
Africa
Sweden 55% 0.16% 0.288 0.314 Credit The credit cannot SEK 2,000 total 
exceed SEK 1,500 donations 
and at least 
SEK 200 per 
individual 
donation
Switzerland 56% 0.09% 0.327 0.174 Deduction 20% of taxable income  CHF 100
United 71% 0.54% 0.348 0.373 Matching    
Kingdom
United 61% 1.44% 0.411 0.227 Deduction 60% or 30% of  




2.2 Tax treatment of donations out of income
Most OECD countries offer favorable tax treatment for private donations. Information col-
lected by the OECD on the type of tax relief offered by different countries is summarized in 
Table 9.1.1
• Tax deductions, by far the most common form of relief, reduce the taxable amount of 
income before calculating the tax liability that is due. They are more generous to taxpayers 
who face a higher marginal tax rate.
• Tax credits are an amount subtracted directly from the tax liability once the liability has 
been computed. The value of the credits is equal for all taxpayers.
• In a matching scheme, the government effectively tops up donations so that the entity 
receiving the donation can claim the tax relief. The UK system of Gift Aid allows chari-
ties to claim the tax that was paid on donations that are made of net of taxable income (at 
the basic rate of tax). Higher-rate tax payers can claim back the difference between their 
marginal rate and the basic rate.
• Allocation schemes are not formally a type of tax relief for giving, but they are a device 
through which taxpayers are able to allocate a fixed amount or a share of their income tax 
to a beneficiary directly through their tax return (e.g., in Lithuania, taxpayers can allocate 
up to 2 per cent of their income tax to their chosen NGO). They are more commonly 
Notes to table: % who give refers to the % population who report having given to charity in the last month, 
taken from the World Giving Index, averaged over 2010–18, collected by Gallup as part of its World Poll 
initiative published by Charities Aid Foundation. Giving as % GDP refers to money donated to not-for-
profits by individuals as a share of GDP, compiled by Charities Aid Foundation. All other information 
provided by the OECD.
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found in countries which have a lower share of givers and a limited tradition of philan-
thropy. See Bilodeau (1994) for an analysis of this type of funding system.
As well as differences in the type of tax-favorable treatment offered, there is also variation in the 
scope of tax relief. Almost all countries set a maximum amount of donations which are eligible 
for tax relief – either in absolute terms or as a percentage of taxable income. In more limited 
cases, there is also a minimum threshold for tax relief to apply.
We use a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to explore correlations between the 
share of the population who gives and alternative types of tax incentives, conditional on charac-
teristics such as inequality, government spending, and per capita GDP. The results are reported 
in Table 9.2.
There is no difference in giving (the share of the population who gives) between coun-
tries offering a tax deduction compared to countries offering a tax credit. Countries offering 
a match have higher giving (p = 0.076) compared to a deduction, but this is a small sample. 
Countries with an allocation scheme have lower giving compared to a deduction (p = 0.092), 
indicating the role of allocation schemes in trying to foster a culture of giving. Of the other 
factors, per capita GDP has a positive effect on giving; doubling GDP is associated with a 10 
percentage point increase in the share of the population that gives (p = 0.070). More inequality 
(a higher Gini coefficient) is associated with lower giving, though the estimated relationship is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.195). There is no systematic relation-
ship between levels of government spending and giving. As indicated by the R2, these factors 
collectively account for 40 per cent of the overall variation in giving. Although tax incentives 
are important, there is a limit to the role that they play, and other deep-seated factors such as 
culture and values also matter. As a striking reminder of this, Adena, this volume, reports a 
sizeable difference in levels of giving between East and West Germany, which share common 
institutions.
In the next section, we discuss the effectiveness of tax incentives in encouraging donations, 
discussing both ‘tax-price elasticity’, that is, how much donations respond to changes in the 
tax-price of giving, and the effects of different features of tax incentives, drawing on standard 
economic theory and behavioral insights.
Table 9.2 Accounting for variation in giving
OLS regression. Dependent variable = Giving (proportion of population)
Coeff SE p-value
(Deduction)
Match (0/1) 0.243 0.131 0.076
Credit (0/1) –0.004 0.066 0.958
Allocation (0/1) –0.144 0.082 0.092
Other (0/1) –0.244 0.179 0.185
Gini –0.555 0.418 0.195
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.107 0.057 0.070
Gov spending (share) –0.216 0.277 0.442
Constant –0.467 0.638 0.471
Note to table: N = 35. R2 = 0.40. Deduction, Match, Credit, Allocation, Other are defined for any coun-





The effect of offering tax incentives is to lower the tax-price of giving. Suppose a donor wants 
to give money to a charity and cares about the dollar income amount ($d) that the charity 
receives. Tax incentives lower the price (in terms of other consumption foregone) of giving 
this amount to $(1 – r)d, and this lower price is expected to increase donations. The tax-price 
elasticity of donations (i.e., how much donations respond to changes in the tax-price) has been 
a key policy parameter of interest in the empirical economics literature. It is important because 
it is a key factor in determining the tax efficiency of tax incentives in boosting charity incomes, 
compared to the alternative of the government giving grants. As discussed by Steinberg (this 
volume), the comparison of grants versus tax incentives also needs to take account of the degree 
of crowd-out from government grants to private donations (see also Saez, 2004; Diamond, 
2006). Broadly speaking, if donations are responsive to changes in the tax-price, then tax incen-
tives are more likely to be tax efficient. Absent crowd-out, then, if the tax-price elasticity is 
greater than one in absolute value, tax incentives are to be preferred to grants if the only objec-
tive is to maximize charity incomes.
Lohse and Scharf (this volume) provide a summary of the findings from the economics 
literature. Most studies focus on the United States, but there has been a range of estimates. In 
early studies, price elasticities of giving were found to be negative and greater than one in abso-
lute value. More recently, estimates have been shown to be sensitive to the empirical strategy 
and in particular to the time horizon (short-term versus long-term) – most studies estimate a 
long-term price elasticity that is less than one in absolute value (although for an exception, see 
Auten et al., 2002). Summarizing the empirical literature, Andreoni (2006a) concluded that 
‘the sensitivity of the estimates to the estimation technique and the identification strategy has 
left the literature unsettled as to the true values of price and income elasticities’. In addition to 
sensitivity to estimation methods, it has more recently been shown that there is heterogeneity in 
the tax-price elasticity across income classes. There is evidence, for example, that the tax-price 
elasticity is greater for richer taxpayers (see Adena, this volume). Hence, the estimated value will 
depend on the sample of donors being used for estimation.
In the next section, we discuss additional factors that might affect the tax-price elasticity, 
providing some reflections on what the tax-price elasticity is measuring. We draw on other 
chapters in this volume to discuss aspects of the tax treatment of donations (beyond the ‘tax-
price’) that might affect how donors respond to tax incentives, including fixed costs, salience, 
match-versus-rebate, and minimum thresholds. The discussion offers some insights for policy-
makers who are keen to maximize the effectiveness of tax incentives.
3.1 What does the tax-price elasticity measure?
The distinction between short- and long-term tax-price elasticities recognizes that tax-price 
changes may affect the timing of donations rather than the amount that is donated and that what 
is observed in response to a tax-price change may not be a change in underlying donations but 
a shift in the timing of donations to take advantage of preferential tax treatment.
Another obvious but often overlooked point is that the estimated tax-price elasticity (based 
on administrative data) captures the responsiveness of ‘taxable donations’, that is, donations 
declared for tax-favorable treatment, which may not be the same as total donations. At least part 
of an observed response to a tax-price reduction may be an increase in the share of donations 
that are declared, regardless of whether the total donations rise or fall. The decision to claim tax 
relief on donations is an important margin that is likely to be affected by the amount of tax relief 
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available. Using administrative data and exploiting a UK tax reform in 2010, Almunia et al. 
(2020) estimate an intensive-margin price elasticity of giving of –0.2 – but they also estimate 
the fixed cost of declaring donations is £47. There are two implications from this. One is that 
extensive-margin responses are important. The second is that part of what is captured in the 
extensive-margin responses may be the decision to declare.
Other fixed costs, such as the cost of changing regular giving commitments (‘hassle costs’), 
are likely to reduce the extent to which donors change out-of-pocket donations, particularly 
for small tax-price changes – for evidence, see Scharf and Smith (2015). Adena (this volume) 
reports that around two-thirds of private donations in Germany (including to big charities such 
as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund) are paid in the form of membership fees. These are 
usually of a fixed, pre-specified value and are often automatically debited from members’ bank 
accounts. They do not adjust when the tax-price changes.
Hassle costs may dampen the effect of deduction-style tax-price changes. One of the benefits 
of a match-style incentive is that more generous tax treatment of charities (i.e., higher match 
rates) are automatically passed on to charities as higher incomes even if donors do not change 
their out-of-pocket donations. In the case of a more generous tax deduction, on the other hand, 
donors must make changes to out-of-pocket donations for the income received by a charity to 
increase (Scharf and Smith, 2015).
Donation responses to changes in the tax-price necessarily reflect the behavior of those who 
are aware of the presence and level of tax incentives. The evidence suggests that awareness of 
charitable tax incentives is sometimes low. Insights from behavioral tax policy show that making 
sales taxes more salient increases consumer responsiveness (Chetty et al., 2009), and the same 
is likely to be true for donation tax incentives. The match element of Gift Aid is arguably very 
salient in the United Kingdom – charities need a declaration by the donor to reclaim the tax 
and will provide a prompt to ‘tick the Gift Aid box’ every time someone donates in a structured 
way. For evidence on the importance of awareness in the context of bequest giving, Sanders and 
Smith (2016) find large responses to a simple prompt to people who are writing their wills as to 
whether they have thought about making a charitable bequest. Using a regression discontinuity 
design, they estimate a sizeable tax-price elasticity effect around the bequests tax threshold. Dis-
cussions with will writers revealed that the presence of the tax threshold created an opportunity 
for conversations about making a charitable bequest and avoiding bequest tax. Some of these 
responses may capture some element of a social norm as well as salience, but clearly, awareness 
of tax incentives matters.
3.2 Design features of tax incentives
Table 9.1 shows that countries vary in the form in which tax relief is offered to donors – and 
this may matter for the tax-price elasticity in ways we discuss in the following. We review some 
insights from the economics literature on differences between the effects of match-style incen-
tives and deduction-style incentives (see also Cutler, Adena, and Ugazio et al., this volume), and 
we discuss minimum thresholds for donations to benefit for tax relief and ask whether there are 
lessons from psychology and neuroscience that might be relevant for tax incentives.
3.2.1 Match versus rebate
Tax incentives can be offered as a match (for every $1 donated out of pocket, the charity 
receives an additional $m from the government in the form of a match) or as a deduction [such 
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that every $1 donated out of pocket only costs the donor $(1 – r)]. If the donor cares about the 
income received by the charity, referred to by Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm (forthcoming) 
as the impact of a donation, then both types of tax incentives lower the tax-price of impact in 
terms of other consumption foregone and should be equivalent in their effect on donations. 
However, estimated tax-price elasticities associated with changes in price driven by changes 
in the match rate are typically greater than the estimated tax-price elasticities associated with 
equivalent changes in price driven by changes in the rebate rate. This evidence comes from 
lab and field experiments with individual charities (Eckel and Grossman, 2003, 2017), from a 
hypothetical experiment varying the match/rebate elements of the UK Gift Aid scheme (Scharf 
and Smith, 2015), and from natural experiments studied by Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm 
(forthcoming).
The literature discusses several explanations for the observed difference, including timing 
differences (matches are typically upfront, whereas deductions may benefit a donor with a delay) 
and pure framing effects (a deduction may be seen as selfish, whereas a match may be seen as 
co-operative). One explanation, already discussed, is that, if out-of-pocket donations do not 
adjust, for example, because of hassle costs, then the income received by the charity (impact) 
will vary mechanically with changes in the match rate and not at all with variations in the rebate 
rate (Scharf and Smith, 2015). More recently, Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm (forthcom-
ing) note that if the donor cares about the impact and also gets warm glow utility (Andreoni, 
1989, 1990) from their own gift, a deduction affects the opportunity cost of both the impact 
and warm glow, while the match reduces the cost of impact but does not alter the cost of one’s 
out-of-pocket donation. This adds to the explanations of why the two types of incentive might 
differ in their effect.
Matching done through the tax system, is different from matching used as a fundraising 
scheme. It is not uncommon for charities to use a large private gift as a fund to “match” the 
donations of other donors, until the fund is exhausted. In practice, large donors usually let 
the charities keep the full amount in the unlikely case that the fund is not exhausted. This 
means that a matched gift will not actually increase total donations and the matching fund 
is entirely infra-marginal. Consistent with this interpretation, Karlan and List (2007) find 
no effects of the rate of the match (1-for-1 versus 2-for-1). Rather, as shown by Huck and 
Rasul (2011), it is the fact that one donor has made a very large grant, not the match rate, 
that makes the difference to other donors, perhaps because it sends a signal of quality for that 
charity (Andreoni, 1990).
3.2.2 Thresholds
Several countries operate minimum thresholds for donations to qualify for tax relief. Recent 
field experiments provide insights into how these might increase donations compared to a sys-
tem with no minimum threshold. Setting minimum thresholds can incentivize donors below 
the threshold to give at or above it. They can also set a social norm for acceptable donations – 
however, this can cause donations to go down as well as up, depending on the level of the 
threshold relative to individuals’ donation amounts (Harbaugh, 1998, Andreoni and Petrie, 
2004). Huck et al. (2015) show that non-convex matching with a lower price for higher gifts 
outperforms simple linear matching, but thresholds need to be high and ideally personalized 
such that they cause each donor to adjust their donations upwards (Adena and Huck, 2017). In 
a real-world setting, varying thresholds by income or by tax-rate in a progressive system would 
be one possible way forward.
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3.2.3 Framing
The lessons from dictator and ultimatum games are that fairness, efficiency, equity, and reciprocity 
are important for people’s decision to give (see Cutler, this volume). Sentiments such as ‘giving 
back’ and ‘a sense of duty’ feature prominently in the narratives of Giving Pledgers, billionnaires 
who have pledged to give away at least half of their wealth. Giving Pledgers also frequently men-
tion that their giving is shaped by values from religion or from their upbringing. To date, most 
experimental findings focus on how values affect the level of giving, but they may also affect how 
people respond to tax incentives – hence, the framing of tax incentives may matter for the response.
Studies have found that ‘social information’, in particular, information about other people’s 
giving, affects donations. Shang and Croson (2009) study messages about other people’s dona-
tions in the context of a donation phone-in, while Smith et al. (2015) find that donors respond 
to seeing information on how much other donors have given on a social fundraising platform. 
Behavioral tax policy has demonstrated that social norm messages from the government can 
increase tax compliance (Hallsworth et al., 2017). In the context of bequest giving, Sanders 
et al. (2016) show that social norm messages (‘leaving a bequest is something that many people 
do’) increases take-up among those writing a will for the first time compared to a simple aware-
ness message (‘have you thought about leaving a bequest’). Reciting the ‘golden rule’ and other 
moral suasion also increases giving (Dal Bó and Dal Bó, 2014). Such messages about donations 
could both increase awareness and also reinforce social norms about giving that could increase 
the effectiveness of tax incentives.
Recently, List et al. (2019) ran a field experiment on fundraising campaign in Alaska, where 
identical mailings about the “Pick-Click-Give” program were sent to thousands of households. 
While each mailing had the same information, their headline banner differed. Half appealed to 
their love of Alaska, and half appealed to the good feeling donors will have about themselves. 
They found significantly more giving among those who were invited to think about themselves 
when giving rather than the good the donation will do for the community.
4 Social efficiency
Tax efficiency is a relatively narrow concept focusing on the effect of tax incentives on the rev-
enues of charities. Consideration of the social efficiency of tax incentives moves from a focus 
on the size of the ‘income pie’ to the size (and composition) of the ‘output pie’ and the social 
benefits derived from charitable income.
4.1 Maximizing the ‘output pie’
One argument for using tax revenue to support charities emanates from the claim that non-profit 
provision is more (cost-)effective. The argument is supported by the observation that because 
private charities often work directly with the populations served, unlike bureaucrats and legisla-
tors, and so can generate greater socially beneficial impact for a given revenue cost compared to 
government provision. Offering tax incentives puts allocation decision in the hands of donors, 
rather than government grants and will result in an allocation of resources within the charitable 
sector that is more (cost-)effective if donors care about charity cost-effectiveness and have more 
information than the government about which charities are most cost effective.
Evidence on whether donors care about cost-effectiveness is mixed (Lohse and Scharf, this 
volume). Donors respond to information about the magnitude of overhead costs (Gneezy et al., 
2014) and to simple ratings by watchdog organizations like Charity Navigator that combine 
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several metrics, including overhead (Gordon et al., 2009). However, such measures may not 
be good indicators of cost-effectiveness. In lab and field experiments, donors do not appear 
to respond to scientific measures of effectiveness, such as the ability of a charity to improve 
outcomes for recipients. Moreover, donors and are not willing to pay to acquire information 
on effectiveness (Karlan and Wood, 2017; Burum et al., 2020). We show in the following that 
many Giving Pledgers are strongly motivated by the potential impact of their gifts and prefer to 
transfer results-based methods from business to non-profits. However, many (large and small) 
donors are motivated by a range of factors besides charity effectiveness, including personal 
interests, values, social pressure (Andreoni et al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2012, Andreoni and 
Serra-Garcia, 2021a, 2021b), and socially motivated fundraising that takes place in the context 
of workplaces or peer networks (Scharf and Smith, 2015).
The effective altruism movement, started in the late 2000s, promotes the twin ideas of 
directing giving to where it can do most good and determining what is the most good by using 
evidence and reasoning. However, there is debate about some of the practical implications of 
the effective altruism principle. First, there may be a limit to what impact has been measured, so 
donors can only choose from a limited range of organizations. More fundamentally, there may 
be a limit to what can be measured (at least on a comparable basis). A de-worming organization 
can measure how many people were treated, n, at an estimated value v per treatment: effective-
ness is nv. An organization providing mental health services can count the number of people 
helped, but may find it harder to monetize the benefit. A suicide hotline may find it hard to 
know how many lives they have saved.
Second, when measures of effectiveness are available, they capture marginal benefits that 
are unlikely to extrapolate to a case for directing all donations to the (currently) most effective 
charity. Providing an additional mosquito net has been demonstrated to be a cheap and highly 
effective way to save a life by preventing malaria, but there is a limit on how many mosquito 
nets are needed.
Finally, many have argued that focusing on the interventions that work/don’t work ignores 
the potential of systemic changes in power and institutions that might bring about even greater 
benefits in the longer term. Adherents of effective altruism would argue that donors should 
support systemic change if it does the most good, but it is hard to fulfill the second principle 
of using evidence-based reasoning: typically marginal interventions, carried out within exist-
ing institutional structures, are the easiest to evaluate in order to produce the required evidence 
base.
The principle of effective altruism makes sense for a donor who is considering which charity 
to give to out of a set of charities doing similar work where measures of effectiveness are avail-
able. However, it may be a ‘social distortion’ in the case of decisions across different charities, 
favoring charities for which effectiveness can easily be measured, potentially at the expense 
of charities engaged in less tangible, more risky, more experimental, more novel, or more 
long-term investments, that could ultimately be of greater value but whose rewards are, as yet, 
unclear.
This brings us to what Reich (2017) calls the ‘discovery case’ for tax incentives. Tax incen-
tives may help to support a plurality of organizations supplying public goods and services, and 
this plurality may be more likely to foster innovation, recognize real needs more quickly, and 
respond to changing circumstances. Precisely because individual donors do not all give to the 
(currently) most cost-effective charities but give to many different charities, donations can help 
to create and sustain a vibrant charity sector. There may be a short-term cost in not giving to 
the (currently) most cost-effective charity, but there may be longer-term benefits of sustaining 
a diverse charitable sector that are even greater.
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Going further, there may be additional benefits to supporting a plurality of charitable 
organizations in terms of fostering a healthy civil society that exists between the public and 
the government. As well as the instrumental value from delivering public services, charita-
ble organizations engage in advocacy on issues such as health, the environment, and human 
rights. They may be part of a vibrant civil society that is important for a healthy democracy – 
influencing policy and providing marginalized groups (including non-voters) with a voice. In 
some countries, they may also play a ‘checks and balances’ role and hold governments account-
able. Tax-favoring donations, by introducing a degree of separation between the source of fund-
ing and the allocation decision, are likely to be a more effective way to promote civil society 
than government grants in a way that is free from direct political influence. This in itself may be 
a valuable output from a system of tax subsidies.
4.2 Composition of public services
Tax incentives for donations are likely to lead to a different allocation of funding across char-
itable causes (religious giving, social services, health, education, culture, etc.) compared to 
government grants/provision. According to standard political economy models, government 
provision will target the preferences of the ‘median voter’. By contrast, donors may allocate 
funding across charities according to their personal preferences (which will be reflected in dif-
ferent levels of warm glow from giving to different causes). More specifically, however, and this 
is a common criticism of tax incentives for giving, the allocation associated with tax subsidies 
will be weighted towards the preferences of richer donors both because they give more and also 
because they enjoy a greater subsidy under deduction-style incentives.
Evidence shows that the distribution of donations by the rich differs from that of the rest of 
the population. Reich (2017) reports that, among donors with incomes less than £100k, 67 
per cent of donations went to religious causes, 10 per cent to basic needs, 4 per cent to health, 
3 per cent to education, and 3 per cent to arts, whereas, among donors with incomes greater 
than £1 million, 17 per cent went to religious causes, 5 per cent to basic needs, 25 per cent to 
health, 25 per cent to education, and 15 per cent to arts. The important questions are whether 
directing funding in line with donor preferences, not median voter preferences, is socially effi-
cient and whether it is equitable.
Inherent in the mechanism for allocating government money via tax subsidies is a tension 
between personal motivations for giving to different causes (which drive donor decisions) and 
the associated social benefits of donations, which, we assume, the government wants to maxi-
mize. Of course, many donors care about maximizing social benefits in the short or long term; 
arguably, richer donors are more likely to act on this, not least because they can pay for the 
information and advice needed to make cost-effective donation decisions (Andreoni, 1998). 
But many donor choices are motivated by personal (reputational) benefits or personal prefer-
ences that have nothing to do with social welfare – there are many examples of the latter in the 
narratives of those billionaires taking the Giving Pledge. In this case, the allocation by donors 
will not be socially optimal. In itself, this does not invalidate the case for tax incentives, but it 
would point to a system that targets tax subsidies at charities which generate greater perceived 
social benefits, possibly varying tax incentives by cause. Whether a government could do this 
objectively, without being swayed by political considerations, is, however, a separate issue.
The second consideration is equity. Giving weight to the strength of people’s preferences in 
directing funding in public service provision is arguably a potential advantage of tax subsidies 
over grants – it allows people to express their willingness to pay for different goods and ser-
vices in markets where there is no price. However, tax deductions give greater weight to the 
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preferences of richer votes, and this is seen by many as inequitable. Again, this does not invali-
date the case for tax incentives, but if this is a concern, then the value of tax subsidies should be 
equalized across donors through a system of tax credits. Here, there is a possible tension between 
designing a system of tax incentives that is tax efficient (which would imply giving more gener-
ous tax incentives to richer donors, who are more tax-price sensitive) and designing a system of 
tax incentives that is seen as ‘fair’ (which would imply equal-value tax subsidies for all donors).
A final argument in relation to the provision of public goods and services is that tax subsidies 
for giving may help to increase voter support for government provision, particularly in diverse 
societies. Allowing donors to direct the allocation of (some) government funding provides a 
mechanism for publicly funded services to reflect a wider range of preferences beyond those of 
the median voter. In a diverse society, government-provided services (meeting the preferences 
of the median voter) may be a long way from the preferences of different groups in society, and 
this may reduce voters’ willingness to pay taxes (Alesina et al., 1999). Levels of public spending, 
support for redistribution, and the legitimacy of the tax system are lower in more diverse socie-
ties (Li, 2010). More ethnic and religious diversity in a community also predicts lower donations 
(Andreoni et al., 2016). Giving people a voice in the composition of public services provides 
an opportunity to overcome this by better reflecting diverse preferences, and this may increase 
support for tax and public spending more generally (De Neve et al., 2014). Tax incentives in 
the form of allocation mechanisms provide a voice in the tax system explicitly. Other types of 
tax incentives (deductions, credits, matches) could be framed in this way.
4.3 Happiness
As well as potential benefits to charity recipients, it is well recognized that act of spending 
or the decision to spend money on others generates good feelings, often called a warm glow 
(Andreoni, 1989, 1990). To what extent should tax incentives take account of personal benefits 
to individual donors? This is perhaps a philosophical question as much it is an economic one 
(Andreoni, 2006a).
According to the Haig-Simons ideal, warm glow from giving is outside the definition of 
social welfare; that is, the government should not count warm glow as part of social welfare 
even if donors care about warm glow when choosing donations. The argument is that the 
money a donor gives away rather than consumes is no longer the donor’s income and should be 
taxed at the rate of the ultimate recipients’ income, which in the case of poverty relief is likely 
zero, as argued by Diamond (2006). At the other end, Kaplow (1995) fully supports counting all 
warm glow in welfare, so even gifts to friends should be tax deductible for the giver. Steinberg, 
this volume, explores the implications of this argument, suggesting that there is a case for tax 
incentives to facilitate mutually beneficial donations that would otherwise not occur.
There are several reasons warm glow considerations do not belong in social welfare calcula-
tions. First, unlike utility from consuming ‘real’ goods and services, warm glow from giving is a 
‘decision utility’ and may be affected by the context and framing of giving decisions. Andreoni 
(1995), for instance, finds giving depends significantly on whether the positive action is to 
choose how much to give (the remainder is not given) or how much to not give (the remainder 
is given), with the former giving more, despite having identical payoff spaces. Should these be 
treated differently? Second, there is evidence that fundraising creates social pressure and that 
people will pay to avoid it (Andreoni et al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2012). Does the warm glow 
from alleviating the guilt that fundraising creates count towards social welfare? It is also clear 
that some sources of warm glow from giving, such as personal reputation or prestige, have no 
social benefit and may create social harm by making others feel worse off. Should the billionaire 
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donor who enjoys personal satisfaction from endowing a fancy new university building receive 
a large tax benefit solely as a result? Andreoni (2006a) makes the case that if there is no compel-
ling social interest argument for the donation itself, then the fact the donation has been made 
should have no effect on the calculation of the socially optimal level of the public good itself. 
The social welfare calculation should no more consider the additional utility from donating than 
the lost utility from other consumption foregone.
As discussed by Sellen (this volume), individual donors will consider the warm glow from 
donating in deciding whether and how to give – and in making trade-offs between donating 
and other spending. He explains that experiments show that spending on other people can 
generate more happiness than spending on oneself, as revealed by self-reported measures of 
happiness and he argues for promoting awareness of what he calls these “positive externalities”, 
but are personal benefits. What do these self-reports tell us? Kahneman and Deaton (2010) used 
happiness data to ask the question directly: Does money buy happiness? In brief, their answer is 
that money can relieve unhappiness but only for incomes reaching about the median household 
income in the area the respondent resides. Beyond that, association of income to happiness 
flattens out.
5 Large gifts
In this section, we briefly discuss large gifts, exemplified by donors who have made good on 
their Giving Pledge (https://givingpledge.org/). Launched in June 2010 by Warren Buffet and 
Bill and Melinda Gates, the Giving Pledge is a public commitment by billionaires, initially from 
the United States but now from 25 countries worldwide, to donate at least half of their wealth 
during their lifetimes. The site itself has information on the pledges rather than donations and 
whether the pledges have been fulfilled, but many Pledgers have given away billions of dol-
lars. In recent years, large gifts have become increasingly important. Analyzing U.S. tax data, 
Duquette (2020) shows that in 1960, 9.8 per cent of potential donors gave half of all donations; 
by 2012, half of total giving came from just 1.8 per cent of potential donors. The increasing 
concentration is due both to a decline in the share of the population who gives and also an 
increase in the value of the largest gifts. Hungerman (2020) reports that the increase in giving 
concentration is steeper than the estimated increases in income inequality reported in the lit-
erature. Any discussion of tax subsidies for giving is therefore increasingly a discussion about tax 
subsidies for large gifts made by the very wealthy.
Following the COVID pandemic, which has brutally exposed global inequalities, there has 
also been an increased focus on the fact that just a handful of the world’s billionaires, who 
have seen their combined wealth increase by 20 per cent, have the capacity to tackle many 
of the major social problems that governments and the charitable sector are facing. For bil-
lionaire donors, there is no ‘public goods problem’ of coordinating contributions from many 
donors. Rather, billionaire donors have the resources to fund the whole of provision of some 
public goods/services individually. The head of the World Food Program USA recently called 
directly on billionaires to come forward to help tackle global food poverty, arguing that they 
have enough money (many times over) to solve the problem. The money spent by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation equals that of many individual countries  – in fact, it is the 
around the same level as Office of Development Assistance spending by the Netherlands, the 
world’s seventh-largest donor country. Large gifts can also be used to make big investments in 
risky medical research that could be transformative. The increasing concentration in giving, 
and the growing importance of billionaire donors with the capacity for very large gifts, raises 
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fundamental questions about the implications for the charitable sector and also about what the 
appropriate policy toward large gifts is.
Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2018) present an interesting analysis of the Giving Pledgers. They 
show that, compared to the sample of all billionaires (defined by the Hurun Global Rich List), 
those who are self-made billionaires compared to those who inherited their wealth and those 
who are richer are more likely to pledge. Age and gender do not have an effect. Although 
Pledgers are more likely to be self-made billionaires, their giving narratives often refer to the 
‘luck’ that they have experienced over their lives and a sense of wanting to give back and give 
others similar chances. Education – and the opportunities that education provides – is a com-
mon theme.
The giving narratives of Pledgers provide insights into their self-reported motivations for 
giving. In many respects, the motivations of Pledgers are similar to those of other givers (see also 
Andreoni et al., 2021). Many Pledgers refer to values that come from religion or from their 
personal upbringing. Joy-of-giving motivations are also important. Pledgers describe giving as 
providing happiness and satisfaction in a way that further material spending does not (‘the more 
I do for others, the happier I am’). Perhaps different from regular donors, however, they see 
the (opportunity) cost of giving as low and perhaps effectively zero (‘my family and I will give 
up nothing we need or want by fulfilling this 99% pledge’). Many explicitly say that they have 
no need for further material items and also see passing (a lot of) wealth on to their children as 
actively causing harm (‘I do not believe that those who provide their offspring with luxuriously 
upholstered lives serve them well but rather saddle them with a terrible burden’).
For major donors, however, a sense of agency and impact is more important than for regular 
donors (Kessler et al., 2019). Many Pledgers talk about translating methods and insights from 
their successful business careers to solving social problems (‘I don’t just write checks – we try to 
make the organizations we fund better. The results have been rather outstanding’). Not surpris-
ingly, with the amount of money that they have to give away, many Pledgers talk about investing 
in solutions to problems rather than treating the symptoms (‘I am not looking for band aids; 
I am looking for solutions’).
As is the case for regular donors, preferences and personal passions are important in deter-
mining where large gifts are directed. One difference with large gifts is that each large gift has 
a bigger impact on the overall distribution. The evidence shows that richer donors – including 
the Pledgers – give to different charitable causes than do regular donors. Education, health, and 
the arts are the leading causes that are cited. This spread of causes contrasts with donors in the 
general population, who give a larger percentage of total donations to religious organizations 
than to any other subsector. The observed decline in the number of givers and an increasing 
concentration of giving is therefore likely to change the causes that benefit from donations, with 
a shift away from dominance by religious giving. Again, this is not an argument in itself to take 
away tax subsidies but to ensure that they are attached to charitable activities which are agreed 
to be genuinely in the social interest.
Should large gifts be treated differently by the tax system from regular donations? Currently 
many large gifts are likely to enjoy larger tax subsidies (per dollar), but only because they are 
likely to be made by higher-income donors who pay a higher marginal rate of tax, not because 
of the size of the gift per se. In many countries (see Table 9.1), larger donations may also be 
capped in terms of the relief they get if they exceed annual tax-free donation limits. There is 
a tax-efficiency argument for more generous tax treatment of large gifts are more sensitive to 
tax incentives. Studies that explore heterogeneity by income show that the tax-price elasticity 
is greater for high-income donors, which would justify a greater subsidy if the sole objective 
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were to maximize the size of the (income) pie for charities, albeit for higher income donors, 
not larger gifts per se.
Hungerman (2020) makes an explicit argument for giving greater subsidies to large gifts 
if giving is more concentrated. The intuition behind his argument that increasing large gifts 
will have fewer negative crowd-out effects in a system where giving is more concentrated and 
large gifts account for a greater share of total giving. The argument may be stronger still with 
evidence that large gifts from well-known billionaire donors crowd in other gifts by acting as 
a signal of quality (Vesterlund, 2006; Andreoni, 2006b; Karlan and List, 2020), although this 
argument applies to donations to a single charity rather than aggregate donation. In particular, 
it may be more about influencing the allocation of the pie rather than growing the pie.
Looking at the income pie only tells part of the story, and it is important to also look at what 
the donations are funding – and the social welfare that is generated. Many large gifts appear to 
be motivated to maximize the prestige (and other personal benefits) to the donors. This applies 
to the praise that is given for major philanthropists’ giving (in aggregate); billionaire donors are 
now rightly being challenged for flaunting their philanthropy while doing everything they can 
to avoid paying tax on their business activities. However, even if they do pay all the tax that is 
due, many of the world’s billionaires could still afford to give away huge sums of money. Much 
criticism by the effective altruism movement is of large donations made to cultural and higher 
education institutions, which seem to have little to do with wider social benefits. There is also 
criticism of donor advised funds, which allow donors to claim tax benefits up front – includ-
ing benefits of avoided capital gains taxation – and pay money into a fund which may not be 
disbursed and may do no social good for many years (Andreoni, 2018).
Many of the narratives provided by those making the Giving Pledge focus on the desire to 
achieve impact. According to the analysis by Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2018), this is by far the 
most prevalent theme in their narratives. Reich’s discovery case for subsidizing philanthropy 
(that is, promoting a plurality of organizations in order to build capacity for social innovation) 
likely applies more to large gifts than to smaller donations, since the latter will typically go to 
established organizations with fundraising capacity. Large donations can be used for risky invest-
ments with the potential for large pay-offs, such as investment in medical research. This type of 
funding may be particularly important in a sector where borrowing to invest may be difficult. 
Many large gifts also go to political/advocacy organizations, such as investing in ways intended 
to sustain a vibrant civic society. This evidence suggests that large gifts can generate sizeable 
social benefits, which would justify some subsidy. However, transparency and accountability are 
important where such large sums, including of public funding, are involved.
6 Discussion
Tax incentives are a key policy tool that governments have to affect the level and composition 
of donations to charities. There has long been a focus in economics on estimating tax-price 
elasticities, but responses to tax incentives will be affected not only by the tax-price but also by 
the design and framing of tax incentives. Relevant factors are likely to include salience, fixed 
costs, minimum thresholds, social norms, and social information. These are important design 
features for policy makers to consider.
The design and scope of tax incentives should aim to maximize social benefit while also 
giving a voice to citizens. The definition of social benefit goes beyond channeling giving to 
the (currently measurable) most cost-effective charities and encompasses a ‘discovery case’ for 
supporting a plurality of organizations offering the possibility of a wide range of benefits and 
longer-term innovation. By allowing citizens to have a say in the allocation of some government 
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funding via tax-subsidized donations, governments may also help to build support for tax/
spending more generally. To date, there has been little discussion of these wider externalities, 
but understanding what it means to have a healthy charitable sector and a strong civil society – 
and the role of tax subsidies in that – is an important topic for discussion (see Lohse and Scharf, 
this volume).
Tax credits, rather than deductions, offer a way to give citizens equal voice. On social effi-
ciency grounds, it is not clear that there is a case for offering greater tax subsidies (per dollar) 
for large gifts, not least since the opportunity cost of donating for the very wealthy is practically 
zero. The case for giving a subsidy is that large gifts have the potential to achieve big social 
benefits, particularly when used in ways that small donations cannot be to fund higher-risk/
reward projects. If there is concern about the purpose of large gifts, the government can use tax 
subsidies to direct large gifts to causes where they will have maximal positive benefit, although 
there is a risk of excessive political interference. No matter the policy, however, ensuring trans-
parency around large gifts and a degree of accountability is clearly important to include. The 
current trend towards increased use of donor advised funds works against this. A first step would 
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Ever since Vickrey (1962) first proposed the treasury efficiency criterion for evaluating the 
charitable giving tax deduction in the United States, economists have argued over whether 
personal giving should receive special treatment through the personal income tax system and, 
if so, what form that treatment should take. It is time to bring these disparate analyses from 
economics and selected other fields together, and that is my goal in this chapter on tax design. 
This chapter focuses on the design of taxes levied against personal income and consumption1 – 
the tax treatment of corporations and other profit-distributing organizations, nonprofit organi-
zations (that is, organizations that cannot distribute their profits), and charitable bequests is 
beyond the scope of the chapter. I focus on considerations of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy 
and omit important administrative considerations (processing and enforcement costs, enforce-
ability of restrictions, and taxpayer compliance costs) in the interest of space.
In the first section, I discuss some results that are commonly believed to be correct but are 
in fact misleading, incomplete, or just plain wrong. In the next section, I catalog four elements 
of tax incentive design and gather the many variations of each element that have been used or 
proposed in the United States. I conclude with some approaches to choosing among the avail-
able options. While I am primarily concerned with economic aspects of tax design, tax systems 
affect the perceived fairness and legitimacy of government, and I discuss these impacts within 
the limits of my expertise.
What’s wrong: accepted wisdom that misleads
In this section, I discuss four erroneous, incomplete, or misleading approaches that are com-
monly cited as correct. First, the literature shows that tax deductions for charitable giving pro-
vide a greater subsidy to the rich than to the poor. This conclusion is correct but incomplete 
and misleading. Second, the literature asserts that a tax incentive is treasury efficient (that is, 
results in an increase in donations that exceeds the loss of tax revenue) if and only if the price 
elasticity of giving is greater than one (in absolute value). This conclusion is incorrect. Third, 
the literature asserts that when giving passes the proper test for treasury efficiency, tax incentives 
for giving are socially efficient. They are not. Finally, it is commonly believed, at least among 
economists, that efficiency is the primary objective of public policy. As most non-economists 
know, this is an exaggeration, and I discuss other important objectives for tax policy.
10
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Pro-rich aspects of charitable tax deductions
In a progressive income tax, the average tax rate2 increases with the amount of income. Pro-
gressivity is implemented through some combination of a zero bracket (the first few dollars 
of income on which no tax is owed) and marginal tax rates3 that increase with income. In 
the United States, the zero bracket has been replaced by the “standard deduction,” which is 
$24,4004 in tax year 2019. Those with incomes of less than $24,400 face a zero marginal and 
average tax rate and pay no income tax. The marginal tax rate is 10% for income between 
$24,400 and $43,450 and rises in a series of steps to 37% for income exceeding $624,400. 
Taxpayers can reject the standard deduction and instead list their actual expenditures on certain 
tax-favored items including charitable donations (itemized deductions) whenever they calculate 
this would reduce their tax burden.
Those who itemize reduce their taxable income (and hence their taxes) in proportion to the 
amount given, but taxes do not depend on the amount of donations made by non-itemizers.5 
We measure the impact of these tax considerations using the “tax price of donations,” which 
represents the net cost to the taxpayer of a dollar of charitable giving. This tax-price is $1 for 
nonitemizers, but is reduced to $1 – m, where m is the marginal tax rate, for itemizers.6 For 
example, when an itemizing taxpayer in the 37% bracket gives $1,000, her taxable income is 
reduced by $1,000, so she avoids $370 in taxes. The net cost to the high-income taxpayer of 
giving $1,000 is $630, so the tax-price (per dollar) is $0.63.
The tax-price of giving declines as income rises for two reasons. First, those with more 
income are more likely to itemize and hence receive a price reduction. Second, the marginal tax 
rate increases as income rises, causing further reductions in the tax-price for itemizers as they 
move up through the income distribution.
This pattern of subsidizing the wealthy in a “bizarre upside-down fashion” (Surrey 1973: 
229–230) results in a “plutocratic bias” (Vickrey 1947: 131). Precisely what is wrong with this 
pattern is not made clear in some publications, but it seems to offend notions of distributional 
justice based on norms of progressivity. Plutocratic bias may be objectionable on other grounds, 
but this is the misleading part of the claim, because tax deductions are not generally regressive.
Tax codes are too complex with too many discontinuities to fully characterize when the 
deduction is progressive or regressive, so I provide a few examples to illustrate my point in Fig-
ure 10.1. In all the examples, I assume that the tax code incorporates the simplest linear progres-
sive structure7 and calculate average tax rates with and without a charitable donations deduction. 
To further simplify, I  set the standard deduction to $0 so that every donor itemizes. Finally, 
I make the very reasonable assumption that the deduction is not refundable, which means that 
anytime the formula suggests a negative amount of tax (government paying the taxpayer), that 
number is replaced by $0.
The usual definition of a progressive tax is that the average tax rate rises with income. 
I report average tax rates but also another measure, consumption as a share of gross income. 
Absent donations, the average tax rate plus consumption as a share of gross income add up to 
one, so that an equivalent definition of progressivity is that the consumption share decreases 
with added income. But are donations part of consumption, used to purchase “warm glow,” 
or are donations a part of income that is not available to the donor for consumption? If dona-
tions are part of consumption, both measures of progressivity tell the same story, but otherwise, 
the tax system can be regressive by the first measure and progressive by the second. I therefore 
report both measures in Figure 10.1.
The first table in Figure 10.1 is the base case, with numbers that seemed plausible plucked 
out of thin air. The first two columns, containing income and donations, show the behavior 
Richard Steinberg
180
Figure 10.1 The charitable donations tax deduction need not be regressive
Base Case Without Deductibility With Deductibility
Income Donations Tax Average Consumption as Tax Average Consumption as 
tax rate a share of income tax rate a share of income
$50 $5 $0 0 0.9 $0 0 0.9
$100 $15 $0 0 0.85 $0 0 0.85
$200 $50 $30 0.15 0.6 $15 0.075 0.675
$400 150 $90 0.225 0.4 $45 0.1125 0.5125
Double Donations Without Deductibility With Deductibility
Income Donations Tax Average Consumption as Tax Average Consumption as 
tax rate a share of income tax rate a share of income
$50 $10 $0 0 0.8 $0 0 0.8
$100 $30 $0 0 0.7 $0 0 0.7
$200 $100 $30 0.15 0.35 $0 0 0.5
$400 $300 $90 0.225 0.025 $0 0 0.25
Income Elastic1 Without Deductibility With Deductibility
Income Donations Tax Average Consumption as Tax Average Consumption as 
tax rate a share of income tax rate a share of income
$50 $5 $0 0 0.9 $0 0 0.9
$100 $20 $0 0 0.8 $0 0 0.8
$200 $80 $30 0.15 0.45 $6 0.03 0.57
$400 $360 $90 0.225 -0.125 $0 0 0.1
Income Inelastic2 Without Deductibility With Deductibility
Income Donations Tax Average Consumption as Tax Average Consumption as 
tax rate a share of income tax rate a share of income
$50 $5 $0 0 0.9 $0 0 0.9
$100 $7.5 $0 0 0.925 $0 0 0.925
$200 $11.25 $30 0.15 0.794 $26.62 0.133 0.811
$400 $16.87 $90 0.225 0.733 $84.94 0.212 0.745
Notes:
1 Assuming the income elasticity of donations is 2
2 Assuming the income elasticity of donations is 0.5
of four different taxpayers (rows) arranged in order of income. The next three columns report 
taxes owed and the two measures of progressivity when charitable donations are not deductible 
from gross income. This tax is clearly progressive under either method when donations are not 
deductible. The last three columns replicate these calculations when donations are deductible. 
Despite the lower price of giving for itemizers, the tax system remains progressive, with increas-
ing average tax rates and decreasing consumption shares.
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The next three tables vary the amount of donations at each income level to show that the 
progressivity conclusion is somewhat robust. The second table doubles the amount of dona-
tions at each income level to see whether tax deductions are regressive for the most generous. 
They are not. Without deductibility, we confirm that the linear income tax is progressive. With 
deductibility, our four taxpayers pay zero in taxes, so the average tax rate is constant (neither 
progressive nor regressive). However, consumption as a share of income does decline dramati-
cally with income, so the system remains progressive by this measure. The last two tables vary 
donations so that the income elasticity of donations is elastic and equal to 2, then inelastic with 
elasticity equal to ½. In the elastic case under deductibility, the average tax rate is stable at zero, 
then jumps to a small positive number, then returns to zero, indicating that it is possible that 
the deduction makes the tax regressive over some income ranges using the traditional measure 
of progressivity. However, even here, the system remains progressive in terms of consumption.8 
Finally, when giving is income inelastic, deductibility has a much smaller effect on progressivity 
by both measures, and the system is approximately equally progressive with and without deduct-
ibility of donations.
The treasury efficiency test is wrong
Early writers such as Vickrey (1962) worried whether the amount of giving stimulated by a tax 
deduction or credit was large enough to justify the foregone taxes. Subsequent work located 
these concerns in the “tax expenditure” framework, where government can collect taxes to 
directly subsidize charity or offer indirect subsidies in the form of tax breaks that encourage 
increased donations. In this framework, the indirect route is superior (“treasury efficient”) if 
the added donations exceed the loss in tax collections, which happens whenever tax credits or 
deductions for charitable donations are employed and the (absolute value of the) price elasticity 
of giving exceeds unity (e.g., Clotfelter 1985).9 As a result, hundreds of empirical studies focus 
on obtaining valid estimates of the price elasticity of giving, almost all of which report tests of 
whether the elasticity is greater than one. Recent surveys of this literature continue to report 
this as the proper test of treasury efficiency (e.g., Bakija 2013; Monnet and Panizza 2017). But 
this is not the proper way to test for treasury efficiency.
Feldstein (1980) was the first to recognize that the traditional test ignored interactions 
between direct government spending and charitable donations. Simply put, government spend-
ing changes the volume of charitable donations for similar goods and services – “crowding out” 
(when donations fall in response to government spending) or “crowding in” (when government 
spending increases donations) (e.g., Steinberg 1987; Andreoni 1989; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002). 
However, Feldstein made some technical errors, and so the proper test for treasury efficiency 
was devised by Roberts (1987). He found that the critical price elasticity for treasury efficiency 
is less than unity when there is crowding out and greater than unity when there is crowding in.
Why is this true? Taxes create economic distortions, so government policy should look for 
the cheapest route to financing a given expenditure on collective goods. Equivalently, govern-
ment should maximize “bang for the buck.” Collective-good expenditure comes from both 
government spending and charitable donations, and charitable donations are provided even 
when the government offers no tax subsidies. Suppose first that government spending crowds 
out charitable donations dollar-for-dollar (100% crowdout). Then direct government subsidies 
accomplish nothing – each time government grants increase donations fall by the same amount 
and total spending on the collective good does not change.10 Indirect subsidies accomplish 
something provided the price elasticity of donations is not zero, and something is better than 
nothing. Hence, any elasticity greater than 0 suffices to show that tax breaks are more treasury 
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efficient than direct government spending. The traditional rule, with a critical elasticity of unity 
is only correct when there is zero crowdout.
Empirical studies provide a complex picture of the extent of crowdout. De Wit and Bek-
kers’s (2017) meta-analysis found that about 2/3 of the studies found crowding out and 1/3 
found crowding in. The form of government direct support seemed to matter, as direct govern-
ment production of collective goods has a larger effect than government grants to nonprofits. 
Crowdout estimates produced from experimental data were many times larger than those pro-
duced from natural data. This is consistent with the results of Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), whose 
theory showed that the size of the donor group matters, and with Ottoni-Wilhelm, Vesterlund, 
and Xie (2017), who found that crowdout decreases with output. Finally, the studies use differ-
ent techniques to deal with econometric problems such as endogeneity bias, and De Wit and 
Bekkers found that this also affects estimates.
So, are deductions or credits treasury efficient by the proper test? The question is poorly 
posed, because there is not a single price elasticity of giving for all kinds of giving and for giving 
to all kinds of causes (e.g., Brooks 2007; Backus 2010; Hossain and Lamb 2012; Zampelli and 
Yen 2017), nor is there a single level of crowding out. Unless governments are willing and able 
to differentiate credits across these many factors accordingly, the concept of treasury efficiency 
is far more limited than previously thought.
Treasury efficiency is not social efficiency
Treasury efficiency was conceived as a simple and operational test to compare direct and indirect 
support for nonprofit organizations, but it measures social efficiency only under some very spe-
cial circumstances. Other times, it can be massively misleading, because it supports a deduction 
or credit in cases where three threshold questions have not been answered: Should the nonprofit 
be subsidized? Should the subsidy apply to private donations? Should we subsidize organizations 
or activities? Finally, treasury efficiency does not suffice to determine the best subsidy rate. For 
all these reasons, we need a full-fledged measure of social efficiency for tax system design.
When used by an economist, efficiency has a precise mathematical definition that is more 
stringent than use of the word in common discourse would suggest. Efficiency is based on the 
outcomes throughout the entire economy which consists of all available resources, all the ways 
resources can be transformed into goods, all the individuals present, and all the ways of divid-
ing each good among consumers. Economy A Pareto-dominates economy B if no individual in 
that economy prefers B and at least one individual prefers A. Economy A is efficient (synonyms: 
Pareto-optimal, socially efficient) if it is feasible (can be produced from available resources) and all 
economies that Pareto-dominate A are not feasible. Equivalently, an economy is socially effi-
cient if the only way to make any consumer better off in her own estimation requires that at 
least one other consumer be made worse off.
In common discourse, efficiency means that resources are not wasted in production of goods 
or services. Social efficiency has additional requirements: that the right mixture of goods be 
produced and that each consumer’s bundle of goods match that consumer’s preferences. When 
the economy is inefficient, there is a feasible way to help people without hurting anyone else, 
and most agree that society should do so. But there are many socially efficient economies that 
cannot be mutually compared by the Pareto standard because one person prefers socially effi-
cient economy A and another prefers socially efficient economy B. In effect, the various socially 
efficient economies differ in the distribution of income, so a theory of distributive justice is 
needed to determine the best efficient economy. Mathematically, efficiency and equity are 
combined in the form of a social welfare function, which provides a complete and transitive rank 
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order over economies so that you can identify the social optimum (the best economy). Theories 
of distributive justice enter the function in the form of distributional weights for comparing 
monetary equivalent gains of one consumer with losses of another. There are substantial disa-
greements over how egalitarian social welfare functions should be, but any view can be accom-
modated by this tool.
The sources of social inefficiency in economic equilibrium are called market failures. In the 
next subsections, I first detail two market failures relating to gifts and donations and discuss how 
these inefficiencies can be fixed by proper tax design. Both these problems relate to the fact that 
transfers of income are collectively consumed as benefits to the giver, other givers, and ultimate 
recipients. A pure collective good11 has two properties – nonrivalry (each unit of production can 
be enjoyed multiple consumers) and nonexcludability (once the good is made, it is not feasible 
to keep anyone from consuming it). Next, I turn to the treatment of charitable donations in 
the literature on socially optimal income taxes, which also incorporates other market failures 
affected by the tax treatment of donations. Finally, I return briefly to the threshold questions 
from a social welfare framework.
A remediable market failure due to donor motivations
Arrow (1972) noted a peculiarity about gift-giving and charitable donations – the act of giving 
is valuable to the donor independently of the consequences of that gift. This idea was developed 
further, most notably by Andreoni (1990) in his impure altruism model. Altruistic motives value 
the consequences of the gift, warm glow values the act of giving, and a donor with a mixture of 
both motivations is an impure altruist. Pure altruists want to others to be helped, but donations 
are inadequate because of the free-rider problem – one potential donor can enjoy the level of col-
lective goods supported by other donors without personally contributing, and in any case the 
personal benefit of giving (enjoying a small increase in collective good provision) is far less that 
the benefits to the group (simultaneously enjoying that small increase).12 Warm glow reduces 
free-riding because non-donors must forgo the special personal benefit associated with person-
ally giving. Kaplow (1995) found that there is a new kind of market failure due to warm-glow 
preferences.13 The failure is best illustrated with an example. Suppose Fred is considering a $10 
gift for Wanda. If he makes the gift, he receives warm glow because he feels better about himself 
for being so generous or because his prospects with the ladies have improved as he gets a reputa-
tion for being generous. If Fred’s warm glow is equivalent to $15 (that is, he would have to toss 
a coin to decide whether to accept $15 additional income for not making the gift in place of 
the $10 gift expenditure), then he makes the gift. The money-equivalent net benefit to Fred is 
$5, the value of his warm glow minus the monetary cost of the gift. For simplicity, assume that 
Wanda’s value of receiving the gift is $10.14 Both parties benefit from the exchange, no one else 
is harmed, and the outcome is socially efficient.
But suppose instead that Fred only receives $7.50 in warm glow from giving the gift. 
Then he does not give Wanda the gift, but mutual gains would be possible if he did, so this 
outcome is inefficient. Government could fix this inefficiency by giving Fred a $3.00 subsidy. 
Now, the sum of warm glow and subsidy exceeds the cost, Fred makes the gift and receives 
net benefits of $0.50, and Wanda gets $10. The sum of gains to Fred and Wanda exceeds the 
cost to the taxpayers who pay for the subsidy, so it is possible to redistribute gains so that Fred, 
Wanda, and the taxpayers are all better off. The subsidy is socially efficient if the sum of the 
net benefits exceeds the so-called dead-weight loss, the money-equivalent value of unintended 
harmful side-effects due to financing the subsidy.15 This provides a rationale for subsidizing 
charitable donations through the tax system, but Fred’s gift was to a single person and not to 
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some charitable cause. Kaplow’s (1995) argument would justify a tax deduction for any kind 
of gift motivated by warm glow.
A remediable market failure in voluntary donations for  
a pure collective good
Donative nonprofits, and even some commercial nonprofits, focus on providing pure collective 
goods.16 Helping people in need of income and services is a collective good for the community 
that cares about these people, so when one donor gives, other donors benefit. Educational 
institutions, ideally, help voters make better decisions, and the quality of government is collec-
tively consumed. Religious institutions produce social capital, also collective. We have already 
commented on the free-rider problem, leading to underprovision of collective goods, but now 
we will take a different look at it.
Collective goods are a specific form of a broader market failure due to externalities. An exter-
nality is a side effect of a market transaction on those who were not parties to the transaction, 
such as pollution inhaled by my neighbors when I buy fossil-fuel electric power. Specifically, 
donations produce reciprocal external benefits (meaning if any member of the group donates, 
every member of the group benefits). Externality theory was developed by Arthur Cecil Pigou 
in 1920, and his proposed solutions are known as Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in his honor. 
Because donations produce external benefits, they should receive Pigouvian subsidies, and if the 
marginal subsidy rate (amount of additional subsidy provided to the last dollar donated) is set 
equal to the marginal external benefits (the sum across external beneficiaries of benefits result-
ing from the last dollar donated), the optimal quantity of donations will be provided.
It is unknown but extremely unlikely that the charitable deduction in the United States pro-
vides optimal Pigouvian subsidies, as the marginal subsidy rate is zero for non-itemizers and equal 
to various marginal tax rates for itemizers. This could be approximately optimal if non-itemizers 
supported charities without marginal external benefits and the highest-income taxpayers sup-
ported causes with the largest marginal external benefits, a dubious supposition. But a Pigouvian 
subsidy set too low still helps, moving the economy towards social efficiency. Unfortunately, if the 
subsidy rate is set sufficiently above the optimum, efficiency will be lower than it would be when 
unsubsidized. My own opinion is that the current system, crude as it is, is helpful from a Pigou-
vian standpoint but could be more helpful if there were an above-the-line charitable contributions 
deduction or if the deductions were replaced by tax credits set at the appropriate rate.17
The optimal income tax treatment of donations
Optimal tax structures maximize the social welfare produced within a class of tax structures, 
such as the optimal linear or nonlinear income tax or the optimal set of commodity taxes. 
Results depend on parameterized social weights embodying a particular notion of distributive 
justice and, without consensus on that, cannot be made operational. Nonetheless, the literature 
provides some guidance for policy makers concerned with tax design.
Saez (2004) considers a government that wants to maximize social welfare by choosing an 
amount to spend on public provision of a single collective good, an amount of money that 
accomplishes redistribution in the form of a uniform cash transfer to all households, and a 
subsidy rate for private donations in a linear tax on labor income that balances the budget. His 
formulation incorporates a warm-glow term reflecting Kaplow’s (1995) concern, a Pigouvian-
subsidy term reflecting externalities, and a crowdout term reflecting Roberts’s (1987) modeling 
of revenue interactions. He separately analyzes two polar cases (logical extremes spanning realistic 
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cases), where the government-produced good is unrelated to the nonprofit good and where the 
two are identical.
In the first polar case, government produces a good that is unrelated to the good financed 
by donations. Then the crowdout term drops out (unrelated goods do not crowd each other in 
or out). The optimal subsidy rate increases with a) the magnitude of external benefits from the 
nonprofit good, b) the tax-price elasticity of giving, and c) the size of average weighted warm-
glow benefits. All else equal, when donations are sufficiently price inelastic, the optimal subsidy 
rate is negative – donations are taxed, not subsidized. This is because price inelastic goods can 
be taxed without substantially reducing the quantity of warm glow, with the tax revenues used 
to reduce the dead-weight loss resulting from distortions in the labor market. Social weights 
also matter. If the weights are sufficiently egalitarian (supportive of redistribution from rich to 
poor) and average weighted warm-glow benefits are high, then the optimal subsidy depends on 
whether the rich give disproportionately more than others. The optimal subsidy is smaller if the 
rich give disproportionately more and larger otherwise.
In the second polar case, the government provides exactly the same good as the nonprofits. 
Now the Pigouvian term drops out because government adjusts its direct spending to ensure 
that the sum of donations and government spending provides the optimal quantity of the collec-
tive good. Saez (2004) assumes that the price elasticity of giving is not constant but gets smaller 
(in absolute value) as the price decreases.18 To find the optimum subsidy rate, you increase 
the rate (decrease the price of giving) until the price elasticity reaches a critical value equal 
to( )1 1− ∗marginal crowdout ( − wtd.average marginal warm glow benefit)  
Both parenthetic quantities are less than 1 (unless there is crowding-in), so their product is 
less than 1.
If we reformulate the proper and common tests for treasury efficiency when the price elastic-
ity is a variable, then subsidy rates should be increased until the elasticity declines to equal 1 (by 
the common test for treasury efficiency) or (1 – marginal crowdout) (by the correct test). Thus, 
the suggested subsidy is largest in optimal tax theory, smaller by treasury efficiency, and smallest 
by the traditional misapplication of treasury efficiency. The three measures are the same only 
when marginal crowdout and marginal warm glow are zero.
Subsequent work has generalized the model in various ways. Diamond (2006) makes some 
different assumptions and considers the optimal nonlinear income tax. He makes a serious argu-
ment that although warm glow affects behavior,19 it should not be included in social welfare 
determination of the optimum. He then characterizes optimal taxes with and without warm 
glow in the social welfare function. Blumkin and Sadka (2007) consider a different form of 
warm glow stemming from status competition. At least in some settings, donors are motivated 
to give the largest donations because that comes with the highest level of status (Harbaugh 
1998). Unlike the other reasons for warm glow, status is a zero-sum game. One individual’s gain 
in status produces negative externalities in the form of lower status of others. Harbaugh focuses 
on how nonprofits can manipulate the status competition by creating elite categories of givers 
(e.g., “golden, silver, and bronze donors”) that increase total giving, but Blumkin and Sadka 
take a different approach. Following the optimal tax literature tradition, government adjusts 
spending to maintain the optimal level of the collective good, so the positive externalities of giv-
ing vanish, the negative remain, and the proper Pigouvian solution is to tax donations. In con-
trast, preliminary work by Hungerman (2020) builds on Saez (2004) to analyze large gifts. He 
adds a measure of skewness in the distribution of gifts and finds that large subsidies are optimal 
even when giving is fairly price inelastic. Almunia et al. (2020) note that many donors do not 
claim their eligible donations on tax returns because the transaction costs exceed the tax ben-




Should nonprofits be subsidized by government in any fashion? From an efficiency standpoint, 
this depends on whether there are any market failures that could be addressed with subsidies. 
We have talked about two such market failures – the under-provision of collective goods and 
the under-provision of warm-glow-motivated gifts.20 Still, the picture is more complicated 
than just that. Government provides many non-tax subsidies that can make up for free-rider-
induced shortages21 and also directly produces collective goods. If non-tax subsidies and/or 
government direct provision suffice to provide the optimal quantity of collective goods, then 
tax subsidies for giving would cause over-provision.22 The free-rider problem is reduced by 
warm glow and could be further reduced if nonprofits employed the provision-point mecha-
nism or the raffle mechanism.23 No free-rider problems affect sales of goods and services that 
do not create externalities, so the problem does not clearly apply to commercial charities 
(those that derive the bulk of their revenues from sales of goods and services, such as private 
nonprofit hospitals and universities). There may be other externalities associated with com-
mercial nonprofits (such as effects of education on crime rates and democratic function) that 
call for Pigouvian adjustments to tax rates, but in other cases (advocacy), the positive and 
negative externalities may cancel out. In sum, there is an efficiency case for subsidizing some 
nonprofits and not others, and it is unclear whether uniform subsidies are, on balance, more 
helpful than harmful.
When subsidies should be given to nonprofit organizations, should they be in the form 
of favorable tax treatment for donations; favorable treatment under sales, property, corporate 
income, and other entity taxes; and/or favorable contracts, grants, and other non-tax benefits? 
Surprisingly little is known about this question. The optimal tax literature has not included 
mixtures of optimal personal and entity tax structures, typically selecting the optimum within 
a restricted class of tax instruments. Clotfelter (1988) took an early look at the harmful side 
effects of property, income, and sales tax exemptions but provided no empirical estimates to 
compare with the dead-weight losses stemming from adjustments to tax rates that hold tax 
revenues constant in the face of income tax deductions and credits. Steinberg and Bilodeau 
(1999) provide a debater’s guide to the advantages and disadvantages of sales and property tax 
exemption, and scattered papers have been published since then, but none provide a compre-
hensive view.
The scant literature on the second question helps to answer the final threshold question – 
should we subsidize organizations or activities? Income tax breaks encourage donations, which 
is the right choice for solving the problem of under-provision of warm-glow but is only a 
means to an end for solving the under-provision of collective goods and perhaps not the best 
means to that end. An alternative is a tax break based on organizational expenditures on col-
lective goods such as the Historic Preservation Tax Credit, a 20% tax credit for the rehabilita-
tion of certified historic structures.24 Tax breaks like this more clearly ensure that revenues are 
spent on collective goods provision.25 The same is true for entity taxation. Exemption from 
a sales tax on purchases and/or sales directly subsidizes nonprofit commercial activity, only 
incidentally benefiting nonprofit provision of collective goods. Exemption from a property tax 
directly subsidizes nonprofit land use, and exemption from a corporate income tax (depending 
on details of the tax) directly subsidizes nonprofit use of capital. Instead, corporate taxes can be 
used to subsidize organizations, for-profit or nonprofit, for their expenditures on remedying 
market failures. This analysis only scratches the surface, and I mention it to raise more ques-
tions deserving attention.
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Social optimality is overrated
When a student is sent to the factory that turns him into an economist, he is exposed to social 
efficiency from day one and develops a natural bias that efficiency is the most important way to 
evaluate public policies. A few enlightened students move on to the distribution center, where 
they learn about distributional weights and social welfare functions and emerge thinking that 
social optimality is the most important thing. Rarely does the student move on to the human 
resources division of the firm, as Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen did, where he learns the fuzzier 
but truly important notion of human flourishing (Nussbaum 2011).
At the political scientist factory, distribution, just or otherwise, is where it’s at. Every mean-
ingful piece of legislation creates winners and losers, and legislation is passed when the winners 
are more numerous or more organized than the losers. Re-election sometimes depends on 
nothing more than that, but at other times, rewarding supporters and punishing oppositional 
members is seen as corrupt or unfair to the detriment of re-election. At the organizational 
theory factory, particularly in the sociology wing, graduates are trained to pay attention to 
the legitimacy and perceived legitimacy of institutions, organizations, and their decisions. The 
sociology and political science clubs may even focus on issues of power, fairness, and rights and 
may even conceive of a social contract granting and limiting personal rights in return for gov-
ernment’s monopoly of legitimate coercive power.
What of the benevolent social planner, concerned with doing what’s right for society? I am 
increasingly of the opinion that the other political science and organizational theory factories 
come closer to “doing what’s right” than the economics factory does. I do not think that an 
efficient or socially optimal tax system makes as much difference to human flourishing as a fair 
tax system created by a political system widely regarded as legitimate. While the economic 
consequences of tax reform are quite significant in some cases, minor tweaks for optimality 
are hard to understand and are unlikely to be very salient in the minds of most citizens. The 
perceived unfairness and power maldistribution seen in the tax treatment of the very rich may 
be far more salient and important for human flourishing than efficiency. This is a reason to end 
the plutocratic bias resulting from the charitable tax deduction even if this form of subsidy is 
progressive and socially optimal.
What’s useful: a catalog of tax designs
Literatures from different fields and disciplines focus on different dimensions of tax design. 
I think that an interdisciplinary catalog might prove useful to inform tax lawyers what econo-
mists are considering, to inform economists what tax lawyers are considering, and to help both 
understand the complexity of comprehensive tax reform. I  consider four dimensions of tax 
policy: what kinds of entities are eligible to receive tax-favored donations with what restric-
tions on entity behavior, what kinds of donations are favored by the tax system, what kinds of 
restrictions are placed on taxpayers as a condition of eligibility to benefit from the tax-favored 
treatment, and what type of tax benefit is best.
Eligible entities
The common choice around the world restricts tax benefits to donations made to nonprofit 
entities. Gifts made to beggars on the street, to family members, and to unincorporated and 
informal community organizations are not eligible for support, but it is worth questioning 
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whether they should be. Now is a good time to consider the question, because there are two 
relatively new kinds of entities that perhaps should become eligible: donor-advised funds 
(which may be administered in a nonprofit community foundation or a nonprofit subsidiary 
of a for-profit investment company) and new hybrid corporate forms that combine features 
of nonprofit organizations with features of for-profits. In the United States, donations to 
donor-advised funds are generally tax deductible, but as donors retain large elements of con-
trol over how the funds are distributed,26 perhaps they should not be. Perhaps donors should 
not be allowed to deduct their contributions to a donor-advised fund but should be allowed 
to deduct their contributions from a donor-advised fund because that is when all control is 
relinquished.
A variety of hybrid forms have been created by recent legislation around the world. In 
the United States, we are experimenting with low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs), 
B-corporations, and flexible purpose corporations. In the United Kingdom, there are com-
munity interest companies, and similar forms are popping up in other countries. These entities 
all distribute profits but with governance structures and restrictions designed to limit distribu-
tion and devote the rest of the profits to social purposes. There are also organizations that use 
a traditional corporate structure but call themselves social enterprises and try to devote some 
of their profits to providing collective goods (like reducing pollution). Currently, donations to 
hybrid organizations are not deductible and are not tax favored in any other way. Considering 
the threshold question regarding subsidizing donations or activities, this should be reconsidered.
U.S. nonprofits must restrict several kinds of activities to qualify for exemption from the 
Federal Corporate Income Tax. The federal nondistribution-of-profits tests differ in minor 
ways from those embodied in the various state corporation statutes,27 as does the list of eligible 
nonprofit purposes.28 Additional restrictions are placed on organizations seeking tax-favored 
donations. Political activities and advocacy are restricted,29 and organizations that provide com-
mercial-type insurance as a substantial part of activities,30 as well as terrorist organizations,31 are 
denied exemption and deductibility. Nonprofit hospitals must meet additional requirements.32
Some writers talk about tax deduction as a privilege, not a right, and emphasize that in 
return for receiving this privilege, nonprofits must give up some control over activities and 
expenditures. I do not agree with denying advocacy on this ground (as denial of deductibility 
amounts to taxing the exercise of free-speech rights), but the policy question is a reasonable 
one – how far can the state go in restricting political speech, fundraising practices, support of 
controversial causes, executive compensation, or other practices because the organization has 
accepted deductible donations?
Policy makers have discussed limiting favorable tax treatment to various nonprofit subsec-
tors. Political parties are already excluded, but sometimes there are proposals to restrict favorable 
tax treatment to nonprofits concerned with the poor and needy and exclude organizations like 
those in the arts and education that do not primarily benefit these groups. At the state level, 
there are many tax credits and deductions for gifts to named charities and to nonprofits in a 
particular field. Indiana, for example, provides state personal income tax filers with a 50% credit 
for contributions to public and private colleges and universities in the state, capped at $400 
(Indiana Department of Revenue 2020). All faculty are urged to donate and take this credit, and 
the university facilitates qualifying gifts that can be earmarked for the faculty donor’s research 
and travel allowance, making a mockery of the restriction on donor control.
Although the matter is understudied, there is some evidence that special subsidies for char-
itable subsectors do not increase total giving. A  laboratory experiment by Chatterjee et  al. 
(2020) finds that targeted tax credits do not increase total giving; rather, they reallocate giving 
from ineligible to eligible organizations. An analysis of 46 tax credits in 23 states by Duquette 
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et al. (2018) finds that estimated price elasticities do not statistically differ from zero, and the 
resulting confidence intervals rule out large effects.
Eligible gifts
In the United States and many other countries that favor donations, gifts of cash, appreciated 
assets, and in-kind goods and services made to eligible nonprofits receive favorable treatments. 
There are variations and controversies. For appreciated assets, should the appreciated value or 
original cost be favored? If the former, should any adjustments be made when the capital gains 
tax rate is different from the labor income tax rate? Should the appreciation portion of the asset 
gift be exempt from the capital gains tax when the asset is given directly but not when the asset 
is sold and the proceeds donated (the current practice in the United States)? How should in-
kind gifts be valued, particularly when the good is no longer traded in markets (when outdated 
models are donated) or when trading markets are thin (for example, when donating a painting 
to a museum)?
But it is also worthwhile to consider extending favorable treatment to gifts of blood and 
body organs, although I will not open that can of worms here. How about gifts of time? Some 
writers support explicit subsidization of volunteer hours, not recognizing that there are already 
implicit subsidies. To a first approximation, the donor’s hourly opportunity cost of volunteer-
ing is the after-tax hourly wage rate, so the tax-price of volunteering is already reduced by one 
minus the marginal tax rate for both itemizers and nonitemizers. The relative price of money to 
time gifts is unaffected by taxes for itemizers (one minus the marginal tax rate cancels out) but 
is distorted in favor of time gifts for nonitemizers. This distortion would end if an above-the-
line charitable deduction were made permanent or the deduction were replaced by a tax credit.
Many donors donate by subscription, that is, through some system of regular automatic 
contributions (monthly, annually) for some period. Subscription giving is more valuable to 
recipient organizations, as it is more predictable and stable. Should subscription gifts be encour-
aged through more generous tax benefits? Others commit their future and posthumous giving 
through various kinds of trusts such as a split-interest trust, a charitable remainder trust, or a 
charitable lead trust. Should the tax treatment of charitable bequests be integrated with that for 
lifetime giving? Finally, some people make a current gift to create a private foundation. How 
should taxes regard these intertemporal donations?
Eligible donors
To benefit from a charitable deduction, one needs taxable income and a positive marginal tax 
rate. Low-income high-wealth taxpayers, if they make sufficiently large deductible gifts, would 
have negative taxable income. Under current law, the marginal tax-price of giving would be $1 
for these taxpayers, but it is possible to design a non-standard refundability provision (a negative 
tax obligation implies the government pays you) that would incentivize giving. The situation 
is slightly different with a tax credit, which is subtracted from taxes owed instead of from the 
income that is taxed. A constant credit rate could be used (e.g., subtract 50% of donations from 
taxes owed), and the tax-price of giving would be ($1 – the credit rate) or 50 cents when the 
credit rate is 0.5. If the credit is nonrefundable, then the total credit is capped at taxable income, 
so the tax-price of giving rises to $1 for especially generous taxpayers. If the credit is refund-
able, the negative tax liability stemming from especially generous taxpayers turns into a payment 
from the government to the taxpayer, and then the tax-price of giving remains constant across 
all ranges of generosity.
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Taxes can be designed with a variety of other donor-level restrictions, and some have been 
used. In the United States, a taxpayer can deduct a maximum of 60% of adjusted gross income 
in any year, limiting favorable tax treatment of giving for the most generous in a way that seems 
hard to justify. However, the excess over 60% can be carried over and deducted over the next 
five years, limiting the impact of the restriction to the time value of money.
The tax code includes an alternative minimum tax (AMT) payable instead of the regular 
income tax when the taxpayer has excessively reduced tax liability through aggressive use of 
all deductions and credits. The intent of the AMT is that very high-income taxpayers should 
not escape taxation entirely, but the devil is in the details, and the details change from time to 
time. Taxpayers subject to the AMT lose the right to take certain tax deductions, but under the 
current tax code, they retain the right to use the charitable tax deduction. Should that change, 
we would have an additional restriction on access to tax-price reductions. Finally, the United 
States has instituted partial phase-outs for specific itemized-deductions (including the charitable 
deduction) taken by high-income taxpayers.33
How should the favorable treatment of donations be structured?
The main question here is whether there should be a tax deduction or a tax credit for charitable 
donations, with several variations related to floors and ceilings and one related to the choice 
between seemingly equivalent tax rebates or tax matches (see also Adena 2021). But there 
are other forms of support, such as the checkoff system that is increasingly popular in state 
income taxes. Taxpayers who have over-withheld income for taxes can check a box on their 
state income-tax form authorizing the state to donate part of their refund to specified chari-
ties (Huffpost 2011). Some states allow the taxpayer to increase their tax liability to fund their 
donations through the checkoff (Tower and Angell 2007). The checkoff system does not affect 
the tax-price of giving; it merely saves the donor the transaction costs of donating, which may 
encourage modest increases in giving and/or shift giving from ineligible to eligible charities. 
There may still be transaction costs due to documentation requirements, which have been 
found to be a problem with credits and deductions (e.g., Almunia et al. 2020).
Whether government matches donations dollar for dollar or provides a 50% tax credit or 
a tax deduction with a 50% marginal tax rate, the results are the same – a dollar of forgone 
after-tax income provides the recipient with two dollars.34 The deduction and credit return 
money to the donor and so are called “rebates” in the literature, as opposed to matching, which 
adds to donations at the recipient end. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1990 and the resulting 
Gift Aid program, the United Kingdom allows donors to claim a combination of matches and 
rebates, and Almunia et al. (2020) estimate a combined price elasticity for the two. However, 
Eckel and Grossman conducted a series of experiments35 and concluded that when a tax break 
is described as government match for charitable donations, donations are higher than when the 
tax break is described as a tax rebate proportional to the size of the gift even though the purely 
economic incentives are identical in the two frames. Subsequent papers address a long list of 
methodological challenges, including those posed by two field experiments. Karlan and List 
(2007) experimented with matching and did not have a corresponding rebate frame, finding 
very low price-elasticities with respect to the match rate. Huck and Rasul (2011) also looked at 
only the matching frame and concluded that the seal of approval implicit in the choice to set up 
a matching fund may have been more important than the price established by the matching rate. 
Eckel and Grossman (2017) addressed both papers, finding that many subjects in these studies 
may not have paid attention to the matching scheme (described in a direct mail solicitation that 
subjects may have only glanced at). In the Eckel and Grossman (2017) experiment, subjects had 
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to check a box indicating that they wanted their donation to be matched (some subjects donated 
without checking the box). They used both frames, with wordings that equalized the seal of 
implicit approval, and replicated their earlier findings. Overall, the evidence seems convincing, 
suggesting that current framing in the United States (which suggests a tax refund or rebate) is 
less effective than matching.
Does the difference between rebate and match elasticities reflect a framing effect (where the 
way something is described and not the substance of that thing affects behavior), or does it rep-
resent the structure of preferences with broader implications? Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm 
(forthcoming) suggest the latter, detailing a theory of impure-impact giving in which donors 
enjoy warm glow from giving in a rebate condition but not a matching condition. Equivalent-
price rebates and matches have the same impact on charitable revenues, and the warm glow and 
impact elements of utility interact to result in different price elasticities. They provide estimates 
from a natural experiment at a university in Indiana that the match-price elasticity is –1.2 
and the rebate-price elasticity is –0.2 and, in the process, reject the simpler pure-impact, pure 
warm-glow, and impure altruism models nested in impure-impact preferences.
I have previously described the plutocratic bias inherent in progressive income taxes with a 
charitable tax deduction – the tax-price of giving declines as income rises. This is why advo-
cates support replacement of the deduction with a tax credit, a reform that was adopted by 
Canada in 1988.36 Refundable tax credits offer tax advantages to every donor. However, transi-
tioning to tax credits is tricky, because it is not possible to simultaneously hold tax collection and 
resulting total donations constant (Lindsey 1988). Reforms can be budget neutral or donation 
neutral but not both.
Even if the replacement is donation neutral, the pattern of giving to different nonprofit 
subsectors will change, because, say, a uniform tax credit of 12% produces a tax-price of giving 
of $0.88 for everyone. This is an increase in price for most itemizers and a decrease in price for 
non-itemizers. The two groups support different kinds of charities, different kinds of chari-
ties may have different price elasticities, and the price elasticity of aggregate donations may 
differ between itemizers and nonitemizers. I am unaware of any studies that incorporate all 
these effects, but Cordes (2011) applied percentage changes to data on donations by subsector 
and income class from the Philanthropy Panel Study. He found that replacing deductions by 
a 12% nonrefundable tax credit would reduce aggregate donations by 8.7%.37 Gifts to religion 
and basic needs would fall by less (7% and 8.1%), and gifts to arts and culture, education, 
health, and combined purposes fall by more than aggregate donations (14.2%, 13.8%, 9.9%, 
and 9.4%).
Tax credits have an additional advantage of policy independence. Any tax reform targeted at 
reducing marginal tax rates (the main goal of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986) has the unin-
tended side effect of reducing charitable donations under a deduction system but not under a 
credit system. This simplifies the task of addressing non-charity distortions caused by income 
taxes.
Deductions and credits may apply only to the portion of donations exceeding a specified 
dollar amount (such as $500) or share of taxable income (such as 2% of adjusted gross income). 
These are called floors. Alternatively, tax relief may apply up to some specified maximum 
amount (a ceiling). Floors can also have multiple parts (such as a tax credit of 10% for the 
excess of donations over $200 and a credit of 20% for the excess of donations over $10,000), 
and income-based phase outs can be thought of as multi-part ceilings. The key economic effect 
of floors and ceilings is that the marginal tax-price and the average tax-price are not constant.
Suppose we have a taxpayer who would donate $2,000 absent tax incentives to give and 
$3,000 if offered a 50% tax credit. The tax credit reduces tax payments by $1,500 but only 
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encourages $1,000 in added donations and is not very efficient – taxes on other taxpayers must 
increase by $1.50 for each dollar donated by the first taxpayer to balance the budget. Now cal-
culate the same numbers when there is a floor of $2,000. To a first approximation, that taxpayer 
would still donate $3,000, but the tax credit costs the government only $500, reducing the 
effect on other taxpayers to $0.50 per dollar donated.38 Intuitively, the government gets more 
bang for its tax expenditure buck by restricting subsidies to the margin rather than subsidizing 
the part that needs no subsidy. In practice, government does not know what would have been 
given anyway, but provided that the floor is below what most people would otherwise give, 
floors increase efficiency in a static model.
Should the floor be a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of income amount? When floors 
are provided for tax deductions, the percentage floor would better address concerns over plu-
tocratic bias. Another consideration is accommodating differences between taxpayers in gen-
erosity. To maximize efficiency, taxpayer-specific floors would be set, but as a practical and 
political matter, taxpayer-specific floors cannot be used. Because income is correlated with 
giving, I think that a percentage floor will come closer to this theoretical ideal and do a better 
job restricting the subsidy to its marginal effect on giving. Finally, the behavioral economics of 
floors have not been extensively studied, but to the extent that the floor sends a social signal on 
what each donor is expected to give, a reasonable dollar-amount floor (one that most taxpay-
ers could afford to reach) might decrease the norm of giving by higher-income taxpayers and, 
in a worst case, major donors would shift to giving the dollar floor amount, and less generous 
donors, who do not reach the floor, would stop giving altogether.
Floors look like a good idea in a static model, but in practice, we must consider dynamics. 
Would less generous taxpayers stop giving annually and bunch their gifts in particular years to 
reach the threshold and obtain tax relief? There is already considerable evidence of bunching 
by high-income donors, whether because they participate in intermittent capital campaigns or 
they wish to achieve prestige and naming rights with their gifts (Auten and Rudney (1990), but 
the added bunching created by floors has not been estimated.
In contrast, ceilings (a maximum amount that can be deducted or credited) make little eco-
nomic sense. True, ceilings limit the government’s exposure to collecting less tax money than 
needed in a worst-case scenario, but a capped subsidy is a waste of subsidy dollars because it 
mostly rewards taxpayers for gifts that they would have made without the subsidy and provides 
no incentive to increase donations above the capped level.
Duquette (2020) proposes a two-tiered charitable contribution tax credit for U.S. taxpayers 
like that adopted by Canada in 1988. Under his proposal, the first dollars donated (up to 2% of 
adjusted gross income) receive a 10% tax credit, and giving in excess of that threshold receives 
a 37% credit. Like a floor, the increasing marginal credit-rate increases bang for the buck; like a 
single-tier tax credit, everyone receives the same subsidy regardless of income. Generosity, rather 
than higher income, is rewarded by larger subsidies to giving. He simulates the effect of his 
proposal and various alternatives using tax data, imputing giving by non-itemizers by matching 
taxpayers with those surveyed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and simulates the effect 
on total giving and foregone tax collections for his proposal compared with various alternatives. 
Results confirm that expected total donations increase (from $290 billion under the 2018 post-
reform tax law to $349 billion if the itemized deduction is replaced by his two-tiered tax credit), 
while foregone tax revenues increase only slightly (from $74 to $77 billion). Results are even 
stronger when he compares the post-CARES Act law (with its non-itemizer deduction for gifts 
of up to $300). Then giving would increase from $304 to $349 billion, while tax expenditures 
would fall from $91 to $77 billion.
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Concluding thoughts
There are many options for reforming the tax treatment of charitable donations, and tax design 
is a complicated business. One point made by Feldstein (1976) bears repeating – there is a dif-
ference between tax design (creating a tax system where there was none before) and tax reform 
(changing a tax system in place). There is considerable investment in charitable institutions 
based on the pattern of donations fostered by the current tax system, much of it irreversible. 
Fixing the plutocratic bias will likely result in major reductions in giving to education, the arts, 
and health, and wages and employment in these industries would likely decrease. To address 
this, reforms may need long phase-in periods, and government should consider compensat-
ing the losers through temporary income support and retraining. Current patterns of taxation 
are also capitalized in the value of physical assets held by nonprofits, and this is another cost of 
reform that government should consider helping with.
When we consider the threshold questions, the economic case for the favorable tax treat-
ment of charitable donations is quite uneasy. Nonetheless, on noneconomic grounds, I support 
favorable treatment following some reforms. The argument concerns statements of civic values, 
fairness, and reciprocity. When a donor supports a collective good, she is helping all the free rid-
ers. Society should not cheapen the warm glow experience of donors by making giving costless, 
but it seems just and proper to raise taxes a bit on the free riders and use this to ease the burden 
on donors who sacrifice part of their personal consumption to help others. The tax authorities 
can make a valuable public statement that giving is valued and worthy of support.
Notes
 1 Consumption taxes, like the value-added tax (VAT), tax consumer spending. The VAT is producer 
focused, assessed at each stage of production so that the final consumer pays the tax when purchasing 
goods or services. A taxpayer-focused consumption tax is administered like a personal income tax. Tax-
payers report their income and savings and calculate consumption expenditures as income minus net 
additions to savings. In this form, charitable expenditures can receive favorable tax treatment through 
tax credits or deductions from the consumption base.
 2 The average tax rate is taxes paid divided by income.
 3 The marginal tax rate is the additional amount of tax due if income increases by one unit of currency.
 4 This is the standard deduction for “married filing joint returns or qualifying widow(er)s.” There are 
two other categories for the standard deduction and all tax brackets, but the numbers in the text will 
uniformly refer to married filing jointly. See IRS (2020a).
 5 Twice in the history of the charitable giving tax deduction, nonitemizers could take the standard 
deduction and also subtract all or part of charitable donations from gross income. This is the “above-
the-line” charitable donation deduction, in effect temporarily due to the COVID-19 crisis. Currently, 
non-itemizers can deduct up to $300 of donations to calculate taxable income.
 6 Of course, U.S. taxes are far more complicated. Deductible donations are limited to 60% of adjusted gross 
income in any year. Gifts exceeding this amount receive no current tax-price reduction on the excess, but 
the excess can be carried over to a subsequent year and deducted then. Time donations (volunteering) are 
not deductible, but because volunteer time comes at the expense of after-tax labor income, the tax-price 
of giving an hour of time is the marginal after-tax hourly wage rate regardless of itemization status. Gifts 
of appreciated assets have a lower price of giving because, in addition to the charitable donation deduc-
tion, they are exempt from the capital gains tax applied to the appreciated portion of asset value. There 
are also complex interactions between federal, state, and local personal income taxes that cause geographic 
variation in the tax-price of giving, and other factors have affected the price of giving in some years.
 7 The simplest linear progressive tax applies a constant marginal tax rate to income in excess of some thresh-
old. The illustrated calculation sets the marginal tax rate to 0.3 and the threshold (top of the zero bracket) 
at $100. Letting T denote tax obligations, T = 0.3 × (Y – 100) when donations are not tax deductible, 
where Y is income. When donations are deductible, T = 0.3 × (Y – 100 – D) where D is donations.
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 8 As a result of our simplifications, the fourth taxpayer’s donations plus taxes add up to more than gross 
income, indicating a negative consumption share that would need to be financed out of savings. This 
is an artifact of maintaining a constant income elasticity of 2 even for high levels of income.
 9 The tax-price elasticity of giving is a proportional measure of how sensitive donations are to variations 
in the tax-price of giving. Specifically, it is the percentage change in the level of donations resulting 
from a 1% change in the tax-price of giving. That elasticity is always a negative number (people buy 
less when the price goes up), which leads to awkward textual constructions (if elasticity is –1.2, giving 
is more elastic than if it is –0.6), so I follow convention in reporting the absolute value of elasticity in 
the text.
 10 He does consider the fact that if government spending exceeds charitable giving in the absence of gov-
ernment spending and tax subsidies, donations will fall to zero and can fall no further. Thus, the first 
dollars spent by government add nothing, the last dollars add dollar for dollar, and the average bang for 
the buck is less than one.
 11 Many economists call nonrival and nonexcludable goods “public goods” because of an older tradition 
where government was thought to be the sole producer. But private nonprofits also produce “public 
goods,” so “collective” is a more accurate description.
 12 Technically, the free rider problem is that the competitive Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous dona-
tions game results in under-provision of collective goods. Similar problems arise with sequential dona-
tions and donations games repeated a known number of times.
 13 My exposition of both this and the optimal taxes subsections follows the wonderful exposition in 
Bakija (2013).
 14 Wanda could value the gift above its cost (“it’s the thought that counts”) or below the cost (“and 
I dearly wish you had thought before giving me this monstrosity”).
 15 Technically, the subsidy is potentially Pareto-improving rather than Pareto-improving. This means that the 
gains to the winners exceed the loss to the losers so that it is possible to transfer money from winners 
to losers so that everyone benefits. It is only Pareto-improving if those transfers are made.
 16 Donations themselves are a pure collective good when donor utility includes an altruistic component. 
The altruistic term represents concern with the outcome resulting from total donations, so if one 
donor increases his gift, this causes a nonrival and nonexcludable benefit to all other donors through 
the summation term. The only time donations are not a pure collective good is when all donors are 
motivated exclusively by warm glow.
 17 I am not aware of empirical studies that calculate the size of external effects of giving generally. Also, 
warm glow suggests that the optimal Pigouvian subsidies do not need to be as large as contemplated by 
Pigou himself.
 18 This is a reasonable assumption and would hold, for example, if the demand curve for warm glow was 
a downward-sloping straight line.
 19 There is no consensus that Diamond’s position is correct, and the detailed debate on this matter is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.
 20 There are other market failures such as contract failure (failure to deliver the promised quality or 
quantity of a good when there is a particularly difficult problem of asymmetric information) and over-
exclusion (for excludable collective goods). The ability of nonprofits to address these market failures 
depends on the level of competition, and a subsidy or “cushion” for nonprofits is necessary when there 
is sufficient for-profit or for-profit-in-disguise competition (Steinberg, 2006).
 21 Although many nonprofits need additional government and private support, they already receive it in 
the form of fees for service and goods from government (20.4% of 2005 revenues for reporting public 
charities) and government grants (9.0%). The largest share comes from fees for services and goods from 
private sources (50.0%), with only 12.3% of revenues coming from private donations (Blackwood et al. 
2008). In addition, government directly provides many of the goods also provided by nonprofits.
 22 When governments are modeled as responsive to voters, they do not always behave as social welfare 
maximizers. However, when the median-preference voter is decisive, as in the simplest such model of 
political equilibrium, government spending on the collective good is efficient when voter preferences 
are distributed symmetrically about the median, and any donations on top of political equilibrium 
would result in overprovision. See Steinberg (1987) for additional complications when voters are cog-
nizant of voluntary donations.
 23 In the provision-point mechanism, fundraising occurs in two stages. In the first stage, a goal is set (the 
provision point) and conditional pledges are solicited. In the second stage, donors are asked to honor 
their pledges if total pledges exceed the provision point and keep their money otherwise. Kickstarter 
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employs a variation on this method. Provision-point mechanisms reduce free riding by pure and 
impure altruists, because rather than providing a small increase in total spending, their pledged dona-
tions can make an all-or-nothing difference. In the raffle mechanism, donors buy tickets that give them 
a probability of winning a tangible prize, and the prospect of possibly winning a prize while donating 
increases the incentive to give. Bose and Rabotyagov (2018) summarize empirical confirmations that 
these mechanisms reduce free riding and propose a combination of the two for further gains.
 24 This credit is available to individuals and business entities. At first glance, this seems useless, because a 
tax credit is of no use to an organization that is already tax exempt, but the IRS explains why it would 
be beneficial to a nonprofit involved in a limited partnership for rehabilitation with a taxable entity 
(IRS 2020b).
 25 Contract failure (fn. 19, infra) cannot be handled this way. To subsidize an activity, the activity must 
be observable by the tax authorities. Contract failure concerns activities that are either unobservable 
by the buyer/donor/client or are not third-party verifiable. For such activities, for-profits have the 
incentive and opportunity to deliver less than the promised quality or quantity of a good. Nonprofits 
are less likely to shortchange donors and consumers, but because the IRS, as a third party, cannot 
verify the extent of for-profit contract failure, it cannot verify the portion of nonprofit expenditures 
devoted to fixing this market failure (see, e.g., Steinberg 2006 for a more complete exposition and 
some caveats).
 26 Although donor-advised funds (DAFs) existed before formal recognition in the tax code, they were 
first defined and regulated under Title XII of the Pension Protection Act of 2006. As discussed in a 
report to Congress by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2011: 2), “The Code now defines a DAF 
as a fund or account at a qualified public charity . . . over which a donor or a donor-appointed advisor 
retains advisory privileges regarding the investment and/or distribution of assets in the account; thus 
the name ‘donor-advised fund.’ The sponsoring organization generally heeds the recommendations 
from the donor but is not compelled to do so.” In practice, donor advice is always heeded, so the term 
“advised” seems like a polite fiction.
 27 There are multiple subsections to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c) about exempt 
organizations. The bulk of donations go to 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4), and the operational test for non-
distribution is different across subsections. In 501(c)(3) organizations, the test is “no part of the net 
earnings of which inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”
 28 For 501(c)(3) organizations, “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, . . ., or for the prevention of cruelty to chil-
dren or animals.”
 29 “[N]o substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to 
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”
 30 IRC Section 501(m).
 31 IRC Section 501(p).
 32 These involve community health needs assessment, financial assistance policies, and some restrictions 
on billing. IRC Section 501(r).
 33 During the first year of the Obama administration, the American Taxpayer Relief Act reinstated a 
phase out of tax deductions for individuals (couples) with income exceeding $250,000 ($300,000) that 
had lapsed under legislation passed by the Bush administration (Weisman 2013).
 34 More generally, letting t be the marginal tax rate and m the match rate and c the tax credit rate, if 
t = c = m/(1 + m), the tax deduction, credit, and match all produce the same price of giving.
 35 The first such article is Eckel and Grossman (2003). The latest is Eckel and Grossman (2017), which 
contains references (omitted here) to all their other studies and studies by others.
 36 The Canadian charitable tax credit is complicated. Credit can be taken for up to 75% of net income, 
but for gifts of certified cultural property or ecologically sensitive land, up to 100% of net income can 
be credited, and carryovers are available. Credits are offered at the federal and provincial level, and the 
credit rates vary with the size of the gift and taxable income (for example, in 2016, the federal charita-
ble donation tax credit was 15% of the first $200, and either 29% [for taxable income up to $200,000] 
or 33% [for taxable income over $200,000] of the excess up to gifts of $200,000, then 29% for the 
remainder of gifts over $200,000). Alberta added a provincial tax credit of 10% on the first $200 and 
21% on the remainder of the gift. A special bonus credit was available to first-time credit claimants in 
some years. (Government of Canada 2017).
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 37 These estimates assume a uniform price elasticity of –1. He finds a different pattern when he assumes 
the price elasticity is –0.5.
 38 Using standard microeconomics, floors complicate donor choice. Graphically, imagine a budget line 
between spending after-tax income on personal consumption or donations. When there is no floor, 
the 50% tax credit causes the budget line to rotate outward around the personal consumption intercept, 
reducing the slope to –0.5. With the floor, the budget line consists of two connected line segments. 
Below the floor, the slope of the budget line is –1, but above the floor, it is –0.5. These line segments 
create a nonconvex budget set, with the usual implications. There is a tangency at the kink point, but 
this is on a lower indifference curve than the taxpayer could reach by looking for a tangency on one or 
both line segments. Depending on the exact shape of the taxpayer’s indifference curves, the new equi-
librium could be the amount the taxpayer would give if there were no tax incentives for giving (which 
is lower than donations under a floorless tax credit) or an amount (depending on income effects) 
roughly comparable to the amount given under the floorless tax credit, or both tangencies might tie 
for the optimum. In terms of elasticities, nonlinearity means you have to use virtual price and virtual 
income changes to predict the policy impact of a tax credit. Most tax simulators used to evaluate the 
effect of tax reforms on charitable giving ignore these complications; the sole exception I know of is 
Feldstein and Lindsey (1983).
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Introduction
In November 2020, the OECD released its most important report on taxation and philanthropy, 
and in it, the organisation strongly suggests that countries “conduct studies that evaluate the 
efficiency” of their incentives that subsidise philanthropy. This suggestion takes on even greater 
importance when one considers that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused the worst global eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression and that in order to get through the crisis, all countries 
are currently in debt and the needs are glaring in several public sectors, particularly in health, 
social services and education. These are sectors to which several private charitable foundations 
have dedicated their purpose in the past.
Private foundations hold about $1 trillion worth of assets in North America, and that fig-
ure continues to grow every year. Even as urgent needs go unmet with the COVID-19 crisis, 
private foundations continue to spend only a tiny fraction of their wealth on charities, mostly 
due to the tax laws that permit and encourage this build-up of philanthropic wealth. In Canada, 
founders can take a full tax credit of a maximum of 57% of the value of their donation in the 
year of the creation of the foundation, while at the same time, that foundation can invest that 
money tax free forever and never spend its capital on charity.
Philanthropy is on the rise, and although many of its facets could be discussed further, the 
basic question in this chapter is to assess whether the tax incentives that private charitable foun-
dations and their founders may benefit from in Canada are treasury efficient. In other words, are 
they a good or fair deal for Canadian taxpayers? The Canadian tax regime is studied because it 
is one of the most advantageous tax regimes for private foundations and their founders among 
the G7 countries. This chapter concludes that the tax regime in Canada is not efficient as it 
presently exists, with a disbursement quota of 3.5%, a full tax holiday for the foundation and a 
tax incentive that may reach as high as 57% of the donation for the founder. To become treasury 
efficient within 20 years, it is demonstrated that the disbursement quota should be increased to 
5.5%.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the tax incentives that private chari-
table foundations and their founders may benefit from in Canada are explained. In the second 
section, the theoretical framework for analysing the treasury efficiency of these incentives is 
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analysed. The last section establishes the necessary facts and reasonable assumptions for the eval-
uation and concludes with the calculation of the treasury efficiency of the tax regime regarding 
private foundations in Canada.
1 Tax incentives that private charitable foundations and their 
founders may benefit from in Canada
Tax incentives towards charitable giving have existed in Canada for over 100 years. The policy 
has been significantly modified over time, and the last major review of the tax regime regarding 
private foundations in Canada dates back almost 50 years.
The first tax deductions for charitable donations were introduced to finance the First World 
War through the creation of wartime relief funds. The Income War Tax Act (IWTA) of 1917 
instituted unlimited tax deductions for all donations, primarily to the Canadian Patriotic Fund 
(CPF) as well as to the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) Fund.
With a 1930 amendment to the 1917 IWTA, the federal government defined the first offi-
cial foundations on which charitable activities would operate on Canadian soil. Establishing 
the rules and obligations governing tax deductions for charitable donations, this amendment 
designated the Ministry of Finance as the regulator of the sector (Elson 2010).
Until the First World War, no major foundation had been created in Canada, and it was 
not until the end of the war that the Massey Foundation was created in 1918 (Granatstein and 
Kucharsky 2008). In 1976, as part of a broader tax reform flowing from the Royal Commis-
sion on Taxation (Carter Royal Commission), the obligation for the foundation to allocate 
at least 5% of its assets annually to charitable organisations and activities was introduced in 
the Income Tax Act. These rules were designed to ensure that tax-receipted charitable gifts 
were applied for the benefit of charities and not simply held in investment accounts (Bour-
geois 2010: 184). Today, the law is essentially the same, but the charitable obligation has been 
lowered to 3.5%.
1.1 Tax incentives for the founder
The giving incentive for the founder is designed to support charities that serve the needs of 
the people. The tax treatment of the donation varies whether the donation is being done by an 
individual or a corporation.
Individuals: Until 1988, the incentive was a tax deduction, and the tax credit was introduced 
in Canada in 1988 for individual donors. An individual who has income taxed at the maximum 
marginal rate may benefit from a tax credit of 57% of the donation, taking into consideration 
both federal and provincial taxes. The federal government limits monetary donations to be 
included in the calculation of a tax credit to 75% of the taxpayer’s net income, and any unused 
credit balance can be carried over for a period of five years.
When capital property is donated, there is a disposal at fair market value (FMV) for tax pur-
poses, which may result in a capital gain, and this FMV represents the donation for tax purposes. 
Capital gains can be eliminated by donating certain types of capital property such as certain 
securities listed on a stock exchange in Canada (shares, debt, participation in a mutual fund trust 
or in a segregated fund trust, etc.).
Corporations: Donations to a registered charity made by a corporation are deductible from 
its taxable income, which will result in a reduction of the corporation’s tax liability. In addition, 
there are additional tax incentives when publicly traded securities are donated. As in the case of 
individuals, the federal government limits monetary donations to be included in the calculation 
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of the tax credit to 75% of the corporation’s net income, and any unused credit balance can be 
carried over for a period of five years.
Without underestimating the importance of donations made by corporations, only dona-
tions made by individuals are analysed in this research because they represent by far the largest 
source of charitable donations made in Canada.
1.2 Tax incentives for private foundations
In Canada, organisations dedicated to charitable purposes and that are registered with the Can-
ada Revenue Agency can issue donation receipts and are tax exempt.
A private foundation in Canada is established as a corporation or a trust. It has only charita-
ble purposes and carries on its own charitable activities, and/or it funds other qualified donees. 
More than 50% of the foundation’s directors deal with each other at arm’s length and/or 50% 
or more of the foundation’s funding comes from a person or group of persons that control the 
charity in some way [Income Tax Act, 149.1(1)].
Private foundations must file financial statements with the prescribed information form 
T3010 annually to the Canada Revenue Agency. The top sectors for private foundations in 
Canada are health, education and social services (Philanthropic Foundations Canada 2017).
Private foundations have to spend 3.5% of their capital annually on charitable activities or 
gifts to qualified organisations. There was a time in Canada when the “disbursement quota” 
imposed on charitable foundations was higher than 3.5%. According to Finance Canada’s 2004 
budget,
analysis indicates that the current 4.5% disbursement quota is high relative to long-
term investment returns. Accordingly, the budget proposes to reduce the 4.5% dis-
bursement quota on capital assets to 3.5%. This rate will be reviewed periodically to 
ensure that it continues to be representative of long-term rates of return.
The reduction in the disbursement quota allows Canadian foundations to keep their start-up 
capital and ensure that their foundations last indefinitely.
The annual expenses of the foundation are considered in the calculation of the disbursement 
quota, and generally, the annual expenses of foundations range from 0.75% to 1.5% of their 
assets (Philanthropic Foundations Canada 2015).
Private foundations cannot engage in any commercial activities, and a private foundation 
that owns more than 20% of a class of shares of a corporation’s stock faces a penalty of 5% of the 
FMV of those excess shares, and its registration can be revoked.
Tax incentives for private charitable foundations and their founders, in general: 
In short, in Canada, the regime grants a donation credit to the founder that can reach 57% of 
the donation in the year of the donation, regardless of when the money will be spent by the 
foundation. The foundation benefits from a total tax holiday, and its annual charitable obligation 
is limited to 3.5% of its capital. Compared to G7 countries (see Table 11.1), Canada offers one 
of the most generous tax regimes to private foundations and their founders.
2 How to measure the “treasury efficiency” of the tax incentives that 
private charitable foundations and their founders may benefit from?
There has been a lot of research into the efficiency of the tax incentives in philanthropy, but 
most of it has concentrated on the tax credits or deductions for giving. There has been less 
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research into the efficiency of the global tax regime that may benefit private foundations, 
including the incentives for giving, the tax holiday for the foundation and the design of the 
disbursement quota.
This section analyses how to measure the treasury efficiency of private foundations. Before 
doing so, the treasury efficiency of the tax incentives of giving will be briefly reviewed to see if 
Table 11.1 Tax regime for private foundations and their founders among the G7 countries
Country Maximum tax exemption/tax Foundation: Foundation: annual Foundation: annual 
credit for founder tax holiday on distribution obligation distribution obligation 
income on the income on the capital
Canada Tax credit of 57% maximum, Yes No Yes, 3.5% annually
subject to limitation of 
75% of income
France Income tax reduction for Yes No No
66% of the value of the 
gift (75% for specific 
donations), up to 20% of 
the donor’s taxable income
Germany Tax deduction up to Yes Yes, income has to No
20% of the taxable be distributed 
income, or donations within 2 years
to a foundation can be 
deducted up to an amount 
of up to €1 million for an 
assessment period of up to 
10 years
Italy Donations to ONLUS are No Yes for foundations No
deductible up to 10% of of banking origin: 
income with a maximum at least half of the 
of €70,000. Alternatively, profits of the year 
tax credit of 26% for must be granted 
donations to ONLUS and in the following 
other kinds of charities, up years. Other: 
to the value of € 30,000 Yes, within a 
reasonable period 
of time
Japan The donor claims a tax credit Yes No No
or a deduction up to 40% 
of its income
United The donor claims a Yes Yes, income has to No
Kingdom deduction from taxable be spent within a 
income or capital gains reasonable period 
for the amount of the of time, generally 
donation grossed up by the accepted as 3 years
basic rate of tax (20%)
United Tax deduction up to 60% No, tax on No Yes, 5% annually
States or 30% of adjusted gross investment 
income depending on the income
beneficiary
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it is a good idea to fiscally encourage giving. If it would not be a good idea to begin with, then 
there would be no point in carrying the analysis further.
After, how to measure the treasury efficiency of private foundations’ tax systems as a whole is 
analysed. This requires questioning the necessity of discounting the future value of the charity 
made by the foundation over the years and whether the cost of the tax holiday that benefits the 
foundation should be considered.
2.1 Treasury efficiency of the tax credit/deduction  
on the donation
The treasury efficiency suggests that the revenue losses to the treasury resulting from the tax 
incentives are equalled or exceeded by the value of the funds generated for public purposes 
through the incentives (Simon 1987: 72). In terms of tax incentives for giving, the treasury effi-
ciency means that money raised by the tax exemption/credit exceeds the cost for the treasury 
in foregone revenue.
To reflect on this, it is therefore necessary to analyse the elasticity of giving. The demand 
for a product is considered inelastic with respect to the price if the percentage of change in 
quantity demanded is less than the percentage change in price (the elasticity is less than 1). And 
the demand for a product is said to be elastic with respect to the price if the percentage change 
in quantity demanded is greater than the percentage change in price (the elasticity is greater 
than 1).
In terms of tax policy, if the price elasticity of a tax incentive is greater than 1, it means that 
the taxpayers who claim tax deductions/credit for charitable contributions are likely to increase 
their giving by more than the estimated revenue cost of the subsidy. In such a case, the subsidy 
would be said to be “treasury efficient.” If the elasticity is smaller than 1.0, the extra giving 
prompted by the charitable deduction is less than the revenue cost for the public finances and it 
is said to be “treasury inefficient.”
Several experts have investigated the price elasticity of giving, and unfortunately their esti-
mates vary greatly. In 1985, Charles Clotfelter found that the price elasticity for the population 
of taxpayers was probably greater than –1 (with a range of –0.9 to –1.4). In 1995, William C. 
Randolph used different methodologies and concluded differently, with a much lower price 
elasticity (Randolph 1995: 710). In 2005, John Peloza and Piers Steel concluded, after an analy-
sis of 40 years of research, that tax deductions were treasury efficient (Peloza and Steel 2005: 
269). Peter G. Backus and Nicky L. Grant concluded in 2019 that the top 10% of income 
earners had an elasticity of at least –1 and middle-income earners had a lower price elasticity 
(Backus and Grant 2019: 319).
Thus, after 100 years of using the tax system in different countries to encourage giving, it 
is still unclear if effectively, these tax policies have proved to be efficient or not. What about 
when these donations are given to private charitable foundations, which often withhold them, 
thereby paying no tax ever? Is the global tax regime for private foundations and their founders 
treasury efficient?
2.2 Treasury efficiency of the tax regime for private foundations  
and their founders
Let’s return to the definition of treasury efficiency, which suggests that tax exemption is efficient 
if the revenue losses to the treasury resulting from the exemption are equalled or exceeded by 
the value of the funds generated for public purposes through the exemption (Simon 1987: 72).
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Translated into the foundation context, the tax regime of the foundation is efficient and 
appropriate as long as it ensures that future grants distributed by the foundation exceed the 
deductions/credits given to the donor (Toepler 2004: 736).
Since these grants distributed by the foundation are made most of the time in the future, and 
the foundation does not pay tax in the meantime, two questions need to be answered in order 
to be able to calculate the treasury efficiency of a foundation:
Should a present-day discount of future grants be considered?
Should the cost of that tax holiday, in terms of public revenues lost, be considered?
Should present-day discounts of future grants be considered?
This question has been analysed mainly by American experts. In 1965, the United States Treas-
ury Department and Congress were troubled by the fact that a donor to a foundation takes a tax 
deduction at the time of the donation, but the donated funds might not reach actual operating 
charities until many years later. Congress and the Treasury believed that because of this delay, 
donors were getting a tax benefit worth more than the charitable benefit they produced. In 
other words, they thought there was a mismatch between the value of the tax deduction and 
the value of charity given in the future. In the Treasury report on foundations submitted to 
Congress in February 1965, the United States Treasury Department stated that:
The tax laws grant current deductions for charitable contributions upon the assump-
tion that the funds will benefit the public welfare. This aim can be thwarted when the 
benefits are too long delayed.
In such cases there is usually a significant lag between the time of the contribution, 
with its immediate effect upon tax revenues, and the time when the public benefits by 
having an equivalent amount of funds devoted to charitable activities.
Several elements in these two quotes show that the Treasury Department recognises that a dollar 
given today to charity does not have the same value as a dollar given in the future, including 
the fact that the Department chooses the word “equivalent” and not “equal” to compare the 
value of the tax savings resulting from the donation with the value of the charity created by the 
foundation in the future. This problem was addressed by introducing a 5% charitable obligation 
into tax law, requiring U.S. foundations to spend at least 5% of their capital on charity each year.
In 2002, McKinsey & Company experts Paul J. Jansen, David M. Katz and Bill Bradley also 
recognised the need to consider present-day discounts of future grants. They argued that we 
should view foundation grants as an investor would view an investment. In other words, just as 
investors would choose to receive a dollar today rather than a dollar a year from now, a dollar of 
charity given today is worth more than a dollar of charity given in the future.
The McKinsey team refer to what is being done in the business world when an investment 
is considered. To decide if the business should invest in a project or not, the present value of its 
future returns is calculated by discounting those returns at a certain rate to reflect the time value 
of money, and the project is considered only if those returns have a present value that exceeds 
its initial cost.
Thus, for the McKinsey team, the business concept of “discounting” should be applied by 
foundations to evaluate what is best between investing in a social project today or investing the 
money for future projects. However, as Jansen and Katz explain, “Applying this methodology to 
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non-profits is admittedly complicated, since their return on investment accrues to society rather 
than to the donor and comes in the form of hard-to-quantify social benefits” (2002).
In 2003, Professor Michael Klausner brought an important clarification to the reflection 
to the effect that donations today are not necessarily worth more than donations tomorrow 
simply because of the time value of money. He said, “there are good reasons for foundations 
to favour high payout rates under certain circumstances, and there may be reasons for the law 
to mandate minimum payout rates, but the time value of money is not one of them” (Klausner 
2003: 54).
Professor Klausner supports his theory by explaining that in reality, delayed spending by 
the foundation does not cost anything, since future charity benefits from compound growth, 
and therefore, “receiving 34 cents today and receiving $241 in 48 years are equivalent.” Thus, 
assuming that the foundation’s assets are invested as profitably as the government’s money would 
have been, Klausner supports the conclusion that the delay does not reduce the present value 
of the government’s subsidy via the deduction/credit allowed on the donation in the first place 
(Klausner 2003: 53).
From that perspective, when we compare a grant to charity today with one made in 48 years’ 
time, we are in fact comparing the benefit of helping one group of people today with the 
benefit of helping another group in 48 years. By invoking the discounted cash flow approach, 
Professor Klausner explains that it is similar to adopting what economists refer to as a “pure time 
preference” in allocating resources over generations. If future grants are discounted to present 
value, Klausner explains that it is the same thing as saying that “future people’s lives are less 
important simply because [they] live at different times.” (Klausner 2003: 54).
Even if Professor Klausner brought this important nuance in relation to the value of money 
over time, he does not reject the idea that it is necessary to analyse “how cost-effective a grant 
to current charity would be, compared to future charity.” Doing otherwise would cheat future 
generations as much as it would cheat present-day taxpayers (Klausner 2003: 57).
In 2009, David A. Weisbach and Cass R. Sunstein also recognised that we can value future 
and present lives equally and still want to consider the government’s opportunity cost. By apply-
ing a market discount rate, in effect, we are asking, “Which project would produce more wealth 
for the future: funding this project or investing the money?” If the project would pay less than 
an investment would, how does it serve the future to fund the project? (Weisbach and Sunstein 
2009: 449).
In 2016, Professor Brian Galle reiterated in his article “Pay It Forward? Law and the Prob-
lem of Restricted-Spending Philanthropy” that, “present value is and must be a key part of 
serious policy analysis.” He explained that to justify government support for restricted spend-
ing, foundation savings should have to beat two benchmarks. First, the utility payoff to future 
spending – net of all the costs and benefits that delay might bring – should exceed the govern-
ment’s investment opportunity: when the government gives foundations a dollar, the utility of 
future spending should equal or exceed the utility we could get from a dollar of present spend-
ing. Second, the net payoff should exceed any returns that the foundation could achieve by 
spending now on projects whose useful life is expected to be just as “perpetual” as the founda-
tion itself (Galle 2016: 1159).
In conclusion, the topic of how time and value interact in philanthropy is important and, 
somewhat surprisingly, “remains under-explored and under-analysed over time”.1 Despite Pro-
fessor Klausner’s inevitable finding that delayed spending by the foundation does not cost any-
thing, since future charity benefits from compound growth, and therefore, “receiving 34 cents 
today and receiving $241 in 48  years are equivalent,” a comparative analysis is nevertheless 
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necessary in order to evaluate “how cost-effective a grant to current charity would be, com-
pared to future charity” (Klausner 2003: 54). In other words, as Professor Galle explains,
it is important to consider whether the future payoffs that a restricted-spending foun-
dation can deliver are better than the alternatives of unrestricted spending, or of elimi-
nating the government’s subsidy and investing that money for some other kind of 
future spending instead.
(2016: 1159)
Should the cost of that tax holiday for the foundation, in terms  
of public revenues lost, be considered?
Investment income is normally taxable income, and therefore, its exemption from tax should be 
considered a subsidy, even if earned by a charity (Hansmann 1981: 54).
The tax regime of private charitable foundations, which allows the donor to take their tax 
deduction/credit at the time of donation, while the foundation spends this money on charity 
several years later, allows foundations not to be taxed on investment income, whereas if the 
founder had owned the property himself, he would have been taxed on said investment income 
(Halperin 2011: 307).
As for the capital gain that accumulates while the investment is held by the foundation, 
its effect on public finances depends on the type of asset donated. For example, in the case 
of shares of public companies, the fact that the foundation is non-taxable does not in itself 
represent an additional cost, because it is a capital gain exempt from tax for the donor at the 
time of donation. The impact on public finances is therefore already considered with the cal-
culation of the loss of tax revenue at the time of the donation. For other assets, those that do 
not benefit from special tax treatment allowing exemption from tax at the time of donation, 
the capital gain exemption from income tax also represents an additional subsidy offered to 
the foundation.
In addition to these revenue losses for the public finances, the tax exemption granted to 
private charitable foundations can “create an unfair competitive advantage for philanthropic 
entities over for-profit businesses” (OECD Taxation and Philanthropy 2020).
Conclusion
To evaluate the treasury efficiency of the Canadian tax regime related to private foundations, it 
is therefore necessary to compare the revenue losses to the treasury resulting from the different 
incentives given to the founder (via the donation tax credit) and the foundation (via the tax 
holiday), with the present value the charity the foundation will be doing over the years.2 If the 
present value of the charity exceeds the revenue losses to the treasury, it generally means the 
regime represents a good deal for taxpayers.
However, if tax incentives related to private foundations and their founders are found to 
be treasury inefficient, it could still be a good initiative that benefits society. For example, the 
increased diversity that results from the fact that private foundations can provide services for 
which there is not enough demand to interest the state or the fact that private foundations, like 
other charities, allow taxpayers to use charitable donations and the tax benefits that flow from 
them as a means to vote on how public funds should be allocated (Levmore 1998: 411).
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3 Are the tax incentives that private charitable foundations and their 
founders can benefit from in Canada treasury efficient?
There are no official statistics relating to private charitable foundations and their founders in 
Canada. To evaluate the treasury efficiency of the tax regime related to private foundations in 
Canada, it is therefore necessary to make assumptions about the charity that private foundations 
really provide, the tax credits received by their founders on their donation and the value of the 
tax holiday for the foundation. To do this, official statistics on all donations in Canada and stud-
ies on private foundations published by non-governmental organisations will be studied. The 
structure of the tax system also allows reasonable assumptions to be made.
3.1 Facts and assumptions
Charity made by private foundations: Canada had 5,738 private foundations with assets 
totalling $56.3 billion in 2018. Their total wealth has increased by almost 200% since 2010, 
from $19.4 billion in 2010 to $56.3 in 2018.
The Income Tax Act requires private foundations to disburse at least 3.5% of their total assets 
to charity annually. In June 2020, The Charity Report analysed the expenditures and charitable 
donations made by the 245 richest private foundations in Canada. According to this study, the 
combined assets of the top 245 private foundations in 2018 amounted to $42 billion and they 
spent 3.34% of their assets on average, on expenditures and donations (The Charity Report 
2020).
The assets and the charity (including the expenses related to charity) of the top 10 private 
foundations in Canada, excluding the MasterCard Foundation, is presented in Table 11.2. This 
calculation reflects the results from 2019, excluding the MasterCard Foundation, because it is a 
private corporate foundation subject to a different tax system from private foundations founded 
by individuals, and this chapter focuses on the latter. Table 11.2 shows that on average, these 10 
foundations together spent on charity, in proportion to their assets, an average of 3.84% in 2019, 
3.69% in 2018 and 3.32% in 2017.
These findings are consistent with the study of Sansing and Yetman (2006), which concluded 
that private foundations respect the required disbursement quota to maintain their tax-exempt 
status, and when they exceed it, it is an immaterial amount above the minimum required (San-
sing and Yetman 2006: 379).
Thus, to analyse the treasury efficiency, the disbursement quota of 3.5% required by the 
Canadian Income Tax Act will be used.
Donation tax credit: According to the Canadian tax system, donations that exceed $200 
attract a tax credit of 29%, and if the individual has income in excess of $214,368 (in 2020) 
and is therefore subject to the maximum tax rate of 33%, he can benefit from a tax credit for 
donations calculated at the same rate of 33% on the excess of his donations over the threshold 
of $ 214,368. Since 5,738 private foundations held $56.3  billion in 2018, or an average of 
$9.8 million per foundation, founders of private foundations most probably benefit from the 
tax credit for donations that exceed $200 and receive savings that vary between 29% and 33% 
at the federal level. Table 11.3, which presents official 2017 statistics on the federal donation tax 
credits, demonstrates that on average, Canadians received a tax credit equal to 29.3% of their 




The provinces also offer a tax credit on donations. The system is similar to that at the federal 
level, and the total tax credit on donations exceeding $200, including federal and the provinces, 
varies between 40% in Ontario and 57% in Quebec.
Value of the tax holiday for the foundation: The value of the tax holiday depends on 
the income earned by the foundation and the tax rate of the founder, because if these assets were 
not owned by the foundation, they would be owned and taxed at the founder’s level.
Income earned by the foundation on its investment: The compounded annual gain in 
the S&P 500 between 1965 and 2019 was 10% (Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2019). Even consider-
ing the COVID-19 crisis, the 2021 evaluation of the firm Vanguard is remarkably similar to last 
year’s, and the outlook for global equities is 5%–7% over the next decade (Vanguard Economic 
and Market Outlook for 2021: Approaching the Dawn: 35). The rates on return earned by the 
Table 11.2  Top 10 private (non-corporate) foundations in Canada – ratio charity/total assets (charity list-
ing; Canada Revenue Agency)
Foundation Year  Total assets Total Charity Adm. expenses Charity/assets
Fondation Lucie and 2019 2,075,222,000  86,012,000  76,189,000  9,823,000 3.67%
André Chagnon  2018 1,955,782,000  55,891,000  46,863,000  9,028,000 2.40%
2017 2,013,966,000  55,207,000  45,214,000  9,993,000 2.25%
Li Ka Shing 2019 1,039,417,449  41,817,569  39,280,789  2,536,780 3.78%
(Canada) 2018  867,319,784  35,861,713  34,282,695  1,579,018 3.95%
Foundation  2017  992,599,987  38,039,589  36,333,183  1,706,406 3.66%
The J W McConnell 2019  677,445,932  31,259,226  25,706,712  5,552,514 3.79%
Family 2018  628,873,297  30,686,639  26,021,051  4,665,588 4.14%
Foundation   2017  657,933,877  29,956,008  25,376,709  4,579,299 3.86%
La Fondation 2019  623,428,000  24,484,753  21,590,193  2,894,560 3.46%
Marcelle-Jean 2018  588,185,746  24,517,331  21,559,702  2,957,629 3.67%
Coutu  2017  583,182,186  26,234,976  23,488,495  2,746,481 4.03%
The Rossy 2019  728,975,044  24,200,293  23,729,335  470,958 3.26%
Foundation   2018  537,487,120  24,925,255  24,587,899  337,356 4.57%
2017  834,902,674  24,100,260  23,792,295  307,965 2.85%
The Schulich 2019  369,588,285  16,362,594  15,041,288  1,321,306 4.07%
Foundation   2018  367,377,905  14,246,024  13,075,690  1,170,334 3.56%
2017  403,086,459  13,901,815  12,541,020  1,360,795 3.11%
Audain Foundation   2019  331,863,419  5,119,178  4,585,414  533,764 1.38%
2018  310,161,125  7,533,075  7,205,511  327,564 2.32%
2017  229,294,091  8,571,226  8,313,797  257,429 3.63%
The W. Garfield 2019  323,552,703  36,562,977  33,386,865  3,176,112 10.32%
Weston 2018  296,149,220  32,375,883  29,356,340  3,019,543 9.91%
Foundation  2017  326,068,236  28,581,360  25,504,267  3,077,093 7.82%
Fondation Mirella & 2019  370,237,537  10,770,080  9,894,202  875,878 2.67%
Lino Saputo   2018  276,932,787  10,033,340  9,464,128  569,212 3.42%
2017  262,413,537  7,930,029  7,347,132  582,897 2.80%
The Molson 2019  250,703,952  11,276,713  11,266,614  10,099 4.49%
Foundation   2018  266,728,803  12,749,308  12,738,662  10,646 4.78%
2017  308,187,446  11,635,435  11,625,062  10,373 3.77%
  Ratio charity/total assets 2019 3.84%
  Ratio charity/total assets 2018 3.69%
      Ratio charity/total assets 2017 3.32%
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top three richest private foundations in Canada during the years 2017–2018–2019 were 6% for 
the Fondation Lucie et André Chagnon, 3% for the Li Ka Shing (Canada) foundation and 7% 
for the Fondation Marcelle-Jean Coutu (Charity Listing, CRA). Thus, for the purposes of this 
analysis, a rate of return of 5% will be used, because it seems to be the most conservative rate, 
considering these different facts and expectations.
Tax rate of the founder: As explained previously, since private charitable foundations in 
Canada hold, on average, assets totalling $9.8 million, it makes sense to conclude that it is the 
wealthiest people who have the resources to set up such a structure, as well as to assume that 
these foundations are generally founded by individuals in the top 1% of earners in Canada. This 
represents a group of 283,015 individuals earning more than $244,800 per year in 2018 (Statis-
tics Canada, High Income Filers in Canada 2020).
Furthermore, Table 11.3 indicates that in 2017, 37% of total tax credits benefited taxpayers with an 
income exceeding $250,000. While this is not a direct correlation with the founders of private chari-
table foundations, these statistics confirm that donations in Canada come largely from the top 1%.
In Canada, as in many jurisdictions, investment incomes are taxed differently depending on 
the nature of the income. Table 11.4 presents the tax rates on interest incomes, dividends and 
capital gains for the top 1% of earners in Ontario and Quebec, the most popular provinces for 
private foundations. It is not possible with the available data to calculate the exact tax rates, but 
for the purpose of this chapter, an average tax rate of 40% seems conservative and probable and 
will be used in the present analysis.
3.2 Treasury efficiency evaluation
As presented in Section 2, the analysis of treasury efficiency requires a comparison to be made 
of the present-day value of the charity that the foundation provides over time and the present 
Table 11.3 Donation tax credit in Canada – Statistics 2017




–  Number of taxpayers   5,529,010    199,000
–  In thousands of CND$ $10,491,945 $3,487,992
Tax credits
–  In thousands of CND$ $3,076,860 $1,135,395 (37%)
Table 11.4 Tax rates for capital gains, dividends and interest incomes
For taxpayers in higher tax brackets established in Ontario and Quebec
Income of > $244,800
Interest Dividends Capital gains
Quebec 53,53% 40,11% 26,65%
Ontario 53,31% 39,34% 26,76%
Brigitte Alepin
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value of the tax holiday from which it benefits, as well as the tax credit enjoyed by the founder 
at the time of the creation of the foundation.
To bring money back to today’s value, the right discount rate needs to be determined. To 
think about the right rate, it is necessary to place yourself in the position of the Canadian gov-
ernment, since it is the one that has to take the final decision to grant the funds.
As in many countries, Canada must borrow presently to face the crisis, and the situation will 
stay the same in years to come. Total Canadian government borrowing was $1.421 trillion as of 
October 31, 2020, and an additional $323 billion in borrowing is expected through 2024. The 
needs are dire for health, education and social services, and if Canada gives tax incentives to the 
founders and their private foundations, who for the most part also have goals related to health, 
education and social services but who withhold these sums from a long-term perspective, the 
country faces a shortfall that it needs now and urgently. So, the current decision to invest in 
private charitable foundations results in more borrowing for Canada, and the cost of postpon-
ing health, education and social services into the future through private charitable foundations 
corresponds to the cost of its debt.
The average effective interest rate on the government’s interest-bearing debt in 2019 was 
2.3%, up from 2.2% in 2018, and the average effective interest rate in 2020 remained at 2.3% 
(Government of Canada-Public Accounts of Canada 2020). Although it is not certain what will 
happen to interest rates within the next few months and years, an interest rate of 2.3% seems to 
reflect the current tendency. Annexes 1–2–3 present an analysis of the treasury efficiency of the 
tax incentives that private charitable foundations and their founders may benefit from in Canada 
on a donation of $100 million, considering the different facts and assumptions presented previ-
ously and a discount rate of 2.3%.
Annexes 1 and 2 evaluate the treasury analysis of the tax regime over a period of 38 years 
and 53 years, respectively. Annex 1 demonstrates that it takes 38 years for the foundation to give 
back to society sufficient charity to balance the tax incentives the foundation and its founder 
receive at a rate of 44%. Annex 2 demonstrates that it takes 53 years for the foundation to give 
back to society sufficient charity to balance the tax incentives the foundation and its founder 
receive at a rate of 57%.
Annex 3 demonstrates that the disbursement quota would need to be increased to 5.5% if we 
want to reach treasury efficiency within a period of 20 years.
Conclusion
This chapter does not question the relevance and charitable nature of foundations or donors. 
Several qualified people have already spoken on this issue. For example, in 2006, Pope Benedict 
XVI clarified in his book Deus caritas est, or God Is Love, that charity is essential and that there 
is no substitute for charity, not even the state.
As private charitable foundations have become an important social pillar, it is important 
to ensure that tax regimes are an effective tool to put private foundations truly at the ser-
vice of the state and its citizens. As demonstrated in this chapter, the current tax system in 
Canada is not treasury efficient, unless it is considered that 38 to 53 years is a reasonable 
time to balance the coffers of the state, which is obviously not the case, especially in times 
of crisis.
The last major tax reform of the Canadian tax system related to private foundations dates 
back almost 50 years, and the time may have come to rethink the subject in depth.
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Notes
 1 This concluding statement is presented in the report On Time, Value, & Philanthropy that followed the 
informal discussion that took place at the Atlantic Philanthropies on 10 May 2016. Available at: https://
cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files/March%2010%20Time-Value%20Meeting%20Recap%20
5-13-16.pdf
 2 Other considerations can be factored into the efficiency evaluation. The economies of scale that the 
state benefits from are a good example because, generally, private foundations cannot count on these 
reduced costs, and, to be exact, these costs should be accounted in the efficiency analysis (Parachin 
2013: 39).
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Year Cost of tax 
credit for the 
public finances 
(44%)
Cost of tax 
credit for the 
public finances 
(57%)
Cost of the 
tax holiday 






less the cost 











   44,000,000  57,000,000        44,412,781  
 1      2,000,000  3,500,000  1,500,000  1,466,276  101,000,000
 2      2,020,000  3,535,000  1,515,000  1,447,643  102,010,000
 3      2,040,200  3,570,350  1,530,150  1,429,246  103,030,100
 4      2,060,602  3,606,054  1,545,452  1,411,084  104,060,401
 5      2,081,208  3,642,114  1,560,906  1,393,152  105,101,005
 6      2,102,020  3,678,535  1,576,515  1,375,448  106,152,015
 7      2,123,040  3,715,321  1,592,280  1,357,970  107,213,535
 8      2,144,271  3,752,474  1,608,203  1,340,713  108,285,671
 9      2,165,713  3,789,998  1,624,285  1,323,676  109,368,527
 10      2,187,371  3,827,898  1,640,528  1,306,855  110,462,213
 11      2,209,244  3,866,177  1,656,933  1,290,247  111,566,835
 12      2,231,337  3,904,839  1,673,503  1,273,851  112,682,503
 13      2,253,650  3,943,888  1,690,238  1,257,664  113,809,328
 14      2,276,187  3,983,326  1,707,140  1,241,682  114,947,421
 15      2,298,948  4,023,160  1,724,211  1,225,903  116,096,896
 16      2,321,938  4,063,391  1,741,453  1,210,324  117,257,864
 17      2,345,157  4,104,025  1,758,868  1,194,944  118,430,443
 18      2,368,609  4,145,066  1,776,457  1,179,759  119,614,748
 19      2,392,295  4,186,516  1,794,221  1,164,767  120,810,895
 20      2,416,218  4,228,381  1,812,163  1,149,965  122,019,004
 21      2,440,380  4,270,665  1,830,285  1,135,352  123,239,194
 22      2,464,784  4,313,372  1,848,588  1,120,924  124,471,586
 23      2,489,432  4,356,506  1,867,074  1,106,680  125,716,302
 24      2,514,326  4,400,071  1,885,745  1,092,616  126,973,465
ANNEX 11.1 – TREASURY 
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credit for the 
public finances 
(44%)
Cost of tax 
credit for the 
public finances 
(57%)
Cost of the 
tax holiday 






less the cost 











 25      2,539,469  4,444,071  1,904,602  1,078,732  128,243,200
 26      2,564,864  4,488,512  1,923,648  1,065,023  129,525,631
 27      2,590,513  4,533,397  1,942,884  1,051,489  130,820,888
 28      2,616,418  4,578,731  1,962,313  1,038,127  132,129,097
 29      2,642,582  4,624,518  1,981,936  1,024,935  133,450,388
 30      2,669,008  4,670,764  2,001,756  1,011,910  134,784,892
 31      2,695,698  4,717,471  2,021,773  999,051  136,132,740
 32      2,722,655  4,764,646  2,041,991  986,356  137,494,068
 33      2,749,881  4,812,292  2,062,411  973,821  138,869,009
 34      2,777,380  4,860,415  2,083,035  961,446  140,257,699
 35      2,805,154  4,909,019  2,103,865  949,229  141,660,276
 36      2,833,206  4,958,110  2,124,904  937,166  143,076,878
 37      2,861,538  5,007,691  2,146,153  925,257  144,507,647
 38      2,890,153  5,057,768  2,167,615  913,499  145,952,724
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credit for the 
public finances 
(44%)
Cost of tax 
credit for the 
public finances 
(57%)
Cost of the 
tax holiday 






less the cost 











   44,000,000  57,000,000       56,801,545  
 1      2,000,000  3,500,000  1,500,000  1,466,276  101,000,000
 2      2,020,000  3,535,000  1,515,000  1,447,643  102,010,000
 3      2,040,200  3,570,350  1,530,150  1,429,246  103,030,100
 4      2,060,602  3,606,054  1,545,452  1,411,084  104,060,401
 5      2,081,208  3,642,114  1,560,906  1,393,152  105,101,005
 6      2,102,020  3,678,535  1,576,515  1,375,448  106,152,015
 7      2,123,040  3,715,321  1,592,280  1,357,970  107,213,535
 8      2,144,271  3,752,474  1,608,203  1,340,713  108,285,671
 9      2,165,713  3,789,998  1,624,285  1,323,676  109,368,527
 10      2,187,371  3,827,898  1,640,528  1,306,855  110,462,213
 11      2,209,244  3,866,177  1,656,933  1,290,247  111,566,835
 12      2,231,337  3,904,839  1,673,503  1,273,851  112,682,503
 13      2,253,650  3,943,888  1,690,238  1,257,664  113,809,328
 14      2,276,187  3,983,326  1,707,140  1,241,682  114,947,421
 15      2,298,948  4,023,160  1,724,211  1,225,903  116,096,896
 16      2,321,938  4,063,391  1,741,453  1,210,324  117,257,864
 17      2,345,157  4,104,025  1,758,868  1,194,944  118,430,443
 18      2,368,609  4,145,066  1,776,457  1,179,759  119,614,748
 19      2,392,295  4,186,516  1,794,221  1,164,767  120,810,895
 20      2,416,218  4,228,381  1,812,163  1,149,965  122,019,004
 21      2,440,380  4,270,665  1,830,285  1,135,352  123,239,194
 22      2,464,784  4,313,372  1,848,588  1,120,924  124,471,586
 23      2,489,432  4,356,506  1,867,074  1,106,680  125,716,302
 24      2,514,326  4,400,071  1,885,745  1,092,616  126,973,465
ANNEX 11.2 – TREASURY 
EFFICIENCY – ANALYSIS  
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 25      2,539,469  4,444,071  1,904,602  1,078,732  128,243,200
 26      2,564,864  4,488,512  1,923,648  1,065,023  129,525,631
 27      2,590,513  4,533,397  1,942,884  1,051,489  130,820,888
 28      2,616,418  4,578,731  1,962,313  1,038,127  132,129,097
 29      2,642,582  4,624,518  1,981,936  1,024,935  133,450,388
 30      2,669,008  4,670,764  2,001,756  1,011,910  134,784,892
 31      2,695,698  4,717,471  2,021,773  999,051  136,132,740
 32      2,722,655  4,764,646  2,041,991  986,356  137,494,068
 33      2,749,881  4,812,292  2,062,411  973,821  138,869,009
 34      2,777,380  4,860,415  2,083,035  961,446  140,257,699
 35      2,805,154  4,909,019  2,103,865  949,229  141,660,276
 36      2,833,206  4,958,110  2,124,904  937,166  143,076,878
 37      2,861,538  5,007,691  2,146,153  925,257  144,507,647
 38      2,890,153  5,057,768  2,167,615  913,499  145,952,724
 39      2,919,054  5,108,345  2,189,291  901,890  147,412,251
 40      2,948,245  5,159,429  2,211,184  890,429  148,886,373
 41      2,977,727  5,211,023  2,233,296  879,114  150,375,237
 42      3,007,505  5,263,133  2,255,629  867,943  151,878,989
 43      3,037,580  5,315,765  2,278,185  856,913  153,397,779
 44      3,067,956  5,368,922  2,300,967  846,024  154,931,757
 45      3,098,635  5,422,612  2,323,976  835,273  156,481,075
 46      3,129,621  5,476,838  2,347,216  824,658  158,045,885
 47      3,160,918  5,531,606  2,370,688  814,179  159,626,344
 48      3,192,527  5,586,922  2,394,395  803,832  161,222,608
 49      3,224,452  5,642,791  2,418,339  793,617  162,834,834
 50      3,256,697  5,699,219  2,442,523  783,532  164,463,182
 51      3,289,264  5,756,211  2,466,948  773,575  166,107,814
 52      3,322,156  5,813,773  2,491,617  763,745  167,768,892
 53      3,355,378  5,871,911  2,516,533  754,040  169,446,581
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   44,000,000  57,000,000        51,012,127  
 1      2,000,000  5,500,000  3,500,000  3,421,310  99,000,000
 2      1,980,000  5,445,000  3,465,000  3,310,945  98,010,000
 3      1,960,200  5,390,550  3,430,350  3,204,140  97,029,900
 4      1,940,598  5,336,645  3,396,047  3,100,781  96,059,601
 5      1,921,192  5,283,278  3,362,086  3,000,756  95,099,005
 6      1,901,980  5,230,445  3,328,465  2,903,957  94,148,015
 7      1,882,960  5,178,141  3,295,181  2,810,281  93,206,535
 8      1,864,131  5,126,359  3,262,229  2,719,627  92,274,469
 9      1,845,489  5,075,096  3,229,606  2,631,897  91,351,725
 10      1,827,034  5,024,345  3,197,310  2,546,997  90,438,208
 11      1,808,764  4,974,101  3,165,337  2,464,836  89,533,825
 12      1,790,677  4,924,360  3,133,684  2,385,325  88,638,487
 13      1,772,770  4,875,117  3,102,347  2,308,379  87,752,102
 14      1,755,042  4,826,366  3,071,324  2,233,915  86,874,581
 15      1,737,492  4,778,102  3,040,610  2,161,854  86,005,835
 16      1,720,117  4,730,321  3,010,204  2,092,116  85,145,777
 17      1,702,916  4,683,018  2,980,102  2,024,629  84,294,319
 18      1,685,886  4,636,188  2,950,301  1,959,318  83,451,376
 19      1,669,028  4,589,826  2,920,798  1,896,114  82,616,862
 20      1,652,337  4,543,927  2,891,590  1,834,949  81,790,694
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The tax system in many countries is designed to encourage private donations to charities. In 
some countries, including Germany, donations can be deducted from gross income and there-
fore reduce individual tax liability. However, this imposes a cost on governments in the form of 
foregone tax revenue. For example, in 2001 in Germany, taxpayers declared a total of €3.7 bil-
lion of donations, of which €2.9 billion was recognized as deductible, thus reducing the tax 
revenue by approximately €0.9 billion.1 Thus, policy makers have a vital interest in assessing the 
effectiveness of allowing deductions to increase donations. The tax-price elasticity of donations 
is crucial for making this assessment and for evaluating potential policy changes. However, its 
value is unknown and has to be estimated. While there are numerous studies estimating tax-
price elasticity of giving for the United States, the evidence for other countries is rather sparse.2 
However, one should not believe that the estimates for the United States are also valid for other 
countries. Specifically, Germany differs much from the United States when it comes to the 
role of the government and the tradition of charitable giving. Total public social expenditures 
in Germany in 2001 amounted to 27.4% of GDP. By contrast, they were 14.7% of GDP in 
the United States.3 National giving levels are 1.67% of GDP in the United States, and they are 
0.22% of GDP in Germany. Moreover, there are also strong regional differences in Germany. 
While in the former East Germany, the giving levels are 0.12% of GDP, they are 0.26% of GDP 
in West Germany.4
The United States and Germany also differ in the charitable goals that are primarily sup-
ported. While in 2010, 35% of U.S. donations went to support religious goals, 14% to edu-
cational goals, and 9% to support human services,5 the numbers for Germany were: 33% for 
emergency relief, 24% for child welfare, and 24% for foreign aid.6 Around two-thirds of private 
donations in Germany are paid in the form of membership fees for nonprofit associations and 
organizations.7 Membership fees are usually of a fixed, prespecified value and are often auto-
matically debited from members’ bank accounts.8 This could imply that German donors will be 
less responsive to small changes in price or that adjustments in contributions may occur after a 
time lag.
Given that donations have not been studied extensively in Germany,9 this chapter contrib-
utes to closing this gap in a number of ways and fully exploits the advantages of the longitudinal 
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character of the data set. First, it accounts for omitted variable bias coming from individual 
unobserved characteristics (like education, wealth or degree of altruism) that are potentially 
correlated with income and marginal tax and are known to be important determinants of 
donations. Second, it accounts for the endogeneity of the tax-price and after-tax income 
variables by appropriate instruments. Third, it helps to overcome the identification problems 
while using the tax reform implemented gradually in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, it allows to 
identify permanent and transitory tax-price and income elasticity and to understand whether 
donors adjust their charitable giving gradually in response to tax changes and whether they 
respond in advance to known future changes. Finally, this study allows tax-price and income 
elasticity to vary by income class.
The chapter is divided into the following parts. The next section presents a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 explains the treatment of donations in the German tax law. Sec-
tion 4 explains empirical methodology. Section 5 presents estimation results. In Section 6, some 
robustness checks are presented, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature
There is a vast empirical literature investigating the tax-price and income elasticity of donations 
in the United States. Initial research was conducted with cross-sectional data, using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) or Tobit methods. Examples include Feldstein and Taylor (1976) and Feen-
berg (1988). The estimated price elasticity was large, on average –1.5 (United States). Later, 
the availability of panel data allowed researchers to exploit techniques accounting for individual 
heterogeneity of donors and found much lower price elasticities (for example, Broman 1989). 
Recently, a new line of research has tried to distinguish permanent from transitory effects using 
the availability of long panels (see, for example, Randolph 1995; Barrett et  al. 1997; Bakija 
2000). However, the discussion concerning the nature of the “true” tax-price elasticity is still 
ongoing.
Studies on tax-price elasticities from other countries are rather scarce, though tax deductions 
for donations are widely employed. Given different attitudes toward giving in different cultures 
as well as different roles governments play in the provision of public goods in different countries, 
the magnitude of the response to fiscal incentives in these countries might be very different 
from the United States. For example, Fack and Landais (2010), using a nonparametric method 
of quantile regression, found rather low elasticities for France, ranging from –0.6 to –0.2.
There are only a few empirical studies for Germany. Pioneering work was done by Paqué 
(1996). Using tax data aggregated on a state and income-group basis for 1961 to 1980 in 
three-year intervals and using the OLS method, he found an elasticity in the range of –1.8 to 
–1.4. Auer and Kalusche (2010) implemented a Tobit estimator on a 1998 cross section with 
individual data and found an elasticity of –1.11 to –1.05. Borgloh (2008) used a Tobit and 
a two-step Heckman model applied to pooled 2001–2003 individual tax data and provided 
estimates in the range of –2.08 to –0.84. Two more recent studies applied a censored quantile 
regression. Bönke et al. (2013) used (pooled) cross sections of the years 1998, 2001, and 2004 
and obtained results ranging between –1.45 and –0.45. Bönke and Werdt (2015) used panel 
data for 2001–2006 and estimated heterogeneous elasticities depending on the level of dona-
tions. For donors at the lower and upper tails of the donation distribution, they estimated the 
price elasticity to be greater than 1 in absolute value and those in the middle of the donations 
distribution to be lower than 1.
This chapter makes use of the longitudinal characteristics of the available panel data for 
2001–2006. Different from Bönke and Werdt (2015), I apply a different methodology which 
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allows me to control for unobserved individual characteristics. Different from early studies for 
Germany, changes in tax rates were implemented in the years 2004 and 2005 (see Figures 12.1 
and 12.2); thus, exogenous variation in price is available.
The methods used in this chapter are most similar to Bakija and Heim (2011). They worked 
with a very long panel of U.S. tax returns from 1979–2006. Bakija and Heim relied on both tax 
changes in the federal tax law and on the differences in tax evolution between different states. 
In Germany, there is only one uniform tax schedule. In this chapter, tax-price elasticity can be 
identified because individuals with different incomes were affected differently by tax schedule 
changes (see Figures 12.1 and 12.2). Instead of using the so called first-dollar (first-euro) price 
as proxy for the actual price, I apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach using the first-dollar 
price as an instrument for the actual price. I take the same approach for after-tax income.
3 Donations and the tax system in Germany
In Germany, both individual tax liability and the treatment of donations are regulated in the 
German Income Tax Act (ITA). The German fiscal year is equal to the calendar year. Roughly 
speaking, tax liability is determined in two steps. In the first step, all income from seven sources 
is added together, and then different deductions are subtracted. These include allowances for the 
elderly and farmers, loss deduction, special expenses deduction (including donations), deduc-
tion for extraordinary expenses, and personal allowances. The remaining amount is the tax-
able income (TI). If a couple opts for joint declaration, the taxable income for each spouse is 
determined as the average of the taxable incomes of both spouses. In the second step, the tax 
due is computed. The formula is TAX aTI bTI ci i i= + +
2 , where i = 0 1 2 3, , ,  defines different 
income thresholds such that this function is continuous but not smooth. Marginal tax is then 
given by MT aTI bi i= +2 . Figure 12.2 presents the marginal tax as a function of taxable income 
for a single household in 2001–2006. A tax reform was implemented gradually in 2004 and 
2005, lowering the marginal tax for all incomes but to a different extent. Figure 12.2 shows the 
changes in the tax-price for individuals with different values of taxable income. It indicates that 
individuals with €10,000, €30,000, and €60,000 taxable income experience a larger increase in 
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Figure 12.1 Marginal tax rates 2001–2006, single
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The deductibility of donations is regulated in §10b and §34g ITA. §10b addresses donations 
and membership fees to organizations that pursue scientific, charitable and cultural goals that are 
recognized as eligible. These are deductible up to an amount 5% of gross income. Furthermore, 
§10b allows deductions of donations and membership fees to organizations pursuing church-
related, religious, and charitable goals that are recognized as eligible. These are deductible up 
to an additional 5% of gross income. Additionally, one can deduct donations to foundations up 
to €20,450 and grants to newly established foundations up to €307,000. Donations to political 
parties are governed by §34g and §10b ITA. Fifty percent of the first €1,650 (singles) or €3,300 
(married) given is directly deducted from due tax, having thus a fixed price of 0.5 for each €1 
given. Each euro donated above this threshold up to €3,300 (singles) or €6,600 (married) reduces 
the taxable income in keeping with §10b. The price of those donations is given by 1 minus 
the marginal tax. In the following sections, I will focus specifically on those donations which 
can be deducted from gross income, the price of which is given by 1 minus the marginal tax.10
Among different separate deductions, German law allows for the deduction of extraordinary 
expenses (§10, §10a ITA). These include childcare, tax advice, alimony and other ongoing 
financial obligations, deductible church tax, education and training, expenses of a provident 
nature, school tuitions, donations, and other. Those who do not itemize any of those obtain a 

















Figure 12.2  The evolution of the tax-price 2001–2006 for different values of taxable income per €100 
(single)
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Sommerfeld (2009) provided a statistical overview of charitable giving in Germany. Her 
survey revealed that 83.5% of taxpayers are aware of the deductibility of donations. According 
to Sommerfeld, 70% of the population donates and 43% declare donations in tax declarations.
4 Empirical methodology
4.1 Empirical specification
Usually, the literature assumes that the demand function for donations, DON f Y= −( )( )1 τ , , is
linear in a natural logarithm and imposes the following empirical specification:11
lnDON ln lnY X u
i i i i i
= + −( )+ + + ( )µ δ τ β γ1 1  (1)
where for each individual i, DON
i
 is the amount of the donations, τ
i
 is the marginal tax, Y
i
is a measure of disposable income, X
i
 is a vector of other characteristics,12 µ is some constant,
and ui is an error term. Given the nonlinear dependence of the right-hand-side variables, that 
is, tax-price, income, marital status, and other characteristics leading to different deductions, 
there is the serious risk that if equation 1 is misspecified, the coefficients of interest might not 
be identified. The issues that accompany attempts to determine the tax-price effect and the 
income effect separately are discussed in Triest (1998). Identification is only possible if there is 
a variation in tax rates (price) independent of individual characteristics that may affect chari-
table giving. Feenberg’s (1988) solution is to exploit the variations in state income taxes in the 
United States. For Germany, there is only one national income tax law. The needed variation 
in price is provided because changes in national income tax occurred in 2004 and 2005, and 
they affected individuals with different incomes differently (see Figure  12.2). Adopting the 
widespread approach from the previous literature on charitable giving, and in order to interpret 
the coefficients directly as elasticities, I estimate the previous log-log specification with some 
modifications explained in the following.
One of the most important issues is the omitted variable bias. The available data are 
missing characteristics such as education, wealth, and altruism which are known to be 
important determinants of charitable giving.13 Likewise, these variables are known to be cor-
related with income.14 Given that, a simple regression analysis will not identify the param-
eters of interest. Therefore, in the donation equation, I  account for the individual-specific 
fixed effects α
i
. I assume that these individual-specific fixed effects α
i
 do not vary (significantly)15
over time. However, these fixed (time-invariant) individual-specific effect are potentially corre-
lated with other explanatory variables, that is, E Xit iα{ } ≠ 0. To account for factors influencing
donations from year to year, the time fixed effects δ
t
 are included in the specification. This might
be especially important, as the Elbe flooding happened in 2002 and the tsunami at the end of 
2004, thus increasing donations shortly afterwards. The time-varying, individual-specific error 
term denoted as u
it
. I assume that E X uit it{ } = 0 for each t. The donation equation becomes:
lnDON lnPRICE lnY X u
it it it it i t it
= + + + + + ( )δ β γ α δ 2 (2)
The next important issue concerns endogeneity. Clearly, the tax-price is determined by 
income, marital status, the amount donated, and other deductions. For many levels of income, 
it holds true that the higher the amount of donations, the lower the marginal tax rate, and 
consequently the higher the tax-price. Similarly, after-tax income depends on taxes, which in 
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turn depends on the amount donated. The simple OLS estimation of the equation of interest 
would yield biased estimates. Here, I address the endogeneity by using an instrumental variable 
estimator. For each individual, I calculate a hypothetical marginal tax at zero donations, which 
is clearly uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Similarly, for after-tax income, I calculate 
a hypothetical after-tax income at zero donations. Those instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous variables but uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics which determine dona-
tions. There is a convention in the literature on charitable giving of regressing donations directly 
onto these hypothetical variables, which are usually called first-dollar price and first-dollar 
income. This seems to be the second-best approach when the IV method is feasible. Not taking 
the IV approach leads to the estimation of what may be termed “first-dollar price elasticity.” 
But this will be different from the actual tax-price elasticity, especially because first-dollar price 
elasticity is measured at a lower quantity and a lower price.
In the data, a significant portion of taxpayers do not itemize. Clotfelter (1980), Boskin and 
Feldstein (1977), and Reece and Zieschang (1985) suggest that excluding nonitemizers and 
border itemizers16 might lead to a selection bias. Therefore, I follow Feldstein and Taylor (1976) 
by calculating a modified first-euro price as if the itemization were possible regardless of the 
actual value of donation.17 This first-euro price is used in the IV approach as an instrument for 
the actual price, which is strictly lower than one for border itemizers and differs for each indi-
vidual. I proceed accordingly for nonitemizers.
Many donors do not report donations in their tax declarations. It is difficult to account 
for censoring and fixed effects at the same time.18 Panel studies from the United States widely 
employ demeaning or first differencing, for example, Bakija (2000) or Randolph (1995), and 
I follow this approach. Nonetheless, I will compare my results from the estimation of equation 2 
with the results from an estimation that accounts for censoring in Section 6.3.
The availability of a six-year panel allows me to identify permanent and transitory effects. 
Therefore, specification 2 is extended to:
lnDON lnPRICE lnPRICE lnPRICE
lnY
it it it it
it






1 1 2 3 1
1 1
+ + +







it i t it
. (3)
The permanent price effect is given by δ δ δ
1 2 3
+ + , the transitory effect by δ
2
, and the effect of
an anticipated increase in price next year by δ
3
.19 Similarly, the permanent income effect is given
by β β β
1 2 3
+ +  and the transitory income effect by β
2
, respectively. When the actual values for
the future tax-price and income are included into the equation 3, one assumes perfect fore-
sight. However, future expectations are what matters for charitable giving and not realizations. 
To address this caveat, I implement a similar solution to the one chosen by Bakija and Heim 
(2011). In one specification (perfect foresight), I treat future realizations of price and income as 
erroneous measurements of future expectations. In an alternative specification (predictable tax 
change), I implement the IV approach in which I assume that the tax formula of the follow-
ing year is known but one’s own income in the following year is not known. This means that 
in the first step, I predict the following year’s income using broad information available about 
the subjects, especially the income and price from the year in question and the year before as 
covariates. In the second step, I use this predicted income to calculate the (predicted) future 
after-tax-income and the (predicted) future price using the appropriate tax formula.
Finally, to allow for heterogeneous effects of price and nonprice variables, I multiply them 
by dummies for four different income classes (gross income in €: 1–29,999; 30,000–59,999; 
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60,000–89,999; and ≥ 90,000 for single households and twice the amount for married cou-
ples). Recall that the price is based on taxable income, which might be very different from the 
gross income. This means that the income groups are rather based on status than on disposable 
income and price. If there is indeed heterogeneity, the last step is also necessary due to the 
selectivity of the available sample in which high-income taxpayers are overrepresented (see the 
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 are dummies for the four income groups j = { }1 2 3 4, , , . This approach allows, moreo-
ver, for a more flexible relationship between income and charitable giving, thus relaxing the 
assumption imposed by equation 1.
4.2 Data
The analysis in this chapter is based on 5% stratified sample from the German Taxpayer Panel 
2001–2006 made available by the German Federal Statistical Office. It is a rich panel of indi-
vidual income tax return data in which high-income taxpayers are strongly overrepresented. 
The strata are based on region, joint or separate declaration, main income source, and the aver-
age of the gross income over the six years. It contains around a million observations per year, 
detailed information on income and taxes, and some demographic characteristics such as age, 
state of residence, religion, and the number and age of children. The panel is available for distant 
computations with SAS. Tables 12.1 and 12.2 present some descriptive statistics.
4.3 Variables
The dependent variable, ln DONit +( )1 , is the natural logarithm of donations declared according 
to §10bITA. Given that there are households that do not declare any donations and in order to 
assure that this variable takes values larger than zero, I add €1 to the amount of donations. The 
U.S. literature usually adds the amount of $10. However, the average donation in those studies 
is 5 to more than 250 times higher than in the data used for this study.20 This suggests that €1 is 
a better choice. However, the choice is still arbitrary. Later, I present robustness checks adding, 
alternatively, €5 and €10 to the amount of donations.
The first independent variable, lnPRICE
it
, is the natural logarithm of the price, which is 1 
minus the marginal tax rate. The actual tax rate is endogenous, as it changes with the amount 
donated. Therefore, I calculate for each individual a hypothetical marginal tax at zero donations 
and use its natural logarithm, lnPRICEit

, as an instrument.
The second independent variable, lnY
it
, is the natural logarithm of the after-tax income. 
Respectively, I calculate a hypothetical after-tax income at zero donations and use its natural 
logarithm, lnYit
 , as an instrument.
Additionally, I include other control variables: dummies for each of the six income sources 




from self-employment, from dependent employment, capital income, and from rent and leasing 
properties), a dummy for joint declaration, for living in West Germany, for religious affiliation, 
and one control variable for the number of children and for the age squared. Note that as those 
controls seldom change over time, they are mostly absorbed by individual fixed effects.
5 Estimation results
Table 12.3 presents the results from the estimation, which allows the coefficients for all nonprice 
variables to differ across income classes and uses the IV approach to price and income. The esti-
mates for permanent price elasticity are –0.57 (Table 12.3, column I) assuming perfect foresight 
and –0.82 (Table 12.3, column II) when relying on predictable changes of future income and price. 
Table 12.2 Descriptive statistics 2
Single
Gross income (€) 1–29,999 30,000–59,999 60,000–89,999 ≥ 90,000
Avg. price 99.59 76.13 62.03 55.45
N in millions (total 6 years)  0.37  0.93  0.35  0.37
Joint declaration
Gross income (€) 1–59,999 60,000–119,999 120,000–179,999 ≥ 180,000
Avg. price 99.66 73.21 61.12 54.80
N in millions (total 6 years)  0.39  1.28  0.52  1.09
Note: This table presents raw sample averages.
Table 12.1  Descriptive statistics 1
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Avg. donation 474.73 537.54 511.34 580.72 647.77 665.48 
(€) (118.99) (133.24) (127.57) (140.57) (153.31) (147.39)
Donor share 45.55 47.64 46.75 48.77 50.34 47.71 
(%) (34.70) (36.98) (35.89) (37.88) (38.93) (36.55)
Avg. price (per 71.03 71.32 71.36 72.20 72.03 72.85 
100€) (75.09) (75.02) (75.05) (74.76) (74.97) (74.95)
Avg. gross 80,287 76,677 76,018 82,302 92,919 96,941 
income (€) (33,344) (33,272) (33,297) (34,531) (33,346) (36,753)
Avg. age 47.20 48.18 49.17 50.16 51.16 52.15 
(44.10) (45.09) (46.08) (47.07) (48.07) (49.06)
Joint declaration 60.30 60.53 60.71 60.86 61.12 61.06 
share (%) (57.77) (57.97) (58.23) (58.55) (58.72) (58.76)
West share (%) 84.77 84.79 84.80 84.83 84.85 84.87 
(85.35) (85.34) (85.32) (85.31) (85.30) (85.31)
Religion share 23.36 23.18 22.92 22.40 21.97 23.61 
(%) (23.08) (23.09) (23.00) (22.72) (22.33) (23.21)
Self-employ- 18.13 18.26 18.50 18.77 18.86 18.77 
ment share (%) (6.36) (6.40) (6.53) (6.75) (6.85) (6.93)
Number of 0.82  0.81  0.80  0.79  0.78  0.76  
children (0.75) (0.75) (0.74) (0.73) (0.72) (0.71)
N in million 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Note: This table presents raw sample averages. Population weighted averages are presented in brackets.
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Table 12.3  Permanent and transitory effects: the estimation allows coefficients on all nonprice variables to differ 
across income classes using the IV approach to price and income. The dependent variable is lnDON
i,t













Permanent price –0.57 –0.82
elasticity
Income class 1–29,999 30,000– 60,000– ≥90,000 1–29,999 30,000– 60,000– ≥90,000
59,999 89,999 59,999 89,999
lnYi,t 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnYi,t−1 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*** –0.01* –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnYi,t+1
0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Permanent income 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28
elasticity
Other controls × Yes Yes
income class
year effects × income Yes Yes
class
fixed individual effects Yes Yes
N in millions 3.36 2.72
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
The estimates for permanent income elasticity are around 0.2–0.3, slightly varying among different 
income classes. The estimates of price elasticity are rather low when compared with previous cross-
sectional studies from Germany.21 However, if the price elasticity differs among income groups, those 
estimates are rather meaningless and depend strongly on the composition of the sample. Therefore, 
in the next table, we move on to relaxing the assumption of homogeneity of price elasticity.
Table 12.4 presents the results from the estimation, which allows the coefficients on all 
variables to differ across income classes (equation 4) and uses the IV approach to price and 
income. It allows for the heterogeneity of tax responsiveness among different income groups 
and corrects for the sample composition in which high income groups are overrepresented. The 
results show that permanent tax-price elasticity varies significantly between income classes. It 
is as low as –0.26 (perfect foresight) and –0.17 (predictable changes) for pretax incomes below 
€30,000 for singles and €60,000 for married couples, respectively. It is as high as –1.40 (per-
fect foresight) and –1.56 (predictable changes) for incomes €30,000–59,999 for singles and 
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€60,000–119,999 for married couples. Higher incomes show elasticity of around –1 when 
assuming perfect foresight and around –1.35 when assuming predictable changes. Overall, there 
is evidence of heterogeneity among income classes. Consequently, this table presents results 
from the preferred specification (equation 4), and the results are referred to in conclusions 
from this chapter. Given that the distribution of the income classes in the whole population 
is approximately 50%, 30%, 10%, and 10%, and their shares of total giving are 23%, 26%, 
14%, and 37%,22 the average weighted permanent elasticity is slightly below –1. Overall, one 
can judge the fiscal incentives in Germany as being effective in stimulating charitable giv-
ing. However, the results also show that different treatment of donors depending on their 
characteristics could improve the efficiency even more. This could lead to a potential further 
decoupling of the price for charitable giving from the tax scheme.
Table 12.4  Permanent and transitory effects. Estimates allowing coefficients on all variables including price 
to differ across income classes. IV approach to price and income. Dependent variable: lnDON
i,t
.
(I) Perfect foresight (II) Predictable tax change instruments
income class 1–29,999 30,000– 60,000– ≥90,000 1–29,999 30,000– 60,000– ≥90,000
59,999 89,999 59,999 89,999
lnPRICE
i,t
–0.01 –0.54*** –0.38*** –0.37*** 0.24*** –0.41*** –0.37*** –0.48*** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
lnPRICE
i,t−1
–0.23*** –0.47*** –0.51*** –0.71*** –0.22*** –0.57*** –0.65*** –0.89*** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
lnPRICE
i,t+1
–0.03** –0.38*** –0.06 0.01 –0.19*** –0.58*** –0.32*** 0.01 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Permanent –0.26 –1.40 –0.96 –1.07 –0.17 1.56 –1.33 –1.38
price 
elasticity
lnYi,t 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnYi,t−1 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01* –0.00 0.01  –0.00 –0.01 –0.02** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnYi,t+1 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.07** 0.05** 0.06** 0.08*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Permanent 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.29
income 
elasticity
Other controls Yes Yes
× income 
class






N in millions 3.36 2.72
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
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The comparability with other empirical studies for Germany is limited because they all esti-
mate “first-euro” elasticity. Regardless of the differences in the definition, my estimates predict 
rather lower responsiveness to tax incentives. This is especially true with respect to previous 
studies relying on OLS and Tobit methods.
The estimates for permanent income elasticity are around 0.2–0.3, slightly varying among 
different income classes.
I find evidence that donors adjust their charitable contributions gradually. They respond strongly 
to the former price. Moreover, I find evidence for all income classes, apart from the highest, that 
donors respond to predictable future changes in the price (see Table 12.4). The actual income and 
to some extent the future income drive the donations. The effects of past income are negligible.
6 Robustness checks
This section presents a number of important robustness checks.
6.1 Assuming that coefficients are uniform across income classes
Table 12.5 presents the results from a regression when assuming that all coefficients are uniform 
across income classes (equation 3) and using the IV approach to price and income. Column 
I presents the results from a regression that assumes perfect foresight, and column II presents the 
results when using predictable-tax-change instruments. The coefficient estimates of permanent 
price elasticity (–0.33 and –0.37) are low in magnitude when compared to the estimates from 
cross-sectional studies estimating a uniform price elasticity for Germany. Similarly, the coeffi-
cient estimates for permanent income elasticity (0.31 and 0.43) are rather low. However, given 
the selectivity of the available sample, those results cannot be carried over to the whole popula-
tion. More importantly, the conclusions from Tables 12.1 and 12.2 are that the assumption of 
homogeneity among different income classes is clearly violated. This table, however, is the basis 
for the comparisons with the subsequent robustness checks.
Table 12.5  Permanent and transitory effects: assuming coefficients are uniform across income classes, using 
the IV approach to price and income. The dependent variable is lnDON
i,t
(I) Perfect foresight (II) Predictable tax change instruments
lnPRICE
i,t
–0.03** (0.01) 0.05** (0.02)
lnPRICE
i,t−1
–0.33*** (0.01) –0.43*** (0.02)
lnPRICE
i,t+1
0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.03)
Permanent price elasticity –0.33 –0.37
lnYi,t 0.21*** (0.00) 0.26*** (0.01)
lnYi,t−1 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02** (0.01)
lnYi,t+1 0.07*** (0.00) 0.15*** (0.02)
Permanent income elasticity 0.31 0.43
Other controls Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Fixed individual effects Yes Yes
N in millions 3.36 2.72
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
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6.2 First-euro price and income instead of IV approach
Table 12.6 presents the results when estimating the basic specification (assuming coefficients are 
uniform across income classes) without the IV approach and using the first-euro price and, similarly, 
hypothetical after-tax income at zero donations instead. The estimates of permanent tax-price elas-
ticity are higher in absolute terms when compared to the basic specification with the IV approach 
(Table 12.5). It changes from –0.33 to –0.59 when assuming perfect foresight and from –0.37 to 
–0.95 when assuming predictable tax change instruments. This might suggest that the estimates of 
tax-price elasticity from previous studies for Germany are overestimated. The estimates for per-
manent income elasticity are somewhat lower, changing from 0.31 to 0.25 when assuming perfect 
foresight and from 0.43 to 0.20 when assuming predictable tax change instruments.
6.3 Censoring
Because I do not observe donations for around 50% of observations, there is a serious concern 
that due to censoring, my confidents are biased. Can the comparably low coefficient estimates 
of price elasticity be explained by neglecting the censoring? I estimate a Tobit model23 on 
pooled data regressing donations directly on the first-euro price and other variables. I then 
compare the results with analogous OLS regression which does not account for censor-
ing. The estimated coefficients as compared to simple OLS regression on pooled data are 
presented in Table 12.7. The marginal effects from the Tobit regressions are similar to those 
obtained from the OLS estimation. This does not support the hypothesis that the estimates of 
the elasticity obtained in previous sections are seriously biased due to censoring.
6.4 Adding different amounts to donations
Because of the numerous observations with zero donations and because the logarithmic func-
tion is not defined at zero, I have added an additional euro to the individual contribution. 
Table 12.6  Permanent and transitory effects. Assuming coefficients are uniform across income classes. 
First-dollar price. Dependent variable: lnDON
i,t
(I) Perfect foresight (II) Predictable tax change instruments
lnPRICE
i,t
–0.22*** (0.01) –0.30*** (0.01)
lnPRICE
i,t−1
–0.38*** (0.01) –0.55*** (0.01)
lnPRICE
i,t+1
0.00 (0.01) –0.10*** (0.01)
Permanent price elasticity –0.59 –0.95
lnYi,t 0.17*** (0.00) 0.18*** (0.00)
lnYi,t−1 0.02*** (0.00) –0.01*** (0.00)
lnYi,t+1 0.06*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00)
Permanent income elasticity 0.25 0.20
Other controls Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes
Fixed individual effects Yes Yes
N in millions 3.36 2.73
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
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Given the steepness of the log function at low levels of donations, I  conduct a robustness 
check by adding €5 or €10 alternatively. This results in somewhat lower absolute coefficient 
estimates of price elasticity due to the shift towards a less steep part of a logarithmic curve 
(see Table 12.8).
6.5 Excluding nonitemizers and border itemizers
Finally, I present the results from a regression in which I exclude nonitemizers and border 
itemizers (see Table 12.9). On average, 30% of the tax units take the standard deduction, and 
less than 1% are classified as border itemizers. As some individuals switch between itemizing 
and not itemizing in subsequent years, I  lose around 42% of my sample. The estimates of 
tax-price elasticity are somewhat lower and those of income elasticity somewhat higher than 
those in Table 12.5.
7 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for charitable giving in Germany. 
While there are numerous studies estimating tax-price elasticity of giving for the United States, 
we know little about European countries. Given this lack of knowledge as well as the different 
role of the government and different tradition of charitable giving, the widespread preferential 
treatment of donations in the income tax is striking.
This chapter provides new evidence from the German Taxpayer Panel 2001–2006. The 
availability of longitudinal data allows for the estimation of the permanent and transitory tax-
price and income elasticity of donations while controlling for individual unobserved character-
istics. The results suggest heterogeneous effects of the tax-price among different income groups. 
Table 12.7  Accounting versus not accounting for censoring: Tobit versus OLS. First-euro price. Assuming 
perfect foresight. Dependent variable: lnDON
i,t
Tobit marginal effects OLS Tobit marginal effects OLS
lnPRICE
i,t
–1.16*** (0.24) –1.11*** (0.03) –0.60*** (0.11) –0.68*** (0.08)
lnPRICE
i,t−1
–0.41*** (0.07) –0.58*** (0.06)
lnPRICE
i,t+1
–0.14*** (0.02) –0.18*** (0.07)
Permanent price –1.14 –1.43
elasticity
lnYi,t 0.51*** (0.11) 0.51*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.13*** (0.02)
lnYi,t−1 0.15*** (0.03) 0.13*** (0.01)
lnYi,t+1 0.39*** (0.07) 0.36*** (0.02)
Permanent income 0.61 0.61
elasticity
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N in thousands 366.5 366.5 306 252
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
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The estimates of permanent tax-price elasticity range between –0.2 for lower incomes and –1.6 
for higher incomes. The average permanent price elasticity weighted with the amount of giv-
ing by different income groups is slightly below –1, meaning that fiscal incentives for donations 
in Germany are effective. There is evidence that donors adjust their donations gradually after 
changes in the tax schedule and respond to future predictable changes in price. They respond 
mainly to changes in current and, to a smaller extent, in future income. The estimates for per-
manent income elasticity are around 0.2–0.3, slightly varying among different income classes. 
Actual income and to some extent future income drive donations. The effects of past income 
are negligible.
Table 12.8  Permanent and transitory effects. Assuming coefficients are uniform across income classes. 




Perfect Predictable Perfect Predictable Perfect Predictable 




–0.03** 0.05** 0.00 0.07** 0.01** 0.07*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnPRICE
i,t−1
–0.33*** –0.43*** –0.31*** –0.31*** –0.19*** –0.26*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
lnPRICE
i,t+1
0.02** 0.01  0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Permanent –0.33 –0.37 –0.17 –0.19 –0.12 –0.12
price 
elasticity
lnYi,t 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.19***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lnYi,t−1 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lnYi,t+1 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Permanent 0.31 0.43 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.30
income 
elasticity
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
× income 
class
Year effects × Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
income class
Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
individual 
effects
N in millions 3.36 2.72 3.36 2.72 3.36 2.72
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
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Table 12.9  Permanent and transitory effects. Assuming coefficients are uniform 
across income classes. IV approach to price and income. Exclud-
















Permanent income elasticity 0.39
Other controls Yes
Year effects Yes
Fixed individual effects Yes
N in millions 1.97
Source: Taxpayerpanel 2001–2006, author’s own calculations
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.1 level
Notes
 1 The average marginal tax weighted by income in 2001 was around 32% (own calculations). For more 
income tax statistics, see Buschle (2006).
 2 See the literature section of this chapter.
 3 For more information, see Welfare Expenditure Report (2001), http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/56/37/31613113.xls (viewed on 8.2.2021).
 4 For more information, see International Comparisons of Charitable Giving (2006), https://www.
cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-publications/international-comparisons-of-charitable-
giving.pdf (viewed on 8.2.2021). The numbers for Germany exclude the church tax, which is between 
8 and 9% (depending on the state) of the tax due.
 5 For more information, see Andreoni and Payne (2013, p. 10).
 6 For more information, see Deutscher Spendenmonitor (2011), www.tns-infratest.com/presse/pres-
seinformation.asp?prID=832 (viewed on 8.2.2021).
 7 For more information, see Sommerfeld (2009).
 8 Most of the organizations offer the possibility of membership; examples include the WWF and Green-
peace. The members usually receive a regular magazine informing about the program achievements 
and the like.
 9 See the literature section of this chapter.
 10 The church tax is not included, because it is automatically deducted from the income of all members of 
the Catholic and Protestant church as well as of some Jewish and some free church congregations and 
amounts to between 8 and 9% (depending on the state) of the tax due. For a study on the interrelation 
of church tax and charitable giving in Germany, see Bittschi et al. (2015).
 11 See, for example, Feldstein and Taylor (1976) or Feenberg (1988).
 12 See Section 4.3 for the enumeration of control variables used in the estimation.
 13 For example, McClelland and Brooks (2004) find that more education is significantly correlated with 
donations, and Brooks (2002) finds similar effects for wealth.
 14 Individuals can be more or less altruistic, which may affect the choice of occupation and consequently 
the income.
 15 Most observations in my sample will have finished their education and, if not, education years will 




 16 Those are the taxpayers who exceed their blanket allowance only due to their donation.
 17 Indeed, in Germany, the blanket allowance for extraordinary expenses including donations is low (€36) 
as compared to the U.S. treatment.
 18 The following programs offer partial solutions: Pantob implements Honoré (1992); LIMDEMP imple-
ments the fixed-effects Tobit model with up to 50,000 individual effects. However, Bradley et  al. 
(2005) criticize applying such methods like Tobit or Heckman’s two-stage method to address censoring 
in charitable donations. They observe that specification tests reject the assumptions about the form 
of the likelihood function in the selection equation, which is necessary for the consistency of these 
estimators. While they opt for semi- and nonparametric methods, they claim that their elasticities are 
similar to those obtained using panel data estimation methods.
 19 Bakija and Heim (2011) include one more lag in their specification, but their panel 
is much longer. They estimate an equation equivalent to 3. Their price coefficients enter 
as γ γ γ
1 1 2 3 1
lnPRICE lnPRICE lnPRICE lnPRICE lnPRIC
it it it it
−( )+ + −− + Eit( ). Rearranging, this gives 
−( ) + + −( ) +− +γ γ γ γ γ1 1 1 2 3 3 1lnPRICE lnPRICE lnPRICEit it it  such that δ γ1 1= − , δ γ γ γ2 1 2 3= + − , and 
δ γ
3 3
= . Then the persistent price effect is given by γ
2
 (= − + + − +γ γ γ γ γ1 1 2 3 3), the transitory effect by 
γ γ γ
1 2 3
+ − , and the effect of an anticipated increase in price next year by γ
3
. They treat their income 
coefficients analogously.
 20 For example, in the sample used by Bakija and Heim (2011), the average donation is $125,000 (in 2007 
dollars). However, the average after-tax income is greater than $1 million.
 21 For example, Paqué (1996) found the price elasticity to be between –1.8 and –1.4 and Borgloh (2008) 
between –2.08 and 0.84.
 22 See Priller and Schupp (2011).
 23 Due to the computational constraint of the statistical office, this estimation was only possible with 
an 0.05% sample. Consequently, the number of observations is 10 times lower than in the other 
estimations.
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Introduction
The recent amendments (October  2020) to India’s Foreign Contributions Regulation Act 
(FCRA) are among the many challenges confronting the non-profit sector in the country. The 
act places significant hurdles to the receipt and utilisation of foreign donations by Indian NPOs. 
This development corresponds to similar global trends of increasing legal and regulatory hurdles 
on NPOs over the last decade, in both the world’s most advanced economies and the developing 
countries facing the most complex civil strife and public health crises. Therefore, the current 
COVID-19 pandemic could not have been a more telling context for demonstrating the criti-
cal role of non-profits in supporting governments and citizens. Moreover, the pandemic has 
brought to light the discouraging regulatory environment in which NPOs operate worldwide.
Tax incentives are a key regulatory mechanism surrounding the non-profit sector, whose role 
is receiving increasing visibility during the pandemic. For instance, Russia, which did not ini-
tially provide any tax incentives for charitable donations, now allows a 1% tax break to businesses 
donating a portion of their profits to charity (CAF America, 2021). China has also significantly 
increased its tax incentives for philanthropic activities (Lexology, 2020). However, India has not 
increased tax incentives for donations to the non-profit sector, despite its pandemic-induced 
fund shortage in the last year. A study by Dasra (2020), a leading non-profit sector advisory and 
research organisation, highlights that there is likely to be significant reduction both in short and 
long term funding to the sector. Funding from corporate social responsibility (CSR) channels 
may see a long-term reduction as almost 2000–3000 crore INR will get redirected to the 
COVID-19–focused PMCARES fund1. Corporates are also likely to register a plunge in their 
profits and subsequently affect the funds they channel to their CSR contributions for the sector. 
Large donations from ultra-high net worth individuals (UHNWIs) may fall in the short term 
due to stock market volatility.
At a time when the Indian government has significantly relied on NPOs during the pan-
demic, it has not made any effort to ease their regulatory environment, particularly regard-
ing funding and tax incentives. On the one hand, since March 2020, NITI Aayog, the apex 
national-level policy planning body of the government of India, has formally collaborated with 
92,000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Kulkarni, 2020) to manage socio-economic 
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challenges. On the other hand, new hurdles have been placed in accessing funding. Foreign 
funding will be hard to access because of the recent amendments in the FCRA. Recent changes 
in the tax regime for individuals and corporates allow donors to voluntarily opt out of tax incen-
tives for philanthropic giving to benefit from lower rates of personal and corporate income tax.
Systematic studies on the role of tax incentive regimes as a whole and their contribution to 
strengthening the non-profit sector (and through that the national community), as well as their 
cost to the public exchequer, are limited, particularly in the Indian context.
A preliminary attempt to address this lacuna is being undertaken in a study by the Centre 
for Social Impact and Philanthropy (CSIP) at Ashoka University, Sonipat, in a research partner-
ship with the Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) in Delhi. The study 
reviews the tax incentive structures of 12 select countries, including India,2 evidence of their 
impact in encouraging philanthropic activities.
This chapter draws from the aforementioned project’s findings. Centring around the Indian 
case, the study examines three critical aspects of tax incentives for charitable donations to 
NPOs. First, to what extent do tax incentives support the non-profit sector financially and 
legally? Second, what is the cost of such tax incentives for philanthropy to the Indian exchequer 
as a share of personal and corporate income tax collected? Third, how do the design and scope 
of the Indian tax incentives compare with other countries/the rest of the world? Overall, this 
chapter aims to provide policy recommendations to the Indian government for strengthening 
its tax incentive regime for philanthropic giving.
We address our research questions using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. To 
examine the financial and legal role of tax incentives, we examined the existing quantitative 
databases and research reports on the sources of financial inflows and their adequacy to the non-
profit sector. Regarding the impact of tax incentives on public revenue, we analysed the data 
on the foregone revenues reported by the Indian government over 13 years from 2006–2019. 
Next, drawing on the previously mentioned tax incentives review project, we conducted the 
cross-country comparative review of the tax incentive regime in India. Additionally, we also 
reviewed secondary documents such as government and civil society reports as well as academic 
literature on the evidence of the impact of tax incentives on philanthropy. We validated our 
findings from the secondary document review by consulting tax and civil society experts and 
academics based in all the study countries except Norway and China. For these countries, our 
analysis relies entirely on secondary documents. All the material reviewed in this chapter is 
available in the public domain and mainly written in English. We commissioned French and 
Portuguese translations of some academic research set in France and Brazil. The language bar-
rier in non-English-speaking countries was addressed by conversations with experts from these 
countries. Nonetheless, the limited access to the literature in the country’s national languages 
is a limitation of this work.
The chapter is organised around our three research questions. In Section 1, we examine the 
financial and non-financial contribution of tax incentives in India. Here we argue that while the 
funds flowing into the sector due to tax incentives are minimal compared to those coming in 
from other sources, they are a prominent source of financial and legal legitimacy for this sector 
in India. Due to their small size and limited capacities, most NPOs lack access to alternative 
funding sources. In Section 2, we discuss India’s tax incentive structure and present the trends in 
the revenue foregone by the Indian government. We illustrate that the revenue lost due to tax 
incentives for philanthropic giving is negligible. In Section 3, we present the global evidence on 
the state of tax incentives. We show that compared to other countries, India has a conservative 
tax incentive regime for philanthropic giving and is among the few countries without docu-
mented evidence on the effectiveness (or the lack) of tax incentives. Finally, in Section 4, we 
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provide policy recommendations for strengthening the Indian tax incentive regime to increase 
philanthropic giving.
1 Tax incentives and India’s non-profit sector: financial  
and regulatory environment
India lacks accurate and recent official data on its non-profit sector in terms of the number 
of NPOs, the nature of their work, their size, and the source of their financial inflows. The 
Darpan portal is an online, publicly accessible database established by the government of India 
where any Indian NPO applying for government grants-in-aid, and those receiving interna-
tional funding, must register. However, it does not cover NPOs that do not use government or 
international grants. The portal provides a broad cross-section of data on the non-profit sector 
covering many thematic areas (such as health, education, skills, and livelihoods), service areas 
(advocacy, service delivery), and information on the quantum of grants-in-aid received. How-
ever, the quality of the data on the portal is poor. Other databases on the sector are in the con-
text of legal and regulatory provisions such as the Income Tax Act, FCRA, and the Companies 
Act. These databases cover only a small subset of Indian NPOs and provide only the number 
of NPOs registered under these acts, leaving out other relevant information such as the area of 
work or the nature of their activities.
Our analysis of the financial and regulatory role of tax incentives draws on three major stud-
ies that provide an overview of the non-profit sector in India. The Indian Ministry of Statistics 
and Planning (MOSPI) in 2012 conducted a census-like exercise of the non-profit sector in line 
with the UN handbook on Non-profit Accounting. The study, however, focused only on those 
NPOs which are registered as ‘societies’, which is one of the three legal forms for the registration 
of NPOs in India. The other two are ‘trusts’ and ‘Section 8’ companies. This study reports that 
India has approximately 3.1 million registered ‘societies’ in India.3 Of these, a little over half a mil-
lion societies were physically ‘traced’ by the MOSPI study researchers. The detailed overview of 
the non-profit sector provided in the study includes data on the state-wise location of the traced 
societies, their operational areas (such as health, education, social service), and rural-urban distri-
bution and funding sources. The second study was recently undertaken by the CSIP to under-
stand the state of the support ecosystem available to the non-profit sector in India dealing with 
aspects such as fundraising, monitoring and evaluation, accounting, and communications. The 
study included 800 NPOs and 65 foundations (grant-making bodies) across India, using an online 
survey on 3,500-plus verified NPOs registered with GuideStar India.4 The profile of the sampled 
NPOs gives a snapshot of the non-profit sector and includes indicators such as their state-wise 
location, thematic operation areas, and operating budgets. The third study was also undertaken by 
the CSIP, and it examined the total capital in the non-profit sector from various sources, including 
tax-incentivised donations, corporate social responsibility and foreign contributions (CSIP, 2020).
These reports highlight three distinct aspects of the non-profit sector in India. First, the 
sector is dominated by small NPOs. The CSIP study5 of the non-profit ecosystem is the only 
one that provides a breakdown of the sample NPOs based on their operating budgets. The 
study estimates that over half of the sampled NPOs6 have an annual operating budget of up to 
approximately 68,000 USD7 approx. (less than INR 50 lakhs) a year. Additionally, 15% of the 
sampled NPOs have an annual operating budget of only up to 6,804 USD (up to INR 5 lakhs 
a year) (see Figure 13.1).
Second, the NPOs’ focus areas as well as their geographical spread are disproportionately 
skewed. The CSIP study highlights that most NPOs are concentrated in the areas of education 
(with 75%) and health (with 65%)8 (CSIP, 2019). However, within these thematic areas, there 
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is no data available on the exact nature of the work undertaken by the NPOs, for example, 
whether it is service delivery, advocacy, or communications. Conversations with experts in 
the sectors highlight that the majority of the NPOs focus on service delivery activities, with 
relatively few working on research and advocacy. Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh are the top 
states where the maximum number of sampled NPOs are located. Similarly, the MOSPI study 
highlights that more than 82% of the traced societies are registered in 24 states (this list excludes 
large states such as Rajasthan and Maharashtra). Of these, Uttar Pradesh, the most populous 
Indian state, has 37% of the traced societies. Andhra Pradesh (undivided; includes Telangana) 
has the second-highest population and only 11% of the traced societies. Bihar, another popu-
lous and poor Indian state, has only 0.6% of the traced societies (MOSPI, 2012, pp. 6–70). The 
concentration of NPOs in a limited number of thematic areas and states, and the availability 
of better funding opportunities through varied sources such as CSR, mutually reinforce each 
other. That is to say, as more NPOs work in certain sectors/issue areas, more funding flows into 
those specific areas than others and vice versa.
Third, tax-incentivised donations constitute the smallest share of funding sources into this 
sector as highlighted by the CSIP study (2018). Table 13.1 presents the share of individual and 
corporate donations incentivised through tax incentives (d1 and d3), which is much lower than 
other funding sources such as CSR funds (C), foreign contributions (A), and informal everyday 
giving (E).9
The data available on the non-profit sector indicates that an accurate assessment of the finan-
cial and legal role of tax incentives is highly difficult. However, the role of the tax incentives may 
be critical because of the specific nature of the Indian non-profit sector. For many NPOs, their 
operating budgets are low, and they operate from geographically remote areas. Consequently, 
they have limited resources to communicate the impact of their work or seek assistance of sup-













68500- 1.3 Mn USD
1.3mn USD and above
Figure 13.1  Distribution of NPOs in study sample according to the operating budget (in USD)
Source: (CSIP, 2019) Conversion rate 1 USD = 73 INR
Note: Lower and outer limit has been kept out of the estimates.
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certificate provides legal legitimacy to NPOs and recognition of their work, including for those 
donors who do not seek to claim tax exemptions. Last, though tax incentives provide lower 
capital inflows to the sector compared to other sources, they remain the primary source of fund-
ing for a vast majority of NPOs that do not have access to foreign or CSR funds. Therefore, for 
these NPOs, even the limited funding support provided by tax incentives may be significant. 
However, a systematic study of these varied roles played by tax incentives in the non-profit sec-
tor is critical.
2 Does India’s tax incentive structure encourage philanthropic 
giving towards NPOs?
India has a long history of tax incentives for philanthropic giving, which dates back to the Brit-
ish Raj (Sampradaan Indian Centre for Philanthropy, 2004). However, the basic structure of the 
Table 13.1 Philanthropic capital flowing in the Indian NPO sector (in USD millions)
S. No. Philanthropic source 2017–18 Source
A. Foreign contribution 2289 www.fcraonline.nic.in
B. Grants-in-aid to NGOs listed 1428 https://ngodarpan.gov.in/
on DARPAN portal
C. Grants through CSR Act 18582 https://csr.gov.in/CSR/
D. (d1+d2+d3) Formal giving (income tax 315 https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/
deductions* claimed on budget2018-2019/ub2018-19/
account of donations rec/annex7.pdf
to charitable trusts and 
institutions)
d1 Corporate taxpayer 215
d2 Non-corporate taxpayers 16
(firms/associations of persons 
[AOPs]/body of Individuals 
[BOI])**
d3 Individuals/Hindu undivided 82
family (HUF) taxpayers
E. Everyday/informal giving by 4178 Report: ‘Everyday Giving in India’ 




Source: Internal note prepared by CSIP, 2020 (reproduced here with permission)
* This is the sum total of amounts sanctioned by the central and state government to the NGOs regis-
tered on Darpan.
** This indicates the income tax deductions claimed by corporate, non-corporates, and individuals/
HUF on account of donations to charitable trusts and institutions under section 80G. It is difficult to 
ascertain the total charitable contributions made, as the IT deduction claimed is a function of the tax 
bracket the taxpayers fall into, the deduction they are eligible for (50% versus 100% deduction), and 
the actual donation amount made by the taxpayer. Since individual charitable contribution data are 
not available at a disaggregate level, we cannot comment on the total charitable contributions made 
by these taxpayers.
*** A report by Sattva Consulting estimated that 90% of India’s everyday giving is informal and largely in 
cash; it is mostly targeted to community members such as domestic helpers, homeless, and religious 
or spiritual institutions.
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tax incentive has remained unchanged since the mid-1970s and has seen a noticeable dilution 
in recent years. Moreover, the current tax incentive regime is designed to disproportionately 
incentivise philanthropic donations to government entities. The recent changes in the tax struc-
ture have either expanded the remit of philanthropic donations to the government or removed 
some incentive provisions for donating to NPOs.
There are two main provisions for tax incentives for philanthropic donations detailed in the 
Indian Income Tax Act, 1960. Under Section 80G, individuals and corporations are eligible to 
receive two categories of tax deductions, 100% and 50%, on donations given to government 
entities, government-run funds, trusts, societies, and other bodies that possess an 80G certificate 
(Puri, Nayak, and Dadrawala, 2018). Under Section 80GGA, donations can also be made for 
scientific research or rural development (Srinath, 2003). Section 80G is the broader and most 
widely used tax incentive provision, and under it, the donations made to government entities 
have the highest incentives. Donations made to NPOs attract only a 50% tax deduction, along 
with a ceiling. Other than this, since the financial year (FY) 2015, three main government pro-
grammes have been granted 100% donor exemption status under Section 80G. These are the 
1) Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, 2) Clean Ganga Campaign, and 3) National Fund for Drug Abuse 
(VANI, 2016). Table 13.2 presents a summary of the 80G tax provisions for donations to NPOs 
and government entities.
Donations made under 80GGA (Srinath, 2003), while being fully deductible, apply only to 
institutions undertaking scientific, social science, or statistical research or rural development. 
Additionally, each institution eligible for a donation must be approved by the government under 
Section 35 (1) ii of the Income Tax Act. Moreover, here as well, the list of institutions eligible 
for donations under this section includes government entities and funds, such as public-sector 
companies, government-notified funds for rural development and afforestation, and a national 
fund for poverty eradication.
The 35AC tax incentive provision was introduced in the 1990s, which aimed to promote 
corporate donations. Under the provision, unlike the certificate granted under Section 80G 
(wherein donations made to qualifying NPOs entitles a donor to a 50% tax deduction), the 
35AC certificate is given to NPOs running government-approved projects (Agarwal and 
Table 13.2 Summary overview of India’s tax incentive structure for philanthropy
Tax deduction Ceiling Nature of entity Examples
100% None Central government funds * National Defence Fund
and entities and some state * Prime Minister’s 
government entities/funds National Relief Fund
50% None Central and state government * Jawaharlal Nehru Fund
funds and entities and some * Prime Minister’s 
government entities/funds Drought Relief Fund
100% 10% of the adjusted Central government funds * Government entities 
gross total income and entities and some state involved in family 
government entities/funds planning
* Government entities 
involved in Olympic 
association
50% 10% of the adjusted Non-profit organisations All NPOs with an 80G 





Dadrawala, 2004) in areas such as drinking water projects, building homes for the poor, and 
building schools in economically vulnerable areas. While the provisions allowed the donors 
to deduct the full value of their donations against their taxable income, the exemptions were 
placed for a specific list of projects approved by the central government (VANI, 2016). This 
provision was, however, revoked in 2016–17.
In 2020, the tax incentives for philanthropic donations received further pushback by the 
Indian government with the introduction of a new ‘optional’ tax regime for individual and 
corporate taxpayers in the Union Budget 2020–21. Under this provision, individual taxpayers 
can avail themselves of lower tax rates if they forgo most of the tax incentives, including those 
for donations. Similarly, corporates who forgo tax incentives and exemptions are eligible for a 
reduction in the base tax rate to 22% from 30% (Rajakumar and Shetty, 2020).10 While both 
these rules are optional at present, given that they entail an option of transitioning to a lower tax 
slab, it has far-reaching implications for tax incentives for philanthropic giving.
India’s overall taxation policy, especially the changes in marginal tax rates since globalisation 
(i.e., the mid-1980s, when India began opening up to the world economy), further limits the 
attractiveness of the restricted tax incentives for donations to NPOs. As several experts note, 
tax reforms involving a reduction in marginal tax rates adversely affect donors’ incentives for 
philanthropic giving (Clotfelter, 2012), unless these are compensated for with other incentives 
for inducing generous contributions. Therefore, analysing the marginal tax rate trends as part of 
a country’s tax incentive regime is crucial for understanding the benefits derived by the donors 
and hence their incentive to give. Similar to many other countries across the world, India, too, 
since the mid-1980s11 has seen a reduction in the marginal rates of personal income tax (PIT) 
and corporate income tax (CIT)12 (see Figure 13.2 for peak PIT rates). In addition to these cuts, 
taxes affecting high-income groups such as the inheritance and wealth taxes, were also abolished 
in the 1980s and 2000s13 (Rao and Rao, 2006).
The lower tax rates introduced for PITs in 1997–98 continue to date with three modifica-
tions: a) an increase in the number of tax brackets with the lowest marginal tax rate starting at 
5% from the earlier 10% (as part of tax regime for individual taxpayers introduced in the Union 


































































Figure 13.2  Trend in the peak rates of individual income tax (in %)
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, various years
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to primary education and health,14 (Rao and Rao, 2006); and c) higher surcharges levied on the 
super-rich (since the Indian Union Budget 2019–20) (CBGA, 2019).15
Unlike the trends in PIT rates (which have stabilised and even increased to an extent) CIT 
rates in India have continued to register significant cuts, even in the recent years. Thus, in 
1985–86, the peak corporate tax rate was reduced from around 60% to 50%, further reducing 
to 45% in 1994–95, 30% in 2005–06 (Pattnaik, 2009), and finally to 25% for existing companies 
as of 201916 and 15% for manufacturing companies established after October 2020 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2020).
However, the decline in tax rates in India did not accompany corresponding measures to 
increase tax incentives for charitable donations, thereby reducing their attractiveness over time 
(Viswanath and Dadrawala, 2004). Recent changes have in fact diluted the tax incentives for 
philanthropic donations.
Are tax incentives for philanthropic donations costly  
to the Indian government?
India is one of the lowest-taxed countries in the world, with the total (union plus state) tax 
to gross domestic product ratio being as low as 18% in 2020. Several experts suggest reducing 
the tax incentives17 (including for philanthropic donations) to broaden the country’s tax base 
and increase the potential tax revenue. However, regarding tax incentives for philanthropic 
donations to NPOs, it is important to assess whether the potential revenue generated by the 
withdrawal of tax incentives is large enough to warrant their removal. It is highly likely that the 
potential revenue generated from such a withdrawal may be negligible compared to the adverse 
impact on the functioning of the non-profit sector. As shown in Figure 13.3, the revenue fore-
gone from individual and corporate donations as shares of PIT and CIT collections, respectively, 
0.44 0.38 0.32
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0.26 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.19
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Revenue foregone due to individuals' donation as share of
PIT
Revenue foregone due to corporates' donation as share of
CIT
Figure 13.3  Revenue foregone on account of deductions claimed on donations by individuals and cor-
porate taxpayers as a percentage of their respective tax revenues
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Receipt Budget, Union Budget documents, various years












Figure 13.4  Revenue foregone on account of philanthropic donations as a percentage of revenue fore-
gone on PIT and CIT
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Receipt Budget, Union Budget documents, various years
Note: RE: Revised estimate; the rest of the figures denote the actuals.
are quite small. Further, in the case of individual taxpayers, this share has consistently remained 
lower than the high reached in 2009–10. Revenue foregone on account of corporate donations 
as share of corporate income tax collection has returned to the high registered in 2014–15, but 
it still remains much below 1% of corporate income tax revenue collected.
Notably, the revenue foregone figures provided by the government are aggregate figures, 
which do not segregate between revenue foregone on account of donations to government 
entities and funds or donations to the NPOs. Given that the former attracts a more generous tax 
deduction, the revenue foregone on account of donations to NPOs is likely to be much lower 
than the aggregate figures cited in the budget documents.
The combined revenue lost due to tax incentives for philanthropic donations by both indi-
vidual and corporate donors over the last decade (see Figure 13.4) constitutes less than 2% of 
total revenue foregone on income tax collection.
Given this context, the move towards a blanket removal of all types of incentives, without 
undertaking an in-depth cost-benefit analysis of their effectiveness against their basic objectives, 
does seem somewhat arbitrary. However, there is an acute lack of such literature in the case of 
philanthropic donations. The few studies available are dated and of little relevance for the pre-
sent context when marginal tax rates for individuals and corporates have declined significantly 
(Aggarwal, 1989; GOI, 2001). Furthermore, there is a lack of publicly accessible data on the 
amount of donations, making a rigorous analysis of the implications for philanthropic activities 
in India difficult.
The previous analysis shows that with globalisation, while India’s taxation strategy has seen 
a significant change, its tax incentive framework for charitable donations has either remained 
static (for the most popular tax incentive scheme under Section 80G) or has been completely 
dismantled (as in the case of the tax incentive under Section 35AC). Consequently, the benefit 
donors can derive from such tax incentives has shrunk over time. The analysis of the data on 
revenue foregone indicates that phasing out of tax incentives for charitable donations is unlikely 
to generate substantial additional potential revenue for the state exchequer. Such a move, how-
ever, is likely to have a disproportionately adverse impact on NPOs by blocking a major funding 
source.
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3 India’s tax incentives and their impact on philanthropy: a global 
overview
Compared to the 11 countries we studied in our project, India’s tax incentive regime can be 
characterised as conservative in what we define as its ‘provision’ and ‘scope’. Unlike countries 
such as Brazil, India’s tax incentives for philanthropic donations do not disincentivise philan-
thropy; however, the existing structure does not prioritise tax incentives as an instrument to 
facilitate donations. The tax incentive structures of the 12 study countries (including India) are 
analysed under the ‘provisions’ of these incentives, which refers to the specific mechanisms for 
providing incentives on individual incomes and assets, and business income. We also examine it 
on the ‘scope’ of the incentives, which includes the rates of incentives, ceilings, and the sectors 
eligible for charitable giving.
Provisions of tax incentives
As presented in Table 13.3, our study countries have three forms of tax incentives on personal 
income tax (PIT), namely deductions, credit, and grossed-up donation. Deductions are the most 
common form and are available in all the study countries, except France and South Korea. In 
these two countries, tax incentives are given in the form of credit. The United Kingdom is a 
unique case, with two forms of incentives, deductions and grossed-up donations. India provides 
tax incentives on both personal and corporate income tax channelled only through standard 
deductions. The form of tax incentives influences charitable donations in important ways. Cred-
its reduce the tax outflow of donors more than deductions.18 Grossed-up donations are most 
beneficial to high-income donors, giving them the maximum reduction in tax outflows.19 In a 
Table 13.3  Summary of tax incentive provisions on personal income tax, individual assets, and cross-border 
donations
Countries Deductions Credit Grossed-up Inheritance Wealth Capital Donation/ Cross-border
tax tax gains tax gift Tax
United States Yes Yes Yes Yes
UK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
China Yes
South Africa1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Singapore Yes
Norway Yes Yes
Brazil Yes Yes Yes
Mexico Yes Yes
India Yes
Bangladesh Yes Yes Yes
South Korea Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Based on Report on the State of Tax Incentives across the 12 countries under finalisation by CBGA 
and CSIP
1 Only businesses are allowed to make cross-border donations.
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grossed-up donation-based approach, charities get greater monetary benefit as compared with 
deductions or credit-based provisions. Grossed-up donations seem to prioritise High Net 
Worth Individuals (HNWIs), as they are the most responsive to tax incentives.20 For small 
donors, grossed-up donations provide greater worth to the monetary value of the donations 
they make. The government monetarily matches the amount donated to a charity, so for every 
amount donated, the charity receives an equal amount from the government, also increasing the 
value of the donation made. The use of either of these forms would significantly enhance the 
impact of tax incentives in India.
Furthermore, as Table 13.3 highlights, India does not have any of the other taxes (other 
than capital gains tax); hence, there are no incentives on those, examples being wealth tax, 
estate duty, or inheritance tax. The gift tax is applicable in India, Bangladesh, Brazil, and 
South Africa, which is included under the donation tax. However, only India does not pro-
vide an incentive for philanthropy on gift tax. It is also among the four sample countries 
(the others are China, Brazil, and Singapore) that do not provide incentives for cross-border 
donations.
Scope of tax incentives
Tax incentive provisions are primarily defined by their scope of implementation and are effec-
tive only when their scope targets a wide range of donors and philanthropic causes. The scope 
of tax incentives on individual incomes, assets, donations, and corporate taxes depends on fac-
tors such as the rate of incentives, the ceiling on income and the tax payable, and the eligibility 
of the sectors. Table 13.4 highlights the rate of incentives and the ceilings applicable on PIT in 
the study countries and shows that India is the only country that incentivises donations to gov-
ernment entities over and above NPOs. Most countries have implemented 100% incentives for 
NPOs with some ceilings, whereas India (along with two other countries) offers tax incentives 
at less than 100% with ceilings.
Table 13.4 Summary of tax incentives rates on personal income tax and applicable ceilings
Country Form Rate of incentives Ceiling (income and tax payable)
Singapore Deduction 250% No limit
UK Deduction and 100% 100% of tax payable
grossed up
USA Deduction 100% 60% of taxable income
China Deduction 100% 30% of taxable income
S. Africa Deduction 100% 10% of taxable income
Brazil Deduction 100% 8% of tax payable with charity area-based exemptions
Mexico Deduction 100% 7% of previous year’s taxable income
Norway Deduction 100% NOK 50,000
India Deduction 50%, 100% 10% of taxable income in most cases, 100% when 
donating to select government funds and entities
Bangladesh Deduction 15% Maximum donation allowed is 30% of taxable 
income or BDT 15 million, whichever is lower
France Credit 66%, 75% 20% of taxable income
S. Korea Credit 15%, 30% 100% of tax payable
Source: An interim report on the state of tax incentives across the 12 countries by CBGA and CSIP, 2021 
(reproduced with permission)
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Table 13.5 summarises the provisions and the scope for a tax incentive for businesses, reveal-
ing that here as well, India is the only country that incentivises donations to government entities.
Table 13.5 Summary of tax incentive rates for businesses
Country Form Rate of incentives Ceiling (income and tax payable)
Singapore Deduction 250% No limit
UK Deduction 100% 100% of tax payable
S. Korea Deduction 100% 50% of taxable income
USA Deduction 100% 30% of taxable income
China Deduction 100% 12% of taxable income
S. Africa Deduction 100% 10% of taxable income
Brazil Deduction 100% 8% of taxable income
Mexico Deduction 100% 7% of last year’s income
Norway Deduction 100% NOK 50,000
India Deduction 50%, 100% 10% of taxable income in most cases, 100% when 
donating to select government funds and entities
Bangladesh Deduction 10% Maximum donation allowed is 10% of taxable income 
or BDT 120 million whichever is lower
France Credit 60% 0.5% of the annual revenue
Source: Report on the State of Tax Incentives across the 12 countries under finalisation by CBGA and 
CSIP, 2021 (reproduced with permission)
Table 13.6 Common causes eligible for tax incentives across the study countries22




China Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France Y Y Y Y Y Y
India Y Y Y Y Y
Mexico
Norway Y Y Y Y Y
Singapore Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
South Africa Y Y Y
South Korea Y Y
UK Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
USA Y Y Y Y Y Y
* Human Rights
The list of causes eligible for tax incentives further determines the scope of the incentives21. 
India has a moderate range of causes eligible for tax incentives. While it does not include areas 
such as human rights, it has a generic area called ‘objects of general public utility’. While this 
provision expands the scope of the eligible causes that are incentivised, it also significantly 
increases the discretionary powers of the government. Table 13.6 presents the most common 
philanthropic causes eligible for tax incentives among the study countries.
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4 Strengthening India’s tax incentive regime: policy 
recommendations
India is among the six countries in our study cohort that have some documentation on the 
impact of tax incentives. But the Indian studies are dated and belong to an era when tax rates 
were high, which made tax incentives lucrative. Therefore, the recent changes in India’s tax 
incentives regime were implemented without a systematic analysis of their economic, legal, and 
regulatory impact on civil society. Such a study would provide the foundational step in improv-
ing and strengthening the tax incentive regime in India, consequently improving the access to 
funding in Indian civil society. We strongly recommend that such a study be commissioned by 
an appropriate government authority.
The best studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives are available in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. They highlight the strengths and limitations of the evidence generated 
through such an analysis. The econometric analysis of price elasticities of tax incentives high-
lights their financial efficacy, although they do not shed enough light on the other roles tax 
incentives play for civil society. Most studies in this stream of research conclude that the increase 
in philanthropic giving generated through an increase in tax incentives, is either non-existent 
or marginal. A key variation is in the price elasticity of different income groups. In the context 
of France (Fack and Landais, 2010), the United Kingdom (Scharf and Smith, 2009), and the 
United States (Bijika, 2013; Backus and Grant, 2019), studies estimate higher elasticities for 
high-income groups, whereas in South Korea (Park and Jeon, 2017) and Singapore (Chua and 
Wong, 1999), the price elasticity of lower-income groups is higher than that of high-income 
groups. The characteristics of the dataset used can especially impact the estimates of the price 
elasticity of tax incentives. The study by Duquette (2016), which uses the data on donations 
received by charities in the United States, estimates that a 1% increase in the tax cost of philan-
thropy leads to a 4% fall in the donations received by charities. Focusing on the charity data, 
this study analysed the donations made to religious organisations and organisations with assets 
valued at less than 100 million USD that are not required to file tax returns. These organisations 
have been mostly excluded from the datasets used in other studies in the United States. We rec-
ommend that an income group-focused study that uses data from both the donors and charity 
organisations would be well suited to understand the financial impact of tax incentives in India. 
However, to undertake this study, data availability remains a critical challenge.
Among our study countries, India lacks sufficient data transparency on taxes (others include 
Bangladesh, China, Mexico, and South Africa) and the scale of donation activities (along with 
Bangladesh, China, Mexico, South Africa, Singapore, and South Korea), posing serious chal-
lenges in conducting a systematic analysis. Without these two data sets, the effectiveness of 
incentives cannot be understood. The United Kingdom and the United States are the only 
countries which provide high-quality data for the study of tax incentives. Table 13.7 summarises 
the types of data available in these two countries and the research analyses they enable from a 
policy perspective.
We also argue that a comprehensive study on the effectiveness of tax incentives should focus 
on the other benefits for donations such as legal recognition of the non-profit sector as a whole 
and individual charities, particularly in remote areas. Tax incentives also establish and anchor 
the state-civil society relationship through a formal and a historically well-established regulatory 
channel. While some sections of civil society are informal in nature and outside the regulatory 
ambit such as that of tax incentives, there is a prominent segment that works with the govern-
ment in service delivery activities, which could benefit from legal recognition and tax incen-
tives. At a normative level, such recognition of charitable activities enables civil society activism 
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Table 13.7 Summary of data required to study tax effectiveness and related research areas
Country Tax data Scale of donations Research areas
United * Summary of individual * Scale of donation data * Effectiveness of 
Kingdom income tax returns available at the level of tax incentives for 
* Total number of donors individual individuals and business 
and amount donated * Sector specific-data on in terms of level and 
by both individuals and level of donations, for number of donors at 
businesses example, on health, different income levels 
* Deductions claimed education, and so on and charity sectors
by individuals as part 
of payroll giving, gift 
aid, self-assessment tax 
returns
* Tax relief provided on 
inheritance, payroll 
and gift of shares and 
property, gift aid
United States * Summary of * Overall quantum * Effectiveness of 
income tax returns of charitable giving tax incentives for 
of individuals and in billion USD individuals and 
businesses further divided by businesses in terms 
* Income group level donors, individuals, of level and number 
details of itemised corporations of donors at different 
deductions claimed * Individual giving as income levels and 
* IT returns of charitable percentage of disposable charity sectors
organisations income and business * Effectiveness of tax 
giving as a percent of incentives based on 
profit donation data from 
charities
Sources: CAF/NCVO, 2010; NCVO, 2017; HMRC, 2019; NCVO Charity Tax Commission, 2019; Giv-
ing USA, 2020; IRS, 2020; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2020
and provides a critical feedback loop on government policies, programmes, and actions. The 
formalisation of civil society strengthens the state-society relationships and creates an effective 
ground for democratic functioning. Thus, a comprehensive study of the multiple registers at 
which tax incentives link the state with the non-profit sector is a first step in strengthening 
India’s tax incentive regime for civil society.
Conclusion
Despite its widespread destruction and challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted 
the urgent need for a constructive relationship between the non-profit sector and the Indian 
state. The need to define the contours of the legal and regulatory environment of the non-profit 
sector to meet the demands of the current times has never been clearer, with the tax incentive 
regime being a critical component. Furthermore, evaluating the contributions of tax incentives 
to the non-profit sector is essential to strengthening the tax regime around the specific needs of 
the non-profit sector. As this sector has numerous small NPOs, small donors should be incen-
tivised or enabled to avail themselves of tax incentives more easily. It is likely that high-income 
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donors work with large NPOs, and therefore their incentive provisions could be modified to 
match the provisions for grossed-up donations like in the United Kingdom for better monetary 
benefits. Other types of incentives for high-income donors should be considered, for which 
new types of taxes such as wealth tax and inheritance tax may need to be introduced. Our 
analysis highlighted that although tax incentives are not the financial backbone of the non-profit 
sector, their removal may significantly and adversely alter the legal and regulatory relationship 
between the state and the non-profit sector, the consequences of which are not fully understood 
given the lack of research and data. Therefore, we strongly recommend that the government 
reconsider further removal of tax incentives and commission a rigorous study of the role of tax 
incentives in the non-profit sector in India.
Notes
 1 Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief in Emergency Situations Fund (PM CARES Fund) has 
been set up as a public charitable trust. Its objective is to provide financial and other assistance and relief 
in the face of crisis and calamity such as COVID-19.
 2 The countries are France, Norway, Brazil, Mexico, China, South Africa, India, Bangladesh, Singapore, 
South Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
 3 Each of these legal forms is governed by national and state-level acts and has different compliance 
requirements.
 4 The study states that the distribution of NPOs registered in the GuideStar database reflects the distribu-
tion and thematic focus areas of other publicly available databases for Indian NGOs such as the Darpan 
database.
 5 The study sampled 800 NPOs across India from a database of 3500+ verified NGOs available with 
GuideStar India. All 800 NPOs were the ones which responded to the survey. The GuideStar database 
reflects the distribution and focus area of other publicly available databases for Indian NGOs such as 
the Darpan database.
 6 This cohort does not include foundations.
 7 1 USD = 73.3 INR (see https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=500%2C000&F
rom=INR&To=USD).
 8 Maharashtra, therefore, has a very well-developed NPO ecosystem whose NPOs receive wide recogni-
tion for their work. This is not the case with other states, although the causality is difficult to attribute.
 9 An accurate assessment of the amount of tax incentivised for donations is not possible due to two 
prominent limitations of this data. First, the figure represents the revenue foregone by the govern-
ment, which includes exemptions given to the donations made to government trusts and funds as well 
as other NPOs. Second, it may not include the contributions made by high-net-worth individuals 
because they ‘typically make philanthropic contributions either independently or through a family-run 
foundation, and are neither required to report their philanthropic investments, nor to claim tax exemp-
tions’ (CSIP, 2020).
 10 This move reduces the effective tax rate to 25.17%, (inclusive of surcharge and cess) as against the exist-
ing statutory tax rate of 34.32%.
 11 See Chattopadhyay, 2011; Rao et al., 2016.
 12 A part of this discussion is based on (Chakravarty, 2014); see (Chattopadhyay, 2011; Rao et al., 2016).
 13 Long-term capital gains tax on securities has been re-introduced in the budget 2018–19.
 14 These are applicable on all taxes.
 15 Taxable income between INR 20 million and INR 50 million now attracts a 25% surcharge, while 
taxable income above INR 50 million attracts a 37% surcharge. The surcharge rate for both taxable 
income groups was 15% earlier.
 16 Twenty-two percent in case companies do not avail of any tax incentives.
 17 That is, tax concessions of all kinds.
 18 To illustrate, on a monthly salary of 1000 INR, which receives a 20% tax cut for a 100-INR dona-
tion, in a deduction-based tax incentive. Here, the donated amount is deducted from the pre-tax salary 
(1000 INR), and the tax outflow reduces from 200 INR to 180 INR if there is no tax incentive on 
donations. However, in a credit-based incentive, the tax outflow will reduce to 100 INR because the 
Tax incentives and NPOs in India
251
donated amount is deducted from the tax the donor will pay. In both cases, we assume that the entire 
amount donated is eligible for tax incentive.
 19 The grossed-up donation-based approach to incentives has two components. First is the grossed-up 
section, in which both the amount donated and the tax applicable are given to the charity. Notably, 
this provision directs the revenue foregone by the government to the charity and not the donor. The 
donor benefits because this provision amplifies the monetary value of the amount donated. Second is 
the rebate component, which is applicable to high-income donors who face high (e.g., 40%) tax rates. 
In this, the government pays to the donor the tax amount over and above the standard rate, that is, the 
difference between the higher tax rate of 40% and the standard tax rate at 20%.
 20 This does not include grossed-up donations in Ireland.
 21 The eligible causes are only one among the many eligibility criteria for an organisation to fulfil to 
receive tax incentives.
 22 In some countries, the causes for charitable donations differ for individuals and businesses. This table 
represents only the causes applicable to individual donations.
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1 Introduction
a Current Swiss legal framework
Switzerland is one of the countries whose legal framework includes a system of tax deductions 
to incentivize charitable giving (OECD 2020).1
Under the current Swiss law, taxpayers can deduct charitable donations from their taxable 
income (individuals) or taxable profits (corporations) subject to a specific threshold. In order to 
be deductible, the donation must be made to legal entities that benefit from a tax exemption as a 
result of the fact that they are pursuing public service or public-interest goals.2 The law and case 
law specify the tax-exemption conditions for such entities, notably that economic goals cannot 
be considered public-interest purposes and that acquiring and managing significant corporate 
equity is considered a public-interest goal only when the interest in keeping such an entity is 
subordinate to the public-interest goals [Art. 56 (g) LIFD]. Such exoneration requirements 
apply to the entities subjected to limited and unlimited tax liability in Switzerland, that is, both 
to resident entities and to permanent establishments. Legal entities governed by public law and 
semi-public companies do not fall into this scope.3
A threshold applies to the amount of the deduction of charitable donations from taxable 
income and profits. At the federal level, this threshold is 20% of the net taxable income or profits 
with a minimum donation requirement of CHF 100. Nearly all cantonal legislations adopted 
the same limit of 20% (often without minimum donation requirement), even though federal 
law does not impose any requirement in this respect:4 as a result of the principle of the cantonal 
autonomy in fixing tax rates, which is enshrined in the Art. 129 of the Swiss Federal Constitu-
tion, tax allowances applied by the cantons and the communes are in effect their sole preroga-
tive. The threshold of a charitable deduction is calculated as follows: first, one must discount all 
deductions from the gross income that are mentioned in articles 26 to 33 of the DFTA (those 
include the deductions related to self-employed business activity, to wealth, social deductions, 
etc.). Second, the calculation of the 20% threshold is based on the remaining taxable income 
after these deductions. The charitable donation is deducted from the remaining income and 
capped – if necessary – at the aforesaid threshold.
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b The 2006 federal direct tax law reform
The 20% threshold of taxable income or profits was introduced on January 1, 2006, as part 
of a larger reform of the Swiss federal tax law.5 Prior to this reform, the threshold was 10%. 
The goal of the 2006 reform was “the liberalization of the Swiss foundation law in order to 
boost the establishment of foundations”.6 Through this reform, the legislator in fact expressed 
its will to encourage more people “to give up part of their wealth” to charitable foundations, 
due to the fact that private foundations were the most popular vehicles (though not the only 
ones) in Switzerland for hosting charitable activities, as well as the fact that private wealth 
had risen sharply in the years preceding the reform.7 The main part of this reform aimed at 
modifying civil law norms related to different aspects of foundations. However, tax law modi-
fications were also carried out as the previous legal framework was considered an insufficient 
incentive for individuals to part with “important” portion of their wealth.8 Thus, even though 
the objectives of these changes were only articulated in very general terms9 (which in itself 
is problematic), it is safe to assume that at least one of its goals was to encourage significant 
donations.
The federal tax law amendments directly impacted charitable giving in three manners.10 
First, as already said, the existing threshold for deduction of charitable donations was increased 
from 10% to 20% of taxable income or profits. Second, the law introduced a possibility to 
deduct non-cash donations. Third, the law added a new clause stating that donations to the 
Swiss Confederation, the cantons, the communes and their institutions are deductible to the 
same extent as donations to charitable tax-exempt entities. Overall, those three tax law amend-
ments significantly expanded the potential for tax deductions.
During the legislative process, the most important discussions concerned the first measure, 
that is, the increase in the threshold for deductible donations. The Economic Affairs and Taxa-
tion Committee of the Council of States,11 reporting on this legislative proposal, was convinced 
that the activities of foundations pursuing public service or public utility goals would effec-
tively be fostered through a more generous practice of deducting donations, as proposed by the 
reform.12 In fact, the initial project suggested increasing the deductions for direct federal tax 
to 40% of net income or net profit. What is more, under certain specific conditions, such as a 
particularly important public interest, an enduring commitment to finance a foundation and at 
least an equivalent deduction granted by a canton and municipality (the latter norm had some 
logic of “matching” mechanisms), the tax deduction allowed by the direct federal tax would 
have been able to reach even 100%.13 Thus, the initial suggested changes offered very generous 
tax deductions.
However, the large increases in deductible thresholds were dismissed in the context of the 
legislative procedure. During the consultation phase with the cantons, which is a part of the 
legislative process in Switzerland,14 the vast majority of cantons resolutely rejected a quadru-
pling of the deduction (from 10% to 40%).15 As a result, the 100% deduction, even in restrictive 
conditions, was also rejected, on the basis that it would affect the fiscal substance of the public 
authorities too profoundly.16 The Federal Council used public law and finance arguments to 
reject the proposed increases. It highlighted that this type of deduction leads to unequal treat-
ment, as taxpayers taxed at high marginal tax rates are favored over those with lower incomes. 
Also, extending too widely the possibility of making a deduction seriously undermines the 
distinctive fiscal character of taxes, whose goal is to finance the tasks of the State, whatever they 
may be.17 In addition, the Federal Council pointed out that the norms instituting such deduc-
tions were questionable from a public finance perspective, because not only they do not respect 
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the principle of “gross accounting”, but they also ultimately restrict the financial sovereignty 
of the Federal Parliament. In particular, by allowing a taxpayer to decide on the allocation of 
certain funds to certain public tasks, the system would be delegating some budgetary authority 
to the taxpayer; such standards are not compatible with the requirements of the Federal Finance 
Act.18 In the end, the threshold of 20% was adopted.19
Other tax law changes did not give rise to controversial discussions. The deductibility of 
non-cash donations was widely approved, with some cantons only pointing out the potential 
valuation problems that could arise.20 The deductibility of voluntary contributions to the Con-
federation, the cantons, the communes and their related public institutions was also introduced 
without particular objections. In fact, the reason behind this provision was mainly to ensure that 
universities, which in Switzerland are mainly federal or cantonal institutions,21 also benefit from 
the liberalization of the charitable deductions system: the proposal highlighted the need to fund 
considerable investments in teaching, research and science.22 The Economic Affairs and Taxa-
tion Committee specifically highlighted in its Report that donations for research and education 
were very relevant for the State and could help to relieve its burden in this area.23
The federal law changes were followed by cantonal law modifications. In Geneva, the thresh-
old of 5% of the taxable net income24 was raised to 20% in 2010.25 In 2009, deductions for legal 
entities were raised from 10% of the taxable corporate income to 20%.26
The introduction of different thresholds in the Swiss federal and Geneva cantonal law was 
introduced as shown in Table 14.1.
c Objectives
To our knowledge, the effectiveness of the 2006 income tax law reform has never been evalu-
ated, neither at the federal nor at cantonal level.27 In general, very little research and data exist in 
Switzerland regarding taxpayers’ giving behavior in relation to tax incentives. Therefore, the aim 
of this chapter (which is a part of a larger project evaluating the efficiency of tax incentives for 
charitable giving in Switzerland) is to provide, using descriptive statistics, a first insight into the 
charitable giving behavior in the Canton of Geneva (GE) and to identify any possible changes 
in behavior – if any – correlated with the 2006 tax reform. The Canton of Geneva is one of 
the most important cantons in Switzerland, having the fifth-largest population and second-
highest gross domestic product per capita.28 Also, and importantly, it is a national as well as 
international philanthropy hub. As a result, observing the patterns of charitable giving behavior 
in relation to tax incentives among the Geneva population may provide significant information 
for policymakers.
Table 14.1  Deductible thresholds in federal and Geneva cantonal income tax laws during the studied 
timeframe
Threshold 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Federal law Individual 10% 20%
Corporate*
Cantonal law (GE) Individual 5% 20%
Corporate* 10% 20%
* This table shows both individual and corporate income tax thresholds; however, the focus of the current 
chapter is only on individual income taxation.
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The present chapter focuses on the tax filing data described in the following section. 
It analyses the giving behavior which can be observed on the basis of tax returns and not 
the overall charitable giving behavior (e.g. donations not claiming any tax deductions for 
their gifts) (see Adena, Chapter 12; Adena et al. 2014; Adena and Huck 2019).29,30,31 This 
chapter will therefore not provide conclusions about the general giving behavior in the 
Canton of Geneva; it only focuses on specific tax-related patterns. In addition, based on 
this study, it will not be possible to draw definitive conclusions as to whether the changes 
of giving behavior – if any – were caused by a specific measure of the previously mentioned 
reform (increase in threshold, introduction of the possibility of non-cash deductions or 
the possibility to deduct donations to State entities), as segregated data for those categories 
were not available.
2 Material and methods
The outcomes presented in this chapter are related to taxpayer behavior for charitable giving 
over a time framework of 11 years (2001–2011) based on data from the Canton of Geneva.
Data were collected in the given years by the Tax Administration of the Canton of Geneva 
through its taxpayers’ returns and were confidentially shared for the sake of our analysis. A dif-
ferent data set was provided for each year under study for a total of 11 data sets. Each data set 
consisted of the same eight variables, listed and described in the following with the original 
French name provided in the data set:
• “identifiant”: a coded ID for each taxpayers. This variable allows, in principle, to follow 
the same taxpayer over time. In other words, the same coded ID is used for a given taxpayer 
for each fiscal year. As Switzerland has a joint filling system, married couples are consid-
ered and treated as one taxpayer in the same way as a single non-married individual and 
have only one coded ID (in this chapter, any deducting taxpayer, couple or individual is 
referred to as “deducter”). The code ID may change from one year to another in specific 
cases, mainly therefore: 1) replacement of one ID by another in the event of the death of 
a married taxpayer (“principal” taxpayer) by his surviving spouse; 2) disappearance of an 
ID in case of marriage between two taxpayers: the “main” taxpayer (often the husband) 
remains, and the spouse disappears; 3) appearance of a new ID in the case of divorce or 
separation of two taxpayers: the “main” taxpayer (often the husband) remains, and the 
spouse appears; 4) replacement of one ID by another in case of a change of surname or 
modification/correction of the date of birth. In all four situations, it is not possible to track 
a given taxpayer over time.
• “annee_de_naissance”: the year of birth of a taxpayer. For married couples, it is the year of 
birth of the “principal” taxpayer.
• “revenu_net_imposable_GE”: the net taxable income in the Canton of Geneva. In 2010 
and 2011, the canton of Geneva has introduced several changes to its personal income 
tax law (e.g., extension of the deduction for family expenses). Those changes to a certain 
extent influenced the definition of taxable income for cantonal tax purposes. For this rea-
son, the calculation of taxable income of 2001 through 2009 to a certain extent diverges 
from its calculation in 2010 and 2011.30
• “revenu_net_imposable_taux”: the net taxable income applied to set the tax rate; it includes 
any foreign income.
• “fortune_brute”: gross wealth.
• “fortune_imposable”: taxable wealth.
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• “bareme_revenu”: the binary (0/1) indication of a possible “splitting” of income tax rate 
in the tax income computation, showing if a taxpayer is a couple (1) and not a single indi-
vidual (0) (see the previous description of “identifiant”).
• “versements_benevoles”: the amount of deduction (if any) for charitable giving, repre-
senting the entire annual amount of the deducted donations (in case it is less than the 
deductible threshold) or capped amount of annual donations, if exceeding the deductible 
threshold.
Since the main relevant variables for the purpose of this study were “identifiant” and “verse-
ments_benevoles”, a longitudinal data set representing the Canton of Geneva taxpayers from 
2001 to 2011 was created and analyzed. In addition, we have used the variable net taxable 
income for tax rate overall (“revenu_net_imposable_taux”) to identify patterns of giving behav-
ior in 2001 and 2011. The outcomes are summarized in the “Results” section.
The characteristics of the available data do not allow checking whether the amounts deducted 
by taxpayers represent the full donation or only the part capped at the threshold level (10% prior 
to 2006 and 20% after 2006 for federal income tax purposes); as a result, in certain cases (which 
we cannot identify), only the deducted amount and not the whole amount of donation can 
be observed. In other words, the total amounts of all charitable donations are not known to us 
for the given 11 years (2001–2011) in the Canton of Geneva, as the present data encompass 
both the un-capped deductions (representing full amounts of donations) and the capped deduc-
tions (representing incomplete amounts of donations) without distinguishing between those 
two categories.31
3 Results
The total number of Geneva taxpayers was calculated. Its trend positively increased every year, 
from a minimum of 234,117 in 2001 to a maximum of 266,336 in 2011. The percentage 
change over the years is reported in the last column of Table 14.2, together with the percent-
age of Geneva deducting taxpayers (second-to-last column) computed for each of the 11 years 
in the given time framework period. From 2001 to 2011, the number of deducting taxpayers 
more than doubled, going from 8.3% of the total number of taxpayers in 2001 to 19.3% of the 
Table 14.2 Descriptive statistics of taxpayers’ population by year (2001–2011)
Year Number of Deducting Non- % of deducting % yearly change 
taxpayers deducting taxpayers in taxpayers
2001 234,117 19,335 214,782  8.3%  
2002 236,341 25,272 211,069 10.7% 0.9%
2003 237,777 30,276 207,501 12.7% 0.6%
2004 240,254 35,192 205,062 14.7% 1.0%
2005 242,521 39,553 202,968 16.3% 0.9%
2006 245,224 39,511 205,713 16.1% 1.1%
2007 248,017 42,248 205,769 17.0% 1.1%
2008 250,886 44,707 206,179 18.0% 1.2%
2009 256,236 47,349 208,887 18.5% 2.1%
2010 261,703 49,389 212,314 18.9% 2.1%
2011 266,336 51,492 214,844 19.3% 1.8%
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total number of taxpayers in 2011. The absolute numbers of these values are 19,335 (number 
of deducting taxpayers in 2001) and 51,492 (number of deducting taxpayers in 2011). Further, 
detailed information for the years under review can be found in Table 14.2, including the abso-
lute number of non-deducting taxpayers and the percentage change of taxpayers from one year 
to the other.
Table 14.2 shows the absolute number of taxpayers, split between deducting and not deduct-
ing, from year 2001 to year 2011. The percentage of Geneva deducting taxpayers, and related 
changes, are also shown.
The total amount of deductions has been computed from year 2001 to year 2011. The 
amounts presented in the current chapter were not inflation-adjusted; however, the income 
classes were objectively computed by population percentages (25%, 25%, 25%, 20%, 4%, 1%). 
The absolute range for the amount of deductions is large, going from a minimum of CHF 
29,133,697 in 2001 to a maximum of CHF 84,014,116 in 2010, with a substantial increase of 
48% from 2008 to 2009. Overall, the total amount of deductions positively increased between 
2001 and 2010, with a negligible (–0.7%) decrease from 2005 to 2006 and a slightly higher 
decrease (–13.4%) from 2010 to 2011, as shown in the third column of Table 14.3. While the 
mean deductions range varies from a minimum of CHF 1,098 to a maximum of CHF 1,701, 
with a CHF 603 difference and a mainly negative trend between the years, the median deduc-
tion range is smaller: from 270 to 393, with a difference of CHF 123 and a slow decrease over 
the years as seen in Figure 14.2. The latter result is validated by the outcome presented in the 
last column of Table 14.3, showing a prevalence of negative percentage of the change in median 
deductions among deducters from 2001 to 2011.
Table 14.3 represents the amount of deductions and related percentage change from 2001 to 
2011. The mean and median deductions among deducters, together with the latter percentage 
change, are also reported.
In addition, we have carried out an analysis of giving by income using as a variable the tax-
able income for tax rate (“revenu_net_imposable_taux”). To that effect, we have divided the 
taxpayers by income classes into six categories, representing the following percentages of the 
taxpayer population (see Annexes 1 and 2): “low” (bottom 25% of taxpayers), “low-middle” 
(25% of taxpayers) and “middle” (25% of taxpayers). The remaining 25% of the taxpayers have 
Table 14.3 Amount of deductions and related percentage change from 2001 to 2011
Year Amount of % yearly change Mean deductions Median deductions % change in 
deductions in the amount of among deducters among deducters median deductions 
(CHF) deductions (CHF) (CHF) among deducters
2001 29,133,697   1,507 393  
2002 33,248,984 14.1% 1,315 360 –8.4%
2003 33,507,115 0.8% 1,098 305 –15.3%
2004 41,229,743 23.0% 1,171 300 –1.6%
2005 47,381,886 14.9% 1,197 300 0.0%
2006 47,056,580 –0.7% 1,190 298 –0.7%
2007 50,968,564 8.3% 1,206 280 –6.0%
2008 51,735,693 1.5% 1,147 270 –3.6%
2009 76,574,313 48.0% 1,617 280 3.7%
2010 84,014,116 9.7% 1,701 290 3.6%
2011 72,741,235 –13.4% 1,412 280 –3.4%
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been divided into smaller income categories in order to make an in-depth analysis of the giving 
behavior of taxpayers belonging to the highest income classes. Thus, the following income class 
categories were established: “middle-high” (20% of taxpayers), “high” (4% of taxpayers) and 
“very high” (top 1% of taxpayers).
The analysis by income class shows that the amount of charitable deductions increases with 
the increase of the taxpayers’ income. The largest amount of deductions is provided by the 
taxpayers belonging to the highest income class (“very high”, i.e., 1%), accounting for 23.1% 
(2001) and 37.8% (2011) of deducting taxpayers as in Figure 14.1. The top 25% income classes 
(middle-high, high and very high together) account for 79.6% (2001) and 73.8% (2011) of the 
total deductions. The percentage of taxpayers deducting charitable donations in the respec-
































Year 2001: deductions by income class
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Year 2011: deductions by income class
Amount of Deductions (CHF) % of Deducting Taxpayers among same income class
Figure 14.1  Amount of deductions and percentage of deducting taxpayers for each of the six income 
class categories in the year 2001 (above) and in the year 2011 (below). The six income class 
categories represent different percentages of the total income amount: Low, Low-Middle 
and Middle correspond to 25% each, while Middle-High indicates 20%, High 4% and Very-
High the top 1%
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an important increase in deducters in 2011 in comparison with 2001. Concerning the median 
deductions by income class, they also increase with the increase of income, rising especially 
sharply in the last three income classes. However, the median deductions in all income classes 
are significantly lower in 2011 than in 2001 as shown in Figure 14.2.
4 Discussion
The descriptive statistics presented in the “Results” section of this study provide several insights 
into taxpayer’s giving behavior in the Canton of Geneva; these could be of interest for policy 
makers. In addition, it offers a first glimpse into the effects – if any – of the 2006 tax reform.
The first observation is that the percentage of deducters among Geneva’s taxpayers more than 






























Year 2001: median deduction by income class






























Year 2011: median deduction by income class
Amount of Deductions (CHF) Median deduction per income class
Figure 14.2  Amount of deductions and median deductions for each of the six income class categories 
in the year 2001 (above) 2011 (below). The six income class categories represent different 
percentages of the total income amount: Low, Low-Middle and Middle correspond to 25% 
each, while Middle-High indicates 20%, High 4% and Very-High the top 1%
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one fifth of the Geneva population made charitable gifts for which they claimed charitable 
deductions, as opposed to less than one tenth of the taxpayers in 2001. Unambiguously, the use 
of these specific deductions has risen among taxpayers, and we observe this increase in every 
income class (Annex 1). Even though we can only speculate about the reasons for this increase 
(i.e., better awareness about the possibility to deduct gifts? An increase in the number of donors 
in the Canton of Geneva? An effect of the higher incentive? Other?), these data show that the 
relevant period claiming charitable deductions has become a common and not a marginal phe-
nomenon during the process of filling tax returns.
This finding raises interesting questions when compared to other available data sources on 
giving behavior. For instance, the study of Freitag et al. reports that in 2014, 71% of the Swiss 
population made charitable donations. However, our data show that, at least in the Canton of 
Geneva, only 19% of taxpayers filed for charitable deductions in 2011. This number reflects tax 
fillings that occurred three years earlier than the study of Freitag et al., but judging from the 
level of increase in charitable deductions in Geneva during the 11-year period under review, it 
is quite unlikely that charitable deductions reached 71% in 2014. Therefore, further studies 
should look into the differences in various data sets describing individual charitable giving 
behavior in Switzerland. For instance, it would be interesting to assess whether and to what 
extent the estimated percentage (71%) of charitable giving by the Swiss population is accurate 
and, if it is, why an important portion of Swiss taxpayers still does not seem to deduct charitable 
donations.
In terms of the amount of deductions in relation to charitable donations, the total annual 
sum deducted by all taxpayers is steadily increasing during the observed period. It is in fact pos-
sible to observe a correlation with 1) the increase in the overall population of taxpayers and 2) 
the increase of charitable deductions among taxpayers. In terms of deductions per taxpayer, we 
observe a decrease both in the mean and in the median over time. While the median constantly 
decreases, the mean of donations fluctuates during the studied period but is overall lower in 
2011 than in 2001. We observe the same trend when comparing median charitable deductions 
by income classes. In other words, the general trend seems to be lesser deductions, and this may 
be a clue showing that, considered individually, taxpayers tend to give less, that is, that the size 
of the individual donations is decreasing. However, a complementary set of data showing the 
exact amount of donations (and not only the deducted amounts) would be needed to verify 
such a hypothesis.
The data presented in the present chapter offers rare glimpse of the Swiss taxpayers’ giving 
behavior per income class. In particular, having compared 2001 to 2011, we observe that the 
deductions made by the 1% of taxpayers having the highest income account for more than 35% 
of all deductions. The deductions for charitable donations carried out by the top 25% income 
classes (middle-high, high and very-high) account for more than 70% of all such deductions 
in the taxpayer population. This information is important for the policymaking, as it suggests 
that calibrating tax incentives for this particular class of taxpayers could potentially be a policy 
option to consider.
In those descriptive statistics, there is no obvious correlation with the timing of the reform. 
The increase of deducters, as well as the decrease in the median of individual amounts deducted, 
are mostly constant and linear, with no distinctive or drastic changes in 2006, when the new 
federal tax law norms took effect, nor in 2010, when cantonal adjustments were made. The 
increase in the overall amount of donations is not linear but subject to certain peaks, the largest 
of them (48%) being observed in 2009, several years after the reform. We can speculate about 
the reasons thereof, for instance, the fact that in 2009, taxpayers who were usually taxed at 
source were given the possibility, under certain conditions, to file a return and then be treated 
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as resident taxpayers (so-called “quasi-residents”), thus claiming all personalized deductions, 
including for charitable giving.32 It can be estimated that the number of such taxpayers was 
around 2,000 in 2009, 4,000 in 2010 and 5,600 in 2011.33 This fact could influence both 
the amount of deductions and the number of deducters. However, the data transmitted by the 
Geneva Tax Administration for the purpose of this study are confidential, not allowing identi-
fication of the quasi-residents and thus verification of whether and to what extent their deduc-
tions explain this peak in giving.
Overall, three important observations should be highlighted: first, over the 11 years under 
review, it appears that an increased number of taxpayers deducted their donations; second, the 
amount of those deductions decreased in terms of both mean and median; third, an overwhelm-
ing part of deductions came from the upper 25% income class. With respect to the first two 
observations, the presented descriptive statistics do not show any conclusive evidence of the 
impact of the reform on those trends. As one of the goals of the 2006 reform was to encourage 
taxpayers to part with a substantial amount of their wealth, because the pre-reform level of giv-
ing was considered insufficient, the constantly decreasing median deduction could be a sign for 
legislators indicating that potentially the reform was unsuccessful on this point, at least for the 
lower 75% classes of income. Yet, this would call for further investigations about the 2006 reform 
effects, because while the total amount of deductions is known, the total amount of donations 
is not. In relation to another implicit goal of the reforms – to attract new deducters – it is not 
possible to detect any evidence of the reform’s real impact, because the number of deducting 
taxpayers has steadily increased since 2001, with no visible increase during the year of the 
reform or the years immediately following the entry into force of the new law provisions. This 
finding in any event may indicate a constantly increasing awareness of the population of tax 
deductions for charitable giving, perhaps independently of any specific tax reform incentive. 
Overall, there is evidence which seems to show that that the reform might not have succeeded 
in attaining at least some of its goals. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the 2006 
reform substantially increased the possibilities for tax deductions, because it not only allowed 
larger deductions but also offered a possibility to deduct non-cash donations (including real 
estate) as well as donations to various public entities. Therefore, one would expect to see at 
least some effects of those important changes in the descriptive data, which is not the case in 
the present study.
Overall, more research ought to be done to understand whether the 2006 reform had 
any effect on charitable giving behavior and, if so, to what extent. Ideally, every new tax 
measure that has been introduced – the increase of the deduction threshold and the intro-
duction of the deductibility of non-cash donations, as well as the possibility to deduct 
gifts to public entities – should be evaluated separately, trying to disentangle their effects. 
Moreover, a more specific study stratified by income could reveal additional insights. 
For instance, alternative data sets should be used to enable researchers to understand the 
changes in the total amounts of donations (and not only of deductions) during this period. 
Furthermore, studying the patterns of charitable giving to higher education institutions 
could help establish whether the tax reform increased – as intended – their funding from 
charitable sources. Finally, studying charitable non-cash donations would contribute to 
determining to what extent such a policy measure was successful. In order to complete 
those studies, allowing an in-depth evaluation of the new tax measures, legislators and the 
administration should make tax measure-segregated data (for instance, indicating the total 
amount of charitable donations for different income categories indicated previously) avail-
able for scientific studies.
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Conclusion
The present chapter provides unique descriptive statistics about taxpayer’s giving behavior in the 
Canton of Geneva for the period from 2001 to 2011. Several important observations emerge. 
First, the number of taxpayers deducting charitable donations significantly increased. Second, 
in general, the median of individual amounts of charitable deductions decreased between 2001 
and 2011 (even without inflation adjustment), and this effect is observed in all income classes 
comparing the years 2001 and 2011. This could suggest that even though the total number of 
deducters increased, they tended to make individually smaller donations; however, an alterna-
tive data set would need to be studied in order to confirm this hypothesis (in particular having 
access to the total amount of donations and not only to the deducted amounts). Third, the 
taxpayers with the highest income, especially the very high income class (top 1% of all the 
taxpayers) accounted for the largest percentage of deductions. Policy makers could consider 
whether tax incentives should target this specific group of taxpayers and whether to envisage 
other incentives which could be more attractive to a broader base of deducters (as proposed by 
other researchers).34 Further interdisciplinary works studying the giving behavior of taxpayers 
belonging to the highest income classes could also usefully build on the present results in order 
to understand the rationale and what, in addition to tax incentives, moves taxpayers to make 
charitable donations.35
Notes
 1 For examples of other jurisdictions, see OECD 2020, pp. 80–84.
 2 Arts 33a and 56 let. g of the Direct Federal Taxation Act (DFTA).
 3 For a more detailed description of the Swiss system, see Lideikyte Huber (2018).
 4 Art. 9(1)(i) Direct Taxation Harmonization Act of 14 December 1990 (DTHA).
 5 Code civil suisse (Droit des fondations), Modification du 8 octobre 2004, RS 4545.
 6 Report 2003, p. 7426.
 7 Schiesser initiative; Report 2003, pp. 7426–7427.
 8 Report 2003, p. 7428.
 9 Schiesser Initiative.
 10 The reform also introduced changes in the Value Added Tax and Withholding Tax Acts, but they will 
not be considered in the framework of the present chapter.
 11 FR: Commission de l’économie et des redevances.
 12 Report 2003, p. 7431.
 13 Draft Federal Act, p. 7458 et seq.
 14 The consultation procedure is the phase of the preliminary legislative procedure during which federal 
projects of great political, financial, economic, ecological, social or cultural significance are examined 
as to whether they are materially correct, feasible and likely to be well accepted. https://www.fedlex.
admin.ch/fr/consultation-procedures/explanations-cp access date 15.09.2021. Consultation proce-
dures are defined by the Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure of 18 March 2005 (Consultation 
Procedure Act, CPA).
 15 Federal Council, p. 7467.
 16 Federal Council, p. 7467.
 17 Federal Council, pp. 7466–7467.
 18 Federal Council, p. 7467.
 19 Federal Act Modifying CC, p. 4551.
 20 In its message, this recognizes the need for rules to establish uniform practice and considers it advisable 
to provide for an ordinance to this effect. Federal Council, p. 7466.
 21 Federal Parliament, deliberation 00.461 Pa. Iv. Schiesser Fritz. Revision of the Law on Foundations 
Report 2003, p. 7426.
 22 Schiesser initiative; also see parliamentary deliberations on Schiesser initiative No. 00.461, p. 1216.
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 23 Report 2003, p. 7432.
 24 Personal Income Tax Act – V (FR: Loi sur l’imposition des personnes physiques (LIPP-V) Détermina-
tion du revenu net – Calcul de l’impôt et rabais d’impôt – Compensation des effets de la progression à 
froid du 22 septembre 2000, D 3 16; in force: 01.01.2001).
 25 Personal Income Tax Act of September 27, 2009 (FR: Loi sur l’imposition des personnes physiques du 
27 septembre 2009; LIPP; D 3 08, in force: 01.01.2010).
 26 Corporate Income Tax Act of September 23, 1994 (FR: Loi sur l’imposition des personnes morales du 
23 septembre 1994, D 3 15; in force: 01.01.1995).
 27 The authors of this chapter have contacted the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration, Swiss Federal Department of Finance and Swiss Federal Audit Office for these pur-
poses. All the sources confirmed that no evaluations were carried out about the efficiency of this tax 
reform.
 28 Federal Bureau of Statistics, regional comparison according to selected criteria, 2020, https://www.
bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/statistique-regions/portraits-regionaux-chiffres-cles/cantons.
assetdetail.11587764.html access date 04.03.2021.
 29 On this topic, also see Chapter 12 of this Handbook, Adena Maja, Tax-price elasticity of charitable 
donations – evidence from the German taxpayer panel.
 30 See Adena et al., 2014.
31 See Adena et al., 2019.
 32 Personal Income Tax Bill of the Canton of Geneva of 16.01.2008, PL 10199 https://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiB6MClrqHwAhXGsKQK 
HZ3CCIwQFjABegQIBhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fge.ch%2Fgrandconseil%2Fdata%2Ftexte%2
FPL10199.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0HcXiLL1mRvpRmQH8HNvVz access date 28.04.2021; Art. 31 Art. 
12 par. 1 of the Regulations for the implementation of the law on withholding tax on natural and legal 
persons of the Canton of Geneva [FR: Reglement d’application de la loi sur l’imposition a la source 
des personnes physiques et morales (RISP) du 30 September 2020; rsGE D 3 20.01].
 33 Information provided by the Canton of Geneva together with the data for the present study.
 34 See Chapter 15 of this Handbook, Nicolas J. Duquette/Jennifer Mayo, Who gives and who gets? Tax 
policy and the long-run distribution of philanthropy in the US.
 35 For further developments on this topic, see the chapters of this handbook by Andreoni/Smith, 
Duquette/ Mayo, Bernardic et al. A study in progress by Lideikyte Huber and Pittavino, to be pub-
lished in 2022, pursues the analysis of the Canton of Geneva further using a new set of tax data.
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WHO GIVES AND WHO 
GETS? TAX POLICY AND THE 
LONG-RUN DISTRIBUTION 
OF PHILANTHROPY IN THE 
UNITED STATES
Nicolas J. Duquette and Jennifer Mayo
1 Introduction
It is commonly believed that giving in the United States is fairly stable. Historically, charitable con-
tributions and philanthropic giving in the United States have remained close to 2% of GDP (Lilly 
School 2020). This quantitative stability has fed a qualitative sensibility that U.S. charitable giving is a 
stable, entrenched, and broadly shared civic activity little affected by public policy or social changes.
This chapter provides descriptive evidence that the reality is more complicated. We describe 
the predictors of charitable and philanthropic donations over time from the perspective of the 
donors who make the contributions and the charitable organizations that receive those contri-
butions. Over time, that 2% of GDP has come from a very different set of donors, as economic 
inequality and changes in social structure and demography have remade the distribution of 
donative behavior.
These changes are reflected in charities’ receipts, as giving has shifted away from churches 
to secular, or at least not solely religious, organizations. By other measures, however, the con-
centration of public support by size, geography, and mission has been largely stable. Compar-
ing these two pieces of evidence, we infer that while secular charities have not seen a dramatic 
concentration or redistribution of resources over time, many are increasingly dependent on 
major donors.
These trends happen in parallel with important policy changes. Over the past 70 years, fed-
eral and state tax incentives for giving have favored specific charities and specific donors, which 
we argue may have contributed to the trends documented here. We conclude with suggested 
tax reforms to expand the distribution of charitable giving among more U.S. households and a 
greater diversity of charities.
2 The lopsided donation distribution
Average charitable contributions in the United States have been remarkably stable over time. 
Figure 15.1 reports the mean contribution of Americans at the personal, tax unit, and household 
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levels, calculated as Giving USA individual contributions divided by time series counts of those 
quantities and converted to real (2019) dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Contribu-
tions are quite stable over time, rising gradually in real terms over the very long run, with the 
exception of a more rapid rate of increase during the late 1990s economic boom. From these 
aggregates alone, it would be easy to conclude that U.S. giving is stable, predictable, and steadily 
increasing without cause for concern.
This apparent stability conceals important shifts in the distribution of giving activity. While 
scholars typically think of U.S. giving and philanthropy as a civic culture with wide participa-
tion, giving activity has become increasingly concentrated over the past 60 years. Figure 15.2 
plots the share of giving by living Americans accounted for by the itemized contributions of 
the tax units who claim the most giving.1 These shares are computed from publicly available 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cross-sectional data for available years 1960 to 2012.2 These 
calculations show a rapid increase in the share of giving made by the top donors. In 1960, the 
top 1% of tax units made 18.9% of all charitable contributions from living individual donors. 
By 2012, this share had more than doubled to 43.5%.
This concentration is difficult to explain. Over this period, income has grown more con-
centrated, which likely accounts for a significant portion of the concentration of philanthropy. 
However, even the highest estimates of increased income inequality would imply a less steep 
increase than this rapid consolidation of giving into relatively few tax returns. It is likely that 
other social forces, such as the changing demography of the United States, also explain changes 
in who gives and how much they give.
Contributions per capita
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Figure 15.1 Aggregate giving in the United States
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2.1 Income inequality
One plausible contributor to changes in the distribution of giving might be greater concentra-
tion of incomes in the United States over the same period. Rising concentration of income 
might mechanically increase concentration of giving to the extent that people give the same 
share of their incomes, but incomes are increasingly concentrated in a few top earners. A bur-
geoning literature quantifies economic inequality in the United States and finds, to varying 
degrees, an increase in inequality in recent years.3
The potential contributions of income shifts to giving are shown in Figure  15.3, which 
plots the average inflation-adjusted fiscal incomes of top donors over time.4 The vertical axis is 
on a log scale, which both makes slopes interpretable as exponential growth rates and the large 
differences between series visible. The top 0.01% of tax units ranked by giving have very high 
incomes, consistently over $1 million in 2012 dollars over the period and then rising rapidly to 
over $8 million in 2012.
However, income concentration is unlikely to explain all of the observed concentration of 
giving among U.S. tax units. We can see this by comparing the 1% of returns with the highest 
charitable contributions to those with the highest reported incomes. Figure 15.4 compares the 
share of charitable contributions made by the top 1% and 0.01% of donors to the shares of giv-
ing made by the equivalent fractiles by reported income. Shaded areas show the difference in 
giving shares between each top-fractile group.
Over time, the top earners account for a greater share of overall charitable giving. However, 
there is a substantial amount of donor concentration above and beyond what is visible in the 
rising giving share of the top earners. In 1960, the giving share of top earners was very close to 















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Donation Share
Figure 15.2 Top donors’ share of annual giving
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Figure 15.4 Top giving shares of top earners vs top donors
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the share of the top givers, but over time, the two groups diverged substantially. The top 0.01% 
of givers provided 4.6% of giving in 1960, whereas the top 0.01% of earners were responsible 
for 3.7%, a gap of about one percentage point. By 2012, when the top 0.01% of givers were 
responsible for 20.6% of giving, the top 0.01% of earners gave 12.6%, a gap of 8.0 percentage 
points. The growth of the gap between the top 1% of earners and donors is less striking, but it 
is still substantial, going from about 5 percentage points in 1960 to about 14 percentage points 
in 2012.
This may be expected simply because the concentration of giving has risen more quickly 
than even the most extreme estimates of changes in income inequality. The Piketty and Saez 
(2003) estimates of changes in fiscal income report a steep rise in income concentration of the 
top 1% from 8.4% in 1960 to 18.9% in 2012, but this increase is not as large as the increase in 
giving. Moreover, Piketty and Saez’s use of fiscal income from tax units likely overstates the 
degree of income concentration over this period; other inequality research that accounts for 
mechanical changes in inequality caused by the relationship between tax units and changing 
marital norms, as well as broader definitions of income not including those not reported on 
Form 1040, show much less dramatic increases.5 While top income groups are giving a greater 
share of all individual contributions than before thanks to their higher income shares, this alone 
does not fully explain the rising concentration of giving.
As a final investigation into the relationship between income inequality and donor con-
centration, we examine the concentration within consistently defined high-income groups. If 
giving had become more concentrated solely because of changes in the distribution of income, 
then the concentration of giving within a set of similar tax units should not rise over time. We 
compute the concentration of giving within consistently defined high-income tax returns over 
the period 1960–2012. To do so, we restrict each year’s data set to tax returns that are married 
filing jointly and within 20% of a target income level after adjusting for inflation to year-2012 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. We then compute the share of itemized contributions 
made by the top 1% of donors within each group each year. The income targets presented are 
real incomes of $1 million, $2 million, and $5 million. The top donor shares within these high-
income groups are presented in Figure 15.5.
The year-to-year differences in the top donor shares within these groups are noisy, but the 
trend over time is unmistakably upward. Within each of the three high-income groups, the 
top 1% of donors are responsible for roughly 10% of giving through the 1960s, rising to shares 
between 20% and 40% of giving in the 2000s. A simple pooled regression of these top 1% shares 
on a trend variable estimates that the top 1% share within high-income groups has increased 
about 0.42 percentage points per year over this period; this estimate is statistically different from 
zero at the 5% level after correcting for serial correlation.
With the concentration of U.S. charitable giving rising sharply not only nationwide but 
within groups of similar incomes, other factors than the distribution of resources must be con-
tributing to the long-run trend.
2.2 Demographic shifts affecting giving
Other trends have shaped the nature of giving beyond the distribution of resources. The demog-
raphy of the United States has changed greatly since 1960, as families have grown smaller, the 
population has become older and more diverse, and gender and marital norms have shifted.
We consider the demographic information inferable from tax returns in Table  15.1. This 
reports the share of returns that report legal marriage status, that claim dependent children, and 
that report social security income (which proxies for being retirement age). We present shares for 
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Figure 15.5 Top 1% donor share within high-income groups
1960 (the first year of tax return microdata), 1970 (the first year of data on children), 1984 (the first 
year of Social Security reporting), 1995, and 2012 (the last data year). For each variable and year, 
we report shares for “Top Givers,” or those with itemized contributions in the top 1% of giving for 
all tax units, and “Other Filers,” or tax filers not among the top givers (regardless of whether they 
itemized or took the standard deduction but excluding nonfilers). The final column presents the 
difference in percentage points between the first observed year and 2012, and the row below each 
variable group reports differences between top givers and other filers within each year.
It is clear that top givers and other filers are not alike and that these demographic differences 
between top givers and others change over time. All mean differences reported in Table 15.1 
are statistically different from zero under a two-sided t-test with p-value less than 0.1%. The 
magnitudes of the differences are striking as well.
From 1960 to 2012, top donors’ marriage rates are consistently high, declining by just over 
five percentage points, from about 89% to about 84%. Other filers’ marriage rates are lower, and 
they drop much faster, from 64% in 1960 to just 39% in 2012. To the extent that it is necessary 
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for most people willing to make large gifts to first feel economically and personally established, 
this differential in marriage rates may explain the greater share of the top givers, because the 
“long tail” of middle-income donors may have dwindled over time.6
Other differences between top givers and the general population are less dramatic than the dif-
ferential marriage trends. The shares of both top givers and other filers with children decline over 
time, although top givers are consistently more likely to have children, with a larger decline over 
the period 1970–2012, narrowing the gap between these groups. Top givers are more likely to have 
a retirement-age person in the home than other filers in all years, with the share of both groups 
reporting social security income growing by about 10 percentage points over the observation period.
Although tax returns provide only limited data about donor demography, the evidence sug-
gests that changes in marriage patterns are likely related to changes in the distribution of giving. In 
recent decades, American households have seen a bifurcation of household finances: lower-income 
people have married less and divorced more, whereas high-income households have become more 
likely to be two-income, dual-professional households who may give differently than a breadwinner-
homemaker pair (Putnam 2000, 2016; Einolf et al. 2018). These speculations cannot be confirmed 
by tax return data alone, but the demographic information available suggests substantial changes in 
the distribution of marriage that are strongly correlated with giving behavior.
2.3 Giving according to charities’ reported receipts
We can next examine whether the lopsidedness of individual giving is reflected in charities’ 
reported receipts. Figure 15.6 plots the share of public support for 501(c)(3) charities according 
to the receipts of those that report the most. These shares are computed from publicly available 
Table 15.1 Demographics
Share of filed 1040 returns
1960 1970 1984 1995 2012 Change over span
Is married
Top givers 88.7% 87.9% 88.7% 84.3% 83.5% –5.3 % pts
Other filers 64.3 59.8 48.2 43.3 38.5 –23.8
Difference 24.4 28.1 40.5 41.1 45.0
Have children
Top givers 59.3 52.7 47.1 39.6 –19.7
Other filers 42.5 37.8 35.3 32.8 –9.7
Difference 16.8 14.9 11.9 6.8
Have Social Security income
Top givers 17.9 22.9 30.2 +12.3
Other filers 7.2 8.6 18.1 +10.9
Difference 10.7 14.3 12.1
Sources: Tax return micro data from Internal Revenue Service (2018); total tax units by year taken from the 
updated data files of Piketty and Saez (2003)
Notes: All variables are weighted by sampling weight. Reported mean differences within groups over time 
and within time across groups are all different from zero, with p-value < 0.001. “Top givers” are the 1% 
of tax units making the largest itemized charitable contributions. “Other filers” are all filed tax returns 
excluding the top givers. “Is married” is the percentage of each sample with a married filing status (joint 
or separate). “Have children” is the share of returns with children. “Have Social Security income” is the 
share of returns reporting social security income.
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IRS Form 990 data for the years 1989 to 2017, where public support is defined as the sum of 
contributions, gifts, and grants. Specifically, public support from Form 990 data is rank-ordered 
and then summed to estimate total public support by top fractile. Unlike individual giving, the 
figure depicts the share of public support going to the top charities as being fairly flat across the 
period. The share going to the top 1% of charities remained below 50% throughout the 1990s 
before peaking at 56% around the Great Recession and then falling back down.
This pattern is in stark contrast to the distribution of individual giving, as although public 
support is fairly concentrated among the top fractiles, it has not become increasingly so. The 
divergence with the distribution of individual giving is somewhat of a puzzle.
One possible explanation is that the concentration in individual giving in fact reflects the 
decline in small-dollar donors. These types of donations are disproportionately religious tithes 
and can be linked to the growing secularization of giving. Figure 15.7 uses Giving USA data 
to plot real giving per household to religious and non-religious causes from 1967 to 2019. It 
depicts a steep rise in non-religious giving in the mid-1990s. In particular, real average giving 
to religious groups has remained fairly stable at around $1000 per household, while giving to 
non-religious organizations has more than doubled, from $1000 to $2500 per household. While 
both religious and non-religious giving is recorded in 1040 data, only non-religious organiza-
tions are required to file an IRS Form 990 (religious organizations are exempt).7 This difference 
in filing requirements means that any disappearance in small-dollar religious donors would be 
reflected in individual giving but not 990-filing charities’ reported receipts. Of course, this 
hypothesis can only be tested with donor-level data, but it offers a possible explanation.
Another possible explanation is that the discrepancy is due to the distribution of big gifts 
across charities over time. Very large gifts from wealthy donors are rare events for the individual 
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Figure 15.7 Giving USA gifts to religion and others
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but not necessarily for the recipient. For example, one individual’s $1 million donation to Har-
vard University would likely represent an outlier relative to that donor’s other giving, as well as 
to other donors, but is not necessarily an outlier for Harvard. In other words, mega-donations 
are lumpy for the individual but not for the recipient, whose receipts relative to other charities 
have much lower variance. This means that the increasing number of big gifts would affect the 
concentration of individual giving but not necessarily the distribution of charities’ receipts.
It is further possible that the composition of public support is changing. Form 990 public 
support, unlike 1040 giving, includes government grantmaking, foundation grants, and trans-
fers from other public charities such as United Way. Figure 15.8 shows that public support and 
itemized contributions have evolved differently. Prior to 2005, 1040 giving exceeded Form 990 
public support; however, that pattern has since reversed, with the latter continuing to rise, while 
itemized giving has remained fairly flat. This is likely due to the differing composition of 1040 
and 990 totals. In particular, 1040 giving includes some components, such as religious giving, 
that are not included in Form 990 totals. However, given the secularization of giving, as well 
as the rise in foundation grants (which are not included in 1040 giving), it is unsurprising that 
Form 990 receipts have overtaken itemized contributions.
We conclude this discussion by looking at the distribution of 990 public support along other 
dimensions; compared to the dramatic changes in the distribution of Form 1040 contributions 
among U.S. tax units, Form 990 distributional statistics are remarkably stable.
Figure 15.9 uses Form 990 data to plot the share of public support by sector according to 
reported receipts for the period 1989 to 2017.8 Throughout the period, education remained the 
sector with the largest share of public support, although this share has steadily declined. Human 
services remained the second-largest sector and was one of the few to see a rising share of pub-
lic support during the Great Recession. According to a report by Reich and Wimer (2012), 
contributions to food banks increased from around $1.2 billion in 2007 and 2008 to just under 
$1.6 billion in 2009. Health-related charities form the third largest sector, with public support 
remaining fairly flat at around 10% throughout the period. Support for private grantmaking was 
flat throughout the 1990s and fell during the Great Recession but has climbed in recent years. 
Arts, culture, and humanities charities have experienced a gradual decline in support since the 
beginning of the period.
Finally, Figure 15.10 plots the share of public support for charities located in the five largest 
U.S. cities from 1989 to 2017. These shares are computed from 990 data, where charity location 
does not necessary reflect service area. For example, many charities are headquartered in New 
York City but in fact provide services across the country or world. Nevertheless, the share of 
public support for New York-based charities declined from around 11% in 1991 to 6% in 2014, 
although this trend has reversed in the most recent years. The remaining cities – Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Houston, and Phoenix – have maintained a fairly constant share of public support, 
with Chicago averaging 2.2% and Los Angeles 1.8%.
In summary, while U.S. philanthropic giving has become concentrated in a small share of 
U.S. tax units, 990-filing charities have not seen a similar concentration across charities. Some 
of this is likely explained by a shift of giving from non-990 charities favored by smaller donors to 
990 charities favored by large donors (specifically, the proportional shift of giving from churches 
to other causes). But much of this also likely reflects a concentration of donors within the aver-
age charity, a trend that cannot be observed in the 990 data but which is consistent with the 
philanthropy trade press’s coverage of major-gifts fundraising. For example, the May 2018 issue 
of the Chronicle of Philanthropy included new and republished articles with titles like “4 Ways 
to Ask Major Donors for Big Gifts” and “How to Make the Most of Your Meetings with Big 
Donors.” Journal articles have also emphasized the need for special, highly personal strategies 
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to cultivate large-dollar donors – which is necessarily more labor intensive per donor than mass 
fundraising (see, for example, Waters 2010; McLoughlin 2017; Drollinger 2018). The upshot: 
a large number of charities are likely more dependent on a shrinking number of donors to 
maintain stable public support revenues. In our final section, we consider the role of tax policy 
in this rising donor concentration.
3 Tax policy and the distribution of giving
Tax policy in the United States has a thoroughly studied incentive effect on philanthropy,9 but 
those effects are not uniform across donors or across charities. In many instances, they have 
actively encouraged the trends described in this chapter or have ineffectively forgone tax rev-
enue to little effect.
3.1 Tax policy affects the giving distribution
Tax incentives for philanthropy are especially valuable to high-income, high-wealth households, 
who deduct against high marginal rates and who are likely to get the most tax savings from the 
ability to avoid capital gains tax on donation of appreciated assets.10 This is a deliberate policy 
choice; at times when reform of the federal contribution deduction has been considered, policy 
changes to reduce the deduction’s value to wealthy donors (such as the appreciated asset double-
benefit) have often not become law, while those that do benefit these donors (such as increases 
to the maximum adjusted gross income (AGI) that may be donated) often have (Duquette 
2019b).11
In recent years, the AGI limitation on giving has increased twice; the 2017 tax reform 
raised the ceiling on the deductible share of AGI from 50 to 60% for cash gifts, while the 2020 
CARES Act temporarily raised the limit to 100%. Though few donors give such large shares 
of their income away, there is a tiny minority of high-wealth households who make up a dis-
proportionate share of contributions, and these tax changes are likely to have an observable 
effect on their giving decisions (Duquette 2019a) and on the spillovers to rival charities (Mayo, 
2021).12
Changes in tax policy and the distribution also affect bequests to charity at death. While 
bequests are largely excluded from taxation at death, tax policy has not always been changed to 
encourage giving by bequest. The reduction in the top estate tax rate, coupled with the increase 
in the exemption from $600,000 in 1997 to $11.8 million in 2020, has reduced the appeal of 
tax-motivated charitable bequests by wealthy households. Notably, incentives for “giving while 
living” strictly dominate the bequest deduction from the estate tax itself, since money given 
away while alive is also no longer part of a future taxable estate (Joulfaian 2001).
At the state level, states offer both deductions modeled after the federal deduction, as well as 
targeted, often extremely generous credits supporting particular charity types. The state deduc-
tions appear to have donation elasticities comparable to the federal deduction (Bakija and Heim 
2011). It is unclear whether state credits, which are narrowly targeted and often subject to 
low caps on deductible amounts, have a similar effect (Feldman and Hines 2003; Teles 2016; 
Duquette et al. 2018; Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm 2018).
3.2 Policy changes to broaden giving
We recommend three policy changes to bolster policy effectiveness of tax subsidies for charita-
ble contributions. These would expand the pool of potential donors, increase dollars given, and 
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increase confidence in the nonprofit sector while controlling the cost of charitable contribution 
tax expenditures.
First, the federal itemized deduction could be replaced with a nonrefundable credit with a 
subsidy rate tied to the share of adjusted gross income donated, not marginal tax rate. Such a 
policy could expand tax subsidies for giving to all households with income tax liability (not just 
itemizers) and substantially increase total donations with little or no cost to tax expenditures 
(Duquette 2020). The 2020 CARES Act created a time-limited deduction for non-itemizers’ 
cash donations up to $300,13 but this incentive is unlikely to have a large effect on giving relative 
to its tax cost; as this chapter has shown, giving is highly skewed, and donors who give more 
than $300/year will have no marginal tax incentive to give more. An incentive with a floor or 
tiered rate to encourage last-dollar instead of first-dollar giving would be more efficient.
Second, we call for an overhaul of regulations governing the reporting of charitable contri-
butions. The current compliance and reporting regime is open to manipulation and low-scale 
tax evasion. For example, the $500 allowance for deduction of noncash gifts without documen-
tation is widely abused (Tazhitdinova 2018). The United States should require non-public lists 
of donations linked to tax identifiers from charities, mandate information reporting of donor 
identities and in- and outflows from donor-advised funds, and expand the required filing of the 
Form 990 or similar to all organizations allowed to receive deductible contributions.
Third, we argue that charitable contributions for a given tax year should be allowed until 
the mid-April filing deadline for personal income tax returns in the following year, as is cur-
rently allowed for contributions to an individual retirement account. This would improve the 
effectiveness of the existing incentives in two ways: first, the time horizon for tax savings from 
charitable giving would be shortened from months to weeks or less and for many donors would 
be near immediate.14 Second, such a policy would allow prospective donors to calculate their 
marginal tax rates before deciding how much to give. Relative to existing policy, these changes 
would give tax-motivated donors higher certainty and a timelier incentive without having to 
increase the generosity of tax expenditures per dollar given. This information would be espe-
cially valuable to middle-tier donors who in December would be unsure about whether they 
will be claiming the itemized deduction (and so have a tax incentive to donate) or the standard 
deduction (and so have no tax benefit for a modest contribution).
All of these reforms would have the potential to broaden access to tax incentives for giving, 
improve their effectiveness, and streamline their use. A two-tier tax credit instead of an item-
ized deduction would expand access to preferential tax treatment and link subsidy rates to the 
share of income given, not tax bracket. Better information reporting would increase confidence 
in charities and decrease scope for tax evasion. And a mid-April deadline would let middle-
income donors have important information about their tax status before deciding whether and 
how much to give.
Notes
 1 “Tax units” are a slightly cumbersome demographic unit corresponding to tax returns and return-
equivalents who do not file. There are fewer tax units than people but more tax units than households 
(since cohabiting adults filing separately are one household but more than one tax unit).
 2 Series taken from Duquette (2021), which explains the calculation of giving share ratios in detail. In 
brief, itemized contributions from tax return data are rank-ordered and then summed to estimate total 
giving by top-giving fractile (Internal Revenue Service 2018). The denominator is taken from Giv-
ing USA estimates of total individual charitable contributions (Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 
Indiana University/IUPUI 2020). Some years within the 1960–2012 range are not calculated due to 
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data limitations or availability, and years after 2012 are not calculated because of the long lag in IRS 
distribution of new microdata.
 3 Some of these estimates of income distribution statistics find very steep increases in U.S. income 
inequality since the middle 20th century (Piketty et al. 2018; Piketty and Saez 2003). Other methods 
find a substantially more modest increase, for example, Auten and Splinter (2019).
 4 Since these calculations are made using Form 1040 data, income is measured and ranked using the 
Piketty and Saez (2003) measure of “fiscal income,” which is observed in tax returns over time but 
which omits important income sources that are not reported (such as retained corporate profits) or 
observed inconsistently (such as Social Security income) or endogenously (such as realized capital 
gains).
 5 See discussions in Auten and Splinter (2019) and Piketty et al. (2018).
 6 Additionally, the large differential in trends in marriage rates means that the increasing share of con-
tributions accounted for by the top donors is likely overestimated for mechanical reasons. Because top 
donor shares are computed as a share of tax units, and because a married couple represents one tax unit 
whereas an unmarried couple represents two, falling marriage rates among other filers will increase the 
number of tax units whose giving is summed to compute the top donor share relative to a world where 
marriage rates were constant across time and groups (see discussion in Auten and Splinter 2019). In 
the context of giving, average gifts within top donor tiers, which will be biased downward for the same 
mechanical reason, nevertheless show a dramatic rise over this period, suggesting that mechanical dif-
ferences from changes in the composition of tax units are secondary to this broader trend (see Duquette 
2021, Figure 3).
 7 Organizations file the 990 if they are 501(c)3 public charities with at least $50,000 in revenue and are 
not churches or other houses of worship. Organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions 
that do not file a Form 990 include private foundations (which file the Form 990-PF), low-revenue 
organizations, churches and other houses of worship, and governmental organizations such as public 
universities. Religiously affiliated charities that are not primarily religious, such as Catholic universi-
ties, do file the Form 990.
 8 Sector is defined according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities classification system. For a 
full list, see https://nccs.urban.org/publication/irs-activity-codes.
 9 See OECD (2020) for a description of the tax treatment of giving across OECD countries.
 10 For a broader discussion on the tax incentives for giving, see Steinberg (2021) and Lideikyte Huber 
et al. (2021).
 11 When appreciated assets are given to qualifying organizations, donors can deduct the fair market value 
of the asset without first recognizing their capital gains for tax purposes, avoiding the income taxes on 
both the gains and on the market value’s worth of income. Because of this double benefit for giving 
appreciated assets, there have been periods in American history when it was theoretically possible for 
very high-income households to wind up with more money by donating highly appreciated assets than 
liquidating the asset and consuming the after-tax proceeds (Duquette 2019a).
 12 These increases may also change reported giving to the extent that giving in excess of the threshold 
may not be reported by donors on tax returns. Over the 1960–2012 period reported in most of the 
figures in this chapter, the AGI limitation was increased twice, in 1964 and 1969. Data for years 1987–
1990 are not reported because the IRS public use data censors giving at the AGI limitation, creating a 
significant downward bias.
 13 Internal Revenue Service, November  2020, “Special $300 tax deduction helps most people give 
to charity this year  – even if they don’t itemize.” Press release. https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
special-300-tax-deduction-helps-most-people-give-to-charity-this-year-even-if-they-dont-itemize
 14 Hickey et al. (2019) find that moving the timing of reporting of gifts closer to the timing of giving 
increases average donations by 9 percentage points.
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Tax incentives for philanthropy aim to increase the positive impacts of charitable activities, in 
some cases by promoting individual donations. There are many conceivable types of tax incen-
tive to achieve this, and they differ in important ways. A vital component in determining the 
efficacy of each is the extent to which tax incentives increase the likelihood and size of phil-
anthropic donations. Research addressing these questions has traditionally been concentrated 
within the fields of economics and public policy. However, alongside this progress, much work 
has been conducted in psychology and neuroscience to understand motivations for prosocial 
behaviour – actions to help other people – generally, and charitable giving specifically. There is 
also increasing recognition that psychological concepts, for example, wellbeing and happiness, 
may be critical in promoting philanthropy (Sellen 2021) and that the efficiency of govern-
ment incentives cannot be quantified without taking into account citizens’ responses to those 
incentives (Steinberg 2021). Research has also identified different responses to functionally 
equivalent subsidies (Eckel and Grossman 2003) and differences between individuals’ responses 
to tax incentives (Lideikyte Huber 2020). These findings suggest that factors other than objec-
tive economic value are important for understanding philanthropy and the role of tax incen-
tives. Here, I provide a review of the literature from psychology and neuroscience, tailored to 
be applicable to tax incentives and with a focus on gifts of money made by individuals. Only 
by understanding why people are philanthropic can the alignment of tax incentives with these 
motivations be assessed.
Studies on charitable giving in psychology and neuroscience constitute a subsection of 
research on prosocial decision-making, a specific application of research on decision-making 
generally. At this most general level, research identifies the costs and benefits associated with the 
different choice options and how these are integrated in value calculations in order to make a 
decision (Croxson et al. 2009). Value can be defined as the importance, worth, or usefulness of 
something and the process of estimating this. The idea of subjective value differentiates expe-
rienced desirability from objective worth (Peters and Büchel 2010). For example, the value of 
food changes depending on how much one has already eaten. In the context of philanthropy, 
choosing to donate suggests the total subjective value of this option is greater than the value of 
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not donating. A comprehensive review of the literature on charitable giving identified psycho-
logical benefits as well as overall costs and benefits as some of the key mechanisms that drive 
giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2010). As charitable giving is defined by giving away money, the 
subjective benefits must outweigh these costs.
From this perspective, tax incentives that aim to increase the frequency or levels of philan-
thropic giving must increase the subjective benefits or decrease the (subjective) costs of donat-
ing. These incentives will be efficient if they promote an increase in giving that is greater than 
the objective cost of the incentive to the government. The psychological or subjective benefits 
of philanthropic decisions can also be conceptualised as motivations for philanthropy and can be 
classified in different ways. In reality, it is likely that multiple motivations work together, even 
within a single decision. However, separating different motivations is necessary to understand 
and assess the possible motivations. Psychology and neuroscience can offer insight into differ-
ent motivations for giving, how these can be increased or decreased, and how they may differ 
between individuals. Before outlining two distinctions between motivations for philanthropy 
that relate to tax incentives, I first give an overview of the methods used in the relevant psychol-
ogy and neuroscience research.
Methods from psychology and neuroscience
Behavioural experiments
Perhaps the most obvious way to evaluate motivations for philanthropy is to ask people why 
they give. This can be done through questionnaires or scales quantifying different motivations 
(Konrath and Handy 2018) or qualitative interviews (Breeze 2013). While these approaches 
provide detailed information about donors’ understanding of their own motivations, they can-
not provide the experimental manipulations of motivations that are required to conclude a 
causal effect on giving. Behavioural experiments that provide these manipulations therefore 
offer a complementary approach to self-report and interview methods.
A large body of literature in experimental psychology and behavioural economics measures 
participants’ decisions to give away or keep money in different contexts. Many of these studies 
use economic games such as the dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, or public goods 
game. The dictator game is the most relevant to many forms of charitable giving. Participants 
in these studies are endowed with a certain amount of money and have the opportunity to give 
some or all of it away (Kahneman et al. 1986). The recipient can be another person or a charity. 
In the ultimatum game, the participant again receives an amount of money and has to decide 
whether to give some away, but now the recipient can decide whether to accept the offer or 
reject it, leaving both them and the participant who made the offer with nothing (Güth et al. 
1982). Participants in the trust game endowed with money must decide what amount, if any, 
to ‘invest’ in another person. The recipient then receives the invested amount multiplied, for 
example, tripled, and has the opportunity to repay the participant by returning some of this 
amount (Berg et al. 1995). The ultimatum and trust games are used to study prosocial behav-
iours motivated by fairness, equity, and reciprocity, as well as responses to violations of these 
principles. Finally, the public goods game approximates contributions to a cause that the donor 
also benefits from. Groups of participants all receive an endowment and decide how much to 
contribute into a group fund or ‘pot’. This amount is often multiplied, for example, by 1.25, 
to incentivise contributions, then equally divided between all group members, regardless of 
contribution (Rapoport and Chammah 1965). The greatest public good is therefore achieved 
by all participants contributing the full amount, but the greatest individual gain results from 
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keeping one’s own money and ‘free riding’ on others’ contributions. These games all measure 
decisions to give money away, but by introducing different potential benefits, they create dif-
ferent motivations.
Within these economic games, additional manipulations can be introduced to measure 
whether they increase or decrease giving. For example, in a dictator game, participants gave 
more to a charity when they saw a photo of a child in need (Genevsky et al. 2013). Other 
studies have adapted the dictator game to ask how much money participants are willing to give 
to prevent another person experiencing pain (FeldmanHall et al. 2012) and show greater moti-
vation to prevent the pain of someone else than oneself (Crockett et al. 2014). Evidence that 
these emotional factors promote donations, and link to participants’ personality traits, suggests 
a role for psychological mechanisms such as empathy in some forms of giving (FeldmanHall 
et al. 2015).
Measuring decisions to give money away directly can be informative, given the reasonable 
assumption that choices generally reflect the option with the highest value (Rangel et al. 2008). 
However, an issue with just measuring donation decisions in experiments is that they can be 
biased if participants act in a socially desirable way, which does not reflect their true motivations 
(Fernandes and Randall 1992). Behavioural experiments are not limited to measuring decisions 
whether to donate. For example, an alternative to measuring willingness to pay (donations) is 
willingness to put in physical effort to earn money for other people (Lockwood et al. 2017). If 
a source of subjective value during philanthropy is creating positive outcomes for other people, 
prosocial behaviours that cause such positive outcomes will be experienced as ‘rewarding’, and 
donors are more likely to repeat them (Gęsiarz and Crockett 2015). Another alternative to 
measuring donation decisions is therefore a behavioural measure of whether people learn to 
repeat actions that benefit others (Lockwood et al. 2016; Cutler et al. 2021).
Neuroimaging
While there are many ways to measure behaviours relevant for prosociality and philanthropy, a 
focus on behaviour may miss the fact that similar behaviours can be motivated by a wide range 
of factors. The differences between motivations are crucial to understand, predict, and encour-
age prosocial behaviours (Hein et al. 2016). Neuroimaging tools can offer additional insights. 
The method from neuroimaging most used in studies relevant to philanthropy is magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI). In these studies, participants lie inside a large tube containing powerful 
magnets and coils that transmit and receive pulses of radio waves. These can create images of 
the structure of the brain (or any part of the body for medical tests), as different tissues have 
different properties and generate distinct signals. For research on philanthropy, we are mostly 
interested in collecting functional MRI (fMRI) datasets that measure activity in different areas 
of the brain during an experimental task. Participants lying in the scanner can complete an 
experimental task by viewing a screen at the end of the tube via a mirror and pressing buttons 
to make responses or choices. During the task, the brain is scanned many times, approximately 
every two seconds. These data can provide information about brain activity due to the fact that 
blood full of oxygen has a different signal in the scanner to blood that is low in oxygen. When 
areas of the brain are active, they receive an increased supply of oxygenated blood. In analysis, 
we then match up these changes in signal that represent increased blood flow, and thus brain 
activity, to what was happening in the experimental task at the time.
The most common way of using fMRI in existing research on prosocial behaviour is to com-
pare different conditions, often using one of the economic games described previously, and look 
for similarities and differences in regions of activity. For example, in several studies, participants 
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decided whether to donate to charities and also received money for themselves during an fMRI 
scan. Results suggest that some areas may be involved in both giving away and receiving money 
(Moll et al. 2006; Harbaugh et al. 2007; Genevsky et al. 2013). Similarly, some regions of the 
brain were involved in both learning about actions that benefit ourselves and learning about 
actions that benefit other people. However, there were also differences between these types of 
learning (Lockwood et al. 2016). These findings offer insight into how the subjective benefits 
of giving may be calculated and represented in the brain, overlapping with networks involved 
in representing benefits for ourselves but also unique. In the following, I outline results on how 
these patterns of brain activity differ when financial incentives for giving introduce different 
motivations.
Motivations for philanthropy
To date, few studies have applied techniques from experimental psychology (Eckel and Gross-
man 2003, 2006; Davis et al. 2005; Peng and Liu 2020; Ugazio et al. 2021; see Adena 2021 for 
a review of field experiments), and to my knowledge no studies have applied neuroimaging 
methods, to the question of tax incentives in philanthropy. However, there is a large and rich lit-
erature in these disciplines on different motivations for giving. Here I outline two distinctions – 
between altruistic and strategic giving and between action-oriented and outcome-oriented 
giving – that are particularly relevant, as they align with different categories of tax incentive.
Altruistic or strategic giving?
Philanthropy could be considered a challenge for traditional theories in economics that suggest 
humans or Homo economicus are self interested (Adamus 2017). One possibility is that prosocial 
behaviours can lead to extrinsic – tangible, often financial – benefits for the donor as well as 
the recipient. A possible motivation for prosocial behaviour is therefore to strategically gain such 
rewards. However, people are also prosocial in contexts where this is not the case (Charities Aid 
Foundation 2019). I will describe these choices, to be generous when there is no opportunity 
to gain extrinsic rewards, as altruistic. This broad distinction between altruistic and strategic 
motivations aligns with several of the eight drivers for charitable giving identified in a review, 
particularly psychological benefits and ‘altruism’, as defined by the authors, compared to mate-
rial costs and benefits (Bekkers and Wiepking 2010).
If altruistic choices to give are generous acts with no opportunity to gain extrinsic rewards, 
motivations for giving in these contexts rely on intrinsic rewards. Sources of intrinsic reward 
include ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni 1989, 1990), vicarious reward experience (Mobbs et al. 2009), 
relief of empathic concern (FeldmanHall et al. 2015), and self-enhancement from adherence to 
moral codes or social norms (Niemi et al. 2018). Intrinsic incentives to give are often studied 
through donations to charities, payments to prevent others from coming to harm (Feldman-
Hall et al. 2012), or dictator games (Kahneman et al. 1986). A meta-analysis of 616 dictator 
game treatments from 131 papers showed that on average, participants gave 28.35% of the total 
amount. Of the 328 treatments with full range information available, 16.74% of participants 
gave half of the total, and 5.44% gave away everything (Engel 2011). These results, combined 
with the extent of charitable giving in the real world, provide evidence of altruistic giving.
In contrast, strategic choices to give are generous acts that can also lead to extrinsic reward, 
which is thought to be the dominant factor in the decision process (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
1997). Experimental tasks that measure strategic prosocial behaviour include the ultimatum 
game, trust game, and public goods game in which generosity can also benefit the donor through 
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cooperation or reciprocity. For example, participants may contribute to the group pot or public 
good, as it leads to positive outcomes for the other group members and themselves. Interest-
ingly, anonymous charitable donations are often considered a prototypical example of altruistic 
behaviour. However, there many examples of strategic benefits for philanthropy. Donations 
to some causes may be better characterised as providing a public good if the donor is among 
the beneficiaries. Membership schemes run by charitable organisations could be motivated by 
obtaining membership benefits, rather than donating for altruistic reasons. Such opportunities 
for strategic benefits may increase with the value of the gift and include indirect extrinsic ben-
efits, for example, corporate philanthropy ultimately improving sales.
Crucially, some tax incentives create strategic benefits from charitable giving. Two of the 
most common tax incentives for philanthropy are matching grants and tax rebates (tax deduc-
tions or credits). A key distinction between these is whether the money contributed through the 
tax incentive goes to the charity or to the donor, respectively. This distinction in the way tax 
incentives are implemented aligns with the distinction between altruistic and strategic motiva-
tions for philanthropy. For matching grants to be effective, the donor must value benefits for 
the charity (altruistic motivation), whereas tax rebates create a strategic motivation for giving.
Situations and tax incentives that create opportunities for strategic motivations do not 
exclude the possibility that altruistic motivations also play a role (Capraro and Rand 2017). In 
other words, a donor could make donations through a scheme that offers tax rebates without 
taking into account the fact they will benefit financially from doing so. It is difficult to design 
experiments that exclude altruistic motivations. This is similar to the difficulty with separating 
whether someone does their job to earn money or because they enjoy it; we can test whether 
they would do the work for free, but it is difficult to manipulate levels of intrinsic motivation. 
If donors are giving for altruistic reasons and not considering tax rebates, the subsidy is at best 
irrelevant and wasteful and at worst conflicts with or ‘crowds out’ the altruistic motivations 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). However, there is evidence that strategic motivations do play 
a role in prosocial behaviour, as manipulations to increase the size or likelihood of the extrinsic 
rewards increase levels of prosocial behaviour (Camerer 2003; Camerer and Fehr 2003). A com-
parison of contexts where extrinsic rewards are possible with those where they are not can help 
identify how these motivations are different.
To understand the differences between altruistic and strategic prosocial decisions, we con-
ducted a meta-analysis to summarise over a decade of fMRI studies on this topic, combining 
data from over 1000 participants (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn 2019). We classified studies 
into an altruistic group and strategic group based on whether the experimental task meant that 
participants could gain extrinsic benefits, money for themselves, through being prosocial or 
whether the only reasons to give were altruistic.
Importantly, in this study, all charitable giving tasks were included in the altruistic deci-
sions group, as no studies have used fMRI to look at financial incentives for the donor during 
charitable giving. However, looking at other types of decision which have both extrinsic and 
intrinsic benefits can help us understand how these motivations interact in the decision process.
Results showed that giving to others, compared to being selfish, in both altruistic and strate-
gic contexts was associated with overlapping increases in activity across several areas of the brain. 
A common way of interpreting results from fMRI studies is to look at what other types of task or 
stimuli are associated with activity in these areas. The areas that were active during both types of 
generosity included the nucleus accumbens (NuAcc), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and subgenual area of the ACC 
(sgACC). These are considered key elements of the reward and value-computation networks 
(Bartra et al. 2013). The sgACC has also been linked to charitable donations specifically (Moll et al. 
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2006), distinguishes altruism from decisions which benefit the individual (Pulcu et al. 2014), and 
signals learning which actions help others (Lockwood et al. 2016). Activity in the sgACC is also 
linked to a reduced propensity to harm others in utilitarian judgements (Wiech et al. 2013), as 
well as emotional processing in social contexts (Drevets et al. 2008). However, it is important to 
note we cannot conclude that sgACC activity during generosity necessarily means emotional 
processing, or any other previously identified process, was taking place during decisions to give 
money. The conclusions are broader: overlap in the brain between altruistic and strategic giv-
ing suggests commonalities in how intrinsic and extrinsic rewards are represented (Levy and 
Glimcher 2012).
We also compared activity between the two groups of studies and found key differences 
between altruistic and strategic choices to give. Altruistic choices to give correlated with greater 
activation than strategic choices in several regions. That any regions show greater activity during 
altruistic choices suggests there is something unique about decisions to give money away with 
no expectation of something in return. Of the areas of the brain involved in both types of giv-
ing, the one that showed even greater activity during strategic decisions was the right NuAcc. 
Activity in this region has been associated with multiple types of reward (Levy and Glimcher 
2012), including money, intrinsic reward (Moll et al. 2006; Harbaugh et al. 2007; Genevsky et al. 
2013), and social cooperation (Rilling et al. 2002). The issues of interpretation apply here too, 
but this finding could show the neural basis of how intrinsic and extrinsic benefits are combined 
during strategic decisions to give. The fact that activity in this area was highest during strategic 
decisions could fit with behavioural findings that people are more likely to be generous when 
they can get something in return (Zheng and Zhu 2013).
In summary, tax incentives following individual donations can be divided based on whether 
the benefit is to the philanthropic organisation or the donor. Incentives such as matching dona-
tions benefit organisations by increasing the overall value of gifts. For donors to value these 
incentives requires altruistic motivations. In contrast, making donations tax deductible provides 
financial incentives to individuals. Tax incentives for social enterprises may also provide benefits 
to the individual customer, as they obtain a desirable product while promoting social welfare. 
These situations with positive material benefits for both the benefactor and beneficiary mean 
generosity can be strategic rather than altruistic. Differences between patterns of brain activity 
during altruistic and strategic choices make a clear case that decisions in these two contexts rely 
on different processes and should not be considered interchangeable.
Our finding that some regions were most active during strategic decisions could suggest that 
contexts which benefit both the benefactor and beneficiary are the most desirable. However, 
there is evidence that altruistic behaviour can decrease following the introduction of extrin-
sic incentives (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). In the analogy of working to earn money or 
because of intrinsic motivation, this is like introducing payment for tasks someone is already 
doing just because they want to. Imagine someone who loves painting in their spare time being 
offered a small payment in return. It risks changing how the value of the activity is calculated 
and potentially undermining intrinsic motivations. Our results could show the neural basis of 
such ‘crowding out’ of altruistic motivations by selfish ones if these different motivations repre-
sented are within the same neural circuits. We also found other regions more involved during 
altruistic decisions, suggesting something unique about choices to help others with no opportu-
nity for financial gain. In other words, introducing extrinsic incentives in an attempt to increase 
generosity could change the core motivations behind giving.
While the results of our meta-analysis and each of the individual studies on this topic provide 
insight into how the brain calculates the costs and benefits of giving, more work is needed to 
apply these ideas to tax incentives specifically. One key question for future research is whether 
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tax incentives that offer money to the donor do alter, undermine, or increase their altruistic 
motivations. Perhaps there are contexts in which donors perceive them as reducing the cost of 
a donation and so increase the amount they donate. One interesting approach to this question 
could be to measure the impact of introducing tax incentives that benefit the donor in phil-
anthropic contexts that differ in whether an extrinsic benefit is already available. For example, 
if tax deductions successfully increase donations through membership schemes but have a less 
positive impact on donations without an existing extrinsic benefit, considering the original 
motivations strategic or altruistic offers a possible interpretation.
As with much research in psychology and neuroscience, an important limitation is the arti-
ficial nature of experimental tasks, particularly those completed while lying in an MRI scanner. 
Examples of real-world tax incentives are often more complex than the distinction between 
altruistic and strategic motivations. UK gift aid applied to the basic rate of tax would align 
with altruistic motivations, as the charity claims 25% extra on donations. For donors to value 
this requires them to value the charity gaining more money from their gift. However, higher-
rate taxpayers can personally claim back a tax deduction, creating an additional extrinsic benefit 
from their giving. Another more complex example is interacting tax rules, for example, appre-
ciated property rules or donations of shares that have changed in value. In addition to complexi-
ties in the financial value of tax incentives for the donor, potential benefits of giving may not 
fall neatly into an intrinsic or extrinsic category. For example, donations to organisations that 
promote donor’s political or cultural beliefs could be seen as strategically motivated to achieve 
the donor’s aims, but these outcomes are less tangible than financial benefits. It may be possible 
to utilise the complex nature of real-world tax incentives, such as differences between individu-
als or countries, to design field experiments or observational studies on this topic. For example, 
donations that straddle tax rate or tax credit rate changes could offer interesting opportunities to 
study strategic motivations. While these situations offer natural examples of increased extrinsic 
rewards and opportunities for strategic motivation, it is important to reiterate that donors may 
still be giving for altruistic reasons.
Action or outcome-oriented altruism?
The findings outlined previously suggest that while giving can be strategic, there is also an 
intrinsic value to giving money away, which provides altruistic motivations for philanthropy. 
This raises the question: why are people altruistic? Previous work suggests a key distinction 
between motivations for altruism: pure and impure (Andreoni 1989, 1990), more recently also 
termed outcome-oriented and action-oriented altruism, respectively (Kuss et al. 2013). Pure 
or outcome-oriented altruism is motivated by the positive outcome for others or public good, 
independent of one’s own contribution. In contrast, action-oriented altruism is motivated by 
positive emotions from the act of giving. This was originally described as warm-glow giving 
(Andreoni 1989, 1990), but recent uses of the term ‘warm glow’ do not necessarily exclude 
outcome-orientations (Västfjäll et al. 2015; Erlandsson et al. 2016; O’Brien and Kassirer 2019) 
so I use the terms action- and outcome-oriented altruism here.
As action-oriented altruism depends on the act of giving, it could be argued that a key com-
ponent is feeling personally responsible for having a positive impact. In contrast, if someone 
is outcome oriented, they should see value in positive outcomes for others that they were not 
responsible for. This distinction in the role of personal responsibility links to the question of 
how effective it is to spend taxes on incentives to promote individuals’ donations, compared to 
those that do not involve individuals. Examples of tax incentives that do not involve individuals 
are tax exemptions or special status granted to philanthropic organisations. More broadly, taxes 
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can be spent directly on public policy goals that increase social welfare, rather than on any form 
of tax incentive. If people’s motivations align with outcome-oriented altruism and so focus on 
the positive outcomes for philanthropic organisations and their causes, public support for these 
different ways of spending tax will be similar, to the extent they have equal social impacts. How-
ever, as these incentives remove individuals’ agency, in order for them to align with motivations, 
people must value positive outcomes for others even when they do not feel personally respon-
sible for the outcome. If personal responsibility plays a key role in motivating altruism, only tax 
incentives that involve individuals and make them feel their actions have a positive impact will 
be popular, but these will have the potential to increase donations.
Research in economics, psychology, and neuroscience provides evidence for both action- 
and outcome-oriented motivations for altruism. As outcome-oriented altruism is motivated by 
the benefit for the other person, separate from the act of helping, it can be difficult to measure 
based on behaviour alone. One prediction of outcome-oriented motivations is that donations 
by oneself and donations by others are perfect substitutes for each other if they create the same 
impact for the recipient(s). This means that if someone else contributes to a cause, an outcome-
oriented donor should decrease their contribution by that amount. This is known as complete 
‘crowding out’ (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. 2017), but, importantly, this form of crowding out is 
distinct from the motivational crowding out described previously, when extrinsic incentives for 
prosocial behaviour undermine intrinsic ones. Experimental tests of crowding out have gener-
ally not shown support for outcome orientation (Andreoni 1990), and a review of crowding out 
in response to government support found mixed and context-dependent results (Wit and Bek-
kers 2017). However, an issue with experimental paradigms is that anything less than complete 
crowding out is considered evidence against outcome orientation, so the power to detect it is 
low. Another issue is that predictions of complete crowding out are specific to contexts where 
additional donations will not increase the size or strength of the positive outcome, and these are 
very unlikely in the real world.
Action-oriented altruism, motivated by the reward of personally having a positive impact on 
another person or cause, was introduced to explain the lack of complete crowding out found in 
behavioural economics experiments (Andreoni 1989, 1990). A similar pattern of behaviour is 
if donors fail to consider the marginal benefit of their gift, for example, donating to an appeal 
that has already raised enough to meet its aims rather than one that has not yet reached its tar-
get. Anecdotal and scientific evidence support the idea that many altruistic behaviours are not 
those that would bring about the greatest possible impact. In the charitable giving domain, for 
example, most donors do not choose causes or organisations based on the efficiency of their 
impact (Van Iwaarden et al. 2009). It is common to choose organisations based on the percent-
age they spend on projects (Caviola et al. 2014), and a lack of overhead costs promotes giving 
(Gneezy et al. 2014), even though this measure is often meaningless for comparing efficiency 
(Bowman 2006). Many other factors also lead to biases in altruistic behaviour, as they diverge 
from the common view that all lives have equal value (Slovic et al. 2011). These biases include 
preferring to help certain recipients over others (Everett et al. 2015) and the nonlinear relation-
ships between the number of people in need and responses (Dickert et al. 2012). Warm-glow 
motivations within charities themselves have also been linked to inefficiency (Scharf 2014). If 
action-oriented motivations apply for responses to tax incentives for philanthropy, donors will 
respond to those that make them feel best about their own impact, even at the expense of objec-
tive impact for the beneficiaries or public good.
Using fMRI, work on observing others’ gain, not because of altruism or prosocial behav-
iour, has identified the neural mechanisms of vicarious reward during positive outcomes for 
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others one is not responsible for. Like donating to charity and receiving money for oneself, 
seeing others receive money was associated with activity in areas including NuAcc (Mobbs 
et al. 2009). This vicarious reward was powerful enough to drive learning, although learning 
rates were slower than for the self (Lockwood et al. 2016). A similar study measured activity in 
NuAcc during gains for the participant, a charity, and both the participant and a charity. The 
extent of activity in NuAcc when just the charity gained money correlated with how much the 
participant enjoyed winning for the charity (Spaans et al. 2018). While these results combined 
suggest that positive outcomes for others and charities have value, they do not consider costly 
prosocial behaviours to achieve these positive outcomes.
Several studies have developed measures of both outcome and action orientations using 
fMRI. In the first, participants made voluntary charitable donations and also observed tax-
like involuntary transfers from their money to the charity. The NuAcc was active in both 
contexts, which the authors conclude shows participants did find the tax-like transfers 
rewarding. This region showed even more activity during voluntary donations, support-
ing the existence of both outcome-oriented and action-oriented giving (Harbaugh et al. 
2007). In a different paradigm, participants also made costly charitable donation decisions 
in the scanner but on some trials, donations were discarded. As the action-oriented reward 
of being generous is unaffected by whether a donation is discarded, signals in the NuAcc 
on discarded donations were considered evidence for other-oriented motivations. This was 
present, but only for the most generous participants (Kuss et al. 2013), again supporting a 
relationship between outcome orientation and giving. In other words, most participants 
did not seem to care whether their donations actually reached the charity. Such differences 
between people suggest differences in motivations for altruism. These may also link to find-
ings in the literature on tax and philanthropy of differences in how responsive people are 
to incentives. Understanding how incentives align with motivations may help explain these 
differences, and in future, if incentives were more aligned with individuals’ motivations, it 
may boost their efficacy.
In summary, research using fMRI and building on theories from economics provides some 
evidence for pure or outcome-oriented altruistic motivation. Such motivation would align 
with support for directing taxes towards social welfare policies or tax exemption for charities to 
minimise outgoings. However, this was often only found in the most generous participants. For 
other people, being responsible for donations was crucial, in line with action-oriented altruistic 
motivation or warm-glow giving. This suggests people may prefer incentives that increase their 
feeling of responsibility for helping others. As with the section on altruistic and strategic giving, 
further research is needed to test these ideas and extend them to tax incentives specifically, espe-
cially including the complexities of real-world schemes. For example, matching grants could be 
perceived as the result of multiple donors’ gifts. Moreover, the tax treatment of the entity hold-
ing the funds will also be relevant, so outcomes such as tax exemption may actually be linked to 
donation decisions rather than independent of them.
Previous work suggests there may be a partial crowding-out effect, with donors decreasing 
their donations if they will be matched (Lideikyte Huber 2020). However, warm-glow givers, 
as identified by a crowding-out task, increased their donations when matched and were more 
responsive to matching incentives than rebates (Gandullia 2019). One interesting possibility is 
whether conflicting previous findings are due to different motivations of participants. Another 
important question is whether matching is more effective if donors feel more responsible for 





In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the research from psychology and neuroscience 
on different motivations for prosocial behaviour and philanthropy that may be most relevant to 
tax incentives. Specifically, I first outlined the distinction between altruistic and strategic moti-
vations for prosocial decisions. These motivations differ in whether there is an extrinsic benefit 
to being generous or not and so correspond to the distinction between tax incentives to the 
donor or to the charity. A key finding is that altruistic and strategic decisions were associated 
with overlapping activity in the areas of the brain that compute the value of different options, 
but there were also neural differences between these motivations. The second distinction 
I described was between pure and impure, or outcome and action-oriented, altruism. The key 
aspect here is whether participants value outcomes for others independently of being responsi-
ble for them, or whether they only get value from the act of personally giving. This aligns with 
tax incentives that are independent of or linked to individuals’ donation decisions, such as tax 
exemptions or matching grants, respectively. Results from the studies described show evidence 
for both of these motivations but suggest feeling responsible for helping others, warm glow, is 
an important factor.
In addition to insight on how to maximise the effectiveness of tax incentives in promoting 
philanthropy, evidence that people experience warm glow from giving may reveal an over-
looked component in calculating the utility of tax incentives. Perhaps encouraging philanthropy 
through tax incentives also has psychological benefits for donors (Sellen 2021). There is evidence 
that being altruistic enhances wellbeing (Dunn et al. 2008), with a recent meta-analysis suggest-
ing a small to medium effect of being prosocial on happiness and no evidence of publication bias 
(Curry et al. 2018). Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that people adapt to the warm glow 
of giving more slowly than to the good feeling of receiving money (O’Brien and Kassirer 2019). 
Prosocial behaviours have also been linked to improved physical health outcomes (Crocker 
et al. 2017), decreased mortality (Konrath et al. 2012), and improved relationships (Crocker and 
Canevello 2008). While there are many potential mechanisms for these benefits, it is possible 
that promoting philanthropy through effective tax incentives can create positive social outcomes 
for both donors and beneficiaries.
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1 Introduction
As philanthropy can only be properly understood from a multidisciplinary perspective, I ground this 
chapter in observations and literature from various fields, including semantics, philosophy, econom-
ics, sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology, and neuroscience. Tax policy is generally 
considered a classical means for promoting philanthropy, and scholars have long debated the extent of 
its efficiency and suitability in policymaking toolboxes (OECD, 2020b). In economics only, Bekkers 
and Wiepking (2011, p. 933) identified over 50 studies published since the 1970s that empirically 
investigated such notions as “price and income elasticity,” “crowding-out effects,” and so on. These 
technical terms are generally taken for granted by economists, and other scientists cannot access this 
complex literature. There is an important need for clarification, synthesis, and accessibility to allow 
cross-fertilization. Building on these premises, I formulate the chapter around this nexus of questions:
• Beyond tax policy, what additional levers can be used for fostering a resilient culture of 
philanthropy and sustainably “grow the giving pie” via nonmonetary incentives?
• How can we then redefine the common understanding of the philanthropy-taxation 
conundrum to craft a new public discourse that spurs long-term generosity?
To answer these questions, I introduce new concepts and I elucidate preexisting ones in order 
to propose a novel analytical framework that is easy to grasp for the broadest community of phi-
lanthropy scholars. Second, I examine the usefulness and efficacy of tax policies using this novel 
prism. Third, I explore multidimensional rewards of altruistic behavior and propose adopting a 
new paradigm to understand philanthropy through happiness lenses. Fourth, I lay the founda-
tion of a roadmap to promote philanthropy with a refreshed narrative.
2 Defining a new conceptual framework
The suggested novel approach requires the definition of several key concepts. Certain are known 
in the literature, while others are new.
17
PHILANTHROPY AS A SELF-
TAXATION MECHANISM 
WITH HAPPY OUTCOMES
Crafting a new public discourse
Charles Sellen
Philanthropy as a self-taxation mechanism
299
a Philanthropy: broad vs. narrow understanding
“Philanthropy” is derived from the ancient Greek word philanthrôpìa (φιλανθρωπία), literally the 
“love of humankind” (Sulek, 2010b). To its broadest philosophical extent, the term may thus 
encompass notions such as being friendly to others or caring for the planet, behaving responsi-
bly in all avenues of life, avoiding pollution, and so on.
The contemporary usage makes philanthropy equivalent to “voluntary action for the public 
good” (Payton & Moody, 2008) or “private means to public ends” (Sulek, 2010a). This essen-
tially involves the gift of something not necessarily tangible (e.g., money, goods) but at least 
quantifiable (e.g., volunteered time, blood).
For simplicity – and although I do not plead for semantic restrictions – I  adopt an even 
more restrictive definition of philanthropy in this chapter as tantamount to “monetary giving” 
(excluding in-kind donations). This is because taxation is most immediately related to eco-
nomic values considered unquestionably measurable in financial terms. A restrictive definition 
is needed temporarily for demonstrating a case with greater clarity. The proposed approach can 
then be extended to other forms of generosity.
I will therefore use the terms “philanthropy,” “generosity,” and “giving” interchangeably, 
even though they are not absolute synonyms in the literature or in real life.
b Philanthropy: costly vs. costless
Economists have long surveyed what they call the “price of giving” (for instance, see Auten 
et al., 2002), defined as “the amount an individual must give for one dollar to accrue to the 
charitable activity itself ” (Meer, 2014). Thus, it follows that the “tax-price of giving” is “the net 
cost to the taxpayer of a dollar of charitable giving” (Steinberg, 2021). From a semantic stand-
point, “price” is ambiguous, as it can be synonym of “cost” and “valuable” at once. A “price” 
must be paid to purchase something; however, something desirable or precious can be said to 
have a “high price” to us (often in an emotional sense) or even to be “priceless.” For that reason, 
I prefer employing the term “cost,” which helps disambiguating and avoiding possible confusion 
in terminology.
If “philanthropy” is understood as “the gift of money,” this gift must be costly to the donating 
entity – whether an individual or a corporation. Indeed, the dictionary defines “gift” as “Some-
thing, the possession of which is transferred to another without the expectation or receipt of an 
equivalent” (OED, 2020). Considering this definition, we may ask this philosophical question: 
If the sum of money from someone’s pockets is repaid by other means (for instance, through a 
tax refund), does it still qualify literally as a “gift”? If the left hand takes back what the right hand 
has donated, where is the generosity? The notion of giving bears the implicit idea of incurring 
loss. In this vein, many wealthy philanthropists interviewed through a qualitative inquiry testi-
fied that a donation must cost you something to deserve being called “philanthropy” (Sellen, 
2019). An extensive review of the literature also established that: “It is clear that giving money 
costs money” (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, p. 932).
In this chapter, I will not go as far as to establish a quality difference between the value of 
two equally costly gifts, depending on whether the donor is wealthy and taps into unneces-
sary surplus or if the donor has a modest background and shares a portion of vital resources1. 
Nevertheless, religious traditions certainly discriminate between those two instances and 
attribute higher moral value to greater efforts made by poor people who give from their live-
lihood, as illustrated in the Christian Lesson of the Widow’s Mite (or the Widow’s Offering)2.
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This moral distinction is somewhat corroborated by some rich people who see philanthropy 
as the “right use of surplus wealth” (Lloyd & Breeze, 2013). Certain major donors openly admit 
that their own surplus giving is less admirable than that of more deprived donors:
There wasn’t one single thing that I ever denied myself from the moneys I gave. Ever. 
But I think that there are people that I’ve seen that have denied themselves the moneys 
they give. Now the amounts might be different and the size. Those people are doing 
a lot more. So to them it’s more meaningful.
(Schervish et al., 1994, p. 71)
To avoid subjective judgment, let us assume here that all gifts have the same moral value. How-
ever, the aforementioned philosophical premises lead us to introduce a fundamental distinction 
between two objective subcomponents of a gift: the part that is “costless” and the rest that is 
“costly.” Clearly, in the absence of tax incentives, the entirety of a gift is costly for the donor. 
However, in the presence of tax incentives, a more or less extensive portion of a gift may end 
up being “costless” to the donor, as this fraction will be paid back.
Equation 1 summarizes this subdivision of a monetary gift’s cost components:
Gift = Costly portion of gift + Costless portion of gift (1)
Figure 17.1a illustrates this equation. Note that the respective sizes of the costless and costly 
components are arbitrary at this point.
c Philanthropy: nominal vs. real
Economists normally discuss nominal wages versus real wages (i.e., adjusted for inflation) 






Figure 17.1a Cost components of a gift from the donor’s perspective
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domestic products, growth rates, or interest rates. I propose that philanthropy scholars distin-
guish between nominal and real generosity.
In this case, the inflation rate would not be the contrasting factor. “Nominal generosity” 
would reflect the face monetary value of the gift made. In contrast, “real generosity” would 
denote the costly value of the gift, that is, the portion permanently coming out of the donor’s 
pocket. In the absence of tax incentives, nominal generosity equals real generosity. In the pres-
ence of a tax incentive scheme, the remaining portion of the nominal gift would be considered 
a “non-gift” insofar as the donor does not “give” this sum permanently (as it will be refunded 
through subsequent tax rebates).
This yields Equation 2:
Nominal gift = Real gift + Non-gift (2)
Let us name the explanatory factors (or “causalities”) behind each subcomponent of monetary 
generosity. The “non-gift” component is the direct result of a tax incentive scheme. The “real 
gift” component is unrelated to mandatory taxation. However, as it results from an individual’s 
choice to voluntarily deprive oneself of a private resource oriented toward the public good, it has 
the same effect as a tax imposed from outside. Therefore, we can call it “self-taxation.” Objec-
tions may arise that philanthropy is voluntary, whereas taxation is coercive; thus, “self-taxation” 
would only be appealing to “masochistic” individuals. Democracies were historically built on 
the principle of “no taxation without consent.” In free countries, taxation ensues from a social 
contract made possible through elected representatives, whereby people agree that governments 
levy taxes for public purposes. Although “self-taxation” may sound like an oxymoron, I contend 
that it reflects the free will of citizens to voluntarily contribute to the public good. Without 
coercion, the donor’s resources are depleted, just as if donated amounts had been taxed.
I therefore propose Equation 3:
Nominal generosity = Voluntary self-taxation + Tax incentive scheme (3)
Equations 2 and 3 are summarized in Figure 17.1b, wherein the French tax scheme was used in 










Nominal gift Subcomponents 
Figure 17.1b Splitting nominal gifts into real gifts and non-gifts
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the amount owed in income tax.3 Thus, a monetary gift costs only one-third (or one-fourth) 
of its nominal value. Because every country has a different tax scheme for incentivizing philan-
thropy – and sometimes none – the respective sizes of the “real gift” and “non-gift” components 
will sensibly vary across tax systems. The needle can also move up or down depending on the 
specific fiscal situation of a donor (person or corporation) within a given country. This can be 
used to describe the tax advantages at a certain moment and evolve over time. Therefore, the 
proposed model offers potential universal applications.
d Philanthropy: conjunctural vs. structural
This section draws inspiration from economists’ analysis of the unemployment rate. This vari-
able usually rises during recessions and decreases with economic growth. Public policies can 
influence the upward or downward trajectory of employment levels in the labor market. Empir-
ical evidence shows that unemployment rates are bound by historical minima and maxima. 
These extremity levels vary across countries. The long-term trend is called “structural rate,” 
which means that unemployment seldom drops below that level under this labor market’s spe-
cific conditions. The variations in this rate above/below the bottom line are called “cyclical 
unemployment.” By definition, the “structural” value is relatively stable over time, whereas the 
“cyclical” part depends on circumstances and business cycles.4
Governments can influence conjunctural levels of unemployment by designing emergency 
plans in times of crisis; however, they cannot easily alter the structural bottom line. Only by 
modifying the labor market fundamental mechanics (e.g., suppressing/introducing require-
ments for minimal wages) can they obtain lasting consequences and get closer to the desired 
level.
Mutatis mutandis, this reasoning may apply to charitable donations with slight variations in 
semantics.5 I define “structural” philanthropy as the lowest average amount of charitable giving 
observed in an individual donor’s (person or corporation) history or recorded on a nation-wide 
scale over a significant period.6 I define “conjunctural” philanthropy as the amplitude of vari-
ation of this generosity level, from lowest to the highest thresholds.7 These concepts are not 
expressed in absolute currency values but in shares of wealth or income (at personal or national 
scopes).
This yields Equation 4:
Total generosity = Structural giving + Conjunctural giving (4)
Figure 17.2 applies this subdivision to the total amount of giving as a percentage of the Ameri-
can GDP over the past 40 years.8
Figure 17.2 shows that “structural giving” in the United States never dropped below 1.6% 
of the GDP in nearly half a century. Conversely, the total amount of charitable donations in the 
country has never surpassed 2.2% of the global output over this lengthy period. Furthermore, 
we distinguish two subperiods. During the first 15 years (1979–1994), structural generosity was 
pegged at 1.6%, and higher levels evolved slightly above this floor. In addition, the corridor of 
annual variation of “conjunctural giving” was extremely narrow (0.1%–0.2%). Then, something 
occurred in the late 1990s that significantly altered the equilibria. Over the past 23 years (1997–
2019), both structural and conjunctural levels have risen. Indeed, the floor has increased to 
1.9% since 1997, while the rooftop reached 2.2% in 2017. The amplitudes of annual variations 
nearly doubled (0.3%). Explaining why the corridor was uplifted in the late 1990s is beyond 
our scope; however, I have noted a “threshold effect” between two relatively “homogenous 
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periods.” Whether upsurges of generosity in response to disasters are part of conjunctural or 







 Structural giving  Conjunctural giving Giving/GDP (%)
Figure 17.2  Structural and conjunctural giving in the United States, 1979–2019 (in current dollars)
Source: Data from GIVING USA 2020, Giving USA Foundation. Grey shades added by author, 2020
Box 17.1  Does “disaster philanthropy” belong to conjunctural or 
structural giving?
The term “disaster philanthropy” explains the waves of spontaneous giving that generally occur 
in the wake of major catastrophes, whether human-induced (terrorism, accidents, economic cri-
ses, etc.) or natural (earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, pandemics, etc.). This source of giving 
typically illustrates the conjunctural fraction of giving defined in our framework, with higher 
peaks than usual observed at both the household and national scales. Although this phenomenon 
theoretically relates to one-time events, the more frequent occurrence of calamities over recent 
years (over 30 cases recorded in 2017–2018 in the United States alone) may lead to the incor-
poration of this type of giving as a recurrent part of the “structural giving” component (Indiana 
University, 2019).
e Micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis
To conclude this conceptual framework section, recall that the pairs of concepts of “nominal/
real” and “structural/conjunctural” philanthropy are applicable to individuals, households, cor-
porations, or nations as a whole. However, they also work for specific groups of actors, cat-
egorized by gender, age, wealth bracket, religion, ethnicity, political opinions, professions, and 
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so on. Researchers could seek to observe evolutive levels of “Catholic Hispanic women’s real 
conjunctural philanthropy,” “Swiss plumbers’ nominal structural giving,” and so on.
Note that the “nominal/real” pair of concepts can either be applied to a specific point in 
time (such as a photograph) or over a period (like a film). On the contrary, the “structural/con-
junctural” binomial tool can only be used longitudinally (like a film, to describe an evolution). 
Both pairs fit a variety of scales of analysis, as summarized in Table 17.1.
3 How does tax policy fit in this new framework?
Let us reconsider the potential role and justification of tax incentives through the novel 
lenses offered by our proposed conceptual framework. When governments ask themselves, 
“How can philanthropy be encouraged?”, they often ask, “How can nominal philanthropy be 
encouraged?” Commentators do the same. Indeed, debates surrounding philanthropy con-
stantly revolve around a “nominal” level of charitable giving. So far, we have not witnessed 
in the literature or in political disputes (either by pros or cons of private giving) any such dis-
tinction between “nominal” and “real” philanthropy. Protagonists usually compare, appraise, 
or refute nominal figures of “how much is given” – or “how much is promised,” as most 
public announcements are pledges rather than actual payouts. Even the harshest critics who 
question the legitimacy of incentivizing big philanthropy (Giridharadas, 2018, among oth-
ers) tend to overlook the technical aspects of how “costly” a gift is to its donor. Few authors 
have detailed the inequities inherent to the tax treatment of charitable giving at a micro scale 
(Reich, 2018). They do this to demonstrate that the incentives tend to benefit the wealthy 
more than modest households, and they suggest pertinent avenues to reform the system in a 
fair way. However, they do not draw full conclusions about the soundness of the tax policy 
applied to each of the subcomponents of a gift described previously. This is what this section 
attempts to cover.
a Sequencing the tax policy debate
According to our framework, the legitimate question of “How do we encourage philanthropy?” 
actually translates into “How do we encourage [the four subcomponents of] philanthropy?” 
Policymakers should thus envision how to address each pillar, as tax policy may have different 
effects on them. Table 17.2 summarizes the main foreseeable mechanisms for public tax officials.
b Combining the subcomponents of tax policy
In a real-life situation, governments are unlikely acting on each subcomponent separately, as 
all four elements are intertwined. However, public decision-makers can attempt to target one 
Table 17.1 Application of new concepts at various scales
Scale of analysis Realities observed
Micro level Single economic agents (individuals, households, corporations, etc.)
Meso level Aggregated groups of agents (sector-wise/professional occupation/age/gender/wealth 
or income bracket/religion/ethnicity/political opinion, etc.)
Macro level Country, economy or society as a whole, worldwide mapping
Source: Author, 2020
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Table 17.2 Possible usages of tax policy in our novel framework
Subcomponents Conceivable effects of tax policy on each subcomponent of philanthropy
of philanthropy
Conjunctural Principle: Tax policy can predictably be effective in inducing greater conjunctural 
part philanthropy by offering temporary high benefits to donors in response to exogenous 
shocks (e.g., economic recession, natural disaster, etc.).
Illustration: In France, influential voices (including former Minister Aillagon, who 
passed the 2003 Act on mécénat) publicly asked to raise the rate of deductibility 
from 66% to 75% for gifts in response to the 2019 Notre Dame fire incident. 
Facing strong public criticism from the Yellow Vests movement, the government 
paid no heed to these calls. Again, in 2020, a multitude advocated the same shift 
to compensate for the losses faced by charitable organizations in the wake of the 
coronavirus crisis. This time, the law-makers relented.1
Analysis: Such measures can only be temporary and moderate. They bear the risk of 
creating a form of “reliance on exceptionality” and removing the exceptions might 
become difficult once the non-profits begin to rely upon them. In that way, what 
was initially intended to be temporary becomes permanent. Conversely, deciding to 
remove the exceptions may create instability in the tax system and thwart donors’ 
expectations, especially among major donors who engage in multi-year planned 
giving. This may also negatively affect the “learning curve” of all donors – small or 
big, current or prospective – who then face an ever-changing set of rules.
Structural part Principle: Tax policy is intuitively suitable for structural philanthropy, provided 
that the tax scheme remains steady over long enough periods of time to generate 
a learning effect among donors, keen awareness among policy-makers, and 
longitudinal data for researchers to demonstrate the policy’s impact.
Illustration: In France, tax incentives introduced in 2007 to deduct some charitable giving 
from the wealth tax2 failed to create a lasting behavioral change among wealthy taxpayers. 
When the tax base was reduced3 in 2017, giving by these households eroded instantly 
and proportionally, from 52,000 to 20,000 households in F.Y. 2018 (Bazin et al., 2019, 
p. 16 ff.). This was a real catastrophe for major gifts fundraising campaigns in France: 
giving from that source collapsed from €270 million to €112 million (–60%). A decade 
of implementation of this scheme was obviously not sufficient to induce a lasting change 
in “structural” giving by the rich. Only 14% of wealthy French households deduct a 
gift from the wealth tax (Bazin et al., 2019), contrasting sharply with the 91% of the 
wealthy who give in the United States (Indiana University, 2016), where the culture of 
philanthropy is more pervasive. So far, France has not succeeded in replicating this culture 
through the sole use of tax incentives to encourage giving by the rich.
Analysis: Given that structural philanthropy is defined as the floor below which the 
generosity levels never drop, raising that floor sustainably should be one of the objectives 
of tax incentives. Ideally, tax policies should be supplemented with an easing of 
philanthropic activities. Domestic tax policy constitutes only one of the five pillars of 
the enabling environment for philanthropy (Indiana University, 2018), along with cross-
border tax policy, administrative regulations, governance and relations with government, 
and socio-cultural traditions related to giving. The fundamental parameters of the 
philanthropy sector must be altered by a diverse set of instruments (including but not 
limited to tax policy) so as to durably shift structural giving upward.
Non-gift part Principle: Equations 2 (Nominal gift = Real gift + Non-gift) and 3 (Nominal 
generosity = Voluntary self-taxation + Tax incentive scheme) provide self-evident 
guiding principles to manage the “non-gift” part of a gift through incentives. Our 




Subcomponents Conceivable effects of tax policy on each subcomponent of philanthropy
of philanthropy
powerful effect on “nominal philanthropy” insofar as one of its subcomponents 
originates exclusively from a tax scheme. However, in this respect, it is futile to 
expect an upsurge in giving through the non-gift part of a nominal gift, because it is 
caused by a pure transfer of public resources to refund private donors.
Illustration: France introduced more generous percentages of deductibility of gifts 
from the income tax in 2003. In subsequent years, nominal giving rose in the same 
proportion as tax-incentive increase, which made experts infer that the apparent rise 
of generosity was only reflecting in more tax subsidies (Malet, 2005). In retrospect, 
the new incentives generated extremely moderate elasticity of the total value of gifts 
and tended to spur mostly the bigger ones (Fack & Landais, 2010). Our conceptual 
framework would have helped put this reality in plain light and perhaps adjust policies 
and reframe public debates in France accordingly. In the United States, econometrists 
have established that high-income taxpayers are particularly responsive to modifying 
their contributions swiftly after a tax-scheme change and even adjust their gifts in 
anticipation of projected reforms (Bakija & Heim, 2011).
Analysis: Seeking to grow nominal philanthropy without growing real philanthropy 
means that only the “non-gift” part of a gift will be shifted. By focusing on this 
subcomponent only, tax policy may artificially boost philanthropy. This mechanism, 
by definition, will work instantly (because it is directly and fully correlated to the tax 
scheme), but it will bring only a delusional satisfaction to policy-makers and fuel an 
illusory bubble of apparent giving – indeed, entirely nurtured by public transfers.
Real part Principle: As “real” philanthropy is defined as the residual portion of a gift that is 
100% costly to the donor, it cannot be directly affected by tax policy. However, 
it may be affected indirectly, because tax schemes can draw new donors to 
philanthropic endeavors and provide them a taste of it, thereby costing them 
something (the “real” fraction), whereas some of these newcomers would never  
have practiced philanthropy in the absence of incentives.
Illustration: France’s introduction of generous tax breaks on the wealth tax in 2007 had a 
mixed impact (see previously) but spurred a new class of vocational philanthropists – at 
least for one decade. My interviews revealed that this wealth tax was so highly despised 
among rich people that several of them found the charitable scheme extremely attractive, 
because it allowed them “earmark/reallocate” to their preferred causes money that 
otherwise would have been “confiscated” by the State (Sellen, 2019). The “real,” costly 
part incurred without refund was then assimilable to a “premium” disbursement they 
accepted to avoid paying the rest to the Treasury. It should, however, be noted that 
various types of French philanthropists co-exist and have different attitudes toward this 
wealth tax (Duvoux, 2021), which may influence real generosity levels from each of these 
profiles (see developments in the following about “perceived costs” of giving).
Analysis: By using tax schemes judiciously, policy-makers can expect spillover effects 
on “real” giving. However, tax policy might not be the most direct or obvious 
option to straightforwardly enhance “real” generosity, which, by definition, remains 
unresponsive to tax reforms.
Source: Author, 2020
1 The Amending Finance Law (April 2020) temporarily raised to €1,000 (up from €552) the amount 
subject to a 75% tax refund when donations benefited “people in need” (including care and treatment).
2 The “TEPA” law n°2007–1223, enacted on August 21, 2007, allows one to deduct 75% of the gift value 
from the wealth tax, up to a ceiling of €50,000.
3 The former “impôt de solidarité sur la fortune” (ISF) became “impôt sur la fortune immobilière” (IFI). Stocks and 
private equity shares were removed from the tax base, which now essentially comprises real-estate assets.
Table 17.2 (Continued)
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of them in particular. Furthermore, understanding these various elements and their relative 
mechanics can only be beneficial in improving the soundness of tax policies.
To this end, our conceptual framework offers a new set of tools for policymaking. In Fig-
ure  17.3a, I  design an entirely fictitious scenario and describe the underlying mechanics at 
work, drawing conclusions substantially different from the initial appearances.
Scenario: In fiscal year one (FY1), donors are presented with an incentive worth one-third 
(33%) of their gifts. Then, an economic crisis occurs, shrinking the overall level of giving in 
FY2 because the recession hits household income. The government decides to increase tax 
incentives to support the nonprofit sector and its unparalleled capacity to create social value 
in difficult times. Reform A doubles the deductibility of charitable donations to two-thirds of 
their value (66%). The new legislation is immediately implemented in FY3, while the economy 
bounces back to generate new growth. Due to economic recovery, FY4 sees more charitable 
giving within a stabilized framework. In this favorable context, the government then deter-
mines that greatly generous tax breaks are no longer justified and slightly reduces the advantage 
by allowing the deductibility of only half of donations (50%) through Reform B. The economic 
boom continues through FY5–FY6 in the presence of these new incentives.
Purpose: This scenario is hypothetical. It is intended to illustrate the mechanics at work 
according to our proposed framework, in contrast to the usual way of thinking about philan-
thropy and tax policy.
Analysis: Most analyses on the effect of fiscal incentives on charitable giving examine only 
nominal levels of gifts, either at the micro (e.g., a household or a company), meso (a group 
formed via certain criteria), or macro scale (e.g., a country). Applying our framework to a case 
study such as this one allows us to differentiate “conjunctural nominal” from “structural nomi-
nal” levels of gifts over time (see double-lined curves in Figure 17.3a). Based on the notion of 
“real giving” introduced previously, we can further distinguish “conjunctural real” from “struc-
tural real” levels (see single-lined curves in Figure 17.3a). The visual discrepancies between these 
four curves completely modify the assessment that decision-makers would make by observing 
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• The recession scenario imagined in FY1–FY2 translates into a temporary drop in giving 
(both nominal and real), a phenomenon that is often observed when the economy falters 
(Rooney & Bergdoll, 2020). Interestingly, Reform A doubles the government’s efforts to 
support charitable giving. This leads to the stabilization of gifts, nominally speaking, in 
FY2–FY3, which means that donors gave the same face value and recipient organizations 
received the same annual budget. However, since the cost to donors was cut by 50%, “real 
generosity” was halved along the way. From a regulator’s perspective, it can be correctly 
said that the reform succeeded in maintaining the same level of necessary funding for the 
nonprofit sector. However, this steadiness occurred only by transferring public funds to 
private beneficiaries – not by maintaining people’s real generosity, which basically fell.
• Economic growth between FY3 and FY4 generated twice more, both nominal and real 
(in an unchanged fiscal environment, the growth in giving is homothetic). Note that while 
FY4’s nominal giving has returned to the FY1 original peak level, FY4’s real giving is only 
equivalent to FY2’s lower level. Thus, public policy did meet its objective of restoring pre-
crisis nominal giving; but, this is at a significant differential cost to state vaults (an additional 
33% of gift value). However, the necessity to protect the national ecosystem of nonprofits 
may still be considered politically worthwhile at this price.
• Past the crisis, when the government evaluates that such a high incentive may no longer 
be legitimate, it resolves to pass Reform B, reducing the level of public support to 50% – 
which remains more than the initial 33% guaranteed during the first period. By examining 
only the nominal trend in giving (FY4–FY5), observers may primarily conclude that the 
reform had a negative impact on charitable behavior. However, even though donors have 
indeed adjusted their nominal giving downwards, their generosity actually remains steady 
in real terms during those two years; the visible drop is only the result of decreased public 
money transfers. Note also that this real generosity level in FY5 is exactly similar to that in 
FY2; however, nominal giving is higher due to tax incentives.
• Finally, continuous economic growth combined with a favorable tax treatment of gifts 
makes donors more comfortable to return to higher generosity levels in FY6. At that point, 
nominal giving is back at its all-time high. Real gifts have risen more effectively than those 
of FY4 (although the incentive is lower) but remain inferior to those of FY1 (despite a 
higher incentive).
As shown by these simulations, the proposed framework offers a completely new operational 
toolbox. If assumptions are refined and adapted to match local situations, these fundamental 
mechanics open a practical and straightforward way to assess public policy. At this point of rea-
soning, the key takeaway of this graph is yet to be considered.
c Centering policy efforts on “core philanthropy”
While tax policy is designed to primarily affect nominal levels – both structural and conjunc-
tural – and to some extent “conjunctural real” giving, it is unhelpful to alter “structural real” 
generosity (see arguments developed in Table 17.2). In Figure 17.3a, this “structural real” is the 
lowest record of generosity, or the floor under which giving never drops. Figure 17.3b high-
lights this fundamental stripe, which I call “core philanthropy.”
“Core philanthropy” is generosity that is entirely costly to the donor. It may be costless (like 
in France) or costly to the Treasury (like in the United Kingdom through the Gift Aid system, 
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whereby the government matches 25% of private giving). “Core philanthropy” existed before 
tax incentives were created and would certainly survive a total removal of those, as its essence is 
based on other types of motives completely unrelated to taxation.
Historical examples and contemporary empirical evidence demonstrate the undeniable 
existence of “core philanthropy.” When Henry Dunant and a group of Genevan citizens created 
the International Committee of the Red-Cross (ICRC) in the 19th century, they established 
the basis for what has since become the world’s largest humanitarian movement. Although the 
ICRC leveraged government collaborations early on, tax incentives did not exist at its foun-
dational stages, and “core philanthropy” was arguably its primary source of funding. In the 
20th century, when the Abbé Pierre called on French radio for an insurrection of generosity 
(insurrection de la bonté) during the terribly cold winter of 1954, millions of people responded 
instantly by sending an overwhelming flood of money and in-kind gifts. Sweden did not offer 
income tax incentives for charitable gifts until 2012; however, Swedish households traditionally 
supported charities long before this reform, which allows only modest tax incentives (OECD, 
2020b, p. 86). Australia, for her part, does not incentivize giving to religious organizations, 
although they receive the lion’s share of the country’s total giving. These are only four examples 
taken from different epochs or contexts, showing that people did not wait for tax incentives to 
express their “core philanthropy.”
Contemporary empirical evidence suggests that American high net-worth individuals9 
(HNWIs) would either maintain (48.3% in 2013) or moderately decrease (41.7% in 2013) 
their giving if income tax deductions were removed. I call “complete core philanthropy” the 
unchanged giving and “incomplete core philanthropy” the portion that would only be subject 
to slight changes (see Figure 17.4). Donors planning on increasing their giving are negligible 
(less than 2%). Those planning to significantly decrease their giving (8.7% in 2013) reveal the 
extent of the tax scheme’s incidence on a minority, contrasting with relatively unalterable giv-
ing levels by the majority. Note that survey statements may differ from the respondents’ actual 
deeds, partly due to a “social desirability” response bias.
To conclude this section, “core philanthropy” constitutes the fundamental brick upon 
which public authorities should seek to build policies designed to enduringly spur phil-
anthropic growth at zero (or limited) cost to government. An upward shift in this ulti-
mate building block of altruism (see plain grey arrows in Figure 17.3b) can raise the whole 
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philanthropic tide in a country and allow tax policy to fully play its role in leveraging both 
conjunctural and nominal levels by riding on the crest of this wave.
4 Other ways to encourage real generosity
The previous section determined that tax policy is a necessary but insufficient tool for fostering 
philanthropy. It can prime the pump by providing a taste for generosity to donors who other-
wise would not have donated. It can multiply pre-existing real giving by all donors into higher 
levels of nominal gifts. However, it cannot create a real-giving upsurge ex nihilo. Therefore, we 
ought to seek game-changing tools to boost this fundamental layer of generosity.
a Levers to stimulate “core philanthropy”
Figure 17.3b depicts “core philanthropy” as the lowest constant stripe of real giving in a nation 
or an individual’s history. Thus, it is a synonym of “structural real giving,” with a value inferior 
or equal to “conjunctural real giving.” If taxation is decorrelated to core philanthropy, what are 
the other influencing factors?
The literature on donor motivations is extensive, and hundreds of publications have been 
condensed by several studies or meta-analyses (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Lloyd & Breeze, 
2013; Konrath & Handy, 2018). Table 17.3 summarizes the main factors identified to donate 
identified in these scholarly works. Note that the concepts of “mechanisms” and “motives” do 
not exactly match.
As shown in Table 17.3, avoiding taxation, or utilizing favorable tax breaks (depending on 
which side of the coin – negative or positive – the donor considers), count among many other 
factors in predicting or explaining charitable behavior. They are not necessarily the most preva-
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Figure 17.4  Change in giving by HNWIs if income-tax deductions for donations were eliminated: 2005, 
2009, 2013, and 2015 (%)
Source: Data from Indiana University, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2016 Bank of America U.S. Trust Study of High Net Worth 
Philanthropy. Labels added by author, 2020
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that “while the potential for tax benefits does influence the decision to give, the specific cause 
or organization is a more important factor.” These authors report (p. 195) that “more wealthy 
people (34 percent) value tax benefits than respondents in the general population (11 percent) 
(HNW Inc., 2000).”
Even though richer families appear three times more sensitive to tax incentives than ordinary 
households, those figures clearly indicate that most citizens (from two-thirds to nine-tenths) 
declare their giving is not predominantly determined by tax schemes.
Consequently, if one wants to improve real philanthropy, the plethora of other non-mone-
tary factors will be of the utmost importance in nurturing generosity. Some of them relate to 
social benefits (reputation, socializing, recognition, etc.), while others relate to psychological 
benefits (pleasure, joy of giving, opportunities to learn, guilt avoidance, etc.). These motives 
are either inner or outer oriented. Most of the time, they bring positive immaterial rewards 
to donors. However, there could be some adverse noneconomic consequences of displaying 
charitable behavior (see Box 17.2).
Table 17.3 Various underlying factors that explain giving
Main studies Identified mechanisms and motives to donate
Bekkers and Wiepking (a) Awareness of need, (b) solicitation, (c) costs and benefits, (d) altruism, 
(2011) (e) reputation, (f) psychological benefits, (g) values, (h) efficacy
Lloyd and Breeze (2013) (a) Belief in a cause; (b) acting as a catalyst for change; (c) achieving self-
Note: this study is centered actualization; (d) feeling a sense of duty and responsibility to share 
on major donors wealth; (e) enjoying the relationships that develop with the charity 
leadership, fellow donors, and beneficiaries; (f) belief that philanthropy is 
the rightful use of surplus money; (g) clarity on the complementary roles 
of government and philanthropy; (h) belief that philanthropy is a good 
parenting tool; (i) appreciating the public recognition that comes with 
being philanthropic; (j) having their own lives enriched by philanthropy
Konrath and Handy (a) Trust, (b) altruism, (c) social ties, (d) tax, (e) egoism, (f) constraints
(2018, p. 359 ff)
Box 17.2  Notable exceptions: When major giving may arouse 
public resentment
In France, public opinion rarely praises the good deeds of philanthropists and rather shows con-
tempt or jealousy, according to the perception of wealthy interviewees (Sellen, 2019), who, there-
fore, generally give quietly10. Consequently, major donors often conceal their best actions (i.e., 
surrendering part of their “social benefits” of giving) in order to avoid the inconvenience of public 
resentment (i.e., reducing the negative side-effects of giving).
In their comprehensive review of literature, Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) focus on material 
costs and benefits, which are defined as “tangible consequences that are associated with a mon-
etary value” (p. 932). I attempt to broaden this definition by encompassing immaterial rewards 
as well as a cost/benefit analysis of giving. This approach may seem akin to rational choice theory 
(Amadae, 2017), which has prompted skepticism. While it is not possible to provide further 
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technical details here, we can still operate within a methodological individualism paradigm as 
long as we remain mindful of the probable framing effects on decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986) and of the cognitive biases and bounded rationality of agents who seek to optimize utility 
under constraints (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002).
b Embracing externalities to apprehend “perceived costs” of giving
Facing such a complex situation involving numerous factors of a diverse nature, economists 
would simplify and discriminate between a financial cost (or “price”; see previously) on the one 
hand and a set of psychological/social benefits on the other (known as “warm glow”). They 
would label the intangible gains “positive externalities” and the immaterial downsides “negative 
externalities.” They would then seek to quantify and “internalize” externalities into a single util-
ity function. Box 17.3 describes open avenues and persistent disagreements among economists 
to explain charitable behavior.
Box 17.3 Disagreements among economists about giving rationales
The economics literature offers several contradictory explanations for charitable giving. If Homo 
economicus is supposedly rational and selfish, why would s/he disburse resources without compen-
sation? As predictions of neo-classical theory and empirical observations did not match, scholars 
proposed a variety of possible explanations. A  few claim that the theory is inaccurate because 
individuals are neither completely rational (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) nor completely selfish 
(Fontaine, 2007). They advocate, instead, for a renewed theory moving from Homo economicus to 
Homo sapiens (Thaler, 2000). Another stream of research justifies the mainstream theoretical frame-
work by incorporating rewards into utility functions, which can then be logically maximized by 
rational economic agents. This yielded the notion of “impure altruism” (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). 
Various forms of recompense have been imagined: the satisfaction of contributing to a public good 
(Sugden, 1982, 1983), the reputation and pleasure derived from giving (Harbaugh, 1998a, 1998b), 
the thrill of “making a difference” in the world (Duncan, 2004), and so on. These explanations have 
different outcomes in terms of donor competition and cooperation. Whereas the “public good” 
model generates more happiness when everyone contributes (and, conversely, less contentment 
when some behave as “free riders”), the differential impact model follows an adverse correlation, 
with more joy derived from being the sole funder (someone who makes a relatively bigger differ-
ence to a cause when other contributors back off). The private consumption model and the prestige 
model rely on intrinsic or prestige motives, respectively, and, consequently, donors either derive 
contentment proportionate to their own giving – and irrespective of others’ contributions – or they 
play a zero-sum game with co-contributors in their quest for “status.”
The common denominator of several models is self-satisfaction, which is generally dubbed 
warm glow. As this notion remains arguably shallow and ambiguous (Tieffenbach, 2019), economists 
admit that “the warm-glow hypothesis provides a direction for research rather than an answer to the 
puzzle of why people give” and call for “more specific models of individual and social motivations” 
(Andreoni et al., 2017).
Another shared characteristic is that tax policy is unlikely to significantly affect donor behavior 
according to each model’s predictions. All of them try to explain “real/costly giving” from a utilitar-
ian or hedonic perspective, setting aside key moral dimensions (Ugazio, 2019).
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By somewhat adapting the economics methodology, let us compare the “actual price” and 
the “perceived expense” of a “real gift” in a donor’s mind. The latter price is equal to the former 
plus all immaterial rewards and minus all immaterial costs. I propose Equation 5:
PRC = ARC – (μ + ψ + σ + π) + ε (5)
where PRC stands for “perceived real cost” by the donor, ARC represents the “actual real cost” 
(monetary disbursement, net of tax rebates) to the donor, μ is the value of all material benefits or 
counterparts received in exchange for the gift, ψ is the sum of all positive psychological rewards, 
σ is the sum of all positive social rewards, and ε is the sum of all negative immaterial side effects 
incurred by the donor. Although underestimated and controversial, π characterizes the power 
relationships and dependencies gifting ineluctably creates (Mauss, 1954). The concept of warm 
glow (see Box 17.3) is often regarded in economics as a “black box”; here, it is proxied by the 
sum of immaterial rewards (ψ + σ + π).
A prior study introduced the notion of “perceived costs of giving” from a different stand-
point. “Cost perception” on the supply side of giving is interpreted as the “ability to give” and 
pertain to donors’ feelings of relative financial (in)security and more or less careful attitude 
toward money (Wiepking & Breeze, 2012). Integrating this approach could surely enrich our 
model in further developments; however, for simplicity, let us assume all donors feel equally 
capable of donating. This allows us to focus on rewarding mechanics.
According to our framework, to increase “core philanthropy” (a.k.a. “real structural giv-
ing”), policies must seek to persuade donors that the “actual real cost” (ARC) they seem to 
incur financially is dwarfed by the multifaceted rewards they will get in return. The more a 
donor becomes aware of these bonuses, the lower the “perceived real cost” (PRC). In extreme 
cases, PRC could become so low and so completely outbalanced by rewards in the donors’ 
minds that the very notion of “cost” may wholly disappear. Moreover, donors will end up see-
ing mostly the “benefits.” A number of qualitative enquiries attest to the validity of this state-
ment, notably among major donors who have reflected long enough on their philanthropic 
endeavors to fully reap their immaterial benefits. One of these donors explains:
I think, basically, when people give, they give for themselves. But I think that they get 
more out of it down the line than what they think they’ll get out of it.
(Schervish et al., 1994, p. 70)
Technically speaking, maximizing ψ can be achieved in many ways, for instance, by counseling 
and coaching donors individually or by allowing them to reflect upon their feelings and self-
satisfaction through academic studies. Likewise, maximizing σ can be attained by celebrating 
philanthropists in society at large; through prizes, plaques, or medals of recognition; or by creat-
ing circles where they could share experiences among peers. Such marks of acknowledgment 
and select group membership are coveted by major donors, for whom philanthropy signifies 
accession to an elite status (Ostrower, 1995) or acquisition of “symbolic power” (Dean, 2020). 
Giving circles provide a similar type of mutual appreciation among donors in the general popu-
lation (Eikenberry, 2009). Anonymous donors forgo σ but retain other rewards. Cynical donors 
may knowingly expect π, while others ignore it. Seeking to maximize μ might be foolish, as 
Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, p. 935) warn:
There is a danger in offering material benefits for charitable contributions. When peo-
ple receive material benefits for helpfulness, they tend to undermine self-attributions 
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of helpfulness, which reduces the effect of prosocial self-attributions on future helpful-
ness. Fringe benefits change the decision into an exchange (do I get value for money?).
Minimizing ε could be realized by teaching philanthropy in schools,11 countering popular mis-
understandings, or mainstreaming philanthropy in the media via more vivid reports or attractive 
educational shows.12
These actions could be partly funded by the state, meaning that they still bear the cost of 
public money. But this expenditure may be worthwhile, considering that the use of public 
funding through tax incentives is unlikely per se to lift “core philanthropy.” The key point is that, 
unlike tax instruments, other tools available to reduce PRC are not state monopolies. Banks, 
wealth advisors, family offices, consultants, academia, nonprofits, media outlets, and many 
intermediaries can join the state’s efforts in a sector-wide coalition to strengthen philanthropy.
Although the donor’s financial cost is worth only the “real value” of a gift, the donor’s 
intangible rewards derive from the full “nominal value” of donations. Suppose a donor gives 
$500, but this gift only costs him/her $200 in real terms due to tax breaks. Suppose charity 
dedicates recognition plaques for gifts above $300. The donor can earn this level of apprecia-
tion only thanks to the tax scheme. Recipient organizations would find it awkward to express 
gratitude only at the level of the “real cost” that donors incur. This means that public policies 
can indirectly award more social advantages to donors. Tax schemes are responsible for greater 
recognition. This is a key aspect, albeit often neglected, to remember when assessing usefulness.
To conclude this section, offsetting the (rare) intangible costs and magnifying the (frequent) 
psychological/social rewards associated with giving would be a relatively inexpensive method to 
use public funding while arousing collective action in support of national philanthropic policies.
c Cultivating the “joy of giving”
Hank Rosso, founder of the Fund Raising School at Indiana University in 1974, used to say 
that: “Fundraising is the gentle art of teaching people the joy of giving” (2016, p. 5). Over the 
past 50 years, research has established many connections between charitable giving or altruis-
tic behavior and higher levels of wellbeing or life satisfaction. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, 
pp. 938–939) provided a snapshot of key studies about the “joy of giving.” The most compre-
hensive review of literature to date on this topic was conducted by Konrath (2016), comprising 
dozens of studies in psychology, sociology, neurosciences, economics, medicine, anthropology, 
and so on. By collecting this broad range of experiments, surveys, and empirical analyses, Kon-
rath reveals a wide array of non-monetary benefits derived from acting altruistically. The key 
findings are as follows:
• Volunteering “causes people to have higher self-esteem and feel less depressed’ (p. 13). Vol-
unteering mitigates the psychological effects of aging (p. 16). Volunteering gives enjoyable 
feelings of “time affluence,” even though the time volunteers spend on others is not used 
for themselves (p. 15).
• Spending money on others generates greater contentment than spending it on oneself. This 
holds true “regardless of the amount of money spent” (p. 13) and “even in relatively poor 
countries” (p. 22). Just remembering those good deeds creates “mood boosting effects,” 
and such positive feelings subsequently stir more altruism, following a self-reinforcing loop 
(p. 13).
• Giving also helps cope with “post-traumatic stress disorder or social anxiety” (p. 15). Giv-
ing generally “enriches people’s relationships, both in quantity and quality” (p. 16).
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• In most cultures across the world, both volunteering time and donating money are associ-
ated with higher wellbeing (p. 18).
• Most importantly, donor awareness of the potentially beneficial effects of giving “does not 
diminish the psychological rewards.” Such consciousness is also found to stimulate altruism 
(p. 14).
• Being generous is found to have direct positive consequences on health and longevity 
(pp. 16–17). In neuroscience experiments, the fact that reward centers of a donor’s brain 
react similarly when giving and receiving money suggests that “physiological effects mirror 
psychological effects” (p. 16).
• Ultimately, “giving increases givers’ sense of meaning and purpose in life” (p. 21).
The universality of these results appears to be consistent across cultures, countries, and genera-
tions. We must now envision how the “joy of giving” can be encompassed in a broader narra-
tive, one that echoes and likely fulfills the donor’s most intimate life aspirations.
d Happiness as a new paradigm
“Happiness” is commonly defined as “The state of pleasurable contentment of mind; deep 
pleasure in or contentment with one’s circumstances” (OED, 2020). It has been pursued 
by the human race for centuries. It is both an individual quest and collective ambition. 
Political regimes of all sorts have attempted using “happiness” as a goal or a justification for 
pursuing their policies – with unequal wisdom and sometimes dreadful results. Countless 
philosophers have addressed this essential notion, which remains quite mysterious. Baruch 
Spinoza (1632–1677) is recognized as one of the most prominent thinkers of happiness in 
modern times. In his magnum opus, Ethics, he stated, “The desire to live a good or happy 
life, of acting well, etc., is itself the very essence of man” (Spinoza et al., 2020, Proposition 
No. 21).
From today’s scientific perspective, “happiness” is not understood as fully equivalent to “joy.” 
Although much overlap can be found between these notions, “happiness” tends to have a much 
broader meaning. A  leading pioneer in this emerging field, Veenhoven (2006, p.  7) defines 
“overall happiness” as “satisfaction with one’s life-as-whole”. It includes two major compo-
nents: a hedonic level reflecting the “balance of pleasant and unpleasant affect” and a cognitive 
dimension based on the “perceived realization of wants” (see Figure 17.5).
Global assessment OVERALL HAPPINESS 
Satisfaction with one’s life as a whole
Sub-totals: 
Information basis Affective experience Cognitive comparison 
Hedonic level of affect 





Figure 17.5  Defining happiness and its components
Source: Veenhoven, 2006, p. 7. Reproduced with permission
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In his landmark contribution on the Moral Biography of Wealth, Schervish (2006) does explic-
itly refer to the notion of happiness in philanthropy. Drawing from Aristotle’s ancient Greek 
concepts of genesis (“the set of metaphysical, social, and personal conditions within which 
agency transpires,” i.e., “the conditions we receive”) and telesis (“the destiny of outcomes toward 
which we aspire,” i.e., “the consequences we strive to create”), he explains how philanthropy 
can serve an “agency moral biography” (pp. 482–483) defined as capacity combined with moral 
compass. Schervish concludes his demonstration by reckoning the necessity to “fulfill donors’ 
desires simultaneously to increase their own happiness and the happiness of others” (p. 491). 
However, the notion of happiness appears to be a rather subordinate idea, used incidentally to 
support and illustrate his central paradigmatic description of “agency moral biography.”
By connecting Veenhoven’s clinical description of happiness with Schervish’s holistic under-
standing of donors’ ability to become change-makers, I propose to observe philanthropy through 
happiness lenses.
A preliminary exploration conducted in France from this angle yielded interesting results 
(Sellen, 2019). I initiated this study after reading Warren Buffett’s letter of commitment to the 
Giving Pledge wherein he openly stated that he “couldn’t be happier with that decision” [emphasis 
added] to “gradually give all of [his] Berkshire Hathaway stock to philanthropic foundations” 
(2010). Back then, French billionaires were invited to join the pledge; however, none had 
responded favorably.13 I pondered the reasons for this monolithic rejection. A working hypoth-
esis quickly emerged that issues of wellbeing (or lack thereof) regarding wealth and its public 
use could be at stake among the wealthy in France, where both conspicuous enrichment and 
ostentatious philanthropy are criticized in public opinion. Encountering high and ultra-high 
net-worth individuals (HNWIs and UHNWIs) through more than 30 in-depth one-on-one 
interviews revealed that “happiness” not only offered a key angle to explain attitudes towards 
philanthropy. They showed that “happiness” could also serve as a pivotal concept to explain 
many related issues, such as the respective roles of government and the nonprofit sector, the 
scope of individual freedom and responsibility, the legitimacy of taxation, the extent of national 
solidarity, and so on.
Although extremely abundant literature on “money and happiness,” on the one hand, and 
on “money and giving,” on the other hand (both streams comprising thousands of articles), 
exists, as do a growing number of publications on the “joy of giving,” little research has been 
conducted at the intersection of the three ideas of wealth, happiness, and philanthropy. To sum-
marize the qualitative findings around this nexus, I connected the tips of the triangular relation-
ship depicted in Figure 17.6.
If, according to Spinoza, nearly all people search for happiness, and considering that every-
one possesses some sharable wealth (usually defined by professional fundraisers as “time, treas-
ure, or talent”), why doesn’t everybody engage in philanthropic endeavors?
Answering this question goes beyond the scope of this study. However, I offer a clue derived 
from the testimonials heard through many interviews. Perhaps not everybody has had the chance 
to cross paths with philanthropy in their lifetime. One needs to be initiated in some ways to 
engage in philanthropy. It may be a childhood education, a one-time life event, an inspirational 
encounter, or something else, but something/someone has to give a prospective donor a taste 
for generosity before this person begins practicing it as a regular activity and, for some, going as 
far as to adopt altruism as a definite lifestyle.
This entry point is best illustrated by stories of successful business leaders who were con-
verted into major donors after peers took them under their wings to start taking on ade-
quate community engagement (Schervish et al., 1994, pp. 68–69, “Philanthropic initiation”). 
However, does not need to be a millionaire to begin looking for other goals in life aside 
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from amassing wealth. Indeed, it has been calculated that beyond an annual income of USD 
75,000, ordinary people’s happiness would not significantly increase with more wealth but 
rather be determined by factors such as relationships, leisure activities, and self-fulfillment 
(Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). Essentially, once basic needs are covered and financial security 
is assured, people find wellbeing in values other than money. These empirical results recall 
Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs,” a schematic pyramid dominated by a supreme desire for “self-
actualization” (Maslow, 1954), although academically, this theory remains heavily contested. 
Sound policies may remedy the lack of awareness about the “feel-good” aspects of giving and 
palliating the lack of attractive opportunities that deter people from engaging in charitable 
behavior.
e Why happiness transcends warm glow
Since Andreoni (1990) established the impure altruism model, economists dissociate altruis-
tic motives (outcome-oriented) from warm glow (action-oriented). However, philosophers 
have identified a core ambiguity whereby donors need to employ self-deception to persuade 
themselves that they are driven by pure altruism to enjoy the expected warm glow. This is 
called the “Valmont effect” (Elster, 2011). Conversely, behaving like a genuinely pure altru-
ist does not preclude unanticipated pleasant rewards. It follows that the pure altruism/warm 
glow dichotomy may exist only in theory. In practice, all donors are impure altruists (having 
mixed motives) to various degrees. Neuroscience reveals evidence for both warm glow and 
more pure motivations, linking them with activity in the reward network of the brain, but 
finds that these motivations vary between people (Cutler & Campbell-Meiklejohn, 2019; 
Cutler, 2021). Psychology also recognizes this intertwined reality: wellbeing is derived both 
from prosocial behavior itself (warm glow) and from witnessing its positive impact (pure 
PhilanthropyWealth
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Figure 17.6  Triangular relationship between wealth, philanthropy, and happiness
Source: Sellen, 2019, p. 274
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altruism) along a seemingly unified continuum. Thus, the “joy of giving” concept already 
goes far beyond the admittedly limitative scope of “warm glow.” The paradigm of “happiness” 
currently developed by social scientists offers even more powerful avenues: it encompasses 
multidimensional factors (emotional, social, cognitive, ethical, aspirational, etc.), resulting in 
a holistic assessment of an individual’s “life-as-whole” (Veenhoven, 2006, see Figure 17.5). 
Therefore, investigating happiness may help apprehend donor motivations and self-fulfillment 
more comprehensively in future research.
5 Roadmap for a new narrative on philanthropy
In light of the freshly acquired knowledge on happiness and wellbeing, what are the elements 
of a renewed approach to the philanthropy-taxation conundrum?
Changing the law or the administrative set of rules regulating nonprofits is not indispensable. 
Tax schemes may even remain identical. Essentially, novelty lies in framing things differently. 
Changing people’s perceptions over the long run implies modifying the collective mindset, and 
the technique is a matter of narrative rather than tax pressure. Traveling along this novel route 
entails five steps.
a Transforming outlooks
The first step towards forging a novel approach is to change the way we look at the problem. 
The conceptual framework proposed previously offers a straightforward and workable method 
for policymakers to decide on the optimal level of tax incentives they deem legitimate in a given 
country. For citizens, understanding the scheme through these lenses will be easy. Citizens are 
all at once voters (i.e., constituents of decision-makers in a democracy), taxpayers (i.e., ultimate 
funders of tax incentives), and potential donors (i.e., beneficiaries of tax breaks), so their under-
standing and approval of the scheme is essential for its proper functioning. The adoption of new 
intellectual tools to address taxation in philanthropy (“nominal/real,” “conjunctural/structural 
giving,” “core philanthropy,” “perceived cost of giving,” etc.) will allow everyone to test their 
relevance and adjust their use.
b Taking happiness seriously
Second, policymakers must fully recognize and grasp the potential of “happiness” as a new para-
digm sought after by citizens. A British poll determined that 85% of citizens agreed with this 
statement: “a government’s prime aim should be to achieve the greatest happiness of the people, 
not the greatest wealth” (BBC, 2006, cited by Veenhoven, 2017, p. 1).
From 1975–2015, Bhutanese authorities officially computed an index of “Gross National 
Happiness.” Recently, several countries have established indicators measuring citizens’ wellbe-
ing in real time. Some made audacious moves toward assessing the performance and soundness 
of public policy on these grounds. Even the United Nations takes happiness seriously: a major 
conference on this topic was held at its headquarters in 2012 (Royal Government of Bhutan, 
2012), and the General Assembly subsequently decided14 to celebrate the “International Day 
of Happiness” annually on March 20. The related World Happiness Report is updated annually 
(Helliwell et al., 2020). Since 2011, the OECD multi-country project Better Life Index15 has 
offered a practical toolbox to measure citizens’ wellbeing through 11 dimensions that can be 
blended and weighted at will (OECD, 2020a).
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c Promoting philanthropy differently
Policymakers should remember three key ingredients of Konrath’s literature review on the joy 
of giving: cultivating the memory of good deeds, repeating small actions frequently, and raising 
awareness about the feel-good consequences. However, philanthropists should not be too self 
oriented (Konrath, 2016, p. 18) to fully reap these benefits. The goal is to leverage altruism to 
build greater resilience.
Repeated giving interactions are like deposits into a resilience bank account with 
compound interest. All of the potential explanations of why giving is associated with 
better health have something in common: they help people to deal with unanticipated 
negative life events and stressors.
(ibid., p. 21)
In short, government should recommend as part of public health policies that citizens take a 
daily dose of “vitamin G” (ibid., p. 22–23). Policymakers should also be mindful of the timing 
of roll-out policies, since this factor may affect giving (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, p. 934).
d Measuring achievements
Measuring social progress is a growing issue. It is beyond this chapter’s scope to address the 
methodological and epistemological controversies surrounding this idea. I only recommend that 
the happiness of donors be assessed scientifically (Veenhoven, 2017), as well as the happiness 
of “beneficiaries” or “end-users” (sometimes called “partners in philanthropy” to reflect equal 
footing) who are all too often forgotten, even in the nascent impact-investing industry whose 
distinctive identity rests on end-user’s satisfaction (Karim, 2020).
By using the “positive social science” approach advocated by Thin (2014), scholars may 
observe and seriously consider subjectively assessed wellbeing (i.e., self-reported by respondents 
in surveys). Indeed, people’s perceptions of their own feelings matter at least as much as the 
investigator’s opinion.
e Embarking the ecosystem on a new journey
Numerous potential implications exist for non-governmental decision-makers. Private bank-
ers and wealth managers could incorporate the wellbeing dimension as a full component 
of their philanthropic advisory services. Nonprofit executives and fundraisers could appeal 
more explicitly to donors and beneficiaries’ shared joy and wellbeing when developing cases 
for supporting and managing their fundraising campaigns. Academics could elaborate on 
compelling case studies and include the happiness dimension in their teachings to sensitize 
next-generation leaders. Every player in the philanthropic ecosystem could contribute to 
reenchant giving along these lines.
f From a negative to a positive approach: reenchanting giving
The perceived “price” of philanthropy is shown to be subject to a framing effect. Despite a lack 
of evidence on how people respond to framing, we already know that presenting incentives as 
matches rather than rebates generates more giving (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, p. 948).
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Following the same logic, we must abandon the claim that tax incentives reduce the price 
of giving, as it taints philanthropy in the donor’s mind. For some donors who see their inher-
ited wealth as a “social stigma,” philanthropy is a “story of purgation,” a method of proving 
to themselves that they deserve their inherited wealth (Schervish et  al., 1994, Chapter  5, 
“Expunging the Guilt of Unmerited Wealth”, pp. 111–125). Insisting repeatedly on the lesser 
cost of giving can only be discouraging – if not insulting – to them. Thus, the concept of 
“voluntary self-taxation” brings forth a practical way for dignifying the wealth these heirs 
received at birth by encouraging them to employ these extra resources in virtuous and honor-
able endeavors.
Likewise, Carnegie’s moral commandment to his fellow tycoons still resonates today as an 
imperious instruction to give away the bulk of one’s wealth before passing away: “The man 
who dies thus rich dies disgraced” (Carnegie, 1889). In fact, very few other moguls heeded 
his unfriendly advice to the letter. Born in 1930, Chuck Feeney is currently one of the rare 
billionaires who lost this prosperous status because of excessive giving (over $8 billion). He 
displays serenity and splendid contentment, and in his own words: “I see little reason to delay 
giving when so much good can be achieved through supporting worthwhile causes. Besides, it’s 
a lot more fun to give while you live than give while you’re dead” (Bertoni, 2020). However, 
his astonishing example symbolizes an exception rather than a rule amidst the ultra-wealthy. 
Even signatories of the Giving Pledge, who freely committed to donating at least half of their 
wealth during their lifetime or at death have not successfully managed to keep the promise so 
far (Schmitz et al., 2021). Furthermore, this initiative struggled to gather almost 10% of the 
world’s billionaires, despite the extraordinary momentum for global philanthropy. After the 
original wonder effect, shortcomings tended to spur more reproaches than admiration (Hill, 
2020). Perhaps the proposed narrative centered on happiness – not self-centered pleasure but 
dynamics of shared joy among donors and beneficiaries – could provide a more durable impetus 
to this type of pledge and circumvent otherwise inescapable criticism by mitigating the breach 
of public trust caused by mogul philanthropists who blur the lines between business and charity 
(Dean & Brakman Reiser, 2021).
Beyond compassionate reactions to tragedies, fear of social backlash, guilt avoidance, narcis-
sistic pleasure, or quest for prestige, humankind remains collectively lacking an overarching set 
of positive reasons to inspire enthusiastic giving. Embracing the happiness paradigm would offer 
such an opportunity.
6 Concluding remarks
a On the conceptual framework
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed distinctions between “nominal/real” philanthropy 
or between “conjunctural/structural” giving and the concepts of “core philanthropy” and “vol-
untary self-taxation” have not been put forward in the literature in those terms. I advocate that 
these concepts be tested, challenged, refined, enriched (e.g., by incorporating factors like ine-
quality), and potentially adopted as commonplace by the academic community to describe more 
precisely the realities debated in philanthropy research from an interdisciplinary perspective.
In society at large, aggregated levels of individual and corporate donations make up a total 
level of generosity. However, again, statistical reports on charitable giving rarely (if ever) present 
the share of those donations that are really “costly” to donors and the portion considered “cost-
less” to them. Therefore, from a philosophical standpoint, it is difficult to determine the exact 
levels of a person’s overall generosity or a people’s charity at the country level.
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b On policy implications
This new toolbox will assist policymakers in describing the issues at stake when it comes to tax 
policy and to adjust fiscal levers to stimulate philanthropy in a given country. Not all policymak-
ers have embedded philanthropy in their strategic goals. Those who do must clearly state their 
objectives and priorities (e.g., boosting donations vs multiplying donors). Policymakers should 
also be aware that “growing the giving pie” is no panacea: consider issues of absorptive capac-
ity (can nonprofits use all additional resources?) and of effectiveness (do nonprofits need more 
money or other forms of support?).
Aside from these caveats, our framework suggests that public authorities wanting to develop 
philanthropy should not seek to artificially raise “nominal” or “conjunctural” philanthropy. 
These measures have limited long-term impact and fail to create lasting generous behaviors. 
Evidence shows that stable incentives applied to a reduced tax base lead to an immediate melt-
down of gifts (e.g., the 2017 wealth tax reform in France). Instead, governments should aim 
to create vibrant ecosystems encouraging a deeper shift in “real” and “structural” philanthropy. 
This can be done by using levers such as education, sensitization, advocacy, case studies, applied 
research, professional training, and so on. Forging a culture of philanthropy depends on many 
factors other than a fiscal year’s planning horizon.
c On happiness as a new paradigm
To elicit greater altruism among potential donors, who supposedly maximize their utility func-
tion even in the presence of bounded rationality and unselfishness, promoting awareness about 
the positive externalities derived from such behavior appears necessary. A large body of research 
on the “joy of giving,” combined with recent qualitative research on subjective wellbeing, has 
explored how donors found themselves with greater happiness along their philanthropic jour-
ney. Focusing on this fruitful lever can improve the “real/structural” or “core” component of 
giving (which exogenous tax incentives barely affect) and eventually trigger persistently higher 
generosity levels derived from donors’ perceived satisfaction.
Refreshed narratives and discursive engagements are vital to rally hearts and minds toward 
the greater good. Beyond the likelihood of materially increasing donations, the happiness para-
digm offers powerful ways to achieve a conceptual “reenchantment” of the act of giving.
Notes
The author is grateful for valuable comments by Fiona Martin, Hans Schmitz, and one anonymous referee.
 1 Bazin et al. (2019, p. 9) put forward the interesting notion of “giving effort” (“effort de don”), which 
represents the ratio between average gift and average income (per tax bracket). However, this idea dif-
fers from the conceptual framework hereby developed, as it does not consider tax effects on the “price” 
of gifts.
 2 This story is narrated in the Synoptic Gospels (Luke 21:1–4; Mark 12:41–44).
 3 Deductibility is allowed within a threshold of 20% of their taxable income (French tax code, art. 200).
 4 A third type of unemployment, called “frictional,” denotes people moving or voluntarily changing 
occupations.
 5 I call conjunctural only the upper part of the differential curve, while “conjunctural unemployment” 
fluctuates above/below the long-term structural trend.
 6 “Significant” here means long enough to observe threshold effects that sustainably modify average giving levels.
 7 Auten et al. (2002, p. 371) mention that donors may opportunistically take advantage of “unusually 
high transitory tax rates.” They distinguish between “transitory” and “persistent price of giving.” How-
ever, these concepts are not synonymous with “cyclical” or “conjunctural” generosity, which designate 
the amounts effectively donated.
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 8 Giving USA 2020’s data spans giving by individuals (including bequests), foundations, and corporations.
 9 HNWIs are individuals or households whose net wealth is at least US$1 million in investable assets 
(excluding their main residency) or whose annual income is at least US$200,000 for two consecutive 
years.
 10 The philosophy according to which “the good does not make any noise, the noise does not make any 
good” is a widespread common trait among France’s major donors.
 11 Examples could be the innovative programs “L’Ecole de la Philanthropie” and “Le Cercle des Petits 
Philanthropes” in France.
 12 French examples include the program “Philanthropia” broadcast on Radio Notre-Dame [https://radi-
onotredame.net/emissions/philantropia/] or the newspaper “Sens & Finances” initiated by the Fonda-
tion d’Auteuil [http://sens-et-finances.apprentis-auteuil.org/].
 13 This is still the case as of September 2021, over a decade later.
 14 U.N. resolution 66/281 of 12 July 2012. https://undocs.org/A/RES/66/281
 15 See: https://www.oecd.org/statistics/better-life-initiative.htm and http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/
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Considerations beyond fundraising  
and tax incentives for giving
Johannes Lohse and Kimberley Scharf
Setting the scene: the non-profit sector in an uncertain economic 
environment
Recent national and global economic challenges have revived interest in understanding the 
extent to which market economies can rely on the non-profit sector’s essential and comple-
mentary role in enabling economic stability and growth. The austerity measures put in place 
across many EU countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and post-pandemic 
government spending sprees have widened the scope and the role of some parts of the charitable 
sector in supplying vital public goods while narrowing the scope and role of other parts of the 
sector. At the same time, the economic burden of COVID-19 on household finances (Bhutta 
et al., 2020) has brought new challenges to the entire charitable sector by limiting fundraising 
opportunities, which again depend upon donor, charity and public-sector responses to a chang-
ing and uncertain sectoral landscape. Especially charities holding low financial reserves were 
negatively impacted by a sudden loss of funding opportunities due to COVID-19 (Mirae and 
Mason, 2020).
These financial strains have put additional pressure on charities to be innovative in their 
fundraising strategies. They have also renewed academic interest in the more general questions 
of whether the charitable sector is an efficient producer of charitable outputs and whether 
these outputs have the right characteristics, such as quality and composition. Questions about 
efficiency and characteristics are important because the charitable sector not only provides a 
significant proportion of public goods and services but also because substantial amounts of sup-
port from the public purse are directed towards it. For instance, in 2017/18, the charitable sec-
tor in the United Kingdom was composed of 166,592 voluntary organizations that contributed 
£18.2 billion (about 1.5% of GDP) to the economy and employed 909,088 people (UK Civil 
Society Almanac, 2020).
While we have reached a better understanding of how charities and donors interact on 
the input, or fundraising, side of the marketplace (see Andreoni and Payne, 2013), there are 
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fewer answers to questions relating to the output side of the market, specifically with respect 
to measuring overall efficiency and the optimal size and composition of the charitable sector. 
Issues of efficiency and composition in the charitable market tie in to the more general problem 
of measuring the efficiency of public goods production and its importance for social welfare 
(Atkinson, 2005; Simpson, 2009).
Coercive taxation has traditionally been interpreted as a means of overcoming the free-riding 
problem in public good provision and therefore underlies the central argument for government 
provision of such goods. Charities, on the other hand, lack the coercive power of the state. 
Instead, if they are to provide any output, they have to acquire resources from others (volunteer 
time or government handouts) or from devising fundraising strategies aimed at increase chari-
table income through altering donors’ free-riding incentives. Whether fundraising strategies are 
successful depends on how donors respond to them. There is a large and growing evidence base 
about this “science of philanthropy”, which mainly focuses on donor motives and on under-
standing how a charity can design the “perfect ask”, that is, how individual charities can maxi-
mize the total amount of donations received (see, e.g., List, 2011; Andreoni and Payne, 2013; 
Vesterlund, 2016). However, while insights into optimal fundraising strategies provide useful 
answers to the question of whether fundraising is profitable to individual non-profits seeking 
to maximize their charitable income, they do not speak to questions related to production 
efficiency or the optimality of the size and shape of the sector. Those questions require an even 
broader perspective than that taken thus far (see Andreoni and Payne, 2013, for a discussion).
Here we explore this broader perspective. We do this through the lens of recent research that 
speaks to these questions in settings of inter-charity competition and donor responses when the 
following considerations are taken into account: (i) the distribution of donations across chari-
table causes, across time and in aggregate; (ii) the technological choices charities make when 
deciding on how to convert donations and other inputs in the production of charitable outputs; 
(iii) the structure of charitable markets. Using insights from (i)–(iii), we then briefly examine 
the role of government and tax incentives.
In devising their fundraising strategies, individual charities compete with other charities for 
soliciting funds from the same pool of potential donors. Yet it is donor responses to these fund-
raising drives that ultimately determines what happens to aggregate donations in the sector and 
the distribution of those donations across organizations within the sector. We are only begin-
ning to understand how donor motivations interact with fundraising efforts when charities 
engage in fundraising competition. In particular, the successful fundraising drive of one charity 
could come at the expense of reducing donations received by other charities, as would be the 
case, if donors had a fixed budget for altruism. Whether donors’ budget for altruism is indeed 
fixed (leading to ‘fundraising cannibalism’) is ultimately an empirical question that has not yet 
been fully settled (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2021; Gee and Meer, 2019). Some stylized facts and 
findings support the fixed budget hypothesis, while others contradict it. For instance, from 
2002–2017, improvements in fundraising technologies that are a direct result of the “science of 
philanthropy” have not significantly increased the total pot of donations in many countries. In 
the United States, giving to non-profits has been around 2% of GDP each year (Giving USA, 
2018). Therefore, to assess how inter-charity competition affects the charitable sector’s total 
income and the way it is distributed across its members, we need to understand exactly how 
fundraising competition drives specific patterns of donor responses not only in aggregate but 
also across charity space and time.
We have more to learn about how donors’ motives for giving influence charitable donations 
and their distribution across causes, but we also need to develop a better understanding of how 
charities choose the production technologies that they use to convert funds and other inputs 
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into outputs. Fundraising competition between charities can result in one of three outcomes in 
terms of the charitable income of the sector ‘net of fundraising costs’, that is, the ‘income pie’ 
of the sector: this pie can become smaller, stay the same or increase due to competition. If and 
only if all charities are operating with the best production technology for transforming dona-
tions into charitable goods and fundraising competition does not influence these technology 
choices, one could safely argue that fundraising competition that results in a bigger income pie 
is also unambiguously welfare enhancing. However, this unambiguous link between welfare and 
the size of the income pie can easily be broken if engaging in fundraising competition redirects 
funding towards charities that do not choose the best technology for transforming donations 
into charitable goods. In other words, fundraising competition may well alter the incentives 
for charities to be efficient producers of charitable goods. If true, the reverse effect can equally 
materialize: fundraising competition that directly reduces the net income of the sector but at 
the same time results in better technology choices could still enhance the overall performance 
of the sector if the efficiency gains from better production technology choices outweigh income 
losses. In sum, the ‘size of the income pie’ is only an insufficient proxy for the ‘size of the output 
pie’, the thing that matters most for evaluating performance if charities are to be considered 
efficient producers of public goods.
Which of these cases occurs depends on how donors respond to fundraising competition and 
how charities respond to those donor responses in terms of the technology choices that they 
make. It may also be that donors are directly influenced by the technological choices of chari-
ties, and if their donations are directed towards inefficient producers, charities may compete 
with other charities by adopting inferior technologies.
There is not much research that looks at these issues, but there is some emerging evidence 
that, unlike in the private sector, inter-charity competition can lead to an inefficient selection 
of providers and/or adoption by charities of inefficient modes of production. There are two 
main reasons that have been proposed for this. First, even if donors are fully aware of chari-
ties’ performance, they could fail to coordinate their donations on the most efficient provider 
(Name-Correa and Yildirim, 2013; Perroni et al., 2019). Second, efficiency considerations may 
not be the foremost driver of their donation decisions (van Inwaarden, 2009; Ryazanov and 
Christenfeld, 2018). Such inefficiencies will be exacerbated if donors are not able to verify the 
quality of charities’ output, which can lead to a higher quantity of low-quality charities enter-
ing the market or remaining in operation (Scharf, 2014; Krasteva and Yildirim, 2016). These 
explanations suggest that there should be a refocusing of the discussion about fundraising itself 
towards a more holistic assessment of the determinants of economic performance (efficiency) 
and ways in which informed giving can be promoted.
There are a limited number of papers addressing the implications of inter-charity competi-
tion for the structure of markets in the charitable sector. Fundraising, donor responses, govern-
ment incentives and societal needs all determine the size and shape of the charitable sector. The 
first question is whether fundraising competition has led to an excessive size of the charitable 
sector. Excessive size can be the direct result of lacking competition in other aspects of charita-
ble markets, such as prices or product quality. Apart from size, spatial factors play a crucial role 
in determining the structure of the charitable market. Not only is there empirical evidence that 
donors display a preference for giving to local charities (Tremblay-Boire and Prakash, 2017; 
Kessler and Milkman, 2018; Gallier et al. 2019a, 2019b), but there are also theoretical reasons 
to expect charities to specialize and localize (Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997).
The previous discussion not only raises important considerations that need to be taken into 
account when assessing the performance of the non-profit sector; it also highlights the need to 
re-evaluate the relationship between the charitable sector and the public sector (e.g., whether 
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privately provided charitable goods are substitutes or complements for public provision) and 
potential policy instruments for incentivizing efficiency in the sector as a whole (Atkinson, 
1995). As we discuss more fully in the following, there is no sound efficiency-based rationale 
for government to be a provider of private goods. Yet such rationale exists for government to 
step in as a provider of public goods and services. What is less clear is whether government is 
better equipped to provide these in comparison to the charitable sector. Getting at the answer 
requires us to consider under what conditions government would provide the same varieties 
of charitable goods and services as the charitable sector and which form of provision, public 
or charitable, is best aligned with recipient preferences. It may be that fundraising competition 
in the charitable sector leads to more efficient outcomes than public provision. In this case, 
questions arise as to whether tax incentives or direct government grants are more effective at 
incentivizing charitable contributions, as well as questions about how social welfare calculations 
take into account measures of crowding-out effects and the cost of frictions of being a donor 
and/or claiming incentives. Besides tax incentives for giving and direct government grants, 
alternative forms of government intervention will also matter for welfare calculations. These 
could include subsidization of verifying output quality when there are information asymmetries 
between charities and donors.
As a starting point for considering the broader perspective we propose here, let us consider 
how the effects of competition differ between the non-profit sector and the for-profit sector 
of the economy. The standard mechanism through which positive selection is promoted in the 
provision of private goods is market competition. In the case of competition between for-profit 
firms producing private goods, the profit maximization objectives of firms are in structural 
opposition to those of consumers and to those of other firms. This opposition can nevertheless 
result in the selection of efficient firms when prices are allowed to play their role of coordinating 
demand and supply in different markets. Absent other market frictions (e.g., incomplete markets 
and incomplete information), perfect competition in the markets for private goods will result in 
exit by all firms that cannot profitably engage in marginal cost pricing. Competition limits entry 
and in the long run ensures that firms with an inefficient production technology (i.e., firms 
that are bad at converting capital and labour inputs into outputs) will incur losses until they are 
driven out of the market, customers get the products and quality they pay for, the number and 
size of firms is optimal and firms use a combination of labour and capital that allows them to 
produce goods in a cost-efficient manner (Arrow and Debreu, 1954).
Competition in the non-profit sector is rather different. By definition, charitable provid-
ers do not operate as for-profit entities with profit maximization objectives. Furthermore, the 
public goods and services they supply are characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability 
in consumption, so the price mechanism does not work to clear markets. The lack of a price 
mechanism means that the selection of efficient charities through competition will be less pow-
erful than the selection of efficient private firms through market competition: a charity that 
values its own activities comparatively more than those of similar charities may choose to oper-
ate even when it is comparatively inefficient, as long as the opportunity cost of continuing to 
operate, in terms of output lost relative to the potential output that could be achieved by other, 
more efficient charities, is not too large. In sum, competition in the non-profit sector does not 
put a brake on entry of charities that use inefficient production technologies. These can enter 
into a new market or continue operating as long as their funds are sufficient to cover their fixed 
costs. This lack of the disciplining effect of prices can easily result in a market structure where 
multiple charities of various sizes and geographical scope offer comparable goods and services 
yet differ in how efficient they are at converting the resources supplied by donors into these 
goods. Similarly, when quality is not readily observable, or the recipients of charitable goods 
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cannot choose between multiple locally differentiated charities, charities offering low-quality 
services can co-exist with higher-quality providers. In both settings, the overall level or quality 
of public good provision could be improved if charities with efficient production technologies 
prevail. However, such quality differences are not readily observable for potential donors or tar-
geted by public sector interventions if outputs are hard to measure because they are intangible, 
non-homogenous or uncountable (Scharf, 2014). Competition between charities supplying 
such outputs hence mostly takes the form of competition for inputs in which charities try to 
convince donors to give. Similarly, with current government subsidies and tax policies as a sec-
ond source of charitable income, it is difficult for government policies to differentiate between 
lower- and higher-quality providers. A more targeted approach of subsidizing the charitable 
activities of the most efficient providers would be needed to replace the disciplining role that 
market competition plays in the private sector.
In the remaining sections, we will elaborate on (i)–(iii) in greater detail first separately and 
then jointly before concluding with (iv) and an outlook on a research agenda that may help to 
better understand how competition between charities can but may not improve the quantity 
and quality of goods provided.
An overview of inter-charity fundraising competition
Charities’ fundraising strategies aim at generating income, which is then used to fund the pro-
vision of cause-specific public goods and services. Fundraising strategies often involve using 
matches or rebate incentives to lower a donor’s perceived price of giving.1 Advertising is the 
private-sector analogue to fundraising in the charitable sector. In the private sector, advertising 
expenditures in a perfectly competitive market are a waste of resources. Products are homog-
enous, so advertising does not lead to higher product quality, more efficient methods of pro-
duction or more income for the market. Nor does it lead to better information for consumers, 
since a perfectly competitive marketplace is characterized by complete information. Advertising 
serves only to influence a consumer’s choice of which firm to buy from (Schmalensee, 1972). 
Whether advertising is also a waste of resources when private markets are characterized by 
imperfect competition is less clear. On the one hand, if advertising has no social value (e.g., 
providing better information to the consumer), it is wasteful, resulting in higher prices for con-
sumers and/or barriers to entry for new firms. On the other hand, if advertising is informative, 
it could enhance competition (through lower prices or weaker barriers to entry for innovation 
on the part of competitors) and result in a positive social value.
Non-profit organizations are not the same as private firms. In particular, non-profit organi-
zations do not have profit maximization as their objective and so, unlike for-profit firms, face 
a binding non-distribution constraint. They lack a residual claimant for surpluses or losses 
incurred. The jury is still out on what motivates charitable organizations instead, but the lit-
erature suggests that a mix of prosocial and self-interested motivations are at work. Rose-
Ackerman (1982) was the first to link charity motives to fundraising behaviour by showing that 
competition in charity markets (as measured by the number of charities offering homogenous 
outputs) leads to excessive fundraising and does not generate an increase in total donations 
going to the sector. For any market size, inter-charity competition in fundraising efforts merely 
convinces donors to choose one of many otherwise identical charitable providers.2
Rose-Ackerman (1982) also showed that an increase in competition for donations in the sec-
tor leads to more entry by charities, which each increase their fundraising activities to the point 
where the marginal cost of fundraising approaches its marginal benefit. Although we are not 
aware of any evidence that speaks to this, from an empirical perspective, if charities are, at least 
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in part, driven by self-interested motives, we would expect increases in the number of charities 
in the market to be reflected in changes in fundraising efforts and vice-versa.
The baseline excessive fundraising result of Rose-Ackerman occurs in a world where charita-
ble outputs are homogenous. In the real world, charitable markets do not offer up homogenous 
outputs. The sector is incredibly diverse in terms of the differentiation of its various outputs. 
This differentiation could be defined over the output itself or over the location of the output. 
If charitable outputs are not homogeneous, the conceptual relationship between the degree of 
competition as measured by an increase in the number of charities and the amount of fundrais-
ing that a charity engages in is not a priori clear: having to compete with more charities may 
prompt a charity to do more fundraising (as in Castaneda et al., 2008), but it may also reduce the 
effectiveness of any given fundraising drive, inducing a charity to reduce its fundraising efforts.
Distribution of donations across charitable causes, across  
time and in aggregate
In a differentiated charitable sector where charities’ fundraising efforts drive competition for 
donations, how does fundraising influence donors’ decisions about how much to give and 
which charities to give to? The theoretical concerns about the efficiency costs of excessive fun-
draising on the input side largely depend on what donors do in response to fundraising initia-
tives. Do donors respond to fundraising drives by simply shifting their donations to the charity 
with the more successful fundraising initiative, do they lift the amount they give to all charities, 
or do they shift and lift their donations? This is mainly an empirical question. However, its 
answer is crucial from a social welfare perspective. Only when fundraising activities lead to a 
net increase of giving to the sector as a whole (i.e., if there is a lift) can they be seen as a non-
wasteful way of raising the level of public goods provided. If, instead, one charity loses what the 
other charity gains (i.e., a shift), fundraising is wasteful if charities are otherwise homogenous.
The empirical literature on fundraising and charitable inputs has recently turned to answer-
ing the question of how fundraising activities by one charity affect the income of other charities 
and thereby the overall sum of donations available to the charitable sector (Ottoni-Wilhelm 
et al., 2021; Gee and Meer, 2019). Understanding these effects is empirically challenging, as it 
is rarely possible for the researcher to observe the whole universe of giving (of time, money or 
in-kind donations) over the whole space of charities while being able to change the fundrais-
ing activities of one charity or cause randomly. Even if sufficiently detailed data were available, 
they would also need to be available over a long time period to understand how earlier giving 
to one charity affect giving to another charity later or vice versa (Ottoni-Wilhelm et al., 2021). 
Despite these challenges, there is now a growing number of experimental and empirical papers 
that try to understand these effects of competition on the total amount of donations flowing 
into the charitable sector (see Andreoni and Payne, 2013).
Due to the empirical challenges described previously, none of the existing studies can pro-
vide a full answer to this question. However, together, they indicate several regularities in the 
patterns of giving that may result when charities compete for a given pot of funds.
Several studies investigate how promoting giving to one charity reduces the amount given 
to another charity project at the same point in time (Meer, 2017) and whether the additional 
amount given to one charity is the same, larger or smaller than the amount lost by the other 
charity. Such spill-over effects are probably largest when charities offer a homogenous public 
good such that donors may not hold strong preferences over who provides the public good. Evi-
dence on this question comes in three forms: lab experiments, field experiments and empirical 
studies.
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While highly stylized in nature, laboratory experiments on the extent of spill-over effects 
offer a high level of control over the observed outcomes by holding constant any other shift 
parameters that may affect giving. The findings from the experimental laboratory are mixed, 
however. In line with the theoretical concerns raised in Rose-Ackerman (1982), showing a 
promotional video does not raise total donations while shifting donations to the charity con-
ducting this fundraising activity (Harwell et al., 2015). Similarly, Deck and Murphy (2019) find 
that introducing a match for donations reduces the amounts received by other charities that 
do not offer a similar price incentive for giving. Finally, Schmitz (2019) exogenously varies 
the size of the charitable market for a homogenous charitable good in the presence or absence 
of a match. In line with the other studies, matching results in a negative spill-over: Giving to 
the matched charity increases, while donations to the unmatched charities decrease such that 
aggregate giving remains unchanged. Evidence for the observation that competition between 
charities simply leads to a redirection of funds is not univocal across all laboratory studies, how-
ever. Filiz-Ozbay and Uler (2019) introduce differentiated tax rebates in a multi-charity setting. 
Their findings suggest that the extent of negative spill-overs may depend on whether the out-
puts of competing charities are complements or substitutes. Negative spill-overs only occur for 
substitutes but not for complements. Moreover, in contrast to the other studies, they do not find 
that negative spill-overs are sufficiently strong to offset additional giving. In both cases, offering 
a tax rebate for one charity increases not only the share of donations going to subsidized charity 
but total donations.
Evidence on competition effects from the field is scarce. Several papers investigate the effect 
of multiple mail solicitations in which potential donors receive fundraising calls in temporal 
succession. This approach reveals how earlier fundraising efforts of one charity affect giving 
to the same charity or other charities at a later point in time. Donkers et al. (2017) find that 
additional mail solicitations by one charity reduce giving to other charities in the short term but 
not in the long term. There is also field evidence when charities compete for donations within 
a shorter time window. Gallier et al. (2019b) investigate spill-over effects in a setting where 
charities compete in a spatially differentiated market. They find little evidence that a match-
ing grant offered by one charity significantly reduces giving to a second un-matched charity, 
in particular when the two charities operate in two different locations and donors can observe 
this local differentiation. This finding differs from Adena and Hager (2020), who provide evi-
dence for substantial negative spill-overs in an online fundraising campaign on a social network 
platform. Thus, in parallel to lab experiments, the size and direction of spill-over effects in the 
field settings studied crucially depend on the context, type of fundraising and timeframe under 
investigation.
Finally, there a several empirical studies that investigate the extent to which fundraising 
competition affects aggregate giving. Van Diepen et  al. (2009) show that fundraising drives 
immediately reduce giving to the same charity at a later point in time but increase giving to 
other charities. In the long run, these effects are negligible. Even in the short term, spill-overs 
may be small in some settings. For instance, offering a match for projects on a crowd-funding 
platform did not result in lower giving to other projects (Meer, 2017). Moving towards a causal 
interpretation, several studies exploit natural catastrophes or other sources of random varia-
tion to identify potential spill-over effects on other charities. Ottoni-Wilhelm et  al. (2021) 
investigate the effect of a disaster appeal on donations to disaster relief and to other causes both 
immediately after the natural disaster and 20 weeks later. Immediately after the disaster, they 
find more giving not only to disaster relief but also to other causes. This short-term increase is, 
however, offset by a decrease in donations later. This observation is in line with Deryugina and 
Marx (2021), who find little evidence that giving to disaster relief immediately after a tornado 
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reduces giving to other causes in the short run. All in all, most empirical evidence suggests that 
negative spill-over effects of fundraising activities are minor and dissipate quickly.
Technology choices and performance
As charities mainly compete for funding, it is donors’ understanding and perceptions of the 
usefulness of overhead costs, actual performance and indirect performance metrics that will 
influence whether funding is directed to the most efficient charities. In the longer run, donor 
preferences will factor into whether competing charities choose efficient modes of production 
and produce high-quality outputs. When charities rely on donors’ perceptions of their produc-
tivity, this raises complications in their production decisions that are absent for private firms. If 
donors’ understanding of efficient production modes, performance and indirect performance 
metrics does not coincide with objective efficiency indicators, charities will optimize along 
the wrong dimensions. Moreover, charity managers may be inclined to influence how donors 
perceive their organization. Their attempt to provide success metrics that aid their fundrais-
ing efforts could refocus measurement and communication of performance indicators from 
harder-to-measure but more meaningful outcomes to more accessible but less meaningful out-
put metrics. Across the sector as a whole, a focus on quantifiable performance metrics may also 
influence the composition of charitable goods offered. For instance, donors interested in impact 
giving may redirect their giving towards charitable outputs that can readily be measured and 
reduce giving towards less tangible outcomes like promoting civil rights (Ebrahim and Rangan, 
2010).
Among the various performance metrics commonly used, the overhead ratio of a charity 
(or more generally its fixed costs) have received the most attention. A low overhead ratio means 
that a large proportion of charitable income covers a charity’s core program expenses, that is, 
the public goods they fund. Donors often perceive high overhead costs as wasteful and thus a 
negative indicator of a charity’s performance (e.g., Charles et al., 2020). Other actors in the 
charitable sector share this negative perception of fixed costs, and there is considerable varia-
tion in cost structures across charities and charitable sectors, which is likely to reflect variation 
in technologies.3 However, this negative view ignores that sometimes, as in the private sector, 
using more efficient production technologies can require incurring higher fixed costs (Perroni 
et al., 2019). Moreover, charities may have more control over some parts of their overhead costs 
(e.g., salaries and administration) than others (e.g., the administrative costs of complying with 
government regulation or providing performance metrics) (Samahita and Lades, 2021).
In their paper, Perroni et al. (2019) discuss conditions for which government funding of 
fixed costs may be called for when charities compete. They show that if non-profit entrepre-
neurs are pro-socially motivated, but impurely so, they will have an incentive to misrepresent 
their technologies to donors and to enter the non-profit sector and compete with other chari-
ties even when the technology that they have access to is dominated by that of other charities. 
This gives rise to two kinds of inefficiencies relating to charity selection, with the result that 
output is not maximized for the given resources that donors and government allocate to the 
third sector.
The first type of inefficiency relates to entry by new providers. In the presence of a non-
distribution constraint, any surplus or shortfall experienced by a charity is reflected in the 
level of its provision rather than in its residual profit claims. This makes it unattractive for 
individual donors to switch towards a start-up charity even if it is more efficient because such 
a switch would result in lower rather than higher provision unless the switch is coordinated 
across donors. As a result, when private contributions are directed towards charity providers 
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that face fixed costs, non-cooperative contribution equilibria – as characterized by Bergstrom 
et al. (1986) – can support an inefficient status quo. Thus, in the absence of a residual claimant, 
fixed costs can not only be used strategically by an individual charity to coordinate their own 
set of donors, as fundraising fixed costs do in Name-Correa and Yildirim (2013), but they can 
also translate into entry barriers when charities choose them strategically in order to capture 
donations from other charities, as in Perroni et al. (2019).
These results contrast with the case of for-profit firms, since coordination between donors 
towards efficient charities is more complex than achieving coordination of consumers towards 
efficient firms. In the case of for-profit firms, consumers can be ‘herded’ towards more effi-
cient firms through price competition: a for-profit challenger can undercut the incumbent and 
induce all consumers to switch, and it can do so credibly because consumers need not concern 
themselves about whether the challenger will succeed in meeting its objectives.
The second type of inefficiency results from sub-optimal technology adoption by incum-
bents. Fixed costs bring a risk of zero provision if they cannot be covered. Therefore, individuals 
will face incentives to abandon charities that adopt technologies with fixed costs in favour of 
other charities that adopt inferior, variable-cost-only technologies. This donor response will 
induce incumbent charities to forgo opportunities for exploiting scale economies and will make 
them adopt inferior technologies instead. Adopting an inefficient technology can thwart entry 
by more efficient challengers. For example, it may be that an incumbent charity has flexibility 
in its choice of technology; in this case, the presence of a less inefficient challenger can induce 
the incumbent to switch to an inferior technology with no fixed costs to protect its position. 
The final result is the same.
In either of the two cases discussed, the presence of fixed costs can bring about inefficient 
entry and/or (equivalently) the adoption of inferior technologies by incumbents. These conclu-
sions are consistent with the prominence given by charities to core funding strategies. Charities 
often lament that donors are unwilling to fund core costs – making it difficult for start-up chari-
ties to get off the ground and for more established charities to cover management and general 
administration costs – and consistently lobby government to step in with grants to cover their 
fixed operating costs.4
Other research has also contributed to the debate on conduct and performance in the char-
itable sector vis-à-vis the for-profit sector,5 but the implications of organizational form for 
inter-charity competition and industry structure have received less attention. An exception is 
Philipson and Posner (2009), who study competition between providers that pursue non-profit 
objectives. They consider markets that are not contestable, that is, where there are barriers to 
entry, concluding that, as in the case of for-profit firms, antitrust regulation may be called for. 
Their arguments hinge on the incentives that charities have to defend their incumbency posi-
tion even when it is not socially efficient to do so. While antitrust measures are not well suited 
to tackle the specific kinds of coordination failures identified by Name-Correa and Yildirim 
(2013) and Perroni et al. (2019), public support of core funding needs may be able to alleviate 
them.
The previous discussion assumes that donors understand the role of fixed costs in capturing 
scale economies and that they have a good understanding of charities’ production functions. 
Suppose instead that a significant fraction of giving is uninformed or has to rely on imperfect 
performance metrics. Then most donors would need to infer whether a charity is efficient by 
being able to verify the quality of output produced or by resorting to performance metrics that 
third parties provide.
If both donors and charities cared only about the quantity and quality of charitable output, 
their interests would be aligned, and there would be no need for such performance metrics. 
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Problems arise either when donors are primarily motivated by warm glow, that is, the act of 
giving itself (Andreoni, 1988, 1990), and therefore pay less attention to charity performance or 
if donors are motivated by altruism (i.e., by the level of public good provided) but cannot rely 
on charities pursuing the same motive (i.e., they act like impure altruists with some warm glow 
motives present).
The ramifications of impure altruism on the production side of charitable activities have 
been largely ignored. Two exceptions are Scharf (2014) and Krasteva and Yildirim (2016), who 
explore the incentives of impurely motivated charities to enter and/or continue operations. 
Scharf (2014) explores the welfare effects of warm-glow charities for entry and efficient selec-
tion of providers in the charitable sector. They show that altruistic motives can be sufficient for 
the most ineffective charities to exit (or not to enter in the first place). However, the lack of a 
price-based mechanism means that the selection of charities through competition will be less 
powerful than the selection of private firms through market competition: a charity that values 
its activities comparatively more than those of similar charities might choose to stay active even 
when it is comparatively inefficient, so long as the opportunity cost of doing so, in terms of 
loss of output relative to the potential output that could be achieved by other, more efficient 
charities, is not too large.
This setting can also provide the basis for comparing the selection effects of private dona-
tions and direct government grants. Private donors can freely choose to give to one charity 
over another similar charity, and they can stop their contributions to a charity that they per-
ceive (rightly or wrongly) to be unsuccessful or increase or decrease their donations to chari-
ties depending on a purely subjective performance assessment. In sum, private donors are not 
accountable to anyone for their choices. Because of legal and political constraints, on the other 
hand, public funding arrangements do not give government the same level of discretion. Gov-
ernment is accountable to the public for its funding choices and cannot arbitrarily discriminate 
amongst charities or arbitrarily terminate its grants. Thus, even if government can perfectly 
observe performance, legitimately conditioning public funding of individual charities on their 
observed performance requires reliance on verifiable third-party signals – a constraint private 
donors do not face.
If verification constraints make government relatively less flexible at conditioning funding 
on performance than private donors, the latter will be in a better position to promote positive 
selection of charities through their giving choices. To the extent that this is the case, diverting 
funding away from direct grants towards subsidizing private donations, such as via tax rebates, 
can improve efficiency, even when it leaves the level of total funding unchanged; and vice-versa, 
diverting funding away from subsidizing private donations towards direct grants can adversely 
affect provision. Thus, measuring the crowding effects of government grants in terms of their 
effects on the volume of funding can understate their true impact on the effective (productivity-
adjusted) provision level.
For donors to contribute in this productive way to charity selection, they have to be reac-
tive to various performance metrics in their giving decisions; that is, their giving needs to be 
informed. Nevertheless, how informed is giving, and what metrics do donors take into account? 
This is an empirical question mainly studied via experiments. Donors react to simple ratings 
by watchdog organizations like Charity Navigator (Gordon et al., 2009). However, presenting 
scientific evidence on a charity’s effectiveness (i.e., its ability to improve outcomes for recipi-
ents) does not increase the average gift size, although it affects donors differently contingent 
on their donations in prior donation drives (Karlan and Wood, 2017). Similarly, Metzger and 
Günther (2019) find in a lab experiment that only a minority of potential donors is interested 
in purchasing information on charities’ effectiveness and administrative costs. Information about 
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the former has no detectable effect on average gift size. It appears that a majority of donors 
takes an uniformed decision to give and hence cannot fulfil their essential role of directing funds 
to the highest-quality providers. As pointed out in Coffman (2017), this problem can even be 
exacerbated when donations are collected by intermediaries (like a workplace campaign, the 
girl scouts or a charity run) in lieu of charities, as donors are even less reactive to performance 
metrics in these circumstances.
Market structure
One aspect of charity performance is related to market size. We know that for private firms, 
larger and more competitive markets are more efficient. However, it is unclear if that conclusion 
carries over to not-for-profit markets. Two questions are of particular importance: First, what is 
the relationship between market size (e.g., population) and market entry of charitable organiza-
tions? Second, under which conditions does the market deliver efficient allocation (e.g., num-
ber of firms, size of firms)? The answers to these questions can have important implications on 
optimal policies regarding the charitable sector.
A recent paper by La Pointe et al. (2018) addresses both questions.6 They develop a simple 
oligopoly model of fundraising competition between charities offering differentiated products. 
Their model delivers theoretical predictions which can be tested and related to analyses of the 
same questions asked of competition and performance in the private sector (Bresnahan and 
Reiss, 1991; Bloom et al., 2013). They find evidence that charities make decisions based partly 
on prosocial motives. As for the private sector, this finding implies that increased competition 
can lead to a better allocation of resources. The mechanism, however, is a different one: for 
the charitable market, a larger market already serves more varieties, which makes it harder for 
a pro-socially motivated charity to justify entering an already crowded marketplace when that 
entry eats into donations going to existing varieties and thus results in the reduced provision of 
existing varieties.
Apart from market size, a second question pertains to the extent of spatial differentiation in 
the sector. For some types of charities, competition in spatially differentiated markets is com-
mon. As for private firms (Lederer and Hurter, 1986; Anderson and De Palma, 1988), this mar-
ket structure implies that charities offering homogenous goods may compete for donations by 
using the location at which their goods or services are provided as a distinguishing feature. An 
alternative to spatial differentiation would be offering services via a larger umbrella organization 
that offers the same product or service at various locations without stressing this as a determin-
ing feature of their operation. Foods banks, animal shelters, religious organizations, neighbour-
hood associations, safe houses, soup kitchens and other instances where the beneficiaries of the 
charitable good are concentrated in a well-defined geographical area are just a few charitable 
causes for which spatial differentiation of providers is a commonly encountered market form 
(Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997). For instance, in the London metropolitan area alone, multiple 
food banks compete for funds or in-kind donations. The location of the different food banks 
is the distinguishing feature and is explicitly referenced in fundraising drives via their names, 
and gift aid forms of each provider specify their name even when they belong to a larger trust 
or organization.
Gallier et al. (2019a, 2019b) extend a standard model of impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990) 
to account for location-specific altruism. Their model suggest donor sorting, that is, a tendency 
to give locally in markets where donors and charities can share a location and donors receive 
additional (warm glow or altruistic) benefits from donations that flow to a charity that is located 
in their geographic proximity. The theoretical model is further supported by experiments that 
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provide strong evidence for donor sorting. This experimental finding gives one strong rationale 
why spatially differentiated competition may be one commonly encountered market structure 
in the charitable sector. Further evidence for location-specific altruism and the importance of 
identity considerations for giving is found in Kessler and Milkman (2018).
Gallier et al. (2019b) also explore how differences in the price of giving between two spatially 
differentiated charities affect the charity with the relatively higher price of giving. Reducing the 
price of giving – through offering a match – has a comparable effect in spatially differentiated 
settings compared to in settings without spatial differentiation; that is, it increases the amount 
given to the charity offering the match. Even more importantly, there are no negative spill-over 
effects (and some instances of positive spill-overs) on charities not offering the match and hence 
having a relatively higher price of giving. For a spatially differentiated non-profit, however, 
positive spill-over effects between separate branches within their network imply that subsidizing 
the giving of local donors to local branches is the most profitable strategy for raising their total 
charitable income.
Public policy
There are good reasons for why economists are sceptical of governments engaging in the pro-
duction of private goods. Without the disciplining effects of market competition, governments 
will not be efficient in providing such goods in the quality, composition and quantity demanded 
by their citizens, and provision costs will be excessive. Government’s role is more obvious when 
it comes to providing public goods and services. As is well understood, at least since Samuelson 
(1954), private markets will underprovide such goods. Underprovision justifies a government 
stepping in and funding the provision of public goods and services through coercive taxation 
as a means of trying to improve on the private market outcome (Bergstrom et al., 1986). The 
charitable sector can also privately provide public goods and services and fund their provision 
with donations as a substitute for government provision. Or it may be that government and the 
charitable sector act in a complementary fashion, both providing public goods and services that 
are financed with donations and government revenue (e.g., tax incentives for giving).
While there is an efficiency-based rationale for government intervention in the provision 
of public goods and services, we do not have clear evidence about whether public provision of 
public goods through a government results in outcomes that are closer to the social optimum 
than private provision of the same type of goods through charitable organizations. The out-
comes of interest are the amounts of public goods provided, the composition of public goods 
and services (varieties, location) and the financing of provision (e.g., donations and/or public 
funding). This raises the general and age-old question about whether governments and/or 
charities are better able to efficiently produce public goods that correspond to what the public 
desires in terms of size, quality and composition and whether the public sector and/or charities 
are more efficient in transforming inputs into outputs.
Governments can employ coercive contributions to public goods through their power to tax, 
so they do not have to rely on potentially wasteful fundraising. The charitable sector does not 
have the same ability to raise income through taxes but instead has to rely on voluntary dona-
tions. Because donations are voluntary, causes contributed to and the distribution of amounts 
given to each charity reflect a donor’s preferences for public goods and services, which depends 
on their motives for giving. If aggregate contributions across causes are also reflective of the 
population’s preferences, then the private sector may be better poised than government to pro-
vide the ‘right’ composition and amount of public goods and services. This argument is even 
stronger if donors can identify a direct link between charities’ fundraising activities and efficient 
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outcomes. However, extending political economy arguments to charitable giving (Horstmann 
et al., 2007; Horstmann and Scharf, 2008) suggests that rich or more numerous donor types 
can exert more influence on the variety of output that a charity provides and may even be able 
to, by the size of their donations, drag smaller donors away from their preferred varieties. The 
social welfare implications in these scenarios would be unclear: on the one hand, the charitable 
sector could be concentrated in few varieties that receive donations from rich and poor, even if 
the poor would prefer to provide something else, or the sector could be overly fragmented but 
with a composition more closely reflecting societal preferences (Sandford and Scharf, 2013).
If we see government’s role primarily as supporting the third sector in their fundraising activ-
ities and regulating it, what policies are preferable from an efficiency perspective? Classically, 
governments have supported fundraising through tax incentives,7 which are based on inputs and 
so do not directly address the inefficiencies that we have discussed here. This prominence of 
tax incentives for giving raises the important and unresolved question of why tax incentives are 
used as a significant channel for delivering public support to charities instead of relying solely 
on direct government grants. This question has provoked much debate and still does, especially 
in light of the pandemic, the financial crisis and the steadily increasing size and importance of 
the charitable sector and the corresponding increase in the level of government support directed 
to not-for-profit enterprises.
Since tax relief lowers the price of giving for donors,8 there is a presumption that its ration-
ale is to encourage private giving and boost charity funding – compared to direct government 
grants, tax incentives may result in a higher overall level of charity funding for the same amount 
of public funds.9 This rationale, however, does not seem to square with available empirical evi-
dence: recent estimates of the effects of tax incentives for giving on gross donations by private 
donors find price elasticities of giving to be less than one in absolute value – implying that the 
cost to the government of raising gross donations by one dollar exceeds one dollar.10 In other 
words, there is empirical evidence for crowding-out effects of tax incentives.
In itself, this need not imply that subsidies are an ineffective way of delivering public funding 
to charities: as Roberts (1984) pointed out, even if tax incentives for giving leave net dona-
tions unchanged or reduce them, they may still dominate direct grants as a way of channelling 
government funds to charities if direct grants also crowd out private donations. It might also 
be argued that tax incentives result in giving that reflects donor preferences, whereas the use 
of grants breaks this link. This further muddies the waters as to draw conclusions about social 
welfare effects.
Empirical evidence suggests less-than-full crowding out of donations by direct government 
grants: Andreoni and Payne (2011) estimate crowding out of fundraising by direct grants to be 
around 25%.11 When combining this with available estimates on price elasticities of giving, it 
would seem that there is not a strong prima facie case for tax incentives over direct grants.12
Recent research also shows the importance of taking into account extensive and intensive 
margin responses. A recent paper by Almunia et al. (2020) use administrative tax data around a 
2010 tax reform and estimate an intensive-margin price elasticity of giving of –0.2. They model 
the extensive-margin response through a fixed cost of declaring donations, which is estimated 
to be around £47. Building on Roberts’ model, they show that the welfare effects of tax incen-
tives for donations are modified when extensive-margin responses are allowed for. Based on that 
theoretical framework and empirical results, a case can be made for increasing the subsidy on 
charitable giving in the United Kingdom.
The previous discussion suggests that in order to assess the relative effectiveness of direct 
grants and tax expenditures, evidence on price elasticities must be combined with evidence on 
crowding out of private giving by direct grants and evidence about associated frictions.
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Considering a broader sectoral perspective can provide an alternative, supply-side-based 
rationale for the use of tax incentives for private giving: relying on tax incentives as alterna-
tives to direct government grants may improve charity selection and performance. This effect 
would remain unmeasured in empirical estimates that focus on effects on the cost of provision 
by charities as measured by their overall budgets (their inputs) rather than the provision itself 
(their output). As well as being relevant for evaluations of third-sector performance, this selec-
tion effect can have important implications for public policy – not just in terms of rationalizing 
existing policies but also for designing new ones.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that this positive selection effect of taxes over direct 
grants hinges on how informed donors are in their decision making (relative to a bureaucrat 
administering government grants). If information on charity performance is highly localized 
and widely distributed across the population, then it may well be that donors’ decentralized 
information status is superior to the centralized knowledge of a government. If centralized 
knowledge is available, a government official may still be unsure how this knowledge translates 
into individual preferences. Yet here oversight and information sharing might be a policy that 
promotes the positive selection effect of tax incentives over direct grants.
Conclusion
We started out with the basic observation that competition for funding in the non-profit sectors 
differs from competition in the for-profit sector because prices cannot fulfil their usual coordi-
nation function. Absent this coordination function of prices, fundraising competition will not 
automatically lead to an efficient size of the charitable sector, an efficient selection of production 
technologies or an efficient market structure. Instead, we pointed out several inefficiencies that 
may prevail despite inter-charity competition or may even be exacerbated by it. Government 
policy needs to consider these potential sources of inefficiency when thinking about subsidies 
to the charitable sector in the form of tax rebates or direct grants. It also needs to consider 
limiting cases where direct government provision can be superior to the private provision of 
public goods and services through the charitable sector. Answering these questions requires the 
“science of philanthropy” to move beyond questions of designing the perfect ask and focus on 
questions about inter-charity competition and production efficiency. Answering this new set of 
questions requires theoretical models and experimental and empirical evidence that facilitate a 
better understanding of (i) whether the budget of altruism is fixed, (ii) what motivates charities 
(instead of donors), (iii) how much donors take charities’ production functions into account 
when distributing funds and (iv) how the answers to these questions vary with government 
interventions and tax policies.
Notes
 1 There is a large body of literature that compares the effectiveness of different kinds of fundraising 
strategies. These strategies include the use of match and rebate subsidies (Karlan and List, 2007; Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008), door-to-door fundraising (Landry et al., 2006; Landry, 2010; DellaVigna et al., 
2012; Andreoni et al., 2017), lotteries (Morgan, 2000; Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Lange et al., 2007; 
Carpenter and Matthews, 2017), lead donations (Huck and Rasul, 2011), gifts (Falk, 2007; Alpizar 
et al., 2008), social information (Meier, 2007; Shang and Croson, 2009) and recognition (Harbaugh, 
1998). For reviews, see Andreoni and Payne (2013), List (2011).
 2 See also Weisbrod (1991), Andreoni and McQuire (1993), Andreoni (1998) and Name-Correa and 
Yildirim (2013).
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 3 We observe considerable variation in the composition of the funding sources of different charities: for 
some, the bulk of funding is represented by government grants, whereas for others, government grants 
are a relatively minor component of funding. There also appears to be some correlation between chari-
ties’ funding from public sources and cost structures. La Pointe et al. (2018) find evidence for a positive 
correlation between fixed costs and the level of government funding received by charities relative to the 
total funding received for Canadian charities’ revenues and costs across different sectors of activities.
 4 The difficulties that charities face in persuading donors (especially small ones) to make donations that 
are not earmarked towards project costs and can be used to fund core costs leads charities to formulate 
specific core funding strategies. See, for example, Scott (2003). Government funding choices do appear 
to be sensitive to charities’ core funding needs, but what is not clear is whether this is motivated by 
the need to promote entry by new charities – overcoming the implicit entry barriers that fixed costs 
induce in the presence of a non-distribution constraint – or by the need to support efficient technology 
adoption by incumbents.
 5 This has focused mainly on the implications of organizational form for internal performance along 
various dimensions – information and agency costs (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Hansmann, 1980; 
Easley and O’Hara, 1983; Glaeser and Schleifer, 2001), differential regulatory and tax regimes (Lakda-
walla and Philipson, 2006) and access to pro-socially motivated workforce (Ghatak and Mueller, 2011).
 6 Papers that study not-for-profit competition have mostly focused on the health care sector (e.g., Prop-
per et al., 2008; Gaynor and Vogt, 2003; Gaynor and Town, 2011; Capps et al., 2010).
 7 See the 2020 OECD Report on Taxation and Philanthropy (OECD, 2020).
 8 Tax relief can take various forms: deductions of donations from taxable income as in the United States; 
tax credits at the marginal rate of income taxation, a system similar to the one used in Canada; a pro-
portional match claimed directly by charities on donations received as used in the United Kingdom. 
All of these methods result in a lower price of giving for donors.
 9 The question of why governments would want to encourage private giving has been the source of 
much debate in the economics literature and in the policy debate. Research that has focused attention 
on this question includes that of Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), Warr (1982) and Scharf (2000). In the 
United Kingdom, tax incentives for giving are the result of the normalization of a late 19C fundraising 
scheme offering donors the chance to avoid paying tax on donations made by Deed of Covenant.
 10 In early studies, price elasticities of giving were found to be negative and greater than one in absolute 
value (these results are summarized by Clotfelter, 1985, and Triest, 1998), but more recent studies have 
shown that estimates are highly sensitive to the empirical strategy and to whether there are corrections 
for short-term price effects. For example, Randolph (1995) uses panel data to find a long-run price 
elasticity of giving of –.51. Using a longer but similar panel to that used by Randolph but a different 
estimation technique, Auten et al. (2002) arrive at the significantly higher estimate of –1.26. More 
recently, Bakija and Heim (2011) find a long-run value of –.7 – close to Randolph’s estimate. See also 
Fack and Landais, (2010) and Scharf and Smith (2015). In sum, it is difficult to exactly estimate the 
price elasticity of giving and results may reflect the availabitlity of data and the econometric methods 
used.
 11 When changes in fundraising costs are taken into account, this estimate has been shown to be even 
higher (up to 60% in Andreoni and Payne, 2011).
 12 On the basis of the aforementioned elasticity estimates, incorporating second-best optimal tax con-
siderations in the presence of endogenous labour supply decisions (Saez, 2004; Diamond, 2006) does 
not substantially affect the conclusions. Yet another rationale could be preference revelation (see Hor-
stmann and Scharf, 2008, who look at the implications for segregation outcomes when donations are 
positively correlated to income inequality): by donating to certain charities, individuals reveal their 
preferences towards alternative forms of collective consumption; government support of private giving 
then results in government funds being directed where individuals ostensibly wish them to be directed.
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When thinking about what tax treatment is optimal for donations, researchers to date have 
had to rely mostly on cross-sectional or longitudinal data from tax returns in their empirical 
analysis. Their ability to draw causal conclusions from such data is limited, and they have to rely 
on relatively strict identification assumptions. Even if the period studied contains tax changes 
over time, the identification problems will still include the following: all individuals are affected 
by the tax changes in the same way, different individuals are affected differently, or changes to 
the tax rate affect both the price of giving and disposable income at the same time. A type of 
experiment in which a random half of the population would face a different tax rate from the 
rest of the population in a particular year could provide causal assessment of the policy in ques-
tion but is rather infeasible.
This is exactly what field experiments with donors to charitable organizations can achieve, 
even if at a much smaller scale. Recent advances in such experiments can provide us with valu-
able insights that could also inform the design of the tax code with respect to donations. In 
this chapter, I connect the literature on the tax treatment of donations with recent field experi-
mental studies in fundraising. Although most of the field experiments I review subsequently are 
designed with the aim of informing charitable organizations about what works best for their 
fundraising campaigns1 and not with a view to aiding tax authorities, many elements of their 
designs are similar to the tax code. Such elements include reductions in the price of giving and 
thresholds for such reduction. The advantage of field experiments is that they allow researchers 
to arrive at clean causal conclusions without strict identification assumptions that are needed 
when using naturally occurring data (List, 2008).
Although some of the questions discussed in this chapter have been analyzed in other types of 
experiments – mostly laboratory but also online and natural experiments – I will not cover these 
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(with some exceptions). The reasons for this are as follows: First, covering all the experimental 
literature would exceed the scope of this chapter. Second, I concentrate on the field experi-
ments because they generally offer a higher external validity than laboratory or online experi-
ments while providing causal inference without relying on potentially restrictive assumptions 
(in contrast to many natural experiments). There are limitations of relying on field experiments 
as well. While some might offer innovative designs leading to higher charitable contributions, 
there might be, of course, other reasons that make the integration of such designs into the tax 
system not desirable or feasible. And even for uncontroversial and feasible designs, there is no 
guarantee that they will work when they are integrated into the tax code. The tests in field 
experiments are usually performed with one organization and one type of potential donor such 
that the results obtained might differ from general equilibrium results, that is, for all charities 
and individuals. Still, I believe that reflecting on those studies might be helpful with a view to 
advancing our thinking about the tax treatment of charitable giving.
I will structure the chapter in the following way. In Section 2, I  review studies showing 
that individuals have a poor idea about their tax-price of giving and that they are inattentive 
to the tax incentives at the point when they make their donations. In Section 3, I review the 
literature that studies thresholds for price reduction, including novel approaches based on per-
sonalization. In Section 4, I will turn towards the field experiments that compare the effects of 
price reduction with direct grants to charities. In Section 5, I compare matching with rebate 
subsidies. In Section 6, I point to the more basic question of whether total donation revenue 
can be increased or whether taxpayers merely shift donations between recipients and over time 
as a result of a change in incentives. In the latter case, any change in the tax code with respect 
to donation treatment would only change the amount of declared donations and not the total 
amount. Section 7 concludes.
2 Timing, awareness, and transaction costs
In several countries, the income tax is designed in such a way that charitable donations reduce 
taxable income, hence reducing the effective price of giving. The price becomes one minus the 
marginal tax. This is the case, for example, in the United States and Germany. In practice, this 
does not necessarily mean that donors have to pay a lower tax on their income at the time when 
they make the donation but rather that they receive a refund for some part of the donation later. 
This is the case for many individuals in Germany. The statistical office reports that in 2016, 
13.7 million of the approximately 25.5 million individuals subject to income taxation filled 
in a tax declaration, and of those, 12 million received a refund,2 while only 1.5 million had to 
make a supplementary payment.3 The time point at which the individual receives the refund 
must then necessarily be some time after the donation decision(s). If a person in Germany 
donates at the beginning of year one, she may not file her tax declaration before the end of 
February of year three (if she uses a tax advisor or a neighborhood organization that offers tax 
help). If we assume it takes the tax office another three months to verify the declaration, the 
difference between the time of donation and a refund might amount to 29 months (and, of 
course, it might be even longer). Even a person who makes a typical end-of-year donation and 
timely tax declaration can expect a 5–8-month lag.
Another issue is that taxpayers are unlikely to know their exact marginal tax and thus their 
individual tax-price for giving until they file their tax declaration and the tax authority approves 
it. Depending on the complexity of the tax system, this number is difficult to calculate, par-
ticularly for donations at the beginning of the tax year, as many income-related factors might 
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change (like a pay raise, loss of a job, or changes in family composition). But even for later 
donations, additional tax-deductible activities might arise or, finally, the tax authority might not 
recognize some of them. Moreover, donors seldom are reminded of the tax incentives when 
they make a donation, so they might easily be inattentive or forget about tax benefits. This leads 
to the following question: To what extent do individuals account for their individual tax-price 
when making their donations?
Even if a number of empirical studies show that tax incentives are effective in encouraging 
donations, at least for those with high incomes (see Chapter 12 and references cited therein), 
it is still unclear what fraction of donations are included in the tax declaration. Clearly, people 
do not list some donations at all (like money put in a donation box or spare change given to 
the homeless people), and some individuals might decide ex post on whether to include their 
donations in the tax declaration. They will not include them if the hassle costs of the deduction 
(which likely vary over time) are higher than the expected refund value.
To my knowledge, there is only one experimental work devoted to studying those questions 
in detail. In two large-scale field experiments, Teirlinck (2020) found that donors in Germany 
are inattentive to tax incentives and hold misperceptions about their individual tax-price. She 
showed that both making tax incentives salient at the donation stage and providing personalized 
information increases donations. She also showed that the effect was larger for high-income 
individuals and that the reason for that was higher hassle costs of tax filing and claiming deduc-
tions for low-income individuals. In contrast, in a field experiment in Italy, Casarico and 
Tonin (2018) documented that mentioning the possibility of a tax deduction in a fundraising 
campaign reduced donations. This reduction was greatest for small donors, which could relate 
to transaction/hassle costs as in Teirlinck (2020). The seemingly contradictory results between 
Teirlinck (2020) and Casarico and Tonin (2018) might arise because of a different content of 
the information provided (it is much more detailed and personalized in Teirlinck, 2020) or 
differences between the two countries. This clearly shows that more research on this topic is 
needed.
3 Thresholds
Some tax schemes include minimum thresholds for charitable donations – only donations above 
the threshold reduce taxable income and thus have lower price. Such thresholds are usually of 
a fixed value or defined as a percentage of income. Minimum thresholds lead to non-convex 
budget sets, and such non-convexities have been studied in a number of field experiments. 
Huck, Rasul, and Shephard (2015) introduced a treatment in which donations above €50 were 
matched 1:1 – that is, they had a price of 0.5 – while those below €50 were not matched and 
had a price of 1. They compared this non-convex matching scheme to a linear 1:1 and 1:0.5 
matching and other schemes. Using a structural estimation approach, they concluded that if a 
matching scheme is preferred, then non-convex matching with a lower price for higher gifts 
outperforms simple linear matching. They also suggested tailoring such matching schemes to 
the characteristics of potential donors. Such personalization was explored by Adena and Huck 
(2019a). In a theoretical framework, they showed how personalized thresholds can increase 
donation values. Such thresholds should be set slightly above the individual’s optimal dona-
tion in the absence of matching. Of course, in practice, the latter is not observed. The authors 
proposed to proxy it with past donation values or to estimate it. They tested this idea in a field 
experiment with past donors and past non-donors. For both groups, they observed a number 
of individual characteristics. For past donors, they proxied the optimal donation with the past 
donation and set the threshold for a fixed match amount at different levels relative to this past 
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donation. They found that the best results were obtained if the threshold was set at around 
60–75% above the past donation. While such personalization is not feasible and potentially also 
not desirable for the tax code, they also showed that similar results can be achieved when a fairly 
small number of individual characteristics are used to set a threshold. They predicted the opti-
mal donation of non-donors by extrapolating from the group of past donors and their individual 
characteristics. On the basis of this prediction, they set the threshold around the estimated values 
and obtained similar results to those obtained when the individual past donation was actually 
known. Again, the most effective threshold was around 75% above the predicted donation. 
Stunningly, the amount of information on individuals used for the prediction was fairly limited. 
How could this idea be applied to the tax treatment of donations? Different thresholds could be 
implemented depending on, for example, income and the number of children instead of ‘one 
size fits all’. And what if personalized or characteristic-dependent thresholds are not feasible or 
desirable? Castillo and Petrie (2021) studied an optimal choice of uniform thresholds. In a large-
scale field experiment and using a structural estimation, they concluded that such thresholds 
should be set relatively high. While the maximum threshold used in the experiment was $500, 
the estimated optimum threshold should be set at $2,000.
As pointed out in Chapter 10, (minimum) thresholds might also impact behavior by imposing 
a particular norm of giving. Adena and Huck (2019a) discovered that their results from a field 
experiment with non-personalized thresholds closely followed the patterns from the literature 
on suggested donation amounts and defaults as reviewed in Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014). 
Thresholds and suggestions increase the likelihood that the donation will be the exact or near 
the suggested value. They lead large donors to reduce their gifts, while small donors increase 
their donations or abstain (if they see that they are not able to conform to the imposed norm). 
As a result, the values of donations increase with the level of the threshold, while the probability 
of donating decreases. The statistical relationship for the total effect is less obvious, but it is likely 
that the sum of all donations decreases as the threshold value increases. Adena and Huck (2019a) 
conclude that the latter pattern does not hold if thresholds are properly personalized. The reason 
is an inverted U-shape relative to the individually optimal donation – the thresholds that are set 
too low and the thresholds that are set too high are inferior.
4 The price of giving: matching versus direct grants to charities
The popular treatment of donations in the tax code results in a deduction that reduces a tax-
payer’s taxable income and consequently the tax due. This results in a lower price of giving, 
where the price equals one minus the marginal tax (see Chapter 12 and Chapter 18). On the 
other hand, charitable organizations often like to attract a major donor before the fundraising 
campaign and to use this major donor’s contribution to leverage subsequent small donations. In 
many cases, a major donor of this kind commits to matching subsequent donations at a speci-
fied match rate (oftentimes 1:1, but sometimes other rates are used) up to a prespecified total 
amount. There are numerous field (and lab) experiments that study the effects of changes in 
the price of giving through matching (see Epperson and Reif, 2019, for a thorough review of 
those studies). In those field experiments, the performance of different matching rates has been 
tested against a pure control without a major donor or with information about the major donor 
providing seed money unconditionally.
Two early field experiments tested different matching rates – high matches implying a price 
of giving of 0.5, 0.33, and 0.25 in Karlan and List (2007) and small matches implying a price of 
giving of 0.5 and 0.75 in Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011) – against a pure control. While in the 
first experiment, matching increased the probability of giving and the gift amount relative to 
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the pure control, there was no such effect in the second experiment. The authors explain the 
results as relating to the heterogeneous responses by different types of donors. In both of the 
field experiments, the changes of the match rate had no effect. The latter result has also been 
confirmed by Meier (2007), who tested the prices of 0.8 and 0.66.
In another field experiment with a lead donor control condition, Adena and Huck (2017) 
showed that matching attracted more donors but that those additional donors predominantly 
gave small amounts. More importantly, they found substantial crowding out for large donors – 
they reduced their donation amounts when matching was in place. The authors used a lead 
donor treatment for comparison. They argued that a lead donor treatment should be used 
because potential donors interpret it as a signal that the charity and its output is of high qual-
ity, as they do in the case of matching. In the spirit of Vesterlund (2003), they assumed that the 
major donor has better information about the quality of the charity and its output and only 
donates if it is high enough.4 Most experiments that rely on pure control for comparisons find 
that matching performed better, while the studies that used a lead donor treatment for compari-
sons often found opposite results.
A number of field-experimental studies provide estimates of the price elasticity of giving. 
However, they use different methods such that the results are not comparable across the stud-
ies. Adena, Hakimov, and Huck (2019) calculated the price elasticity for field experiments 
that used a match rate of 1:1 and a lead donor as a control. Out of five studies, they found the 
price elasticity to be lower than one in absolute value for three of the experiments (Rondeau 
and List, 2008; Huck and Rasul, 2011; Gneezy, Keenan and Gneezy, 2014) and higher than 
one in absolute value for two (Adena and Huck, 2017; Adena, Hakimov, and Huck, 2019). 
While Huck, Rasul, and Shephard (2015) found that no matching scheme can outperform a 
lead donor, this conclusion seems to apply only to specific samples, like those made up of rich 
Western individuals (Adena, Hakimov, and Huck, 2019).
An interesting insight emerged from a field experiment by Meier (2007). He found that 
matching has a negative long-term effect on donations that can undo the initial positive effect. 
Donors who were offered matching in year one and did not receive matching in year two 
reduced their subsequent gifts. The reduction was larger than the initial increase in giving 
from matching relative to a no-matching control. Meier (2007) argues that matching incentives 
might crowd out the intrinsic motivation for giving. Other studies, however, did not confirm 
this negative long-term-effect of matching (Karlan, List, and Shafir, 2011; Kesternich, Löschel, 
and Römer, 2016).
Another important result is that an announcement of a lead donor always seems to lead to 
better fundraising results than no such announcement (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Ron-
deau and List, 2008). This is because (i) the donors are not pure altruists (that is, they do not 
derive utility solely from all donors’ contributions to the public goods) but are (to some extent) 
warm-glow givers (that is they derive utility from their own donation per se; see Andreoni, 
1990). Therefore, there is no crowding out, or it is not complete. (ii) A lead donor provides a 
signal of quality about the charitable organization and its output, thus leading to higher con-
tributions. A treatment with a lead donor (seed money) resembles direct government grants 
to nonprofit organizations, and one might be tempted to conclude from the previous line of 
the field-experimental literature that direct governmental grants should be superior to price 
reductions. Again, such comparisons are subject to certain limitations, namely that field experi-
ments can only provide partial equilibrium results. Maybe this is why, somewhat in contrast to 
the experimental literature outlined previously, the empirical literature studying the effects of 
governmental grants on individual giving has found (incomplete) crowding out (Andreoni and 
Payne, 2003) rather than crowding in.
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Finally, in order to reduce crowding out, Adena and Huck (2017) proposed an innovative 
design in which the matching amount is not going to the same project but to another, ideally 
complementary, one. What kind of similar design is plausible for the tax code? One option is for 
the tax subsidy to benefit other social projects directly instead of being paid back to the donors.
5 Matching versus rebates
Matching is sometimes offered by a major donor who matches gifts to a charity directly or by 
employers who encourage payroll giving. In contrast, the preferential treatment of donations in 
the U.S. and German tax code takes the form of a rebate. In the UK tax system, both subsidy 
types exist in parallel – donations of UK taxpayers are matched at a rate of 25% up to the tax 
due amount, and eventually the rebate subsidy applies. Matching and rebates are both math-
ematically equivalent, and both reduce the price of giving. But they differ in the implementa-
tion – that is, in the timing and which actions are required by the donor for the subsidy to apply. 
While matching usually happens instantaneously and the donor usually does not need to take 
any action, the rebates are paid out much later and require the donor to claim donations in their 
tax declaration. Do those two instruments have the same effect on donors?
Throughout the experimental literature, rebates consistently perform worse than match-
ing. This was shown, among others, by Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2006, 2008, 2017) both 
in the laboratory and field experiments. The inferiority of rebates was even higher in field 
experiments, where the rebate takes more time to materialize (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). 
See Vesterlund (2016) for a thorough review of the experimental literature on this topic and 
Chapter 20, of this Handbook for a laboratory study.5 This raises a question: Why are rebates 
inferior to matches?
In order to understand the reasons behind the differences in the effectiveness of matches 
and rebates, Eckel and Grossman (2017) introduced a small twist into the design of their field 
experiment: The donors had to tick a box if they wanted the subsidy – matching or rebate – to 
materialize. Only 56% of donors ticked the box, and donors in the match treatments were twice 
as likely to do so. The authors suggested different explanations for the observed responses: they 
pointed to a lack of awareness of the incentives, an unwillingness to accept a subsidy, misper-
ceptions, or a reluctance to deal with the additional costs of cashing in a rebate check. Those 
reasons may potentially lead to differences between the responsiveness to match versus rebate 
incentives. The researchers found a much lower price elasticity in the case of rebates – they 
were less than one in absolute value, while price elasticities in the matching treatments were 
estimated to be above one in absolute terms. However, when they only accounted for the 
donors who accepted the subsidy, the price elasticity estimates were very similar and very high. 
Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman (2021) offer a different explanation for the non-equivalence 
between the match-price elasticity and the rebate-price elasticity. According to their theoretical 
model, the donor cares about the impact of the amount received by the charity (which includes 
the matched amount in the case of matching) and gets warm-glow utility from their own gift. 
While the rebate affects the opportunity cost of both the impact and warm glow, the match 
reduces the cost of impact but does not alter the cost of one’s out-of-pocket donation.
All together, the experimental results suggest that encouraging charitable giving in the tax 
code through deductions might be inferior to other simple alternatives. A potentially better 
solution would be instead to allow donors to communicate their tax number together with a 
donation and for the charities to cash in the match. If there is a reason to prefer rebates in the tax 
code, Thaler und Sunstein (2008, p. 230) propose the following simplification: an introduction 
of a charity debit card which would be only used for donation payments. Each donor would 
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receive a summary at the end of the year which they could simply add to their tax declara-
tion. This would reduce the additional transaction costs, which might explain the differences 
in the performance between rebates and matches. Richard Thaler6 has made a further proposal 
regarding the simplification of how donations are treated in the tax code. Instead of differential 
incentives for those with high versus low incomes (see Chapter 10 for a discussion), he proposes 
a fixed subvention of 15% for each and every donation, including those made by individuals 
who do not pay any taxes.
6 Is the total donation pie constant?
The effect of incentives for charitable giving in the tax code depends crucially on whether 
the donation pie is constant. Even if a change in tax incentives leads to a change in the vol-
ume of claimed donations, it is possible that it merely leads to a shift between the claimed and 
unclaimed donations, eligible and ineligible beneficiaries, or over time. Truly increasing total 
donations would require reducing spending on other goods (assuming a constant budget), ide-
ally on those which are not desirable from the society’s point of view (Heger and Cornish, 2021; 
Schmitz, 2021). This leads to another important question that has become topical but is difficult 
to answer. Is the total donation pie constant, or can it be made bigger?
Field experiments that observe giving to only one charity in the short term do not allow us 
to answer this question. What happens to giving to other charities if one charity increases its 
fundraising activities or offers additional incentives for giving? In a field experiment with blood 
donations, Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (2012) found that individuals went to blood drives that 
offered incentives like a t-shirt or lottery ticket and avoided those without incentives while 
keeping their total blood donation volume constant. Adena and Hager (2020) conducted a field 
experiment with fundraising activities for one organization in a random half of the zip codes 
in Germany. They also analyzed zip code-level data for a large fraction of donations to other 
organizations. They found a significant crowding out of donations to other organizations of a 
similar type, which points to crowding out and a limited scope to expand the donation pie.7
Another take on the total giving question is offered by studies that look at giving over time. 
Adena and Huck (2019b) studied whether inducing a donor to give more today leads them to 
reduce their giving later on. Initially, they documented that individuals who were informed 
about a future fundraising campaign reduced their giving in the first year as if they were plan-
ning their long-term giving. However, individuals in the second year gave similar amounts to 
their first-year amounts.8 This means that, ultimately, they did not optimize over time. Similarly, 
Shang and Croson (2009) found that new donors who learned about a high donation that was 
given by a previous donor gave more, and they did so again a year later without receiving such 
information. This means that increasing giving today leads to more giving tomorrow and con-
tradicts the fixed-budget hypothesis. In comparison, the findings from the empirical literature 
on tax-price incentives suggest that taxpayers do account for future and past changes in their 
individual tax-price to some extent (see again Chapter 12).
All together, the experimental results presented previously are inconclusive9 and suggest that 
more research is needed.
7 Conclusions
Researchers have long called for tax reform with respect to the treatment of donations (Saez, 
2004). The results from the field experiments presented previously call into question sev-
eral design elements of the tax treatment of donations: the complexity and timing, the price 
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reduction for giving through deductions, and the somewhat random setting of thresholds for 
deduction. Still, the previously reviewed studies cannot provide the ultimate answer for how to 
optimally incentivize giving through taxes, as they are not designed to do so. While there are 
a number of existing field experiments with taxpayers meant to enhance tax compliance (Iyer 
et al., 2010; Gangl et al., 2014; Dwenger et al., 2016; Bott et al., 2019), to my knowledge, 
no one has conducted a real-world field experiment that varies the tax incentives for giving.10 
There may be scope for this, and for this reason, more research of this type is needed.
Notes
 1 Another reason is to understand better the motivation of donors, though laboratory experiments are 
sometimes a better option to that end.
 2 There are, of course, other reasons than charitable giving that might lead to a refund.
 3 https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Staat/Steuern/Lohnsteuer-Einkommensteuer/im-fokus-steu-
ererklaerung.html (accessed on 19.01.2021).
 4 See also Adena et al. (2017) for quality certification.
 5 There are two studies with different designs that achieve equivalence of rebate and matches. The first 
is in the context of unit donations (Diederich et al., 2020), and the second relies on framing contribu-
tions in terms of charity receipts and not refunds (Davis, 2006).
 6 18.12.2017, Richard R. Thaler, “It’s Time to Rethink the Charity Deduction” https://nyti.
ms/2pmvncz (viewed on 20.10.2017).
 7 In contrast, in the small world of a laboratory experiment, Schmitz (2021) found that matching incen-
tives shifted donations towards charities that offer price reductions but that the overall donations 
remained constant. In an experiment with survey participants, an extra budget for charitable giving 
provided by the researchers, and two charities, Gallier et al. (2019) found that matching raised overall 
donations.
 8 Such positive path dependence has been also found in an online experiment by Heger and Slonim 
(2020).
 9 See also Gee and Meer (2020) for a more detailed review of further literature on this topic.
 10 There are experiments outside the lab that try to mimic the real tax context, for example, (Becchetti, 
Pelligra, and Reggiani 2017).
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1 Introduction: individuals and charitable giving
Philanthropy can be defined as voluntary giving for the common good and as such codified by 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1 Non-profit organisations and charities are among 
the most prominent actors in the context of philanthropy. They are essential contributors of 
public goods and services that governments often fail to provide (Kingma, 1997). Such organi-
sations are mostly supported by individual donations (Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish, 2006). 
For example, according to Giving USA (2020), individual donations amounted to 68.9% (or 
$309.66 billion) of the total $449.64 billion donated in the United States in 2019. These num-
bers are even more remarkable considering that donations by corporations only amounted to 
4.7% (or $21.09 billion) during the same period. These patterns in donations have been consist-
ently observed over time. Further, over the past 10 years, both total donations and individual 
donations have been increasing, which is another encouraging trend (see Figure 20.1). How-
ever, a closer look at Figure 20.1 reveals a worrisome fact: the upward trend of donations by 
individuals is losing momentum. For instance, in 2009, individual donations amounted to 74% 
of the total, whereas in 2019, they only amounted to 69% of the total. Moreover, the number 
of people who give to charity annually has significantly decreased over the past years (Osili, 
Clark and Han, 2019). Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of identifying 
mechanisms that can reverse these worrying trends and increase not only the amount of dona-
tions but also the number of donors (Laffan and Dolan, 2020).
In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the relevance of behavioural science 
regarding individuals’ everyday decisions as well as societal policies. Behavioural economics’ 
insights have been used to develop new policy tools that increase organ donations (Johnson 
and Goldstein, 2003) and pension contributions (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), improve carbon 
emission offset (Weber and Johnson, 2012), and help reduce poverty (World Bank, 2014). Thus, 
it is very likely that insights from behavioural sciences can contribute to philanthropy as well. 
For instance, one intriguing application of behavioural sciences in philanthropy is to inform 
and design optimal public policies and fundraising mechanisms aimed at promoting giving 
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empirically determine, in laboratory settings, individuals’ motives that drive charitable giving. 
While such motives are difficult to determine from data on actual donations, such as surveys, 
tax returns, or charitable level data, laboratory experiments and experimental techniques offer 
a useful alternative.
In the following section, we introduce the new interdisciplinary field of behavioural phi-
lanthropy, an approach that combines insights and methods of disciplines that investigate phi-
lanthropy from a broader perspective, such as sociology that utilises surveys and case studies to 
investigate how policies may impact philanthropy at the societal level, with those of disciplines 
that analyse the determinants of philanthropy at the individual level, such as behavioural eco-
nomics that relies on experiment-based research to provide a mechanistic understanding of 
philanthropic behaviour and its determinants.
Enter behavioural philanthropy
The academic literature on philanthropy has been growing over the past 20  years (see Fig-
ure 20.2). Although the literature is spread across the disciplines of economics, law, psychology, 
and sociology, among others, we simplified the categorisation of these approaches into two 
levels: macro-surveys and micro-experimental levels.
Figure 20.1  (Colour online):2 Real charitable giving growth in the United States, along with the Stand-
ard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index for comparison over time (2009–2019). The gap between total 
donations and individual donations is growing over the years
Source: Data on the trends of total charitable giving and individual charitable giving in the United States were 
retrieved from Giving USA Foundation. Yearly reports are based on the estimates of IRS Form 990 (a tax exemp-
tion form completed yearly by a non-profit organisation), which are econometrically adjusted based on information 
from other research institutions
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The prevailing approach in philanthropic research has been at the macro level, relying on 
archival tax data and cross-sectional surveys (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). Studies that use 
surveys have identified important correlates of charitable giving, such as religion, age, educa-
tion, and socialisation practices (for review, see Wiepking and Bekkers, 2012). Such surveys 
usually involve a large number of respondents and are therefore relatively thorough and can 
detect small effects (see Figure 20.3). Most of these questionnaires often ask about real-life 
behaviour, as surveys are generalisable and ecologically valid such that they can be applied 
to other real-life situations. While survey and tax data provide an insightful line of research 
for philanthropy, the biggest flaw of this approach is the lack of evidence to support causal 
inferences; given that mostly correlational data are used, survey measures do not provide 
insights on the causality of the observed relationships between external factors, predictors, 
and behaviour. Therefore, due to the lack of a mechanistic explanation, findings in this 
domain often have several possible explanations for the relations identified, which are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, while there is a lot of descriptive knowledge about who 
gives, little is known about why some people give more than others or why some people 
may be more inclined to give to a specific cause instead of another. Cross-country surveys 
Figure 20.2  (Colour online):3 Number of publications on ‘charitable contributions’ over time (2000–
2020). The fitted line represents logistic regression




can also be a costly and time-consuming method of data collection, and while taxation stud-
ies frequently provide longitudinal data, they are usually collected only once a year. Another 
notable drawback of this type of data is that it relies on self-reports. Since philanthropy is a 
prosocial behaviour, it might be impacted by self-serving biases, such as social desirability and 
self-deception. As such, one could expect that people may report wrong information about 
desirable outcomes (i.e., more donations), thus impacting results. Even when participants 
want to be honest, the results might vary depending on the respondent’s level of introspection 
(Wallendorf and Brucks, 1993).
In the past years, there has been a rise in micro-level research, especially in the fields of 
psychology and behavioural economics, which investigates philanthropic behaviour at the level 
of individuals or small groups by relying on controlled causal manipulations. Studies using such 
experiments provide an additional answer to how and why some people engage in philanthropy 
more than others and thus enhance the potential to inform policymakers looking for effective 
mechanisms to stimulate individual giving, for instance, through tax incentives. The experi-
mental designs are flexible to different experimental manipulations and provide evidence of 
how philanthropic behaviour changes with environmental parameters. For example, how does 
philanthropic behaviour change when a country introduces a new tax subsidy scheme? Does an 
increase in taxation of individual wealth affect charitable donations? These manipulations can be 
studied in laboratory settings and are an important step in building predictive models that aim 
to capture the rationale behind people’s decision-making. Such empirical knowledge provides 
insights into individual differences and establishes a basis for predictive models of philanthropic 
behaviour. However, experimental data are usually not reliable, generalisable, or ecologically 
valid because the evidence gathered in these controlled and simplified experiments often pre-
vents drawing generalised inferences that could predict behaviour outside the laboratory setting. 
Another disadvantage of such experiments is that most of them are conducted on a ‘Western, 




educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic’ (WEIRD) (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 
2010) sample and therefore lack explanatory and predictive validity on the behaviour of the 
majority of the population. However, with recent advances in online platforms (such as Prolific 
and Mechanical Turk), online experiments are not only cost and time effective but also allow 
testing of the same designs on a country or global scale and across representative samples. Since 
tax cultures, and thus incentives, may differ depending on the region (see, for instance, the 
typology of the tax systems of the OECD countries proposed by Wagschal, 2015), such studies 
not only offer a very detailed overview at the country level but also extend and compare these 
findings to those of other cultures and countries.
Behavioural philanthropy proposes to generate novel theoretical models that are capable of 
providing mechanistic explanations of philanthropic behaviour by relying on evidence gathered 
in controlled experiments at the individual and group levels. Obtaining such evidence can be 
instrumental in forming policies and best practices for philanthropic actors. In the context of 
this book, it is important to stress the relevance of this approach by providing solid evidence 
regarding data-driven incentive schemes.
The challenge for behavioural philanthropy is to elaborate on existing economic models 
to deliver psychological realism that does not depend only on specific cases. We propose that 
combining the cognitive psychology studies on individual motivations for philanthropy and 
matching these insights with well-defined theories and methodologies of behavioural eco-
nomics will allow a better understanding of the mechanisms that drive human (charitable) 
behaviour. To provide reliable evidence capable of informing policymaking and supporting 
other practical applications, we must carefully design research that ensures that behavioural 
philanthropy: 1) addresses socially and ecologically valid questions, 2) uses appropriate meth-
ods to answer these questions, and 3) develops theories that are well defined and supported 
by computational models that can predict philanthropic behaviour at both the micro and 
macro levels.
2 Literature review: identifying the motives of giving through 
psychology and economics
Understanding motives is crucial for solving one of the economic puzzles that philanthropy 
poses, namely why self-interested agents work hard to give away their earnings (apparently) 
unselfishly. In the following discussion, we analyse some of the most common motives that 
drive philanthropy as identified by researchers.
Personal material benefits – spillover effects
To address the donor’s puzzle (see previously), the micro-donor-centric utility-based 
approach proposes that one of the crucial motives for philanthropy is that it provides ben-
efits for both the recipients and the donors (Becker, 1974). In this spirit, early economic 
theories have proposed that philanthropy is not unselfish and that self-interested agents 
might give because they will benefit from these donations (for review, see Andreoni, 2006). 
For example, donating to medical research (for example, in COVID-19 times) may help 
donors benefit from the findings (i.e., vaccines) in the future. A second example is illus-
trated by so-called enlightened self-interest, which suggests that individuals may give to 




Personal psychological benefits – self-image effects
While the personal spillover effects of charitable giving reconcile the apparent dissonance 
between self-interest and philanthropy, this motive fails to explain why individuals engage in 
philanthropic activities even when it is extremely unlikely that they might experience any ben-
efits. For instance, why would individuals donate to relieve poverty on another continent, or 
why do people decide on charitable bequests (after their death)? In both of these scenarios, the 
individual has little to no chance of directly generating any personal benefit.
An alternative explanation is that donors do not derive a direct (or indirect) economic utility 
from giving but rather a psychological one: people feel good when they do good. This view has 
been referred to as ‘warm-glow’ giving, in which a donor gets an emotional reward by giving 
to others (Andreoni, 1990). This perspective has been supported by several empirical findings 
(Ottoni-Wilhelm, Vesterlund and Xie, 2014). Moreover, self-image theories use a dual self-
approach to account for self-image as a motivation (Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009). As such, 
the dual self serves as an observer of one’s own actions and provides signals about one’s own 
identity (Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) 
suggested that people try to find a balance between two motivational forces (i.e., cheating and 
getting higher material payoffs and maintaining the self-image of being honest).
Long-term strategic benefits – social signalling
A large body of evidence demonstrates that one can use philanthropic giving as a strategy to 
promote or signal one’s social image. For instance, previous studies found that public recogni-
tion increases not only volunteer work (Linardi and McConnell, 2011) and effort in charitable 
fundraising (Ariely, Bracha and Meier, 2009) but also the willingness to donate blood (Lacetera 
and Macis, 2010), as well as the likelihood that people will respond to fundraising appeals (Kar-
lan and McConnell, 2014). Strategic motives for philanthropy have been captured by two main 
theoretical models that speculate that such motives are observed either because donors want 
to signal their altruism to others and receive social image benefits (i.e., ‘I am generous’) (Har-
baugh, 1998a; Harbaugh, 1998b; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004) or because 
donors want to encourage others to give through social influence (i.e., ‘follow my lead’) (List 
and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Shang and Croson, 2009; Bracha, Menietti and Vesterlund, 2011).
Intrinsic and extrinsic motives
Intrinsic moral motivation is another dominant driver of philanthropy. While it can be hard 
to directly assess the relevance of moral motives in promoting giving due to experimental 
demand effects, it is possible to quantify its relevance by measuring ‘moral crowding-out’, 
that is, the observed detrimental effects of adding extrinsic material incentives to stimulate a 
given behaviour (e.g., donating to charity, voting, etc.), which is motivated by intrinsic moral 
motives. Such effects have been documented in several studies that have demonstrated the eco-
nomic inefficiency of extrinsic incentives on intrinsically motivated behaviour (for a review, see 
Promberger and Marteau, 2013). In 1970, Titmuss hypothesised that paying for blood dona-
tion would undermine the social utility of the intrinsic motivation of the act and have nega-
tive consequences on blood donations. Accordingly, a meta-analysis (Niza, Tung and Marteau, 
2013) of Titmuss’ hypotheses suggested that economic incentives are inefficient in the blood 
donation context. Similarly, Venkataramani et al. (2012) found that tax incentives do not boost 
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organ donation. In the charitable giving context, Nelson et al. (2006) implemented egoistic 
(emphasising that donated money will benefit oneself as well as helping others) and altruistic 
(emphasising that donated money will benefit others in need) ads and found that altruistic ads 
were preferred by people whose charitable behaviour was motivated by intrinsic factors.
Despite these findings, it is still unclear how extrinsic incentives influence philanthropy. 
For instance, Falk and Zehnder (2013) found that the impact of gifts on possible donors influ-
enced the frequency and amount donated in different directions. Compared to the no-gift 
condition, in which the relative frequency of donations was 12%, small gifts (one postcard 
with one envelope) increased the frequency of donations by 2% points (to 14%), and large 
gifts (four postcards with four envelopes) increased the frequency by 9% (to 21%). While these 
frequency differences were significant, the net donations were significantly lower between 
the no-gift and the large-gift conditions but not between the no-gift and small-gift condi-
tions and between the small- and large-gift conditions. Interestingly, while only suggestive, 
those receiving no gift were more likely to donate large amounts (>200 CHF), whereas those 
receiving large gifts were more likely to donate smaller amounts. Furthermore, another study 
looked at how financial incentives in the form of tax-matching or tax-rebate schemes can 
impact individuals’ donations to charitable giving. Here, it was shown that in a dictator game 
setting (see Section 3 and Forsythe et al., 1994), matching schemes had a stronger effect on 
incentivising donations as compared to the effect of rebate schemes (Peng and Liu, 2020). 
Finally, additional studies that have investigated the role of gifts in charitable donations found 
mixed results ranging from no effect in an online fundraising campaign offering products 
(Chen, Li and MacKie-Mason, 2006) to a negative effect on the amount contributed by 
donors to a natural park in Costa Rica (Alpizar, Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008). 
Such mixed evidence regarding the effect of incentives on charitable giving calls for future 
meta-analysis and replication studies.
Social norms, rules, and mimesis
Social norm theory in sociology (Schwartz, 1977) suggests that the likelihood that individu-
als will adopt charitable giving depends on whether such behaviour is approved, shared, and 
expected by the group or society and is considered a social norm. Social norms can be explicitly 
written in the teachings of many religions globally with a common consequence; that is, to 
give purely altruistically is the true essence of giving, as expressed in the Jewish Torah and the 
teachings of the Quran. The role of social norms in stimulating philanthropic behaviour has 
been established in existing studies that demonstrated that when participants are explicitly told 
that the social norm is to contribute to charity, the likelihood of their donating money increased 
(Agerström et al., 2016).
Modulators of individual motivations
The previous paragraphs provide an overview of some of the economic, psychological, and 
societal motives for charitable giving. Such motives are not important solely from the perspec-
tive of theoretical works (Bonar, 1926) but also because they provide a solid basis for designing 
experimental paradigms that can test predictions in a laboratory setting. For example, one could 
design an experiment to understand how the source (e.g., gifted vs. earned) of one’s wealth 
may modulate the impact of self-image motivation and warm glow on one’s decision to give. 
In this vein, a previous study (Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis, 2011) investigated whether 
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participants’ earnings were the result of effort or obtained through effort and luck. The results 
revealed that participants with the highest wealth were less likely to contribute to wealth redis-
tribution among their social group’s peers, irrespective of whether their wealth was obtained by 
exerting higher effort or due to effort and luck. Thus, these results demonstrate that the source 
of one’s wealth does not seem to impact one’s decision to give back to society. In the context 
of philanthropy, based on these findings, a theoretical model has been proposed (Mayo and 
Tinsley, 2009) which states that a similar behavioural pattern would be observed in the context 
of charitable giving; that is, perceptions of effort and luck as the cause of reward distribution 
would systematically reduce the warm glow giving of higher-earnings households and thus lead 
to lower contributions to charity by wealthier individuals.
Other possible modulators of individual motivations could be the perceived effectiveness 
of a philanthropic organisation or individual preferences for a given charity. In other words, 
are people more strongly motivated to give to charities that maximise impact and produce the 
greatest welfare gains? Or are more efficient philanthropic organisations the most popular ones? 
While normative economics models of charitable giving suggest that individuals should be 
motivated to give to charities that maximise welfare, descriptive accounts show that individuals 
often do not maximise the outcomes of their donations (Berman et al., 2018); however, they are 
more sensitive to efficacy when helping themselves or their families (Burum, Nowak and Hoff-
man, 2020). Therefore, lab studies could investigate and disclose whether and how individual 
preferences for charities and charity efficacy impact intrinsic moral motivation and therefore 
charitable giving.
To conclude, as the previous examples illustrate, there is a strong need for novel data 
that are capable of isolating the different factors that modulate individual motivations and 
informing computational models of individual philanthropic behaviour. To obtain this data, 
behavioural philanthropy proposes using methods from behavioural economics and game 
theory to investigate philanthropic decision-making with experimental games in controlled 
lab settings.
3 Testing models of individual charitable giving: behavioural/
experimental game theory and social preferences
Behavioural game theory has developed experimental games, wherein: 1) the decisions of the 
player can impact other individuals’ payoffs, and/or 2) the player’s payoff may not only depend 
on their own decisions but also on the decisions of others. By altering the payoff rules of differ-
ent parties, such games can be used to reproduce the elementary tensions that govern decision-
making in social contexts and therefore constitute the most convenient experimental tools to 
investigate individual motives in social contexts (Camerer, 2003).
The main goal of this section is to introduce behavioural game theory as a powerful and 
flexible framework for behavioural philanthropic research on charitable decision-making. First, 
we present two of the most pertinent games for the studies of philanthropy, namely the dicta-
tor game, which is the one most widely used games in the study of social preferences such as 
altruism and inequity aversion, among others (Vesterlund, 2016), and the public good game, 
which, although widely studied in the economics of cooperation (Fischbacher, Gächter and 
Fehr, 2001), is overlooked in charitable giving research. Following this, we highlight three 
major advantages of using these games for investigating charitable decision-making; that is, they 
measure actual behaviour and are properly incentivised, allow researchers to infer causality, and 
are highly generalisable and comparable.
Bernardic et al.
362
Economic games to model charitable decision-making
Dictator game
The dictator game is one of the simplest games and a useful tool for investigating generosity and 
altruistic motives (Forsythe et al., 1994). It features two players: the dictator and the recipient. 
The dictator is endowed with an amount of money and asked to divide this endowment with 
the recipient. The recipients’ role is entirely passive, since they can neither send some of the 
transferred money back (as in the trust game) nor reject the offer (as in the ultimatum game). 
For example, if the dictator is endowed with 10 dollars (E) and decides to allocate 2 dollars (x) 
to the recipient, the dictator receives 8 dollars (E – x), and the recipient receives 2 dollars (x). As 
such, the dictator game measures how much dictators give under experimentally manipulated 
conditions to mimic giving in charitable settings. The more money the dictators transfer, the 
more prosocial they are toward the recipient.
Rational choice theory predicts that the dictator will act solely out of self-interest, maximise 
his payoffs by keeping the largest amount possible, and thus give nothing (zero) to the recipient. 
However, empirical studies have reported that giving behaviour in a dictator game is consist-
ently and significantly larger than zero. A recent meta-analysis reported that, on average, dicta-
tors gave 28.35%, while the distribution of means was left skewed; 36.11% of all participants 
gave nothing, 16.74% gave 50% (equal split), and as many as 5.44% of all participants gave 100% 
of their endowment to the recipient (Engel, 2011).
However, the classic setup features another (anonymous) participant as the recipient (e.g., 
Forsythe et al., 1994), and later studies looked at transfers to recipients outside the laboratory, 
such as Hurricane Katrina victims (e.g., Fong and Luttmer, 2009) or let an existing non-profit 
replace the role of the recipient (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2006b) and found contrasting results. 
Although changing the recipient does change the giving amounts, the theoretical predictions 
(everyone behaves self-interestedly and gives nothing) are never met, and most participants 
decide to give in laboratory as well as non-laboratory settings.
Public good game
While the dictator game focuses on binary interactions (one person deciding to give to another 
person, entity, or charity), the public good game was designed to investigate decision-making 
within group dynamics.
Participants in the public good game are first paired in groups and are each given an amount 
of money that they can individually allocate between a personal account and a public com-
mon pool. The money in an individual account benefits only the individual; the money in the 
public pool benefits the entire group and is typically also increased by the experimenters, as it 
is multiplied by a predefined rate. Importantly, group benefits are equally distributed across all 
individual members regardless of whether they contribute to the public good. The design of 
public and private earnings is set to mimic everyday situations/dilemmas of public goods (i.e., 
contributing to public transport, health insurance, and public education). In particular, on the 
one hand, the entire group earns the highest profit when all members contribute all of their 
resources to a public good (for a review, see Menietti et al., 2018). On the other hand, free rid-
ers can increase their payoff by contributing nothing and still benefit from the common pool 
(see Figure 20.4, a player in red). Such behaviour (as in real life) creates a socially inefficient 
situation and is called the free-rider problem.
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Empirically, contributions in the public good game typically start off around 50% of endow-
ments and then decrease with repetition but remain substantial even when participants have had 
time to gain experience in the game (see, e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Croson, 
2007, 2008; Holt and Laury, 2008 for reviews). Such contributions can be seen as evidence that 
individuals are concerned about others’ welfare. Thus, by manipulating the incentives to give, 
we can determine how certain parameters and mechanisms influence contributions to others. 
For example, the introduction of an altruistic punishment option, in which individuals can 
punish free riders (who do not contribute to the common good), increases public cooperation. 
Interestingly, such punishments work even when they are costly for individuals who decide 
to punish, and there is some evidence that negative emotions toward defectors influence such 
altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). This has been supported by a neuroscientific 
study by Strobel et  al. (2011), who found that reward-related regions of the brain (nucleus 
accumbens) showed punishment-related activation.
In this context, studies in different disciplines (including law, management, economics, and 
public policy) have revealed that beliefs, feelings, and behaviours of people within groups influ-
ence individual decisions regarding cooperation and promotion of the group good over the 
selfish benefit. As such, the public good game captures how the incentive to behave selfishly 
affects the interaction between potential donors and groups.
Advantages of economic games
Accurately measuring behaviours
One of the main strengths of economic games is that they allow researchers to observe and 
assess actual behaviours. Such games connect the strategic decisions of multiple individuals to 
group-level outcomes through precisely defined mechanisms. In contrast, much of the research 
Figure 20.4  (Colour online):5 Overview of the two economic games’ settings for studying charitable 
decision making: Dictator game (upper part) and public good game (lower part)
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in law and social science has conducted surveys aimed at eliciting self-reports of behaviour and 
participant perceptions. Such self-reports and perceptions can be biased, especially when self-
serving, social desirability, and self-deception biases come into play (Lee and Sargeant, 2011). 
The decision-making context in economic games is monetarily incentivised to increase value 
and create real stakes and dilemmas (between personal gains and cooperation) that will motivate 
individuals to reveal their true behaviour and mimic real-life situations. Although economic 
games are simplified and cannot include all factors from complex real-life settings, they never-
theless provide a setting that is more comparable to a real-life scenario as compared to hypo-
thetical survey scenarios.
Inferring causality
An important element of any theory is the understanding and description of causal relation-
ships (Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2019). Such insights are also important for practitioners and 
organisations that develop interventions based on theories and experimental findings. One of 
the biggest problems of field research is that it usually has an endogeneity problem, which refers 
to a scenario in which unmeasured or omitted variables could explain the resulting correlation. 
In contrast, participants in economic games are usually randomly assigned to different condi-
tions and experimentally controlled to rule out alternative explanations. Such settings allow 
experimental manipulations to be imposed, thus providing mechanistic (i.e., causal) explana-
tions of how people decide.
Adaptability, comparability, and replicability
Economic games provide great flexibility, and their baseline designs are usually simple and 
adaptable to the specific research questions that mirror situations in which people have to 
decide whether they would trust, cooperate, free ride, or be fair. While survey questionnaires 
are usually greatly varied, economic games have standard designs, and their richness and com-
plexity can be modified as required. Economic games, therefore, provide an opportunity to 
achieve adaptability, comparability (to other studies), and replicability (of findings and their 
generalisability).
Economic games and behavioural philanthropy
A general framework
To further explore the different factors that influence charitable giving, we believe that both 
the dictator game and public good game can offer a clear and well-controlled setup for analys-
ing charitable decision-making. By randomising experimental treatments, providing a baseline 
condition, and testing representative samples, such studies will provide implications more clearly 
and quickly and avoid the endogeneity issues in field experiments.
As in all economic games, there is no deception involved, and participants know that they 
receive real incentives and the money will go to the selected charity. This not only provides 
insights into personal preferences in which people’s self-interest competes with self-image but 
also allows us to test the efficiency of different motivations that mirror decisions in real settings 
(such as tax incentives, warm-glow giving, social signalling, etc.). Furthermore, since public 
good games entail group interactions, this facilitates the study of the influence of social factors 
such as norms, social comparisons, and social signalling on individual and group behaviour.
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Toward a more ecological framework
Although such games mirror everyday dilemmas, we believe that further improvements to pro-
vide an even more ecologically valid framework are possible. In the following paragraphs, we 
discuss some fundamental adaptations and manipulations that can increase the relevance of pub-
lic good games as the tool of choice to investigate individual motives for philanthropy.
First, a common practice in dictator and public good games is to provide participants with 
endowments that serve as their capital and participants use such ‘free’ endowment when mak-
ing decisions. There has been empirical evidence suggesting that such ‘given’ money, so-called 
house money, might be treated differently, and people take more risks when playing with it as 
compared to using their regular income (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). To avoid such distortion, a 
simple addition to economic games might be a working task in which participants earn money 
before playing economic games. Then, we will be able to provide insights into how varying 
sources of money (e.g., whether higher rewards are earned by luck or effort) impact decision 
making and how individual decisions are influenced by the nature of the money (i.e., free 
endowment vs. earned income) (Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis, 2011; Tonin and Vlasso-
poulos, 2017). Moreover, manipulating the level of effort can enable us to test how warm-glow 
motivation plays a role in giving, investigate the meritocratic aspects of giving (Mayo and Tins-
ley, 2009), and reveal how income inequality impacts giving behaviour (Gee, Migueis and Parsa, 
2017). Importantly, these endowments should not be confused with the incentive schemes that 
are characteristic of public good games, which entail growing public wealth by multiplying the 
individual contributions of individuals to the public good by a pre-determined factor. These 
incentives are ecologically sound, as they mimic existing schemes, such as tax rebates or match-
ing, that governments frequently decide to implement to stimulate private investments in a 
given area such as philanthropy.
Second, manipulating the participants’ level of information in public good games can explain 
the role of subjective and objective social comparisons in giving. We believe that studies should 
also look into whether behaviour in games is generalisable with respect to real-life behaviour, 
for example, by combining experimental data with reports on real donations.
4 Behavioural philanthropy and tax incentives
In this section, we illustrate how the behavioural approach to philanthropic giving can help 
address important practical questions. Accordingly, we focus on individual reactions to tax sub-
sidies. To incentivise more individuals to donate and greater amounts of donations, many coun-
tries have implemented subsidies as tax deductions, tax credits, allocation, or matching schemes. 
Identifying the best subsidy mechanism and understanding how it is perceived by individual 
taxpayers is fundamental to promoting charitable giving.
Incentives for charitable giving: rebate and match subsidy
Most empirical studies have investigated subsidies such as rebate or match subsidies. In a tax 
rebate subsidy, a fraction of the donor’s contribution is refunded by a government and/or third 
party, while the charity still receives the entire amount donated. Alternatively, the match sub-
sidy supplements the donated money; both the individual’s contribution as well as a matching 
payment by the government and/or third-party subsidy are given to the charity. Theoretically, 
the rebate (r) and match subsidy (m) predict identical effects on individuals’ net donations: 
m =  r/(1 – r), and the total amount a charity receives should be the same regardless of the 
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subsidy type. For example, a 1 (donor contribution):1 (government contribution) matching 
scheme should be equivalent to a 50% rebate subsidy: when a 50% tax rebate (subsidy) is 
applied, an individual donor contributes 1 dollar, and the government refunds 50% of the dona-
tion (0.5 dollars) to the donor; thus, the charity receives 1 dollar, and the cost of donation for 
a donor is 0.5 dollars. When a 100% match subsidy is applied and an individual donor contrib-
utes 0.5 dollars, the government also donates 0.5 dollars; thus, the charity receives 1 dollar, and 
the cost of donation for a donor is 0.5 dollars, which is expressed by the following equation: 
1 = 0.5 / (1 – 0.5). Similarly, a 2:1 matching scheme is equivalent to a 33% rebate, and a 4:1 
matching scheme is equivalent to a 20% rebate.
Empirical studies: matching subsidy stimulates more giving to charities 
than rebate subsidy
Strikingly, despite the mathematical equivalence between the two subsidy mechanisms, both 
laboratory-and field-based empirical studies have repeatedly observed that match subsidies raise 
more money for charities as compared to rebates that are equally costly for the donor.
Eckel and Grossman (2003) conducted the first lab study to investigate whether charitable 
decisions are the same under equivalent match (100%, 33%, or 25% match) and rebate subsi-
dies (50%, 25%, or 20% rebate). Employing a modified dictator game, participants (n = 181, 
students from the University of Texas) were asked to divide different amounts of endowments 
(40, 60, 75, or 100 tokens; each token value $0.10) between themselves and a charity of their 
choice. The findings showed that under the match subsidy condition, charity received 1.2 to 2 
times more money than that of the rebate subsidy. Several experimental studies have replicated 
the finding that matching subsidies lead to higher charity receipts and larger price elasticity as 
compared to rebate subsidies (see Table 20.1). Moreover, findings from laboratory experiments 
were replicated in field studies; however, although the difference between the rebate and match 
subsidy in total charity receipts was significant, it was smaller than that of the findings reported 
in laboratory studies (see Eckel and Grossman, 2008, 2017; Bekkers, 2015).
Several previous studies have examined the impact of different rates under matching and 
rebate conditions (see a summary of the existing studies in Table 20.1). Karlan and List (2007) 
conducted a natural field experiment to investigate how different match ratios (donation: match 
of $3:$1, $2:$1, $1:$1) impacted revenue per solicitation and response rate. Contrary to intui-
tion and standard economic theory predictions, higher match ratios ($3:$1, $2:$1) did not have 
a different impact on donations as compared to that of smaller match ratios ($1:$1). Moreover, 
this study also found that match subsidy increased both the likelihood of contributions (by 22%) 
and the amount given (by 19%) as compared to the no-subsidy condition. However, the effect 
of match subsidy relative to the control treatment could not be confirmed in a follow-up study 
(Karlan, List and Shafir, 2011). Therefore, future laboratory and field experiments are needed 
to establish how effective match and rebate subsidies are relative to the control treatment (i.e., 
the no-subsidy condition).
From both the non-profit and government perspectives, it is important not only to provide 
clear and replicable evidence on how effective specific subsidies are but also to examine the 
long-term consequences of implementing different subsidies. In other words, does more giv-
ing in match conditions result in less giving in the future? Meier (2007) conducted the first 
field experiment on student tuition among students at the University of Zurich. While the 
randomly assigned matching mechanism increased contributions at the start, once the matching 
subsidy stopped, the contribution rate declined. Furthermore, this decline was strong enough 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A large national study in the Netherlands (Bekkers, 2015) found that nine months after the 
matching campaign, there was no difference in contributions between individuals whose dona-
tions were matched and those whose donations were not matched. In contrast, other studies 
(Karlan, List and Shafir, 2011; Kesternich, Löschel and Römer, 2016) found a positive increase 
in contributions after the experiment but only in the specific condition of a 1:1 match subsidy. 
Overall, these findings report very mixed results of subsidies in the long term, and future lon-
gitudinal studies are needed to better address the factors that might explain these inconsistent 
results.
While previous studies established that match subsidies increase charity receipts, recently, 
Peng and Liu (2020) explored whether match subsidies increased individual net donations. 
Moreover, given the large amount (about 2% of GDP) donated annually in the United States, 
another important aspect is the amount donated by government or third-party donors under 
subsidies such as match or rebate. To provide evidence on these two important questions, fur-
ther studies that compare match, rebate, and control (no subsidy) conditions and highlight not 
only the charity receipts but also net donations and cost for government and/or a third party 
who subsidises the donations are required. Therefore, the verdict for the most optimal dona-
tion design, which accounts for the costs and benefits of different subsidies, is still ongoing, and 
more research that implements representative samples and avoids using house money is needed.
Speculations on what drives the different behavioural outcomes
There have been some speculations and explanations from cognitive psychology regarding why 
theoretically similar match and rebate conditions would provide different behavioural out-
comes. One of the first factors investigated was the role of confusion. In Davis, Millner, and 
Reilly’s (2005) third experiment (referred to as full information treatment), a table on how 
much participants would earn and how much the charity would receive was included when 
participants made decisions. While this extra information moved the rates of match and rebate 
subsidies closer together, the charity receipts were still higher under the match subsidy than 
under the rebate subsidy. A recent study (Peng, 2020) followed up on this finding and reported 
a correlation between the money donated under the two different subsidies and the cognitive 
reflection task (CRT), which is a measure of cognitive abilities. While people with high and 
low CRT both gave significantly higher donations under the match subsidy condition, partici-
pants with higher cognitive ability are more likely to attain theoretical equivalence. Since rebate 
subsidies are even more complex to calculate and estimate in real life, future studies should 
address whether and how attention, complexity, and confusion play a role in the effectiveness 
of different tax incentives.
Davis and Millner (2005) argued that part of the effect might be attributed to rebate aver-
sion, since participants might have more real-life experiences with rebate subsidies than with 
match subsidies. For example, in real life, rebates usually come with cost uncertainty. Such 
uncertainty depends on both the donor (i.e., time cost and additional effort or errors, or they 
might forget filling and mailing the form) and external, non-donor mistakes (i.e., the letter can 
be lost, errors can occur) regarding filling and mailing the forms. Comparing this to a typically 
immediate match subsidy, it might be that people are just rebate averse. To test this, Eckel and 
Grossman (2006a) asked participants to freely decide between the two subsidies before they 
were asked to contribute to the selected incentive. They predicted that if participants were 
rebate averse, more participants would decide to implement a match subsidy. Interestingly, more 
people decided on a rebate than a match subsidy, although this difference was not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the donations from participants who selected the matching subsidy 
Behavioural philanthropy
371
were twice the amount of donations from participants who selected the rebate subsidy. Another 
possible explanation could be that the different responses were due to an isolation effect (Davis, 
2006), suggesting that participants focus on the variable they have under their control (i.e., 
money transfer), and net donations will be the same between rebate and match, which in turn 
implies that total contributions under the match exceed those under the rebate by precisely the 
magnitude of the match.
Lukas, Grossman and Eckel (2010) focused on the problem that the choice set under the 
rebate is smaller than under the match condition; that is, a participant in the rebate condition 
can never contribute everything. To minimise this effect, the authors allowed participants to 
borrow against future rebates to mirror possible contributions under the match. Additionally, 
they included the payoff table, yet the difference between the match and rebate conditions 
remained. Finally, although proposed in the first study by Eckel and Grossman (2003), to the 
best of our knowledge, no study has addressed whether different results are due to the differ-
ences in cooperative framing and reference groups. While the rebate subsidy is cast in a reward 
frame, the match subsidy might be perceived as a cooperation frame, and the experimenter 
can be seen as a reference group. Accordingly, it is plausible that rebate incentives may hurt an 
individual’s intrinsic motivation to give.
To address these unanswered questions, we have developed a novel paradigm in an ongo-
ing research project that asks participants to make donations in a public good game setting and 
allows us to manipulate whether donations are incentivised by matching or rebate schemes or in 
the absence of incentives. Our preliminary results revealed that in this social context, the match-
ing scheme was the only one that effectively increased net donations to charities as compared 
to no incentives and rebate-type incentives. Importantly, we found no difference between the 
donations given by participants in the group incentivised through this scheme and those that 
had no incentive at all. This suggests that rebate schemes may be inefficient to promote philan-
thropy, as they cost the state a loss in tax revenues and do not achieve the objective of increasing 
the revenue of philanthropic organisations (see Figure 20.5).
5 Open questions and future research directions
We believe that behavioural philanthropy can make fundamental contributions to the under-
standing of why people engage in philanthropy and devise ways to increase the willingness of 
people to participate in the endeavour of promoting human wellbeing. Insights from this new 
field of research, combined with knowledge from other micro- and macro-level approaches to 
philanthropy, have the potential to deliver better-rounded evidence to support the design of 
effective tax policies and institutional practices aimed at promoting philanthropy. As can be seen 
in this chapter, recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of attempts to address 
the question of what motivates people to donate and how to boost this donation behaviour. 
However, much of this research regarding different factors that impact charitable giving has 
been largely correlational, leaving an open question of how different factors influence donation 
decision-making.
One of the most direct ways of stimulating giving among individual donors is to decrease 
the monetary cost of donating (for instance, through tax subsidies). While such a direct way of 
incentivisation decreases the cost of individual donors, it also increases the cost of government 
and/or third parties. To maximise public good, the ‘most optimal’ donation design (Haruvy 
et al., 2020) that produces the highest donor contributions at the lowest cost to the governments 
or third parties must be found (O.E.C.D., 2020). The first step in providing such applications 
for a behaviourally informed policy is to define which subsidies work, whether donors are price 
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sensitive, and how donors respond to different frames of reduction in the cost of a donation. 
Since large amounts of money are involved in fundraising campaigns, such questions are not 
only important for the benefits of non-profit organisations but also have key implications for 
policymakers and overall public good maximisation.
While many studies have focused on monetary incentives that boost charitable giving, such 
as rebates and matches, recent neuroscientific studies have shown that altruism can also be 
mediated by mindfulness (Iwamoto et al., 2020). In particular, subjects who were in meditation 
treatment donated 2.61 times higher than the control. Such findings call for more research on 
how stress and emotional regulation impact social preferences and charitable giving.
Overall, field studies on the long-term effects of matching subsidies have reported mixed 
results, from no effect to positive and negative effects. We believe that laboratory studies, which 
are not only cheaper and faster to conduct but can also better control for heterogeneity of set-
tings and samples, might be useful in the future to provide insights into what drives the differ-
ences. Once the behaviour in the laboratory is well understood, we believe field experiments 
could test whether such long-term findings are replicated in the representative samples and 
real-life behaviour.
While the experiments using match and rebate subsidies that were reviewed in this chapter 
treated taxes and donations as private ways of creating public value, economic literature (Slavov, 
2014) seems to agree that taxes are public, while donations are a private way of creating public 
Figure 20.5  (Colour online):6 Preliminary results on the effect of taxation subsidies on charity dona-
tions. Match subsidy significantly increases charity donations as compared to both rebate and 
no-subsidy schemes. Interestingly, the rebate scheme does not increase charity donations as 




and social welfare. Therefore, laboratory studies that mirror the effects of tax reductions regard-
ing different public or private ways of creating public value are needed.
As mentioned previously, we must stress that most studies (with the exception of Peng and 
Liu, 2020) have used WEIRD societies for their study samples, which has compounded the rep-
lication problem discussed in this chapter (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan, 2010). To provide 
conclusions on a more general understanding of human behaviour, future studies should focus 
on cross-cultural samples and investigate how different donation behaviours are similar or vary 
across different countries and cultures.
Constructing theories of a more general understanding of human behaviour, linked between 
economics, psychology, and neuroscience, provides opportunities to address long-standing ques-
tions. By providing such theories, we will not only develop clear predictions through the use 
of formal modelling and set theoretical expectations but also determine whether novel findings 
are confirmatory or surprising and thus whether they require future replication and scrutiny. We 
hope to see behavioural philanthropy flourishing by addressing socially relevant and empirical 
studies with strong empirical methods that can answer these questions and provide models and 
evidence that predict charitable donations within and without the laboratory setting. We hope 
such practices will provide evidence on current mechanisms and build new ways ‘to get the 
basket under the apple tree’.
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Cross-border payments for philanthropic purposes raise various legal and notably tax concerns. 
Indeed, domestic laws of the states involved may characterize these payments in various ways 
and could apply different or even conflicting tax rules. In addition to the exception of the 
jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice (EUCJ), which has introduced limits to the potential 
restrictions or discriminations caused by domestic taxation rules of EU Member States, taxation 
rules applicable to non-profit organizations are not coordinated. As a consequence, as we will 
demonstrate further, the risks of multiple or even contradictory taxation consequences of cross-
border philanthropic payments could hinder their development and contradict their purposes, 
which, in essence, are not for profit.
In general, we can summarize the typical domestic tax problems as follows. First, often, states 
will treat resident and non-resident philanthropic entities differently. As a consequence, fre-
quently, payments for philanthropic purposes in favor of a charitable entity sited abroad will not 
be allowed as a deduction in the payer’s country. Conversely, the country of the recipient entity 
may also subject payments from foreign sources to profit (or income) tax. Second, resident 
philanthropic organizations often bear the burden of taxes levied in the source state, typically in 
a form of a withholding tax, on income received (dividends, interests, royalties and sometimes 
pensions). Third, the rules of inheritance and gift taxes are usually very different from one state 
to another. It follows that cross-border charitable inheritances or gifts may potentially be subject 
to heavy gift or inheritance taxes either in the residence country of the donor (or the deceased 
person), in the country of the beneficiary or even, in some cases, in the country of situs of spe-
cific assets (typically real estate or art collections).
This chapter will therefore try to analyze the extent to which the application of double 
taxation conventions (DTCs) could solve or at least alleviate the potential tax burden on cross-
border philanthropic payments. To that aim, after a brief overview of the main domestic rules 
of some states in this area (hereafter II.), we will summarize the interesting jurisprudence of 
the EUCJ, which has developed a rather favorable tax perspective for cross-border charitable 
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giving, including for non-EU third countries (hereafter III.). Finally, we will show how existing 
DTCs, or some new provisions of those legal instruments, may serve as tools to avoid excessive 
tax burden on cross-border philanthropic payments, alleviate potential double taxation or even 
create an incentive in favor of transnational charitable giving (hereafter IV.).
II Overview of the main domestic tax problems
A Direct taxes
1 Introduction
Without going into the details of the various domestic tax rules on cross-border payments, we 
will summarize the traditional tax issues that could arise in a typical cross-border transaction 
involving a donor (or a deceased person), a philanthropic entity, and beneficiaries, all sited in 
different states.1 For the purpose of our analysis, we will focus on philanthropic entities, namely 
legal structures (typically an association or a foundation) with a non-for-profit purpose.2 In this 
context, a first distinction should be drawn between the position of the beneficiary and the donor.
2 The philanthropic entity as beneficiary
In general, the entity beneficiary of the payments, will be a foundation, an association or a trust3. 
In most countries, foundations or associations, as legal persons, will be subject to domestic 
profit tax. To the extent they benefit from an exemption based on their philanthropic purpose, 
these entities would however usually not be subject to profit tax4. In general, this exemption 
should apply both for domestic and international payments, but the state of residence of the 
entity could apply different domestic rules based on the place of residence of the donor. In 
particular, it may be more difficult for the host state of the charitable entity to ascertain that a 
payment from abroad qualifies as a gift, that is, as a payment without any counterpart expected 
from the donee.
In addition, the conditions of a tax-exempt status are quite different between states and are 
governed by domestic law rules. For example, under Swiss law, foundations or associations 
which pursue charitable goals, characterized more generally as “public utility purpose” (“but 
d’utilité publique”), are exempted from profit and capital tax on payments exclusively and irrev-
ocably affected to the charitable goals.5 The concept of a public utility purpose corresponds to 
an altruistic activity, which serves the public good exclusively and directly.6 Philanthropic enti-
ties should pursue a goal that benefits the collectivity as a whole and reach that objective based 
on disinterested sacrifices from their members.7 In practice, tax exemption is granted by the 
competent tax authority under four cumulative conditions:8 (i) the pursuit of a goal of general 
interest; (ii) the members, and notably board members, should follow a disinterested purpose; 
(iii) the philanthropic activity should be effectively pursued; (iv) the funds are irrevocably attrib-
uted to such activity. In practice, qualifying philanthropic activities are usually regarded as meet-
ing the public utility test, namely a charitable, humanitarian, sanitary, ecological, educational, 
scientific or cultural purpose. The circle of beneficiaries should be opened and undetermined. 
However, the place of the activity is not relevant. Both domestic or foreign activities are eligible, 
to the extent that they meet the four conditions mentioned previously. In addition, once the 
conditions are met, a tax-exempt entity is not taxable on all payments received, notwithstand-
ing their source. As a consequence, charitable payments stemming from Switzerland or abroad, 
including for gifts or inheritance purposes, will not be subject to profit tax. In other words, 
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from the perspective of the beneficiary entity, Swiss domestic tax law does not make any differ-
ence between local- or foreign-source payments.
In the United States, in order to obtain a tax-exempt status, the qualifying organization 
must apply for recognition of the exemption and has to fulfill several requirements, notably to 
be organized and operated exclusively for the philanthropic purposes mentioned in the law.9
3 Tax position of the donor or payer
The situation is quite different from the perspective of the payer who makes a payment or a gift 
to a non-resident philanthropic entity. In most states, subject, however, to specific limits, the 
payer may deduct charitable payments to a tax-exempt entity resident in that state from income 
tax.10 For example, under Swiss law, charitable gifts in favor of Swiss resident tax-exempt phil-
anthropic entities are deductible, but the scope of the deduction is limited to 20% of the net 
taxable income for federal purposes. This percentage varies from canton to canton, but in most 
cases, cantonal law applies the same limitation as federal law.
However, payments in favor of non-resident philanthropic entitles are either not deductible 
or subject to complex limitations.11 While some states, like Switzerland12 and Australia, tend in 
principle not to grant any deduction for cross-border gifts, other states, like the United States, 
have a more favorable policy, subject to strict conditions, notably that the gift must be made to 
a qualifying organization.13 Other states also allow for the deduction of cross-border charitable 
gifts but subject to specific requirements, such as, inter alia, the recognition of the foreign entity 
as a charitable entity following philanthropic purposes or some geographical limitations on the 
performance of the charitable activities.14 In France, gifts to foreign non-profit organizations are 
in principle not deductible, but the tax administration may allow such deductions to the extent 
there is a reciprocal regime between France and the state of the beneficiary.15
Some international networks, however, exist, usually of private law nature, such as Transna-
tional Giving Europe (TGE),16 which allows, under specific conditions, a deduction of domestic 
charitable payments, which are then transferred to non-resident beneficiaries. The deduction 
is subject to strict conditions, and a fee is levied by the intermediate entity in order to cover, 
notably, the administrative costs of the “cash pool charity.”17 There are other exceptions based 
on domestic law.
This uncoordinated approach may result in a non-deduction from payments to a non-resi-
dent charitable entity and, in rare cases, in an additional taxation in the country of the recipient 
entity. Such consequences are generally the result of an absence of recognition of the philan-
thropic status of a non-resident charitable entity by the state of residence of the donor. Indeed, 
the conditions of the tax-exempt status are closely related to domestic rules. States may have 
quite divergent views on which activities may “deserve” a tax-exempt status. In other words, a 
charitable activity may be regarded as a “public utility activity” in one country and non-philan-
thropic in another. As we will see, however, within the EU, discriminations between resident 
and non-resident comparable public entities have been challenged by the case law of the EUCJ 
(see infra III.). In addition, the compatibility of such differences of treatment with the principle 
of non-discrimination anchored in DTCs similar to the OECD Model DTCs still needs to be 
addressed (see infra IV.).
B Inheritance or gift tax
In this area, domestic tax rules are in general completely uncoordinated and highly dependent 
upon local peculiarities.18 In addition, even if an OECD Model of DTC for inheritance and gift 
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tax purposes has been drafted,19 there exist very few DTCs in this domain.20 In order to dem-
onstrate the potential disparities in the tax treatment of cross-border charitable inheritance or 
gifts, we may draw a distinction between the state of the payer and the state of the beneficiaries.
In most cases, countries will treat charitable payments to resident or non-resident beneficiary 
entities differently. In some countries, like Switzerland, we may even find different rules from 
one canton to the other. Indeed, under Swiss law, the ability to tax gifts or inheritances belong 
exclusively to the cantons.21 It could even occur that charitable gifts or inheritance in favor of 
entities sited in other cantons could not benefit from a tax exemption available in the canton 
of residence of the payer. A fortiori, gifts or inheritances from a resident in one canton in favor 
of philanthropic entities abroad would, in most cases, be subject to a cantonal gift or inheritance 
tax at the highest cantonal rates applicable to unrelated parties. There are a few rare exceptions. 
For example, under Geneva law, a total or partial exemption for gifts of inheritance in favor of 
legal entities abroad may be granted, upon request, by a decision of the Geneva government.22 
In practice, this decision is difficult to obtain. The canton of Basel-City also seems to grant an 
exemption for inheritance or gifts of public utility entities, independently from their place of 
residence.23 In addition, there are, under Swiss law, a limited number of intercantonal or inter-
national agreements based on the principle of reciprocity.24
Since the rules are completely uncoordinated, we could even be confronted with an addi-
tional gift or inheritance tax in the country of the recipient.
C Consequences
As a consequence, domestic law does not provide for appropriate solutions to the numerous tax 
obstacles of cross-border philanthropic payments. First, gifts paid in favor of nonresident phil-
anthropic entities may not benefit from any deduction. Second, in the state of the beneficiary, 
there is even a potential risk that such payment could be subject to income or profit tax. Third, 
cross-border gifts and inheritance will often be subject to gifts or inheritance tax, potentially to 
the maximum applicable third-party rate, in the state of the payer and also, in some cases, even 
in the state of the beneficiary.
III The EU Law
A The EUCJ case law
The issue of potential excessive taxation of cross-border charitable payments has, however, 
been alleviated within the EU. In very interesting jurisprudence, illustrated notably by four 
landmark cases, the EUCJ has developed a framework which sets coordinated rules for cross-
border charitable payments (including gifts or inheritance), notably on the basis of the freedom 
of movement of capital.25
In Stauffer, a musicology center operating as a tax-exempt foundation in Italy received rental 
income for a building it owned in Germany. This country refused to grant a tax exemption 
with respect to rental income on the grounds that the beneficiary did not reside in Germany. 
The EUCJ held that such discrimination was not justified, being contrary to the principle of 
free movement of capital.26 That conclusion was based on the following motivation. First, the 
court ruled that the principle of freedom of establishment could not be invoked. In order to do 
so, the enterprise should have secured a permanent presence in the host Member State in which 
the real estate owned was actively managed. In the present case, the foundation did not have any 
premises in Germany for the purposes of pursuing its activities. Second, however, the freedom 
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of movement of capital is applicable. In order to define the concept of capital movement, the 
nomenclature provided by Directive 88/361 has a relevant indicative value, even if the list is not 
exhaustive. Investment in real estate is included in this list, and, therefore, freedom of movement 
covers both ownership and management of such property. In this context, the fact that, under 
German domestic law, the tax exemption applies only to charitable entities which, as a matter 
of principle, have an unlimited tax liability in Germany puts non-resident comparable organi-
zations at a disadvantageous position, which constitutes a restriction on the free movement of 
capital. In order to be justified, the difference in treatment between a foundation with unlimited 
tax liability and those with limited liability “must concern situations which are not objectively 
comparable, or be justified by overriding reasons in the general interest, such as the need to 
safeguard the coherence of the tax system or effective fiscal supervision.”27 In addition, the dif-
ference in treatment must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective of 
the applicable legislation.28 The German government tried to justify the difference of treatment, 
notably, by arguing that a resident non-profit entity performs duties which usually would be a 
burden on the state budget, whereas the charitable activities performed by the foundation only 
concerned Italy and Switzerland. The ECJ did not follow that line of reasoning. In particular, 
the necessity of a link between the foundation and its activities was regarded as non-relevant. As 
a consequence, in the absence of a justification and overriding reasons of general interest, the 
ECJ found that the freedom of movement of capital had been infringed.
Having examined the scope of the rules on exemption from the perspective of the benefi-
ciary, the ECJ then had to address the tax position from the point of view of a donor who was 
resident in an EU Member State and made a gift to a philanthropic entity sited in another EU 
state. In Persche, a German citizen had made a gift to a charitable organization in Portugal. The 
German tax authorities had disallowed the deduction, as the beneficiary did not meet German 
law requirements.29 The ECJ was being asked to give a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of 
such a refusal. First, the court stated, in essence, that, when a taxpayer requests a tax deduction 
in one Member State with respect to gifts made to established organizations of acknowledged 
general interest in another Member State, such gifts “come within the compass” of the provi-
sions relating to the free movement of capital, even if they are made in kind in the form of 
common consumer goods.30 Second, the possibility of obtaining a deduction for tax purposes 
“can have a significant influence on the donor’s attitude” so that the inability to deduct gifts 
to charitable bodies established in another Member State constitutes a restriction on the free 
movement of capital.31 Third, this restriction is not justified. While the states have discretion 
to define the interests of the general public that they wish to promote by granting tax benefits, 
they cannot deny the right to equal treatment of a gift to a charitable body in another Member 
State, promoting the same interests of the general public recognized by the first Member State, 
“solely on the grounds that it is not established in that Member State”32. The ECJ considered, 
however, that, according to the principle of proportionality, nothing prevents the tax authorities 
of the Member State to require the taxpayer wishing to obtain the deduction to provide relevant 
evidence. In addition, the tax authorities concerned may contact the authorities of the other 
Member State in order to obtain information that may be necessary on the basis of Directive 
77/799 on exchange of information.33 As a consequence, since Persche, gifts from a taxpayer of 
one Member State to an institution with a public purpose in another Member State are gov-
erned by the principle of the free movement of capital and therefore cannot be the subject to 
tax discrimination in the case where the recipient is a charitable entity established in another 
Member State promoting similar interests of the general public.
In the third case, the ECJ had to examine tax discrimination in the area of gift and inherit-
ance tax. The case Missionswerk involved a bequest from a Belgian resident on her death to an 
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association with a religious purpose in Germany.34 The Belgian tax authorities wanted to apply 
an 80% tax rate to the bequest, whereas the same bequest would have been taxed at a rate of 
7% under domestic law. Once again, in keeping with its previous judgments, the ECJ held that 
the Belgian inheritance and gift rules were discriminatory. In order to reach that conclusion, 
the ECJ considered that a cross-border inheritance constitutes a movement of capital within the 
meaning of Art. 63 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Taxing an 
inheritance, whose beneficiary is a non-profit-making body, which has its center of operations 
in another Member State, in which the deceased neither actually resided nor worked, more 
heavily constitutes a restriction to the free movement of capital by reducing the value of that 
inheritance.35 Indeed, this rule is liable to make those cross-border capital movements less attrac-
tive by dissuading Belgian residents from naming as beneficiaries persons established in Member 
States in which those Belgian residents have not actually resided or worked. In addition, this 
restriction is not justified. The Belgium government tried to argue that Member States are enti-
tled to require, for the purposes of granting certain tax benefits, a sufficiently close link between 
non-profit-making bodies and the activities in which they are engaged. In the present case, 
Belgium collectivity takes an advantage from that regulation. However, according to the EUCJ, 
the fact that a Member State may be discharged from some of its responsibilities does not allow 
that state to establish a difference of treatment with the motive that the bequest made in favor of 
organizations with a public purpose in another state cannot result to a budgetary compensation 
in the state of source. Indeed, according to the court, the necessity to prevent a reduction of 
tax resources is neither a motive mentioned in Art. 65 TFEU nor an overriding reason in the 
general interest justifying a restriction to Art. 65 TFEU.36 Therefore, the EUCJ, following its 
previous case law, considered the Belgium legislation discriminatory.
Finally, in Commission vs Austria, the EUCJ also confirmed that an Austrian tax rule, accord-
ing to which deductions from tax are allowed solely for gifts to research and teaching institu-
tions whose seats are in Austria, to the exclusion of gifts to comparable institutions established 
in other Member States of the EU or the EEA, is contrary to the free movement of capital, as 
guaranteed by Article 56 EC and Article 40 of the EEA Agreement.37 The Court, in its reason-
ing, also referred to the previous case, Laboratoires Fournier, of 2005.38 In the latter, while the 
ECJ held that the promotion of research and development may constitute a reason of overriding 
interest, the court nevertheless considered that national legislation reserving the benefit of a tax 
credit solely to research carried out in the Member State concerned was directly contrary to 
the objective of European Union policy in the field of research and technical development. In 
accordance with Article 163(2) EC, that policy aims in particular to remove the fiscal obstacles 
to cooperation in the field of research and cannot therefore be implemented by the promotion 
of research and development at the national level. The same is true of the tax rules concern-
ing gifts at issue in the present case, insofar as the Republic of Austria relies on that objective 
to limit the deductibility of gifts to Austrian research establishments and universities.39 It is 
interesting to note that, according to the Court, since the provisions of Article 40 of the EEA 
Agreement have the same legal scope as the substantially identical provisions of Article 56 EC, 
the considerations of the case law on that provision may, in similar circumstances such as those 
of the present case, be transposed mutatis mutandis to Article 40 EEA.
B Impact of EUCJ case law
It follows that Member States have an obligation to treat domestic and foreign charitable enti-
ties in another Member States equally. However, even if the principle of non-discrimination 
has to be observed within the EU, there are still many difficulties for charitable entities and 
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donors to “effectively exercise their fundamental freedoms.”40 First, there is no global recogni-
tion of charitable entities. Indeed, as seen previously, the conditions of tax-exempt status are 
defined by the domestic law of the host state. Second, the charitable entity has to prove that it 
complies with the tax-exempt status conditions, as defined under the domestic law of the host 
state.41 Third, the state of the donor has to be able to properly verify that such conditions are 
met, which requires an effective and adequate exchange of information clause in a Directive or 
a multilateral or bilateral treaty.
The case law of the EUCJ, in the context of the freedom of movement, could have an 
impact in non-EU third countries, such as Switzerland. Indeed, Art. 63 TFEU prohibits restric-
tions on the free movement of capital not only between Member States but also between Mem-
ber States and third states. Consequently, gifts or payments derived from EU Member States to 
a third country, such as Switzerland, could benefit from this case law.42 In the specific case of 
Switzerland, this is also justified by the fact that, even though Switzerland is not an EU Member 
State, it has adopted a European policy based on bilateral sectoral agreements. These agreements 
create broad, reciprocal access to markets and form the basis of close collaboration in several 
areas. As a consequence, in our view, attributions from an EU state towards non-EU countries 
should in principle be able to benefit from the case law developed by the EUCJ, following the 
Persche case. Following these cases, however, the EU state of residence of the donor should still 
be in a position to obtain relevant information from the state of the beneficiary. This condition 
should be met, to the extent that both states provide for an effective exchange of information, 
following the OECD standard of Art. 26 OECD Model DTC. This should notably be the case 
between Switzerland and an EU Member State, since the change of policy of Switzerland, as of 
13 March 2009, in the area of exchange of information, to the extent of a DTC following the 
OECD standard, has been ratified between those countries.43
The question of whether a similar rule could also apply in the opposite direction, namely 
in the case of payments arising from a donor resident in a third country, such as Switzerland, 
in favor of a philanthropic institution sited in an EU state, is more delicate. In this context, an 
international agreement between the third country and the EU state providing for a freedom of 
movement of capital should exist. This should in particular be the case for EEA Member States. 
For third countries outside the EU or the EEA, it could be interesting to check whether a simi-
lar rule might be derived from the principle of non-discrimination under a tax treaty that incor-
porates a provision similar to Art. 24 of the OECD Model DTC with that EU Member State.44
C Proposal for a European Foundation
Despite the case law mentioned previously, the situation is still not satisfactory for cross-border 
donations within Europe. First, some Member States still have not implemented the rules of 
non-discrimination and either tend to discriminate against foreign-based EU nonprofit entities 
compared to local ones or provide very complex rules and processes in order for a foreign-based 
non-profit organization to be viewed as comparable to a resident entity.45
On 8 February 2012, as a multilateral solution to this problem, the EU Commission pre-
sented a Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE) 
(hereafter FE Prop. Regs).46 This initiative intended to create a new European legal form which 
should facilitate the establishment and operation of foundations in the single market. It should 
allow “foundation to more efficiently channel private funds to public benefit purposes on a 
cross-border basis in the EU.”47 The proposed Regulation would also include a chapter on the 
tax treatment of the FE, donors and beneficiaries. First, with respect to income and capital gain 
taxes, gift and inheritance taxes, property and land taxes, transfer taxes, registration taxes, stamp 
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duties and similar taxes, the Member States where the FE has its registered office would have to 
apply the same tax treatment as applicable to public benefit-purpose entities established in that 
Member State (art. 49 FE Prop. Regs). Second, the same tax treatment applicable to donations 
made to public benefit-purpose entities established in the Member State where the donor is 
resident should apply to any natural or legal person donating to the FE (Art. 50 FE Prop. Regs.). 
Third, beneficiaries of the FE should be treated as if they were given by a public benefit purpose 
entity established in the Member State or residence of the beneficiary (Art. 51 Prop. Regs). It 
was apparently difficult to reach the required unanimous approval of Member States.48 A pos-
sibility to reach a consensus could have been to delete the tax chapter of this draft Directive. 
Finally, the proposal was withdrawn in March 2015.49
IV Impact of double taxation conventions
A In general
Non-profit organizations, as we have seen, may face complexities and even multiple taxation 
issues in cross-border payments. In addition, based on different domestic law rules, payments 
to foreign non-philanthropic entities could face adverse tax consequences, notably due to the 
absence of recognition by the host state of the tax-exempt status granted by a foreign state. 
DTCs could be used as tools to solve or alleviate or at least improve those issues.50 In order to 
achieve these goals, a DTC should be applicable to philanthropic entities, despite their tax-
exempt status (infra B.). In addition, specific treaty rules could either grant an exemption to 
income received by a non-profit entity resident in a contracting state (infra C.) or even offer a 
tax incentive, such as a deduction for cross-border gifts in favor of philanthropic entities sited in 
another contracting state (D.). Limitation on benefits (LOB) treaty rules, to the extent they are 
applicable, sometimes also grant qualifying status to non-profit entities (E.). DTCs could also 
ensure that cross-border gifts or inheritance will not be subject to multiple or burdensome tax 
(F.). Finally, an interesting possibility would be to rely on the non-discrimination provision of 
DTC to try to offer comparable tax treatment of payments to domestic and comparable non-
profit entities sited in another contracting state (G.).
B Residence of charitable entity
The first issue is to ascertain that charitable entities may benefit from a DTC. It requires that 
these entities may be regarded as (i) persons, according to Art. 3 OECD Model DTC, which are 
(ii) resident in a contracting state, within the meaning of Art. 4 OECD Model DTC. According 
to the OECD Commentary, the term “person” should be interpreted broadly. A foundation or 
an association is notably considered a person. In order to be “resident,” such an entity should 
meet the criteria to be fully taxable according to domestic law. It is, however, not important 
whether the state of residence makes use of the effective right to tax.51
The OECD Commentary confirms this position by stating that:
In many States, a person is considered liable to comprehensive taxation even if the 
Contracting State does not in fact impose tax. For example, pension funds, charities 
and other organizations may be exempted from tax, but they are exempt only if they 
meet all of the requirements for exemption specified in the tax laws. They are, thus, 
subject to the tax laws of a Contracting State. Furthermore, if they do not meet the 
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standards specified, they are also required to pay tax. Most States would view such 
entities as residents for purposes of the Convention.52
Following this approach, Art. 4 OECD Model DTC offers a protection against so-called 
virtual double taxation and provides for a limit towards the other contracting state, even if the 
state of residence does not levy a tax. The U.S. Model DTC (2016) is even more precise in that 
it provides, in Art. 4, that the term “resident of a Contracting State” includes:
an organization that is established and maintained in that Contracting State exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural, or educational purposes; notwith-
standing that all or part of its income or gains may be exempt from tax under the 
domestic law of that Contracting State.53
Many countries, such as Switzerland, follow this approach for charitable entities sited in 
their territory, despite tax-exempt status. As a consequence, notwithstanding the exemption of 
legal persons, which pursue public utility goals, these countries treat them as residents for tax 
purposes.54
According to the OECD Commentary, contracting states may solve the tax status of such 
entities in a specific provision of a DTC.55 Following this approach, specific DTCs, fol-
lowing the approach of the U.S. Model, entail a provision providing that exempt charitable 
entities are regarded as resident. This is the case, for example, of many treaties concluded 
by the United States,56 such as, inter alia, the U.S. treaties with the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Ireland and Switzerland.57 The United Kingdom also includes specific clauses in 
many DTCs granting residence to non-profit organizations established in one contracting 
state.58 Other states, however, consider tax exempt entities not resident for the purposes of 
DTCs.59
In order to continue to ensure the proper development of philanthropic activities, it should 
be recommended that states adopt the policy mentioned previously and simply confirm their 
positions that, as a matter of principle, charitable entities, despite their tax-exempt status, are 
in general regarded as resident for tax treaty purposes. Countries also have the possibility to 
confirm the application of tax treaties to non-profit entities in a mutual agreement procedure 
(MAP). Such agreements have already been concluded in practice.60
This would allow resident non-profit entities to claim the benefits of the allocation rules 
of the treaty, notably a reduced or nil withholding tax at source on any dividends, interests or 
royalties sourced in the other contracting state, as provided in provisions similar to Art. 10, 11, 
or 12 of the OECD Model of the applicable treaty.
C Exemption
As resident entities, non-profit organizations could claim the benefit of tax treaties, to the 
extent they comply with the potential limitation on benefits rules, if applicable61. In general, 
most DTCs entail distributions rules for specific foreign source income, notably for dividend, 
interest, royalties and sometimes services that may still suffer a residual withholding tax at 
source.
A few treaties go even further than confirming a residence status to philanthropic enti-
ties by providing a general tax exemption from income sourced in another contracting state.62 
These examples are, however, rare and exist mostly with some treaties concludes by the United 
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States.63 As an interesting example, Art. 27 (Exempt Organizations) of the U.S.-Germany treaty 
provides that:
1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 28 (Limitations on benefits), a Ger-
man company or organization operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, educational, or public purposes shall be exempt from tax by the 
United States in respect of items of income, if and to the extent that:
a) such company or organization is exempt from tax in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and
b) such company or organization would be exempt from tax in the United 
States in respect of such items of income if it were organized, and carried 
on all its activities, in the United States.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 28 (Limitations on benefits), a 
United States company or organization operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, educational, or public purposes shall be exempt from tax 
by the Federal Republic of Germany in respect of items of income, if and to 
the extent that:
a) such company or organization is exempt from tax in the United States, and
b) such company or organization would be exempt from tax in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in respect of such items of income if it were organ-
ized, and carried on all its activities, in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In general, these provisions apply only to a non-profit organization resident in one contracting 
state that would also be exempt from tax in the other contracting state if it were organized and 
carried their activities in that state.
The advantage of such provisions is that they apply to all types of income and not only to 
dividends, interests or royalties. In addition, the exemption would go beyond the benefits of 
treaties with provisions similar to Art. 10, 11 or 12 of the OECD Model DTC in that it would 
grant a zero rate and not a reduced rate of tax at source, as the case may be.
In the case where a state uses the credit method for the avoidance of double taxation, the 
benefits of the tax exemption granted in another state, in the absence of a specific rule, would 
lead to a virtual double taxation.64 Indeed, the exemption granted in one contracting state 
would lead to the absence of a credit in the other contracting state, unless that state includes 
a rule that would take this situation into account. States under a credit system could therefore 
be recommended to include a specific exception to the credit method for non-profit entities 
exempt in other states to the extent that they would qualify as exempt entity if they were resi-
dent in the state imposing the credit.
D Deductions of cross-border gifts
To the extent it is applicable, a DTC will then attribute, following the allocation rules, the 
right to tax income and, to the extent relevant, the assets of such entity between the contract-
ing states. Under existing law, in principle, the allocation rules of a DTC focus on income (or 
profit) and, as the case may be, on capital (or wealth) but do not apply to the tax treatment 
of deductions. In particular, DTCs do not entail any specific rule applicable to cross-border 
deductions or allocations in favor of entities following philanthropic purposes. Tax treaties may, 
however, be used as promoting tools and could include an incentive for cross-border charitable 
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giving in the form of a deduction, which is usually available to gifts to domestic non-profit 
entities in the host state.65
The Netherlands, admittedly in a fairly isolated case, and the United States, with some states 
that are tightly linked geographically, have included such clauses in their tax treaties.66 It seems 
that the inclusion of a provision on charitable donation is also part of the tax treaty policy of 
the Barbados.67 The possibility, under specific conditions, to deduct cross-border gifts does 
exist under the U.S.-Canada DTC (1980), the U.S.-Mexico DTC (1992) and the U.S.-Israel 
DTC (1995).68 The provisions of these DTCs providing for a charitable deduction do, however, 
limit the deduction of donations to the other contracting state from income derived from that 
particular state.69 Another interesting example is given by Art. 22 of the Netherlands-Barbados 
treaty,70 which provides for the following rules for charitable contributions:
Contributions by a resident of a Contracting State to an organization constituting 
a charitable organization under the income tax laws of the other Contracting State 
shall be deductible for the purposes of computing the tax liability of that resident 
under the tax laws of the first-mentioned Contracting State under the same terms and 
conditions as are applicable to contributions to charitable organizations of the first-
mentioned State where the competent authority of the first-mentioned State agrees 
that the organization qualifies as a charitable organization for the purposes of granting 
a deduction under its income tax laws.
In order to encourage cross-border philanthropic giving, countries would be well advised to 
insert clauses in their tax treaties that would allow for recognition of a deduction for gifts to 
entities that have an acknowledged public purpose under the same conditions as those of the 
donor’s state of residence. We will, however, analyze further the potential implications of the 
principle of non-discrimination.
E Limitation on benefits provisions
Under the influence of the United States treaty policy, so-called “limitation of benefits” pro-
visions have been implemented in many treaties. Following the OECD Base Erosion Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) program, the 2017 version of the OECD Model DTC includes a new Art. 29, 
which opens the possibility to negotiate a LOB clause in a DTC. This approach is based on a 
list of alternative tests, which have to be fulfilled in order to be able to claim the benefits of a 
DTC. A LOB clause aims at discouraging treaty shopping by giving the advantages of the treaty 
only to qualifying persons.
Without any specific clauses, non-profit resident entities have to verify that they meet at least 
one of those tests in order to qualify for the benefit of the treaty. However, some treaties do 
consider philanthropic entities, as such, qualifying persons under LOB clauses.71 For states that 
wish to include LOB clauses in their treaties, these types of specific qualifying provisions should 
provide for a simple and efficient mechanism to avoid a complex analysis of the LOB tests for 
philanthropic entities.
F Exemption of gift and inheritance tax to cross-border non-profit 
entities under gift and inheritance tax treaties
There are also a few DTCs in the area of inheritance tax and, rarely, in the field of gift tax. For 
instance, Switzerland has concluded only nine DTCs in the area of inheritance tax and no DTC 
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for gift tax purposes. Again, and in the rare cases where such treaties do exist, they generally 
do not offer any specific tax treatment for cross-border inheritance or gifts in favor of philan-
thropic institutions. We have seen, however, that in the case of Switzerland, some cantons have 
concluded reciprocal agreements for gifts with religious, charitable or public utility purposes, 
but only with five states. However, the non-discrimination principle anchored in Art. 24 of the 
OECD Model for direct tax purposes, applies to “taxes of every kind and description.”72 The 
analysis of the impact of such a principle is thus relevant not only for direct but also inheritance 
and gift taxes.
There are, however, some rare treaty provisions that include rules which try to minimize the 
adverse tax consequences of cross-border payments for inheritance and gift tax purposes. Such 
treaties have been concluded mostly with the United States.73 For example, Art. 9 of the DTC 
between the United States and Denmark provides the following rules for charitable gifts and 
estate (reductions):
1. The transfer or deemed transfer of property to or for the use of a Contracting 
State or a political subdivision or local authority thereof, or to a corporation or 
organization of a Contracting State operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, if such transfer is exempt 
from tax or taxed at a reduced rate in that state shall be treated by the other 
Contracting State as if such transfer or deemed transfer were made to a similar 
corporation or organization of that other State.
2. In the case of property which passes from a decedent
a) domiciled (within the meaning of Article 4 (Fiscal Domicile)) in Denmark 
to the spouse of such decedent, the United States shall, in computing its 
tax, allow the same marital deduction that would be allowed with respect 
to a decedent domiciled in the United States, and in such case the tax 
rates that would be applicable if the decedent had been domiciled in the 
United States shall apply. If the United States tax determined without 
regard to the preceding sentence is lower than that computed under the 
preceding sentence, the lower tax shall apply.
b) domiciled (within the meaning of Article 4 (Fiscal Domicile)) in the United 
States to the spouse of such decedent, Denmark shall, if the spouse so 
requests, compute its tax as if the provisions of Danish law regulating 
matrimonial property rights were applicable to such property.
Art. 10 of the DTC between the United States and France, with respect to taxes on estates, 
inheritances and gifts, provides the following rule for charitable exemptions and deductions:
(1) A transfer to a legal entity created or organized in a Contracting State shall 
be exempt from tax, or fully deductible from the gross value liable to 
tax, in the other Contracting State with respect to its taxes referred to in 
Article 2, provided the transfer would be eligible for such exemption or 
deduction if the legal entity had been created or organized in that other 
Contracting State.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall apply only if the legal entity: (a) Has a 
tax-exempt status in the first Contracting State by reason of which transfers to 
such legal entity are exempt or fully deductible; (b) Is organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational or cultural 
Cross-border philanthropic payments
391
purposes; and (c) Receives a substantial part of its support from contributions 
from the public or governmental funds.
(3) This Article shall not apply to transfers to a Contracting State or a political 
or administrative subdivision thereof unless specifically limited to a purpose 
described in paragraph (2)(b).
In general, these clauses tend to offer equivalent rules for domestic and foreign entities in the 
treaty partner, subject, however, to specific conditions. In other words, a contracting state 
should treat a transfer to a foreign charitable entity in the other contracting state at a reduced 
or zero rate, as if such transfer were made to a similar organization in the state of donor or 
deceased.74
G The non-discrimination principle
1 In general: Art. 24 par. 1 OECD model
DTCs in the area of direct taxes do generally provide for a non-discrimination clause corre-
sponding to Art. 24 par. 1 OECD Model DTC, according to which:
National of a Contracting State cannot be subject in the other Contracting state to 
any taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burden-
some than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other 
State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be 
subjected.
This rule applies to “taxes of every kind and description”75 and therefore also to taxes falling 
outside the scope of the treaty in question, such as inheritance or gift taxes.76 In actual terms, 
the non-discrimination principle means that a tax applied to nationals and foreigners in the 
same circumstances,
must be in the same form, as regards both the basis of charge and the method of 
assessment, its rate must be the same and, finally, the formalities connected with the 
taxation (returns, payment, prescribed times, etc.) should not be more onerous for 
foreigners than for nationals.77
In the situation in question, partial or total exemption means a rate reduction that would be 
refused to foreign institutions due to their place of incorporation.
Consequently, the compatibility with such a non-discrimination clause of a reduced exemp-
tion or a more burdensome taxation of cross-border payments for philanthropic purposes in 
comparison to the potential more favorable tax regime applicable for comparable domestic 
charitable payments may be questioned.78
However, the non-discrimination clause of current DTCs, based on the OECD Model, 
still relies on the criteria of the nationality. In other words, and contrary to the case law of 
the EUCJ mentioned previously, Art. 24 par. 1 OECD Model only protects against overt and 
direct discrimination based on nationality.79 In this respect, the principle of non-discrimination 
is different in scope from the EU principle, which also protects against so-called “hidden” and 
indirect discriminations, which, while not openly based on the concept of nationality, are in 
effect essentially targeting nationals.80 As a consequence, until now, DTCs following Art. 24 
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par. 1 OECD Model have had limited impact, notably for individuals, because most states apply 
domestic tax rules, which are based on residence and not on nationality.81
The same is also true, in general, for philanthropic institutions, which are usually treated 
differently according to the criteria of residence, that is depending on their seat. In addition, 
the historical interpretation of Art. 24 par. 1 OECD Model tends to confirm that the initiators 
of this provision did not intend to offer the same tax advantages as comparable local entities 
to non-resident entities with public utility purposes.82 The OECD Commentary follows the 
same line of reasoning. Indeed, it provides that Art. 24 par. 1 OCDE Model should not be 
interpreted as compelling contracting states, which offer certain tax privileges to private non-
profit institutions, to extend those privileges to similar institutions which pursue non-profit 
activities.83 At this stage, to the best of our knowledge, the jurisprudence does not seem to have 
interpreted Art. 24 OECD Model differently. In our view, only an evolutive interpretation of 
Art. 24 OECD Model, following the case law of the EUCJ, which would opt for a protection 
against hidden or indirect discrimination based on nationality, could justify such a broadening 
of the scope of the rule against non-discrimination.
As a consequence, even if in practice the differences of treatment between comparable resi-
dent and non-resident philanthropic entities may constitute “hidden” or indirect discrimina-
tion, because the exemption or the tax deduction would only apply to resident philanthropic 
entities, this discrimination is not overtly based on nationality. The leading and current inter-
pretation of Art. 24 par. 1 of the OCDE Model tends therefore not to compel the state of resi-
dence to extend the same privileges offered to resident philanthropic entities to similar entities 
sited abroad.
2 Art. 24 par. 4 OECD model
Art. 24 par. 4 of the OECD Model DTC may, however, offer a broader scope of application. 
According to 24 par. 4 OECD Model DTC, interests, royalties and “other disbursements” paid 
by an enterprise of a contracting state to a resident of the other contracting state must, for the 
purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible under the same 
conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned state. This time, such a 
rule does not allow for indirect discrimination based on residence, to the extent that this clause 
targets (non)residence of the person benefiting from the payment and not of the person who 
challenges the non-discrimination.84 As a consequence, it should be analyzed whether this dif-
ferent perspective of the principle of non-discrimination may challenge the differences of treat-
ment between domestic and cross-border philanthropic payments in favor of similar entities. In 
particular, we could wonder whether the refusal of a deduction for gifts towards philanthropic 
entities resident in a state other than the state of the donor would not be contrary to a provision 
of a DTC, including a rule similar to Art. 24 par. 4 OECD Model DTC.
The answer requires a careful analysis. First, it should be questioned whether “gifts” or other 
liberalities fall into the concept of “other disbursements” mentioned in this provision. Accord-
ing to commentators, contributions – such as gifts – which do not represent a counterpart are 
not governed by the OECD norm. Indeed, such a provision tends to apply to interest, royalties 
and other expenses which represent a remuneration for a transaction (services) or an investment 
(capital).85 Such interpretation is, however, not the only conceivable one. Indeed, the OCDE 
Commentary admits that this provision could also include payments to a pension fund by the 
employer.86 In any event, such a broad interpretation of the concept of “other disbursements” to 
gifts is undoubtedly disputable. In addition, this rule only applies to expenses paid by an enter-
prise. According to Art. 3 par. 1 lit. c OECD Model DTC, this term refers to the “carrying on 
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of any business.” The term “business” includes the performance of professional services and of 
other activities of independent nature.87 According to commentators, this concept is difficult to 
assess and rather “ambiguous.”88 In addition, the question of whether an activity is performed 
in an enterprise or is deemed to constitute in itself an enterprise has always been interpreted 
according to the provisions of the domestic law of the contracting states.89 It follows that at least 
the deduction from an individual, acting in a non-independent activity, in favor of a nonresident 
entity following philanthropic purposes, following a similar treatment in domestic law, could 
not benefit from this provision.
As a consequence, a potential violation of the non-discrimination principle could exist 
in the case of refusal of deductions in favor of non-resident public utility institutions, which 
are, however, allowed for similar domestic organizations but only under narrow limits. These 
deductions should at least be claimed by legal persons or individuals acting in an independent 
capacity that should be characterized as enterprises and only to the extent that we may character-
ize such gifts as “other disbursements” within the meaning of Art. 24 par. 4 OECD Model. In 
this framework, cross-border payments could be deductible under the same conditions as gifts 
in favor of residents in the state of the payer.90 In this case, the amount of deduction, the timing 
and all other conditions should be the same.91
V Conclusion and recommendations
Our chapter has shown that DTCs may indeed offer interesting solutions in order to solve, or 
at least alleviate, the potential tax burdens of cross-border charitable giving. This possibility 
should, in our view, be developed further because, apart from the EU, “there is little tax sup-
port provided by counties for cross-border giving.”92 In some rare cases, DTCs may even be 
used as tax incentives to promote transnational giving by offering a deduction, under specific 
conditions, which would correspond to domestic gifts or payments to local non-profit entities. 
However, the practice is not well established, and there are in fact only a very few treaties that 
include specific clauses that favor cross-border charitable giving, mostly some United States 
and United Kingdom treaties, and, in the case of Barbados, part of a general policy. The author 
would recommend clarifying the position of states with regard to the application of DTCs in 
favor of non-profit entities and the application of similar rules between domestic gifts to phil-
anthropic organizations and foreign comparable institutions in contracting states. This could be 
achieved by implementing the following recommendations.
First, states should be encouraged to clarify their position on the application of DTCs to 
charitable entities. Following the majority view described previously, states should admit that, 
despite their tax-exempt status, non-profit entities are recognized as resident for DTC purposes. 
Perhaps a clarification of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 could solve this controversy. States 
that do not wish to accept this interpretation should then at least include specific rules in their 
treaties that confirm this point. This would allow philanthropic organizations to claim the 
benefits of the allocation rules of a DTC, including the reduced withholding treaty rates for 
dividends, interests or royalties sourced in the other contracting state.
Second, contracting states, in order to create an incentive for philanthropic payments, could 
be encouraged to include in their DTCs a specific clause which would allow for the recognition 
of the deductibility of gifts to entities with public utility purposes, under the same conditions as 
philanthropic entities, seated in the place of residence of the payer. In this respect, Art. 22 of 
the DTC between Holland and Barbados of 2006, which provides for a deduction of gifts to 
a charitable entity in the other contracting state under the same conditions as gifts to entities 
recognized as such in the state of residence of the donor, could serve as a reference.
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Third, a new treaty rule could be introduced which would provide for a full exemption of 
foreign source income received by a philanthropic entity resident in a contracting states. Such 
provisions do already exist but only in rare cases. In general, they apply only to non-profit 
organizations resident in one contracting state that would also be exempted from tax in the 
other contracting state if they were organized and carried out their activities in that state. This 
rule applies to all types of income and not only to dividends, interests or royalties. In addition, 
the exemption would go beyond the benefits of treaties with provisions similar to Art. 10, 11 or 
12 of the OECD Model DTC in that it would grant a zero rate and not a reduced rate of tax 
at the source, as the case may be.
Fourth, provisions could also be introduced in tax treaties in order to avoid multiple or 
adverse tax consequences of cross-border payments for inheritance and gift tax purposes. The 
recommendation, in order to have some impact, would require a broad change of policy among 
states and the conclusion of many more DTCs in the area of inheritance and gift taxes. In this 
respect, a provision similar to Art. 9 of the DTC between the United States and Denmark in 
the area of inheritance and gifts tax could serve a starting point of reference.
Fifth, under current law, DTCs based on the OECD Model do not offer a similar protec-
tion against non-discrimination for cross-border philanthropic payments as EU case law. Only 
an evolutive interpretation of Art. 24 par. 1 of the OCDE Model, which would go beyond 
the criteria of nationality, could broaden the scope of this principle. The current position, as 
confirmed by the OECD Commentary, does not seem to allow following the same line as the 
case law of the EUCJ. Furthermore, the non-discrimination principle applicable to “other dis-
bursements,” as governed by Art. 24 par. 2 OECD Model, does not seem under current law to 
undoubtedly apply to philanthropic gifts, even if sound arguments could be made, at least in the 
case of gifts or charitable payments from enterprises (including legal entities). As a consequence, 
the interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination in a DTC should be broadened to 
require a similar treatment of comparable non-profit entities in resident and non-resident states. 
While it appears difficult to adopt this rule from a political standpoint, a first step in this direc-
tion could be to clarify the interpretation of the concept of “other disbursements” in Art. 24 
par. 4 OECD Model to include payments for philanthropic purposes.
Sixth, and in the long term, a more global solution, such as a multilateral approach, could 
be proposed. In this context, a mechanism similar to the multilateral treaty implemented in the 
context of the OECD BEPS program93 in order to incorporate treaty modification rules recom-
mended by the BEPS Action plan could serve as a model. Indeed, in this context, a multilat-
eral instrument (a so-called MLI) entered into force on 1 July 2018 in order to modify DTCs 
which are covered by the MLI, under a complex mechanism of acceptance by the states party 
to the MLI. The purpose of this multilateral instrument is clearly different in that it intends to 
include in DTCs various rules against aggressive tax planning of multinational enterprises and 
against double non-taxation. In the future, in any event, this type of multilateral mechanism is, 
however, an interesting model also for philanthropy because it allows modification, upon rati-
fication, of all covered tax treaties. We could therefore also imagine introducing rules favorable 
to cross-border philanthropic payments within a multilateral mechanism similar to or inspired 
by the MLI.94
However, even if the principle of non-discrimination towards non-resident public purpose 
entities would more generally apply, the problem would not be completely solved. Indeed, as 
the impact of the tax law of the EUCJ has demonstrated previously, complexities or discrimi-
nating approaches among states could still exist and qualify as restrictions on the free move-
ment of cross-border charitable payments. In this respect, multilateral solutions, such as the 
implementation of the EU FE, represent an interesting approach, which appears, however, 
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difficult to implement. An alternative would be at least to try to find a consensus, for example, 
at the OECD level, on a recommendation (soft law) which would offer basic elements on the 
acceptance of a similar treatment of payments to domestic and foreign comparable public pur-
pose entities. In this respect, some basic elements on the conditions of comparability should 
be designed. Common factors should be defined on: (i) a definition of the public non-profit 
purposes qualifying for the similar tax treatment and (ii) the essential elements of an adequate 
supervision mechanism, which could be viewed as acceptable and equivalent to the supervision 
rules applicable in the host state.
Finally, it appears that, in order to ensure that the benefits of a treaty are fully granted to 
non-profit entities, the mains issue is to include a rule which recognizes, under clear conditions, 
the equivalence of non-resident entities and similar domestic entities.95 In order to verify that 
this condition is met, various solutions have been introduced by some states. This issue is crucial 
and is the key to fostering the development of cross-border philanthropic payments without tax 
infringements. The case law of the EUCJ, mentioned previously, also confirms the necessity to 
compare non-profit domestic entities and foreign organizations with similar charitable purposes 
sited in another EU state. A specific treaty provision could also be introduced in this respect and 
provide for the key binding conditions of such recognition. It is also essential to ensure that the 
qualifying philanthropy entity does pursue a legitimate and effective activity for a non-profit 
purpose, which could be more precisely defined in a relevant treaty provision. Furthermore, the 
issue will be to safeguard the ultimate proper destination of the funds for charitable purposes, 
which requires extensive due-diligence rules and an adequate supervision mechanism.96 To 
that end, the exponential development of the network of rules of international administrative 
assistance in tax matters, as of March 2009, has opened broad possibilities for states to verify all 
foreseeable relevant information, including financial data.97 The development of anti-money-
laundering rules, and the corresponding due diligence requirements, should also help to bring 
more certainty to the effective and adequate use of funds transferred for charitable purposes.
***
Notes
 1 For a comprehensive report on the tax treatment of philanthropy across 40 OECD members and par-
ticipating countries, see recently, OECD, Taxation and Philanthropy, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No 
27, Paris 2020.
 2 In this chapter, we will use the term philanthropic or non-profit entities or charitable organizations as 
synonyms.
 3 The tax treatment of charitable trusts would require a further analysis, which goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter, since most states do not recognize trusts as such as legal entities.
 4 See OECD, Philanthropy and Taxation, op. cit. 2020, pp. 41 ff.
 5 See Art. 23 al. 1 lit. f of the Federal Harmonization Tax Law (FHTL); Art. 56 lit. g of the Federal 
Direct Tax Law (FDTL).
 6 Under Swiss law, possibilities to exempt philanthropic entitles have been extended by a change of the 
law as of 1 January 2018 for legal persons pursuing “ideal goals” to the extent their profits are below 
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1 Introduction
An entity must typically meet a number of requirements in order to be considered a philan-
thropic organisation. In general, it must (i) be ‘not-for-profit’, (ii) have a ‘philanthropic pur-
pose’, and (iii) exist for ‘public benefit’. Besides, the entity must meet a range of administrative 
and oversight requirements. Common categories considered of ‘philanthropic purpose’ are 
welfare, education, scientific research, healthcare, culture, environmental support, and disaster 
relief (OECD, 2020). Despite the large consistency in domestic incentives for charitable giving 
(OECD, 2020; Quick et al., 2014), tax benefits on cross-border gifts are far less common. This 
is remarkable, especially considering the role cross-border philanthropy could play in tackling 
global challenges (OECD, 2020), as well as the willingness of donors to contribute to foreign 
philanthropic organisations. According to estimates in the Global Philanthropy Tracker 2020, the 
philanthropic outflow1 in 2018 across the 47 countries included in the report totalled $68 bil-
lion (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020).
Currently, there are few solutions that allow philanthropic organisations to work with for-
eign donors and ensure a tax benefit to them. Limited measures exist to overcome the tax 
barrier to international fundraising. Philanthropic organisations can, for example, set up a phil-
anthropic entity for fundraising purposes in a foreign country – a foreign friends’ organisation. 
This solution allows donors to give to a philanthropic organisation in their country of residence 
and obtain a tax benefit. The philanthropic organisation in the donor’s country regrants the gift 
to the foreign philanthropic organisation that the donor intends to support. Other solutions rely 
on a giving intermediary or legislation that enables tax-efficient giving. Examples of the latter 
are the four fundamental freedoms in European Union (EU) Law,2 tax treaties, or legislation in 
the donor’s country that allows for tax benefits on donations to foreign philanthropic organisa-
tions. Legislation that allows for tax benefits on cross-border philanthropy is not widespread 
(OECD, 2020). The tax provision on qualifying philanthropic organisations typically limits the 
geographical scope of the tax incentive. Furthermore, some countries impose restrictions on the 
foreign spending of philanthropic gifts, which limits the use of a foreign friends’ organisation or 
a giving intermediary as a solution for tax-efficient cross-border giving.
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The significant inapplicability of tax incentives on cross-border donations makes it less attrac-
tive for donors to give to a foreign philanthropic organisation. A cross-border gift becomes more 
expensive compared with a domestic charitable gift. For philanthropic organisations, attracting 
gifts from abroad can therefore be more challenging, as they are in a disadvantageous position 
in comparison with domestic philanthropic organisations. A  level playing field, where both 
domestic and foreign philanthropic organisations are eligible to receive gifts with correspond-
ing tax benefits, is preferred from a fundraising perspective. The European philanthropic sec-
tor even advocates for a ‘single market for philanthropy’, in which philanthropic organisations 
across EU Member States are treated equally, as is set out in the Philanthropy Manifesto (Donors 
and Foundations Networks in Europe and European Foundation Centre, 2019). To improve 
the environment for global philanthropy, the 2018 Global Philanthropy Environment Index also, 
amongst others, calls for the unification of a legal framework for cross-border philanthropy and 
tax incentives for gifts made directly to foreign philanthropic organisations (Indiana University 
Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2018).
This chapter evaluates optimal solutions from within the existing ones (which are briefly 
outlined in Section 2), more specifically in the context of arts organisations, to overcome the tax 
barriers of cross-border giving. The knowledge among fundraising professionals on tax incen-
tives for cross-border gifts is discussed in Section 3B. The focus is on donations by individuals 
and the tax benefits that could facilitate these gifts.
Throughout this chapter, I refer to philanthropic organisations. These are organisations that 
make contributions towards public benefit and have a special tax status in their country of resi-
dence that makes them eligible to receive gifts in return for a tax benefit to the donor. These 
could be in the form of a tax deduction, tax credit, or any other type of incentive. In this chap-
ter, arts organisations are used as a specific subtype of philanthropic organisations. The arts – 
more broadly, culture – are considered philanthropic causes in many countries, although not in 
all. In Argentina, Indonesia, and Malta, for example, culture is not considered a philanthropic 
purpose, and arts organisations do not qualify for a favourable tax status (OECD, 2020, p. 45). 
Whenever arts organisations are mentioned in this chapter, however, they are considered to have 
the same favourable tax status as other philanthropic organisations in their country of residence.
To assess the most optimal existing solution from a philanthropic perspective, arts organisa-
tions’ experiences with different solutions are elaborated on in Sections 3C–3E. The method-
ology according to which this information is gathered is presented in Section 3A. The giving 
intermediary is perceived as the current best option in many cross-border situations (Sec-
tion 4A). However, it has its disadvantages, which can be overcome with an optimal solution 
from the perspective of philanthropic organisations (Section 4B).
2 Solutions enabling tax-efficient cross-border giving
In most countries, the tax incentive for donations is limited to donations made to philanthropic 
organisations that are incorporated in the country that grants the tax incentives or they conduct 
(at least part of) their activities in the country that offers the tax incentive (Jochum and Sav-
vaidou, 2015, pp. 69–70). If a donor wishes to give to a foreign philanthropic organisation, a 
tax incentive often does not apply. Depending on the tax law in the donor’s country, it might 
be possible to obtain a tax benefit on a cross-border donation based on solutions at different 
legal levels.
At the national level, countries can partially or entirely remove geographical restrictions from 
tax incentives for gifts. By doing so, they allow donors to contribute to foreign philanthropic 
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organisations with a tax benefit. I refer to this method of obtaining a tax incentive on a cross-
border donation as the ‘unilateral solution’.
In accordance with the four fundamental freedoms in EU law, EU Member States may not 
discriminate against equivalent philanthropic organisations located in other EU Member States.3 
Therefore, most EU Member States have modified their domestic legislation. Luxembourg, for 
example, allows Luxembourg taxpayers to contribute to qualifying organisations in Luxem-
bourg as well as qualifying organisations in other Member States of the EU and those of the 
European Free Trade Association.4 Dutch taxpayers can deduct their gifts to qualifying charities 
located in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, another EU Member State, or state designated by 
the Ministry of Finance from taxable income.5
For a foreign philanthropic organisation to qualify as a recipient of gifts with a correspond-
ing tax benefit, the philanthropic organisation will have to meet the conditions of a qualifying 
organisation in the donor’s country. This differs across countries. By imposing requirements on 
qualifying philanthropic organisations, governments target their tax benefits towards specific 
policy goals. Furthermore, the requirements help governments exercise control over the quali-
fying recipient philanthropic organisations and avoid abuse.
In the Netherlands, for example, foreign philanthropic organisations must be recognised as a 
Public Benefit Pursuing Entity (Algemeen Nut Beogende Instelling) by the Dutch tax authorities. 
To qualify as such, the organisation must meet a set of requirements. The foreign organisation 
must be located in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, another EU Member State, or a state des-
ignated by the Ministry of Finance. Most importantly, it must exclusively or almost exclusively 
(at least 90%) contribute to public benefit. It has to comply with a set of oversight rules and 
administrative requirements. These include, for example, a requirement to publish an annual 
report, policy plan, and other documents online.6
In the case of the Netherlands, the foreign philanthropic organisation must meet the Dutch 
requirements. This is what is referred to as host country control. Countries can also rely on 
supervision over the philanthropic organisation in the country of residence of the philanthropic 
organisation. This is referred to as home country control (Hemels, 2009). Luxembourg partially 
relies on home country control. In Luxembourg, the foreign philanthropic organisation must 
be a similar entity to a qualifying Luxembourg organisation. To establish that the organisa-
tion is similar to a qualifying Luxembourg organisation, the donor has to demonstrate that the 
foreign philanthropic organisation (i) ‘pursues one or more non-lucrative aims’ including art, 
education, philanthropy, worship/religion, science, social, sports, tourism, and/or development 
cooperation and (ii) is eligible to receive gifts with a tax benefit under the laws of its country of 
residence and that it is exempt from income tax and wealth tax.7
At the international level, countries can conclude tax treaties in which they bilaterally agree 
to apply their tax incentives to cross-border donations.8 Since a tax treaty, in principle, decides 
which law is applicable and does not actually shape laws; the tax treaty solely regulates that the 
tax incentive available in the domestic situation applies in the specific cross-border situation 
and details the type of control exercised over the recipient charity – whether home country 
control, host country control, or a combination of the two. Most tax treaties are based on the 
model tax treaties of either the United Nations or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). These model tax treaties do not include a provision that enables 
tax-efficient charitable giving between the contracting states.9 This is a possible reason for the 
existence of a limited amount of treaties that facilitate tax benefits on cross-border donations.
The United States has concluded tax treaties with Canada, Israel, and Mexico in which 
cross-border donations to philanthropic organisations qualify for a tax benefit. The deductibility 
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of donations to philanthropic organisations in the other contracting state is, however, limited to 
the income derived from that country.10
At the supranational level, countries can overcome the inapplicability of tax incentives by 
(i) recognising equivalent philanthropic organisations in states with which they have concluded 
a supranational agreement or (ii) through the introduction of a common philanthropic sta-
tus with the same tax preferences for organisations with a domestic philanthropic status. This 
requires countries to (partially) give up their sovereignty over their tax system. EU Member 
States, for example, must – in accordance with the four fundamental freedoms in EU law and 
specifically the free movement of capital11 – apply the domestically available tax incentive to 
gifts to comparable philanthropic organisations located in other EU Member States. This was 
enforced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Persche case.12 Thus, when a donor tax 
resident in EU Member State A donates to a philanthropic organisation in Member State B 
and the donation qualifies for a tax benefit in Member State A, the donor must also receive a 
tax benefit in the cross-border situation between Member States A and B. Discrimination on 
the basis of the country of residence of the philanthropic organisation is not allowed within the 
EU. Since 2005, the EC has instituted infringement procedures to ensure non-discrimination 
of philanthropic organisations and their benefactors in the EU. Nonetheless, Croatia, Portugal, 
Romania, and Spain do not apply the domestically available tax incentive in a comparable cross-
border situation with other EU Member States.13 The EC has ongoing infringement procedures 
against Spain.14
Countries could also supranationally agree to use a common philanthropic status. In 2012, 
the European Commission presented the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for 
a European Foundation. This proposal aimed to provide for a European uniform and supra-
national legal form for philanthropic organisations. This proposal, however, was withdrawn in 
2015.15
These solutions at three different legal levels are initiated by governments and enable donors 
to overcome tax barriers across borders. Philanthropic organisations can also facilitate foreign 
donors with a tax benefit by circumventing the cross-border situation. This is done by facilitat-
ing the donor to donate to a domestic philanthropic organisation, which then spends the dona-
tion abroad. Philanthropic organisations can, for example, establish a separate entity with the 
specific purpose of raising funds in the donor’s country, which I refer to as a ‘foreign friends’ 
organisation’. Donations are made to this legal entity with a philanthropic status in the donor’s 
country of residence and they receive a tax benefit. The foreign friends’ organisation then trans-
fers the funds to the philanthropic organisation located abroad. The foreign friends’ organisation 
offers tax authorities a certain degree of supervision over the philanthropic organisation while 
offering an option to facilitate tax-efficient cross-border charitable giving.
As an alternative to a foreign friends’ organisation, which is typically dedicated to one 
philanthropic organisation, philanthropic organisations and their donors could also make 
use of a giving intermediary (also referred to as an intermediary organisation). This giving 
intermediary fulfils a similar role as the foreign friends’ organisation. However, it serves mul-
tiple foreign causes in exchange for a limited fee. The giving intermediary has philanthropic 
status in the donor’s country of residence. By donating to the giving intermediary, the donor 
obtains a tax benefit. The giving intermediary transfers the donation to the foreign phil-
anthropic organisation. The fee, which can vary between 0.5% and 5% is usually deducted 
from the gift. To avoid infringement of domestic tax laws, the giving intermediary must 
ensure that the recipient charity spends the donations in line with the philanthropic status of 




Usually, a giving intermediary attracts funds from donors in one country and enables them 
to contribute to philanthropic organisations in one or more foreign countries. There are also 
networks of giving intermediaries – entities with philanthropic status in multiple countries that 
allow donors from multiple countries to give to philanthropic organisations in other countries. 
The philanthropic organisation would, however, have to deal with entities in the different 
countries to ensure they act in line with the legislation in the donor’s country.
Whether it is possible to obtain a tax benefit by donating to a giving intermediary depends 
on the legislation in the donor’s country. Some countries, like the Netherlands, might perceive 
the giving intermediary as a fiscally transparent entity and, therefore, might consider the final 
beneficiary of the gift when deciding on the eligibility for a tax benefit. Other countries impose 
strict limitations on foreign spending of donations received, like Australia in the past (Silver and 
Buijze, 2020, pp. 123–128).
Solutions like the foreign friends’ organisation, the giving intermediary, and other solutions 
cannot be used in every cross-border situation. This again is dependent on the legislation in the 
donor’s country of residence.
3 Experiences with solutions to tax-efficient,  
cross-border philanthropy
A Methodology
To assess which of the existing solutions is optimal from the perspective of philanthropic organi-
sations aiming to facilitate tax incentives for foreign donors, I used a qualitative case study design 
(Bryman, 2008, pp. 52–58; Yin, 2003, pp. 1–9).16 In these qualitative case studies, I particularly 
focused on arts organisations as a specific group of philanthropic organisations. Amongst this 
group, some organisations are geographically bound to their physical location (like museums), 
whereas others can travel to foreign locations (like performing arts companies).
Semi-structured interviews were held with 47 employees of arts organisations responsible 
for international fundraising. These included managing directors, heads of development or 
heads of funding, coordinators of international friends circles, and the like. For clarity, I refer to 
these persons as ‘fundraisers’. Furthermore, interviews were held with 25 tax and philanthropy 
experts, including tax and philanthropy advisors, employees of giving intermediaries, philan-
thropists, policy makers, and tax inspectors. Documents of arts organisations were analysed, 
including annual reports, websites, and media coverage on these organisations, and the gifts 
received and efforts made to attract funds from abroad were also examined. The cases were 
selected through a non-probability sampling strategy to ensure that a variety of organisations 
was included. All organisations have philanthropic status in their country of residence and are 
of some international relevance. They have either received donations from abroad or made a 
serious attempt to raise funds abroad. The results included 36 case studies on cross-border fun-
draising by arts organisations active across different disciplines and located in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.17 More importantly, these arts organisations had international fundraising experience in 
various countries, as these were the resident countries of the donors. These countries stipulated 
whether a tax incentive was available in a cross-border situation and also which solutions should 
be used to obtain that incentive. The sample arts organisations received cross-border gifts from 
Belgium, Bermuda, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Peru, 




The interviewees were, amongst others, asked about their foreign fundraising and specifi-
cally their efforts to assist a foreign donor in obtaining a tax incentive on a donation, knowledge 
about tax incentives, experiences with the existing solutions, and preferences concerning these 
solutions.18 The data gathered provide insight into the practice of cross-border philanthropy. 
They demonstrate what challenges an arts organisation faces when trying to facilitate a foreign 
donor with a tax benefit.
B The use of tax incentives for cross-border gifts
All arts organisations included in the research advertised tax incentives in the information for 
domestic donors. The interviewees seemed to be aware of the applicable domestic incentives 
and requirements involved. Those organisations that proactively raise funds abroad also address 
the possibility of obtaining a tax benefit on a cross-border donation in their brochures and on 
their websites. Fundraisers explain that they do so because the tax benefit persuades donors – 
although it is not the main motive behind giving. Arts organisations 13 and 35, for example, 
had foreign donors who contribute without receiving a tax benefit. It is not always known 
whether a donor utilises a tax incentive. Among the fundraisers interviewed, there was a general 
presumption that, when available, donors do use tax incentives. Arts organisations 1, 3, and 24 
all had a donor for whom receiving a tax incentive was a prerequisite for giving. Arts organisa-
tion 3 used a giving intermediary to facilitate this gift, while arts organisation 24 even set up an 
American friends’ organisation to provide the donor with a tax benefit. As fundraiser 24 says: 
‘Actually, it was he who said “I would like to support that exhibition. . . . I would like to sup-
port this exhibition with my American company, but I can only do so if you have a 501(c)3” ’. 
Arts organisation 1 had to conclude that it was unable to facilitate the foreign donor with a tax 
benefit, after which the donor renounced his gift.
The fundraisers were, to some extent, familiar with the unilateral solution, foreign friends’ 
organisation, or giving intermediaries. Some of them had experience with one or a few of 
these solutions. The best-known solutions were the foreign friends’ organisation and the giv-
ing intermediary. Fundraisers had little to no experience with tax treaties and the fundamental 
freedoms in the EU. Not being aware of all the solutions does not seem to pose a problem for 
them. Fundraiser 9 mentioned the following when asked whether he wanted to know more 
about tax incentives for cross-border giving:
Given that I know how [giving intermediary] works, I do know that it is feasible, and 
it will not take very long before it is arranged. So, if [arts organisation 9 receives a 
cross-border gift] we can still [provide a tax benefit via the giving intermediary].
C Experiences with foreign friends’ organisations
For arts organisation 24, for example, the core reason for setting up a foreign friends’ organisa-
tion was to facilitate their foreign benefactors with a tax incentive. Among the 36 arts organisa-
tions included in the research, 11 had, or used to have, a foreign friends’ organisation. Setting 
up a foreign friends’ organisation seemed to be of interest for arts organisations with a strong 
connection to one or a few foreign countries and a large support base in those countries that 
provides a steady stream of income. Fundraisers 26 and 35 stressed that having a foreign friends’ 




Experiences with foreign friends’ organisations were not solely positive. Interviewees com-
plained about the costs involved in setting up such an entity and the extensive and detailed 
administrative requirements that had to be met for the organisation to be recognised as a phil-
anthropic organisation for tax purposes. Furthermore, the maintenance of a foreign friends’ 
organisation – managing the entity and ensuring the entity continued to meet the general and 
administrative requirements of a philanthropic organisation (such as annual audits and board 
meetings) – imposed a large burden on the main organisation. For arts organisation 7, this was 
a reason to give up its American friends’ organisation:
The [board of the] American friends had the view that it was a big administrative bur-
den, it was costly and took up too much of their time, which they would rather invest 
in meeting other people. Thus, they decided that nowadays this can be arranged in a 
much easier and different manner.
It was clear that voluntary efforts of dedicated individuals residing in the country where the 
foreign friends’ organisation was established were key. As director 23 put it: ‘Without the right 
people to pull the organisation, it is not a realistic option [to set up a foreign friends’ organisa-
tion]’. For arts organisations, this means that they have to try to attract these persons and get 
them motivated to help the organisation, as well as keeping them aligned with the views of 
the arts organisation. Larger arts organisations even had staff at the main organisation to ensure 
smooth collaboration with the foreign friends’ organisation. In fact, the experiences of several 
arts organisations demonstrated that active management of the foreign friends’ organisations 
was necessary to ensure the foreign entity flourished and avoided any potential damage to the 
reputation of the main organisation.
D Experiences with giving intermediaries
Another well-known and widely used solution among arts fundraisers is the giving intermediary. 
All informants were familiar with this solution, and most of them had experience using it. The 
fact that the giving intermediary ensures the applicable legal and administrative requirements are 
met for the donor to obtain a tax benefit on a cross-border gift is a big relief for arts organisations. 
First, the arts organisation does not have to hire tax and legal experts in the donor’s country to 
inform them. Second, the arts organisation does not have to meet specific provisions and detailed 
administrative requirements to be recognised as an eligible recipient according to a foreign legisla-
tion, in addition to the legislation in the arts organisation’s country of residence.
Although a fee is charged by the giving intermediary, arts organisations do not perceive that 
as an obstacle. Compared with the costs involved for a foreign friends’ organisation, the fee is 
perceived as reasonable. Fundraiser 10A explains:
It is a very deliberate choice not to apply for charitable status, the 501(c)3 status, in the 
United States because then you need to have a board, take care of the administration, 
and you need an office. These costs are just too high in comparison to [the fee of a 
giving intermediary]. They cost us a minimum fee, as they are not for profit. So, in 
comparison, the [giving intermediary] is the cheapest option.
The fact that there are no other costs for legal advice or official translations of articles of 
association and other documents makes the giving intermediary relatively inexpensive. Most 
arts organisations pay the fee themselves. It is rather exceptional for a donor to pay this fee.
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When making use of a giving intermediary, philanthropic organisations are usually vetted to 
ensure the giving intermediary does not put its own philanthropic status at risk by supporting 
the foreign organisation. For this procedure, the philanthropic organisation must submit sev-
eral documents to the giving intermediary, such as annual reports, articles of association, and a 
policy plan. This was not considered an obstacle by the interviewees, as the vetting procedure 
was perceived as uncomplicated in comparison to the procedure of obtaining philanthropic 
status abroad for the arts organisation. Furthermore, once vetted, the arts organisation can 
actively inform foreign potential donors of the option to make a donation to the organisation 
with a tax benefit. If the organisation receives donations from multiple countries, however, the 
philanthropic organisation must deal with multiple giving intermediaries by whom it must be 
vetted. For organisations that only receive philanthropic gifts on an incidental basis, the giving 
intermediary proves to be an interesting solution.
E Experiences with the unilateral solution
A few arts organisations included in the research are familiar with the unilateral solution and 
have actual experience with it. The organisations that did rely on the unilateral solution have 
mixed experiences.
Arts organisation 20, an Italian cultural heritage organisation, hired tax advisors from the 
United Kingdom to help them obtain charitable status in the country. They tried twice but 
failed in both attempts.19 According to the rejection letter, the articles of association of the arts 
organisation did not meet the exact requirements for recognition as a philanthropic organisa-
tion under United Kingdom law. First, the philanthropic aim of the organisation was defined 
too broadly. Where the articles of association referred to ‘the defence of the environment 
and artistic and monumental heritage’, according to the Charities Act 2006, they should have 
instead referred to ‘the advancement of the arts, culture, and heritage’ and ‘the advancement 
of environmental protection or improvement’. Second, the dissolution clause stated that the 
organisation’s remaining assets would be donated to other organisations ‘with objectives of pub-
lic utility’. ‘Public utility’ was considered too indefinite to ensure the funds would be distributed 
to ‘charitable purposes’. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) applied the Charities 
Act, 2006, in a strict and narrow manner. Despite the essence of the articles of association being 
in line with the Charities Act, 2006, the exact wording was lacking. Anecdotal evidence shared 
by the interviewed tax advisors suggests that not all supervising authorities are as stringent as the 
HMRC. France, for example, has a more lenient way of testing equivalence.
The example of arts organisation 20 illustrates that despite being similar, in the case of host 
country control, it can be impossible for philanthropic organisations to obtain philanthropic 
status in their country of residence, as well as in that of their foreign benefactors’. Conflicting 
requirements concerning the articles of association prohibit this.
Since arts organisation 20 wanted to maintain its philanthropic status in Italy, it could not 
change its articles of association, as it would then run the risk of not meeting the Italian require-
ments for philanthropic organisations. In this specific situation, applying for philanthropic status 
in the United Kingdom was a waste of resources, as the fundraisers had hired tax experts and 
official translators, as well as investing time themselves.
Other arts organisations were more successful. Belgian arts organisation 18 had an in-house 
tax lawyer, who applied for philanthropic status in four EU Member States. She reported that 
this process was relatively easy in two countries. In these countries, arts organisation 18 received 
philanthropic status. In the other two countries, the application procedure was complex and 
lengthy. Arts organisation 18 had to resubmit documents in one country and was still waiting 
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for a response after one year from the other country. Tax lawyers also experienced these lengthy 
procedures when trying to register their clients as an equivalent philanthropic organisation 
in another EU Member State. In some EU Member States, the philanthropic status must be 
renewed after a certain period, which further increases the administrative burden (Hippel, 
2014). For arts organisation 18, obtaining philanthropic status without having to establish or 
use the services of a separate legal entity proved advantageous.
4 Assessing the solutions to tax-efficient, cross-border giving
A Why is the giving intermediary currently the best option?
The optimal solution to facilitate a foreign donor with a tax benefit from the perspective of 
philanthropic organisations depends on the specific cross-border situation. Dutch donors, for 
example, can use a tax deduction when giving to philanthropic organisations located around 
the world as long as these organisations have Public Benefit Pursuing Entity (PBPE) status in 
the Netherlands. Arts organisations 33 and 34, both American arts organisations, are registered 
as a PBPEs in the Netherlands. Dutch donors, however, cannot use the giving intermediary to 
obtain a tax deduction on cross-border giving. American donors, on the other hand, can rely 
on the giving intermediary but not on domestic tax law to give to a foreign charity.
The optimal solution also depends on the specific context of the philanthropic organisation. 
Does it receive a steady stream of income from one specific country? Under these circum-
stances, it might be worthwhile to invest in a solution, like a foreign friends’ organisation that 
facilitates a tax benefit for donors in the specific country. However, if international gifts are inci-
dental and foreign donors are scattered across different countries, this might not be worthwhile.
Fundraisers included in this research who know and/or have experience using a giving inter-
mediary are positive about this solution. The majority prefer the giving intermediary over other 
existing solutions, as they do not have to worry about legal and administrative requirements, and 
costs are limited. From their perspective, it is the optimal solution in many cross-border situ-
ations. Their knowledge on other solutions seemed to be limited. Therefore, the experiences 
of tax and philanthropy advisers are considered when assessing the solutions to cross-border, 
tax-efficient giving. When taking these views into account, the intermediary charity scores 
high as well.
An advantage of the intermediary charity over the foreign friends’ organisation, unilateral 
solution, tax treaty, and supranational agreement is that it does not require much tax or legal 
knowledge. In the interviews, the fundraisers, for example, demonstrated that they were not 
familiar with tax treaties as a possible method to overcome the tax barrier to cross-border phil-
anthropic giving. The following quote from fundraiser 28 of an American arts organisation 
that could potentially make use of a tax treaty to facilitate their Mexican, Canadian, and Israeli 
donors with a tax benefit illustrates that gathering the relevant knowledge is not their prior-
ity: ‘it requires time, energy, and expertise to research this and so far we have not had enough 
staff, or we have not deemed it a big enough pay-off to invest in doing the research on this’. 
The frequent changes in tax laws further complicate the issue for arts organisations who have 
to keep up with legislation regarding charitable organisations in multiple countries. This itself 
is not surprising, as fundraisers are not tax experts. The arts organisations, however, must hire a 
tax adviser who is familiar with international tax law and the legislation in the donor’s country.
Another advantage of the giving intermediary is that no separate legal entity needs to be 
established to facilitate foreign donors with a tax benefit. This is not the case in the option 
involving a foreign friends’ organisation. Although setting up a legal entity abroad can have 
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benefits when a philanthropic organisation wants to strengthen its relationship with a foreign 
country, setting it up solely for fundraising purposes is perceived as a rather costly and complex 
option that requires continuous attention and time. Besides the cost of setting up an entity and 
its maintenance, it is considered a rather time-consuming effort. As fundraiser 1 explains: ‘[The 
foreign friends’ organisation] namely requires a lot of maintenance. I know how much invest-
ment is required to get a meeting with the board, to mobilise them, to bring them all together. 
That requires quite a lot of time’. Tax advisor 4 recognises the work involved in setting up a 
philanthropic organisation and says:
I sometimes also tell my clients – who say ‘I want my own foundation’ – you have to 
know that you also take on a lot of hassle [when setting up a foundation]. You have to 
meet all Public Benefit Organisation requirements. You are not the sole board mem-
ber. [The PBO] has to be officially independent. So, you have to gather some people 
[to join you on the board]. It also includes some administrative obligations. So, it is not 
just fun to have [a foundation]. It also has other sides to it.
For philanthropic organisations that do not want to set up a legal entity abroad, relying on 
one of the legal solutions – the unilateral solution, tax treaty, or the four fundamental freedoms 
in the EU – could be an option.
The four fundamental freedoms in the EU require the philanthropic organisation to be con-
sidered equivalent to domestic philanthropic organisations. Philanthropic organisations would, 
therefore, need to meet certain requirements like obtaining the necessary tax and legal know-
how or hiring an expert. The procedures to be recognised as an equivalent philanthropic organ-
isation – the equivalence test – are often unclear and differ across EU Member States, which 
is the second hurdle. The proof that the donor must submit to demonstrate equivalence varies 
across countries, and sometimes there is lack of clarity regarding what proof is required. Then 
there are countries, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, and the Slovak Republic, that decide whether a foreign charity is a charitable organisation 
on a case-by-case basis (for each donation filed for a tax benefit) (OECD, 2020, p. 111). This 
decision is made ex post, making it difficult for donors to anticipate on a potential tax benefit 
when donating to a foreign philanthropic organisation. Belgium also relies on a case-by-case 
approach. It is possible, though, to obtain a ruling on the equivalence of a foreign entity in Bel-
gium (OECD, 2020, p. 111). Other countries make a general decision in which a foreign phil-
anthropic organisation is granted equivalence to a domestic philanthropic organisation at once. 
In Finland, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, and Sweden, foreign philanthropic organisations 
must prove equivalence to a domestic charity and register themselves (OECD, 2020, p. 111). 
This ex-ante approach provides certainty on the applicability of a tax incentive to donors who 
want to contribute to a foreign charity and thus allows philanthropic organisations to use the 
available tax incentive as a tool to stimulate donations from foreign donors.
Philanthropic organisations that want philanthropic status in their country of residence as 
well as in the country where their foreign donors reside might have to meet the requirements 
in both countries. The interviewed tax advisors demonstrate that the key factor was whether a 
solution relied on home country control, host country control, or a combination of the two.
Koele (2007, pp. 389–390) and Oberson (2021) agree that in theory, a tax treaty can provide 
an effective solution to overcome the tax barrier to cross-border philanthropic giving. The tax 
advisors interviewed added that this provision is only useful from a practical point of view if 
it includes the concept that the philanthropic organisation under the legislation in one of the 
contracting states is essentially equivalent to a philanthropic organisation under the legislation 
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of the other contracting state. If equivalence of philanthropic organisations is not included in 
the tax treaty, and the treaty thus relies on host country control, it might not provide an effec-
tive solution.
In the case of Persche, the ECJ ruled that an EU Member State does not automatically have 
to acknowledge a foreign philanthropic status when granting tax relief to donations. In the EU, 
the predominant type of control, therefore, is host country control, with a few exceptions, such 
as Luxembourg. Under host country control, the philanthropic organisation must meet the 
requirements of a philanthropic organisation for tax purposes in the EU Member State where 
the donor resides (Hemels, 2009). This imposes a large administrative burden on philanthropic 
organisations, as they have to demonstrate that they meet the requirements in the foreign coun-
try. Philanthropic organisations would potentially have to meet 28 different sets of requirements 
to meet the definition of a philanthropic organisation in all 28 Member States.
If requirements of the host country conflict with those of the home country of the phil-
anthropic organisation or with those of another country where the philanthropic organisation 
has donors, it might not even be possible to facilitate donors in multiple countries with a tax 
benefit based on a legal solution. Tax advisor 1 pointed to the requirements regarding the legal 
form as conflicting between the home country and the host country. Tax advisor 10 had a 
foreign religious philanthropic organisation as its client who could not be recognised as such 
in the country of tax advisor 10 since religion was not considered a cause qualifying for special 
tax treatment. The definition of a public benefit purpose was conflicting in this case. Other 
conflicting requirements between countries that were mentioned included the reimbursement 
of board members, the articles of association – as experienced by arts organisation 20 – and the 
disclosure of documents. When relying on a giving intermediary, it is not necessary to meet 
every single administrative requirement in the donor’s country of residence, as the giving inter-
mediary ensures it meets all legal and administrative requirements. It is usually sufficient if the 
foreign philanthropic organisation is not for profit, benefits the general public, and pursues a 
philanthropic purpose. Not having to meet every detail of the requirements in countries where 
foreign donors reside to some extent neutralises the fact that taxation rules applicable to philan-
thropic organisations are not coordinated across countries. It allows philanthropic organisations 
to facilitate foreign donors in multiple countries with a tax benefit on their gift, despite varying 
requirements.
What further hinders the effectiveness of the legal solutions is their scope. The number 
of tax treaties that include a provision on cross-border charitable giving is limited. Only one 
of the tax advisers interviewed actually had experience in using a provision on cross-border 
charitable giving, specifically the provision in the Canada-U.S. tax treaty.20 The effectiveness of 
the fundamental freedoms in the EU as a solution to ensure tax-efficient cross-border giving 
is in the first instance limited to cross-border giving from one EU Member State to another 
EU Member State or member of the European Economic Area (EEA).21 To the best of my 
knowledge, the Netherlands is the sole country that has unilaterally extended the scope of its tax 
provision beyond the EEA. Canada and New Zealand allow foreign philanthropic organisations 
to become eligible recipients of gifts with a tax benefit (OECD, 2020 p. 113). The definition of 
qualifying philanthropic organisations, however, is limited.
B What the optimal solution would look like
Although the giving intermediary is currently the best available solution, it is not the optimal 
solution. The intermediary is a workaround, a service to avoid the actual cross-border situation 
for which a fee has to be paid. It does not allow the arts organisation to directly receive the 
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international donation and requires them to collaborate with giving intermediaries in all the 
countries where they have donors.
For philanthropic organisations, it would be far more appealing if they could directly receive 
a foreign gift with a tax benefit. This could be done by allowing for cross-border gifts based 
on domestic legislation, tax treaties, or a supranational agreement. Ideally, the solution would 
be available in numerous cross-border situations. The experiences of arts organisations and 
tax and philanthropy experts demonstrate that the optimal solution would need to have clear 
procedures that apply an ex-ante approach to provide donors with certainty in advance on the 
tax benefit they obtain on their gift. Finally, and most importantly, the ideal solution relies on 
home country control. This would avoid philanthropic organisations having to meet multiple 
sets of (potentially conflicting) requirements. Furthermore, it would be a cost-efficient solution, 
as fundraisers themselves are usually well aware of the tax requirements that their organisation 
has to meet in its country of residence to be considered philanthropic.
The question is whether a solution that relies on home country control is feasible. Consid-
ering the high degree in overlap of requirements to qualify as a philanthropic organisation and 
the definition of philanthropic purpose (OECD, 2020), one would expect it to be feasible. It, 
however, would require countries to give up part of their sovereignty and trust each other’s 
supervising authorities. The unsuccessful attempt to introduce a European-wide uniform and 
supranational legal form for philanthropic organisations22 taught us that, thus far, this is an 
insurmountable barrier.
5 Conclusion
In the past three decades, extensive efforts have been made to overcome the tax barriers to 
cross-border giving. In line with the efforts within the EU to harmonise taxes, most EU Mem-
ber States have opened their tax incentives to philanthropic organisations in other EU Member 
States. Networks of giving intermediaries like Transnational Giving Europe were established 
and grew from an annual turnover of €3 million in 2009 to almost €14 million in 2019 (Trans-
national Giving Europe, 2020). These efforts all contribute to create a level playing field for 
philanthropic organisations across countries. This stimulates international giving, which is 
important, as international philanthropy holds the potential to make a positive contribution to 
global challenges.
Still, a lot can be done to further ease cross-border philanthropy. The experiences of arts 
organisations show us that, despite legislation enabling tax-efficient cross-border giving in 
theory, in practice, obtaining a tax incentive on a cross-border donation is still challenging. 
Although the giving intermediary is effective and rather easy to use for arts organisations, 
this is no more than a workaround. Ideally, either at a national, bilateral, or supranational 
legal level, a provision should be introduced that allows for tax-efficient cross-border giving 
to equivalent foreign philanthropic organisations based on an ex-ante approach and home 
country control. The feasibility of such a solution is expected to be challenging, as states are 
not likely to give up a part of the sovereignty over their tax systems and trust each other’s 
supervising authorities.
Notes
 1 Philanthropic outflows are defined as ‘a) the sum of charitable financial contributions sent by donors 
when the donor (individuals, corporations, foundations, or other grant-making organisations) and 
the beneficiary (individuals, philanthropic organisations, or intermediary organisations) are located in 
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 15 European Commission (7 March 2015) Withdrawal of Commission Proposals, OJ. C80(17), available 
at EUR-Lex-52015XC0307(02)-EN-EUR-Lex (europa.eu). For a detailed analysis of the potential of 
the European Foundation to overcome the tax barriers to cross-border giving, I refer to Hemels (2009) 
and Hemels and Stevens (2012).
 16 This is part of a larger research on cross-border charitable giving to the arts and the tax barriers 
involved. It was carried out between 2012 and 2017; see Tackling the International Tax Barriers to Cross-
Border Charitable Giving (Buijze, 2020).
 17 For a full list of interviewees, see Appendix 1.
 18 In this research, interviewees were questioned about actual experiences with cross-border giving (the 
ex-post perspective) as well as hypothetical situations based on a vignette (the ex-ante perspective). This 
resulted in rich data, from which criteria could be derived and parameters for the optimal solution 
could be set (to be met by the arts organisation) (Buijze, 2020). This chapter, however, focuses on the 
actual experiences of interviewees with fundraising abroad and the solutions to tax-efficient cross-
border giving. Thus, this chapter takes the ex-post perspective.
 19 When the interviews took place, the United Kingdom was still part of the European Union.
 20 Convention between Canada and the United states of America with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
(26 September 1980, as amended through 2007), Treaties & Models IBFD.
 21 As the relevant EU case law refers to the free movement of capital, EU law could remove the tax bar-
rier when donating from an EU Member State to a third country, based on article 63 TFEU. The 
scope of article 63 TFEU, however, is limited by article 64 TFEU, which stipulates that EU Member 
States may retain the restrictions that existed on 31 December 1993. As the tax provisions on charitable 
giving were in place before this date in many EU Member States, the tax benefits do not have to apply 
in cross-border situations between EU Member States and third countries.
 22 On 8 February 8 2012, the EC presented a Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a 
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efactors would receive the same tax privileges as domestic charitable organisations in every EU Mem-
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# Location  Interviewee  Discipline  Type  Size  FFO*  EA** 
1 NL  Fundraiser 1  Cultural heritage  Fixed location  Medium       
2 NL  Fundraiser 2  Performing art  Company  Small       
3 NL  Fundraiser 3  Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium       
4  NL  Director 4  Fine arts  Fixed location  Small       
5 NL  Fundraiser 5  Performing art  Festival  Medium       
6 NL  Director 6  Cultural heritage  Fixed location  Medium  V    
6 NL  Fundraiser 6  Cultural heritage  Fixed location  Medium  V    
7 NL  Fundraiser 7  Performing art  Company  Major  V    
8 NL  Fundraiser 8  Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium  V    
9 NL  Fundraiser 9  Performing art  Company  Superstar       
10 NL  Fundraiser 10A  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
10  NL  Fundraiser 10B  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
11  NL  Fundraiser 11  Cultural heritage  Fixed location  Small       
12  NL  Fundraiser 12  Performing art  Company  Medium       
13  NL  Fundraiser 13  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
14  NL  Director 14  Fine arts  Fixed location  Small       
15  NL  Fundraiser 15  Performing art  Company  Medium  V    
16  NL  Director 16  Fine arts  Network organisation  Small       
17  NL  Director 17  Cultural heritage  Network organisation  Small       
18  BE  Fundraiser 18A  Fine arts  Fixed location  Major       
18  BE  Fundraiser 18B  Fine arts  Fixed location  Major       
18  BE  In-house lawyer 18  Fine arts  Fixed location  Major       
19  CH  Fundraiser 19  Fine arts  Fixed location  Small  V    
20  IT  Fundraiser 20A  Cultural heritage  Network organisation  Major  V    
20  IT  Fundraiser 20B  Cultural heritage  Network organisation  Major  V    
20  IT  Fundraiser 20C  Cultural heritage  Network organisation  Major  V    
21  DE  Fundraiser 21  Fine arts  Festival  Major       
22  FR  Fundraiser 22A  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar  V    
22  FR  Fundraiser 22B  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar  V    
23  BE  Director 23  Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium       
24  DK  Fundraiser 24  Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium  V    
25  UK  Fundraiser 25  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar  V    
26  BE  Director 26  Cultural heritage  Fixed location  Small       
27  AT  Fundraiser 27  Performing art  Festival  Superstar  V    
28  U.S.  Fundraiser 28  Performing art  Fixed location  Superstar       
29  BE  Director 29  Fine arts  Fixed location  Small       
30  FR  Fundraiser 30  Fine arts  Fixed location  Major  V    
31  U.S.  Fundraiser 31  Cultural heritage  Network organisation  Medium     V 
32  U.S.  Fundraiser 32A  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
32  U.S.  Fundraiser 32B  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
32  U.S.  In-house lawyer 32  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
33  U.S.  Fundraiser 33  Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium       
33  U.S.  In-house accountant 33 Fine arts  Fixed location  Medium       
34  U.S.  Fundraiser 34A  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
34  U.S.  Fundraiser 34B  Fine arts  Fixed location  Superstar       
35  FR  Fundraiser 35  Performing art  Festival  Major       




Americans are generous, at least with respect to charitable contributions. We contribute more 
money (and often highly appreciated property) to fund charitable activities (both domestic and 
foreign) than residents of any other country.1 While this generosity exists among Americans of 
all income levels, over the past three decades or so, there has been a dramatic increase in chari-
table giving (and planned charitable giving) by those at the very top of the income distribution. 
We can see this in both the large growth of assets held in the non-profit, tax-exempt sector as 
well as the number of billionaires who have pledged to give a majority of their wealth for chari-
table purposes. The “Giving Pledge” highlights the generosity of the ultra-wealthy and their 
willingness to give back to a society that helped them achieve their success.2
Americans also lead in funding international charitable activities.3 Many alternatives exist to 
help fund charitable activities outside the United States. For example, U.S. donors can contrib-
ute to U.S. charitable organizations that engage in direct operations in foreign countries or that 
make grants to foreign charitable entities, to U.S. “friends of ” organizations that then transfer 
the funds to a designated foreign charitable organization, and to donor-advised funds with a 
recommendation that the funds be directed to a designated foreign charity. Tax subsidies to 
donors and to U.S. charitable entities support all these activities.
But Americans who contribute directly to foreign charities generally receive no income tax 
benefits (with exceptions for contributions made to charities in Canada, Mexico, and Israel, 
subject to limitations).4 In examining whether this barrier to cross-border philanthropy makes 
sense, this chapter considers two key questions:
1 Should tax benefits support charitable activities outside the United States?
2 Should the U.S. tax system treat contributions to foreign charities differently from contri-
butions to domestic charities?
Under current law, U.S. tax barriers to cross-border philanthropy are remarkably low.5 Contri-
butions to U.S. charitable organizations are deductible even if all charitable activity takes place 
outside the United States. Direct contributions to foreign charities are generally not deductible 
for income tax purposes. But, because many alternatives are available under U.S. law to channel 
contributions to foreign charities, this prohibition merely increases the complexity and transac-








foreign charities differently than contributions to domestic charities. Practically, donors gener-
ally can transmute non-deductible contributions to foreign charities into deductible contribu-
tions to domestic charities pretty easily.
The harder question is normative: what should the law be? It depends on how one frames 
the inquiry. One approach focuses on whether there are meaningful differences between U.S. 
and foreign charitable activities and between domestic and foreign charities that justify different 
tax treatment. This approach requires looking at the different rationales for charitable tax subsi-
dies for guidance that might apply to warrant differential treatment. Unfortunately, the different 
theories that support using tax benefits to support charitable activities provide remarkably little 
guidance as to what types of activities merit favorable tax treatment and whether to extend such 
subsidies to foreign charitable activities or foreign charities. While strong arguments exist that 
the theories supporting charitable tax subsidies do not justify privileging domestic activity (or 
prohibiting or limiting subsides for foreign charitable activity), it is not clear a finding of “no 
sufficient difference” justifies tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities.
A second approach examines whether the current U.S. approach is the most effective way 
to achieve societal objectives for supporting charitable activities, including foreign activities. 
This second approach requires considerations of the efficacy of the current tax regime for both 
domestic and foreign charitable activities as well as other alternatives the U.S. government could 
adopt to provide financial support and other incentives to charitable activities. The question is 
easy to state: do the costs of the charitable tax subsidies exceed the benefits from the incremental 
charitable activities resulting from the tax subsidies? The answer is a lot more difficult. It requires 
looking at who benefits from charitable tax subsidies (both donors and recipients of charitable 
goods and services), who bears the costs of the tax subsidies, and who decides how to spend 
the funds attributable to these subsidies. It also requires consideration of factors that may justify 
greater tax incentives for domestic charitable activities than foreign charitable activities. Under 
this approach, it is not possible to answer the question of whether U.S. tax subsidies should sup-
port foreign charitable activities and foreign charities without going back to examine the U.S. 
charitable tax regime for both domestic and foreign activities.
Five observations help shape the discussion of using tax subsidies for domestic and foreign 
charitable activities.
First, we lack a comprehensive theory that marries tax subsidies to the current collection of 
qualified charitable activities and charitable organizations. The current tax regime reflects a set 
of trade-offs that result in a robust charitable sector and contributes to the diversity, pluralism, 
and even cacophony that are important in our society.6 It is unclear whether these same trade-
offs would apply to foreign charitable activities and foreign charities.
Second, the choice of whether to extend tax subsidies to foreign charitable activities or 
foreign charities need not be binary (that is, either deny tax subsidies for foreign activities or 
foreign charities or adopt tax subsidies that do not differentiate domestic and foreign charitable 
activities or charities). Another option provides tax subsidies for foreign activities and charities 
that are less expansive (either by adopting a different standard of charitable purpose or more 
restrictive contribution limitations) than those available to domestic activities.
Third, determining the efficacy of charitable tax subsidies requires consideration of all tax 
benefits for charitable activity, not just the charitable deduction under the personal income tax. 
These include income tax benefits for contributions of appreciated property, the reduced estate 
tax liability resulting from both lifetime and testamentary giving, and the loss of tax revenue 
from large transfers of assets from the taxable to the tax-exempt sector.
Fourth, the decision to provide tax subsidies for domestic and foreign charitable activities 
may require policy makers to compare the relative contribution of donors (the after-tax value of 
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their donation) with the effective matching grant provided by government tax subsidies. They 
could then consider whether the current regime is at a “tipping point” where wealthy donors 
have too much control in deciding how government funds are spent.
Finally, accountability and oversight considerations play an important role in both under-
standing current aspects of the U.S. regime for cross-border philanthropy and providing a ration-
ale for different treatment for foreign charitable activities and charities across different countries.
Part I reviews some of the important tax and other regulatory provisions that apply to chari-
table organizations and to donors. Part II examines some of the implications of using the tax 
system to subsidize charitable activities. Part III examines whether tax subsidies should support 
charitable activities outside the United States. Part IV considers whether the tax law should treat 
contributions to foreign charities differently than contributions to domestic charities as well as 
some proposed reforms that would encourage cross-border philanthropy. Part V provides some 
conclusions.
I Regulatory regime for charitable activities
This section reviews briefly the current tax regime that applies to charitable organizations and 
to those donors who contribute to these charities.
A Tax rules for charitable organizations
U.S. tax law provides two major types of tax benefits for charitable organizations.7 First, the 
tax law provides an exemption from income tax for income related to the organization’s chari-
table purpose and for investment income. Second, qualified charities are eligible to receive 
tax-deductible contributions for income, estate, and gift tax purposes. These two tax subsidies 
substantially reduce the after-tax costs of contributing to these charities for donors. In addition 
to these federal tax benefits, charitable organizations may have access to tax-exempt financing 
and qualify for state and local income, sales, and property tax benefits.
To qualify for tax exemption, U.S. tax law requires that the charitable organization be organ-
ized and operated for one of the enumerated charitable purposes. These activities include the 
usual suspects (religious, charitable, scientific, and educational purposes) as well as some activi-
ties that are less obvious (fostering amateur sports competition and for the prevention of cruelty 
to children or animals).
Additional statutory requirements for qualification ensure that the charitable organizations 
do not spill over to other non-charitable goals. They include a prohibition against “private 
inurement” to prevent the organization from providing benefits to insiders and related per-
sons. Similarly, organizations cannot engage in political campaign activity or excessive lobbying. 
Most important for our purposes is a geographical limitation. Only donations made to chari-
ties organized or created in the United States or its possessions can qualify for the charitable 
income tax deduction. Foreign charities can qualify for tax exemption by complying with the 
same application procedures that apply to domestic charities. This status allows foreign charities 
to avoid federal income tax on their charitable activities and investment income but does not 
allow U.S. donors to claim income tax deductions for contributions to these foreign charities.
Different types of charitable organizations. Charitable organizations in the United States come 
in different flavors. The tax law divides charities into private foundations and public charities. 
“Traditional public charities” are what most people think of as charitable organizations, such as 
the YWCA or the Red Cross. Different types of charitable organizations may qualify for public 
charity status.8 The first category provides public charity status either because of the nature of 
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an organization’s activities or because of the broad financial support received.9 This category 
includes educational organizations, religious institutions, and hospitals and medical research 
organizations. A second category of public charities are organizations that receive more than 
one-third of their support from gifts, grants, fees, and receipts of sales of goods and services 
related to their exempt purposes.10 Public charity status provides more generous income tax 
benefits for donors than contributions to private foundations and allows charitable entities to 
avoid a host of excise taxes, minimum distribution requirements, and restrictions that apply to 
private foundations.11
Charitable organizations that do not qualify as public charities are private foundations. While 
they differ greatly in size and nature of activities, they share a common feature – that a small 
group of donors (individuals, families, or corporations) controls them. Two types of private 
foundations exists: one, private operating foundations that engage directly in charitable activi-
ties, and two, private foundations that hold assets for grants to other charitable organizations.12 
Because of a history of abuses involving private foundations, U.S. tax law provides for several 
measures to reduce self-dealing and other abuses and requires a minimum annual distribution.13 
For tax years beginning after December 20, 2019, private foundations are subject to a 1.39% 
excise tax on their net investment income.14
For purposes of cross-border philanthropy, the key difference between public charities and 
private foundations is the additional requirements imposed on private foundations for grants 
made to foreign charities. Unless the foreign charity has received a determination letter from 
the IRS that it meets the standards to qualify as a U.S. public charity, private foundations need to 
comply with certain regulatory requirements. Private foundations are required to either exercise 
expenditure responsibility with respect to the grant or make a good faith determination that 
the foreign charity is the equivalent of a U.S. public charity. Failure to comply results in tax and 
other penalties.
To exercise expenditure responsibility, a private foundation must conduct a pre-grant inquiry 
of the foreign charity to ensure that the funds will be used for the intended charitable purposes. 
Expenditure responsibility also requires the foundation (i) to enter into a written agreement 
with the foreign charity that requires the foreign charity to return any funds not used for the 
charitable purpose, (ii) to exert all reasonable efforts to ensure the funds are spent solely for the 
purposes the grant was made, (iii) to obtain full and complete reports from the foreign charity 
on how funds were spent, and (iv) to make full and detailed reports to the IRS about the funds 
transferred to the foreign charity.
Private foundations can also avoid excise taxes and other penalties on grants to foreign chari-
ties by making a good-faith determination that the foreign charity is the equivalent of a U.S. 
public charity. An organization is equivalent to a U.S. public charity if it is organized, operated, 
and funded like a U.S. public charity. Before 2015, private foundations could rely on an affidavit 
from a foreign charity establishing that the organization was the equivalent of a Section 501(c)(3) 
organization. Treasury regulations provide that private foundations can satisfy the equivalency 
requirement by obtaining written advice from a qualified tax practitioner that the foreign 
charity satisfies the requirements for qualified public charity status.15 In 2017, the IRS issued 
guidelines that sets forth the types of documents, affidavits, representations, and financial infor-
mation that tax practitioners should compile and review in providing written advice to private 
foundations to support an equivalency determination.16 Organizations, such as NGOsource, 
have substantially reduced the costs and challenges of establishing equivalency determination 
by providing private foundations (and donor-advised funds) with access to their repository of 
foreign charities satisfying the U.S. public charity equivalency requirement or by providing legal 
assistance in confirming equivalency for foreign charities not in their repository.17
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In the post-September 11, 2001 world, the differences between the oversight requirements 
for public charities and private foundations have narrowed substantially. As set forth in Part I.C, 
while public charities are not subject to expenditure responsibility or equivalency determina-
tions for grants to foreign charities, they must engage in sufficient due diligence and monitoring 
of funds to avoid penalties under counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws.
Donor-Advised Funds. One major change in the U.S. charitable landscape over the last decade 
is the growth of donor-advised funds.18 These funds offer a hybrid approach to charitable giv-
ing that allows a donor to achieve a substantial measure of informal control over the investment 
and ultimate disposition of the donated property while qualifying for the less onerous rules and 
more generous tax benefits of a public charity.19 A donor-advised fund is a fund or account at 
a qualified public charity (called a “sponsoring organization”) over which the donor or donor-
appointed advisor retains advisory privileges regarding the investment or distribution of assets 
in the fund or account.20 Donors irrevocably transfer funds to the sponsoring organization and 
can claim an income tax deduction when funds are transferred, even though donors generally 
retain the ability to provide advice as to the ultimate charitable beneficiary and often to direct 
how the funds are invested. While the sponsoring organization has legal authority over how the 
funds will be invested and transferred, as a practical matter the “advisory” power of the donor 
will almost always be respected.21
A rapidly growing phenomenon is the affiliation of sponsoring organizations with financial 
institutions (such as Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program, 
Schwab Charitable Fund, and Goldman Sachs Philanthropy Fund).22 The charitable organi-
zations affiliated with financial institutions have seen a rapid increase in both the number of 
donor-advised funds and assets placed in donor-advised funds.23 These sponsors have succeeded 
in creating a relatively simple device that allows donors to time their charitable contributions to 
get the maximum tax benefits while retaining control over where and when the contributions 
to traditional public charities will be made (as well as determining how the assets will be man-
aged in the interim).
Donor-advised funds provide an easy mechanism for donors to designate contributions to 
foreign charities, thus avoiding the non-deductibility rules for direct contributions to foreign 
charities. Similar to the requirements imposed on private foundations, donor-advised funds 
making grants to foreign charities must either make a determination that the foreign charity is 
equivalent to a U.S. public charity or exercise expenditure responsibility over the grants to avoid 
tax penalties.24 Sponsors of donor-advised funds have adopted different policies for contribu-
tions to foreign charities recommended by donors. One approach allows donors to recommend 
distributions to foreign charities but limits potential recipients to those foreign charitable organ-
izations that have received a Section 501(c)(3) determination letter. A  second option allows 
contributions to foreign charities but effectively channels the contribution through an Ameri-
can intermediary charity that will then make a grant to the foreign charity.25 Finally, sponsors of 
donor-advised funds can partner with organizations that can conduct due diligence of foreign 
charities and provide evidence of equivalency determination to a U.S. public charity.26
“Friends of” Organizations. U.S. tax law allows donors to claim a charitable deduction for 
contributions made to a U.S. intermediate entity even if the intermediate entity transfers funds 
to a designated foreign charity.27 As long as the organization does not act as a “mere conduit” 
to the foreign charity, U.S. donors can secure deductions for charitable contributions that are 
effectively made to foreign charities.28
These “friends of ” organizations must satisfy several requirements.29 First, the organization 
must not be required to transfer funds to the foreign charity by either charter or bylaw provi-
sion or by the terms of the gift. Second, the gift to the foreign organization must be within the 
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intermediate entity’s mission and purpose. Finally, the organization must exercise due diligence 
in determining that the foreign charity qualifies as an eligible organization. If the “friends 
of ” organization qualifies as a public charity, then it can avoid the expenditure responsibil-
ity requirements that apply to private foundations. IRS guidelines require that the “friends 
of ” organization not be controlled by the foreign charity.30 A search of the Charity Navigator 
reveals at least 1,000 friends of organizations that have “American Friends of ” in the name of 
the charity.31
In addition to formal “friends of ” status, foreign charities can get de facto status by contract-
ing with an intermediary U.S. charity. For example, CAF America has established a “friends 
fund” that allows foreign charities to avoid the application and reporting requirements under 
U.S. tax law but still allow U.S. donors to receive charitable deductions for funds directed to 
foreign charities.32
B Tax rules for donors
Since 1917, the United States has allowed individuals and corporations to deduct contributions 
made to qualified charitable organizations for income tax purposes. Various limitations on the 
amounts deductible apply depending on the type of donee (public charity or private founda-
tion) and type of property contributed (cash or non-cash property contributions).
Under current temporary provisions, individuals can deduct cash contributions to public 
charities subject to a limitation of 60% (100% for contributions made in 2020) of their adjusted 
gross income.33 For non-cash individual charitable contributions to public charities, the limita-
tion is 50% of adjusted gross income unless the property is long-term capital gain property, in 
which case a 30% limitation applies.
Less favorable rules apply to contributions to private foundations. Generally, individuals can 
deduct 30% of their adjusted gross income for contributions of cash and short-term capital gains 
property and only 20% of their adjusted gross income for contributions of long-term capital 
gain property. For contributions to either public charities or private foundations, individuals can 
carry forward charitable contributions that exceed the limitations for up to 5 years.
Except for a temporary exception provided in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act34 and extended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,35 indi-
viduals who take the standard deduction rather than itemizing receive no income tax benefits 
for charitable contributions. One major consequence of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
(TCJA) is the dramatic increase in the number of taxpayers in this category. Before the TCJA, 
about 69% of taxpayers took the standard deduction. Because of the increase in the amount of 
the standard deduction (and limitations put on other personal deductions – most notably the 
state and local tax deductions), more than 90% of taxpayers will elect to claim the standard 
deduction – and get nothing for their charitable contributions.36 The itemizers are dispropor-
tionately from the upper end of the income distribution.
Donors contributing appreciated property generally receive a less widely recognized second 
tax benefit on top of the well-known charitable deduction. They can claim a deduction equal 
to the fair market value of the appreciated property without paying any capital gains tax on the 
pre-transfer appreciation.37 While contributions of appreciated property to private foundations 
are generally limited to the tax basis in the property, a special exception applies to contribu-
tions of appreciated publicly traded stock.38 As examined further in Part II.D, for many donors, 
the economic value of avoiding any tax on pre-transfer appreciation (and the resultant loss of 




Individuals (and estates) can also receive tax benefits for charitable contributions under the 
estate and gift tax. For 2020, the estate and gift tax exemption is $11.58 million per individual 
(a married couple will have an exemption of $23.16 million). For taxable estates of $1 million 
or more, the estate tax rate is 40%. In 2019, charitable giving through estates amounted to about 
$43 billion, resulting in reduced estate tax revenue of roughly $17 billion (about one-third of 
the annual revenue loss from the charitable income tax deduction).39
Wealthy donors generally engage in more charitable giving at death than through lifetime 
charitable contributions. For net estates between $50 to $100  million, testamentary giving 
exceeds charitable giving in the last 5 years of life by a factor of 10.40 For estates over $100 mil-
lion, testamentary transfers are 20 times greater than giving in the last five years of life.41 The 
amounts of charitable contributions are substantial. For estates over $50  million, charitable 
contributions as a share of the net estate exceed 40%.42
C Non-tax requirements for U.S. charitable organizations
While the IRS is responsible for recognizing tax-exempt status and monitoring charities’ 
activities, charitable organizations are also subject to regulation at the state level. In the United 
States, charitable entities are organized or incorporated under state law and are subject to 
supervision by various state agencies. Each state has a non-profit statute that governs the 
allowable purposes for non-profit status as well as rules governing the operation and dis-
solution of charities. States vary greatly in the resources devoted to monitoring charitable 
activity as well as types of enforcement activities.43 Many states require non-profits to register 
before engaging in fundraising activities and have local solicitation laws to protect donors from 
deceptive charities.
In addition to IRS and state supervision, charitable organizations are subject to several regu-
latory regimes that seek to prevent diversion of charitable assets for illicit purposes. These 
include counter-terrorism laws as well as laws targeting money laundering and corruption. 
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush signed Exec-
utive Order 13224, which required the U.S. Department of Treasury to maintain a list of known 
and suspected terrorists and impose sanctions on those individuals or organizations who support 
or are associated with those on the list. The primary U.S. terrorist list is the Specially Designated 
Nationals List maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control.44 Charitable 
organizations that provide funds, goods, or services to listed terrorists or terrorist organizations 
can have their assets frozen or their tax-exempt status revoked, even if they did not knowingly 
support terrorist activity.
Additional potential penalties are included in the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT 
ACT) Act of 2001,45 which was enacted about a month after Executive Order 13224 was 
signed. The Patriot Act imposes civil and criminal penalties on nonprofits and their directors if 
they are found to have provided material support to terrorists. In 2002, Treasury issued Volun-
tary Guidelines (later revised) that sought to provide “best practices” for charitable organizations 
to follow in making grants to foreign grantees.46 The Voluntary Guidelines set forth the types 
of information that the nonprofit should obtain from grantees as well as the appropriate due 
diligence the nonprofit should conduct before making any grants.
U.S. charitable organizations can subject themselves to additional governance and operat-
ing requirements by joining organizations that require members to meet certain standards to 
maintain membership. InterAction is an alliance of 190 U.S.-based non-governmental organiza-
tions that work in developing countries. Members of InterAction agree to comply with a set 
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of standards that provide a broad code of conduct covering governance, financial reporting, 
fundraising, public relations, management practice, human resources and program services.47
II Charitable tax subsidies
Before focusing on foreign charitable activities and foreign charities, this part examines four 
key questions related to tax subsidies: first, what theories justify favorable tax treatment; second, 
what the optimal level of charitable tax subsidies is; third, what the funding and allocation alter-
natives are for charitable contributions; and fourth, when one considers all charitable tax sub-
sidies (not just the charitable deduction under the federal income tax), what we can say about 
the relative split between donors (amount of the after-tax contribution) and the government 
(reduced tax revenue) of funding for charitable activities.
A Theories justifying charitable tax subsidies
Tax scholars in the United States have taken different approaches in examining the justifica-
tions for tax subsidies for charitable activities.48 The literature falls into two general categories. 
One group of scholars focuses primarily on the donor. They justify allowing tax deductions for 
charitable contributions based on considerations of designing the proper base for taxation and 
income measurement. A mostly different group of scholars justifies tax benefits for charitable 
deductions and for charitable organizations as a subsidy for collective goods and services. The 
difference is important. The donor-based theories are rooted in the design of a tax system. In 
contrast, the subsidy-based theories seek to use the tax system as a means to achieve non-tax 
objectives, in this case increasing incentives for private donors to support and monitor charitable 
activities and providing matching funds to supplement their efforts.
Donor-oriented approaches. Early examinations of the role of charitable deductions in an ideal 
tax system worked within the Haig-Simons framework, which defines income as the sum of 
personal consumption (“private preclusive use”) plus wealth accumulation over a given time 
period.49 Considering this definition of income, amounts transferred as charitable contributions 
are not income to the donor because they do not result in exclusive personal consumption. 
Instead, such contributions create common goods whose enjoyment is not limited to contribu-
tors nor apportioned among contributors according to amounts of contributions. Under the 
donor-oriented approach, no government subsidy for charitable contributions exists, as the 
contributed amounts are not income in the first place.
One could also allow a charitable deduction because it equitably accounts for loss of welfare 
by the donor.50 Society should reward those who transfer private resources for the public good. 
In addition, as donations often derive from perceived moral obligations, the involuntary nature 
of the transfer should not require taxing the donor on such amounts.
Tax scholars have offered serious challenges to both donor-oriented approaches.51 While 
these theories reflect a common intuition that money (or other property) transferred to charity 
should qualify for income tax deductions, the theoretical basis for charitable deductions as a way 
of accurately measuring income remains shaky.
These donor-oriented theories provide little or no guidance as to what types of charitable 
activities warrant support or whether giving for domestic activities should be preferred over 
giving for foreign charitable activities. As long as the donor gives up control of the property, it 
does not matter how or where the donated resources are actually used. These theories justify 
the tax deduction because donors are worse off because of their charitable donations. Interest-
ingly, to the extent that geographic distance between the donor and the beneficiaries makes it 
Cross-border philanthropy
423
harder for a donor to achieve reputational, social, or financial advantages from donations, one 
could argue that donor-centric theories justify preferences for foreign charitable activity over 
domestic activity.52
Subsidy-oriented approaches. A second approach justifies the charitable deduction (and other 
tax benefits) as a subsidy for certain types of under-provided collective goods and services. 
There are several strands of the subsidy literature, focusing on different types of market or 
government failure. The market failure arguments generally start with examination of public 
goods – those goods where one person’s consumption does not reduce availability to others 
(“non-rival”), and there is no way to exclude others from enjoying the good (“non-excluda-
ble”).53 Such goods will be under-supplied because self-interested individuals will choose to free 
ride on the charitable activities of others rather than paying to support the goods and services 
themselves. As a practical matter, most goods provided by governments (and charities) are rival 
and excludable. These goods and services include schools, hospitals, roads, and various transfer 
payments. However, these goods and services can generate externalities that are not fully cap-
tured by market participants. There is thus a role for governments (and charities) to supply such 
goods where there are substantial secondary benefits. Allowing a tax deduction for charitable 
contributions thus both increases the amount of funds going to these types of activities (correct-
ing a suboptimal level of funding) and imposes costs on those uncharitable individuals (making 
them involuntary contributors to these causes).
Support for tax subsidies for charitable contributions also rests on potential failures that may 
be inherent in the government decision-making process. If we leave all spending decisions to 
the political process, the level of collective goods and services would be decided by majority 
rule. The tax subsidy for charitable contributions allows, at least for certain types of goods and 
services, the preferences of a minority of voters who have a greater taste for certain collective 
activities to receive government support, as long as they are willing also to pay for them.54 
This decentralized approach allows for greater diversity and innovation, among other benefits.55 
Under this view, the greater the heterogeneity of preferences for collective goods, the stronger 
the case for tax subsidies for charitable contributions.
For our purposes, it is remarkable how little guidance these subsidy theories provide on 
such basic questions as which types of activities should qualify for favorable tax treatment and 
whether to extend tax deductions for foreign charitable activities of foreign charities. While the 
subsidy theories may provide general support for the government matching of private contribu-
tions, it does not tell us which types of activities to support, how much support to provide, or 
in which countries to provide support. Attempts to rank charities as to their relative worthi-
ness based on their purpose and effectiveness of performance face substantial obstacles.56 These 
challenges are perhaps unsurprising given both the difficulty of achieving political consensus on 
what activities are more or less worthy and of assessing the relative efficiency and effectiveness 
of performance.
Rather than relying on academic theories, we can view charitable tax subsides as a necessary 
part of the bargain to encourage charitable activities. The current tax regime reflects a series of 
trade-offs that occurred in the U.S. legislative and administrative process that result in a robust 
charitable sector.
The first trade-off focuses on the types of activities that merit tax subsidies. Policy makers 
can choose between a relatively narrow group of activities to support (for example, limiting to 
organizations that help the poor or prevent disease) or a more expansive approach (adopting a 
broad definition of what is “charitable”). The narrow approach reflects a policy decision that 
some types of charitable activities deserve government support more than others. In contrast, 
the expansive approach gives donors greater choice on how to spend their funds (and matching 
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government funds) that likely results in more diverse and innovative charitable sector. In taking 
the broad approach, Congress was willing to use tax subsidies to support many different types of 
charitable activities, recognizing that some of the activities that receive support are of question-
able “worthiness.”57
A second trade-off concerns the level of review in granting tax-exempt status and monitor-
ing charitable activity. Here, governments can choose between an aggressive approach that allo-
cates resources to substantive reviews of applications for tax-exempt status and to monitoring 
entities to ensure they are fulfilling their charitable mission and a more narrow approach that 
relies on a limited review of applications for tax-exempt status and relies heavily on reporting 
to monitor activity. In taking the narrow approach, Congress is encouraging the growth of the 
charitable sector, recognizing that a potential for abuse exists.
A third trade-off focuses on the design of tax incentives. Generally, the more generous incen-
tives are, the higher the amounts of charitable contributions will be.58 For example, favorable tax 
treatment for contributions of appreciated property will result in greater contributions, albeit 
at a cost of substantial lost tax revenues. Again, Congress has adopted a menu of tax incentives 
(more than just the charitable deduction under the personal income tax) that has resulted in a 
large and diverse charitable sector. If Congress scales back on favorable tax treatment, then the 
growth of the charitable sector will slow.
The important insight is that these (and other) trade-offs were instrumental in adopting and 
shaping tax subsidies for charitable activities. It may be that Congress focused on both domestic 
and foreign charitable activities and charities in making decisions as to the scope of charitable 
activity, the level of government supervision, and the design of tax subsidies (and revenue 
costs). However, it is also possible Congress made these choices focusing primarily on domestic 
charitable activities and charities. It is likely that for each of these three trade-offs, different 
considerations may apply for domestic charitable activities and domestic charities as compared 
to foreign charitable activities and foreign charities. This may change the focus from the binary 
question of whether to extend the current charitable regime to foreign charitable activities and 
charities to how might the tax regime differ for foreign charitable activities and charities.
B Optimal level of charitable tax subsidies
The nonprofit sector in the United States consists of 1.5 million charitable entities, with assets 
of about $4 trillion ($2.5 trillion in net assets) and total revenues of $2.1 trillion (about 11% of 
GDP).59 The sheer number and size of charitable organizations raises the question of whether 
the nonprofit sector in the United States is too big or too small. I have no idea – but I am con-
fident that bigger is not necessarily better.
What would we need to know to answer this question? To start, we would require infor-
mation about the charitable organizations and the different types of activities they are engaged 
in. We would then have to engage in the messy process of determining the societal benefits 
generated by the charitable sector, a process that requires making value judgments of the rela-
tive merits of different types of charitable activities (soup kitchens versus operas). While at one 
time, the IRS adopted a rather narrow view of what activities constitute charitable activities,60 
the current approach provides for tax subsidies for a “kaleidoscope” array of organization that 
often have little to do with common perceptions of charitable activity, such as poverty reduc-
tion, education, and health services.61
One’s view of the optimal size of the charitable sector is likely colored by confidence in 
the approval process for tax-exempt and nonprofit status and the success of the IRS and state 
governments in monitoring charitable activities. Here, much is lacking. The IRS and state 
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government approve almost all applications for tax-exempt and non-profit status, and their abil-
ity to monitor the activities of over 1.5 million entities is extremely limited.62 With some high-
profile exceptions,63 because of either a lack of political will or resources, there is remarkably 
little oversight of the charitable sector, especially in light of its size and importance.
Also important in thinking about the optimal size of the charitable sector is the relative effi-
ciency of charities in using their assets to provide goods and services. Unlike the for-profit sec-
tor, for many charitable organizations, there is relatively little “market discipline” by consumers. 
Underperforming charitable organizations seldom go out of business. While organizations such 
as the Charity Navigator64 and Charity Watch65 provide information about the financial health, 
accounting and transparency, and fund-raising practices of different charitable organizations, 
these reviews focus more on financial management of the charities rather than on the effective 
use of their assets to fulfill their charitable purposes.
Attempts to rank charities by the effectiveness in providing societal benefits (for example, 
lives saved or lives improved per dollar spent) require assessments of the relative marginal ben-
efits from new charitable contributions as well as value judgments as to the types of projects 
that merit support. Organizations such as GiveWell (a U.S. public charity) provide guidance to 
potential donors by identifying high-impact giving opportunities.66 GiveWell has developed a 
cost-effectiveness algorithm that allows the organization to compare charities engaged in similar 
activities as well as across different charitable activities.67
The non-profit sector also faces major corporate governance challenges. In the for-profit 
sector, shareholders play a role in monitoring the behavior of managers and directors, and 
directors (with varying degrees of success) monitor the behavior of managers. Many charitable 
organizations (especially those with a large number of donors contributing small amounts) lack 
mechanisms for controlling the actions of managers and the board of directors.68 A survey of 
corporate governance practices in U.S. non-profits highlights their failure to adopt measures 
that would improve accounting and transparency.69 These challenges have led to calls to reduce 
the size of the board of directors of large nonprofit organizations as well proposals to bifurcate 
boards (with one board focusing on fund-raising and the other board with governance respon-
sibility).70 The American Red Cross71 and FIFA72 offer two examples of high-profile corporate 
governance failures that resulted in less effective performance of charitable activities and misap-
propriation of charitable funds.
The question of the optimal level of charitable tax subsidies is intertwined with the question 
of the optimal relative split between the size of the public sector, private sector, and the charita-
ble sector. Whether governments should provide charitable tax subsidies depends on the relative 
marginal costs and marginal benefits of those subsidies. Determining costs and benefits requires 
some prediction of what the counterfactual would be – what would the charitable sector look 
like in a world without tax subsidies?
Countries differ in the relative split between goods and services provided by the public 
sector, private sector, and charitable sector.73 One, two, or three sectors can provide health 
care; primary, secondary, and university education; or poverty relief programs. Not surprisingly, 
countries with more comprehensive and successful government-provided health, education, or 
poverty relief programs will likely have a smaller nonprofit sector than countries with less suc-
cessful or less comprehensive government programs.
One explanation of why Americans are more generous in making contributions to sup-
port charitable activities than residents of other countries is because of a relatively low level of 
government spending (or effectiveness) for these activities. In the cross-border context, large 
charitable contributions funding foreign charitable activities could compensate for relatively 
low levels of U.S.-government provided foreign assistance. The key insight is that individuals 
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can “purchase” these types of goods and services by either paying taxes or making charitable 
contributions, but they direct the “purchase” only by charitable contributions, while majority 
rules for taxes.
Countries preferring a larger charitable sector will likely provide greater charitable tax sub-
sidies than countries preferring a smaller charitable sector. But while the total level of gov-
ernment support for charitable activities (either through direct government expenditures or 
charitable tax subsidies) may be relatively similar among countries, the key difference is who 
dictates how the funds are spent.
Who benefits from charitable tax subsidies? One answer is the charitable organizations. 
These organizations now have greater resources because of the tax benefits. We first need to see 
which types of charities receive substantial contributions.
Figure 23.1 sets forth the choices made by U.S. donors in their charitable giving in 2019. 
Similar to other countries, religious organizations receive the largest share of donations. Con-
tributions to international organizations and to arts, culture, and humanities organizations are a 
lower percentage of total giving, though still substantial in amounts of donations.
We then need to determine who benefits from the charitable activity. Beneficiaries depend 
on the type of charitable activity – with gifts to poverty-reduction organizations helping low-
income individuals, gifts to religious organizations primarily benefitting members of the con-
gregation, and gifts to arts organizations and prestigious private schools skewed towards the 
wealthy.
Table 23.1. highlights how charitable giving varies by income levels.
Because the beneficiaries of tax subsidies vary greatly by income level, tax subsidies are going 
disproportionately to charities supported by the wealthy rather than charities favored by those at 
the bottom and middle of the income distribution. For all charitable giving, no more than one-
third of the contributions are made to organizations that assist the poor. In contrast, for donors 
with income greater than $1 million, the share going to organizations that assist the poor is no 
more than one-fifth of total contributions.74
Another potential beneficiary of charitable tax subsidies is the donor. Again, we need to 
















Figure 23.1  Share of charitable giving by type of recipient (2019)
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subsidy? If a donor who makes a $1 million contribution would have contributed the same 
amount without a tax subsidy, then the donor is better off by the amount of the tax subsidy (and 
the financial position of the charity is not changed). The result is simply a tax reduction without 
any increase in charitable funding. If the amount of the contribution would be less if there were 
no tax subsidy (but not reduced by the full amount of the tax benefit), then the donor and the 
charity would share the tax subsidy.
As discussed earlier, only about 10% of U.S. taxpayers can take advantage of charitable 
deductions under the personal income tax (and only about 4,000 individuals who died in 2018 
left estates large enough to require filing an estate tax return and to claim charitable deductions 
under the estate tax).75 Figure 23.2 sets forth for different income levels the relative amount 
of the contribution supported by tax subsidies. Much greater tax subsidies are provided for 
contributions made by those at the top of the income distribution than contributions made by 
middle- or low-income donors.
Given how the current U.S. tax regime “matches” charitable contributions, it is not surpris-
ing that the top quintile captures almost all of the tax benefits, with over half going to the top 
1%. Table 23.2 provides an estimate of the distribution of tax benefits for charitable deduction 
under the personal income tax system.
What about the costs of the tax subsidies? The economic consequences of providing subsi-
dies through the tax system depend on who bears the burden of reduced tax revenues associated 
with charitable tax subsidies. Here are some alternatives. First, the government could com-
pensate for the lost revenue from charitable tax subsidies by adopting revenue-raising income 
tax provisions (for example, through higher tax rates). Second, the government could recoup 
the lost revenue by increases in taxes other than the income tax. Finally, the lost revenue from 
charitable tax subsidies could simply result in reduced government spending (some of which 
might be offset by the charitable activities).
For each alternative, a different class of individuals bears the consequences of providing 
tax subsidies. For example, if governments recaptured lost revenue under the income tax 
system, the burden will fall primarily on wealthy individuals who are not charitable. In the 
United States, the income tax burden falls primarily on high-income taxpayers. For the 
2017 tax year, the top 1% received 21% of total adjusted gross income and paid 38.5% of 
federal income taxes. The top 10% received about 48% of total income and paid about 70% 
of total federal income tax. In contrast, the bottom 50% received only about 11% of total 
income and paid about 3% of total federal income taxes. The poor are not subsidizing the 
charitable activities of the billionaires who signed the Giving Pledge; it is other millionaires 
and billionaires.
Table 23.1 Household giving by income and charity type ($ in billions)
Household income Religion Combined Help meet Health Education Arts Other Total
basic needs
<$100,000 59.96 7.70 9.34 3.06 2.69 1.01 6.16 89.92
$100,000 to $200,000 11.39 2.16 2.46 1.12 1.14 .44 1.17 19.88
$200,000 to $1 million 21.01 10.19 5.30 4.81 29.15 13.57 7.45 91.48
$1 million or more 8.64 2.06 1.93 12.97 12.94 7.88 4.85 51.27
Total 101.00 22.11 19.03 21.96 45.92 22.90 19.63 252.55
Source: The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, 2007. Patterns of Household Charitable Giving by 
Income Group, 2005. Bloomington, I.N.: The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University at 12
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In contrast, if governments recoup revenue from other parts of the tax system, then the 
burden will fall on all taxpayers. Here, the distribution of the total tax burden falls more evenly 
across the population. When we focus on all federal taxes, the share of total taxes of the top 1% 
falls to about 25%, and for the top 10%, the share is about 54%.76
Finally, if governments choose to reduce government spending, then the burden falls on 
those individuals who would have received those goods and services. Here the economic cost 
of charitable tax subsidies is not limited to lost revenue; it also includes the opportunity costs 
associated with reduced government spending (which may or may not be more socially useful 
than privately directed charitable activity).
Table 23.2 Distribution of charitable deduction under the Federal Income Tax (2020)
Expanded cash income Total contributions ($ Share of total tax Marginal tax Share of tax units with 
percentile billions) benefit (%) benefit per $100 of benefit (%)
contributions ($)
Lowest quintile $6.3 * $0.1 0.1%
Second quintile $16.9 0.3% $1.4 1.4%
Middle quintile $36.1 1.7% $3.2 5.6%
Fourth quintile $63.9 6.5% $6.6 14.1%
Top quintile $200.9 95.1% $21.8 36.3%
All $324.4 100.0% $15.3 8.9%
Breakdown of top quintile
80th–90th percentile $43.8 7.6% $11.4 25.0%
90th–95th percentile $30.4 8.2% $15.5 37.4%
95th–99th percentile $39.6 17.6% $22.5 54.8%
Top 1 percent $87.1 58.1% $29.0 79.7%
Top 0.1 percent $53.0 35.2% $28.0 89.9%
Source: McClelland, R., Steuerle, E., Lu, C., and Boddupalli, A., 2019. Tax Incentives for Charitable Contri-


















Total contributions Total contributions generating a tax benefit
Figure 23.2  Tax benefits for contributions by income group (2020)
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C Funding and allocation alternatives for charitable activities: why 
pay lobbyists to influence government spending?
We could, but do not, separate the decision to provide federal funds for charitable activities 
from the decision of who gets to decide how federal funds are spent. The following framework 
sets forth different combinations of funding and allocation decisions that reflect the public and 
private nature of using tax benefits to subsidize charitable activities.77
The upper-left box of Figure 23.3 reflects the use by individuals or corporations of their own 
funds to support activities that they choose. This is the after-tax cost of charitable contribu-
tions. For example, if an individual is subject to tax at the 37% marginal tax bracket and makes 
a $1,000 contribution, the value of the income tax deduction is $370, and the after-tax cost 
would be $630. Donors can further reduce the after-tax cost of making charitable contribution 
by taking advantage of tax subsidies afforded contributions of appreciated property as well as 
other income, gift, and estate tax savings. For those individuals who receive no tax benefits for 
their contributions, either because they do not itemize deductions or have no tax liability, the 
full amount of their contribution would be included in this box.
The upper-right box reflects the tax benefits associated with the contribution. Here pri-
vate actors determine how public funds are allocated. Why pay lobbyists to persuade mem-
bers of Congress on spending priorities when I can get my own private earmark to support 
medical services to combat cholera in Haiti simply by writing a check to the U.S. affiliate of 
Doctors Without Borders (Médécins Sans Frontières)? Here donors can direct government 
spending while bypassing majority approval. Minority preferences dictate government spending 
patterns.78
The bottom-left box reflects government regulation that influences the use of private funds 
for charitable purposes. This includes both incentives for funding certain types of activities 
and organizations and disincentives and prohibitions against certain types of activities, such as 
expenditures that may jeopardize an organization’s tax-exempt status or that may result in excise 
taxes for private foundations.79 In a post-September 11, 2001, world, it also includes require-
ments for charitable organizations to prevent diversion of charitable assets for illicit purposes 
(money laundering and counter-terrorist financing).
Finally, the bottom-right box reflects public actors spending public funds. Here taxpayers 
are subject to the whims of the majority (through their elected representative), who dictate 
how revenues are spent (including funds for many of the same types of activities supported by 
charitable tax subsidies). Congress can decide directly how to spend funds from general tax 
revenues, or Congress can delegate spending decisions to state and local governments, to gov-
ernment agencies, or to some band of experts, such as the governing boards of the National 
Figure 23.3 Allocation and funding alternatives
Funding alternatives
Private funds Public funds
Allocation 
alternatives
Private actors Unmatched portion of charitable 
contributions
Matching portion of 
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Public actors Government regulation 
(incentives and restrictions on 
the use of private funds)
Direct government programs 




Science Foundation or the National Endowment of the Arts. Important for our purposes, this 
bottom-right box includes amounts provided to U.S. Agency for International Development 
(US AID). In 2019, US AID provided about $2.7 billion in grants for U.S.-based charities for 
foreign humanitarian and development assistance.80
Viewing the charitable deduction (and other income and estate tax subsidies) as a matching 
grant program provides a lens to view charitable tax subsidies under different academic theories. 
As discussed earlier, we could allow charitable tax deductions because amounts contributed 
should not be included in an individual’s tax base. Under these “base defining” theories, the 
existence of a federal matching program does not change the donor’s tax base but does have tax 
revenue consequences.
Subsidizing charitable activity could also be justified because of market or government fail-
ure. Tax subsidies allow the minority to support activities that might be underprovided by the 
majority or under a “pluralistic” view that values greater participation, innovation, and supervi-
sion by donors to charitable activities. Under these theories, who gets to take advantage of tax 
subsidies and the relative split between donors and governments matters. The attractiveness of 
tax benefits for domestic or foreign charitable activities and charities may depend on the scope 
and degree of the subsidy, as well as the relative cost sharing between donors and government.
Here are a couple of alternatives for tax regimes that highlight the matching component of 
charitable tax subsidies. First, consider a tax regime with a relatively low top marginal income 
tax rate (say, a 20% tax rate), and a very large percentage of the population pays income taxes 
and is able to benefit (if they desire) from the charitable deduction. Here donors are bearing 
80% of the cost (and reduced tax revenues cover the other 20%), and a large part of the popula-
tion could participate in the matching grant program. For those in favor of using tax subsidies 
to support domestic or foreign charitable activities, the combination of donors providing the 
lion’s share of the funding and the possible high levels of citizen participation provide substantial 
support for the tax subsidies.
In contrast, consider a tax regime with a top marginal tax rate of 80%, and only individuals 
subject to the top rate can claim charitable deductions. Here donors are contributing a relatively 
small amount of the costs of the charitable activities (20%), with the rest shifted to the gov-
ernment in the form of reduced tax revenues. Wealthy donors are able to dictate government 
spending even though their out-of-pocket costs are relatively low.
D Whose money is it (and should it matter)?
While the U.S. top marginal income tax rate currently is 37%81 (much less than the 90% tax 
rate of many decades ago), total current and future tax benefits may increase the relative split 
between donors and government to much higher levels (with the cost to the government much 
closer to or exceeding 80% rather than the 20% of the example previously). Even where the 
income tax benefits from charitable tax deductions are relatively low, other income and estate 
tax savings (both federal and state) could substantially alter the relative contributions between 
donors and governments.
Let’s start with what is one of the strongest cases for tax subsidies for charitable activities: the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.82 The Gates Foundation allocates roughly 60% of its spend-
ing on foreign charitable activities and 40% on domestic charitable activities. An OECD survey 
of philanthropic giving by foundations to developing countries found that the Gates Founda-
tion provided half of total giving.83 By any formulation of “worthy” charitable activities, the 
types of foreign activities supported by the Gates Foundation easily qualify. The Gates Foun-
dation funding generates substantial benefits in foreign countries but also generates positive 
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externalities across borders. The foreign projects supported by the Gates Foundation likely 
address both political and market failures in foreign countries and are designed and monitored 
by talented and dedicated employees. The Gates Foundation provides a high level of transpar-
ency for grant and financial information to allow for a review of their activities.
What are the tax revenue consequences for Bill Gates and the Gates Foundation? First, Bill 
Gates gets an income tax deduction for his contribution of Microsoft stock to the Gates Foun-
dation. Let’s assume that Bill Gates contributes $40 billion of Microsoft stock to the Gates Foun-
dation, that he is subject to income tax at a 37% rate, and that in the year of the contribution he 
has $50 million in adjusted gross income. What is the value of the charitable deduction under 
the personal income tax? As noted in the Gates Foundation 2019 Annual Report, the income 
tax benefits are relatively insignificant.84 If Gates were able to fully use the charitable deduc-
tion to reduce his taxable income for the year to zero (with large carryforwards), the potential 
charitable tax benefit would be $18.5 million ($50 million multiplied by 37% = $18.5 million). 
The contribution reduces U.S. tax revenues by $18.5 million.
However, limitations apply. U.S. tax law provides for less generous rules for contributions 
to private foundations. Applying the 20% adjusted gross income limitation for contributions of 
property to private foundations reduces the amount of the charitable deduction to $10 million 
dollars ($50 million multiplied by 20%) and the amount of the tax savings to about $3.7 million 
($10 million multiplied by 37%). The amount of lost revenue to the U.S. government from the 
charitable deduction (even if Gates staggered his stock contributions over several years and he 
took advantage of charitable carryforwards) is trivial compared to the size of the $40 billion 
contribution.85
But this is not the end of the story. By funding the Gates Foundation with appreciated 
property rather than cash, Bill Gates permanently avoids any tax on pre-transfer appreciation 
of Microsoft stock. What would the tax liability be if Bill Gates sold the stock (either to fund 
the Gates Foundation or other purposes)? If we assume a tax basis of 5% of the value of the 
stock ($2 billion), the gain recognized by Bill Gates is $38 billion. Assuming current capital 
gains rates of 23.8%, the tax liability of the sale would be roughly $9 billion, leaving Bill Gates 
with $31 billion in after-tax proceeds. While Bill Gates’ state of residence (Washington) has no 
personal income tax, the effective capital gains tax rate in many states are much higher. If Bill 
Gates gave up rain in Seattle for sunshine in Los Angeles, he would face a potential capital gains 
tax rate of over 37%.
Of course, Bill Gates has techniques to monetize the $40 billion of Microsoft stock without 
incurring tax liability. For example, he could borrow against the stock and engage in hedg-
ing transactions to minimize (but not completely eliminate) the potential decline in Microsoft 
stock. He could then hold the stock until death and under current U.S. tax law avoid any tax 
on pre-death appreciation of the Microsoft stock. But he has a long time to wait. Using IRS 
guidance on life expectancy, Bill Gates at age 64 has life expectancy of 23.6 years (his friend 
and charitable partner, Warren Buffett, is 90 years old and has an IRS-predicted life expectancy 
of 5.7 years).
Bill Gates’ generosity has additional tax revenue consequences to the U.S. government. Gates 
has irrevocably moved $40 billion of his assets (and additional billions from Warren Buffett and 
others) from the taxable to the tax-exempt sector. In the 2019 Annual Report, the Gates Foun-
dation reported $6 billion of investment income. One approach in determining the value of 
the tax exemption is the amount of potential tax liability on the $6 billion in excess of any tax 
imposed on the investment income of private foundations. For current tax years, private foun-
dations pay a tax on investment income of 1.39%. If the $6 billion of investment income were 
currently taxable and subject to tax at 21% (the corporate tax rate) or the 23.8% rate applicable 
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to dividends and capital gains of individuals, the lost tax revenue to the U.S. government would 
be roughly $1.4 billion per year.86 This tax subsidy will continue as long as the Gates Foundation 
has substantial investment assets.
Finally, at time of death, the size of Bill Gates’ estate is likely smaller because of the $40 bil-
lion contribution to the Gates Foundation (and other contributions to the Gates Foundation 
and other charities). The amount of the reduction in the size of the taxable estate from the 
contribution of Microsoft stock to the Gates Foundation as well as the amount of the tax ben-
efits depends on many factors, including assumptions as to how the assets and proceeds would 
have been used, how they would have appreciated, the life expectancies of Bill and Melinda 
Gates, and what other tax minimization strategies Bill and Melinda Gates might exploit. Here 
are some plausible estimates. One approach just focuses on the $40 billion contribution and 
assumes the taxable estate shrinks by that amount. Current estate tax rates are 40%, resulting 
in a tax benefit of $16 billion. Alternatively, we could assume that Gates retained the $40 bil-
lion in Microsoft stock until death, in which case the value (and resulting tax benefit) could be 
less (if Microsoft stock declined in value or Bill and Melinda Gates engaged in high levels of 
consumption that generated no residual value) or substantially more (if Microsoft continued to 
appreciate in value).
We are back to the original question of funding and allocation alternatives for charitable 
activities: Who should decide how to spend the funds resulting from charitable tax subsidies? 
Should the Gates Foundation have sole discretion in choosing which diseases to combat and 
which African countries deserve financial support?
This is no correct or easy answer. One view of Bill and Melinda Gates’ funding of the Gates 
Foundation is resoundingly positive. One can make a strong case that the Gates Foundation 
is funding exactly the types of foreign charitable activities that merit government subsidies, 
especially given the cross-border challenges for disease prevention. Organizations like the Gates 
Foundation may be better positioned to design and monitor these types of programs than 
government agencies (such as US AID) or international organizations. Bill and Melinda Gates 
could simply have spent the funds contributed to the Gates Foundation on houses, artwork, 
and Stave puzzles87 or made additional investments to increase their wealth. Compared to con-
sumption and investment, their philanthropy should be celebrated.88 And although the lost 
tax revenue from the counterfactual sale of appreciated Microsoft stock, the loss of investment 
income for assets transferred to the tax-exempt sector, and the smaller taxable estate on death is 
substantial, I have little doubt that Bill and Melinda Gates (with the assistance of well-qualified 
and well-compensated lawyers and accountants) would be able to arrange their finances to 
reduce greatly any tax liability.
But examining the political and economic consequences of charitable contributions pro-
vides a different perspective on philanthropy.89 Here the desirability of large charitable gifts may 
depend on the relative size of the tax subsidies for Bill Gates and other mega-donors. If the split 
is 80% by the donor and 20% by the government, then a strong case can be made that the tax 
subsidies play an important role in encouraging charitable activities (whether domestic or for-
eign). However, a different answer may result if the size of the aggregate tax subsidies (charitable 
income tax deduction, no capital gains tax on the contribution of appreciated stock to charity, 
the tax exemption for investment income, and foregone estate state tax liability) approaches or 
exceeds 80%.
It is not possible to determine whether the split of the funding of the Gates Foundation 
between the Gates and the government is closer to 80%/20% or 20%/80% without mak-
ing various assumptions about the Gates’ charitable and investment activity and potential tax 
liability if they did not fund the Gates Foundation. It is also difficult to determine Gates’ level 
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of charitable giving in a world where tax subsidies were less generous. But with the current 
collection of charitable tax subsidies available to many mega-donors, we may well have reached 
a “tipping point” whereby these donors decide how to spend potential current and future tax 
revenues even though their after-tax contribution may be substantially less than the govern-
ment’s share of funding.
If policy makers consider the aggregate tax subsidies too generous, they have several options to 
scale them back.90 For example, the tax regime for gifts of appreciated property could be changed 
to tax donors on any appreciation of the gifted property to charities or to limit the charitable 
deduction to the tax basis of the property (or just allow charitable contributions only for cash 
contributions). An Obama-era proposal would cap itemized deductions (including the charitable 
deductions) at 28% regardless of the taxpayer’s tax rate.91 Congress could change the unlim-
ited estate tax deduction for charitable contributions by imposing limitations based on a dollar 
amount of contribution or a percentage of the total estate. Congress could also increase existing 
taxes on investment income of private foundations, increase mandatory distribution rules (and 
extend distribution requirements to donor-advised funds and public charities), and expand the 
taxation of investment income of public charity. All these proposed changes will generate addi-
tional tax revenue but also will reduce incentives to transfer property to charitable organizations.
Under current law, the charitable income tax deduction plays little or no role for many ultra-
wealthy individuals. This partly explains why several ultra-wealthy donors use for-profit limited 
liability companies rather than tax-exempt private foundations for their philanthropic activities. 
But with the election of Joe Biden and a Democratic-controlled Congress, this could change. 
President Joe Biden has proposed increasing the top marginal tax rate and eliminating the rate 
preference for investment income and capital gains.92 The Democratic members of the Senate 
Finance Committee have proposed taxing accrued but not realized gains on certain assets, most 
notably stock.93 All these changes would increase the tax burden on the ultra-wealthy as well 
as increasing the tax subsidy for charitable contributions. If one was concerned in the current 
tax environment that the relative contributions by ultra-wealthy donors and the government 
was skewed too much towards the use of public funds, then changes to increase the income tax 
burden on the wealthy would exacerbate the problem of wealthy donors deciding how govern-
ment funds are spent.
III Should tax subsidies be available to support charitable activities 
outside the United States?
The United States adopted much of the current tax regime covering the tax treatment of chari-
table entities and the deductibility of charitable contributions at a time when U.S. donors had 
relatively little interest in foreign charitable activities or entities. Whether Congress would have 
adopted a similar regime if contributions for foreign charitable activities or to foreign charitable 
entities played a much greater role in total charitable giving is unknowable. One way to address 
this question is to start with a baseline of tax subsidies for contributions to domestic charities or 
domestic charitable activities and then determine whether to extend these subsidies to contri-
butions for foreign charitable activities and to contributions to foreign charitable entities.
A Home field advantage: should we privilege domestic charitable 
activity over foreign charitable activity?
Consider this thought experiment.94 Assume the United States and another country (or 
two countries in the European Union) are identical in every respect, including a currently 
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under-provided public good or quasi-public good (for example, disease prevention programs 
or university education). Assume also the benefits of the externalities from the public good are 
enjoyed entirely locally. Should the United States tax its individual and corporate taxpayers to 
provide the same level of public goods in both countries?
As a matter of domestic tax policy, the answer is probably no. Despite calls by moral philoso-
phers advocating greater cosmopolitan responsibilities, tax and spending policies in the United 
States are driven by the gains to its citizens and residents rather than to foreign beneficiaries. 
There is a strong intuitive appeal to helping those closer to us (both geographically and cultur-
ally) than those outside our borders. We give greater weight to the utilities of our citizens and 
residents and discount the utilities of foreigners. If we focus only on the overall welfare of our 
society (defined by national borders), then the externalities generated by domestic charitable 
activities will remain in our country, while the externalities from foreign charitable activities 
accrue to others. Finally, if we view part of the bargain of providing tax benefits for charitable 
contributions as relieving government of the obligation of providing the goods and services 
directly, then favoring domestic activities over foreign activities may reduce the demand for 
domestic government spending.
All of these arguments are subject to strong counterclaims. It is hard to make comparisons 
between deserving individual recipients in the United States and abroad. Questions as to who 
are more deserving beneficiaries raise difficult value judgments that are hard to evaluate without 
some normative framework or political compromise. It is also not clear whether we should take 
such a narrow view of society in measuring general welfare, especially given the international 
consequences of many local challenges. Finally, providing tax subsidies for foreign charitable 
activities may well result in reducing the burden on the U.S. government, as it may allow for 
less direct U.S. government assistance to foreign countries.95
The important observation from the experiment is that if we cannot justify using general 
tax revenue to fund the foreign charitable activities, we should not use the charitable deduction 
as a means of providing public goods outside the United States. This provides a strong case for 
preferring tax benefits for domestic rather than foreign charitable activities.
Relaxing some of the assumptions of this experiment strengthens the case for U.S. tax sub-
sidies for foreign charitable activities. First, let’s assume that the U.S. government spending on 
charitable activities supported by tax subsidies in the other country generates positive exter-
nalities for the United States. For example, the foreign spending could result in political and 
strategic advantages to the United States. This help explains why we provide official develop-
ment assistance to certain countries and not to others. Similarly, U.S. government spending and 
charitable activities on health and environmental programs in foreign countries could generate 
benefits that are global rather than local in nature. For these types of expenditures, a strong case 
could be made for taxing its individuals and corporations to fund these activities (or providing 
charitable tax subsidies).
Second, let’s relax the assumption as to the two countries being identical. Now substantial 
differences may exist across countries as to relative income levels, poverty levels, disease preven-
tion, or suffering from natural or man-made disasters. Countries could also differ in the relative 
success in providing basic services and the relative size and make-up of the charitable sector in 
both countries. This again presents a much stronger case for U.S. government spending – either 
directly or through charitable tax subsidies.96
How could we determine the optimal split for tax subsidies between domestic and foreign 
charitable activities? Here is another thought experiment. Assume a philosopher queen could 
decide how to allocate government charitable tax subsidies, say, $50 billion a year. She could 
determine which charitable projects merit funding by adopting the approach used by for-profit 
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managers and non-profit grant makers in determining how to allocate resources among com-
peting projects. With information about the costs of the investment, the amount, and timing of 
potential returns and an appropriate discount rate, grant makers would fund those projects with 
the greatest returns. So, theoretically, if the philosopher queen had $50 billion a year to spend 
on charitable projects, she could rank projects from the highest return to the lowest return and 
fund projects until the funds were exhausted.
If there were only domestic charitable activities, she would only need to rank domestic 
charitable projects. In a world with both domestic and foreign charitable activity and a policy 
of not granting preferences to domestic charitable activities over foreign charitable activities, 
then the process is again a straightforward ranking, with those projects with the highest returns 
funded without regard to geographical location.
But now assume some or great preference for domestic activity over foreign activity. She 
would then need to adjust the returns on foreign charitable activity by some factor, ranging 
from 0 to 1. In an America First world, the factor would be 0. In a world where the location 
of the charitable activity did not matter, the factor would be 1. Under this approach, a mix of 
domestic and foreign charitable projects would receive funding, with the relative mix deter-
mined by the relative discount applied to foreign projects.
B Overview of foreign charitable activities
Challenges exist in determining the size and scope of foreign charitable activities supported by 
U.S. donors and U.S. charities. Tables 23.3 and 23.4 seek to provide some sense of the types of 
foreign charitable activities receiving substantial support.
The National Center for Charitable Statistics has compiled data from the tax returns of U.S. 
charities to determine which organizations have substantial international activities.
These organizations provide a variety of services (health care, poverty relief, disaster 
relief, scholarships, environmental, and humanitarian aid). While it is difficult to make 
Table 23.3 List of U.S. nonprofits that give the most to foreign charitable activities
Non-profit NTEE classification Grant expenditures
1 Gavi Alliance International Relief $1,470,812,729
2 Food for The Poor, Inc. International Relief $866,573,810
3 Direct Relief International Relief $794,960,941
4 World Vision International Relief $706,466,654
5 Compassion International Incorporated International Relief $588,458,666
6 MAP International International Relief $576,398,289
7 Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. International Relief $554,862,050
8 Save The Children Federation, Inc. International Relief $498,746,784
9 Population Services International Scientific Organization $387,371,578
10 United States Fund for UNICEF United Nations Association $365,514,922
Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS)
Note: The amounts of grant expenditures presented are derived from responses to question 3(A) in Part IX 
of the IRS Form 990 filed by each organization for fiscal year 2017 that asks for the total expenses related 
to “grants and other assistance to foreign organizations, foreign governments, and foreign individuals.” The 
National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) is a classification system for tax-exempt organizations cre-
ated by the IRS and the NCCS. All organizations on this list fall within the “International, Foreign Affairs, 
and National Security” NTEE major group area.
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direct comparisons between domestic and international charitable activities, a review of 
the largest foreign charitable organizations supports the position that international activi-
ties better fit traditional notions of charity than the current array of activities of domestic 
charitable entities.
A different story may emerge if we just focus on “friends of ” organizations. Significant chal-
lenges exist in identifying which charities are “friends of ” organizations if the words “friends 
of ” are not included in the name of the organization. Table 23.4 sets forth a listing of some of 
the largest “friends of ” organizations. Here, donors target contributions to foreign entities that 
donors may have a more direct affinity (such as educational institutions, cultural organizations, 
religious organizations, and foreign countries).
For some readers, providing U.S. tax subsidies for contributions to these foreign entities 
has less appeal. U.S. taxpayer dollars may yield greater returns (at least in the United States) 
for support of U.S. educational institutions than subsidies for Cambridge, Oxford, and Israeli 
universities.97 Similarly, one can make strong arguments for using U.S. government resources 
for funding for U.S. military veterans rather than members and former members of the Israeli 
Defense Forces.
Whether these concerns merit differential treatment for contributions related to foreign 
charitable activities is unclear. For many observers, an advantage of the current charitable tax 
regime is that it provides donors the ability to direct their funds (and matching federal funds) 
to those charitable activities they wish to support. Just as it is difficult to compare the relative 
Table 23.4 “Friends of ” organizations based on grants made to foreign affiliates (2017)
Non-profit NTEE classification Grant expenditures
1 Cambridge in America International, Foreign Affairs, and $78,750,336
National Security
2 Friends of The Israel Defense Forces International, Foreign Affairs, and $69,042,549
National Security
3 American Technion Society Education $55,334,498
4 American Friends of The Israel Arts, Culture, and Humanities $51,199,921
Museum
5 American Friends of The Hebrew Education $46,108,488
University, Inc.
6 American Associates of Ben-Gurion Education $37,738,195
University of the Negev, Inc.
7 Americans for Oxford, Inc. Education $36,343,411
8 American Friends of Tel Aviv International, Foreign Affairs, and $30,194,134
University, Inc. National Security
9 American Friends of Magen David International, Foreign Affairs, and $19,668,102
Adom National Security
10 American Friends of IDC International, Foreign Affairs, and $19,055,7530
National Security
Source: National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS)
Note: This list contains only organizations that are classified by the IRS as organized for the purpose of 
providing monetary support for either a single entity (11) or multiple entities (12) under the National 
Taxonomy of Exempt Organized (NTEE). The amounts of grant expenditures presented are derived from 
responses to question 3(A) in Part IX of the IRS Form 990 filed by each organization for fiscal year 2017 
that asks for the total expenses related to “grants and other assistance to foreign organizations, foreign 
governments, and foreign individuals.”
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worthiness of different types of domestic charitable activities, it is hard to compare the relative 
value of domestic and foreign charitable activities.
Is there an optimal division of tax subsidies between domestic and foreign charitable activi-
ties? Assume a country decides to provide $50 billion per year in tax subsidies. How should 
it divide those subsidies between domestic and foreign charitable activities? Several alterna-
tives exist: we could allocate all the subsidies to domestic charitable activities, allocate between 
domestic and foreign charitable activities based on some criteria, or allocate by letting donors 
decide where the subsidies should go. The first and third options are easy to implement. The 
second option raises a host of challenging issues, such as whether U.S. policymakers should 
give greater weight to domestic over foreign charitable activities and how to assess the relative 
“worthiness” of different types of domestic and foreign charitable activities.
Focusing only on foreign charitable activity, Congress could reach a different result in two 
main ways. First, it could adopt narrower standards for foreign charitable activity than the broad 
scope allowed for domestic charitable activity. For example, Congress could enact a “worthi-
ness” approach limiting tax subsidies to certain types of activities (poverty reduction and disease 
prevention) but not to other activities (perhaps religious and cultural). If Congress decides to 
provide blanket preferences for domestic over foreign charitable activity, it could reduce the tax 
subsidies for foreign activity (or increase the tax subsidies for domestic activity).
IV Should contribution to foreign charities be treated differently 
from contributions to U.S. charities?
This section examines whether the United States should treat contributions to foreign charities 
differently than contributions to domestic charities. It first reviews the legislative history for 
restricting charitable deductions under the income tax to U.S. charities. It then reviews the dif-
ferent alternatives for structuring contributions to foreign charitable activities or foreign chari-
ties to qualify for charitable income tax deduction. Finally, it examines the benefits and costs for 
allowing direct contributions to foreign charities.
A Geographical limitations
With limited exceptions, U.S. tax law adopts a “water’s-edge” policy by allowing donors to 
deduct for income tax purposes only contributions made to donees created or organized in the 
United States; or in any possession thereof; or under the laws of the United States, any State, the 
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States.98 The income tax regime initially 
allowed tax deductions for contributions made to foreign charities.99 Congress adopted this 
“place of organization” restriction in 1938.100 Here is the often-cited passage in the legislative 
history of the Revenue Act of 1938:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable or other 
purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss 
of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met 
by appropriations from public funds and by benefits resulting from the promotion of 
general welfare. The United States derives no such benefit from gifts to foreign insti-
tutions, and the proposed limitation is consistent with the above theory.101
Professor Harvey Dale has persuasively described this passage as “bad history, bad philoso-
phy, and bad logic.”102 It is bad history, because there was no Congressional quid pro quo 
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requirement that charitable activities relieve government of an expense before allowing 
deductibility. Many types of domestic activities that qualify for tax benefits even though 
the government is not relieved of obligations to provide similar goods or services would 
not satisfy this requirement. Conversely, because of the current level of private assistance for 
foreign charitable activities, the U.S. government may be relieved of the burden of providing 
different types of foreign aid. It is also bad philosophy, as even in the 1930s, this was a narrow 
view of the world in general and global philanthropy in particular.103 Finally, it is bad logic. 
It makes little sense to deny a charitable deduction based on where the entity is organized 
but to allow charitable deductions to domestic entities that use some or all of their funds 
outside the United States.104
The strongest rationale for requiring a domestic entity as a pass-through for funds sent over-
seas is to increase accountability and transparency. This allows the IRS and state governments 
to have some oversight over the activities, even though the funds are spent outside the United 
States. If deductibility under Section 170 requires the IRS to determine that the contributions 
are used exclusively for charitable purposes and that no part of the earnings inure to the benefit 
of any private individual, it is important to have a U.S. intermediary, especially where the IRS 
lacks the ability and authority to audit activities outside the United States.105
Oversight concerns take on added importance in the post-September 11, 2001, world. The 
use of charitable organizations to support terrorist activities makes the costs of abuses related to 
foreign charitable activities greater than wasted U.S. tax dollars. While requiring foreign chari-
ties to use a U.S.-based intermediary may not be entirely effective in limiting the flow of funds 
to terrorist organizations, it potentially provides some help in limiting such abuses.106
B Options for funding foreign charitable activities and foreign 
charities through a U.S.-charitable organization
The place of organization restriction merely increases the transaction costs of providing funds 
for foreign charitable activities and foreign charities. U.S. donors have multiple options to fun-
nel their contributions towards foreign charitable activities and foreign charities:107
1 The easiest method is for donors to contribute to U.S. public charities engaged in foreign 
charitable activities either directly or through making grants to foreign charities;
2 U.S. individuals or corporations can use private foundations to make grants to foreign 
charities. As discussed earlier, to avoid excise taxes and other penalties, private foundations 
must either exercise expenditure responsibility or determine that the foreign charity is the 
equivalent of a Section 501(c)(3) organization;
3 Donor-advised funds present similar opportunities for foreign charitable activities as private 
foundations. Donors can effectively direct funds to foreign activities and even to foreign 
charities as long as they exercise expenditure responsibility. Sponsors of donor-advised 
funds impose different restrictions, but as a practical matter, donors can select a sponsor that 
will allow them to achieve their objectives;
4 “Friends of ” organizations also provide an easy path to fund foreign charitable activities and 
foreign charities. As long as the organization does not act as a mere conduit, U.S. donors 
can use these organizations to engage in cross-border philanthropy;
5 Internet and other platforms allow for U.S. donors to choose foreign beneficiaries by 
effectively using the public charity status of a charitable intermediary. These platforms 
reduce transaction costs for individuals seeking to fund foreign projects. For example, CAF 
America, Give2Asia, and GlobalGiving provide individuals with funding opportunities for 
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education, health, and other types of projects in different countries and may offer foreign 
charities an opportunity to achieve de facto friends of status.108
Because of the availability of these alternatives for funding foreign charitable activity and foreign 
charities, the tax barriers for cross-country philanthropy are remarkably low. The general rule 
remains that direct contributions to foreign charities are not deductible for income tax pur-
poses. But the availability of U.S. intermediaries to channel contributions to foreign charities 
and the ability of private foundations and donor-advised funds to obtain equivalency determi-
nations of U.S. public charity status for foreign charities relatively quickly and inexpensively 
(through organizations such as NGOsource) means the U.S. regime is more a toll charge for 
contributions to foreign charity rather than a roadblock.109
C Benefits and costs of allowing deductibility for direct contributions 
to foreign charities
Assume for purposes of this discussion that there were no problems in monitoring the activi-
ties of domestic or foreign charities (or that the proportion of charities behaving badly were 
the same) and that we do not value domestic charitable activity over foreign charitable activity. 
Under these assumptions, we would want those organizations that were the most efficient pro-
viders of charitable services to receive tax subsidies. Many reasons exist why foreign charities 
would be more effective than U.S. charities in providing assistance in foreign countries. These 
could include better knowledge of local conditions, lack of language challenges, greater recep-
tivity of beneficiaries to receive assistance from local providers, and lower operating costs. We 
should want the donations and the matching federal funds to go to the charities that provide 
the highest-quality assistance. Allowing direct contributions to foreign charities will have the 
additional benefits of encouraging the growth and development of charitable sectors outside 
the United States.
Another reason to provide deductibility for contributions to foreign charities is that some 
foreign countries may have regulatory regimes that are more effective in approving and moni-
toring charities than the IRS and state attorney generals. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
Charity Commission likely provides more effective oversight of U.K. charitable organizations 
than U.S. oversight mechanisms.110
Allowing direct contributions to foreign charities avoids the complexity and transaction costs 
of the current regime. Given that it is relatively easy to get around the “place of organization” 
restriction, why make donors go through this extra step? U.S. charitable intermediaries would 
no longer collect a percentage of foreign contributions.
There are several potential costs of allowing direct contributions to foreign charities. The 
most important cost is giving up some or all of U.S. oversight over foreign charitable activity. 
While there may be incomplete vetting of applications for tax-exempt status and not robust 
monitoring of charitable activity by the IRS and state officials, there is at least some level of 
oversight by IRS and state officials. The tax returns (Form 990) provide helpful information in 
understanding the charities’ operations and place oversight responsibility on officers and direc-
tors. Having an intermediate U.S. entity will also help in enforcing laws related to anti-terrorist 
financing and money-laundering. While other countries and organization may have similar 
measures to address these concerns, it may be in U.S. interests to directly involved in monitoring 
the activities of foreign charities receiving contributions from U.S. donors.
Several alternatives have been offered to extend tax benefits to foreign charities while mini-
mizing opportunities for abuse.111 First, foreign charities could apply for the right to receive 
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tax-deductible contributions in the same way they can currently apply for tax-exempt status.112 
Second, the IRS could establish an “approved foreign charity list” of those foreign charities that 
satisfied certain criteria based on a review by the IRS, the State Department, or some other 
agency. This approach shares much in common with the current Canadian and Irish systems, 
where individual taxpayers can deduct contributions to foreign charities as long as the Canadian 
or Irish government has also contributed to those charities.113 Third, the existing tax-treaty 
network could be used to provide for deductibility of contributions to foreign charities on a 
country-by-country basis. Currently, the United States provides treaty relief for U.S. residents 
with Canada, Israel, and Mexico.114 These provisions generally allow U.S. residents to reduce 
their foreign source income by donations to foreign charities.115 Finally, we could adopt a “sub-
stantial equivalent” approach, where charities in those countries whose charitable regulation 
meets some minimum guidelines would be eligible to receive deductible contributions.
This last alternative presents both opportunities and challenges. This substantial equivalent 
approach would reduce barriers to cross-border giving and provide donors greater choices in 
making charitable contributions. However, this approach may result in competition among 
countries to attract charitable organizations, not unlike tax competition for foreign investment. 
Even where countries adopt similar charitable regulation regimes, countries can vary greatly in 
their appetite for monitoring and enforcing charitable regulations.
V Conclusions
The U.S. regulatory regime provides relatively low tax barriers for U.S. donors to engage in 
cross-border philanthropy. From the beginning of the charitable deduction, U.S. tax law allowed 
tax benefits for contributions to domestic charities even if these charities spend some or all of 
the funds on charitable activities outside the United States (either directly or through grants to 
foreign entities). Since 1938, U.S. donors generally receive no income tax deductions for con-
tributions made directly to foreign charities.
But the bark is worse than the bite. Donors have many alternatives (with different levels of 
complexity and administrative costs) to direct funds to foreign charities and still receive U.S. 
income tax benefits. These include contributions to (i) domestic public charities or private 
foundations that effectively forward the funds to foreign charities, (ii) “friends of ” organiza-
tions with affiliated foreign charities, (iii) donor-advised funds with recommendations that the 
funds be transferred to designated foreign charities, and (iv) different platforms (such as CAF 
America, Give2Asia, and GlobalGiving) that facilitate transfers to foreign charities at a nominal 
charge). While the lack of deductibility for direct contributions may increase complexity and 
administrative costs, requiring a U.S. intermediary provides at least some degree of oversight 
and accountability for U.S. regulators.
Whether the U.S. charitable tax regime is desirable depends on how the inquiry is framed. 
One approach looks at the existing rationales for charitable tax subsidies and asks whether 
meaningful differences exist between domestic and foreign charitable activities and between 
foreign and domestic charitable entities that justify different tax treatment. Here, one can make 
a strong argument that the tax law should extend subsidies to foreign charitable activities and 
to foreign charitable entities (with some mechanism for confirming charitable status and moni-
toring). The relative strength of the argument depends on how foreign activities and foreign 
charities fit within the theoretical basis for charitable tax subsidies. Unfortunately, the U.S. lacks 
a coherent, comprehensive theory on why we should allow charitable tax subsidies for domestic 
charities engaged in domestic charitable activities. Just as current theories provide little guidance 
on how to compare the worthiness of different types of charitable domestic activities, they are 
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of limited use in comparing the relative value between domestic charitable activities and entities 
and foreign charitable activities and entities. It is not surprising we struggle with the proper tax 
treatment for foreign activities and foreign charities. The current regime allows donors almost 
complete discretion in determining which countries should benefit from their share of the 
contributions (the after-tax amount of the contributions) as well as the government’s share (the 
amount of the tax subsidy).
The question then becomes (for both domestic and foreign activities and charitable entities) 
whether the current charitable regime is the best way to achieve certain societal objectives. In 
the domestic context, the current regime has produced a robust charitable sector that increases 
the level of underprovided goods and services and allows donors to direct funds to activities 
that they believe merit support. Donors do many good things that local or federal government 
would not, or could not, provide. We can adopt a “take or leave it” approach that asks whether 
we are better off with the current tax regime than we would be without it. This recognizes a 
set of trade-offs that reflect decisions made as to which charitable activities deserve tax subsidies, 
the role of government in granting charitable status and monitoring activities, and the form of 
these subsidies under the income and estate and gift regimes.
In the foreign context, it is not clear whether the same types of trade-offs would apply and 
whether the benefits of tax subsidies for foreign activities justify the costs. These differences may 
support providing tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities and entities but not necessarily in 
the same form as the current domestic charitable regime.
In both the domestic and foreign context, a “bang for the buck” approach may support 
proposals for reforming the tax subsidies regimes to maximize returns for government revenues 
foregone. This requires examining the value of all tax benefits for charitable activity, not just the 
charitable deduction under the personal income tax. Part of this analysis would focus on who 
can take advantage of the tax subsidies and the relative contributions of donors and government 
in funding charitable activities. For both domestic and foreign charitable activities and entities, 
there may be a “tipping point” whereby the size of the tax subsidies relative to the donors’ after-
tax contribution no longer justifies allowing donors to determine where and how the matching 
portion of the government’s contributions are spent.
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I Introduction
Australia offers a tax deduction to encourage philanthropy, making charitable gifts less expensive 
for donors than they would be otherwise. Until quite recently, this tax incentive generally did 
not extend to cross-border philanthropy,1 notwithstanding its significance for Australian chari-
ties2 engaged in international charitable activities. The Australian government’s justification for 
this strict approach derived from policy concerns relating to the fiscal consequences of extend-
ing tax concessions to cross-border donations and the potential for charities operating overseas 
to be misused for terrorist financing and other criminal purposes (Silver, McGregor-Lowndes 
and Tarr, 2016, pp. 85, 109–113). As a result of this policy position, Australian donors were 
subject to one of the most restrictive legal regimes among OECD donor countries for the tax 
treatment of cross-border philanthropy.
Ironically, instead of ensuring that the benefits of these charitable tax subsidies remained 
in Australia, the government’s restrictive approach enabled largely unregulated tax deductible 
cross-border giving to take place through giving intermediaries. During this period, the gov-
ernment’s insufficient oversight and monitoring of cross-border charity and philanthropy was 
highlighted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that pro-
motes the implementation of measures for combating terrorist financing and money laundering 
in compliance with its recommendations.3 In an evaluation of Australia’s domestic regulation of 
charities operating overseas, FATF found that Australia’s supervisory framework for nonprofits 
was wanting, leaving them “vulnerable to misuse by terrorist organisations” (FATF and APG, 
2015, p. 16).
Confronted with these regulatory shortcomings, combined with an increased number of 
Australian charities – almost 5,000 or 10 percent – operating and transferring funds overseas, 
(Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, 2018, p. 8),4 the government was forced 
to reconsider its regulation of cross-border charity. In doing so, changes were proposed to the 
regulatory regime governing international charitable activities. These changes included new 
tools to regulate charities operating and transferring funds overseas as part of a reform pack-
age introduced to “strengthen governance arrangements, reduce administrative complexity and 
ensure continued trust and confidence in the sector” (O’Dwyer, 2017).
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At the same time, as a result of two judicial decisions challenging the legislative efficacy of 
the geographic restrictions placed around Australia’s charitable tax concessions, the government 
decided to change policy course, culminating in a new tax ruling reflecting a more permissive 
approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations (Australian Taxation Office, 2019). 
While the government did not provide a rationale for this policy shift, its new approach repre-
sented a change in the longstanding justification for the provision of a tax deduction for chari-
table gifts. In Australia, the gift deduction is characterised as a government subsidy to promote 
charitable activities having a public benefit (Krever, 1991, pp. 1, 5). The subsidy was justified 
in that it supported the domestic charitable sector provide public goods that would otherwise 
need to be provided by the fiscal state (Krever, 1991, p. 5; Stewart, 2014, pp. 251–252). This 
traditional rationale corresponds to a narrow conception of public benefit in the tax law, confin-
ing it to the fiscal state.
With a less restrictive approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations, a more geo-
graphically expansive conception of public benefit is possible that recognises the growth in 
Australian cross-border charitable activities. Indeed, an Australian inquiry into the definition of 
charities found that “public benefit is a universal concept and cannot be contained within the 
boundaries of any country” (Sheppard, Fitzgerald and Gonski, 2001, p. 257). Under this plural-
ist rationale, the gift deduction can be justified as supporting the decentralised provision of pub-
lic goods through a diverse charitable sector wherever that may be (Reich, 2011, pp. 187–190; 
Stewart, 2014, pp. 251–252). As a result, the public benefitting from the gift deduction can be 
justified as extending beyond Australia’s borders to the wider global community.
This chapter examines the removal – albeit incomplete – of some of Australia’s tax barriers 
to cross-border philanthropy. Part II focuses on the evolution of the legislative architecture gov-
erning Australian cross-border philanthropy and identifies important changes to the regulatory 
regime that accompanied these developments. Part III employs the traditional tax policy criteria 
of efficiency, equity and simplicity to evaluate the Australian’s government’s shift to a less restric-
tive approach to the tax treatment of international giving. Part IV concludes by considering 
how the Australian experience can inform other governments seeking to reform their own tax 
and regulatory regimes affecting cross-border philanthropy.
II Legislative architecture governing cross-border philanthropy
Australia provides a deduction to its taxpayers as an incentive to encourage philanthropic giv-
ing. To be eligible to receive tax-deductible donations,5 an Australian organisation must obtain 
deductible gift recipient (DGR) status and be registered with the Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission, Australia’s national charity regulator [Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 10–5]. Most DGRs are charities, although less 
than 40 percent of charities are DGRs (Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, 
2018, p. 27).6 Charities are defined in s 5 of the Charities Act 2013 (Cth) as not-for-profit 
organisations established for charitable purposes that are for the public benefit. The concept of 
public benefit is central to the legal definition of charity, derived from the seminal English case, 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel ([1891] AC 531 (Lord Macnaghten)). 
The charitable purposes enumerated in s 12 of the Charities Act 2013 (Cth) are reflected in 
the broad categories of deductible gifts contained in the income tax legislation, each of which 
contains “special conditions” (ITAA 1997, div 30).
One of the special conditions that must be met to achieve DGR status is that an organisa-
tion must be “in Australia” (ITAA 1997, s 30–15). However, the tax legislation does not pro-
vide a definition of “in Australia” for the purposes of this residency requirement. Instead, the 
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Australian Tax Office, which is responsible for administering and enforcing tax law for charities 
and other not-for-profits, has issued public tax rulings to explain the meaning of the “in Aus-
tralia” residency requirement for DGRs.
A longstanding restrictive approach to the tax treatment  
of cross-border donations
For more than 50  years, the Australian Tax Office interpreted the “in Australia” residency 
requirement for DGRs strictly. The policy imperatives underlying this restrictive approach to 
the tax treatment of cross border donations were to protect the national tax base by ensuring 
that publicly-funded tax concessions are used for the broad benefit of the Australian community 
and to prevent non-profit organisations being used for tax abuse purposes of money laundering, 
offshore avoidance arrangements and terrorist financing [Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws 
Amendment (Special Conditions for Not-for-profit Concessions) Bill 2012 (Cth), pp. 5–12; 
Explanatory Materials, Exposure Draft: Tax Laws Amendment (2014 Measures No #) Bill 2014 
(Cth), pp. 5–12].
The Australian Tax Office’s strict interpretation of the “in Australia” residency requirement 
for DGRs was set out in a public tax ruling for a common sub-type of charity in Australia 
known as public benevolent institutions (Australian Taxation Office, 2003, para 129). Public 
benevolent institutions provide direct services to those in need of benevolent relief or raise 
funds for the purpose of providing benevolent relief [Australian Charities and Not-for-profits 
Commission Act 2012 (Cth) s 25–5(5) column 2, item 6]. They encompass organisations whose 
purpose it is to relieve poverty, sickness, suffering or disability. The Australian Tax Office’s “in 
Australia” ruling for public benevolent institutions stated that for a public benevolent institution 
to be endorsed as a DGR it was required to be “in Australia”, such that it “must be established, 
controlled, maintained and operated in Australia and its benevolent purposes must be in Aus-
tralia” (Australian Taxation Office, 2003, para 128). The tax ruling further clarified that because 
the purpose of a public benevolent institution was to provide direct relief to persons in need, 
“this will mean that relief will be provided to people located in Australia” (Australian Taxation 
Office, 2003, para 129).
In practical terms, the result of this “in Australia” tax ruling was that donations by Australian 
taxpayers made directly to a charity outside Australia were never tax deductible. It also meant 
that donations made to an Australian DGR to use the gift for its own programs outside Australia 
were also not tax deductible, unless such activities were relatively minor or incidental to the 
organisation’s Australian operations (Australian Taxation Office, 2003, para 130). Importantly, 
some limited exceptions to the “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs are contained in 
the tax legislation. An organisation can obtain DGR status and use tax deductible donations for 
its activities outside Australia if it establishes an overseas aid fund undertaking development and 
humanitarian activities, a developed country disaster relief fund or a public fund on the Reg-
ister of Environmental Organisations or if it is specifically listed by name in the tax legislation 
under the category of international affairs (ITAA 1997 ss 30–55, 30–80, 30–85). However, due 
to the high entry barriers resulting from initial heavy vetting, relatively few organisations have 
obtained DGR status through one of these purposefully limited exceptions (Silver, McGregor-
Lowndes and Tarr, 2016, pp. 96–103).
Australia’s restrictive approach to the provision of tax incentives for cross-border phi-
lanthropy was significant when compared to other OECD donor countries. A comparative 
analysis of the tax laws and policies governing cross-border philanthropy in the functionally 
comparable jurisdictions of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
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Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States revealed that Australia’s use 
of domestic tax policy to place geographic barriers around charitable tax relief for donors 
located it at the most restrictive end of the spectrum of approaches to the tax treatment of 
cross-border donations. At the other, most permissive, end of the spectrum was The Neth-
erlands, which applies the same tax treatment to domestic and cross-border donations by 
allowing the registration of eligible foreign entities as Dutch charities. Other countries at 
the restrictive end of the spectrum are those which, like Australia, have tax laws with “in 
country” residency requirements, including Canada, Japan and the United States. However, 
because these jurisdictions generally permit a tax deduction for cross-border donations made 
indirectly through domestic charities, they were classified as less restrictive than Australia 
(Silver and Buijze, 2020, pp. 119–122).
In addition to limiting the ability of Australian donors seeking to obtain a tax deduction 
for donations directed overseas, the Australian Tax Office’s longstanding interpretation of the 
“in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs had other unintended consequences. With few 
options for engaging in tax-effective overseas giving, many Australian nonprofit organisations 
and their donors resorted to using workarounds to channel tax-deductible funds abroad. This 
was achieved by using organisations that had obtained DGR status pursuant to one of the lim-
ited exceptions to the “in Australia” residency requirement as giving intermediaries (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2015, table 10.1).7 These channelling arrangements, involving a servicing 
fee being paid to the intermediary DGR,8 created a workaround for organisations and their 
donors, enabling them to circumvent the strict “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs 
in order to engage in tax-effective cross-border charitable activities (Silver, McGregor-Lowndes 
and Tarr, 2016, pp. 95, 103). In doing so, this fee-paying workaround compromised the govern-
ment’s ability to regulate cross-border charity through the tax laws. This in turn made monitor-
ing cross-border charitable flows far more difficult and increased the risks that these funds could 
be used for tax abuse and terrorist financing purposes.
The Australian government’s inadequate oversight and supervision of cross-border charity 
was exposed in a report by FATF, which assesses terrorist financing vulnerabilities and threats 
faced specifically by the nonprofit sector through its Recommendation 8. This Recommenda-
tion serves as an international policy standard influencing the domestic regulation of charities 
operating overseas. In its evaluation report of Australia in 2015, FATF rated Australia “non-
compliant” with Recommendation 8, finding that Australia had “not implemented a targeted 
approach nor [had] it exercised oversight in dealing with nonprofit organisations that are at risk 
from the threat of terrorist abuse” (FATF, 2015, p. 6).
During this period where the efficacy of the “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs 
was being scrutinised internationally, the government’s restrictive position on this issue was also 
being challenged in the Australian courts. A landmark decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 204 considered the 
“in Australia” residency requirement for income tax exemption, which differs slightly to that 
for DGRs. The Court found that this requirement did not mean that charitable funds trans-
ferred through a suitably qualified charitable intermediary needed to be expended in Australia; 
it only imposed a requirement that the charitable intermediary incur its expenditure and pur-
sue its objectives principally in Australia (p. 239 [73]). This decision was affirmed in Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v The Hunger Project Australia (2014) 221 FCR 302, where the issue 
was whether Hunger Project Australia qualified as a public benevolent institution in Australia. 
Hunger Project Australia was part of a global network of entities whose purpose was to relieve 
hunger in developing countries. While Hunger Project Australia was primarily a fundraising 
arm for other Hunger Project entities engaged in the direct provision of hunger relief outside 
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Australia, the organisation had some involvement in global and program decision-making. The 
Federal Court of Australia found that despite the fact that Hunger Project Australia did not itself 
directly give or provide relief but rather did so via its related entities, it nonetheless qualified as 
a public benevolent institution and was therefore eligible to apply for income tax exemption 
and DGR status (p. 314 [67]).
These two judicial decisions had significant implications for the Australian Tax Office’s strict 
interpretation of the “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs. By interpreting the “in 
Australia” residency requirement for income tax-exempt entities as not mandating that the 
ultimate purposes or beneficiaries be in Australia, these decisions suggested that, similarly, an 
organisation’s purposes or beneficiaries may not need to be “in Australia” to qualify for DGR 
status.
A new less restrictive approach to the tax treatment  
of cross-border donations
Faced with both legal and practical challenges to its longstanding interpretation of the “in 
Australia” residency requirement for DGRs, in 2017, the Australian Tax Office withdrew its 
“in Australia” public tax ruling for public benevolent institutions (Australian Taxation Office, 
2017). At the same time, the Australian Tax Office cited a statement issued by the Commis-
sioner of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission that an organisation “is not 
precluded from being registered as a [public benevolent institution] subtype of charity if it has a 
main purpose of providing benevolent relief to people residing overseas” (2016, s 5.8). This was 
followed by an announcement that the Australian Tax Office would be issuing a new public tax 
ruling on the “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs and income tax-exempt entities 
(Australian Taxation Office, 2018).
The new public tax ruling was issued in December 2019. This tax ruling is not limited to 
public benevolent institutions. Instead it is concerned with DGRs and income tax-exempt 
entities more broadly. The tax ruling states that a DGR satisfies the “in Australia” residency 
requirement for DGRs in the tax legislation so long as it is “established or legally recognised in 
Australia, and makes operational or strategic decisions mainly in Australia” (Australian Taxation 
Office, 2019, para 7). Importantly, there is no requirement that the organisation’s purposes or 
beneficiaries be in Australia. The practical result of this new tax ruling is that while donations 
by Australian taxpayers made directly to a charity outside Australia are still not tax deductible, 
donations made to a qualified Australian DGR to use the gift for its own programs and those of 
its eligible related entities outside Australia are now tax deductible, provided that organisation’s 
operational or strategic decisions occur “mainly in Australia” (Australian Taxation Office, 2019, 
paras 19, 35).9 With this less restrictive approach to the provision of tax incentives for interna-
tional philanthropy, Australia’s location on the tax treatment of cross-border giving spectrum 
has shifted further towards the permissive end of the spectrum, albeit far from The Netherlands’ 
equivalency ideal.
In the intervening years, while the charitable sector in Australia awaited the new public tax 
ruling, Australian organisations and their donors took advantage of the legal vacuum that existed 
by establishing public benevolent institutions with DGR status for the purpose of sending funds 
and engaging in charitable activities outside Australia.10 By the end of 2017, approximately 
10 percent of all charities in Australia reported operating overseas (Australian Charities and 
Not-for-profits Commission, 2018, p. 8),11 a significant increase from approximately 6 percent 
of all charities in 2013 (Cortis et al., 2016, p. 11). More than three-quarters of these charities 
reported transferring funds overseas (Powell et al., 2017, p. 11). The rise in Australian charities 
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operating and sending funds outside Australia signified the need for increased regulatory over-
sight and monitoring of these organisations.
New regulatory tools governing cross-border charitable activities
The Australian government responded to the criticism it had received from FATF in 2015 by 
conducting a national risk assessment into the charitable sector (AUSTRAC, 2017). The risk 
assessment found that while there were few proven instances of money laundering and terror-
ism financing – consistent with other assessments (AUSTRAC, 2014; AUSTRAC, 2016) – 
there remained a “medium” risk level of organisations being misused for such purposes 
(AUSTRAC and Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, 2017, p.  39). Rec-
ommendations from the risk assessment focused on measures to strengthen the oversight and 
monitoring of international charitable activities. FATF conducted a follow-up report in 2018 
analysing Australia’s progress in implementing new requirements relating to recommendation 8 
(FATF, 2018). In the period between its two reports on Australia, FATF amended Recommen-
dation 8, emphasising the need for governments to adopt “effective and proportionate measures 
commensurate to the risks identified through a risk-based approach that respects countries’ obli-
gations under the Charter of the United Nations and international human rights law” (FATF, 
2016, pp. 54–55).12 FATF’s follow-up report concluded that Australia was “largely compliant” 
with the revised Recommendation 8, citing the comprehensive risk assessment Australia had 
taken of its nonprofit sector. However, the report also noted “concerns that some smaller chari-
ties, which are identified as potentially higher-risk, are not subject to adequate monitoring” 
(FATF, 2018, p. 6), signalling that changes to Australia’s regulatory framework governing these 
organisations were required.
To ensure compliance with its international obligations under FATF Recommendation 
8 and to address the concomitant rise in Australian charities operating overseas, the Austral-
ian government undertook an assessment of the regulatory regime governing cross-border 
charity, resulting in a DGR reform package (The Treasury, 2018). The Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission has had a range of regulatory tools at its disposal, provided 
for in the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth), including 
registration and reporting requirements, governance standards, penalties for non-compliance 
and revocation of charitable status. However, the DGR reform package introduced new tools 
specifically for regulating the sub-sector of charities with DGR status that operated outside 
Australia.
The most significant new reform measure introduced to strengthen the oversight and moni-
toring of cross-border charitable activities was the issuance of external conduct standards, which 
came into effect in 2019 [Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission Amendment 
(2018 Measures No. 2) Regulations 2018]. While Australia’s charity legislation had made provi-
sion for external conduct standards since the inception of the Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission in 2012, these standards were only developed and implemented as part of 
the DGR reform package in 2018.
The regulations adopted to implement the external conduct standards stated that the objec-
tives are
to provide greater confidence that funds sent, and services provided, outside Australia 
are reaching legitimate beneficiaries and are being used for legitimate purposes . . . and 
to prevent a registered entity from being misused by a criminal organization.
(s 50.1)
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Pursuant to the regulations, the external conduct standards apply to a registered entity if it 
operates outside Australia or works with third parties that operate outside Australia, unless its 
overseas activities are “merely incidental” to its operations and pursuit of its purposes in Aus-
tralia (s 50.4). There are four external conduct standards, which require charities engaging in 
cross-border charitable activities to appropriately manage their overseas activities and control 
of resources (s. 50.20), conduct an annual review of their overseas activities on a country-by-
country basis (s 50.25), ensure they have appropriate anti-fraud and anti-corruption measures in 
place (s 50.30) and protect vulnerable individuals outside Australia from exploitation or abuse 
(s 50.35).
These external conduct standards combined with the new “in Australia” tax ruling represent 
an opportunity for the Australian government to provide the necessary regulatory oversight 
and monitoring of cross-border charity to facilitate legitimate cross-border charitable flows. 
The next section analyses Australia’s new approach to cross-border charitable activities utilising 
normative tax policy considerations that inform policy-making across jurisdictions.
III Tax policy analysis
A review of the Australian tax system found it to be generally “accepted that a well-designed tax 
system will meet its revenue raising objective, while balancing the core principles of equity, effi-
ciency and simplicity” (The Treasury, 2015, p. 14). Reform of domestic tax laws are frequently 
shaped by these traditional tax policy concerns of equity, economic efficiency and simplicity 
of administration and compliance (Graetz, 1995, p. 609; O’Connell, 2008, p. 19). With a new 
interpretation by the Australian Tax Office of the “in Australia” residency requirement for 
DGRs, it is worthwhile considering how the current legislative architecture for the tax treat-
ment of cross-border giving in Australia holds up against these tax policy considerations.13 The 
following tax policy analysis evaluates the benefits of the gift deduction as it applies to cross-
border donations against the potential inequities, inefficiencies and complexities the deduction 
might produce.
Equity
There are two conceptions of equity to be considered when evaluating a national tax system: 
horizontal equity and vertical equity. The former involves the idea that “people with equal abil-
ity to pay taxes pay equal amounts of tax”, while the latter is concerned that “those with greater 
ability to pay, pay more” (Graetz, 1995, p. 610). For domestic donations, the gift deduction is 
generally seen as satisfying horizontal equity because taxpayers with a similar capacity to pay are 
treated the same. For example, in Australia, taxpayers in the highest tax bracket of 49 percent 
each pay 51 cents after tax for each dollar donated, while taxpayers in the lowest 19 percent 
bracket each pay 81 cents. However, the gift deduction has been criticised on vertical equity 
grounds for decreasing the equity of the tax system. This is because progressive rates of per-
sonal income tax result in the deduction having greater value for those taxpayers on higher 
incomes (Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel, 2010, p. 726). The result is an “upside 
down effect” whereby the wealthier the donor, the less a charitable gift costs (Krever, 1991, 
pp. 219–220; Gergen, 1988, p. 1405). This inequity is compounded given that higher-income 
taxpayers are allocated more of the tax subsidy, as they have the resources to make larger dona-
tions compared to lower-income taxpayers. Vertical inequity can therefore be seen as a “critical 
flaw” of the gift deduction that renders it “at best, ‘undemocratic’ and at worst unacceptably 
elitist” (Krever, 1991, p. 21).
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Applying these concepts of horizontal and vertical equity to cross-border donations requires 
a further level of analysis. Horizontal equity is arguably not achieved if the gift deduction is 
only available for donors in the same tax bracket who choose to give domestically but not for 
those whose donations are directed internationally. Instead, equal tax treatment for domestic 
and cross-border donations would be required. While Australia’s more permissive approach to 
the tax treatment of cross-border donations does not meet this horizontal equity ideal in that 
gifts made directly to foreign charities are still not tax deductible, it does create greater hori-
zontal equity than existed under the government’s more restrictive approach. This is because 
the Australian Tax Office’s new interpretation of the “in Australia” residency requirement for 
DGRs allows a deduction for Australian taxpayers in the same tax bracket for gifts made to 
qualified Australian charities that operate abroad.
An additional consideration for vertical equity is whether a higher level of income has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of giving internationally. This would make Australia’s more 
permissive approach to the tax treatment for cross-border donations arguably more justifiable. 
In Australia, income has been shown to have a negative correlation with support for foreign aid 
and is not statistically significant for private donations to aid organisations. Instead, tertiary edu-
cation is the strongest positive socio-economic determinant of both support for foreign aid and 
private donations to aid organisations (Wood, Humphrey Cifuentes and Pryke, 2014). This is 
consistent with studies in other jurisdictions (Casale and Baumann, 2015, p. 117; Micklewright 
and Schnepf, 2009, p. 335; Wiepking, 2010, p. 1081). As a result, even with a new interpreta-
tion by the Australian Tax Office of the “in Australia” residency requirement for DGRs, vertical 
equity issues remain.
Beyond the conceptions of horizontal equity and vertical equity which focus on a national 
tax system, equity can also be considered from a broader perspective that extends beyond 
national borders. Under this broader view, a generous tax deduction for cross-border dona-
tions may reduce global inequities given that most cross-border giving from wealthy countries 
is directed to developing countries (Roodman and Standley, 2006, pp. 5–6). This redistribu-
tive effect “might have especially powerful welfare effects for the world’s most disadvantaged” 
(Pozen, 2006, p. 583). Australia’s more permissive approach to the tax treatment of cross-border 
giving has the potential to assist in reducing global inequities as more charitable funds are redis-
tributed from Australia to poorer countries.
Efficiency
The gift deduction is widely viewed as a government subsidy or tax expenditure, the fiscal 
equivalent of a direct government spending program, because it “triggers a reduction of tax-
able income and, as a result, a tax saving, that would not be available in a benchmark income 
tax system which treated charitable gifts similarly to all other gifts or uses of income” (Krever, 
1991, p. 5). Because of the tax savings arising from gift deductibility, the donor does not bear 
the entire cost of the gift, and the government forgoes tax revenue. This raises the question of 
whether the gift deduction is a cost-effective way to subsidise charitable organisations. Eco-
nomic (or treasury) efficiency is concerned with understanding whether the public benefit 
derived from the gift deduction exceeds the costs of the subsidy – specifically, whether a dollar 
of forgone taxes creates at least an extra dollar of charitable donations or (if not) whether the 
subsidy should be replaced with direct spending (Colinvaux, Galle and Steuerle, 2012, p. 8).
One measure of whether the gift deduction is efficient in encouraging donors to give to 
charity is to consider the price elasticity of giving. If giving is price elastic, then lowering the 
price of giving through tax incentives can potentially increase both the amount donated and 
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the number of individuals donating (Simon, Dale and Chisolm, 2006, p. 272; Colinvaux, Galle 
and Steuerle, 2012, p. 9). On the other hand, if giving is price inelastic, then the tax deduction 
is an inefficient way to fund charitable organisations. On balance, empirical studies indicate 
that the price elasticity of giving has absolute value greater than one, at least among individuals 
with high incomes (Gergen, 1988; Peloza and Steel, 2005; Bakija and Heim, 2011; List, 2011). 
Indeed, high top marginal tax rates in Australia suggest that for wealthy taxpayers, the gift 
deduction would have a significant impact on giving (McGregor-Lowndes and Crittall, 2015, 
pp. 7, 61). While there have not been studies to determine the price elasticity of cross-border 
giving, one comparative study of charitable giving to developing countries found that individu-
als in countries with targeted income tax incentives give more to developing countries (Rood-
man and Standley, 2006, p. 35). This suggests that the gift deduction may be a cost-effective way 
to subsidise international charitable activities.
Whether a tax deduction for cross-border donations increases economic efficiency also 
depends on the wider social objectives of the deduction and the scope of the public who 
should benefit. The Australian government historically took a narrow view of treasury effi-
ciency, largely confining the benefits of the deduction to the Australian public. According to 
this view, a generous deduction for cross-border donations would decrease treasury efficiency 
within Australia due to the consequences for the public purse. However, with the govern-
ment’s shift in policy and a new interpretation of the “in Australia” residency requirement for 
DGRs, a broader view of economic efficiency appears to have been adopted pursuant to which 
a deduction for cross-border donations is economically efficient in its cost-effective delivery of 
support to beneficiaries overseas. Under this broader view of treasury efficiency, it is also argu-
able that globally net social welfare will be increased with a more permissive approach to the 
tax deductibility of cross-border donations (Pozen, 2006, p. 580). Indeed, all Australians stand 
to benefit from cross-border gifts that fund organisations involved in the production of global 
public goods, such as medical breakthroughs associated with the development of vaccinations 
for COVID-19 or solutions for the climate change crisis. In such situations, the Australian gov-
ernment receives a return or benefit for the public funds expended.
Simplicity
Tax laws should be simple for taxpayers to comply with and for administrators to implement 
(Graetz, 1995, p. 609). Tax expenditures such as the gift deduction “can add complexity to the 
tax system [in that they] complicate the law and create additional choices for people” (Australia’s 
Future Tax System Review Panel, 2010, p. 726). A recurring theme in the Australian nonprofit 
tax literature is criticism of the not-for-profit tax concessions for their complexity (O’Connell, 
2008, pp. 19–20). For example, not only is the process for obtaining deductible gift recipient 
status in Australia complicated, “there are five initial categories of recipient and then a further 
14 categories (different to the categories for income tax exemption) that each have a general 
category and a specific category for specifically listed entities” (O’Connell, 2021, p. 30). Such 
complexity is not surprising given that the charitable tax concessions in Australia developed by 
way of “ad hoc decision-making” rather than “considered policy analysis” (O’Connell, 2021, 
p. 36).
When applied to cross-border donations, the complexity surrounding the gift deductibility 
provisions generally increases. In Australia, the complex legislative architecture governing the 
tax treatment of cross-border donations had lacked clarity, particularly as the meaning of “in 
Australia” is not stated in the tax legislation and has required interpretation by the Austral-
ian Tax Office. Organisations engaging in international charitable activities and their donors 
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are required to navigate the complex laws and cumbersome processes surrounding the “in 
Australia” residency requirement for DGRs and its exceptions to determine whether they are 
eligible for DGR status.
The new “in Australia” tax ruling provides some clarity for organisations operating overseas 
and their donors and in doing so reduces the need for complex workarounds to facilitate tax-
effective cross-border giving. When regulatory reforms for cross-border charity are also taken 
into account, the overall result is a less complicated, more streamlined system for both taxpayers 
and administrators.
Summary
The Australian government’s longstanding approach to the tax treatment of cross-border dona-
tions prioritised fiscal consequences over other tax policy considerations. This resulted in a 
reduced capacity of the traditional tax concerns to influence policymaking with respect to 
cross-border philanthropy. With a new, less restrictive approach, it is possible to evaluate the 
benefits of the gift deduction as it applies to cross-border donations against these tax considera-
tions. A tax policy analysis reveals that while there are some costs to the public purse and verti-
cal inequities persist, on balance, the government’s more permissive approach to cross-border 
philanthropy better promotes economic efficiency in the broad sense as a cost-effective way to 
subsidise international charitable activities and ultimately contributes to a reduction in global 
inequities due to the redistributive effect on the global allocation of resources. This approach 
also has the potential to reduce the complexity associated with tax deductibility for cross-border 
donations by providing legislative clarity and regulatory specificity for charities operating over-
seas and their donors while simplifying administration for regulators.
IV Conclusion
A recent OECD report on taxation and philanthropy found that “[d]espite fairly widespread 
use of incentives for domestic philanthropy, the landscape for a more global approach to phi-
lanthropy remains fairly guarded” (2020, p. 109). For many years, the Australian government 
epitomised this guarded approach with its longstanding policy prohibiting tax concessions for 
cross-border philanthropy mitigated by special exemptions with high entry barriers. The result 
was that Australia, like many donor countries around the world, was faced with a legal and 
regulatory environment for cross-border giving where a tension existed between effective gov-
ernment regulation and a desire for donors to engage in tax-effective international philanthropy.
In theory, the government’s strict approach limited the ability of Australian donors to get a tax 
deduction for cross-border donations by requiring these gifts to be made through organisations that 
had succeeded in obtaining DGR status under one of the very limited exceptions to the “in Aus-
tralia” residency requirement. Yet in practice, instead of ensuring that the benefits of these charitable 
tax subsidies remained in Australia, this approach enabled largely unregulated tax deductible cross-
border giving to take place through giving intermediaries. The channelling workaround used to 
circumvent the restrictive tax laws was costly for donors and stifled their ability to engage in tax effec-
tive cross-border giving. At the same time, it compromised the ability of the Australian authorities to 
appropriately monitor cross-border charitable flows, underscored by FATF’s evaluation of Australia’s 
regulation of charities operating overseas. As a result, the government was unable to provide effective 
regulatory supervision of cross-border philanthropy. This failed approach, recognised by the Austral-
ian courts, is a lesson for other jurisdictions in what not to do.
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Following these judicial decisions challenging the geographic restrictions placed around the 
charitable tax concessions, the Australian government has acknowledged the shortcomings of 
its overly restrictive approach to the tax treatment of cross-border donations. In doing so, it has 
changed policy course by issuing a new “in Australia” tax ruling for DGRs that provides greater 
scope for some Australian charities and their donors to engage in tax effective cross-border 
charitable activities. While restrictions remain in place, such that Australian “cross-border dona-
tions are not incentivized as a general principle” (OECD, 2020, pp. 109–110, Table 5.1), for 
those organisations that qualify for DGR status, the government’s new approach alleviates the 
need for charities and their donors to engage in workarounds of the tax laws. Indeed, a tax 
policy analysis demonstrates that although the government’s new approach to the tax treatment 
of cross-border donations is not without domestic costs, the benefits to both the Australian 
community and the wider global community are difficult to ignore. With the establishment of a 
more appropriate supervisory framework for monitoring cross-border giving, there is potential 
for greater transparency of cross-border charitable activities which will advance Australia’s tax 
abuse risk profile.
The government’s reduction of some of the territorial barriers around charitable tax relief 
for donors, combined with new tools for regulating international giving, is a first step towards 
reforming Australia’s legal and regulatory regime governing cross-border philanthropy. The 
extent to which this less guarded approach achieves a more appropriate balance between ensur-
ing adequate oversight of cross-border charitable flows while enabling Australian citizens to 
effectively contribute to the wider global community remains to be seen.
Notes
 1 Defined as a charitable gift from a donor in one jurisdiction to a recipient in another. This term will 
be used throughout this chapter interchangeably with “international philanthropy” and “international 
giving”.
 2 Charities are a subset of not-for-profit organisations that meet the statutory definition of charity under 
the Charities Act 2013 (Cth).
 3 Australia is a founding member of FATF, which was established in 1989.
 4 This includes transferring funds or goods, or delivering programs, outside Australia.
 5 Under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 30–15 (ITAA 1997), Australian residents can 
deduct from their taxable income the value of donations of AUD $2 or more made to a DGR.
 6 Other not-for-profit organisations eligible to become DGRs include government institutions, 
income tax-exempt funds, and organisations with purposes that are primarily sporting or recrea-
tional in nature. The Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No. 2) Act 2021 amends the ITAA 
1997 to require non-government DGRs (other than ancillary funds) to register as a charity from 14 
December 2021.
 7 ‘Grants and other payments’ made by Australian non-profit organisations to ‘non-resident organisations’ 
(defined as any organisation domiciled overseas, including foreign branches and subsidiaries of Austral-
ian organisations) amounted to more than AUD $1 billion, highlighting the widespread use of domestic 
nonprofits for cross-border giving, a significant component of which is likely to be intermediary giving.
 8 This servicing fee was typically 7–10 percent of the amount distributed. See Letter from Philanthropy 
Australia to Prime Minister Tony Abbott, 21 April 2015, 1 (on file with author).
 9 The location of decision making is determined on the basis of where the organisation’s decision-
making powers are mainly exercised, such that if the decision makers are located in more than one 
place, operational or strategic decisions would be made “mainly in Australia” provided the balance of 
decision-making power usually lies in Australia.
 10 Data from the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission’s registration database as at 
24 May 2017 shows that the number of public benevolent institutions operating overseas has been 




 11 This includes transferring funds or goods, or delivering programs, outside Australia.
 12 This change represented an acknowledgment be FATF that the non-profit sector’s vulnerability to 
terrorist abuse may previously have been overstated given that “not all non-profit organisations are 
inherently high risk (and some may represent little or no risk at all)”.
 13 A tax policy analysis of Australia’s long-standing restrictive approach to the tax treatment of cross-
border donations was undertaken in Silver and Buijze (2020, pp. 136–148).
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Traditionally, philanthropy is thought to be an activity of rich individuals and charities funded 
by individuals. In this context, donations, transfers without a direct return, are the typical form 
of philanthropy. It is important to stress that these are transfers without a direct return, as in many 
cases, donors do expect an indirect return. In their literature survey on philanthropy, Bekkers 
and Wiepking (2011) identified eight key mechanisms that in combination drive individual 
philanthropy: (1) awareness of (perceived) need, (2) solicitation (being asked for a donation), (3) 
cost and benefits of a donation, (4) altruism, (5) psychological benefits (warm glow), (6) reputa-
tion, (7) values and (8) (perceived) effectiveness of a donation. Such a combination of motives 
was already present when the typical Dutch hofjes were founded in the 14th century. These 
hofjes are an early form of private social housing: small city houses gathered around a green 
which provided free or cheap housing for the elderly and the poor. For founders, the indirect 
return could be an increase or confirmation of prestige, social status and better chances to get 
to heaven after death: the poor as treasurer of heaven (Hooijer 2019, Chapter 2). A similar mix 
of charitable, social status and immortality motives can be found in the context of, for example, 
current-day art patrons. Donating to the arts can give access to certain social networks and is 
expected of those in certain circles. It can even make the donor immortal when a room or an 
entire gallery is given her name. It is, therefore, important to recognize that individual philan-
thropy is usually not purely altruistic. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011, p. 936) even found in their 
literature survey that private benefits dominate altruistic motives.
Nowadays, philanthropy is no longer an activity of individuals only. Companies have also 
become important players. Some well-known examples of corporate foundations are the Carls-
berg Foundation (one of the oldest corporate foundations, founded in Denmark in 1876), the 
IKEA Foundation and the Wal-Mart Foundation. Philanthropy has, in this development, fol-
lowed the general economy in which economic activities were no longer only enterprises of 
individuals but also bundled in legal forms, companies.
Companies and (former) entrepreneurs initiating philanthropic activities brought their entre-
preneurial customs, values and expectations into the world of philanthropy. This influenced 
philanthropic activities. Entrepreneurs and companies have certain expectations and introduce 
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their business attitude into the philanthropic world. This leads to new forms of philanthropy 
next to the conventional form of donations. Examples of such new forms of philanthropy are 
program-related investments and donations to for-profit companies.
These developments in the world of philanthropy lead to several questions related to 
tax incentives for charitable donations and charities. A tax incentive is a provision in tax 
legislation, regulation or practice that leads to a reduction or postponement of tax income 
for the government and deviates from the ordinary or benchmark structure of a tax sys-
tem.1 In short: tax legislation is used to give fiscal rewards for certain desired behaviour. 
Tax incentives for corporate philanthropy include, for example, deductibility of gifts and 
an exemption of gift tax.
Many questions that arise as a result of corporate philanthropy in relation to tax incentives 
are at the top of the charitable agenda in the Netherlands. As the Dutch tax rules for charita-
ble activities are still based on traditional forms of philanthropy, the Dutch tax administration 
and the philanthropic world are currently struggling to fit the more entrepreneurial forms 
of philanthropy into this system. This chapter takes, therefore, after a short discussion of the 
general business rationales for corporate philanthropy, the Netherlands as an example. I give a 
brief overview of corporate philanthropy in the Netherlands and discuss problems which have 
been encountered in the Netherlands in relation to deductibility of corporate gifts, donations 
of shares, donations to for-profit entities and program-related investments, solutions that have 
already been found and solutions that are proposed. Furthermore, I discuss the threats a proposal 
for an EU Directive on a common corporate tax base entails for an EU level playing field of 
corporate giving and competition for corporate donations.
2 Business rationale for corporate philanthropy
Just as individuals do not only have altruistic motives for philanthropy, corporate philanthropic 
activities are usually not done without a business rationale. I, therefore, respectfully disagree 
with OECD (2020, pp. 102–103) that seems to make a sharp distinction between sponsoring 
(business costs) and donations (not business cost). According to OECD (2020), sponsoring is 
fully deductible as business costs as in return, “corporations purchase publicity and advertising 
from philanthropic entities for the fair market value of those services”. Donations do not seem 
to be regarded as business costs by OECD (2020), as there is deemed not to be a return. This 
echoes the French system, where all payments to philanthropic entities are considered donations 
(OECD 2020, p. 103) and hence not business costs. However, this disregards the fact that busi-
nesses usually have a clear rationale for their actions and that although donations do not lead to 
a direct return from the philanthropic entity, they do lead to indirect returns, which provide a 
business rationale for the donation.
There is a large strand of management literature on the impact of so-called corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities on firm performance.2 CSR firms are found to have a better 
long-run performance. CSR is regarded to contribute to an organization’s reputation and thus 
to increase sales and profits. A well-designed CSR policy can reinforce the authenticity of a 
brand. However, CSR is not only a marketing strategy but also a recruiting strategy, especially 
for millennials who, both as consumers and as employees, are found to value CSR even more 
than previous generations (McGlone, Winters Spain and McGlone 2011). CSR has also been 
found to be increasingly important for competitiveness, because it can lead to innovation. Fur-
thermore, CSR can not only lower the cost of equity but also of debt (El Ghoul et al. 2011; 
Goss and Roberts 2011).
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Expectations for CSR performance have progressed from “net zero” practices aimed primar-
ily at reducing or offsetting negative impact toward “net positive” contributions: minimizing 
negative impact while also contributing positively to society and the environment. Customers 
and employees expect CSR efforts from companies.
A 2017 KPMG survey found that CSR reporting is by now standard practice for large 
and mid-cap companies around the world, an upward trend also driven by investor pressure. 
Amongst the world’s 250 largest companies, the reporting rate was 93%, and in the worldwide 
sample of the top 100 companies by revenue in each of the 49 countries studied by KPMG, the 
reporting rate was 75% (KPMG 2017).
In short: corporate philanthropy is regarded a strategic activity that may play an important 
role in the process of stakeholder management, including enhancing relations with employees, 
customers and regulators (Brammer and Milington 2006). Management literature, therefore, 
shows that there is a valuable indirect return for donations and gives a clear business rationale 
for philanthropic activities. Given this business rationale, it would follow that such donations are 
to be regarded as business costs.
3 Corporate philanthropy in the Netherlands
Several Dutch companies have incorporated charitable foundations that are registered chari-
ties in the Netherlands.3 According to Lonneke Roza in Venema (2018), there were at least 75 
corporate foundations in the Netherlands in 2018. This does not seem like much, given the 
fact that there are almost 44,0004 registered charities in the Netherlands, but Roza noted that 
she made a conservative estimate, as corporate foundations are not registered separately. Fur-
thermore, many companies do not incorporate their own foundation but donate directly to the 
causes they want to support. In addition, charities like the Prins Bernhard Cultuur Fonds offer 
companies the possibility to create an endowed fund.5 This means that the company does not 
have to incorporate and maintain a charity itself.
In order to obtain charity registration, corporate foundations must meet the same require-
ments other charities must meet for registration, such as the expenses being for more than 90% 
in the public benefit; having an independent board (meaning that at least half of the board 
members must be independent from the company or its shareholders); restrictions regarding 
the remuneration of board members; the obligation to publish information, including recent 
accounts and a policy plan, on a website; and articles of association stating that any liquidation 
proceeds must go to a similar charity.6
Given the 90% public benefit requirement, corporate foundations are not allowed to spend 
more than 10% of their expenses for the benefit of the company or its shareholders. In cases 
where there is a very close bond between the activities of the company and the CSR activities, a 
corporate foundation might not be the best solution for corporate philanthropy. If, for example, 
the philanthropic activities focus on premises of the company and are all done with employees 
of the company, it might be more cost effective to perform the activities from a business unit 
within the company. The same applies when the philanthropic activities are relatively limited or 
are mainly in the form of donations to charities.
4 Deductibility of corporate donations and Dutch tax law in general
In the Netherlands, business costs, for example, costs made for business reasons, are, in principle, 
fully deductible.7 There are exceptions to this principle. For example, gifts that are made for 
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business reasons but meet the definition of bribes in criminal law are not deductible.8 However, 
bribes are usually not part of a corporate philanthropy policy and can safely be regarded as being 
out of scope for purposes of this chapter.
From the discussion of management literature in Section 2, it can be derived that in most 
cases, corporate charitable gifts will be done for business reasons such as meeting expectations of 
consumers and employees. In my view, it is not necessary that there be a direct return provided by 
the recipient, such as in the case of sponsoring. An expected indirect return, for example, in terms 
of reputation, brand value or employee or customer expectations would also suffice for the gift to 
be business-like. In those cases, corporate gifts are fully deductible as business costs in the Neth-
erlands, without a threshold or a maximum. For these business gifts, it is not relevant whether the 
recipient is a registered charity. This deduction can, in my view, not be regarded a tax incentive, as 
it stems from the ordinary Dutch tax system that allows deduction of business costs.
If, however, costs are not made for business reasons but for shareholder reasons, these are, 
in principle, not deductible. This means that if, for example, a company gives a large amount 
to the church the sole shareholder, an individual, is member of, one must establish what the 
reason was for this gift. If there is no business reason for the gift and it was only done because 
the shareholder wanted the company to do so, this would not be a deductible gift. For Dutch 
tax purposes, this would be deemed a hidden non-deductible distribution of profit (dividend) 
to the shareholder and subsequently a gift from the shareholder to the church. The dividend 
will be taxed with personal income tax (PIT) in the hands of the individual shareholder, but 
she can claim a deductible gift for the same amount if all PIT requirements for gift deduc-
tion are met. One exception to this rule is that corporate gifts that are substantiated with 
written documents and are made to charities registered in the Netherlands9 are deductible up 
to a maximum of the highest of 50% of the profits or EUR 100,000 (the gift deduction).10 
For business gifts made for business reasons, this provision is irrelevant, as such gifts are fully 
deductible in the same way as any other business costs are. Especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), it is of importance that it is stated in a decree that an entity making 
a gift because of personal charitable wishes of the shareholder can deduct this gift, making 
use of this gift deduction (and within the boundaries of the gift deduction).11 This is a devia-
tion from the ordinary application of the Dutch corporate income tax and, therefore, a tax 
incentive.
This tax incentive is attractive for a shareholder if her private funds do not suffice to donate 
directly. However, if the shareholder has enough private funds and sufficiently high taxed 
income, donating directly might be more attractive from a tax point of view. In 2021, the 
Dutch corporate income tax rate is 15% for the first EUR 245,000 and 25% for the remainder. 
The highest tax rate in personal income tax is 49.5% in 2021 (this rate applies, for example, to 
wages and income from independent activities; the lowest rate for these activities in 37.1% in 
2021), and the lowest rate (for income from a substantial shareholding) is 26.9% in 2021. A gift 
to a charity registered in the Netherlands can, if certain requirements are met, be deducted in 
full.12 Even though the tax rate against which a gift can be deducted is no longer the top rate 
of 49.5% but a rate that is gradually reduced to 37.1%, a shareholder who (or whose partner, 
as gifts can also be taken into account by one’s partner for tax purposes) has sufficient taxed 
income can, therefore, benefit more from donating in private than from having the donation 
being made by her company.
The cap of EUR 100,000 makes the corporate gift deduction unattractive for larger com-
panies that will usually be expected to spend much more on corporate giving. However, if the 
gifts can be regarded as business expenses, this restriction is not of relevance.
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5 Gifts in the form of shares
In the Netherlands, gifts can be done in cash and in kind, including in the form of shares. In 
this respect, there is no difference between gifts that are deducted as business expenses or that 
are deducted under the gift deduction.
However, for charities that receive shares of a company, this is not without difficulties. The 
Dutch tax administration requires a yearly mark-to-market valuation of shares owned by a 
charity, demanding that an increase in value of the shares, including unrealized gains, lead to an 
increase of charitable spending, as otherwise, according to the tax administration, the require-
ment that a charity may not own more assets than necessary for the continuity of its activities 
(in short: anti-hoarding requirement) is not met.
It is questionable whether this view is correct. It is disputed in literature, but it was never 
tested in court. However, in 2019, the Ministry of Finance announced a policy change accord-
ing to which a mark-to-market would not be necessary (anymore). In case of large sharehold-
ings, the Ministry suggested requiring that the charity have enough control to ensure that 
enough funds will flow to the charity to fund its activities. The Ministry of Finance announced 
it would, together with the charitable sector, develop guidance on this requirement.13 This 
guidance might be included in a decree. The latter would give the guidance a stronger status, 
also in relation to the principle of legal expectations and an obligation for the tax administration 
to apply the guidance. The Ministry of Finance promised that this guidance would be published 
in 2020,14 but this promise was not met.
6 Donations to for-profit companies
Some entrepreneurial charities donate to for-profit companies. An example is the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation that gives donations to pharma companies to develop vaccines. The 
reason for such donations us usually a market failure. For example, from a humanitarian point 
of view, vaccines that can protect against infectious diseases in developing countries should pref-
erably be cheap and free from patents. However, developing such vaccines requires substantial 
resources. These can only be recovered through high prices for vaccines protected by patents. 
That makes the vaccines out of reach for the poor. The market mechanism encourages devel-
oping medicines that can be protected by patents and cure diseases found in rich countries that 
can pay high medicine prices.
The market failure is that not all positive external effects are included in the price. Rich 
countries benefit if infectious diseases are contained in poor countries. Through mutations, 
these diseases can also become dangerous for people living in rich countries. Furthermore, 
developing such medicines might lead to valuable knowledge which can be used again later. 
Such positive external effects can be a reason for governments to support research. Devel-
oping countries usually lack the resources to fund such research. Charities may step in and 
enable companies to develop vaccines and medicines that are of importance for developing 
countries.
The Dutch tax administration can be reluctant to regard such donations to for-profit entities 
as charitable. As the Dutch charitable status requires that at least 90% of the spending be for the 
public benefit, this point of view can be problematic. The philanthropic sector has asked the 
Dutch Ministry of Finance to regard donations to for-profit entities as charitable if the donation 
pursues one or more of the philanthropic objects of the charity. It is not yet clear whether the 




An alternative for a donation is a loan at a low interest rate or taking a minority share. The high 
risk of such investments is not compensated by financial means. A financial reward is also not the 
primary purpose of such investments. Well known are micro-financing initiatives in developing 
countries supporting people to support themselves instead of becoming dependent on dona-
tions, following the well-known quote, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach 
a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime”.15
This kind of philanthropy is not new. At his death in 1790, Benjamin Franklin bequeathed 
£1,000 to both Boston and Philadelphia. This bequest had to be used the following 200 years 
to give loans to young apprentices as he had once been. The interest-bearing loans had to be 
paid back and then be used to provide new loans. In 1990, the balance in the Boston trust was 
$4.5 million, while the Philadelphia account was valued at $2 million (Yenawine 2016).
This revolving fund made Franklin the founding father of what were called program-related 
investments (PRIs) by the Ford Foundation in 1968. According to the Ford Foundation (1974), 
PRIs could achieve certain philanthropic goals more effectively than donations. Already in 
1969, the United States included this kind of philanthropic spending in tax legislation. PRIs 
generally come out of a foundation’s grant budget and count toward the 5% of assets that U.S. 
foundations are required, under tax law, to pay out every year. The U.S. Internal Revenue 
Code defines PRIs as those investments in which (1) the primary purpose is to accomplish 
one or more of the foundation’s exempt purposes, (2) production of income or appreciation 
of property is not a significant purpose and (3) influencing legislation or taking part in politi-
cal campaigns on behalf of candidates is not a purpose (Internal Revenue Service 2020). Such 
PRIs must be distinguished from so-called mission-related investments (MRIs, also referred to 
as impact investments) that are designed to generate both a social and a financial return. MRIs 
are not deemed a charitable activity, nor do they qualify as charitable distributions in the United 
States (Levitt 2011).
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides for extensive guidance on PRIs (Inter-
nal Revenue Service 2020). In determining whether a significant purpose of an investment is 
the production of income or the appreciation of property, it is relevant for U.S. tax purposes 
whether investors who engage in investments for profit only would be likely to make the 
investment on the same terms as the private foundation. If an investment incidentally produces 
significant income or capital appreciation, this is not, in the absence of other factors, regarded 
as conclusive evidence that a significant purpose is the production of income or the apprecia-
tion of property. To be program related, the investments must significantly further the founda-
tion’s exempt activities. They must be investments that would not have been made except for 
their relationship to the exempt purposes. The investments include those made in functionally 
related activities that are carried on within a larger combination of similar activities related to 
the exempt purposes. Recipients of PRIs do not have to be charitable themselves and may even 
be for profit. The IRS guidance mentions various examples of PRIs, including low-interest or 
interest-free loans to needy students, high-risk investments in non-profit low-income housing 
projects and investments in businesses in low-income areas.
Based on the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016, the United Kingdom 
also recognizes PRIs for charitable purposes. PRIs that further the object of the charity are 
considered for the UK expenditure requirement (Charity Commission for England and Wales 
2017).
The situation is completely different in the Netherlands. The Dutch tax administration 
regards PRI in the same way as other investments. This means that charities that invest in PRI 
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on a large scale may be confronted with the anti-hoarding requirement that was discussed in 
Section 5. This problem has been brought to the attention of the Ministry of Finance. The 
Ministry announced that in collaboration with the philanthropic sector, guidance would be 
published in 2020 on PRI (confusingly called impact investments by the Ministry of Finance) 
that do not breach the anti-hoarding requirement.16 However, this promise was not met.
8 Corporate giving, EU law and the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base
The decision whether to provide tax benefits for corporate giving is at the discretion of national 
governments, also in the European Union (EU). As is the case with all tax legislation, the fiscal 
sovereignty of EU Member States is, however, restricted by EU law, including the fundamental 
freedoms included in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). In various judgments, 
the ECJ held that a different treatment of non-resident charities solely based on their place of 
residence is a restriction of the free movement of capital of article 63 TFEU and, therefore, not 
allowed.17 Member States are not obliged, however, to mutually recognize each other’s charities. 
They can still impose their own charity requirements on foreign charities, including a registra-
tion requirement. This means that also after this case law, tax benefits for corporate charitable 
giving vary widely in the EU.
On 16 March 2011, the European Commission published a Proposal for a Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).18 This proposal aimed to provide large companies 
with a single set of corporate tax rules for doing business across the internal market and included 
a provision on charitable gifts. However, the Member States could not come to an agreement 
on this proposal. It was withdrawn and replaced on 25 October 2016 by a proposal for a two-
step process: first a CCTB without consolidation and then a full CCCTB.19 The 2016 CC(C)
TB is still in discussion. The provision on charitable gifts differs significantly from the 2011 
proposal. It would significantly change the landscape for corporate donations in the EU.
The 2011 CCCTB seemed to be derived from the French corporate gift deduction. Based 
on article 12 of the 2011 CCCTB, gifts to charities would be deductible up to a maximum 
of 0.5% of revenues in the tax year. Furthermore, only gifts to charitable bodies as defined in 
article 16 of the 2011 CCCTB could be deducted.20 In a proposal for amendments,21 it was 
suggested to add that the purpose had to be included in a list in Annex III to the Proposal.22 
The aim of including this list was to align the CCCTB definition of charitable bodies with that 
in Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE).23 The 
latter would have enabled the incorporation of a separately constituted EU entity for a public 
benefit purpose. Member States had to regard an FE as equivalent to resident charities and give 
them, their donors and their beneficiaries the same tax treatment as resident charities. However, 
Member States could not unanimously agree to the FE Proposal, and in March 2015, it was 
withdrawn.24
It seems that also within the context of the CC(C)TB, Member States could not come to 
an agreement on what constitutes a public purpose. Article 9(4) of the 2016 CCTB simply 
provides that Member States may provide for the deduction of gifts and donations to charitable 
bodies. A definition of “charitable body” is missing. Formulating such definition seems to be 
left to the Member States. This means that if the 2016 CC(C)TB would be adopted, tax benefits 
for corporate charitable giving would be as divergent in the EU as they are today. The CC(C)
TB will not lead to a level playing field for businesses providing donations to philanthropic 
activities. Depending on the Member State in which a donation is made, there will be more or 
fewer possibilities to deduct the gifts.
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One could question whether corporate charitable gifts that are part of a CSR strategy could 
not simply be deducted as business costs under the CC(C)TB. Given the fact that the CC(C)TB 
would only apply to large corporations, it would not be very likely that charitable gifts would 
be based on shareholder motives, and one would expect a business rationale. Article 9(1) 2016 
CCTB provides that expenses are deductible only to the extent that they are incurred in the 
direct business interest of the taxpayer. Article 9(2) elaborates that the expenses referred to in 
article 9(1) include all costs of sales and all expenses, net of deductible value added tax, that the 
taxpayer incurred with a view to obtaining or securing income, including costs for research and 
development, acquisition or construction costs of assets less than EUR 1,000 and costs incurred 
in raising equity or debt for the purposes of the business. If these provisions would apply to 
charitable gifts, there would not be any divergence between Member States with respect to 
corporate charitable giving. This would enhance the internal market.
However, given the fact that the deduction of charitable gifts is specifically included in article 
9(4) and that the treatment of gifts in the CC(C)TB seems to be derived from the French system 
that does not regard donations as business costs, it might be argued that charitable gifts are not 
regarded as deductible expenses within the meaning of section 9(1). It might be that these costs 
are not regarded as being in the direct business interest of the taxpayer and cannot be regarded as 
being incurred with a view to obtaining or securing income. This would not be in accordance 
with the evidence from management literature that CSR, including charitable corporate giv-
ing, has a clear business rationale, just as other marketing and recruitment strategies do, and can 
increase profits and reduce the costs of attracting debt.
It is difficult to understand why regular marketing and recruitment costs would be deduct-
ible under article 9(1) and CSR costs in the form of charitable donations would be restricted by 
national provisions based on article 9(4). For companies that would be taxed in the Netherlands 
under the CC(C)TB, this would, for example, mean that they could no longer fully deduct 
these gifts as business costs but would be limited by the maximum of EUR 100,000. The latter 
amount might suffice for an SME but is not even close to the amount of corporate giving that 
the public expects from large companies.
When questioned by Parliament on the impact of the CC(C)TB on corporate charitable 
giving by Dutch companies, the Dutch State Secretary of Finance answered that given the vari-
ous objections of several Member States, including the Netherlands, it is not to be expected 
that Member States will come to an agreement soon on the CCTB proposal.25 However, this is 
beside the point that it would be important for a level playing field in the EU internal market 
that the Member States give more thought to the business rationale for corporate charitable 
giving by large businesses within the CC(C)TB scope and consider including such gifts in the 
already quite specific enumeration of article 9(2).
9 Conclusion
Corporate philanthropy is here to stay in the Netherlands. Corporate donations as such are 
not problematic from a Dutch tax perspective, as these will usually be deductible in the same 
way as regular business costs are. This might change, however, if the CC(C)TB Directive were 
adopted. In that case, such donations might only be deductible up to an amount of €100,000. 
The CC(C)TB would, therefore, negatively affect the level playing field in the EU for corpo-
rate philanthropic donations and receiving philanthropic organizations and thus have a negative 
effect on the internal market.
Currently, in the Netherlands, it gets complicated when charities become entrepreneurial 
in the way they want to achieve their objectives. In this respect, the tax legislation is lagging 
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behind in the Netherlands. It is problematic for charities to comply with the requirements for 
charitable status when shares were donated to them, when they engage in PRI or when they 
donate to for-profit entities. This charitable status is necessary to be eligible for tax incentives. 
It is to be hoped that the Dutch Ministry of Finance will publish the promised guidelines soon 
and that these will be more adaptive to modern forms of philanthropy. As it is, Dutch tax law is 
a hindering factor for charities that want to apply more entrepreneurial forms of philanthropy 
to achieve their goals.
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1 Context
All around the world, governments stimulate individuals and corporations to give to nonprofit 
organizations by providing tax incentives. How can such tax incentives be designed to encour-
age individuals and corporations to support nonprofit organizations? In this chapter, we provide 
evidence on a legal reform in the Netherlands introduced in 2012. The reform (Weekers, 2012) 
not only changed conditions for all registered charities in the Netherlands but also targeted 
one specific sector: the cultural sector. In this chapter, we answer the following two research 
questions: (1) How did giving to cultural nonprofit organizations change after the charity law 
reform between 2011 and 2018? and (2) How did fundraising by and entrepreneurship within 
cultural nonprofit organizations change after the charity law reform between 2012 and 2019?
Giving in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a country with a long and rich philanthropic his-
tory (Wiepking & Bekkers, 2015, p. 211). Data on giving behavior in the Netherlands became 
available in the mid-1990s. We have evidence that amounts donated to charitable cases increased 
substantially since then (Bekkers, Gouwenberg & Schuyt, 2020). Philanthropic giving in the 
Netherlands to all causes amounted to €5.7 billion in 2018 (Bekkers, Gouwenberg & Schuyt, 
2020). There is a widespread participation in charitable giving in the Netherlands, with about 80% 
of Dutch households giving to charity (Bekkers & Van Teunenbroek, 2020; Van Teunenbroek & 
Bekkers, 2020). This puts the country in the top 10 of the World Giving Index (CAF, 2019). Yet 
philanthropy entails only a small fraction of the economy; the total value of philanthropy in the 
Netherlands amounts to 0.85% of GDP (Bekkers, 2018; Bekkers, Gouwenberg & Schuyt, 2020). 
In the Netherlands, philanthropy is generally viewed as a complement rather than a substitute to 
government intervention (Wiepking & Bekkers, 2015). In 2018, on average, a household donates 
265 EUR per year, with a median gift of 55 EUR (Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2020).
Reform objectives. One goal of the reform of the law on giving (“Geefwet”) was to reduce the 
dependency of the cultural sector on government grants. The reform intended to encourage 
philanthropic giving by both private donors and corporations, and to stimulate entrepreneur-
ship by cultural nonprofit organizations (De Nooij, Bekkers & Felix, 2017; Franssen & Bek-
kers, 2016; Koolen-Maas, Van Teunenbroek & Bekkers, 2021). To achieve these objectives, the 
government enhanced the deductibility of donations to cultural nonprofit organizations and 
cultural organizations were given more freedom to earn commercial income.
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How the reform could diversify income sources. In theory, the legal reform in the Netherlands 
facilitated a more diverse income portfolio for cultural nonprofit organizations, such that their 
dependence on government funding would reduce. Generally speaking, nonprofit organiza-
tions draw financial support from multiple sources, including private and corporate donations, 
commercial activities, government support and other sources of income – resulting in a mix of 
income sources. Generating a sufficiently robust and diversified mix of income is critical to sus-
taining the nonprofit organization (Chikoto-Schultz & Sakolvittayanon, 2020; Hung & Hager, 
2019). Strong dependence on a single source of income could endanger the organization if 
income from that source is suddenly reduced. Thus, nonprofit organizations are advised to diver-
sify their income sources. Earning more non-government income could substitute for reduced 
income from government grants. Private donations and commercial activities provide sources of 
income that may help organizations survive and thrive when income from government grants 
is reduced. To provide cultural nonprofit organizations with more freedom to earn commercial 
income, the legal reform permitted organizations to engage in commercial activities, as long as 
90% of the activities benefit a public goal and total income does not exceed expenditure.
Tax incentives for donations. Governments can support nonprofit organizations with direct 
subsidies in the form of government grants or tax exemptions and rebates, as well as with indi-
rect subsidies such as tax incentives for donors. Tax incentives can take many forms (European 
Fundraising Association, 2018; OECD, 2020). The Netherlands is one of many countries to 
offer charitable deductions for donations from taxable income of individuals or corporate prof-
its. Both tax deductions and tax credits are indirect subsidies because they benefit nonprofit 
organizations indirectly through a price effect on donors. The lower tax-price allows donors 
to give more at the same cost to themselves. The tax incentives benefit nonprofit organizations 
only when donors are price sensitive and increase their donations as a result of a lower price of 
giving. Therefore it is crucial to know to what extent donors to the cultural sector are actually 
using the deduction and are aware of the enhanced deductibility through the multiplier.
Tax treatment of philanthropic organizations in the Netherlands. Before the reform, the Nether-
lands was already providing an excellent environment for charitable causes (Hudson Institute, 
2013). The Netherlands has favorable tax treatment of philanthropic organizations, ranking 
number 1 on the Index for Philanthropic Freedom (Hudson Institute, 2015) and the Global 
Philanthropy Environment Index (2018). Philanthropic organizations in the Netherlands are 
exempt from income tax, estate tax and gift tax. There is no spending requirement for founda-
tions and no mandatory disclosure of large gifts. On the donor’s side, the Dutch tax deduction 
scheme offers tax incentives on individual and corporate donations. For instance, donors can 
deduct the value of their gift from the income tax up to 10% of total income when the recipient 
is registered as a public benefit organization (“ANBI”). Planned gifts are deductible from the 
income tax for private taxpayers when they are declared in an official deed by a notary. Occa-
sional gifts are deductible when they exceed the threshold of 1% of pre-tax income. Corporate 
taxpayers can deduct the annual value of their donations up to 50% of their annual profit or 
revenues.
A separate status for cultural nonprofit organizations. The charity tax reform created a separate 
category of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations: cultural nonprofit organizations registered as a 
public benefit organization (“Culturele ANBI”). To register as a cultural ANBI, the nonprofit 
organization must be for at least 90% committed to and focus on activities in the cultural field 
(Belastingdienst, 2021). The tax code itself does not specify exactly which purposes and activi-
ties belong to the sphere of culture. In practice, a wide range of nonprofit organizations qualify. 
Registered cultural nonprofit organizations include museums, archives, theatres, libraries and 
heritage preservation societies, as well as (pop) music, dance and film festivals. The more than 
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4,000 organizations registered in 2020 include museums with collections of global significance 
attracting millions of visitors per year, as well as many small, locally bound associations run by 
volunteers that do not have their own building that is open to the public.
A multiplier for donations. The legal reform in the Netherlands enhanced the deductibility of 
donations by individuals and corporate taxpayers to registered cultural nonprofit organizations 
through a multiplier. The multiplier of 1.25 for individuals is capped at a deduction of 10% 
of tax income. The multiplier of 1.5 for corporate taxpayers is capped at 50% of profit with 
a maximum of €100,000. Through the multiplier, households and corporations could give 
higher amounts at the same price. An example: consider a €1,000 gift to a registered cultural 
nonprofit organization by a household with an income of €60,000 and a marginal tax rate of 
52%. In the old situation, the charitable deduction would reduce the price of the gift to €480. 
For the calculation of the tax deduction after the reform, the gift may be multiplied by 1.25. 
The tax-deductible amount of €1,250 results in a tax benefit of €650 (1,250 × 0.52). Thus, the 
net cost of the €1,000 donation is only €350. If the household uses the tax benefit to increase 
the amount donated up to the previous price point of €480, it may give €1,371 at no additional 
cost (Bekkers  & Franssen, 2015). By making donations to cultural nonprofit organizations 
more attractive, the Dutch government expected that donations would increase. The govern-
ment budget for 2012–2015 included a projected decrease in the income tax as a result of an 
increase in the charitable deduction, amounting to €22 million per year (De Jager & Weekers, 
2012, p. 45).
Concerns about substitution. Because the reform made giving to culture more attractive than 
giving to other charitable causes, donors may have redirected their giving to cultural non-
profit organizations. When introducing the tax reform, the minister stated that such substitution 
effects are unlikely to occur because amounts donated to culture tend to be low (Bekkers & 
Mariani, 2012) and sought approval from the European High Court (De Nooij, Bekkers & 
Felix, 2017). This process took a long time. While the reform took effect on January 1, 2012, 
the court approved the reform only on March 20, 2013. Pending approval, cultural nonprofit 
organizations were uncertain whether the law would in fact apply and were barely active pro-
moting the enhanced deductibility to donors. The charity tax reform initially applied until 
December 31, 2017. On October 10, 2017, the Dutch government decided that the law on 
giving will remain in effect for an indefinite period of time (Nijboer, 2017).
Cutbacks. The legal reform coincided with sizeable cutbacks in direct government fund-
ing to cultural nonprofit organizations (Raad voor Cultuur, 2017). The national govern-
ment announced that it would cut about 20% of the budget for arts and culture. In practice, 
between 2011 and 2015, the cuts amounted not only to €200 million in direct funding from the 
national government but also included cuts worth €47 million from provincial governments and 
€250 million from municipalities. During these periods of government cutbacks, the resources 
available to support cultural nonprofit organizations have been restricted. The uncertainty and 
decline in government funding – combined with the charity tax reform – necessitated income 
diversification among cultural nonprofit organizations. The reduction in government grants 
reduced the income for some cultural nonprofit organizations more strongly than others; those 
relying more on government funds were affected most. There were, however, instances in 
which some cultural nonprofit organizations received protection from the government cut-
backs. These organizations included, for instance, the largest museums in the tourism industry 
in the biggest cities (e.g., Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague). Initially, the charity tax 
reform was seen as a test case for other nonprofit sectors that the government wanted to cut 
back on (e.g., international relief and development).
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When announcing the cutbacks in 2011, the newly appointed minister for Culture, Edu-
cation and Science lamented dependence on government funding and called upon cultural 
nonprofit organizations to become more entrepreneurial and to diversify their income, for 
example, by increasing income from donations, corporate sponsorships and commercial activi-
ties (Broer & Niemantsverdriet, 2011). At the time, the cultural sector largely depended on 
direct funding from the national government and from local governments. The cutbacks threat-
ened the existing basis of support for the future of the cultural sector. Protests were futile. 
One of the parties supporting the minority government at the time even justified cutbacks by 
qualifying culture as a “leftist hobby” not worthy of government support. In the caricature, 
cultural nonprofit organizations appeared to be passive welfare recipients waiting for handouts 
and lacking creativity and a business mindset. Indeed, because of their dependency on govern-
ment funding, few cultural organizations will have developed skills and capacity for fundraising 
among private donors. Due to the legal restrictions, commercial activities were largely absent 
within cultural nonprofit organizations.
To support a culture change within the cultural sector to become more entrepreneurial and 
attractive for donors and sponsors, the Ministry of Culture, Science, and Education subsidized 
two training programs: a leadership program, “Leiderschap in Cultuur”, and a workshop on 
fundraising, “Wijzer Werven” (De Nooij et  al., 2017; Franssen & Bekkers, 2016). In addi-
tion, the Ministry of Culture, Education and Science executed a public awareness campaign to 
inform the public about the charity tax reform (“Cultuur, daar geef je om”).
Previous research
At least five strands of literature are relevant for the analyses we present in this chapter. The 
first pair of strands concerns the donor side: 1. research on tax incentives for charitable giving; 
2. research on the effects of changes in government funding. The other three strands concern 
nonprofit organizations: 3. research on entrepreneurship, 4. research on fundraising and 5. the 
Matthew effect.
1 Tax-price effects on charitable giving
A considerable body of literature in economics studied how changes in the tax-price of giving 
influence private giving. Though most donors report that the price of giving is not a relevant 
motivation to donate (Konrath & Handy, 2018), previous research indicates that tax incentives 
do in fact affect charitable giving (Peloza & Steel, 2005; Steinberg, 1990). In their 16-year-old 
meta-analysis, Peloza and Steel (2005) find a considerable price elasticity of giving. Subse-
quent research continued to demonstrate strong price effects (Adena, 2014; Almunia etal., 
2020; Bönke, Massarrat-Mashhadi& Siela, 2013; Duquette, 2016 ; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; 
Fack& Landais, 2010; Hungerman & Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2021; Karlan & List, 2007; Meer, 2014; 
Scharf& Smith, 2015). In the United Kingdom, Almunia et al. (2020) concluded that gift aid 
may have increased the amounts donated but not the proportion of donors.
Several studies also analyze differences between individuals and causes in their sensitivity to 
tax incentives of charitable giving, finding that the wealthy are more responsive to changes in 
the price of giving (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). As a result, it is likely that giving to culture 
is more price sensitive than giving to other causes, because giving to culture is much more 
prevalent among the wealthy than among non-wealthy households (Bekkers, Gouwenberg & 
Schuyt, 2020).
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Previous research in the Netherlands confirms that taxpayers in the Netherlands are also 
sensitive to price changes (Bekkers, 2012, 2015; Bekkers & Mariani, 2009; Brennenraedts etal., 
2016; De Jong, 2012; Ministerie van Financiën, 2008), suggesting that giving in the Nether-
lands is price sensitive, though much less so than studies from other countries indicate (Peloza & 
Steel, 2005). We can rule out the possibility that taxpayers are not responsive to the price of giv-
ing because they don’t know about it. Fewer than 10% of taxpayers are unaware of the charitable 
deduction (Franssen & Bekkers, 2016, p. 34). We can, however, question the extent to which 
taxpayers are aware of the enhanced deductibility as a result of the legal reform. A majority of 
taxpayers gave incorrect answers in a knowledge quiz consisting of two questions on the legal 
reform (De Nooij, Bekkers & Felix, 2017).
2 Effects of changes in government funding
Because the legal reform coincided with significant government cutbacks, it is important to 
take note of the vast body of literature that has examined the relationship between government 
funding and private giving. In theory, a crowding-out effect occurs when a decrease in gov-
ernment funding leads to an increase in philanthropic giving for a cause or when an increase 
in charitable giving reduces government funding (Abrams & Schitz, 1978; De Wit & Bekkers, 
2017; Lu, 2016). Reduction of government funding could lead nonprofit organizations to invest 
more in fundraising (Andreoni & Payne, 2003). A crowding-in effect occurs when an increase 
in government funding leads to an increase in charitable giving or vice versa (Khanna & Sandler, 
2000). Institutional signaling theory predicts a crowding-in effect, as government support can 
signal that nonprofit organizations are trustworthy, leading to a positive relation between gov-
ernment funding and charitable giving (Handy, 2000; Heutel, 2014). Conversely, a reduction of 
direct government funding may signal to citizens that a charitable cause and the organizations 
supporting it are not worthy of support. In our case, it was an explicit objective of the govern-
ment to create a crowding-out effect by replacing direct funding in the form of government 
grants by indirect support in the form of charitable deductions. If the signaling explanation 
holds, however, the pejorative remarks about the cultural sector by policy makers may have 
undermined the desired crowding-out effect.
The empirical evidence on the effects of changes in government funding is mixed. Though 
early studies (Kingma, 1989) suggested that an increase in government funding may decrease 
charitable giving, subsequent estimates have been less clear and may as well go in the opposite 
direction. Two recent meta-analyses (De Wit & Bekkers, 2017; Lu, 2016) showed that estimates 
vary widely from study to study, depending on the data, methods and context. De Wit and 
Bekkers (2017) show that laboratory studies are more likely to find crowding-out effects than 
studies relying on surveys or administrative data. There is little support for crowding-out (or 
crowding-in) outside the laboratory. The assessment by Payne (1998, p. 338) still holds: “a severe 
cut in government funding to nonprofit organizations is not likely, on average, to be made up by 
donations from private donors”. One interpretation of the finding that estimates from experi-
ments are stronger is that most citizens are not aware of changes in government funding, while 
participants in experiments receive explicit information (De Wit & Bekkers, 2020; Horne, 
Johnson & Van Slyke, 2005). The meta-analysis by Lu (2016) found a positive correlation between 
government funding and charitable giving to arts organizations in the United States, United 
Kingdom and Canada. This finding suggests a crowding-in, though it is not clear whether it 
holds in the Netherlands.
Four years before the legal reform, when the Netherlands government announced cutbacks 
after the 2008–2009 financial crisis in which it bailed out national banks, we asked participants 
Culture change is hard
481
in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study whether they would be willing to increase dona-
tions in various areas. At that time, it was not yet clear how much the government would cut 
in which areas. Among donors to cultural organizations, a mere 12% said they would be willing 
to increase donations. At the same time, among donors to culture, there was also a group of 9% 
that said they would be reducing their gifts in response to government cutbacks (Bekkers & Mari-
ani, 2012). Because those who reported a willingness to increase their gifts gave low amounts any-
way, and larger donors were reluctant to increase their gifts, the net effect in the entire population 
is likely to be minimal. After the cuts were announced, we asked similar questions and found even 
less positive results. Among those who gave to culture and were aware of the enhanced deduct-
ibility, only 8% expressed willingness to increase gifts to culture (Bekkers, Mariani & Franssen, 
2015). Ten percent of these participants said they would give less in the coming year.
In sum, the effects of the legal reform on donor behavior by households are likely to be 
rather small: the tax-price effect on giving in the Netherlands is weak, and the willingness of 
citizens to increase donations after government cutbacks is small. Now we consider the changes 
that the legal reform may have had on the behavior of cultural nonprofit organizations.
3 Revenue diversification and entrepreneurship  
in nonprofit organizations
All organizations need to acquire and maintain financial resources for their operations (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Nonprofit organizations are generally advised to adopt a revenue diversifica-
tion strategy, as nonprofit organizations operate in a resource-scarce, competitive and therefore 
uncertain environment (Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Gronbjerg, 1993). Strong dependence on a 
single source of income could endanger the nonprofit organization if income from that source 
is suddenly reduced. Thus, nonprofit organizations are advised to avoid “putting all their eggs 
in one basket”. Revenue diversification is a financial strategy in which the organization relies 
on diverse and multiple sources of income. It improves the financial health and stability of non-
profit organizations because it lowers the risk of financial crisis, provides the organization with 
a financial cushion and improves the likelihood for financial organizational survival (Chikoto-
Schultz & Sakolvittayanon, 2020). A particularly relevant finding by Hager (2001) is that arts 
nonprofit organizations with a higher degree of revenue diversification were less likely to close 
down. Kingma (1993) advises nonprofit organizations to consider the expected return, risk and 
correlation between different income sources when they are making decisions about the level 
of revenue diversification they seek to achieve.
Despite the theoretical relevance of revenue diversification, empirical estimates of its asso-
ciation with the financial health of nonprofit organizations, operationalized by either financial 
capacity, vulnerability or sustainability, do not reveal a clear pattern. Hung and Hager (2019) 
and Lu, Lin and Wang (2019) conducted meta-analyses of revenue diversification. Both found 
a large degree of heterogeneity in the association between revenue diversification and nonprofit 
financial health. Some studies reveal positive results, others reveal negative results. Lu, Lin and 
Wang (2019) find that a majority of studies that examined the association between revenue 
diversification and financial capacity report a negative correlation, though the average is very 
close to zero. The bottom line is that there is no simple pattern in the association between rev-
enue diversification and financial health, not even in the differences between the results.
In addition to government funding, nonprofit organizations can also raise income from 
private or corporate donations, engage in corporate sponsorships, apply for grants from founda-
tions, sell goods and services, raise membership fees or obtain income from investments or other 
resources (Chikoto-Schultz & Sakolvittayanon, 2020; Garcia-Rodriquez & Romero-Merino, 
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2020). These other sources have gradually been considered more relevant in recent years (Garcia- 
Rodriquez & Romero-Merino, 2020). In particular, nonprofit organizations gradually adopted 
business practices and are said to become “business-like” (Maier, Meyer  & Steinbereithner, 
2016; Vaceková et al., 2020). One example of such business practices is implementing commer-
cial activities to generate commercial income to support the nonprofit organization’s mission. 
This involves, for instance, selling goods or products related to the nonprofit’s mission but also 
asking admissions fees for nonprofit services (e.g., admission tickets to a museum, orchestra or 
theatre). Commercial activities may generate a substantial source of income for cultural non-
profit organizations.
Entrepreneurship. The charity tax reform in the Netherlands not only sought to encourage 
the financial independence of cultural nonprofit organizations by allowing them to generate 
more commercial income. The reform aimed to enhance their entrepreneurship. Entrepreneur-
ial orientation involves three components: 1. innovation, 2. risk-taking and 3. pro-activeness 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Organizations with low scores on these dimensions are characterized 
as conservative (e.g., Morris, Webb & Franklin, 2011). Innovation is the degree of creativity and 
the extent to which new services, products or processes are introduced. Risk-taking refers to 
the degree to which an organization is willing to bear the risks and invests in services, products 
or projects that still have to prove successful. Pro-activeness refers to the extent to which an 
organization actively seeks opportunities and anticipates on future market needs.
The trend among nonprofit organizations to adopt business-like practices, however, also 
raises serious concerns (e.g., De Goede, Schrijvers& De Visser, 2018; Eikenberry& Kluver, 
2004; Maier et al., 2016; Trommel, 2018; Vaceková etal., 2020; Weisbrod, 2004). One concern 
is mission drift. Weisbrod (2004, p. 40) recommends that “nonprofit organizations should get 
out of commercial ventures”, as becoming business-like produces mission drift: a diversion 
of resources away from a nonprofit organization’s mission. Maier, Meyer and Steinbereithner 
(2016) echo this warning. Vaceková and colleagues (2020) also highlight that income from com-
mercial activities can be a risky approach. As nonprofit organizations adopt business-like prac-
tices, their commitment to public welfare may be in danger, at least in the public’s perception. 
Commercial activities could cause a loss of income from private donations and government 
grants. On the other hand, they may also help to secure survival of the organization (Vaceková 
et al., 2020). The arguments supporting the legal reform ran along these lines.
Nonprofit organizations may demonstrate an entrepreneurial orientation in the programs 
and services they offer, as well as in the activities they engage in to generate income. Invest-
ments in fundraising activities are an important example of entrepreneurship (Mourdaunt & 
Paton, 2013).
4 Fundraising: If you don’t ask, you don’t get
Historically, private donations are the most distinctive source of income for nonprofit organi-
zations (Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2020; Weisbrod, 1998). While the literature 
is replete with studies examining the individual determinants and motivations of donating 
behavior (e.g. Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Konrath & Handy, 2018), very few studies inves-
tigated how fundraising activities by nonprofit organizations affect giving behavior. With-
out fundraising, however, nonprofit organizations would receive very few donations. In the 
Netherlands, more than 95% of all donations by individuals occur in response to some form 
of solicitation (Bekkers, 2005). As a result, differences between households in giving behav-
ior are strongly affected by the likelihood of exposure to fundraising solicitations (Bekkers, 
2005, 2019).
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Approaches to fundraising “are nearly as diverse as the types of nonprofit organizations that 
populate the nonprofit sector” (Hager, Rooney & Pollak, 2002, p. 312). Effective fundraising 
activities attract contributions by private individuals or corporations at a scale that exceeds their 
costs. Effective fundraising requires practical knowledge that can be taught and learned (Breeze, 
2017). On the other hand, fundraising also benefits from social skills that some people have 
more of than others.
The prevalence and effectiveness of fundraising activities vary considerably across countries 
and organizations. Though the Netherlands has a long philanthropic tradition, the current 
degree of professionalization of fundraising in the Netherlands is not as high as in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Wiepking  & Handy, 2015; Wiepking et  al., 2021). Fundraising activities in the 
Netherlands rely heavily on volunteers who have not been trained as fundraisers. The most 
common fundraising method in the Netherlands is door-to-door collection. This method is 
highly effective in terms of compliance but inefficient in terms of return on investment (Bek-
kers, 2005), because strong social norms direct low gift amounts, irrespective of income (Wie-
pking & Heijnen, 2011). Moreover, the reduced availability of volunteers has made it more 
difficult for charities to organize fundraising campaigns. As a result, households receive a lower 
number of solicitations to contribute to charities.
Fundraising efforts also depend on a range of organizational factors, including the field of 
activity, organizational age, organizational size in terms of paid staff and total revenues, geo-
graphical scope and location and tax status (Lyon & Zappala, 2006). For instance, younger non-
profit organizations experience greater difficulty in raising funds, as they have not yet earned 
a solid reputation and donor trust. This is a problem for new organizations in the market for 
charity.
Fundraising investments and effectiveness are a function of capacity (size, paid staff) and 
experience. This implies that cultural nonprofit organizations with more fundraising experi-
ence and more capacity in terms of size and the presence of paid staff are more likely to attract 
donations (Hager, et al., 2002). Chang and Tuckman (1994) find that higher spending on fun-
draising is positively associated with revenue diversification. Larger organizations arguably have 
more capacity to invest in fundraising. When facing cuts in government funding, they will be 
more able to replace that amount by income from fundraising. Thus, fundraising experience 
and capacity determine the ability to deal with reductions in government grants.
The Matthew Effect. The previous can result in the so-called “Matthew effect”, labeled by 
Merton (1968) after a phrase in Matthew (13:12): “to him who has will more be given, and he 
will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away”. Mat-
thew effects occur when previous advantage leads to further advantage and previous disadvan-
tage leads to further disadvantage (Merton, 1968). Matthew effects exacerbate existing resource 
disparities and are essential in understanding the dynamics of inequality. Matthew effects are 
observed across a broad spectrum of social, economic and political institutions and systems 
(Rigney, 2010).
In our study context, larger cultural nonprofit organizations are most likely to invest in fund-
raising, gaining experience and capacity, and thus obtain more income from fundraising. Smaller 
cultural nonprofit organizations, on the other hand, are most likely unable to make investments in 
fundraising and will thus lack fundraising experience and capacity and receive less income from 
fundraising. Thus, larger cultural nonprofit organizations will obtain more fundraising income, 
while smaller cultural nonprofit organizations will obtain less fundraising income. The larger 
cultural nonprofit organizations are advantaged by being able to make necessary investments and 
being more experienced, while smaller organizations are disadvantaged. A dynamic analysis of 
income changes among the 465 largest charities in the Netherlands in the period 2005–2010 
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indicated that, indeed, government funding and fundraising capacity are positively related (Bek-
kers, 2013). In flat contrast to the crowding-out hypothesis, charities that saw their income from 
government funding increase in a given year were more likely to increase investments in fund-
raising in subsequent years. Charities that lost government funding, in contrast, were less likely to 
increase investments in fundraising. Such patterns suggest that in the Netherlands, government 
funding and private donations are complements rather than substitutes. To better understand 
this complementarity, it is crucial to examine the dynamics of different revenue sources (De 
Wit, Bekkers & Wiepking, 2020, p. 83). Hung (2020) performed a meta-analysis on the rela-
tionship between commercialization and private donations, finding that commercialization and 
private donations were not related in cultural nonprofit organizations – again in studies that 
were largely from the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Examining earned revenue 
activities, Levine Daniel (2021) showed that earned revenue activities complement donations 
when the activity entails offering new products or services to existing donors.
The Dutch government cutbacks and the charity tax reform will most likely widen the income 
gaps between larger and smaller cultural nonprofit organizations. Resources accumulate among 
the larger cultural nonprofit organizations, carrying them in a upward spiral towards further 
advantage as they gain more experience and gain more financial means to make further invest-
ments in fundraising. Smaller cultural nonprofit organizations will experience a downward spiral.
One reason larger organizations may be advantaged compared to smaller organizations with 
regard to the government cutbacks is that it takes resources to be resilient (Barasa, Mbau & Gil-
son, 2018). Organizations with fewer resources at their disposal are less likely to fully recover 
from adverse events such as cutbacks. In an analysis of register data, the national audit chamber 
found that 16% of cultural nonprofit organizations that had received government grants prior to 
the cutbacks went out of business after the cutbacks (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2015). This is an 
important caveat for the following analyses of changes in the behavior of cultural nonprofit organ-
izations: we are essentially looking at a population of relatively resourceful and resilient survivors.
Data and methods
In the following analyses, we examine changes at both the donor and recipient side of the 
market for giving to cultural nonprofit organizations in the Netherlands. On the donor side, 
we document changes in giving behavior of households, corporations and high-net-worth 
households. Have donations to culture increased after the charity tax reform? On the recipient 
side, we document changes in the income sources as well as entrepreneurial behavior among 
cultural nonprofit organizations. An analysis of this data allows us to estimate to what extent 
the reduction of direct government support has been compensated by other sources of income.
Data. We collected longitudinal data covering the period between 2011 and 2019. For the 
donor side, we rely on data from the Giving in the Netherlands (GIN) studies, an initiative of the 
Center for Philanthropic Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Since 1995, the research 
provides biennial macro-economic estimates of philanthropy by households, corporations, foun-
dations, bequests and lotteries. For the recipient side, we rely on data gathered among cultural 
nonprofit organizations in the Netherlands. The appendix provides details on both data sets.
As income diversification and entrepreneurial behavior by cultural non-profit organizations 
vary with the level of income, we divide the responses from cultural nonprofit organizations into 
five groups: very small (max €2,000), small (€2k–€50k), medium-sized (€50k– €1.5 million), 
large (€1.5– €10 million), and very large (more than €10 million). In some analyses, we combined 
the two highest income levels into one group of (very) large cultural nonprofit organizations. 
Table 26.1 provides an overview of the composition of the sample for 2012, 2015 and 2019.
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The composition of the response varies from year to year as a result of changing priorities 
in the data collection strategy. In the first edition, we sought to obtain the broadest possible 
representation of the cultural sector. We included as many organizations as possible and invested 
a lot of effort to recruit them. As a result, the response consisted mainly of small organizations 
with no paid staff. In the second edition, we had fewer resources available but sought to retain as 
many organizations as possible that participated in the first edition. This proved difficult for the 
smallest organizations. In the third edition, we focused on the largest organizations to capture 
the majority of all economic activity in the cultural sector. As a result, almost one-fourth of the 
response consisted of large institutions. To control for changes in the income distribution of the 
response by organizations, we stratified the analyses per year by income class.
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of changes in giving behavior by households and 
corporations and in income sources and entrepreneurial behavior among cultural nonprofit 
organizations over the course of the period 2011–2019. Unfortunately, the nature and chronol-
ogy of the policy decisions do not allow for a clean causal identification of the effects of the 
legal reform. Most importantly, the legal reform coincided with severe government cutbacks 
in the cultural sector. As a result, we cannot identify the effect of either one of the two. At 
best, we obtain an aggregate estimate of the combined effects of the charity tax reform and 
the government cutbacks. In the more likely scenario, however, numerous other unmeasured 
factors such as ongoing trends in giving behavior, technological advancements and fluctuations 
in the economy created changes in giving behavior and the behavior of cultural nonprofit 
organizations. On the donor side, we can to some extent control influences on giving to cul-
ture that also occur in other sectors. Because the multiplier favored cultural nonprofit organiza-
tions, the proportion of total giving that goes to cultural nonprofit organizations should have 
increased. Even when the exact size of the price effect due to the introduction of the multiplier 
cannot be identified, we can observe its sign. Theoretically, the reduction in the price of giv-
ing should lead to an increase in the amount donated, particularly among those who use the 
charitable deduction. If we do not observe such a change, we can either assume that the price 
effect is absent or that it has been neutralized by a negative effect of the reduction in direct 
government funding. In both cases, we can infer that the price effect is weaker than the effect 
of the reduction in direct government funding.
Table 26.1  Sample composition in number of cultural nonprofit organizations per income class (n), the 
share of the response per year (%) and the average income (€) for 2012, 2015 and 2019
2012 2015 2019
n % € n % € n % €1
Very small 229 23      267 51 12 436 33 6 745
Max 2K
Small 407 41    17.942 203 46     17.816 219 38 18.743
(2–50K)
Medium-sized 243 25   353.265 126 29   366.789 182 32 401.979
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 103 10 8.366.911 58 13 9.493.479 140 24 8.974.125
(>1.5 mln)
Total sample 982 100   904.337 438 100 1.370.950 574 100 2.323.462
Excluding the very large 964 98   455.132 428 98   601.447 539 76 909.422
organizations (>10 mln)
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Results: a small increase in total amounts donated to culture  
after the reform
A first result is that giving behavior to culture and arts increased from €293 million in 2011 to 
€439 million in 2018 (see the light grey line in Figure 26.1). This seems like a large increase. 
In the same period, however, contributions to other causes (religion, health, international assis-
tance, environment, nature and animal protection, sports and recreation and education and 
research) increased as well, roughly at a similar pace.
Total giving (the dark grey line) increased from €4.3 billion in 2011 to €5.7 billion in 2018. 
As a result, the share of culture (the striped black line) remained small and did not increase 
much. In 2011, culture received 6.8% of all contributions; in 2018, the share was 7.8%.
Figure 26.2 breaks down the sources of contributions. Households provide a small share of 
all contributions to culture. In 2018, households donated €78 million to culture, amounting to 
18% of all contributions to culture. In 2011, the amount donated was €26 million, amounting 
to 9% of all contributions. We cannot attribute the full increase to changes in giving behavior 
by households, because the method improved. We will revisit this issue in the following when 
we discuss amounts deducted, particularly by wealthy households.
In the Netherlands, charity lotteries also provide a significant share of funding to cultural 
nonprofit organizations. The amount was €80 million in 2018, 18% of all contributions to cul-
ture. In 2011, lotteries gifted a total of €68 million (23%). Gifts from lotteries are mostly coming 
from one lottery: the BankGiro Loterij.
An increasing share of total income for cultural nonprofit organizations comes from bequests. 
In 2018, the total amount to culture and arts received through bequests amounted to €33 mil-
lion, 8% of total contributions. The amount in 2018 is much higher than in previous years, 
mostly as a result of a single very large bequest of €22 million to the Prins Bernhard Cultu-
urfonds. Excluding this bequest, we still observe an increase in bequests, from €5.7 million in 
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Figure 26.1  Total amounts donated to charitable causes, to culture and the share of culture in the total 
amount, 2011–2018
Note: Data for 2018 are based on a new estimation method in which the donations of high-net-worth households 
are also included.
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Corporations Households Foundations Lotteries Bequests Total
Figure 26.2  Total contributions to culture and arts in millions of euros, 2011–2018
Note: Data for 2018 are based on a new estimation method in which donations by high-net-worth households are 
better represented.
The largest share of contributions to culture typically comes from corporations. In 2018, 
corporations gave a total of €174 million to culture and arts. This was 40% of all contributions 
to culture. Compared to 2011, when corporations gifted a total of €124 million (42% of all con-
tributions), this is an increase. The share of corporate donations to culture, however, remained 
small throughout the period (see Figure 26.3). In 2011, it was 9%. In 2013, it declined to 6%, 
then jumped to 11% and plateaued at that level in 2015 and 2018.
The total amount contributed by corporations consists of sponsorship and gifts. Corporations 
prefer sponsorships over gifts; almost three quarters (73%) of the total amount consists of sponsor-
ships. About one third (36%) of corporate contributions to culture and arts were gifted in the form 
of manpower or in-kind donations (e.g., offering office space to host an exposition). Culture and 
arts is probably a sector where corporations can easily connect their name to a one-time event. The 
percentage of corporations supporting the culture and arts sector with gifts is small. Since 2011, the 
percentage of corporations using sponsorships is 10%. For gifts, this was 7% in 2011 and 5% in 2018.
Giving by households increased slightly
In 2018, about one in nine households donated to culture and arts (see Table 26.2). This pro-
portion has not increased much since 2011. The average amount donated to culture and arts 
among those who give to culture has increased, from €37 in 2011 to €48 in 2018. We also see 
an increase in the median amount donated. The average amount among all donors (where we 
assigned those households that did not donate to culture a value of 0) also increased, from €3,50 
in 2011 to €4,70 in 2018. While the amount donated to culture increased, the share of culture 
in total giving did not increase by much; it was 1.5% in 2011 and 2.0% in 2018.
High-net-worth households give less to culture
In 2018, about one in five high-net-worth households to culture (see Table 26.3). Unexpect-
edly, the proportion of high-net-worth households that give to culture has decreased since 
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2011, when it was 29%. The average amount donated to culture among those who give to 
culture has decreased as well, from €607 in 2011 to €295 in 2018. We also see a decrease in the 
median amount donated among high-net-worth households. The average amount among all 
donors (where we assigned those households that did not donate to culture a value of 0) also 
decreased, from €176 in 2011 to €63 in 2018. Thus, the share of culture decreased from 7.4% 

















































Share of culture in total amount (in%)    Culture All causes
Figure 26.3  Share of culture in the total amount given by corporations, 2011–2018
Table 26.2 Percentage and average amount given to culture and arts by households, 2011–2018
2011 2013 2014 2015 2018
% giving to culture 10 10 10 11 11
€ Average amount donated to culture (among donors) 37 34 28 36 48
€ Median amount donated to culture (among donors) 15 13 10 10 20
€ Average amount donated to culture (among all households) 3,50 3,50 2,80 4,90 4,70
€ Average amount to all causes (among all households) 225 240 216 247 236
Share of culture 1.5% 1.5% 1.3% 2.0% 2.0%
Table 26.3  Percentage and average amount given to culture and arts by high-net-worth (HNW) house-
holds, 2011–2018
2011 2013 2014 2015 2018
% giving to culture 29 29 30 22 21
€ Average amount donated to culture (among HNW donors) 607 318 343 589 295
€ Median amount donated to culture (among HNW donors) 100 50 76 100 79
€ Average amount donated to culture (among all HNW households) 176 92 102 139 63
€ Average amount to all causes (among all HNW households) 2.254 1.009 1.267 1.657 1.071
Share of culture in total giving by HNW households 7.4% 9.1% 8.1% 8.4% 5.9%
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Use of the charitable deduction by Dutch households decreased
Since 2012, donations to cultural ANBIs are eligible for an additional gift deduction. The percent-
age of households that use the deduction, however, has not increased since 2011. On the contrary, 
the proportion of households deducting gifts has declined from 8.9% in 2011 to 7.2% in 2018 
(see Figure 26.4). Among high-net-worth households with a net worth exceeding €1 million, the 
proportion using the deduction has also decreased, from 17.0% in 2011 to 15.6% in 2018.
At the same time, we see that the average amount deducted increased, from €1.113 in 2011 
to €1.423 in 2018. As a result, the total volume of donations for which Dutch households use 
the charitable deduction increased slowly from €723 million in 2011 to €792 million in 2018. 
The increase of €69 million over a period of 7 years is less than half the budgeted amount of 
€22 million per year.
Among households with a net worth exceeding €1 million, the percentage of households using 
the deduction decreased, but the amounts deducted increased slightly (see Table 26.4). We see 
the reverse pattern among the most wealthy households in the country with net worth exceeding 
€10 million. The net result is that the most wealthy households in the Netherlands have a higher 
share of all amounts deducted in 2018 (9.1%) than in 2011 (8.4%). For comparison, it is important 
to note that this group forms only 0.06% of all households in the Netherlands. This means that the 
inequality in the use of charitable deduction is large and increasing. The even more disconcerting 
conclusion is that the increase in the use of the charitable deduction was not accompanied by an 
increase in the amounts donated to culture among wealthy households.
Changes among cultural nonprofit organizations
Now we turn to the behavior of cultural nonprofit organizations. Were they able to diversify 
their income? Did their dependency on government funding decrease? Have cultural nonprofit 












































Use of gift (%) deduction Amount deducted (€) Total deducted amount ( € mln) 
Figure 26.4  Percentage of Dutch households using the gift deduction, 2011–2018
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS)
Note: The vertical dotted line represents the legal reform (2012).
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Were Dutch cultural nonprofit organizations able to diversify  
their income?
Table  26.1 shows the changes in total income of cultural nonprofit organizations for every 
income class in the period 2012–2019. Although the average income is subject to sample fluc-
tuations, we see an increase in average total income within the very small and medium-sized 
cultural nonprofit organizations. There is no increase in revenues visible within the small and 
large cultural nonprofit organizations as the average amount in 2019 is roughly the same as in 
2012. To obtain a more reliable view on revenue development over the years, we examine the 
longitudinal group.
Figure 26.5 shows the total income for the entire longitudinal group increased slightly over 
the period 2012–2019 with a decrease in 2014. This decrease can be a result of the small n and 
the lack of larger cultural nonprofit organizations in the response for that year. If we exclude 
the largest organizations, we see a smaller fluctuation in total income in the period 2012–2019 
with no clear trend.
Income diversification
We divide the income of cultural nonprofit organizations into income sources: government 








2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
Total longitudinal group Longitudinal sample excluding very large cutural NPOs
Figure 26.5  Total average income, longitudinal group 2012–2019
Table 26.4 Charitable deductions by wealthy households, 2011–2018
2011 2013 2014 2018
Net worth >€1 million % 17.0 16.2 16.0 15.6
€ 5.803 6.550 6.461 6.047
Net worth >€10 million % 19.4 19.4 20.5 22.2
€ 16.800 18.200 15.600 16.000
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income. Government funding was furthermore divided into national or state government fund-
ing and other government funding (i.e., funding provided by the European Union, provincial 
government, municipalities). Commercial revenues refer to commercial activities related to the 
core activities of the nonprofit organization, such as entrance fees and tickets. Private income 
refers to donations, gifts, bequests from individuals and corporations. Sponsorships consist of 
income received from corporations in exchange for something in return that benefits the cor-
poration. Private income and sponsorships together form fundraising income. Indirect revenues 
refer to generated income that is not directly related to the core activities of the organization. 
This includes for example, revenues generated by renting out facilities and other indirect com-
mercial activities.
We examine the income mix over the years for every income class separately to control to 
some extent for the sample fluctuation. Important to note is that we calculate the share of each 
income source in total income using the sum of all seven income sources as the total income. 
This sum, however, differs from the total reported income as reported in Table 26.1. After dis-
cussing the income mix, we examine each source of income separately.
Income mix
Figure 26.6 shows the income mix for all income classes in 2012, 2015 and 2019. Our data indi-
cate that the income mix differs substantially between cultural nonprofit organizations when we 
divide them into the four income classes. Figure 26.6 shows that based on their income class, 
cultural nonprofit organizations differ not only in the sources from which the organizations 
derive income but also where the center of gravity lies in the income mix.
Very small cultural nonprofit organizations are less dependent on government funding in 
2019 than in previous years. Moreover, sponsorships and other income sources are an impor-
tant income source. Very small cultural nonprofit organizations rely on private revenues, 
1% 2% 3%
18%

























































2012 2015 2019 2012 2015 2019 2012 2015 2019 2012 2015 2019
Very small (max 2K) Small (2K - 50K) Medium-sized (50K - 1.5
mln)
Large and very large
(min 1.5 mln)
State government funding Other government funding Commercial revenues
Private revenues Sponsorships Indirect revenues
Other
Figure 26.6  Income mix in share (in %) of total income for each income class in 2012, 2015 and 2019
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sponsorships and other income, as these sources generate most of their income. Other cultural 
nonprofit organizations still rely for a large part of their income on grants and public activi-
ties. State government funding, other government funding and commercial revenues make up 
a large part of the total income of medium-sized, large and very large organizations. As the 
nonprofit organization grows, grants and public activities form a more important source of 
income. A smaller portion of the income comes from sponsorship, private, indirect and other 
sources. Private revenues, sponsorship and other income form a more important part of the total 
income for the (very) small nonprofit organizations. Private income and sponsorships increase 
importance when the cultural non profit organization is smaller.
The income mix of small cultural nonprofit organizations did not change much between 
2012 and 2019. Other government funding, commercial and private revenues remain the most 
important sources of income. The income mix of medium-sized organizations remained largely 
unchanged. The main sources of income are still other government funding and commercial 
revenues. The income mix of large and very large cultural nonprofit organizations appears more 
unbalanced in 2019 than in 2012 and 2015. Income from state government funding, other gov-
ernment funding and commercial revenues is more important in 2019. Private revenues, on the 
other hand, seem less important; sponsorships within the large and very large institutions still 
only generate a very small part of their total income.
Government funding
Table 26.5 strikingly shows that the share of state government grants in total revenues of the 
large and very large cultural nonprofit organizations is higher in 2019 compared to previous 
years. Very small cultural nonprofit organizations did not receive any government funding by 
the state during the entire period. The share of state government funding in medium-sized 
organizations fluctuates over the years. The share of state government funding in the class of 
small cultural nonprofit organizations seems to be stable over the years.
Table 26.6 shows the average income from other government funding for each income 
class over the years. We see that the share of other government funding in the total income 
in 2019 is higher for large and very large cultural nonprofit organizations. Very small cul-
tural nonprofit organizations did not receive other government funding. Among small and 
Table 26.5  State government funding in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per 
income class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Max 2K)
Small 1 178 3 399 1 212 2 339 3 1.018
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 18 53.865 14 39.672 17 50.177 8 22.735 13 80.925
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 7 648.060 5 487.822 5 489.483 6 540.656 15 1.659.939
(>1.5 mln)
Note: Share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
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medium-sized cultural nonprofit organizations, the share of other government funding in 
total income in 2019 did not change compared to 2012, although slight fluctuation is visible 
between the years.
When we add both government funding sources together, we see that government funding 
remains an important source of income for the majority of Dutch cultural nonprofit organiza-
tions. Government funding accounts for 24%, 43% and 47% of the total revenues for small, 
medium-sized and (very) large cultural nonprofit organizations. Contrary to the objective of the 
legal reform and the cutbacks, dependence on government funding among (very) large cultural 
nonprofit organizations is much higher in 2019 than in previous years. The dependence on 
government funding among small and medium-sized cultural nonprofit organizations is similar 
in 2019 and 2012. Only the dependence on government funding among very small nonprofit 
organizations fell sharply when we compare 2019 with 2012.
Commercial revenues
Table 26.7 shows that the share of commercial revenues is subject to fluctuation for all income 
classes. In 2019, it appears that commercial revenues have become a more important source of 
income for larger cultural nonprofit organizations. The share of commercial revenues in total 
income for (very) small organizations does not differ too much in 2012 and 2013; in 2014 and 
2015, there appears to be an upward trend. Nonetheless, the trend did not continue in 2019. 
Among medium-sized cultural nonprofit organizations, the share of commercial income is 
slightly higher in 2019 after a small decrease in 2014 and 2015. When we look at (very) large 
cultural organizations, commercial revenues constitute a bigger share of the total income.
Private revenues
The share of private revenues in the total income fluctuates over the years for all income classes; 
it appears that private revenues such as donations, gifts and bequests from individuals and cor-
porations is a less important source of income when the cultural nonprofit organization is 
larger. In Table 26.8, we see that the share of private revenues in the total income among (very) 
small cultural nonprofit organizations is lower in 2019 compared to 2012. The share of private 
Table 26.6  Other government funding in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per 
income class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 17 101 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
(Max 2K)
Small 21 2.770 19 2.787 19 2.834 20 3.048 21 6.508
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 25 75.400 33 96.636 26 78.447 35 98.454 30 179.545
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 24 2.221.084 20 1.942.755 20 1.886.522 24 2.058.428 32 3.473.801
(>1.5 mln)
Note: Share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
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revenues in the class of medium-sized organizations remains relatively stable. Interestingly, the 
share of private revenues of the (very) large organizations fluctuates over the years. When we 
compare the share of 2019 with 2012, the share of this income source fell sharply in the class 
of (very) large organizations. Commercial revenues seem to be an important source of income 
over the years for smaller cultural nonprofit organizations.
Sponsorships
Similar to private revenues, sponsorships also appear to be a more important source of income 
for smaller cultural nonprofit organizations. See Table 26.9. The share of sponsorship income 
in the total income is higher in 2019 compared to 2012 among the very small organizations. 
Again, we see strong fluctuation over the years without a clear trend. Within the group of small 
cultural organizations, sponsorships constitute a smaller share in 2019 than in previous years; 
sponsorships thus became a less important income source for these organizations. The share of 
sponsorships remains the same for medium-sized and large organizations over the years; spon-
sorships generate only a small portion of their income.
Table 26.7  Commercial revenues in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per 
income class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 10 60 10 62 27 90 29 259 12 154
(Max 2K)
Small 21 2.682 27 3.844 24 3.539 35 5.416 22 6.568
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 20 59.281 20 57.565 18 53.619 18 50.117 23 136.787
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 23 2.097.792 24 2.362.998 20 1.905.460 23 2.025.139 31 3.333.086
(>1.5 mln)
Note: Share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
Table 26.8  Private revenues in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per income 
class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 42 240 25 152 57 191 48 423 33 444
(Max 2K)
Small 30 3.902 21 3.066 30 4.494 17 2.564 24 7.292
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 13 38.016 18 53.655 14 43.938 20 55.667 13 77.773
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 32 2.900.695 27 2.652.564 27 2.552.921 39 3.365.523 12 1.259.389
(>1.5 mln)
Note: Share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
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Table 26.9  Sponsorship revenues in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per income 
class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 10 59 5 29 2 6 23 206 22 294
(Max 2K)
Small 13 1.718 14 1.974 10 1.433 11 1.748 8 2.514
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 2 4.757 2 5.621 2 5.342 2 4.276 4 22.900
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 3 243.145 3 330.556 3 283.373 3 252.981 3 289.597
(>1.5 mln)
Note: share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
Indirect revenues
Our data show that the importance of indirect revenues on the total income fluctuates for all 
income classes and is a relatively small source of income in 2019. For instance, we see that the 
share of indirect revenues in the total source of income in the group of very small, large and very 
large institutions in 2019 is lower compared to 2012 but higher or equal to the years in between. 
In the class of medium-sized organizations, the share of indirect revenues is also subject to strong 
fluctuations from year to year without a clear trend.
Changes in fundraising
Private revenues such as contributions, donations, gifts, sponsorships and bequests from 
individuals and corporations can be considered fundraising income. The data show that 
larger cultural nonprofit organizations engage more often in fundraising and invest more in 
fundraising. In 2019, 55%, 50%, 73%, 89% and 100% of very small, small, medium-sized, 
large and very large cultural nonprofit organizations engaged in fundraising. On average, 
Table 26.10  Indirect revenues in average amount (in €) and share (in %) in the total revenues per income 
class 2012–2019
2012 2013 2014 2015 2019
% € % € % € % € % €
Very small 17 97 50 306 13    45 0 0 6 81
(Max 2K)
Small 10 1.349 13 1.878 13 1.882 7 1.087 10 2.963
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 2 6.535 3 8.127 10 30.895 2 6.585 13 80.573
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 8 763.930 7 638.919 11 1.021.566 5 398.608 5 537.567
(>1.5 mln)
Note: Share in % calculated based on the sum of the seven income sources as total income.
Koolen-Maas, van Teunenbroek, and Bekkers
496
in 2019, very small nonprofit organizations invest on average €113 in fundraising; small, 
medium-sized and (very) large organizations invest on average €507, €7.127 and €97.970, 
respectively. In addition, we find that smaller organizations more often rely on volunteers 
for fundraising activities, whereas larger cultural nonprofit organizations hire more paid 
staff to raise funds.
We also asked respondents one question inquiring their knowledge on the legal reform. 
Our inquiry, asked the height of the multiplier for individual donations to cultural nonprofit 
organizations (1.25). Large(r) organizations were more likely to answer this question correctly 
and have more knowledge about the reform.
The data also show a relation between the size of the organization and whether a cultural 
nonprofit organization communicates about the multiplier to potential donors. The larger the 
cultural nonprofit organization, the more likely it is that the organization communicates about 
the multiplier. Cultural nonprofit organizations that do not communicate about the multiplier 
generate substantially fewer revenues than those that do communicate about the reform.
Did cultural nonprofit organizations become more entrepreneurial?
Besides stimulating individual and corporate donations to cultural nonprofit organizations, the 
legal reform also aimed to stimulate cultural nonprofit organizations to become more entrepre-
neurial. This would subsequently reduce their dependency on government funding and would 
diversify their income. Within our study, we provided respondents with various statements 
related to entrepreneurship to measure their attitudes towards and levels of entrepreneurship 
within their organization. Our statements stem from the theoretical concept of entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO). Were cultural nonprofit organizations able to become more entrepreneurial, 
and which cultural nonprofit organizations have been most successful in achieving this? We can 
conclude that the cultural nonprofit organizations that participated in our study had a more 
positive attitude towards entrepreneurship in 2020 than in previous years.
We included one statement related to entrepreneurship in general. We asked to what extent 
respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement “Working in an entrepreneurial way is 
important for our organization” on a 6-point Likert-scale ranging from “totally disagree” (1) to 
“totally agree” (6). Figure 26.7 shows that, over the years, an increasing proportion of respond-
ents (fully) agreed with this statement.
We presented three statements to respondents about innovation – with the same 6-point 
Likert scale. Figure 26.8 shows that the majority of respondents indicated that their organiza-
tion behaves rather innovatively by exploring new opportunities, improving and innovating 
programs and projects and by constantly seeking new projects and activities. The percentage of 
cultural nonprofit organizations that have a positive attitude towards innovation was higher in 
2019 than in 2015 and 2016.
To measure pro-activeness, we provided respondents in 2020 with two statements in which 
they had to choose between two alternatives on a 7-point Likert scale. At the one end is a 
“reactive” alternative (1), while the other end gives a “pro-active” alternative (7). Reactive 
organizations wait, while pro-active organizations take the lead. Respondents could also choose 
a middle position (4). We organized the responses in such a way that respondents choosing 1–3 
were classified as “reactive”, while respondents choosing 5–7 were classified as “pro-active”. 
Figure 26.9 shows that cultural nonprofit organizations are very divided when it comes to their 
attitude towards being proactive.
Third, we investigated the extent to which respondents indicated their organizations are 
willing to take risks. Similar to pro-activeness, we provided respondents with two statements in 






















(Fully) agree neutral (Fully) disagree
Figure 26.7  Agreement to the statement “Working in an entrepreneurial way is important for our organi-
zation” in 2015, 2016 and 2020 (in %)
which respondents needed to choose between two alternatives on a 7-point Likert scale. Both 
statements provide a risk-averse alternative (1) versus a risk-taking alternative (7). Figure 26.10 
shows that respondents in 2020 more often say that their organization takes risks when it comes 
to projects and activities. This increase stems from a decrease in organizations that did not make 
a clear choice (4; neutral). The percentage that indicates their organization avoids taking risks 
remained the same over the years. We do not see a clear change in the more general statement 
about uncertain situations.
We also asked respondents about their attitudes towards being independent as an organiza-
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(Fully) agree Neutral (Fully) disagree
Figure 26.8  Agreement to statements on innovation in 2015, 2016 and 2020 (in %)
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income diversity: “It is good to be less dependent on the government” and “We rather engage 
in fundraising than receive government funding”. Both statements had a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from “fully disagree” (1) to “fully agree” (6). Figure 26.11 shows that the attitudes 
towards these two statements did not change substantially since 2015. Cultural nonprofit organ-
izations attach greater importance to increasing their fundraising income to a lesser extent, they 
value independence from the government.
Finally, we provided two statements to respondents regarding the organization’s collaboration 
with corporations and partnerships more broadly. Figure 26.12 shows that the attitudes towards 
cross-sector collaboration did not change substantially over the years. Most cultural nonprofit 
organizations in our sample indicate they are not reluctant when it comes to collaborating with 
corporations; attitudes towards collaboration with other parties outside the cultural sector are 
even more positive.
In Table 26.11, we look at four different aspects related to entrepreneurship per income class 
in 2020. It is evident that larger cultural nonprofit organizations score higher on entrepreneur-
ship. The four aspects are innovation, risk-taking, cross-sector partnerships and independence. 
For innovation, we only look at the first three statements on innovation. When we look at 
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We make safe choices
- We take risks
2016
We first wait and see
- We have a strong and assertive attitude
Risk taking Neutral Risk averse















We are rarely the first organization to introduce new 
programs and activities
- We are often the first organization to introduce new 
programs and activities
We follow the course set by similar organizations 
- We set the course for similar organizations
Pro-active Neutral Reactive
Figure 26.9  Responses to statements on pro-activeness in 2020 (in %)
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1. Within our organization we are not reluctant when it comes to
corporations
2. We see value in collaborating with parties
outside the cultural sector
(Fully) agree Neutral (Fully) disagree
Figure 26.12  Responses to statements on cross-sector collaboration in 2015, 2016 and 2020 in (%)
Table 26.11 Highest score on four aspects of entrepreneurship per income class in 2020 (in %)
Innovation Risk-taking Cross-sector partnerships Independence  Entrepreneurship
Very small 57 35 42 47 44
(Max 2K)
Small 60 43 45 32 44
(2K–50K)
Medium-sized 72 61 61 39 58
(50K–1.5 mln)
Large and very large 92 71 66 48 68
(>1.5 mln)
Total sample 69 53 53 38 52
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innovation, 57% of very small cultural nonprofit organizations (fully) agree with all three state-
ments. In contrast, 92% of the largest organizations (fully) agree with these three statements. The 
same applies to risk-taking and the attitude towards cross-sector partnerships. Large(r) cultural 
nonprofit organizations have more positive attitudes. We see a different pattern when we look at 
independence. Very small organizations and (very) large cultural nonprofit organizations all score 
similarly. Their scores are more positive compared to medium-sized organizations. The total score 
in the last column is calculated based on the number of times that respondents have a positive atti-
tude towards the four aspects of entrepreneurship. We see that the percentage of organizations that 
say they engage in entrepreneurial behavior increases markedly with the size of the organization.
Conclusions
We studied developments in donations to cultural nonprofit organizations and changes in their 
income sources and entrepreneurial orientations. On the donor side, we find that donations 
to culture increased somewhat after the charity law reform. The increase comes solely from 
an increase in the amount donated. The increase roughly kept pace with the increase in giv-
ing to other causes. This means that we do not see much of a substitution effect away from 
other causes to the cultural sector. Because the reform coincided with large cutbacks in direct 
government funding, we cannot isolate the tax-price effect on giving to culture. It is, however, 
unlikely that the effect comes from a crowding-out effect of reduced government funding. 
Before the reform, we found that households were not willing to compensate government cuts. 
The joint effect of the reduced tax-price of giving and the cutbacks is much less than projected 
by the Ministry of Finance. The increase in the amount deducted from the income tax was 
roughly half of the projected increase. Finally, we see that the increase does not come from 
the group of wealthy households that gives the highest amounts to culture and benefits most 
from the tax deduction. As a matter of fact, donations to the cultural sector made by wealthy 
households even decreased after the introduction of the charity law reform, though at the same 
time, the amounts deducted by the most wealthy households increased. This makes it unlikely 
that the increase in giving to culture is the result of the multiplier for donations to culture that 
the legal reform introduced.
The results on the side of cultural nonprofit organizations are very different. Our findings 
indicate that cultural nonprofit organizations succeeded in earning more income from private 
sources and became more entrepreneurial. The increase in entrepreneurship is evident both 
from the attitudes of cultural nonprofit organizations as well as from their behavior. These 
results are in line with the objectives of the reform.
At the same time, cultural nonprofit organizations are still relying on government funding 
quite heavily. Contrary to the objective of the charity tax reform, cultural nonprofit organiza-
tions relied more strongly on government funding in 2019 than in previous years. Their sources 
of income did not become more balanced or diversified. We also see that a Matthew effect 
occurred: differences between smaller and larger organizations increased. In part, this develop-
ment is due to more investments in fundraising by larger organizations and more effective com-
munication about the reform to prospective donors.
We conclude with a few insights for policymakers in other countries. What can they learn 
from the Dutch charity tax reform for the effective design of tax incentives for charitable giv-
ing? A first lesson is that one should not expect miracles: enhanced deductions do not easily 
expand the pie of total giving. A second lesson is that it is important to help organizations to 
become entrepreneurial and learn how to successfully engage in fundraising. Cultural nonprofit 
organizations that invested in fundraising were more likely to increase their fundraising income. 
Culture change is hard
501
These were larger organizations. Prior experience and current income allow these organiza-
tions to build capacity and invest in fundraising, enabling them to obtain the necessary skills and 
capacity for fundraising. Subsequently, these investments generate income out of fundraising 
and commercial activities. Finally, we warn policy makers to be aware of adverse consequences 
such as the Matthew effect or substitution effects. Though we did not see much of a substitution 
effect in giving behavior, we do see a Matthew effect among cultural nonprofit organizations.
Note
 1 This text and supporting materials are available at https://osf.io/qrdfc/.
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Data on giving behavior
The results on giving behavior to culture and arts in the Netherlands are based on data from the 
Giving in the Netherlands (GIN) studies. GIN is an initiative of the Center for Philanthropic 
Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Since 1995, GIN biennially publishes macro-
economic estimates of philanthropy by households, corporations, foundations, bequests and 
lotteries. The data among households and corporations include weighted responses to survey 
questionnaires on giving in the past calendar year. The data among foundations, bequests and 
lotteries are based on annual reports (and in the case of foundations, an additional survey).
The data on households include two samples: 1. a general sample among Dutch households 
and 2. a targeted sample among Dutch high-net-worth households. The high-net-worth sam-
ple is included to improve the coverage of the high end of the income and wealth distribution 
in the Netherlands. The sample includes respondents with a capital (freely disposable) of at 
least €50,000. Most of the households in the high-net-worth sample (37%) have a capital above 
€500,000. Besides being a Dutch resident and the age restriction of being 18 years or older, 
there were no restrictions for the general household sample. The general household sample has 
a longitudinal design: the same respondents are approached every two years. Both samples are 
weighted based on age, gender, region, household size and education level. See Table 26.A.
The data on corporations are collected via a survey among a representative sample of corpo-
rations located in the Netherlands. The questionnaires were completed by an employee respon-
sible for the corporation’s sponsorships and donations. In the questionnaire, sponsorships are 
described as donations with a “business interest” and where the corporation receives someting 
in return, while gifts are donations without a business interest without a return. We extrapolated 
the data from the sample to the total population of corporations in the Netherlands. The sample 
was weighted based on the total number of corporations in the Netherlands per sector, includ-
ing data on the number of employees per company.
The data on lotteries are based on annual reports of all nine lotteries in the Netherlands. The 
data on foundations are based on contributions by foundations from surveys and annual reports. 
For foundations, we report a minimum estimate, since not all foundations are represented (i.e., 
incomplete data). For 2018, the data include 122 endowed foundations (with a budget of more 
than €500,000) and 676 fundraising foundations.
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Data on cultural non-profit organizations
We collected data on cultural nonprofit organizations via a survey administered three times: 
in 2014, 2016 and 2020. We collected the data on 2012 and 2013 in the autumn of 2014. 
We collected the data on 2014 and 2015 in the summer of 2016. In the winter of 2020, 
we collected the data on 2019. As some cultural nonprofit organizations did not have their 
annual report ready for 2019, we allowed them to provide their revenues and expenses for 
the year 2018. In this chapter, we refer to the year 2019 for both 2018 and 2019, as the 
responses for 2018 were negligible (see Table 26.B). We rely on survey data, as we cannot 
rely on income tax returns. Tax returns only contain information about the donations that 
households declared as deductible gifts. Not all households that could make use of the gift 
deductibility do so in practice. As a result, the insight into the giving behavior via tax returns 
is incomplete (Bekkers, 2010). Moreover, tax returns do not distinguish between in-kind and 
monetary gifts.
To obtain a wide and varied data set, we invited all Dutch cultural nonprofit organizations 
registered with the tax authority as a cultural nonprofit organization with a public benefit (Cul-
turele ANBI). We invited these cultural nonprofit organizations several times using multiple 
methods. When email and/or correspondence addresses were available, we sent an invitation 
per postal service and via email. In 2020, the email invitation was sent three times. In 2020, we 
also called the cultural nonprofit organizations that participated in our study in all previous years 
(i.e. longitudinal sample group) and the largest cultural nonprofit organizations by telephone to 
solicit participation. As we were particularly interested in the largest cultural nonprofit organiza-
tions, we supplemented our survey data on 2019 with publicly available annual reports from 82 
largest Dutch cultural nonprofit organizations.
The survey included questions on the organization’s revenues and expenses, as well as 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship (i.e. innovation, risk-taking, and pro-activeness). As we 
expected that the effect of the charity tax reform became only noticeable after several years, we 
mainly focussed on the data gathered in 2020. Our sample is unlikely to be representative of 
the entire Dutch cultural nonprofit sector. The sample of cultural nonprofit organizations for 
which we gathered data in 2014 and 2015 consisted to a greater extent of medium-sized and 
large cultural nonprofit organizations. The 574 cultural nonprofit organizations that provided 
data in 2020 are also unlikely to be representative of the entire cultural sector, especially since 
Table 26.A Sample sizes on giving behavior
2011 2013 2014 2015 2018
Households 2.193    980 1.001 1.192 1.201
Corporations 1.164 1.201 1.115 1.007 1.022
High-net-worth households 1.307 1.356    836    891 1.087
Table 26.B Sample sizes of cultural nonprofit organizations
2012 2013 2014 2015 2018 2019
Cultural nonprofit organizations 928 928 512 438 21 574
Response rates (in %) 39 39 – – 10
Koolen-Maas, van Teunenbroek, and Bekkers
508
we were particularly interested in the largest Dutch cultural nonprofit organizations. As we sup-
plemented the data with annual reports of the largest Dutch cultural nonprofit organizations, 
the largest cultural organizations are probably overrepresented, while smaller organizations are 
underrepresented in the data collected in 2020. To account for this, we carried out certain 
analyses over the years for different income classes (i.e., very small, small, medium-sized and 
(very) large cultural nonprofit organizations).
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Philanthropy has left an indelible mark on the United States over the last half century. To offer 
just one example, a foundation proved instrumental in the creation of the nation’s emergency 
911 response system in the 1970s (Kohler, 2007, p. 1). Unfortunately, the foundation rests on an 
increasingly fragile foundation. Wealthy donors have begun to avoid the very structures created 
to support philanthropy, forgoing the generous tax benefits they provide. In 2015, Mark Zuck-
erberg and Priscilla Chan proudly announced the creation of the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative – a 
limited liability company – to give away 99% of their net worth.
This chapter offers an unconventional explanation for the diminished allure of foundations 
and the rise of for-profit philanthropy embodied in alternative philanthropic vehicles such as the 
limited liability company. In our previous work, we have shown how trust plays a critical role in 
hindering the rise of social enterprise (Brakman Reiser and Dean, 2017, pp. 11–13). Designed 
to pursue profits and social goals simultaneously, an absence of trust between investors and social 
entrepreneurs chokes off access to capital these ventures need to grow.
Rousseau famously observed that hunters unable to trust one another will never share the 
big prize – the stag – and will instead be condemned to hunt hares on their own. Both untrust-
ing and untrusted, social enterprises have been unable to raise capital from investors. Trust 
remains out of reach because each lacks the means to make a reliable commitment to the other.
In 1969, a legislative compromise we call the Grand Bargain solved a similar trust gap 
between philanthropists and the public. Gilded Age industrialists like Rockefeller and Carn-
egie pioneered the concept of a philanthropic foundation, designed to manage and distribute 
funds for charitable purposes. Newly minted moguls followed suit in the ensuing decades. By 
mid-century, concern was running high about abuses within these organizations. A series of 
inquiries by administrative agencies and congressional committees led to major reform legisla-
tion in 1969.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 can be viewed as “a necessary part of the bargain to encour-
age charitable activities . . . reflect[ing] a series of trade-offs that occurred in the U.S. legisla-
tive and administrative process that result in a robust charitable sector” (Zolt, 2021, p. 26). 
Now officially dubbed “private foundations” by statute, they retained the capacity for perpet-
ual life and significant tax benefits in exchange for government regulation and transparency. 
27
TRUST AND FOR-PROFIT 
PHILANTHROPY
From Surrey’s private foundation to 
Zuckerberg’s limited liability company
Steven Dean and Dana Brakman Reiser
Steven Dean and Dana Brakman Reiser
510
The Grand Bargain channeled foundation resources toward public-regarding activities and at 
least some significant current spending and away from entanglements with business interests 
and politics. It demanded heightened accountability through new prophylactic rules against 
non-charitable distributions and transactions between foundations and their donors and man-
agers. The enhanced disclosure scheme it imposed allowed for tracking and enforcement of 
this strengthened regulatory framework. By imposing these affirmative obligations on foun-
dations, the Grand Bargain directly targeted two of the main criticisms of modern-day phi-
lanthropy and its “tax incentives for giving . . . that they may be regressive and undemocratic” 
(OECD, 2020, p. 2).
Today, alternatives to the private foundation, notably philanthropy LLCs, commercially affil-
iated donor-advised funds and strategic corporate philanthropy defy the Grand Bargain. These 
for-profit philanthropy tools allow elites to evade the regulatory architecture the Grand Bargain 
erected. Just as social enterprise blurs the boundaries between doing business and doing social 
good, for-profit philanthropy phenomena upend the Grand Bargain’s balance between elite 
power and public control. The possible dissolution of that bargain and the cautionary tale of 
social enterprise suggest how easily trust can slip through our fingers.
We trace the Grand Bargain’s decline to developments in tax policy designed to enhance 
transparency that, in no small irony, can in turn be traced to the Grand Bargain itself. The tax 
expenditure budget that grew out of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 may have doomed the Grand 
Bargain simply by clearly and publicly tallying its costs. That lost innocence transformed phi-
lanthropy from a shared act of faith into a transaction, with the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative as 
its logical conclusion.
1 Trust to transaction
The link between taxation and philanthropy has been indisputable since Carnegie wrote his 
famous essay “Wealth.” Not one to mince words, Carnegie concluded that by “taxing estates 
heavily at death the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s unworthy life” 
(1889, p. 659). In practice, carrying out the threat implicit in such progressive taxes has proven 
difficult. Even when rates are high, loopholes and lax enforcement shield wealthy taxpayers 
from the harsh judgment Carnegie envisioned.
Philanthropic reforms Congress embraced in 1969 targeted perceived abuses by curbing 
tax benefits and enacting exacting penalties on political activity and a range of transactions 
deemed suspect. As Carnegie predicted, philanthropists seized on that sternly worded invitation 
to transform “the surplus wealth of the few” into “in the best sense, the property of the many, 
because administered for the common good” (Carnegie, 1889, p. 660). Since 1969, the Gates 
Foundation and countless others have had an enormous impact in areas ranging from health to 
education.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 would – by fueling the subsequent work of one of its chief 
architects, Stanley Surrey – plant the seeds of the Grand Bargain’s undoing. As Surrey put 
it, he “came to recognize that most of the matters considered in 1969 – whether they were 
adopted or rejected in the final legislation – related to items in the Tax Expenditure Budget” 
(Surrey, 1973, p. viii). The Grand Bargain succeeded for any number of reasons, but perhaps 
the most important was that both wealthy elites and the public could believe they got the 
better of it. The tax expenditure budget, by design, made that impossible. Stripping all mys-
tery from the exchange of tax breaks for philanthropic largesse may have doomed the Grand 
Bargain.
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A The picaresque story of the income tax
The world has changed in the half-century since the Grand Bargain created a fruitful and 
unlikely partnership between the public and wealthy philanthropists. The most striking changes, 
the rise of new technologies and old inequalities, may not pose the greatest threat to the Grand 
Bargain and its philanthropic stag hunt. This chapter highlights deeper challenges fueled by legal 
changes so gradual they often go unnoticed. From election law to the income and estate taxes, 
a slowly remade landscape has left the Grand Bargain intact while stripping it of the power to 
generate trust.
In this chapter, we tell the picaresque story of the income tax to show how legal change has 
made trust between philanthropists and the public harder to come by. Enshrined in the U.S. 
Constitution a century ago to “put the burdens of government justly upon the backs of the peo-
ple,” the income tax began modestly, paid by an elite few (Jennings Bryan, 1896). In the decades 
that followed the ratification of the 16th Amendment, the income tax evolved into a shared 
ritual at the heart of our civic life. Today, more Americans file federal tax returns than vote.
By 1969 – when the Grand Bargain was struck – top marginal income tax rates above 70% 
had become an enduring presence for high-income taxpayers. Those rates tell a compelling 
story of the power of taxation to constrain elite influence. Recent calls to raise top marginal 
rates to match those prevailing at the time of the Grand Bargain underscore the continuing 
appeal of that narrative. The Grand Bargain reveals a more complex reality, highlighting both 
unexpected limits and surprising power.
The specter of high tax rates played the role Carnegie once envisioned, but not because the 
rich felt bound to pay them. The Grand Bargain allowed the wealthy to avoid high marginal 
rates. Although they had already mastered that feat, the 1969 Tax Reform Act allowed them 
to do so respectably. In the 1950s and 60s, support for high wartime tax burdens might have 
waned, but the rates themselves had not. That confluence of high rates and skepticism made tax 
avoidance widespread (Bank, 2017, p. 128).
Nominal rates were high, but well-advised taxpayers could blunt their impact. Aggressive 
tax planning fueled a very different reality in which charitable contributions could, as described 
in the following, quite literally pay. Today, by any measure, the burden of the income tax 
falls lightly on elite shoulders. Reduced marginal income tax rates tell only part of the story. 
Technical changes – applying capital gains treatment to most dividends, for example – mean 
that corporate earnings distributed to shareholders once taxed at rates above 90% now face a 
maximum rate of 20%.
Other changes matter as much or more to the fate of the Grand Bargain but can be seen 
neither in the rise and fall of rates nor the fate of loopholes. A half century ago, tax planning 
could tame the threat of high rates, but not without risk. Today, wealthy individuals have lit-
tle to fear. A report by the Treasury’s Inspector General for Tax Administration issued in 2020 
revealed that “high-income nonfilers owing billions of dollars” were simply being ignored by an 
underfunded Internal Revenue Service. Together, lower rates, larger loopholes and weakened 
enforcement reveal an altered landscape that makes the Grand Bargain’s benefits far less appeal-
ing than 50 years ago.
B Regulating philanthropy
Simply doubling top marginal tax rates would be both too much and not enough to reinvigor-
ate the Grand Bargain. As early as 1957, Surrey highlighted how “high rates of the individual 
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income tax, and of the estate and gift taxes” powered tax preferences like the foundation (Surrey, 
1957, p. 1149). Yet as Surrey understood all too well, translating high rates into revenues can 
be surprisingly difficult.
Carnegie and Surrey both understood how tax law could play a central role in the rise and 
fall of the Grand Bargain, but tax does not tell the whole story. While the value of tax benefits 
shrank, the opportunity costs of embracing the Grand Bargain’s constraints on political activity, 
in-kind contributions and privacy ballooned. The Grand Bargain brought federal oversight to 
almost every component of foundation operations in service of restraining the real and potential 
excesses of these powerful institutions and the people behind them. It tells foundations how to 
spend the money they distribute; how to invest the money they retain; and how to manage their 
relationships with fiduciaries, employees and donors.
Federal tax law regulates foundation spending on virtually all possible dimensions. A payout 
requirement addresses both the timing and the amount of foundation spending by penalizing 
foundations that fail to distribute at least 5% of their assets each year for charitable purposes. 
Through excise taxes imposed on certain types of expenditures, it also limits the potential 
recipients of foundations’ resources and the purposes for which they may be distributed. Faced 
with these constraints, philanthropists such as Zuckerberg and Chan have rejected the private 
foundation in favor of a limited liability company. Although it may seem otherwise, that offers 
reason for optimism.
Nowhere can the magnitude of the growing sacrifice choosing a private foundation repre-
sents be seen more starkly than in the changing role of money in politics. In an election law 
environment that imposes ever fewer limitations on political spending by elites, pledging politi-
cal abstinence by forming a private foundation has become costly. So philanthropists find ways 
to avoid them.
Allowing foundations to engage in political activity – replacing outright prohibitions with 
limits and minimum standards of accountability – could replicate the Grand Bargain’s success, 
nudging elites towards benign forms of political engagement. It could help to turn the clock 
back to 1969, preserving the philanthropic partnership between the public and elites against 
the entropic pull of profit. The Grand Bargain harnessed tax avoidance. The same might be 
accomplished with political spending.
This chapter explores three distinct ways to breathe new life into the Grand Bargain. A return 
to steeply progressive post-war rates – and all that goes with them – represents only one path 
back towards a reinvigorated Grand Bargain. As detailed in the following, that route may be the 
least promising. Reducing the opportunity costs of embracing regulated philanthropic forms by 
remaking the relationship between politics and philanthropy could have an even greater impact. 
Finally, a wealth tax could deliver accountability in timing, transparency and targeting for the 
age of for-profit philanthropy.
C The evolving income tax
In 2019, Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez alluded to a 70% marginal tax rate on income, and 
many found the idea astonishing. A century of history shows that we might be equally sur-
prised by the rates in effect today.1 A careful study of the income tax reveals many more twists 
and turns than the steadily falling tax rates of the last three decades suggest. In countless ways, 
today’s income tax bears little resemblance to the one embraced after the ratification of the 16th 
Amendment.
At first, the vast majority of Americans paid no income tax at all. In terms of its reach, the 
first modern U.S. income tax can be roughly compared to today’s estate tax, targeting only the 
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most affluent. And the tax was only imposed on amounts far in excess of anything a typical 
worker could hope to earn (or, in the case of the estate tax, to accumulate). After the Second 
World War, that would change as the role of the income tax in American life grew.
Initially a tool designed blunt the excesses of inequality by compelling the wealthiest to 
contribute more, a vast expansion would make the income tax part of most American lives. 
Once a tax on elites, the income tax became a tax on the masses. In the years since, a further 
expansion – notably in the form of negative taxes designed to subsidize the wages of the work-
ing poor – ensured that the income tax plays an important part in the lives Americans from 
every background.
Many struggling workers today have reason to exclaim “thank God for tax day!” In terms of 
those it touches, the story of the income tax has been one of relentless expansion. How much 
any given taxpayer pays has been much more complicated. At the most basic level – the rate 
of tax set by Congress – the burden of the income tax grows along with how much a taxpayer 
earns. How they earn income also matters. The results – famously illustrated by Warren Buffet’s 
observation that he pays a lower rate of tax than his secretary – can be counterintuitive.
Despite such quirks, an overarching pattern on rates appears clear. First one World War then 
another triggered a sharp rise in rates only to be followed by a steady fall. Recent critiques 
focused on top marginal rates seize on that pattern to highlight the failure of the income tax to 
curb inequality.
D Rates, loopholes and enforcement
The Grand Bargain hints at why a focus on rates misses the mark. When the Grand Bargain 
was struck, growing evasion and avoidance had already made the U.S. income tax surprisingly 
porous, with “high rates tempered by many avoidance possibilities” (Surrey, 1957, p. 1150). 
Legislative loopholes had made many affluent taxpayers learn to stop worrying and love the 
income tax.
Falling rates alone do not explain the Grand Bargain’s diminished appeal. The tax breaks that 
would compel Stanley Surrey to create the tax expenditure budget highlight a very different 
balance of power between tax authorities and elites at the time the Grand Bargain was struck 
than those high nominal rates might suggest. Thanks to such tax breaks, in Surrey’s day, plan-
ning could often deflect the blow of rates above 70%.
But they could not do so without risk. Even half a century ago, tax authorities could neither 
detect nor defeat every avoidance scheme. Yet enforcement remained a real threat. Top rates 
have fallen significantly since the Grand Bargain was struck, but an accelerating decline in the 
ability of tax authorities to challenge aggressive taxpayer behavior matters more. As tax rates 
fell, the value of the tax benefits the Grand Bargain promised did the same. Even those sharp 
declines fail to paint an accurate picture of the falling burden the income tax poses for wealthy 
taxpayers. Tax rates have fallen in half. The drop-off in enforcement has been steeper.
A decade ago, a typical U.S. taxpayer faced an audit risk four times smaller than they would 
have in the 1960s (Slemrod and Bakija, 2008, p. 181). And since then, that trend has only gained 
momentum. A systematic effort to reduce funding to the Internal Revenue Service has further 
hobbled tax enforcement, as highlighted by the 2020 Treasury report titled “High-Income 
Nonfilers Owing Billions of Dollars Are Not Being Worked by the Internal Revenue Service.” 
If shrugging off the burden of the income tax has become as simple as not filing a return, the 
tax advantages of the private foundation mean nothing at all.
The Grand Bargain’s power can be explained in part by an implicit threat such high tax 
rates might be enforced. Today, the likelihood of enforcement has fallen even more sharply 
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than rates. Lower rates were precisely what Surrey hoped to achieve with his tax expenditure 
budget, with “all economic income . . . taxed, and the top rate lowered to 35 percent” (Sur-
rey, 1973, p. 226). But he intended “tax-rate reductions for the wealthy” to be paired with 
“the closing of a number of loopholes which the public cannot understand” (Surrey, 1957, 
p. 1151).
2 Entitlement and entitlements
The Grand Bargain was struck at a moment when high post-World War II rates had yet to fall 
but had already worn out their welcome. The Grand Bargain did not invent, but did reinvent, 
the foundation. Surrey once considered foundations symbols of a tax system that stealthily 
favored insiders. He drily noted, for example, that “[o]n July 30, 1955, Congressman Curtis 
of Missouri introduced a private bill for the relief of the Cannon Foundation, which had been 
established by Congressman Cannon of Missouri” (Surrey, 1957, p. 1178).
The Grand Bargain rehabilitated foundations by imposing clear limits on their activities and 
on the tax benefits of giving. As his tax expenditure budget expanded the tax base by thrusting 
loopholes into the spotlight, the Grand Bargain steered elites towards philanthropy by forcing 
them to make an easy choice between the possibility of lurid headlines for tax avoidance and 
the certainty of flattering coverage for charitable giving. The resulting truce between wealthy 
taxpayers and the public would help philanthropy flourish in the United States.
Central to the Grand Bargain’s success was the myth that it made both sides winners. While 
taxpayers and the public each yielded on key points, they had little information about the value 
of the tax breaks at stake. Both the public and elites could believe that the costs of philanthropy 
were borne by someone else thanks to a virtuous counterpart to Murphy and Nagel’s everyday 
libertarianism. Murphy and Nagel note that by the 1990s, many taxpayers had come to believe 
themselves entitled to the entirety of their pre-tax holdings and to see any imposition of tax as 
an affront (Murphy and Nagel, 2002, p. 9). In the 1950s and 1960s, those battle lines had not 
yet hardened.
Trust comes much more easily when you can believe you have an opportunity to gamble 
with house money, with nothing to lose and everything to gain. Against a backdrop of high 
nominal rates and rampant planning, elites and the public could each place very different values 
on the tax breaks delivered by the Grand Bargain. The Grand Bargain, as Surrey tells it, drove 
him to put a price tag on the tax law’s hidden subsidies, fueling the creation of the tax expendi-
ture budget.
When the Grand Bargain was struck, taxpayers and policymakers lacked even that rudimen-
tary framework to shape their expectations. The tax expenditure budget Surrey popularized 
fundamentally changed the way policymakers approach tax breaks, highlighting that tax breaks 
for charitable giving reduce tax revenues by more than $50 billion each year. No longer would 
“tax expenditures tumble into the law without supporting studies, being propelled instead by 
clichés, debating points, and scraps of data and tables that are passed off as serious evidence” 
(Surrey, 1973, p. 6).
A Control
The architecture of the Grand Bargain also allowed each to feel they controlled the disposition 
of foundation assets. Public control took the form of clear expectations on the timing, transpar-
ency and targeting of foundation spending. For their part, philanthropists could rightly claim 
authorship of foundation achievements as they both exercised day-to-day control and continued 
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to manage the capital that fueled their efforts. The Grand Bargain again let both be sides be 
winners.
Rob Reich describes a long-ago antecedent to the Grand Bargain that helps explain its 
power. He examines an Athenian “system whereby wealthy citizens could make voluntary con-
tributions to various state projects that were of benefit to the entire citizenry, or demos.” Even 
when vital to its survival, Athens did not quite compel these philanthropic – here liturgical – 
efforts. In Reich’s words, “[l]iturgies in democratic Athens became a system of public finance 
via private contribution, something akin to a system of taxation” (2018, p. 31). Rather than 
compulsory, the Athenian system made contributions voluntary.
The liminal nature of that system – almost, but not quite, a tax – achieved much the same 
result as the Grand Bargain. Wealthy Athenians could qualify for a safe harbor – a “temporary 
exemption” – from that near-tax by, say, voluntarily funding the construction of a trireme war-
ship. Reluctant elites knew they might be enlisted to build and captain such a vessel by selec-
tion from the registers of wealthy people kept by the state. But even then, the liturgical system 
allowed the chosen individual an alternative. By identifying a wealthier citizen – not already 
exempt – they could shift the burden by invoking the antidosis procedure, which would require 
whichever citizen a trial determined was wealthier to fund the effort.
That liturgical system relied only indirectly on state power. The wealthiest citizens might 
recognize the logical inevitability of being called on to make a contribution. Anticipating their 
selection by the state or a challenge by a less wealthy neighbor, they enjoyed the luxury of 
transforming an obligation into an act of generosity. Ensuring that civic burdens fell fairly on 
the backs of the Athenian people while “preserving certain privileges for the wealthy, such as 
honor, gratitude, and status as a civic benefactor” that liturgical process accomplishes just what 
Carnegie envisioned (Reich, 2018, p. 34).
The Grand Bargain did much the same. With triremes replaced by private foundations and 
antidosis by audits, the Grand Bargain allowed wealthy Americans to trade the complexities and 
risks of tax planning for the simplicity of honor and gratitude. But today, we live in Surrey’s 
world. Any bargains struck will not be paid for with house money.
Just like their liturgical counterparts, for the past half century, philanthropists have been 
able to trade state compulsion for public gratitude. Both the Grand Bargain and the Athenian 
liturgical system represented a partnership between the public – the demos – and wealthy elites. 
Against the backdrop of (nominally) high tax rates, the Grand Bargain achieved what Reich 
describes as a “balance between plutocratic voice and democratic voice” that did not depend 
on the government’s power over elites (2018, p. 140). The mere possibility that their tax plan-
ning might unravel in the harsh glare of public scrutiny would have made “honor, gratitude and 
status as a civic benefactor” every bit as appealing as it once was to wealthy Athenians.
B Optimal rates
Encouraging future Chans and Zuckerbergs to embrace private foundations could be as straight-
forward – and every inch as difficult – as recreating the conditions that prevailed in 1969. The 
income tax presents a particularly tempting opportunity to turn the clock back. Doubling the 
top marginal income tax rate from 37% to 74%, for example, should, after all, make tax breaks 
twice as appealing.
That simple math obscures a more complex reality. Recent interest in sharply higher tax 
rates can be traced to the work of economists focused on a narrow question. Diamond and Saez 
worked to identify the “optimal” tax rates for high-income earners. Relying on key assump-
tions, they concluded that tax rates twice as high as those in effect currently could be imposed 
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without distorting behavior over the short run. Diamond and Saez do note that over the long 
term, high rates could affect choices about education and careers in ways that would be decid-
edly suboptimal.
Diamond and Saez show that even surprisingly high rates would have little immediate impact 
on top earners. But they offer an important caveat. If avoidance and evasion remain possible, 
those high rates would mean little in terms of increased revenues. In order to have an impact, 
they would need to be paired with “base broadening and tax enforcement” (Diamond and 
Saez, 2011, p. 173). Simply put, taxpayers must have none of the escape hatches Surrey worried 
about.
In practice, returning rates to levels not seen for decades may be the easy part. Base broad-
ening might mean, for example, reversing changes that now result in dividends paid to stock-
holders once taxed at 90% benefitting from capital gain rates of 20%. Without countless such 
adjustments, doubling the top marginal rates might not impact the treatment of elites at all.
C Philanthropic windfalls
High tax rates on their own will not produce the trust once supplied by the Grand Bargain and 
will not generate big tax payments by wealthy individuals. Surrey’s tax expenditure budget illus-
trates why. Since the concepts embodied in the tax expenditure budget were in their infancy – 
and despairing of the prospect of explaining the excessive generosity of the tax treatment of 
charitable gifts the tax expenditure budget targeted – Surrey offered a stylized example. He 
underscored how entirely legal tax planning could produce surprising results:
If a person in the 70 percent top bracket informs the Government he is selling fully 
appreciated stock to pay his tax bill or to obtain cash for other reasons and would like 
$100 paid to a philanthropy, the Government pays the $100 to that philanthropy and 
also pays the person $5 – or perhaps $6.50 or even $15.50.
(Surrey, 1973, p. 227)
His point was simple. Combining the tax benefits granted to contributions of appreciated 
property – deduction of its full value plus exclusion of all gain from income – can transform a 
gift into a windfall. Before the Grand Bargain was struck, philanthropy might cost philanthro-
pists less than nothing.
A charitable contribution of appreciated property could be more than fully paid for with the 
tax breaks it would generate, resulting in a net after-tax payment to – not from – a donor. For 
the Grand Bargain, that would prove a help rather than a hindrance. When a charitable gift can 
more than pay for itself while loopholes cause marginal rates above 70% to loosen their grip, 
notions of entitlement like those Murphy and Nagel found problematic become meaningless. 
From the taxpayer’s perspective, the pain of curtailed tax preferences and increased accountabil-
ity trumped even a modest risk of being dragged into court and compelled to pay tax at a 70% 
rate. From the public’s perspective, curbing abuses to boost tax revenues while asserting firmer 
control over the operations of foundations would have been equally appealing.
With high rates and robust enforcement, philanthropic tax preferences would, of course, 
once again become appealing for the wealthy. But not for the demos. Why not just keep the 
revenues and allow philanthropic entrepreneurs to compete for funding?
The same would be true if current rates were imposed broadly and enforced vigorously. A top 
tax rate approaching 40%, if wealthy taxpayers actually expected to pay it, could nudge them 
towards private foundations. High rates, unenforced and under threat by loopholes, would not.
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3 Interests, not price
The Grand Bargain’s success lay in its ability to elude the question of how heavy a tax burden 
should fall on elites. Rather than focusing on price (here, tax), elites and the demos had the 
luxury of focusing on interests.2 The Grand Bargain offered both respectability and the mod-
ern-day equivalents of triremes. Impossible in the zero-sum world Surrey fought for, the Grand 
Bargain made winners of both the public and elites.
In the pre-tax expenditure budget era, the Grand Bargain’s price remained obscure. While 
precisely what Surrey lamented, the resulting lack of salience of cost made agreement possi-
ble. The private foundation gave the wealthy license to gamble their fortunes on idiosyncratic 
visions of public benefit. And it allowed the public to believe that elite philanthropy cost them 
nothing.
An exchange of respectability elites could secure nowhere else for a rescue the public 
could hope to receive from no one else forged the trust at the heart of this modern-day lit-
urgy. Rekindling that trust through the income tax would be difficult precisely because of 
the tax expenditure budget. Because of Surrey’s great success, price has taken center stage 
(Sellen, 2021, p. 1).
A Converging political interests
Fortunately, the Grand Bargain itself suggests another approach. Although its tax aspects loom 
large, the Grand Bargain did much more than remake the tax treatment of elite philanthropy. 
Today, political spending presents a tableau of unconstrained power hardly more reassuring than 
the one Surrey described half a century ago. Surrey’s cartographic feat – mapping the terrain of 
tax breaks – has not been, and perhaps could not be, replicated for political spending. Certainly, 
no one has yet created political influence budget.
In principle, that absence creates an opening. Rather than attempting to craft an optimal 
suite of tax incentives – bargaining over price – to cement a new philanthropic partnership 
between elites and the public, it offers an opportunity to bargain over interests. What minimum 
standards elites and the public might jointly impose on political spending matters less than the 
ability to find common ground.
Private foundations could, for example, be allowed to make contributions on the same terms 
as individuals, effectively “tak[ing] a more general approach that is consistent across both the 
political entities and charitable organisations performing them” rather than merely attempting 
“to regulate the definition of charitable purposes and the types of activities that may advance 
them” (Carmichael, 2021, pp. 1–2). Many philanthropy LLCs make such political contribu-
tions. In 2020, the Emerson Collective contributed over a quarter of a million dollars to the 
Democratic party. Limiting – and clawing back the value of any tax benefits from – any politi-
cal contributions by foundations, rather than punishing them as current law does, could make 
foundations more appealing without making them more costly in terms of either direct or tax 
expenditures.
Just as the Grand Bargain nurtured expectations regarding philanthropic activity, a new com-
promise could draw clear lines between forms of philanthropic political engagement. By ensur-
ing accountability for those types of political expenditure deemed philanthropically compatible, 
such an arrangement would reduce the opportunity costs of embracing private foundations 
without creating new sources of unobserved political influence. Crafted carefully, such mini-
mum standards could benefit both elites and the demos by preserving a balance between pluto-
cratic and democratic voice.
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B Bargaining in the shadow of a wealth tax
One could also draw a different lesson from the Grand Bargain’s success. That both elites and 
the public could claim victory in the Grand Bargain does not, of course, mean that either was 
correct. The public may have been hoodwinked into believing that a combination of high 
nominal and low effective tax rates could constrain elite influence by promoting philanthropy. 
Wealthy taxpayers arguably agreed to minimum standards and modest tax burdens to ward off 
what they did not yet recognize as a waning threat of enforcement. Whatever they believed, 
neither truly gambled with house money.
Today’s wealth tax proposals  – and the fundamental disagreements that surround them – 
could allow elites and the public to replicate the Grand Bargain’s feat. The wealth tax remains 
nearly as unmapped today as the income tax was before Surrey conquered it. Its advocates, 
perhaps naively, see an opportunity to realize the unfulfilled promise Jennings Bryan once 
saw in the income tax, finally “put[ting] the burdens of government justly upon the backs of 
the people.” Its critics see little more than a return of the evasion and avoidance that Surrey 
decried. Both cannot be true, but since no U.S. wealth tax has ever been enacted, this particular 
Schrödinger’s cat remains both alive and dead.
Today, estimates of the revenues a wealth tax would raise vary by an order of magnitude. The 
success of the Grand Bargain suggests that there will be no better time to forge an agreement 
between elites and the demos on the wealth tax’s treatment of philanthropy than before we 
know its measure. Absent a compromise, both sides risk being left with a losing hand.
High effective wealth tax rates would profoundly impact elites. A wealth tax riddled with 
loopholes and saddled with inadequate enforcement would leave the public with little to show 
for their efforts. Neither can discount the possibility that the strong version its advocates envi-
sion or the weak version its critics fear will materialize. Better, perhaps, to gamble on the 
impact philanthropy can have on public problems and elite reputations than to risk a toothless 
or crushing wealth tax.
The public would, of course, prefer a wealth tax able to bring elite influence to heel with 
high rates, a broad base and robust enforcement. Elites, on the other hand, undoubtedly prefer 
the freedom the opposite would bring. Given the wide range of possible outcomes, a substantial 
opportunity to find common ground would exist.
A wealth tax that falls more lightly on assets placed in a private foundation than it does on 
assets placed in a philanthropy LLC might nudge elites rather burdening them. The results could 
revive the Grand Bargain, capitalizing on the uncertainty surrounding the wealth tax today to 
burnish the appeal of private foundations at a time when some of the wealthiest philanthropists 
have turned to other vehicles. The public might just accept the possibility of substantial lost tax 
revenues as the price of reimposing minimum standards on elite philanthropy. For their part, 
elites would eliminate a non-trivial risk that a strong wealth tax would leave them footing the 
bill for today’s triremes, without the benefit of gratitude or honor.
Conclusion
In some ways, philanthropists and social entrepreneurs could not be more different. But both 
depend on trust to have access to capital. Social entrepreneurs have been unable to persuade 
investors to trust them, just as they find themselves unable to trust investors. The results for the 
growth of social enterprise have been as predictable as they have been disappointing.
Philanthropists hope to retain, rather than gain, access to capital. The Grand Bargain allowed 
them to do that in exchange for embracing a suite of rules that limited their freedom and 
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heightened transparency. Chafing under the burdens of the Grand Bargain, philanthropists have 
turned to alternatives to the private foundation. Renewed interest in steeply progressive taxes 
highlights the fragile benefits the Grand Bargain offers to the wealthy and the potential conse-
quences of lost trust. A potent wealth tax would not leave the wealthiest philanthropists entirely 
without access to capital, but it could represent the end of the fruitful partnership forged by the 
Grand Bargain a half century ago.
Notes
 1 In 1913, 7 cents would have been collected in tax on the last dollar earned by a prosperous taxpayer. In 
2020, after more than a century, that burden would rise more than fivefold to 37 cents. While striking, 
that contrast actually understates the changes that have marked the income tax’s tenure (Roberts, 2014, 
pp. 932–939).
 2 In Getting to Yes, the classic vision of bargaining (over positions such as price) is contrasted against 
bargaining over interests. Bargaining over interests allows two sides to reach agreement by focusing 
on aspects of an arrangement that are not zero sum. The authors offer an example of farmers and oil 
producers realizing that since it would take at least that long to begin drilling, waiting three months to 
evict farmers after oil was discovered rather than doing so immediately would benefit both the farmers 
(harvesting crops crucial to their livelihoods) and the oil companies (drilling as soon as possible) (Fisher 
et al., 2011, pp. 5–6).
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THE GROWING CONCEPT 
OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN 
AUSTRALIA
Can a social enterprise take advantage of tax 
concessions by operating through a charity?
Fiona Martin
I Introduction
Social enterprise is a broad term beneath which sit entities ranging from for-profit businesses 
that, for example, use only ethically sourced suppliers, to, in some cases, not-for-profits (NFPs) 
and charities that carry on businesses that support their underlying charitable purposes (Nehme 
and Martin, 2019). The importance of the latter entities is seen by many researchers as rapidly 
increasing in western democracies. The report ‘Global Civil Society: An Overview’ (Salamon, 
Sokolowski, and List, 2003) found that the number and variety of NFPs or charitable institu-
tions had grown enormously in the 1990s, and there is nothing to suggest that this growth is 
not still occurring. Expansion of this sector is more marked in developed nations, but it is also 
occurring in the developing world. These organisations occupy a unique space within the com-
munity in that they are private in nature; however, they exist for a public or community purpose 
(Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 2003). Furthermore, most developed nations offer a variety of 
tax concessions for charities and NFPs, the most common being the exemption from income 
tax. For example, the income of charities in England,1 the United States,2 Hong Kong,3 New 
Zealand,4 and Australia5 is generally exempt from income tax. Although not all social enter-
prises are NFPs, many are (Social Traders, 2016), and all charities must be.6
There is no legal definition of NFP in Australia; however, the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO) advises that a non-profit (or NFP)7 organisation does not operate for the profit or gain 
(direct or indirect) of individual members both while operating and winding up. Any profit 
made must be used to carry out the organisation’s purposes (Dal Pont, 2000, pp. 22–25). The 
ATO accepts an organisation as an NFP where its constituent or governing documents prevent 
it from distributing profits or assets for the benefit of particular people (Australian Taxation 
Office, 2007, p. 6).
In ‘Global Civil Society: An Overview’, the researchers found that in the late 1990s, the 
NFP sector had aggregate expenditures of US$1.3 trillion. This represented 5.1 per cent of the 
combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the 35 countries examined. If this figure is looked 
at in terms of national economies, it would make it the seventh-largest world economy at that 
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time behind the United States, Japan, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France and 
ahead of Italy, Brazil, Russia, Spain, Canada, and Australia (Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 
2003). There are currently over 57,000 charities in Australia (Australian Charities and NFO 
Commission, 2017), and they employ 1.26 million staff (Australian Charities and NFO Com-
mission, 2017). In June 2018, there were 12.6 million people employed in Australia, which 
means that employees of charities make up almost 10 per cent of all employees in Australia. 
Charities in Australia, the United States, and other developed nations are major providers of 
welfare, education, and health services (Powell et al., 2017; Boris, 2012).
As well as seeing the number of charitable entities increase, the number of NFPs in Australia 
increased from 520,000 in 1996 to 700,000 in 2008 (ATO, 2008–09, p. 61). In Australia, this 
sector is therefore of growing significance both economically and socially. But not only is there 
a growth in NFPs and charities, the number and type of what are termed social enterprises are 
also growing. A 2016 Australian report estimates that there are 20,000 social enterprises in Aus-
tralia (Social Traders, 2016, p. 9), and 68 per cent of these are in the services sector, of which 24 
per cent are in retail and 23 per cent in healthcare (Social Traders, 2016, p. 9).
There are many reasons for the growth of NFPs and social enterprises, including the with-
drawal of government from areas which it traditionally dominated, such as disability services, 
education, and health; the increasing complexity of today’s society; and awareness of interna-
tional issues such as the environment (Koele, 2007, p. 1). The business sector has been criticised 
for ignoring human needs and producing untenable social inequities (Salamon, Sokolowski and 
List, 2003, pp. 1–2). The issues with both government and business are considered to foster the 
growth of the third sector and social enterprises.
This chapter seeks to analyse the overlap, advantages, and disadvantages between social 
enterprises and charities. It has commenced with an introduction that describes the parameters 
and impact of the third sector. Part II considers the term ‘social enterprise’ and reviews the lit-
erature around this concept. Part III establishes the legal definition of charity, whether charities 
can carry on businesses, and the advantages and disadvantages of carrying on a business through 
a charity. Part IV uses three case studies to illustrate this last point, and Part V is the conclusion.
II What is a social enterprise?
Most social enterprises see themselves primarily as businesses in that they emphasise the impor-
tance of trading to build long-term sustainability. In that sense, they are part of the market 
economy in that they earn revenue from the production and sale of goods and services. How-
ever, while traditional businesses trade for the purpose of creating profit, social enterprises 
operate for a social purpose – profit (or surplus) is only a means to that end. These entities also 
see themselves as distinct from charities, which have traditionally relied on donations and grants 
for their operations. However, as charities become more commercial and entrepreneurial, and 
government grants decrease, many now consider themselves part of the social enterprise sector. 
This point is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Social enterprise is also seen from different perspectives by the stakeholder groups involved 
in their development and operation. For example, users and consumers of their goods and ser-
vices value the fact that meeting investor needs is not the main priority of the business model 
and that they aim to re-invest profits in the social mission of the enterprise. Social enterprises 
are also gaining recognition because of the developing focus on ethical business practices in the 
broad community (Reiser and Dean, 2017, pp. 9–10). Many social entrepreneurs and philan-
thropists see social enterprises as a new way of doing good outside the constraints of charitable 
status. Governments see social enterprise as a new way of tackling wicked problems, building 
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social capital, creating community wealth, and outsourcing public services. Community groups 
and staff of the enterprises see social enterprise as a new way of becoming involved in the gov-
ernance of business enterprises. Indeed, ownership and control are essential questions in social 
enterprise, and ideally the social enterprise should be owned and controlled in the interest of 
its social or environmental mission. This also means that it may not be an NFP, as some of its 
profits or capital on a winding up may go back to the original investors.
Review of literature surrounding social enterprise
As there is no legal definition of social enterprise in Australia, it is not surprising that many 
practitioners and researchers in this area rely on the 2010 ‘Finding Australia’s Social Enterprise 
Sector’ Report (FASES Report), which is also used in the subsequent 2016 FASES report (Bar-
raket, Mason and Blain, 2016, p. 3). The Report states that social enterprises are organisations 
that are led by an economic, social, cultural, or environmental mission consistent with a public 
or community benefit; trade to fulfil their mission; derive a substantial portion of their income 
from trade; and reinvest the majority of their profit/surplus in the fulfilment of their mission 
(Barraket et al., 2010, p. 16).
This definition is cited by the Australian Law Reform Commission in their 2019 report 
‘The Future of Law Reform’ (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2019, p. 48). It is also cited 
by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
2015, p. 1). It is ‘the definition utilised in the most substantial public policy investments to date’ 
(Barraket et al., 2017, p. 345, 347).
A slightly different view was taken by a group of researchers and academics who came 
together through the University of New South Wales, Centre for Social Impact. This group, 
known as the Legal Models Working Group (Rodgers et  al., 2015, p. 8), stated in its 2015 
report that the defining features of social enterprise are contained in three essential elements. 
These are first, trading for social purposes; second, achieving financial sustainability; and third, 
re-investing profit into the social mission of the enterprise (Rodgers et al., 2015, p. 2).
The authors include ‘financial sustainability’ as a feature of social enterprises (a feature which 
is not explicitly stated in the FASES definition), because they consider successful trading and 
profitability a ‘necessary factor for success’ of these enterprises. The Report states that ‘[s]
uccessful trading is a necessary factor for success as a SE and an enterprise’s social mission can 
be achieved only if the enterprise continues to be a viable, profit-making, business venture’ 
(Rodgers et al., 2015, p. 13).
The Legal Models Working Group relied for its definition of a social enterprise on the 
characteristics provided by Social Enterprise, United Kingdom. According to this organisation, 
social enterprises should (Social Enterprise, 2012, p. 1)
• Have a clear social and/or environmental mission set out in their governing documents;
• Generate the majority of their income through trade;
• Reinvest the majority of their profits;
• Be autonomous of the state;
• Be majority controlled in the interests of the social mission; and
• Be accountable and transparent.
These characteristics make social enterprises clearly different from ordinary businesses, but they 
also differ from charities and many not-for-profits. The fundamental difference is that not all 
charities and NFPs generate most of their income through trade.
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The Social Innovation Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Alliance (SIEEA) has been dis-
banded but described itself as a strategic partnership of intermediary organisations working 
to support the growth and improve the impact of the ‘social economy’ in Australia (Pro Bono 
Australia, 2014). The SIEE Alliance’s 2014 report outlined six characteristics of social enter-
prises. These were:
• Driven by an economic, social, cultural, or environmental mission for public benefit;
• Place people at the centre of their business;
• Trade profitably to fulfil their mission;
• Reinvest profits/surplus in the fulfilment of their mission;
• Engage a wide group of stakeholders in governance and decision-making; and
• Operate with transparency (Social Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Alliance, 
2014).
Although the core principles are the same, the last two points are interesting additions to the 
criteria of social enterprises which are not included in the FASES definition.
Social Traders is an organisation which ‘connects social enterprises with social procurement 
opportunities’ by certifying social enterprises and facilitating procurement contracts (mostly for 
government projects/policy) for social enterprises in Australia (Social Traders, 2019a). They are 
partially funded by the Victorian state government. They have three criteria for social enter-
prises. First, that they have a defined primary social purpose, environmental, or other public 
benefit; second, they derive a substantial portion of income from trade; and third, they reinvest 
50 per cent or more of their annual profits towards achieving the social purpose (Social Traders, 
2019b).
Victoria has a ‘strong concentration of social enterprises’ which ‘may reflect the effects 
of more consistent public policy support for social enterprise in this state’ (Barraket, Mason 
and Blain, 2016, p. 13). The Victorian government defines social enterprises as organisa-
tions that are driven by a public or community cause, be it social, environmental, cultural, 
or economic; derive most of their income from trade, not donations or grants; and use at 
least 50 per cent of their profits to work towards their social mission (State Government of 
Victoria, 2019).
The Australian Institute of Company Directors views social enterprises through the lens of 
the type of activities that they perform and the audience that they benefit (Australian Institute 
of Company Directors, 2015, pp. 1–2). They consider that social enterprises can be one of eight 
types of entities. First are intermediate labour market companies. These are for-profit com-
mercial businesses developed as a method of training and providing work for the unemployed. 
Second are social firms; these are commercial businesses developed to provide employment 
for people with a disability. Again, they are for-profit entities. Third are Australian disability 
enterprises, an Australian government term for businesses developed to employ people with a 
disability who are unable to work in mainstream organisations; these are also for-profit entities. 
The final group of five are entities that are more community led and focused. They tend to 
be NFPs. These comprise cooperatives, associations, and mutual, as in member-run, member-
benefiting businesses which are designed to meet a specific need of members (for example, 
childcare); community enterprises which are businesses designed purely to benefit the local 
community (for example, a credit union or petrol station); community development finance 
institutions, which are businesses created to provide access to financial products for people who 
find it difficult to access mainstream financial services; fair trade organisations, businesses cre-
ated to improve the conditions and pay for producers of goods, usually in developing countries, 
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through selling accredited goods to developed world consumers; and charitable business ven-
tures, an income-generation arm of a charity.
Researchers are now publishing in this area, and a body of academic literature is emerging. 
Young and Lecy consider that social enterprises are organisations or ventures which pursue 
financial success in the private marketplace in combination with a social purpose. They also 
argue that social enterprises are more diverse than NFPs and that they are not willing to be 
confined to one particular sector (Young and Lecy, 2012, p. 3).
III The legal definition of ‘charity’
At common law, a ‘charity’ must be an NFP.8 No payment can be made to a charity’s members 
other than for wages or allowances to employees, reimbursement of expenses, or payment for 
services. This requirement also means that on a winding up, any excess funds must be trans-
ferred to an entity with similar purposes.
Prior to the introduction of a statutory definition of ‘charity’ and ‘charitable purpose’ in 
Australia, the Australian courts recognised a legal definition as developed through the com-
mon law.9 This common law dates back to the Preamble to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses,10 
which listed a range of charitable purposes that included relief of poverty, assistance to scholars 
and orphans, help to returned soldiers, and repairs to highways and churches.
Subsequently, the House of Lords accepted the guidelines suggested by Lord Macnaghten in 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel11 in applying the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble in a tax scenario. Lord Macnaghten suggested that charitable purposes fall within 
four divisions. These are the relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of reli-
gion, and other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding 
heads.12 The classification of charitable purpose into these four areas has been consistently used 
as a guideline in Australian judicial considerations.13 Furthermore, as well as requiring a charita-
ble purpose, entities that aim to qualify as charities must also be of public benefit.14
In 2013, Australia followed several other countries and enacted a statutory definition of 
charity.15 The Charities Act 2013 (Cth) (Charities Act) was enacted in 2013 and came into 
force on 1 January 2014. This legislation includes a definition of charity and charitable pur-
pose. Under the Charities Act, an entity is ‘charitable’ for federal law purposes if it is a ‘charity’ 
within this term as defined in the legislation.16 The Act requires that the organisation satisfy 
four requirements. First, it must be NFP; second, all the entity’s purposes must be charitable and 
for the public benefit (or ancillary or incidental to and in furtherance or in aid of such purposes); 
third, none of the entity’s purposes can be disqualifying purposes; and finally, the entity cannot 
be an individual, political party, or government entity.17
Charitable purposes are defined in s 12(1)(a)–(l) and expanded upon in ss 14, 15, 16, and 
17 of the Charities Act. These purposes include the traditional categories of relief of poverty, 
advancement of education, and religion,18 together with others such as promoting reconcilia-
tion and protection of the natural environment. Section 12(1)(l) of the Charities Act states that 
a charitable purpose includes the purpose of promoting or opposing a change to any matter 
established by law, policy, or practice in the Commonwealth, a State, a Territory, or another 
country, but the promotion or opposition to change must be in furtherance or in aid of one or 
more of the purposes set out in s 12(1)(a)–(k).
The public benefit requirement has two overlapping aspects. The purpose or object of the 
NFP must be ‘beneficial’ in itself, and it must be of benefit to the community or a sufficient 
section of the community (with the exception of entities for the relief of poverty, where a more 
relaxed test is followed). The case law establishes that for the first three heads of charitable 
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purposes, ‘the court will assume it to be for the benefit of the community and, therefore chari-
table, unless the contrary is shown’.19 It is usually where the charitable purpose falls within the 
general heading under the common law ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’ that argu-
ment surrounding charitable benefit in this sense arises.
As stated previously, the first aspect of public benefit is that the charity’s objectives must pro-
vide some actual public benefit. This benefit can, however, extend beyond material benefit to 
other forms including social, mental, and spiritual. An example of where the courts in Australia 
have found that a purpose was beneficial was the 1971 decision of The Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting of the State of Queensland v The Commissioner of Taxation.20 In this case, the High Court 
of Australia, Australia’s highest judicial authority, held that the production of law reports was a 
matter that was beneficial to the community in a charitable sense.
The public benefit test also requires that the public or a section of the public be benefitted by 
the charity’s objectives. In other words, it cannot be a charity that merely assists a family group 
or a group of employees. The public benefit test, however, does not mean that the entire public 
must be benefitted. The case law has accepted that a benefit to a ‘sufficient section of the public’ 
is sufficient.21 The rationale is that not all charities are for the benefit of the entire community; 
after all, charities are often motivated by the need to assist a section of the community with 
special needs or disadvantages. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia in 1959, Dixon 
CJ, expressed it clearly in Thompson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation when his Honour said 
that the public benefit test can be determined ‘by reference to locality, to conditions of people, 
to their disabilities, defects or misfortunes and by reference to many other attributes of men and 
things, yet the trusts may retain their “public” character’.22
The requirement that a charity must be of public benefit commonly arises in the context of 
tax concessions. The concern is that private individuals might take advantage of the favourable 
tax position available to charities for what is essentially a private purpose.23 The tax advantages 
of charities was a strong consideration for Lord Greene in Re Compton when deciding whether 
a trust for the education of descendants of a named person was a family trust and not charitable 
because it was not for the benefit of the community. His Lordship came to this conclusion even 
though the advancement of education is a recognised charitable purpose.24
The public benefit test is not applied with the same degree of strictness by courts where the 
charitable purpose is the relief of poverty. In Re Scarisbricks Will Trust,25 the Court approved a 
charity for the relief of poor relatives (‘the relations of my son and daughter’). Further, in Dingle 
v Turner,26 the House of Lords granted charitable status to a trust for the relief of poor employ-
ees, even though this group was defined through their employment relationship. This approach 
has been accepted in many cases in England27 and Australia.28 The rationale seems to be that 
relief of poverty is overwhelmingly charitable and beneficial to the community.
Can charities carry on businesses?
In 2008, the common law of Australia confirmed that a charity that engaged in carrying on 
a business could still maintain its charitable status. This confirmation is found in the High 
Court decision of Federal Commission of Taxation v Word Investments Limited.29 Word Invest-
ments Limited was established as a company limited by guarantee in 1975 by members of the 
Wycliffe Bible Translators Australia. Wycliffe engaged in Christian evangelical purposes and 
was recognised by the Australian Taxation Office as a charity for the advancement of religion. 
The memorandum of association of Word Investments allowed it to carry on business activi-
ties in connection with its other purposes (which were all clearly charitable as being for the 
advancement of religion). Any funds from these activities were to go directly to Wycliffe and 
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other entities to support the evangelical work and therefore the religious charitable purpose. 
Word engaged in the business activity of running a funeral business along commercial lines and 
distributed all surpluses towards its charitable purposes.
The crucial issue was whether an entity could still be considered charitable when it had the 
capacity to carry on a business, the funds from which would go towards its purposes, which 
were all charitable. The funeral business was conducted along commercial lines and was open to 
the general public. The majority in the High Court emphasised that Word’s powers to carry on 
business activities were a means to Word achieving its religious charitable purposes and there-
fore did not preclude its charitable status. The rationale of the court was:
Word endeavoured to make a profit, but only in aid of its charitable purposes. To point to 
the goal of profit and isolate it as the relevant purpose is to create a false dichotomy between 
characterisation of an institution as commercial and characterisation of it as charitable.30
Therefore, as long as the entity is an NFP and satisfies all the other requirements, in that it has 
solely charitable purposes and operates for the benefit of the community or a section of the 
community, it can retain its charitable status and operate a commercial business. The income 
from this business will be exempt from income tax in the same manner as all other income of 
the charity.
The Australian situation is very different to many other jurisdictions (OECD, 2020).31 For 
example, the business income of charities in the United States is taxable under what is referred 
to as the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT). The UBIT, found in ss 511–514 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, generally imposes income tax at the corporate tax rate on the unrelated 
business income of certain tax-exempt entities. The business income must arise from a trade or 
business that is regularly carried on by the charity and is unrelated to its purposes. ‘Unrelated 
trade or business’ is defined in s 513 as
any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from 
the need of such organization for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits 
derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educa-
tional, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption.
Certain exempted types of U.S. unrelated passive income, including dividends, interest, loan 
proceeds, annuities, royalties, rent from real property, capital gains, and certain other types of 
income such as research income, are not subject to the UBIT.32 However, any kind of invest-
ment income is subject to UBIT to the extent that it is debt financed.33
Examples of how Australian charities commonly carry on business can be seen through such 
organisations as the St Vincent de Paul Society and Oxfam. The St Vincent de Paul Society 
operates stores around Australia that sell second-hand clothing, books, toys, and so on that have 
been donated by the public. This is not only an efficient means of recycling goods and providing 
them at low cost to low income earners, but all the profits from the shops go right back into 
the community, funding local programs like soup vans, food hampers, tutoring programs for 
disadvantaged children, emergency relief, and accommodation. If we consider the criteria that 
the Legal Models Working Group set out for a social enterprise, the St Vincent de Paul Society 
has much in common. It is trading for a social purpose, in that it is assisting low income earners 
in purchasing clothes and other essentials and is recycling existing goods; second, it is achieving 
financial sustainability: the goods are donated and then on sold at a small profit, and they are re-
investing profit into the social mission of the enterprise. The only ostensible difference between 
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this organisation and an NFP social enterprise is that the St Vincent de Paul Society must have 
charitable purposes to retain its charitable status. In this case, it is for the relief of poverty and 
advancement of religion.
Until recently, Oxfam34 sold ‘fair trade’ goods manufactured in developing countries both 
through its stores and online. A decrease in demand and high overheads has meant that this part 
of the organisation has closed; however, it still supplies fair trade coffee and drinking chocolate 
to supermarkets, other outlets, and online. This coffee is sourced from communities in develop-
ing countries. Oxfam ensures that the producers are paid a fair price, and all the proceeds are 
reinvested into Oxfam’s projects of alleviating world poverty.35 Again, there is little difference in 
this organisation’s aims and how it operates as compared to a social enterprise.
The advantages of being a charity
For a variety of reasons, both historical and political, most developed nations offer a variety 
of tax concessions for charities and not-for-profits. In England,36 the United States,37 Hong 
Kong,38 New Zealand,39 and Australia,40 the income of charities is generally exempt from 
income tax. Tax concessions to NFPs represent a significant amount of public sector revenue in 
Australia, the United States, and other nations. In Australia, the Treasury estimates that the tax 
deductibility of donations to specific eligible NFPs (including some charities) costs the Com-
monwealth revenue around $1.3 billion per year.41 In the United States, this amount is estimated 
to be $69.1 billion dollars for the 2016 fiscal year.42
However, just because an organisation is an NFP does not mean that it is eligible for exemp-
tion from income tax. An NFP organisation will only be exempt from income tax if it falls 
into a category of exempt entity. Section 50–5 ITAA97 lists the categories of entities that are 
exempt from income tax. These entities fall into specific ‘main’ categories (each category has 
sub-categories), and this includes charities (ITAA97 s 50–5).
An organisation that is NFP and a charity will therefore be exempt from income tax. Such 
an organisation is also able to access other Commonwealth tax concessions under the Fringe 
Benefits Tax43 and Goods and Services Tax (GST).44 In Australia, charities are also able to obtain 
a range of tax concessions under state and local government legislation.45
Tax deductibility of donations to eligible charities
Section  30–15 ITAA97 provides that a donation of $2 or more to what is referred to as a 
Deductible Gift Recipient (DGR) is deductible from a taxpayer’s assessable income whether 
the donor is a company or an individual. If the donation is property, then the property must be 
valued at greater than $5,000.46 If the donation is jointly owned property, the owners work out 
the share based on each owner’s interest in the property.47
Australia is unlike the United States and other countries in that it does not place a percentage 
cap on the deduction for donations. The Australian federal government has instead protected 
the revenue by limiting the types of organisations that are eligible for donation status. In other 
words, just because an entity is a charity does not mean that it is a DGR.
The ITAA97 sets out how to determine whether an entity is eligible to be endorsed as a 
DGR.48 The number of DGR categories is more than 40, which provides insight into the 
complexity of the system. To be eligible for endorsement under one of what are referred to in 
the legislation as the general categories, the organisation must fall within a category specified in 
the ITAA97 and itemised in subdivision 30-B. These general categories are Health, Education, 
Research, Welfare and Rights, Defence, Environment, The Family, International Affairs, Sports 
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and Recreation, Cultural Organisations, Fire and Emergency Services, and Ancillary funds. 
Examples of the types of entities that are included under the general headings include Public 
Benevolent Institutions (PBIs), public hospitals, health promotion charities, school building 
funds (both government and NFP), and necessitous circumstance funds.
The largest group of charities that are eligible for DGR status are PBIs (Cortis et al., 2015, 
pp.  49–50). The PBI was developed by the legislature to ensure that the tax concession of 
deductibility of donations was not available to all charities. There are several explanations for 
this, although currently the paramount one seems to be the protection of the revenue as the 
donation tax concession is estimated by Treasury to cost the Federal revenue approximately 
$1.3b per year.49 Further reasons that flow from some of the Parliamentary debates and judicial 
statements at the time the term was inserted in the legislation suggest that the phrase PBI was 
developed to capture those entities more closely aligned to the traditional view that charities 
are for the relief of poverty (Martin, 2017) and therefore are the NFPs that should have most 
significant tax concession privileges (Martin, 2017; Chesterman, 1999, pp. 340–341).
It is the responsibility of the Commissioner of Taxation, the head of the Australian Taxation 
Office to ensure that the administration of the general categories of DGRs is applied impartially. 
Furthermore, since 2013, regulation and registration of charities has been vested in the Austral-
ian Charities and Not-for-profit Commission (ACNC).50 NFPs must register with the ACNC 
before they can be endorsed by the ATO as charities,51 and for charities that wish to become 
DGRs, this registration is an essential pre-requisite.52 Charities therefore face the administrative 
burden of making separate and different applications to two different government agencies.
Section 30–120 of the ITAA97 provides that the Commissioner may use his endorsement 
powers according to Division 426 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 
to endorse DGRs. The endorsement may be for an organisation or for the operation of a 
fund, authority, or institution. This means the Commissioner can endorse the organisation or 
fund itself or endorse the legal person that operates the organisation or fund. Section 30–125 
ITAA97 lists the requirements for application for endorsement. The ATO also publishes guides 
for the NFP sector. These include a Gift Pack to help NFPs to apply for DGR status.
If the organisation or fund does not meet the requirements for the general categories, it may 
apply for a ministerial decision to change the ITAA97 to specifically list it in the legislation as 
a DGR. To commence this process, the organisation must write to the Treasurer (ATO, 2013). 
DGRs listed by name include organisations such as the National Trust and the Australian Sports 
Foundation. The federal government announced that from 1 July 2019, DGRs that are not 
government entities will be automatically registered with the ACNC (O’Dwyer, 2017). There 
is no detail in the media announcement about how this process will occur.
Other benefits of being a charity
A charitable or a not-for-profit social enterprise may access a range of grants specifically avail-
able to promote the mission of those enterprises. However, once the social enterprise becomes 
a for-profit business, these grants will no longer be accessible to them even though the social 
enterprise’s social mission remains in place (Justice Connect, 2014, p. 15).
The limitations of being a charity
As discussed earlier, charities must have a charitable purpose as established under the Charities Act. 
A social enterprise with a mission that does not fall within one of these purposes would therefore not 
qualify. However, a potentially more significant limitation is that charities cannot access investment 
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funds or provide a return to investors from their profits. This is because they must be NFP structures. 
If a social enterprise is run through a proprietary limited for-profit company, it can issue shares to 
investors, who can then anticipate a return on their investment and have some say in the manage-
ment of the company. Chuffed, which is one of the case studies discussed later in this chapter, is a 
good example of where a charity transitioned to a for-profit model for just these reasons.
IV Blending social enterprises and charities: three case studies
Some organisations have managed to work around the previous issues and limitations by either 
carrying on business through a charity or forming hybrid structures or joint ventures with repu-
table charities. In this part, I discuss three case studies. Each case study demonstrates a different 
way of carrying on a social enterprise. The first is a charity, the second a for-profit entity, and 
the third a hybrid of charity and for-profit structures. I have chosen each situation as a case study 
for the following reasons. First, each has been written about, and therefore there is publicly 
available documentation regarding their effectiveness, longevity, or otherwise. Second, each 
either uses a charity or has used a charity in the past to carry on its social enterprise. Third, each 
represents a very different way of approaching the carrying on of a social enterprise.
The first case study is Vanguard Laundry Services, a hospital laundry service that provides 
employment for people suffering from mental illness. The following is a description of this entity:
Vanguard Laundry Services is a social enterprise commercial laundry service based in 
Toowoomba, Queensland, which provides jobs and employment pathways for people 
with a lived experience of mental illness who have a history of unemployment. In 
2019, the third year of business, Vanguard grew rapidly and increased laundry rev-
enues. While it did not make an operating profit in FY2019, this was achieved early 
in 2020.
(Vanguard Laundry Services, 2019, p. 2)
Vanguard operates as a PBI, so it is a charity and DGR, and it partners with several organisa-
tions, both charities, businesses, and government, to access operating funds (Vanguard Laundry 
Services). It operates a commercially successful business, which it can, due to the Word Invest-
ments decision. As a charity, it has the advantages of tax concessions, including income tax 
exemption. As a PBI, donations to it are tax deductible. As discussed in Section III, being a PBI 
allows it to gain DGR status, and therefore any donations from the public are tax deductible. 
This is a major incentive to members of the public to make donations. Being a charity does 
mean that its social mission is limited to charitable purposes. In this case, the social mission of 
Vanguard Laundry Services fits squarely within charitable purposes to assist the disadvantaged. 
The other major limitation of operating through a charity is that Vanguard has limited access 
to investment funds; however, by partnering with business and government, it has managed to 
obtain funds without losing its charitable status. This is through both donations and grants. In 
addition, it is making a profit from the business undertaking.
My second case study found the charity structure too confining and moved to a wholly 
for-profit social enterprise. This organisation is Chuffed. Chuffed.org was established in 2013, 
and its stated mission was to transform and improve the nature of non-profit fundraising. The 
organisation was first registered as a company limited by guarantee, and it was a charity. How-
ever, the desire to grow the business and attract venture capital while at the same time maintain-
ing its social mission resulted in this organisation transforming from an NFP entity to a hybrid 
for-profit business which is incorporated as a proprietary company (Paramanathan, 2016). In 
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this way, it could raise capital through issuing shares and retain its social mission by embedding 
this in its constitution.
Chuffed assists in fundraising for projects that have a social, community, or political cause, and 
promoters can include charities and NFPs (Chuffed, 2018). Chuffed charges fees and also operates 
courses that are fee paying. Chuffed is clearly carrying on a business, and all proceeds of the business 
will be assessable income. Some of the ventures that Chuffed engages with would clearly fit within 
charitable purposes, for example, its many projects raising funds to assist refugees and asylum seekers; 
however, others, such as ‘Ophelia’s broken tail’ (Ophelia’s Broken Tail, 2020), are targeted to assist 
individuals (in this case a rescued greyhound) and therefore unlikely to fit within a charitable pur-
pose or the public benefit (being targeted at a particular animal and its owners). Chuffed is therefore 
free from restrictions regarding its social mission and can more easily gain investment funding than a 
charity; however, it is not income tax exempt, and amounts paid to it are not eligible for a tax deduc-
tion. Another advantage is that operating through a proprietary limited company means it has fewer 
restrictions and reporting requirements than a charity (Nehme and Martin, 2019).
The third case study is a social enterprise that forms a corporate group grouping a DGR 
with a proprietary company. An example of this corporate group structure may be found in the 
STREAT organisations.
STREAT Ltd is a Melbourne-based NFP social enterprise that originally operated café busi-
nesses that employed young homeless Australians. In 2012, STREAT Ltd bought two cafes and 
a coffee roasting business from another social enterprise. To protect itself from liability, it created 
a corporate group that resulted in a hybrid model being created and in which a proprietary lim-
ited company would operate the businesses (e.g., Diagram) (Justice Connect, 2014, pp. 14–15).
Diagram of Hybrid structure of STREAT 
STREAT and Investors own shares in STREAT Enterprises Pty Ltd 
STREAT Enterprises pays profits to STREAT and Investors in the form of dividends 
STREAT Enterprises Pty Ltd
Coffee Shops 
For-profit proprietary company-operates a social enterprise (running the 
two cafes and a coffee roasting business.
STREAT LTD 
NFP and DGR
Investors – for 
profit
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STREAT is exempt on all the income that it receives from STREAT Enterprises Pty Ltd. 
This will be in the form of dividends and, if franked (tax credit on the dividend), STREAT is 
entitled to a refund of the franking credits. The investors will receive taxable dividends. But, if 
franked, can access a franking credit. As it is a charity and a DGR, STREAT can access grants 
and tax-deductible donations. By having a separate entity own the coffee shops, STREAT and 
the investors are protected from liability if the enterprise is unsuccessful. STREAT Enterprises 
can also raise funds through issuing shares.
However, it is important to note that running such a structure can be expensive, as there will 
be a range of legal obligations that need to be complied with, for example, to gain DGR status, 
the organisation must comply with legal rules that are set out in div 30 ITAA97 and be endorsed 
by the Australian Taxation Office. Charities are subject to regulation by the ACNC. This cost 
may stop newly incorporated social enterprises from adopting this model. However, it may be 
a realistic option once the social enterprise becomes successful.
Clearly, all these entities have the characteristics of social enterprises as established in the 
FASES Report (Barraket, Mason and Blain, 2016, p. 3). They are led by an economic, social, 
cultural, or environmental mission consistent with a public or community benefit. In the case 
of Vanguard, this is to provide employment opportunities for people with mental health issues, 
which will in turn keep them out of poverty. Chuffed is a crowdfunding platform that raises 
funds for projects that have a social, community, or political cause. In the case of STREAT, it 
is homeless youths who are being assisted to gain employment, which will ultimately result in 
their being able to find affordable housing and lift them out of poverty. All these organisations 
trade to fulfil their mission, derive a substantial portion of their income from trade, and reinvest 
most of their profit/surplus in the fulfilment of their mission (Barraket et al., 2010, p. 16).
It appears that there is a spectrum in Australia along which social enterprises may move and 
develop but that with some developments in their structure, certain opportunities are either lost 
or gained. At the furthest end of the spectrum is the traditional charity which operates a busi-
ness that is linked to its charitable purpose, such as a charity shop operated by the St Vincent’s 
de Paul Society. Such an entity must be an NFP, have charitable purposes, and be registered 
with the ACNC to gain charitable status and therefore income tax exemption. Moving further 
along the spectrum are also charities, but they operate businesses that are more akin to social 
enterprises, such as the examples of Vanguard and STREAT. If they are NFPs and have solely 
charitable purposes, they can maintain charitable status and income tax exemption. If they are 
also DGRs, donations to them are tax deductible, which is a motivating factor for donations. At 
the furthest end of the spectrum are social enterprises operating as for-profit businesses. They 
are liable to income tax; however, they can also access investment funds and pay profits to inves-
tors. Somewhere in the middle are hybrid structures such as the STREAT example. However, 
this requires legal advice and may be costly to establish and maintain.
V Conclusion
This chapter has established that whilst social enterprises and charities can be very different and 
have very different aims and outcomes, there is also considerable overlap. Many social enter-
prises have social outcomes that are like charitable purposes. For example, Vanguard Laundry 
Services describes itself as a social enterprise, but it is also a charity with the charitable purposes 
of assisting the disadvantaged and alleviating poverty. A social enterprise that puts the environ-
ment at the forefront of all decisions and workplace practices would look very similar to a char-
ity for the promotion of the environment. STREAT is a charity and a social enterprise with the 
aim of educating and assisting the unemployed and thereby ultimately relieving poverty.
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Whilst there is considerable overlap between social enterprises and charities, there are also 
differences and limitations. Charities have the advantage of being income tax exempt and being 
able to access grants from both government and charitable organisations. In some cases, they 
can attract donations that are tax deductible. For-profit social enterprises cannot access these 
advantages; however, they can access investment from shareholders and, if successful, can pro-
vide a return to investors. If a social enterprise operates through a proprietary limited company, 
it has fewer restrictions and reporting requirements than a charity (Nehme and Martin, 2019).
It is possible in Australia to carry on a business through a charity, and this chapter has pro-
vided examples of some charities that have successfully done this. It is also possible that a hybrid 
structure can be established, as was done by STREAT. However, no one structure will suit all 
outcomes, and it is important that entrepreneurs take the considerations discussed in this chap-
ter into account before launching a social enterprise.
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1 Introduction
In Switzerland, legal tax-exempt entities are exhaustively listed in the law (Oberson/Hull, 
2011, p. 41). Such an exemption includes institutions of public or private law to the extent 
that they are dedicated to purposes in the public or cultural interests. It classically applies to 
charity-type entities that are completely “not-for-profit.” On the contrary, “for-profit” entities 
are subject to full corporate tax on profit and capital. In recent decades, in Switzerland, as in 
other developed countries, a hybrid form of entities that blurs the boundaries of the classical 
binary model (for- or not-for-profit) has emerged. For these social entrepreneurs, generating 
revenue (clearly outside profit maximization) from their enterprises is a key driver, ensuring 
financial sustainability, generating returns for investors, and avoiding the need to rely on chari-
table donations or grants. Even if they consider generating revenue, their purpose remains in 
the public interest, as they pursue a mission solely focused on the promotion of public benefit 
purposes.
This hybrid characteristic may, as we shall see under the current Swiss tax environment, pre-
vent them from benefiting from a tax exemption (the hybrid nature of the social entrepreneur 
may also carry some problems in other fields of the tax law, like VAT: see, Vogelsang, 2021, p. 
501). We therefore explore which conditions to fulfill under Swiss tax law and, in particular, 
which could be an obstacle for those social entrepreneurs.
2 Notion of social entrepreneurship and selected model
The notion of social entrepreneurship is difficult to precisely define. Recent research indicates 
that the conceptualization and definition are differentiated under the applicable subject and 
methodology (Shapovalov et al., 2019). Broadly defined, social entrepreneurship is the field 
in which entrepreneurs tailor their activities to be directly tied to the ultimate goal of creating 
social value. In doing so, they often act with little or no intention to gain personal profit (Abu-
Saifan, 2012; Zahra et al., 2008). In this sense, “the social entrepreneur is a mission-driven indi-
vidual who uses a set of entrepreneurial behaviors to deliver a social value to the less privileged, 
all through an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-sufficient, 
or sustainable” (Abu-Saifan, op. cit, 2012).
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As this definition is too broad to examine whether a tax exemption is possible under the 
current Swiss tax environment in each particular case, we arbitrarily select a special model of 
social entrepreneurship among this definition. Indeed, among these social enterprises, there are 
companies in the technology sector that are considering developing devices specifically for the 
world’s poorest countries or that are seeking a medicine for diseases that are only found in such 
countries. These markets are commercially unattractive to ordinary market oriented enterprises 
because customers are not able to pay a high price. Therefore, there is a lack of research and 
development in this sector, which requires a social enterprise to take an interest in it.
These companies generally operate with start-up capital that comes from a donation or pub-
lic or private subsidy. With this seed money, development is conducted, and, in the best case, a 
product is developed and then sold at a price that is just enough to cover research and production 
costs and to enable the company to start researching a new product or drug. It is a production 
and selling model with a minimum margin, clearly having its place in development policies.
3 Current tax environment under Swiss tax law
Under current Swiss tax law, the granting of an exemption for public utility or public service 
purposes is subject to the fulfillment of several conditions. Under the terms of Article 56, let. g 
of the Direct Federal Tax Act (DFT), legal persons pursuing public service or pure public utility 
purposes are exempt from tax on profits exclusively and irrevocably allocated to these purposes 
(first sentence). The law adds the following: “economic purposes cannot, in principle, be con-
sidered to be of public interest” (second sentence). We first examine the general and specific 
conditions (3.1 to 3.2) and then will specifically analyse the prohibition of economic purpose 
(see Section 3.3). The practice of the Swiss tax authorities is reflected in circulars that are avail-
able online (in particular, “2008 Circular”; and the “Circular AFC, 1994”).
3.1 General conditions
The tax exemption of a legal person on the basis of Art. 56 (g) DFT presupposes the fulfillment of 
three cumulative general conditions: being a legal person, the exclusive and irrevocable use of the 
funds, and the effective continuation of the activity in accordance with its articles of association.
3.1.1 Being a legal person
This condition is not as innocuous as it may seem at first glance. Of course, this means that an 
entity applying for exemption must be incorporated in a legal form. The type of entity does 
not matter (foundation, association, or even corporations, like Swiss société anonmye, société 
coopérative, or another type of legal person), provided that it is a legal person. Nevertheless, this 
raises the question of trusts. Thus, if a trust, by definition now governed by foreign law, carries 
out activities that may be exempt in Switzerland, it is not certain that it can be tax exempted; it 
is not a person under Swiss law. However, this condition demonstrates another essential point of 
the Swiss legal framework: the exemption applies to entities and not to activities.
3.1.2 Exclusive and irrevocable use of funds
The funds must be used purely for public purposes. This allocation must be exclusive and 
irrevocable. The means must exclusively serve the exempted purpose and not be used for any 
other statutory purpose. The allocation of funds is irrevocable when the available means cannot 
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be returned to the founders or donors. This destination of the funds must be made in an 
irrevocable provision contained in the founding act of the legal entity. This condition may be 
relatively easy to fulfill for entities that are not owned by anyone. For example, a foundation or 
an association has only assets for the former or members for the latter. In such cases, it is suffi-
cient to state in an irrevocable statutory clause that the funds will revert upon dissolution of the 
entity to another legal person, which will also be exempt for a similar purpose. This condition 
appears to be more complicated for corporations. Indeed, the funds initially entrusted (share 
capital) are remunerated in the form of dividends. According to the Circular AFC 1994, cor-
porations that pursue purely public utility purposes must renounce, in their articles of associa-
tion, distributing dividends and directors’ fees (on this last point, see Section 3.2.2). However, it 
seems that this element mixes the irrevocable allocation of capital and its remuneration. A stock 
company should not be prohibited from remunerating its shareholders, but the articles of asso-
ciation should irrevocably provide that the funds initially made available may not be distributed. 
Furthermore, on liquidation, as in the case of a foundation or an association, the initial capital 
must be allocated to another entity benefiting from a similar exemption.
Regardless of the existence or lack of a limitation to the distribution of a dividend for 
companies, this element should not constitute a significant obstacle for the social enterprise. 
Indeed, in the model chosen previously, the initial financing can be carried out either as “non-
refundable” in the form of a subsidy or a donation or in the form of an equity investment. In the 
first hypothesis, there is, by nature, neither the return of funds to the investor nor remuneration 
for the donation.
In the second hypothesis, it may occur in practice that the investor who wants to invest in a 
hybrid social enterprise is attracted by its social function but nevertheless demands some form 
of remuneration for its funding. In practice, it is often the case that this investor agrees to a 
lower return than they could obtain from an ordinary commercial enterprise but nevertheless 
demands a return. In such cases, it should be noted that the previously mentioned practice of 
the tax administrations presents an obstacle, since it appears to prohibit any payment of divi-
dends. In our view, this prohibition is not related to the principle from which it is supposed to 
derive, which is the irrevocability of the funds allocated to fulfill the statutory purpose. Thus, 
it should not be strictly prohibited to distribute a dividend but rather limit the distribution in 
relation to the outlay so that the “social” investor can still obtain a limited form of remuneration, 
without which they will not make the investment.
3.1.3 Effective continuation of the activity
The purpose according to the articles of association must be the same as that actually fulfilled in 
reality. In this sense, there is no point in indicating as a statutory aim of pure public utility while 
pursuing a different aim, whether it is profit-oriented or not. There is also no actual purpose 
if no activities are carried out at all, and the funds are only hoarded. The prohibition of the 
accumulation of assets has been emphasized in case law (in particular ATF 120 Ib 374 consid. 3a 
p. 377) on the grounds that hoarding removes the altruistic character of the institution in ques-
tion. The question of whether an entity devotes sufficient resources to the pursuit of its statu-
tory aims or, on the contrary, has hoarded its assets, is in principle a question of accounting. An 
operating loss should hence exclude any claim of hoarding (cf. RDAF 2016 II 144 recital 5.5.3). 
In the aforementioned judgment, it was thus held that an entity that allocated 1/3 of its profits 
to its corporate purpose was not deemed to be accumulating assets. Distributing 62,000 fr. in 
a financial year in which a profit of 156,428 fr. was made “cannot represent a fraction out of 
proportion to its means.” If, as indicated by case law, the examination of whether the statutory 
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purpose is actually being pursued is made with regard to the use of profits (and not with regard 
to available assets), the criterion must be deemed to have already been satisfied in the case of a 
loss over a financial year.
This condition is not a specific problematic of social enterprises. Any entity benefiting from 
a tax exemption may prove problematic if the entity cannot immediately start its activity of pure 
public utility.
3.2 Specific conditions
In addition to these three general conditions, in accordance with the text of Article 56. g DFT, it is 
necessary that the legal entity pursue either a public service or pure public utility. Hence, Swiss tax law 
distinguishes between these two types of activities that are eligible for tax exemption, on the one 
hand, activities of pure public utility and, on the other hand, public service activities. Each of these 
types of activities must meet specific conditions; for example, an exemption for an activity of pure 
public utility will not be exempted under the same conditions as a public service activity (Fed-
eral Supreme Court, case 2C_147/2019 of August 20, 2019, and case 2C_740/2018 of June 18, 
2019). According to case law, an exemption based on a public service purpose must be interpreted 
restrictively. A legal person pursues public service goals if it performs tasks closely related to state 
tasks (cf. ATF 131 II 1, recital 3.3. p. 6; case 2C_740/2018 of 18 June 2019, recital 5.3).
Exemption based on the pursuit of purely public utility objectives, which is our selected 
case (see previously 2.), presupposes the fulfillment of two more specific conditions, namely the 
exercise of an activity in the general interest in favor of an open circle of recipients and disinter-
estedness (Federal Supreme Court, cases 2C_484/2015 of December 10, 2015, recital 5.3 and 
2C_251/2012 of August 17, 2012, recital 2.1).
3.2.1 General interest
According to the Circular AFC 1994 (p. 2), activities of charitable, humanitarian, health, eco-
logical, educational, scientific, and cultural nature may be considered to be of general interest. 
For example, public assistance, the arts, science, education, the promotion of human rights, the 
safeguarding of heritage, the protection of nature and animals, and development aid are likely to 
promote the general interest. Public utility presupposes that the entity carries out an activity in 
the general interest (as opposed to selfish individual interests), that is, an activity that serves to 
promote the interests of the community and meets the needs of a significant part of the popu-
lation (Urech, 2017, art. 56 LIFD N 60). It must be an activity that is particularly worthy of 
encouragement and support according to the conception of a significant part of the population, 
one which is carried out for the good of the community. The general interest should not neces-
sarily be confused with the (presumed) interest of a majority of the population, nor with the 
activities normally carried out by the state.
In the leading case, ATF 113 Ib 7 (= RDAF 1990, p. 197) concerning the “Welttheaterge-
sellschaft Einsiedeln,” the Federal Court confirmed that the elements constituting the exemption 
on grounds of public utility must be interpreted strictly and that it does not cover every activity 
enriching the community in cultural terms. In particular, the condition of “public utility” cannot 
be considered as satisfied in the presence of events which constitute a pure entertainment. In addi-
tion, an association of public utility cannot simply be tax exempted because it receives subsidy from 
a public authority. This was also emphasized by the Federal Supreme Court in an old judgment 
(ATF 63 I 316 consid. 1), according to which musical culture is to be considered as being in the 
public interest if the entity makes sacrifices in this respect.
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In a recent decision by the Federal Supreme Court (August  20,2019, 2C_147/2019), the 
tax exemption was requested by a foundation whose aim was, among other things, to promote 
respect for animals, mainly horses, as a symbol of nature. This foundation acquired horses des-
tined for death from their former owners so that the animals could continue their retirement. 
After analyzing the general conditions of the exemption, the Court considered whether this aim 
was truly in the general interest; it held that it was not. It thus stated (recital 5.1) that the con-
cept of general interest should not be understood in a broad sense, which would include any 
activity in the service of the community and would also include all efforts to promote the eco-
nomic or social interests of certain categories of the population. Public-interest goals are those 
that, from the perspective of the community as a whole, are particularly worth pursuing. In this 
case, the Court considers that even if the majority of the population does not share the view that 
the animal is a mere object, the acquisition of a horse is a personal choice, the consequences of 
which remain the primary responsibility of the owners concerned. Therefore, there is no public-
interest goal in the sense of tax exemption. As said previously, the Court stated that public interest 
is not the sum of every community interest but interests that, from a community (as a whole) per-
spective, are particularly worth pursuing. This could not be construed as the addition of all personal 
interests. In any case, this condition should not present a specific problem for social enterprises.
3.2.2 Disinterest
In addition to the objective element of general interest, the notion of public utility includes a 
subjective element, disinterestedness. An activity is disinterested in the sense of tax law only if it 
serves the public interest and is based on altruism, in the sense of dedication to the community. 
Therefore, the notion of pure public utility presupposes not only that the activity of the legal 
person is carried out in the general interest but also that it is disinterested. That is, it requires a 
sacrifice on the part of the members of the corporation or third parties in favor of the general 
interest overriding their own interests. In this sense, it is required that the legal person requiring 
the benefit of Article 56 let. g LIFD acts in a non-profit-making capacity.
First, disinterestedness presupposes a sacrifice for the benefit of third parties in the interest of 
the community. This sacrifice may materialize (i) in the form of financial or work contributions 
made by the institution, the founder, the members of the institution’s board or third parties, or 
(ii) through what may be termed a “collective sacrifice.” That is, the activity is only carried out 
thanks to public or para-public subsidy or even naturally through a mixture of these different 
means. The sacrifice must be significant and allow the institution to have sufficient funds to 
achieve its statutory goals (Urech, op. cit., art. 56, LIFD N 67). In this respect, members of the 
institution’s bodies must perform their duties on a voluntary basis, subject to reimbursement 
of their actual expenses, and/or in the event of activities exceeding the activity of a member 
of the Foundation Board/Association Committee. Hence, because they perform their duties 
on a voluntary basis, the managing members of the legal person are in principle subject to 
reimbursement of their actual expenses (Urech, op. cit. N 67 ad art. 56). This sacrifice must 
be of some importance in relation to the means available to the legal person. The condition of 
disinterestedness presupposes that an institution’s activity is based on altruism.
In a judgment by a lower Court (Fribourg – RDAF 2012 II 569), the Court recognized this 
disinterest by stating
it should be noted on the one hand that the members of the committee and more than 
a hundred volunteers work free of charge. Indeed, sacrifices can be made not only in 
the form of cash, but also through benefits in kind. On the other hand, it is important 
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to note that income is also earmarked to a large extent for the provision of free events 
and the realization of special cultural promotion projects (at least indirect support for 
young talent and youth choirs, original creations, additional offers of introduction to 
musical culture, provision of documentation, etc.). In addition, the applicant appar-
ently aims for the lowest possible price policy, which makes admission to paid concerts 
more accessible to a wide audience.
In the same vein, activity in one’s own interest is deemed to exist when the aim of a foun-
dation is to build high-quality, moderately priced housing and the personal interests of an 
economic group in the construction industry, which is close to it, depend on this activity, even 
though the latter could be a public interest (ATF 114 Ib 277).
The question of disinterestedness does not, in our view, pose a specific problem for social 
enterprises. Admittedly, the remuneration of the board of directors can be an obstacle as soon 
as tax practices require such disinterestedness. However, the 2008 Circular (p. 38) specifies that 
when a member of a foundation board or a committee of an association assumes tasks that 
exceed the ordinary activity of such group from a quantitative or qualitative viewpoint, an 
appropriate compensation may be paid to him. This is particularly the case if a member of a 
board or association committee is primarily engaged in this professional activity and is remu-
nerated in accordance with market rates. In such a case, compensation does not preclude the 
notion of disinterest, since the institution would have to use the services of third parties or per-
form said tasks through a commercial entity. In any case, these would have to be compensated 
in accordance with the professional tariff applicable in the matter according to the nature of 
the assets to be managed or the deployed activity. Thus, the same applies to paid members of a 
social enterprise.
3.2.3 Unlimited circle of potential recipients
The exempt entity must not pursue its own interests, which excludes the exemption for mutual 
assistance institutions. Furthermore, the case law has made it clear that it is not so much the 
statutory purpose that is decisive but the actual use of the funds. Thus, in a recent judgment 
(case 2C_835/2016 of March 21, 2017, in RDAF 2018 II 437), the Supreme Court held that 
the exemption had rightly been withdrawn from an entity which, although having an open 
circle of beneficiaries in its statutes, carried out its activity – a public utility activity – exclusively 
in favor of members of a specific religious community. The funds paid out only went to a very 
limited circle of recipients, that is, institutions with the same religious affiliation. It is decisive 
that the restricted circle of recipients belonging to the same religion is contrary to the necessary 
openness.
The activity cannot generally be aimed at the entire population. However, it must be carried 
out for the benefit of an unspecified part of the population and is therefore aimed at an open 
circle of potential recipients (Urech, op. cit., art. 56 LIFD N 64). This is not the case if the circle 
of recipients is too narrowly limited (e.g., limited to a family circle, members of an association, 
or persons exercising a specific profession) (Circular AFC 1994, p. 3).
3.3 What about the prohibition of economic activities?
Once all conditions described previously are met, one should nevertheless control that the 
entity is not pursuing an economic goal (see especially Lideikyte Huber, 2019). This condition, 
which is probably the most important for our subject, that is, in relation to social enterprises 
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as defined previously, is the prohibition for an exempted enterprise to pursue an economic 
purpose. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no direct case law in relation to social 
entrepreneurship under Swiss tax law that has been confronted with this condition. Neverthe-
less, the prohibition of a predominant economic activity has increased in some cases, notably 
linked to cultural activities.
Generally speaking, a profit-making purpose exists when a legal person, in a situation of real 
competition or economic monopoly, commits capital and labor to obtain a profit and demands 
a remuneration for its services similar to that normally paid in economic life. The exemption of 
such an entity would be contrary to the principle of economic neutrality, even if the institution 
were to devote itself exclusively to an exempt purpose or to allocate the entire profit to this 
purpose (Circular AFC 1994, p. 3; Urech, op. cit., art. 56, LIFD N 74).
Thus, the criterion of market participation relates more to the services provided (out-
bound) (and, if applicable, invoiced) by the entity than to those it acquires (inbound). This 
condition is the corollary of the selflessness and sacrifice that the latter implies. However, 
this condition does not require that persons carrying out activities in favor of the institu-
tion should not be remunerated. An exception to this principle is the case of secondary 
gainful employment or when the aims of pure public utility are paramount. An economic 
activity (even with a certain lucrative purpose) is permissible if it remains subsidiary and 
of secondary importance in relation to the activity of general interest or serves to achieve 
the goal of public utility (Circular AFC 1994, p. 4). In this case, economic activity must 
be a means and not an end in itself. Hence, not every gainful activity leads to the refusal of 
tax exemption, provided that this activity does not constitute the final goal of the institu-
tion. Gainful activity, which remains subsidiary to altruistic activity, does not preclude an 
exemption based on public utility. For example, a meditation center dedicated to Buddhist 
practice and meditation can accommodate participants and provide courses by charging 
for its services, including a share of administrative costs, at cost price even if the entity is 
tax exempted (Supreme Court of August 17, 2012, case 2C_251/2012). The activity may 
either be subordinate or allow the legal entity to have the means to be allocated to the 
exempt purpose.
In this context, a recent case law of the Swiss Supreme Court, Supreme Court July 22, 2020, 
published in ATF 146 II 359, is very interesting. International School A in Geneva sought a 
full tax exemption, arguing that it served as a public service objective. The Supreme Court 
rejected its claim, stating that an exemption due to the pursuit of a public service purpose is, 
in principle, excluded when a legal person pursues mainly profit-making purposes, even if 
these simultaneously serve public-interest purposes. In any case, the exemption can only be 
admitted if the profit-making purposes are secondary to the main public service purpose of 
the legal person. Thus, an exemption, even partial, is excluded when the legal person pursues 
profit-making purposes that exceed a certain measure (see a previous case in ATF 131 II 1). 
The principle of competitive neutrality must be respected in the case of a lucrative activity of 
the legal person. However, this principle only applies between legal persons in comparable situ-
ations of competition.
The court responded to the appellant’s argument that making a profit was a matter of 
medium-term survival for any public school and that it should therefore be distinguished from 
the goal of doing so. While it is certain that a private school must aim for minimum profit-
ability to survive, the presence of deferred profits is an element to be taken into account in the 
weighting of the criteria established to determine the granting of a tax exemption. Indeed, a 
school run as a commercial enterprise with the aim of making a profit cannot benefit from it. 
Hereafter, we examine what can be derived from this case law.
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4 (Deemed) obstacles for our selected social enterprise model
4.1 Obstacles
As previously mentioned, a profit-making activity occurs when a legal person, in a situation 
of real competition or economic monopoly, commits capital and labor to obtain a profit and 
demands a remuneration for its services similar to what is normally paid in economic life. The 
exemption of a commercial enterprise is thus contrary to the principle of economic neutral-
ity. Even if it devotes itself exclusively to an exempt purpose or uses the entire profit for that 
purpose, for tax purposes, such enterprises must be treated as those that do not pursue a disin-
terested purpose (Urech, op. cit., N 77 ad Art. 56). There is nevertheless a commercial purpose 
if the natural persons behind the legal person seek gain through the latter.
In the social enterprise model described previously, several phases need to be distinguished. 
First, an initial research phase, which is made possible by an initial foundation. In this phase, 
the device to be developed or medicine is developed and researched. In this phase, there is no 
production or sale. Let us take the example of an X-ray machine that is designed to withstand 
power cuts, high temperatures, and high dust levels and must be transportable. It is already 
questionable whether the imperative of Swiss tax law (“Economic goals cannot in principle be 
considered to be in the public interest”) is respected at this early stage. The aim of the entity is 
to produce and sell its products, which is clearly an economic goal that, according to the law, 
cannot be construed as a public interest.
In fact, the law makes it clear that the purpose of an entity cannot be an economic one. Thus, 
the different phases of research and production should not change the purpose of the company. 
In our hypothesis, the purpose of the social enterprise is to find, develop, produce, and eventu-
ally deliver technological solutions specific to developing countries or impoverished communi-
ties. Therefore, regardless of the phase of research or development, the prohibition of economic 
purposes could prevent our company from benefiting from the exemption. This consequence 
is even truer in the following phases, especially when selling to third parties. Admittedly, this 
sale is made with a very small margin, allowing only basic financing for future researches. It is 
thus relatively clear that the activity described previously cannot benefit from a tax exemption 
for the purpose of pure public utility, the conditions of which are strictly described in the law.
However, why is it important that such social enterprises benefit from a tax exemption? 
There are several reasons. First, the entity itself is tax exempt, allowing it to lower its production 
costs. Indeed, this exemption covers both profit and capital taxes. Second, the exemption also 
allows a deduction for donations made by an entity in favor of legal persons that are exempt 
from tax due to their public service or public utility purposes up to a maximum of 20% of 
the income. In other words, as soon as the social enterprise would be exempt, all entities that 
finance it without any counterpart are likely to deduct this donation up to 20% of the tax-
able profit from their own tax. To obtain a private subsidy, in particular to finance the start 
of research, the exemption presents an element facilitating the search for funds for the social 
enterprise, since it ensures the funder a reduction in its own taxes. There is at least one final 
very important element in Switzerland linked to the status of tax-exempt entities. It is a type of 
label that indicates recognition of its utilitarian status by the state. It is a form of “State stamp” 
that guarantees that the entity receiving it brings some kind of special utility through its activity. 
If one considers these three consequences of the tax exoneration status, the last one is probably 
the most important.
By definition, the social enterprise does not aim to maximize its profits, and it is practically 
certain that it will only cover its expenses in the medium term, at least, without making large 
Raphaël Gani
544
profits. Therefore, it is not very interested in the direct effects of tax exemptions. As far as its 
financers are concerned, it may certainly be interesting to be able to deduct a donation from a 
tax burden, but the entities that are willing to finance social enterprises are themselves generally 
exempt entities and therefore do not pay tax. It is therefore really this quasi-“State guarantee” 
effect that is most interesting for social enterprises such as in the model examined herein. This 
will serve to make it easier for them to find funding, and it is not uncommon for funders to 
require such an exemption to grant a subsidy.
In summary, given the state of the Swiss tax context, the prohibition to pursue an eco-
nomic purpose expressly mentioned in the law constitutes a major obstacle to any granting of 
a tax exemption for the social enterprise model. As currently understood in the practice of tax 
administrations in Switzerland, the selected model of social enterprise would probably not be 
granted a tax exemption. However, this situation is regrettable, since it prevents the develop-
ment of this type of social enterprise, which is of great social importance.
4.2 Are these obstacles only deemed?
However, it could be argued that the prohibition of the economic purpose should not be 
directly applied to some types of social enterprises. If we examine the scholarly writings and 
the latest case law of the Federal Court as indicated in its latest ruling on a privately owned 
school, it is striking that the prohibition of an economic purpose must above all avoid disrupting 
competition between enterprises that are in comparable situations. This can also be viewed as in 
line with the issue raised in the OECD report (2020), Taxation and Philanthropy, OECD Tax 
Policy Studies (ch. 2.3.3 p. 31), according to which commercial operations run by non-profit 
entities have an unfair advantage when competing with for-profit organizations offering the 
same or similar goods and services. It is clear that the prohibition of an economic purpose must 
prevent a company subject to tax from having to compete on the market with a competitor that 
is exempt from tax. If the prohibition did not exist, the exempted company would have lower 
production costs (by the amount of the net tax burden) than its competitors. This is also why 
the prohibition of economic activity in the context of tax exemption is always linked to com-
petition. A profit-making activity can only occur when legal persons are in a situation of “real 
competition.” This is also the main concern of courts that have to decide cases of tax exemption 
in the field of culture. Exemptions for cultural purposes should not disrupt competition with 
non-exemptible entities operating in the entertainment field.
However, in our social enterprise hypothesis, there is, strictly speaking, no market. What 
is at stake in the production of a medical device for developing countries is that the market by 
definition is not interested in it due to lack of economically interesting outlets. Since poten-
tial customers cannot pay a market price, development and production must be carried out 
by a social enterprise. If there is no market, there can be no disruption of competition. More 
specifically, a company that produces “ordinary” medical devices is not in competition with 
our social enterprise because not only does it not sell the same type of products, but above 
all, it is also not present in the same market. Thus, assuming that there is a market, only social 
enterprises can, by definition, be in that market. There is therefore ultimately no disruption 
to free competition or to the market. An enterprise that produces ordinary medical devices is 
not in a comparable situation with a social enterprise that develops a medical device specific 
to developing countries.
It follows that the reason for which the legislator established the profit motive as a categori-
cal prohibition of tax exemption does not allow this prohibition to be applied to our social 
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enterprise model. In other words, it seems that the sentence in Art. 56 DFT stating that “eco-
nomic purposes cannot in principle be regarded as being in the public interest” should not 
prevent social enterprises considered herein from obtaining a tax exemption. As long as such 
enterprises do not disrupt competition between market players in similar situations, there is 
no need to prohibit economic purposes. The current prohibition of economic activity should 
therefore be substituted with a “level playing field test” in which the tax administration should 
control that the exemption requesting entity is interfering with legal persons in comparable 
competitive situations. This point seems to be compatible with the current legal text, since 
the law makes it clear that the prohibition is only applicable “in principle.” In this respect, the 
legislator did not want to prohibit all economic activity, and the substitution of the prohibition 
of an economic activity by a “level playing field test” allows this exception to be in line with 
the current law.
The current practice of tax administration can hence appear to be too restrictive compared 
to the ratio legis. This is also derived from the most recent Supreme Court’s case law, which 
tends to avoid disrupting competition between entities in comparable situations. However, we 
have sought to demonstrate that certain activities carried out by certain social enterprises do not 
disrupt this competition and thus should be tax privileged.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, it must be noted that in the current Swiss tax environment, a social enterprise in 
the sense defined herein will face several obstacles before obtaining a tax exemption. In particu-
lar, these are the prohibition of economic purposes, as currently applied in Switzerland, which, 
in our view, does not take sufficient account of the hybrid nature of social enterprises. As has 
been proposed, if one accepts that the legal prohibition of economic purposes for tax-exempted 
entities ultimately serves to protect competition between similar actors, this obstacle could be 
removed without the need to change the law. Under this hypothesis, the social enterprise, like 
the model herein, which does not disrupt competition, that is not in competition with other 
enterprises not exempted from taxes should not be prohibited from having a “hybrid” economic 
purpose.
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IMPACT OF THE OVERLAP 
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INITIATIVES ON THE 
PHILANTHROPY TAX REGIME 
IN FRANCE
Philippe Durand, Dominique Lemaistre and Laurence de Nervaux
Introduction
In most European countries, philanthropy has seen rapid and conspicuous development over the 
past 20 years. This is notably visible in France, where donations from individuals subject to tax 
deductions increased by 70% between 2006 and 2016. Moreover, two-thirds of the foundations 
in France have been created since 2000.1 This phenomenon, whereby private actors voluntar-
ily collaborate with public authorities to serve the ‘common good,’2 enables a synergy between 
vastly different cultures and different parts of society.
However, at the same time, some actors serving the public interest can be driven to include 
a degree of profit-making activities to complement their resources or to achieve their goals, 
depending on the challenges they face and according to the mechanisms described in this study.
The hybridisation of economic models among an ever-increasing number of actors is not 
unique to France and is well documented in international academic research.3 In practical 
terms, such hybridisation led to a profound upheaval in the major categories of reference in 
social and economic spheres. Consequently, the redistribution of roles between the public and 
private sectors blurred the traditional boundaries between commercial activities and activities 
that fall within the scope of public interest. This unavoidable evolution of economic models 
corresponds to regulations aiming to define clear boundaries between public and commercial 
interests.
The difficulties in distinguishing commercial and public-interest activities discussed in this 
chapter pertain to European competition regulations, which limited state subsidies in accord-
ance with the de minimis rule.4 However, this problem is highly apparent in the French context 
because, after decades of restricting public-interest financing to the state and public authorities 
nearly 20 years ago, France decided to encourage private generosity by providing significant tax 
benefits.5 The rapid growth of philanthropy, or the transfer of proceeds from economic success 
to serve the common good, is a notable indicator of the redistribution of roles between the 
public and private sectors, increasing the number of interactions between actors with diverse 
interests and the complexity of the resulting models.
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Using the French context, this chapter aims to describe this gradual increase in poros-
ity between economic activities and public interest by reviewing the background of such 
developments and the problems they pose. It also outlines proposals for adapting the defi-
nition of public interest to specific economic activities to restore consistency between the 
law and the official guidelines by administrative authorities and avoid depriving organisa-
tions and actors of scarce funding while addressing some of the most acute problems facing 
today’s society.
I Transformation of relationships between non-profit actors,  
the commercial world and the public sector
The deep transformation of the relationships between various actors supporting public interest 
and their economic models is rooted in the socio-historical context of the last quarter of the 
20th century. The Glorious Thirties, the 1970s and the 1980s failed to remove poverty and 
exclusion mainly because of two factors of economic relegation. The first is the growing urban-
isation and the desertion of some rural areas which created geographical pockets of poverty. The 
second is the consequence of unemployment induced by successive economic downturns after 
the oil crises became both a cause of economic hardship and social relegation.6 Consequently, 
job creation for long-term unemployed became a matter of public interest, with a special focus 
on the causes of poverty and relegation; that is, the vulnerabilities of territories and individuals.7 
While this two-fold effect is prevalent even after 40 years, the challenge today is to establish 
clearly defined criteria to identify these vulnerabilities.
This socio-historical context, which is shifting the dividing line between the economic and 
social spheres, is simultaneously experiencing a radical reorganisation of public-interest finan-
cing. An increasing complexity is visible in two areas: a change in the ecosystem, with the mul-
tiplication and diversification of donors, and a change in their relationships with public funders, 
with the nature of the funding transforming from a subsidy into a form of service rendered for 
value.
A Developments in the public sector
1 Growing scarcity of public resources and the recourse  
to private funding
In the past 20 years, there has been an inexorable rise in the cost of some of the state’s sovereign 
missions (e.g., education and healthcare, with the increased duration of compulsory schooling,8 
the ageing of the population9 and the growing technology of healthcare). In this context, phi-
lanthropy has become a popular method of financing or supplementing the financing of certain 
initiatives.
Thus, in search of additional revenues, the French legislature frequently extended the list 
of bodies or the scope of actions that may benefit from philanthropic contributions to sectors 
which have been almost entirely financed by public money until now.10 This is notably the case 
for higher education, research, culture and heritage protection. Apart from direct legislative 
intervention, public bodies also created ‘friends’ associations’11 to raise funds while providing 
donors with tax benefits for voluntary contributions. The scarcity of resources thus encourages 
public bodies to compete with associations and foundations in the philanthropic fundraising 
‘market’.
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2 Transformation of subsidies into a service subject to public  
procurement rules
Over the past 30 years, public actors have had to review the scope and methods of their actions 
under the combined effect of shrinking public resources and a decrease in public subsidies.
Initially, associations receiving regular subsidies were generally considered de facto representa-
tives of the state or some other public entities responsible for public missions. However, this 
situation met increasing criticism because it was viewed as a kind of ‘debudgeting’. This con-
nection between subsidised associations and the state is challenged for two main reasons.
• First, the purpose or scope of subsidies and the methods of assessing the achievements of 
such subsidies lack sufficient regulation.
• Second, the European Union (EU) rules regarding fair competition oblige public entities 
to select their suppliers and providers through a tender process. But if one of the bidders 
receives subsidies, this would be considered an infringement to fair competition rules. 
Therefore, entities receiving public subsidies should frequently be excluded from public 
tenders.
Thus, supervisory bodies also contributed to the rise in the suspicion of public subsidies granted 
to public-interest actors.
To comply with the EU’s principles of fair competition, public authorities gradually dressed 
subsidies as a price paid in exchange for services within the framework of public tenders. How-
ever, private companies can also bid on these tenders. This approach is likely to attract both asso-
ciations and new service providers from the commercial world. National surveys on associations 
indicate a major change in their resource structure between 2005 and 2011: a decrease in public 
funding from 34% to 25%, combined with an increase in public procurement from 17% to 24%.12
Therefore, public authorities treat associations as service providers, which has serious conse-
quences for their economic and fiscal models. What was previously a matter of public interest is 
shifting towards a traditional commercial relationship, which now falls within the ambit of the 
legal and fiscal rules specific to such a relationship.
B Developments in the commercial sector
Parallel to the changes concerning public actors, the relationship between the commercial sec-
tor and public interest is also evolving.
1 Progressive institutionalisation of corporate philanthropy
In France, the first foundation, Fondation de France, was created in 199013 based on the Ameri-
can model. Twenty years after its emergence, a corporate foundation, the new ‘American uncle’ 
of the French non-corporate service sector, led to private donors supplementing and taking 
over state action. Private actors in the field welcomed this development, as they constitute an 
additional source of revenue. However, these actors are in an awkward position between profit 
and not profit. This is a characteristic of what we refer to as the hybridisation of their model.
Regarding the dividing line between commercial activities and activities for the ‘common 
good’, despite undertaking a public-interest mission lying beyond the scope of the company’s 
corporate purpose, in the early 1990s, corporate giving was deductible from the company’s 
Durand, Lemaistre, and de Nervaux
550
revenue, similar to its expenses. This provision, which is still applicable in most developed 
countries,14 helps to blend philanthropy into the company’s business model. In France, this 
regime changed in 2003,15 following which philanthropic activities were incentivised through 
tax deductions rather than being deducted from the companies’ taxable income. This devel-
opment emphasises the benefits of public subsidies. It had consequences when the ‘doctrine 
of causes’, a historical framework defining the scope of tax shelters according to the charity’s 
objectives and formed the cornerstone of philanthropy in France, was shaken up by European 
competition law, as discussed in the next section.
2 Corporate social responsibility and the introduction of an endogenous 
corporate mission of public interest
Article 116 of the Law of 15 May 2001 on ‘the new economic regulations’16 proposed that 
companies listed on the stock exchange must include information regarding their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities in their annual reports.
Thus, the associations gained new funding, accompanied by new constraints. Already pro-
viding services to the state, they now became service providers for CSR activities with similar 
consequences for the complexity of their economic and fiscal models (e.g., the obligation to 
implement specific analytical accounting, known as ‘sectorisation’, or even to create subsidiar-
ies, among others).
The case of Simplon, examined further in the following, provides a telling example of 
the impact of the rise in CSR on the relationship between companies and public-interest 
operators. This social business offers free training in digital professions to low-income 
and marginalised people. Thus, companies trying to improve the diversity of their human 
resources, an important component of CSR reporting, no longer remain donors but have 
also become the clients of Simplon by sponsoring the remuneration of the trainers for those 
lacking solvency.
With the increasing demand for private intervention in social issues, CSR and sustainable 
development have become key arguments for companies to resist the scrutiny and short-term 
views of some of their shareholders; therefore, to improve their position in this challenge, some 
American companies found a solution that includes such social issues in their corporate pur-
pose, with the B-corp (benefit corporation) status. Hiller’s study describes the context of the 
development of this new model in the United States,17 while Reiser analysed its advantages and 
limitations.18 In France, this movement culminated in the Plan d’action pour la croissance et la trans-
formation des entreprises [Action Plan for Corporate Growth and Transformation] Law enacted on 
21 May 2019, which created mission-based companies. However, unlike in the United States,19 
this new model does not have a legal status in France.
II ‘Public interest market’: A grey area
A Historical subjectivity in the concept of public interest
The concept of public interest, which is sometimes portrayed as universal and unchallengeable, 
is, conversely, truly subjective. This observation was not new. For instance, sociologist Chloé 
Gaboriaux analyses the recognition of the public utility of associations and foundations by the 
Conseil d’Etat (French Supreme Administrative Court) during the Third Republic (1870–1914). 
When the Conseil d’Etat was just renewed by the republicans and thus sought to establish its 
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legitimacy and the impartiality of its opinions, Gaboriaux nevertheless demonstrates the impact 
of the subjectivity of the members of the highest administrative court, their value systems and 
their personal relations.20
Beyond personal positions and ideological convictions, the borders of public interest saw his-
torical and geographical fluctuations, depending on the context. Notwithstanding some points 
of stability, such as solidarity and access to education and healthcare, some causes appear, while 
others disappear. However, in the long term, the scope of public interest increased significantly. 
For example, in France, access to culture, once accepted as a privilege of the powerful, was 
included as a public interest cause since the end of the 19th century,21 whereas the environment 
was included within its scope only in the past few decades.22
Another example of this volatility of public utility in France can be found in the early 20th 
century idea of ‘municipal socialism’. This historical concept was analysed by the legal expert 
Katy Sibiril in an article on the notion of interest in French administrative law.23 In this case, 
some local elected officials utilised public utility to justify their intervention to address the 
inadequacy of the private sector in meeting the requirements of trade, management of water or 
electricity and distribution services or public transport in rural areas. This interventionist stance 
was justified only because the local authorities deemed it necessary to satisfy universal needs. 
From this perspective, market competition, which has considerable significance today in the 
assessment of public interest, was not considered a relevant criterion.
While the present economic logic is returning to the concerns of public interest, unlike 
municipal socialism, it operates less as an aim but rather as a means of integrating citizens 
through work. Thus, the desire to promote integration by enabling people to find employment 
is clearly in the public interest and therefore within the scope of philanthropy.
B New distinction in economic markets between the public  
and private sectors
New private markets are now developing in sectors that were financed mainly by public author-
ities 50 years ago. An ageing and dependent population is a key example of this development. 
The ‘silver economy’ is now a regular economic market which is estimated at over 130 billion 
euros24 and is regulated in France by a supply chain contract since 2013.
These changes led to a fundamental evolution in the concept of public interest. Today, the 
distinction is no longer determined by the sector of intervention and the purpose of activity 
by applying the ‘doctrine of causes’ but by other criteria such as the fragility or vulnerability 
of populations and territories. This new mechanism is probably more relevant, as it allows for 
a more specific consideration of the needs of the target population rather than predetermining 
eligible areas. However, defining its boundaries remains challenging.
C The social and welfare sectors as alternatives to the liberal  
capitalist model
In 2014, the French legislature recognised a specific field of the economy known as the économie 
sociale et solidaire [social and welfare economy (ESS)], composed of four types of organisations: 
mutual companies, cooperatives, associations and foundations25.
The 2014 law also introduced Entreprise Solidaire d’Utilité Sociale [Welfare Company of Social 
Utility (ESUS)] accreditation for ESS companies serving the public interest or public util-
ity that have democratic governance and reinvest most of their profits in the company. This 
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accreditation entitles the holder to specific resources, including welfare-based employee savings 
schemes and tax reductions.
The ESUS accreditation aimed to urge private investors to encourage greater participation 
in corporate projects with social utility through tax incentives. Their investments have a pur-
pose other than profit, enabling the creation of an environment for developing welfare-based 
enterprises. However, this accreditation led to a new form of hybridisation by bringing together 
associations, mutual companies, cooperatives and even traditional companies seeking to dis-
tinguish themselves from other commercial enterprises. Despite the intent to create a credible 
alternative to the global capitalist enterprise, this new mechanism further increased the com-
plexity in defining a scope that is already fragmented and composite, as organisations eligible for 
accreditation (associations, mutual companies, cooperatives and foundations) have very different 
missions and operations.
The diagram (e.g., Stages 1, 2 and 3) shows three successive stages of the growing complexity 
of the relations and flows (donations or investments) between the actors in the French context: 
those traditionally working under general interest vs. private interests. In the middle, the grey 
area represents the ‘public interest market’, where private actors integrate some of their eco-
nomic activities to serve the public interest.













Figure 30.1  Stage 1: Traditional actors on the spectrum from public to private interests
Stage 2: Three-stage legislative evolution of the interactions between economic 
actors and the public-interest sphere
• 1990 law: creation of the corporate foundation marking the emergence and recognition of the private 
donor to supplement and take over state action
• 2001 law: introduction of CSR, an endogenous corporate mission for public interest
• 2014 Law on Social Economy: The legislature-recognised economic field, ESS, composed of four 
types of organisations: mutual companies, cooperatives, associations and foundations.
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Stage 3: New models and complex flows defining the grey area of the ‘public inter-
est market’
• Private resources funding public interest
• New economic models (hybrid social enterprises, benefit corporations)
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Figure 30.3  Stage 3: New models and complex flows defining the grey area of the ‘public interest market’
The proposals formulated in this chapter focus on shifting the limit of public interest to the dot-
ted line in the middle to include hybrid social enterprises, according to the conditions described 
in the subsequent sections.
Durand, Lemaistre, and de Nervaux
554
III History of the tax regulatory framework in France
A Set of rules and three definitions
This section interprets the eligibility criteria of the philanthropic shelter tax regime according 
to its regulatory context. For this, we delineate three relevant concepts and their associated 
rights arising from the Conseil d’Etat case law, tax legislation and the official guidelines of the 
tax authorities.
1 Public utility
This concept is part of the official guidelines of the administrative authorities, recognised by 
the case law of the Conseil d’Etat, upon the proposal of the Ministry of the Interior.26 Public 
utility depends theoretically and explicitly upon the concept of public interest, as mentioned in 
Articles 200 and 238 of the French General Tax Code. Nevertheless, in practice, the reconnue 
d’utilité publique [recognition as being of public utility (RUP)], a body regulating public utilities, 
rarely casts doubt on whether an activity constitutes public interest.
2 Public interest
This second concept also follows the official guidelines of the administrative authorities,27 in this 
case, tax authorities, which are under the Ministry of Finance.
• Donations to public interest, which form the basis of the philanthropy tax regime, are regu-
lated by Article 200 of the General Tax Code. It entitles donors to a 66% reduction in income 
tax equal to the gift amount, subject to a ceiling of 20% of the taxable income. The reduction 
is applicable to donations and payments, including the express abandonment of income or 
proceeds made by taxpayers domiciled in France to organisations listed under Article 4 B.
• Article 238 bis of the General Tax Code adapts Article 200 to corporate giving by defining 
an almost identical scope. The reduction of up to 60% of the donation amount is applicable 
to income or corporation tax (and 40% reductions for donations over 2 million euros).
• In terms of the wealth tax, Article 885–0 V bis A of the General Tax Code relating to the 
Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune [Solidarity Tax on Wealth] reproduced in Article 978 for the 
Impôt sur la Fortune Immobilière (Real Estate Wealth Tax) defines a narrower scope which is 
different from Article 200 of the General Tax Code. In this case, the applicable reduction 
is 75% of the donation amount, with a ceiling of 50,000 euros.
3 Social utility
Law No. 2014–856, regarding the social and welfare economy, provides a precise definition of 
social utility. Under this law, enterprises (i.e., associations, foundations, cooperatives and mutual 
companies) whose objectives satisfy at least one of the following three conditions are recognised 
as being of ‘social utility’.
• Their aim is to support economically and socially vulnerable people or those with adverse 
personal circumstances or who need social or socio-medical support due to their health 
condition. Such persons may be employees, users, clients, members or beneficiaries of this 
enterprise.
The philanthropy tax regime in France
555
• Their aim is to help prevent exclusion and inequality in healthcare, socio-economic and 
cultural matters to provide education to citizens, particularly through community centres, 
to protect and support social and territorial cohesion.
• They contribute towards sustainable development in its economic, social, environmental 
and participatory dimensions to support energy transition or international solidarity, pro-
vided that their activities are related to one of the aims mentioned in 1) and 2).
After public interest, social utility has its own doctrine of causes with no reference to public 
interest, the tax treatment or the fiscal framework of philanthropy.
The two fiscal frameworks do not fall within the ambit of the same set of rules. Nevertheless, 
while they overlap, they do not duplicate each other and have a fundamentally distinct set of 
provisions. The concept of social utility is split between the Conseil d’Etat’s conception, which 
de facto presumes public interest, and the definition of the ESUS accreditation regulated by the 
ESS law, which differentiates itself from the official guidelines of the tax authorities. In practice, 
this split is particularly confusing for public-interest funders who must determine whether the 
organisation seeking involvement is eligible for philanthropic tax benefits. Nevertheless, in 
France, the distinction between for-profit and non-profit remains fundamentally determined 
by its tax law.
B Official guidelines of the administrative authorities and their limits
1 Introduction of the ‘4Ps’ rule
In the mid-1990s, the administrative authorities’ guidelines28 originally intended to settle a tax 
investigation problem regarding the criteria for determining cases when associations and assimi-
lated organisations should be subject to commercial taxes, namely corporation tax, value-added 
taxes (VAT) and territorial economic contributions. However, the concept of public interest 
was subsequently extended to regulate the scope of the philanthropy tax regime.
The boundary between taxed and non-taxable activities was previously based on the ‘doctrine 
of causes’ and depended upon the aim of the organisation’s activities: pursuing a philanthropic 
goal and conducting a for-profit economic activity. From a tax perspective, this teleological 
approach was a source of great insecurity as inspectors were obligated to question the tax status 
of non-profit organisations upon finding that their management used similar methods or activi-
ties that placed the organisation in competition with private enterprises. Thus, the doctrine 
of causes was unsuitable for determining the scope of commercial taxes, despite its coherence 
with the statutory definition of the scope of donations eligible for the philanthropic tax benefits 
provided by Articles 200 and 238 bis of the General Tax Code. The objective or cause of the 
organisation prevails while establishing the scope of non-profitability, determining fiscal liability 
and delineating the right to benefit from the philanthropy tax regime. The presumption of eli-
gibility for the philanthropy tax regime is, therefore, almost systematic when the funds received 
by the organisations fall within the ambit of this doctrine.
However, Articles 200 and 238 of the General Tax Code do not define the concept of public 
interest. They refer to the official guidelines of the tax authorities, which have three conditions 
to be satisfied beyond the cause doctrine:
• disinterested management,
• widespread beneficiaries that are not limited to a small circle of people, and
• non-profitability.
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From the outset, the semantic conflation of profitability with economic activity blurs the rea-
soning of eligibility for philanthropic tax benefits.
When the guidelines were introduced, the public-interest sector had a limited scope of 
activities requiring donations. Therefore, non-profitability was analysed solely in terms of the 
volume of economic activity. As far as their economic activities were not preponderant, organi-
sations would not be liable for commercial taxes and would remain eligible for philanthropic 
benefits.
However, by the late 1990s, the EU imposed new rules in line with the policies of com-
petition law.29 The non-profit sector was affected by the state subsidies received, especially 
those received indirectly through philanthropic tax incentives. France was particularly affected 
because, since 1995, such incentives took the form of a tax reduction rather than a simple 
deduction from the taxable base. A law enacted in 200330 significantly increased tax reductions. 
However, this measure also led to the suspicion of French non-profit organisations benefiting 
from the philanthropic regime.
Therefore, the analysis of non-profitability is not limited to the preponderance of economic 
activity. The French tax administration devised a ‘4Ps’ grid, which is better suited to verify 
whether an association with commercial activities competes unfairly with other businesses.31 
This inquiry focuses on the following aspects:
• Product: Does the ‘product’ offered cater to a need that is either not catered to or inad-
equately catered to by the market? In other words, the product offered should not be avail-
able in any market where it can be procured under similar terms, which is tantamount to 
ensuring that there is no risk of competition with businesses in the commercial sector.
• Public: Do the target beneficiaries (‘public’) suffer from any difficulties (unemployment, 
disability, age etc.) that make them worthy of philanthropic interest and justify the grant of 
special benefits?
The beneficiaries in this case refer to direct ‘clients’ or recipients of the activity and not those 
for whom the activity could be a source of employment.
• Prices: If the product is not gratuitous, are the prices significantly below the market prices 
(beyond the effect of tax exemptions), such that they facilitate access to similar services for 
people in difficulty?
• Publicity: Advertising (‘publicity’) or, more broadly, marketing and sales methods that lead 
to the presumption of competition, may only be used to appeal to the public’s generosity 
while considering the type of target beneficiaries the organisation serves. The purchase of 
advertising inserts, sale of a catalogue on newsstands or participation in trade shows may 
call into question the non-commercial nature of the organisation’s approach. However, in 
the age of digital communication and social media, this criterion is losing relevance.
The non-profit nature of the organisation should be assessed by all four criteria and not just 
based on one criterion. Furthermore, the presence of competition must be assessed ‘in concreto’, 
implying that a product or service would not be considered competitive if it has no competitors 
within a radius of several dozen kilometres. However, this concern has been undermined by the 
fact that, in the case of VAT, the EU Court of Justice subsequently retained the importance of 
competitive potential rather than the presence of actual competition.32
As European law applies to circumstances of hybridisation of for-profit and non-profit mar-
kets, reasoning based on unfair competition prevails over the doctrine of causes.
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This new dominant paradigm to assess the scope of public interest has several limitations, as 
seen in the case of Montessori schools. Although the law states that private education is a mat-
ter of public interest, in 2013 and 2014, the local authorities of the tax administration consid-
ered one Montessori school in the form of an association ineligible for philanthropy. This was 
because this school had three other Montessori schools operating as limited liability companies 
(and therefore subject to commercial taxes) within a radius of less than 30 km. Thus, these 
schools fell within the same ‘geographical area of attractiveness’33 defined under the tax code.
The liberal approach characterising Europe favours private companies’ interventions in pub-
lic-interest issues. Despite public service constraints, European tax laws prefer to apply the 
normal rules of competition, even if it means allowing private companies to assume any public 
service obligations while scrupulously preventing it from becoming a means of distorting mar-
ket competition. This approach exemplifies the regulation on the ‘Services of General Eco-
nomic Interest (SGEI)’.
2 Public interest and the exclusion of profit-making activities: 
A nonlinear movement
The official guidelines issued by the tax authorities favoured the 4Ps rule in certain cases. For 
instance, these guidelines resolutely protect the disability sector against scrutiny over unfair 
competition. The administrative authorities accept that Etablissements et services d’aide par le travail 
[establishments and assistance services through employment] would not fall within the scope of 
competition34 distortion because the additional costs incurred by disabled workers significantly 
exceed the advantages of the tax benefits. Moreover, disabled workers are considered beneficiar-
ies or the ‘public’ of the 4Ps and not clients to whom the products or services are sold.
In other cases, the doctrine of causes prevailed. France was an early campaigner in Europe 
to exclude the cultural sector from a competitive analysis. Recently, this exception includes the 
audio-visual and press sectors.
Conversely, some early examples of the rejection of the doctrine of causes due to evidence 
of competition include a decision by the tax authorities based on an old case of the Conseil 
d’Etat relating to the Association de médecine du travail du département de la Mayenne.35 In 
this case, it was held that any activity aimed at providing services to businesses is necessarily 
‘profit-making’. Accordingly, administrative instructions state that for an activity to remain of 
public interest, its main purpose must not consist of applying resources to enable enterprises 
to conduct or delegate tasks to third parties that are either compulsory or useful to their main 
activity. In other words, to determine its tax regime, an organisation conducting non-profit 
operations may assume a non-profit role solely to satisfy tax eligibility based on the identity of 
the beneficiaries and the services it provides.
3 Weaknesses of the hybrid model
• Supremacy of guidelines over tax law.
• After the introduction of the ‘4Ps’ analysis grid, rather than revising the law or putting the 
doctrine of causes into perspective, France chose to allow two different types of reason-
ing to coexist. This led to the paradoxical application of the current tax law guidelines in 
France.
• Distorted link between commercial taxes and ineligibility for philanthropic tax benefits.
• Ideally, the shift from a purpose-based definition of non-profitability to that based on an 
absence of competition with businesses should have ended the connection between the 
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payment of commercial taxes by non-profit organisations and their ineligibility for philan-
thropic tax benefits. However, the tax authorities did not foresee the consequences of this 
evolution and continued to restrict the eligibility of non-profit organisations engaged in 
profit-making activities to enjoy philanthropic tax benefits. In some respects, this amounts 
to considering that the mere fact of conducting an activity for payment implies that it is no 
longer of public interest.
• Stopgap proposal of the sectorisation of profit-making activities with ‘preponderance’ of 
the non-profit-making activity.
The sectorisation of profit-making activities could enable organisations to retain philanthropic 
tax benefits without creating a separate legal person, provided that the donation amount is not 
utilised for profit-making activity and does not act as a subsidy that could distort competition. 
However, sectorisation is only suitable for organisations that can clearly distinguish and isolate 
an economic activity that is not preponderant from other activities.
Several conditions must be satisfied to be allowed to sectorise an economic activity:
• Separation of commercial activities from non-profit-making activities: An organ-
isation’s activities must correspond to services of a different nature, which does not exclude 
an element of complementarity as far as the two activities are effectively separated.
• Principle behind sectorisation: According to the 16 February 199936 instruction, sec-
torisation must be based on a ‘principle of a physical separation or individualisation of 
the relevant activities in relation to the association’s main activity, notably with respect to 
the place of production, human and material resources and investments’. However, the 
tax instruction of 18 December 200637 specifically curtailed this requirement and allowed 
associations to apply the same resource simultaneously if they could justify it based on the 
association’s purpose (e.g., achieving social diversity). In such cases, the separation of activi-
ties may be limited to the accounting aspect by separating the expenses and incomes from 
various activities or for various kinds of beneficiaries.
• Preponderance of non-profit-making activities: An association must not be guided 
by commercial activities, while its non-profit-making activities must remain materially pre-
ponderant. This distinction must be assessed to reflect the true weight of the association’s 
non-profit activity, such as by measuring the ratio of commercial income to an association’s 
overall financial resources (operating income, subsidies, subscriptions, donations, etc.), 
without a set percentage of margin of appreciation set by tax authorities. However, the 
example published in the 1998 tax instruction indicated a ratio of 75% of resources from 
the non-profit sector to 25% of commercial income. However, additional criteria may be 
considered, such as the magnitude of voluntary work and the number of staff and resources 
devoted to profit and non-profit-making activities, respectively. This preponderance was 
assessed based on a multi-annual average.
• Isolating income and expenditure of exempt activities vs. taxable profit-making 
activities: Cost accounting should enable the isolation of income and expenditure relating 
to the sectors of exempt activities and taxable profit-making activities, where each sector 
must bear its incumbent costs. This requires the allocation of operating resources to either 
the profit or non-profit sector. In the case of assets for common use, a distribution mecha-
nism must be devised.
The application of sectorisation is particularly complicated for small organisations that are often 
underequipped to deal with legal issues. Therefore, it does not resolve the requirements of 
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organisations whose purpose depends on a predominant economic activity or whose economic 
activity would be considered extremely similar to the other activities.
The Simplon case: an emblematic hybrid
The Simplon project, a socially conscious welfare enterprise, was co-founded by Frédéric Bardeau 
in 2013. It leverages digital technology to promote the inclusion of disadvantaged or vulnerable 
groups (migrants, older adults, people with disabilities) while supporting the digital transformation 
of organisations. Simplon.co is a network of socially aware and inclusive factories that offer its cli-
ents free training in digital technical professions, both in France and abroad.
Through its 109 factories worldwide, Simplon has already trained more than 11,476 people, 
78% of whom are job seekers, with a positive outcome rate of 67%38 after training.
The project is widely recognised for providing free training to insolvent persons on a large 
scale. The majority of the project’s budget now comes from public funds. However, to remain 
economically feasible, the Simplon project was forced to create three organisations in the course of 
its development:
• An ESUS-approved simplified limited liability company, a commercial body positioned in 
a market consisting of companies seeking to improve their recruitment diversity in the age of 
CSR and that of the state, local authorities (regions) and the Employment Agency. This entity 
brings together ESS investors and receives public subsidies and issues invoices in its capacity as 
a training organisation for third-party funders (trainees are not liable for payment).
• An endowment fund, with the capacity to collect donations and issue receipts for receiving 
tax deductions. The endowment fund supports activities that are complementary to training 
such as social support, French lessons for refugees, mobility assistance, housing assistance and 
drop-out prevention scholarships.
• An association that receives grants from donors that cannot be channelled through the 
ESUS-approved SAS or the endowment fund and that which assist a part of the support activi-
ties, excluding training and occupational integration.
According to Frédéric Bardeau, ‘this forced hybridisation of our model is the source of many 
complications in the management of the project, particularly in terms of governance and human 
resources’. In a 2019 report by the Court of Auditors that addressed this emblematic case,39 the 
state expressed its regret regarding the Simplon Foundation directly subsidising free and inclusive 
activities conducted by the ESUS-approved SAS as an umbrella foundation but without proposing 
a solution nor questioning the impact of Simplon’s actions.
IV Proposed changes and methods
The proposals in this chapter have a three-fold objective: (i) to modernise the concept of 
public interest to adapt it to new circumstances (as in other periods of its history), (ii) to 
make administrative authorities’ official guidelines comply with the law and (iii) to urgently 
simplify the work of public-interest operators and protect their access to essential resources 
to fulfil their missions.
Durand, Lemaistre, and de Nervaux
560
A Constraints
The regulation and application of public interest face two types of constraints.
The first constraint is the predominance of the objective of public interest in conducting an 
activity. This primarily involves ensuring that the pursuit of gain (‘profit’) does not determine 
the activities of the relevant organisation. Tax authorities already mostly consider this constraint 
by requiring disinterested management, executive remuneration and the democratic function-
ing of the organisation. While some adaptations might seem appropriate, the present rules for 
non-corporate bodies do not require any significant modifications.
The second constraint is the rules pertaining to competition and state subsidies. Measures to 
prevent unfair competition due to philanthropic tax benefits are not unique to Europe. From a 
global perspective, it is also one of the recommendations of the 2020 OECD report on taxation 
on philanthropy (recommendation 6.6.2).40 As discussed earlier, the guidelines of the French 
Tax administration give paramount importance to the numerous and stringent constraints of 
European law.
However, the general opinion supports upgrading the doctrine of causes upheld by Articles 
200 and 238 bis of the General Tax Code, accounting for the constantly evolving list of subjects 
eligible for philanthropy, which corresponds not only to the structural changes in society but 
also to economic cycles. Consequently, the assistance provided to a small business after a natural 
disaster or in a severely underdeveloped region would not be analysed in the same way as under 
‘normal’ circumstances in a developed country.
• Analysis of competition: A complex undertaking
The analysis of competition is a complex process. Competition may arise directly because of 
the actions of the organisation seeking benefits from the philanthropy tax regime if its services 
overlap with those provided by commercial enterprises. However, indirect competition occurs 
when the benefits enjoyed by the organisation are transferred, notably in the form of lower 
prices, to businesses to conduct activities to meet their aims.
Tax authorities’ comments redefining the condition of non-profit organisations regarding 
‘commercial taxes’ already attempted to define competition. They emphasised that competition 
can be effective in certain geographical areas and not in others and is limited to certain catego-
ries of products or services while being assessed based on their target clients.
However, these efforts were partly undermined by the European courts’ adoption of a stricter 
approach, particularly regarding VAT. In 2017, the Court of Justice focused on the potential 
rather than the effective nature of competition regarding this tax.41 This allowed non-profit 
organisations to compete with each other or with companies, despite operating in different 
geographical areas. Similarly, it obliged the tax authorities to adopt a more restrictive approach 
to VAT exemption on services provided by an entity, especially created by non-profit organisa-
tions, for their own needs (Article 261 B of the General Tax Code). This is a real concern for 
these associations.
The lesson to be drawn from these regulations is that rather than using the theoretical analysis 
of competition to define the tax treatment of transactions, it would be better to try to use the 
exceptions or derogations provided in the sixth VAT Directive, particularly Article 13. By relying 
too much on the commentaries of the FTA, taxpayers, including non-profit organisations, cannot 
be sure that such commentaries could not be challenged by the EU Commission or by the ECJ.
• De minimis subsidies42
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The European regulation regarding subsidies compatible with the internal market provides 
some criteria for restricting and relaxing subsidies. The latter is applicable for de minimis subsi-
dies that may be granted to small enterprises or for amounts that are considered too insignificant 
to distort competition.
These regulations enabled the introduction of an amendment on support offered to small 
businesses (cf. Article 238 bis (4) of the General Tax Code regarding the grant of financial subsi-
dies to or equity investments in SMEs). This provision was adapted to the European regulation 
on state subsidies compatible with the internal market, which required prior approval from the 
European Commission.
Article 17 of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 65/2014 of 17 June 2014, mentioned in 
Article 238 bis (4) of the General Tax Code, concerns organisations accredited for paying certain 
financial subsidies or providing non-financial support services, such as advice to SMEs. This 
reference provides a framework for utilising financial subsidies by targeting new investments or 
acquiring assets from organisations. Financial subsidies must not be remunerated, whereas the 
assessment of their value should treat support services as donations in kind.
The conditions for accreditation notably require the relevant organisations to be man-
aged in a disinterested manner, the subsidies to satisfy the criteria for de minimis aid and the 
amount paid each year to an enterprise to not exceed 20% of the organisation’s resources. 
This example illustrates the complexity of the system and the hierarchy of EU rules over 
national regulations.
Moreover, it seems clear that the benefits of the provisions favouring philanthropy and the 
nature of organisations’ non-profit activities are obsolete. Therefore, it warrants a revision of 
this connection along with the overly global and systematic approach of the tax authorities 
towards organisations that complement the activities of profit-making enterprises, particularly 
associations intermédiaires [intermediary associations], entreprises d’insertion [job seekers’ support 
organisations or the ESUS].
• Organisations’ use of legal forms other than associations
The provisions of Articles 200 and 238 bis of the General Tax Code could be applied 
to companies, even in the cultural or research sectors. Organisations operating in various 
sectors, including those supporting integration through employment, housing and depend-
ent support, constitute different forms, such as cooperative companies or even traditional 
corporations. However, legal statutes should not justify, by themselves, exclusion from the 
scope of the philanthropy tax regime.
Accordingly, a parallel could be drawn with Article 107 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which deter-
mines the areas of subsidies considered compatible with the internal market, as listed in the 
following.
• Promoting economic development of regions with an abnormally low standard of living or 
serious under-employment.
• Facilitating the development of certain economic activities or regions without altering 
trade conditions to be contrary to public interest.
However, the preference for a corporate form rather than an association should not be used 
to circumvent non-profit constraints, such as in terms of remuneration. If allowed to conduct 
an activity in public interest, companies must pay special attention to their governance and 
resource use, particularly regarding the devolution of assets in the event of cessation of activity.
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The problem of executive remuneration or the risk of a diversion of philanthropic funding 
due to a privileged relationship between organisations and the beneficiaries of their actions 
must be scrutinised. However, this should apply to all organisations, regardless of their legal 
form.
B Proposals
The following proposals aim to arrive at a better definition of the scope of public interest in the 
context of Articles 200 and 238 bis of the French General Tax Code and the official guidelines 
of the administrative authorities. However, these proposals do not seek to extend the scope of 
the benefits provided by other legislation, nor do they deviate from the principles laid down by 
European law.
From this standpoint, we outline the following proposals for redefining the scope of public 
interest:
1 Three cumulative conditions to be presumed by public interest actions
We propose a three-stage approach to overcome the difficulties of assessing public interest. 
Moreover, in addition to the organisations mentioned previously, organisations that satisfy the 
following cumulative conditions should be eligible for the philanthropic regime:
• Disinterested governance
The first eligibility condition is to ensure that the organisation’s governance is disinterested.
As discussed, Articles 200 and 238 of the General Tax Code already apply to certain compa-
nies. However, an increasing number of actors in public interest tend to opt for a commercial 
status to benefit from institutional investments, which, in the current context, deprives them of 
the potential for philanthropy that could aid their missions.
Following the progress made by associations and foundations, other social and welfare organ-
isations (SSEs) should also diversify their resources as far as possible to guarantee disinterested 
governance.
• Purpose of the project
Once the first condition is satisfied, the next step is to analyse the purpose of the project. If the 
conditions relating to the purpose of the project are not satisfied, then the project will not be 
eligible.
We propose that the terms ‘family’, ‘social’ and ‘humanitarian’ in Articles 200 and 238 bis 
of the General Tax Code be interpreted based on the relevant tax instruction. To clarify the 
scope of these terms, such instruction could draw inspiration from the terms used to define 
the scope of ESUS accreditation (vulnerable people, prevention of exclusion, maintaining and 
strengthening territorial cohesion, the preservation and development of social cohesion, etc.). 
Alternatively, they could also refer to the definitions proposed by organisations representing 
the philanthropy sector as part of the working group set up in 2013 on the territoriality of 
donations led by Gilles Bachelier.43 These proposals are inspired by the definitions of social and 
medico-social action provided in Articles L116–1 and L312–1 of the Code of Social Welfare 
and Families.44
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Additionally, the conditions listed in III B 1 should apply not only to project operators but 
also to those who support them by providing advice and/or funding, provided they operate 
under public interest and from the non-profit sphere.
Furthermore, advocacy, when distinguished from the promotion of particular interests, 
should be considered a means of conducting actions related to a public interest cause and should 
therefore benefit from the rights attached thereto, provided that the cause served is eligible 
for philanthropic benefits. Some prominent and effective examples of public interest actions 
include Greenpeace’s work to protect the environment or the fight against AIDS.
• Non-competitive nature of the project
The third issue is determining whether the nature of the project is non-competitive. This 
requires considering the three criteria (product, public and price) currently used by the tax 
authorities. The activity must offer a product or service that meets specific social needs.
• For products or services that are currently unavailable in the territory under consideration, 
a time-based criterion should be introduced to support activities in their starting phase. 
For instance, some activities that are useful in terms of public interest may be unprofitable 
before finding a suitable economic model.
• If the first condition is not satisfied, then the product or service must be offered at a price 
that is accessible to people in vulnerable circumstances.
• If the first two conditions are not satisfied, then the product or service should be provided 
to a group that does not currently have access to it (e.g., job seekers’ support organisations 
helping people obtain employment).
2 Invert and clarify the conditions for implementing sectorisation
Rather than limiting economic activities, philanthropic resources should be sectorised to indi-
cate the charges that they may legitimately cover. This mechanism would help to justify the 
additional costs incurred by a public-interest organisation when acting for people in difficulty 
or in deprived areas, thereby promoting transparency while avoiding any suggestion of unfair 
competition.
Nevertheless, the limitations of sectorisation listed earlier remain relevant and require further 
review. The conditions under which philanthropic funds can be traced should be specified. 
For example, regarding job integration initiatives, there is continuity between activities that 
are part of a competitive sector and those that are not. The same beneficiary may require both 
professional and social support, one of which may not fall under philanthropy. Thus, the funds 
intended for each of these activities may, in part, be common, yet administrative authorities are 
reluctant to address such situations. Therefore, a regulatory framework for the sectionalisation 
of activities should also consider such situations.
3 Amending the statutory provisions of the general tax code relating  
to philanthropy
As provisions on philanthropy are not limited to the official guidelines of the administrative 
authorities, the statutory provisions of the General Tax Code relating to philanthropy may 
require an amendment.
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Given the risk of interference with EU law, some aspects of the contemplated amendments 
must be subject to prior notification to the European Commission. This precaution should be 
taken to forcing organisations that may have already received donations to reimburse the funds 
received in the event of a dispute. Dealing with such risk is all the more important to avoid 
donors’ tax benefits from being challenged.
Frequently updating these regulations would be cumbersome because of the nature of the 
notification procedure. Therefore, the content and scope of the regulatory mechanism should 
be clarified before they are notified to the European Commission. This would require a detailed 
consultation and documentation outside legislative text, which could also serve as a basis for the 
administrative authority’s comments on the proposed mechanisms. Such a process would also 
provide an opportunity to address two concerns: the challenge of anticipating answers to poten-
tial questions asked by the European Commission and the challenge of clarifying the rights and 
obligations of the organisations concerned.
Conclusion
The analysis of public and commercial interests overlaps with the economic and social spheres. 
Additionally, the increasing complexity of the relationships between public, private commercial 
and private non-profit actors highlights two main ideas:
• Public interest is and will necessarily remain a partially subjective concept, whose scope 
cannot be set in stone and whose interpretation would vary with time and space. There-
fore, it is important to adapt its scope to societal evolution and train administrative authori-
ties to interpret the same while understanding the true constraints and motivation of the 
actors in the field.
• The idea that the preponderance of profitable economic activities within an organisation 
should inevitably imply its for-profit motives, and therefore its incompatibility with public 
interest is largely erroneous.
Although this chapter focused on the French context, it is clear that methods to improve the 
untenable situation faced by several public-interest operators must be explored at both the 
national and European levels. To start, subsequent efforts should focus on identifying and ana-
lysing these issues in various national contexts to identify similar issues and converging action 
policies.
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Foreword 
Philanthropy plays an important role in most countries, providing private support to a range of activities for 
the public good. This differentiates the sector from government initiatives (i.e., public action for the public 
good) and profit-based initiatives (i.e., private action for the private good). Almost all OECD countries 
provide some form of preferential tax treatment for philanthropy. Entities with a philanthropic status typically 
receive tax relief directly in relation to their activities, while both individual and corporate donors to these 
entities are often able to receive tax incentives that lower the cost of giving. This report represents one of 
the most comprehensive attempts to catalogue the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and philanthropic 
giving across 40 OECD member and participating countries. 
In many countries these tax preferences have been in place, unaltered, for many years despite changing 
social conditions. For example, when income tax exemptions for philanthropic entities were introduced in 
many countries around the beginning of the 20th century, there were relatively few eligible entities and 
most of their income was in the form of donations. Over time, the philanthropic sector has grown and many 
philanthropic entities now rely significantly on self-generated income, including business and investment 
income. Large philanthropic foundations have also become more prevalent, placing greater focus on the 
degree of influence of large donors on the use of taxpayer funds. Meanwhile, the increasingly global nature 
of many policy challenges – such as environmental and public health concerns (including the COVID-19 
pandemic) – raises questions regarding the appropriate tax treatment of cross-border giving. These 
developments suggest that a review of the tax rules in place in many countries may be warranted. 
This report provides a detailed review of the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving 
in 40 OECD member and participating countries. The report first examines the various arguments for and 
against the provision of preferential tax treatment for philanthropy. It then reviews the tax treatment of 
philanthropic entities and giving in the 40 participating countries, in both a domestic and cross-border 
context. Drawing on this analysis, the report then highlights a range of potential tax policy options for 
countries to consider. 
The report, which has been carried out as part of a collaboration between the OECD and the Geneva 
Centre for Philanthropy, draws heavily on country responses to a questionnaire on Taxation and 
Philanthropy by country delegates to Working Party No. 2 on Tax Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
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Executive Summary 
Most countries provide some form of preferential tax treatment for philanthropy. Entities with a philanthropic 
status typically receive tax relief directly in relation to their activities, while both individual and corporate 
donors to these entities are typically able to receive tax incentives that lower the cost of giving. This report 
provides a detailed review of the taxation of philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving in 40 OECD 
member and participating countries, and draws on this analysis to highlight a range of potential policy 
options for countries to consider. 
The report first examines the various arguments for and against tax concessions, highlighting that there is 
no single generally accepted rationale for the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy. Economic theory, 
for example, provides a limited rationale for preferential tax treatment of philanthropy where there is under-
provision of a public good or where there are positive externalities associated with the philanthropic activity. 
Additional arguments include that the surplus of a philanthropic entity is different in nature to income (and 
therefore beyond the scope of the income tax base), and that philanthropic giving strengthens civil society 
and so should be encouraged. Arguments against tax concessions for philanthropy highlight, for example, 
their fiscal cost, as well as potential distributional and democratic concerns. In particular, richer taxpayers 
often receive larger tax incentives than poorer taxpayers. Meanwhile, as a tax incentive effectively 
reallocates tax revenue towards the favoured philanthropic entity, richer taxpayers who make larger 
donations may gain a disproportionate influence over how public resources are allocated. 
The report then considers, in turn, the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and of giving to philanthropic 
entities, before considering cross-border issues. For an entity to receive philanthropic status and the 
associated tax benefits, it typically must meet “not-for-profit”, “worthy purpose”, and “public benefit” 
requirements, as well as being subject to other administrative and oversight requirements. Not-for-profit 
requirements prevent any form of profit distribution. Worthy purpose requirements specify the types of 
activities eligible for support – most commonly welfare, education, scientific research, and healthcare. 
Public benefit requirements typically stipulate that the benefit must be open to a sufficiently broad section 
of the public.  
Most countries surveyed provide concessionary income tax treatment for approved philanthropic entities. 
The report identifies two approaches commonly taken: the first is to exempt all (or specific) income, and 
the second is to consider all forms of income taxable, but to allow the entity to reduce its taxable income 
through current or future reinvestments towards the fulfilment of its worthy purpose. Countries following 
the first approach generally exclude non-commercial income (received gifts or grants) from the tax base. 
Approaches to dealing with commercial activities and the income generated from those activities, diverge. 
A common approach is to exempt commercial income that is related to the worthy purpose and tax 
unrelated commercial income. A number of countries also provide preferential VAT treatment to 
philanthropic entities, and concessions regarding various other taxes (e.g. property taxes). 
All the countries surveyed also provide some form of tax incentive to encourage philanthropic giving to 
eligible entities, although the generosity and design of the incentives vary. In the large majority of countries 
surveyed, donations are deductible from an individual’s taxable income. Other countries offer tax credits 
instead and, in some cases, the donations of individuals are matched by government. Furthermore, as 
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long as there is a sufficient nexus with earning income, most countries consider corporate sponsoring of 
philanthropic entities a deductible business expense. Additionally, most countries that levy inheritance or 
estate taxes generally provide preferential tax relief for philanthropic bequests. Restrictions on the size of 
tax incentives for giving are common and vary across countries. Some countries limit the size of the tax 
incentive by adopting a cap of a fixed amount, while others adopt caps based on a percentage of the 
donor’s income or tax liability, and some adopt a combination of both. To limit the cost of matching 
schemes, countries set the rate at which the relief may be claimed by the receiving philanthropic entity. 
Lastly, the majority of countries that incentivise cash donations of individuals also incentivise non-monetary 
donations. 
Regarding cross-border philanthropy, the report finds that, beyond the European Union, there is little tax 
support provided by countries for cross-border giving. With regard to philanthropic entities that operate 
across borders, beyond the European Union, most countries do not provide tax relief for foreign 
philanthropic entities operating domestically. However, many countries do allow domestic entities to 
operate abroad without losing their tax-favoured status, though they are potentially subject to additional 
restrictions or reporting requirements. 
Drawing on the preceding analysis, the report highlights a number of key issues that countries face in the 
design of their tax rules for philanthropy. First, the report highlights that countries need to ensure that the 
design of their tax incentives for philanthropic giving is consistent with their underlying policy goals. For 
example, countries that are particularly concerned about restricting support to areas prioritised by 
government may wish to consider limiting the breadth of their eligibility criteria. Countries particularly 
concerned about the distributional impact of the tax incentive, may wish to provide a tax credit, which will 
ensure that the same proportionate tax benefit is provided to taxpayers irrespective of their income level. 
Conversely, countries with a progressive personal income tax system wishing to provide a greater incentive 
to richer donors in order to maximise total giving, may wish to provide a tax deduction. 
Second, countries should reassess the merits of providing tax exemptions for the commercial income of 
philanthropic entities, at least insofar as this income is unrelated to the entity’s worthy purpose. In 
undertaking such a reassessment, countries will need to consider the added complexities associated with 
distinguishing between taxable (i.e. unrelated commercial income) and exempt income and weigh the 
additional compliance and administrative costs against the pursuit of competitive neutrality. Furthermore, 
countries that currently provide an exemption should consider fully subjecting philanthropic entities to the 
VAT.  
Third, the report identifies a number of ways countries can look to both reduce the complexity and improve 
the oversight of the concessionary tax regimes for philanthropy. These include: applying the same eligibility 
tests for both philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving; imposing a minimum value threshold for a 
non-monetary donation to receive a tax incentive; establishing a publicly available register of approved 
philanthropic entities; introducing an annual reporting requirement; implementing a combined oversight 
approach (e.g. tax administration and independent commission); clearly differentiating between corporate 
donations and sponsorship; improving data collection and tax expenditure reports; implementing limits to 
fundraising expenditures; implementing rules that limit certain types of operating expenses of philanthropic 
entities; and limiting the remuneration of staff, managers, and board members of philanthropic entities.  
Finally, the increasingly global nature of many policy challenges – such as environmental and public health 
concerns (including the COVID-19 pandemic) – may require countries and institutions to cooperate across 
borders. In this context, there is merit in countries reassessing whether there may be some instances 
where equivalent tax treatment should be provided to domestic and cross-border philanthropy. To address 
concerns regarding oversight, countries could impose equivalent requirements as apply in the domestic 
philanthropy context, or require additional checks before providing tax-favoured status. 
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This introductory chapter provides background information on the 
characteristics of the philanthropic sector, to set the scene for the detailed 
analysis of the taxation of philanthropy that follows in the report. It also 
provides an outline of the overall structure of the report.  
Philanthropy plays an important role in most countries, providing support for a wide range of private 
activities and initiatives in support of the public good. This differentiates the sector from government 
initiatives (i.e., public action for the public good) and profit-based initiatives (i.e., private action for the 
private good). The use of the tax system as a means of supporting philanthropy is widespread. In addition 
to government grants and the contracting of services to philanthropic entities (“direct support”), 
governments typically support philanthropy (“indirectly”) in two ways, by providing: tax incentives for giving 
to philanthropic entities; and (full or partial) exemptions of philanthropic entities from various taxes. 
In many cases these tax preferences have been in place, unaltered, for many years despite changing 
social conditions. For example, when income tax exemptions for philanthropic entities were introduced in 
many countries around the beginning of the 20th century, there were relatively few eligible entities and most 
of their income was in the form of donations. Over time, the sector has grown, often in response to out-
sourcing by governments of welfare and other services, and many philanthropic entities now rely 
significantly on self-generated income, including business and investment income. There have also been 
significant developments in research on the optimal design of tax incentives for giving that highlight, for 
example, a range of efficiency and distributional concerns. Furthermore, the increasing prevalence of large 
philanthropic foundations has placed greater focus on the degree of influence of large donors on the use 
of taxpayer funds. Finally, the global nature of many of the challenges facing the world such as 
environmental, medical research, and public health concerns (such as the COVID-19 pandemic), raises 
questions regarding the appropriate tax treatment of cross-border giving. 
In light of these developments, a reassessment of the tax rules in place in many countries may be 
warranted. To aid such reassessment, this report provides a detailed review of the taxation of philanthropic 
1 Introduction 
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entities and philanthropic giving in 40 OECD member and participating countries, and highlights potential 
reform options for countries to consider. The report draws heavily on country responses to a questionnaire 
on Taxation and Philanthropy (“the questionnaire”) by country delegates to Working Party No. 2 on Tax 
Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs.  
This introductory chapter provides a range of background information on the philanthropic sector to aid the 
analysis to follow. It first discusses the exact meaning of philanthropy adopted in this report. It then 
highlights a number of key aspects of the philanthropic sector, before discussing the size of the 
philanthropic sector both in terms of the number of philanthropic entities and the total amount of giving to 
the philanthropic sector. Finally, the chapter provides an outline of the structure of the report to follow. 
1.1. Defining philanthropy 
The term “philanthropy” does not have a universally accepted meaning. The term derives from the Greek 
“philanthropia” meaning “love of humanity” or “love of gods for humanity”. Various attempts have been 
made to define the term. Dictionary definitions include “the gratuitous transfer of funds or other property 
for altruistic purposes”.1  
Scholars from different disciplines have also sought to define the term, referencing various concepts such 
as the “voluntary” aspect of philanthropy, the notion of “generosity” or concern for others, or the application 
of private resources for public purposes. For example, philanthropy has been described as: 
 voluntary giving, and voluntary association, primarily for the benefit of others; (Payton, 1988[1]) or  
 the voluntary giving and receiving of time and money, aimed (however imperfectly) towards the 
needs of charity and the interests of all in a better quality of life; (Van Til, 1990[2]) or 
 the use of personal wealth and skills to benefit specific public causes. (Anheier, 2005[3]) 
All of these ‘definitions’ are concerned with the act of giving, but the term philanthropy is also used in other 
contexts. For example, philanthropy has been defined as being ‘one form of income of non-profit entities’ 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1992[4]), equating philanthropy with donations and moving the focus from the act 
of giving to the recipient entities. The term is also sometimes used to refer to the entities themselves, with 
one researcher noting that the term ‘typically applies to philanthropic foundations and similar institutions’ 
(Anheier, 2005[3]). 
Another definition is: ‘The planned and structured giving of money, time, information, goods and services, 
influence and voice to improve the wellbeing of humanity and the community’ (Philanthropy Australia[5]). 
This definition is narrower in that it emphasises planned and structured giving, but also notes different 
types of gifts and includes the notion of community. It has also been said that ‘being a philanthropist is 
synonymous with the largesse of rich individual donors’ (Anheier and Leat, 2006[6]). But generally the term 
is considered broad enough to cover all giving. 
Despite the divergent uses of the term, there are some common threads: philanthropy is concerned with 
‘giving’, and with ‘worthy’ and ‘public’, rather than private, causes. Several definitions refer to giving time 
as well as money. There is also a reference to ‘altruism’ or concern for others in some of the definitions, 
but this is not generally part of any definition that specifies which entities or activities qualify for tax relief. 
Indeed, some entities exist for the benefit of their members rather than for the broader public benefit e.g. 
a disability support group. The focus then, is on ‘gifting’ – the making of voluntary contributions without 
expectation of return; and on identification of appropriate worthy causes or purposes. This identification of 
‘worthy purposes’ is likely to differ between jurisdictions and is an important part of the tax framework in 
this area.  
In some common law countries, the term ‘charity’ is often used to refer to the act of giving or to the entities 
that either enable or carry out activities. Although the terms charity and philanthropy are sometimes used 
   11 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
entities and philanthropic giving in 40 OECD member and participating countries, and highlights potential 
reform options for countries to consider. The report draws heavily on country responses to a questionnaire 
on Taxation and Philanthropy (“the questionnaire”) by country delegates to Working Party No. 2 on Tax 
Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs.  
This introductory chapter provides a range of background information on the philanthropic sector to aid the 
analysis to follow. It first discusses the exact meaning of philanthropy adopted in this report. It then 
highlights a number of key aspects of the philanthropic sector, before discussing the size of the 
philanthropic sector both in terms of the number of philanthropic entities and the total amount of giving to 
the philanthropic sector. Finally, the chapter provides an outline of the structure of the report to follow. 
1.1. Defining philanthropy 
The term “philanthropy” does not have a universally accepted meaning. The term derives from the Greek 
“philanthropia” meaning “love of humanity” or “love of gods for humanity”. Various attempts have been 
made to define the term. Dictionary definitions include “the gratuitous transfer of funds or other property 
for altruistic purposes”.1  
Scholars from different disciplines have also sought to define the term, referencing various concepts such 
as the “voluntary” aspect of philanthropy, the notion of “generosity” or concern for others, or the application 
of private resources for public purposes. For example, philanthropy has been described as: 
 voluntary giving, and voluntary association, primarily for the benefit of others; (Payton, 1988[1]) or  
 the voluntary giving and receiving of time and money, aimed (however imperfectly) towards the 
needs of charity and the interests of all in a better quality of life; (Van Til, 1990[2]) or 
 the use of personal wealth and skills to benefit specific public causes. (Anheier, 2005[3]) 
All of these ‘definitions’ are concerned with the act of giving, but the term philanthropy is also used in other 
contexts. For example, philanthropy has been defined as being ‘one form of income of non-profit entities’ 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1992[4]), equating philanthropy with donations and moving the focus from the act 
of giving to the recipient entities. The term is also sometimes used to refer to the entities themselves, with 
one researcher noting that the term ‘typically applies to philanthropic foundations and similar institutions’ 
(Anheier, 2005[3]). 
Another definition is: ‘The planned and structured giving of money, time, information, goods and services, 
influence and voice to improve the wellbeing of humanity and the community’ (Philanthropy Australia[5]). 
This definition is narrower in that it emphasises planned and structured giving, but also notes different 
types of gifts and includes the notion of community. It has also been said that ‘being a philanthropist is 
synonymous with the largesse of rich individual donors’ (Anheier and Leat, 2006[6]). But generally the term 
is considered broad enough to cover all giving. 
Despite the divergent uses of the term, there are some common threads: philanthropy is concerned with 
‘giving’, and with ‘worthy’ and ‘public’, rather than private, causes. Several definitions refer to giving time 
as well as money. There is also a reference to ‘altruism’ or concern for others in some of the definitions, 
but this is not generally part of any definition that specifies which entities or activities qualify for tax relief. 
Indeed, some entities exist for the benefit of their members rather than for the broader public benefit e.g. 
a disability support group. The focus then, is on ‘gifting’ – the making of voluntary contributions without 
expectation of return; and on identification of appropriate worthy causes or purposes. This identification of 
‘worthy purposes’ is likely to differ between jurisdictions and is an important part of the tax framework in 
this area.  
In some common law countries, the term ‘charity’ is often used to refer to the act of giving or to the entities 
that either enable or carry out activities. Although the terms charity and philanthropy are sometimes used 
12    
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
interchangeably, they do not necessarily have the same meaning. While charity and philanthropy both 
seek to accomplish the same outcome – to address needs and make the world a better place – the method 
that philanthropic entities and charitable entities each use to reach that outcome is different. Whereas 
charity refers to the direct relief of suffering and social problems, philanthropy systematically seeks out 
root causes of these issues and endeavours to find a solution (Anheier and Toepler, 2010[7]). This 
distinction has been significant in the emergence of modern philanthropic foundations, particularly in the 
United States. 
This report will use the terms philanthropic giving and philanthropic entities, respectively, to refer to:  
 the act of giving by individuals and corporations, to philanthropic entities with worthy purposes, and 
 entities that are engaged in activities in pursuit of those purposes, including by providing funds to 
other entities.  
1.2. The philanthropic sector 
Although philanthropy has a long history, the idea of a philanthropic sector or ‘third sector’ beyond the 
realms of the state and the market is of fairly recent origin, certainly post-World War 2. This relatively recent 
recognition of the sector as having an economic and political presence may explain why there is limited 
research into the sector as such, with the notable exception being in the United States.2 More recently 
other countries have undertaken research, and there have been a number of comparative world-wide 
studies3 that have identified common characteristics and helped to inform decision-makers.  The notion of 
a distinct sector remains a perplexing concept in modern political and social discourse, as it covers a 
tremendous diversity of institutions and behaviours.  
It is difficult to compare philanthropic sectors across countries for a number of reasons. First, each country 
will have its own historical, economic and political background that will influence the size and scope of the 
sector. This has been described as the ‘social origins’ theory that considers inter alia, how and why welfare 
states took on different forms (Anheier and Salamon, 1996[8]). The theory suggests an inverse relationship 
between the extent of government social welfare spending and the size of the non-profit sector. This 
research identifies countries as having one of four characterisations:  
 ‘liberal states’ – where democratic government developed before the welfare state. The welfare 
state may be limited but available to the ‘deserving poor’. These countries are likely to have a larger 
philanthropic sector; 
 ‘social-democratic states’ – where the working class gained power and pushed for a universal 
welfare state. As a result of the high level of welfare, these countries tend to have smaller 
philanthropic sectors; 
 ‘corporatist states’ – where the welfare state developed under the control of non-democratic 
states that later became democratic. These countries tend to have low welfare and large 
philanthropic sectors; 
 ‘statist states’ – where a country’s elites are in control of the public good provision, and this leads 
to both low government spending on social welfare and a small philanthropic sector.4 
The theory also suggests that there will be differences across countries in the predominant types of non-
profits, shaped by historical development and class relations. Other country specific issues may include 
the role of religion in the development of the country, including in the development of philanthropic 
traditions. Economic development may also be significant both in terms of needy recipients and in the 
accumulation of the financial ability to provide welfare and for citizens to be able to contribute by way of 
philanthropy.  
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Other factors that may make comparisons difficult include notions of ‘legal families’, that is whether the 
country has a common law or civil law tradition. Common law countries tend to adopt the notion of ‘charity’ 
that dates from the Preamble to a Statute of Elizabeth of 1601,5 as the basis for identifying worthy purposes 
and activities. Civil law countries will not be constrained by these notions but may have strong traditions of 
freedom of association and organising for workers’ rights. The German non-profit sector has, for example, 
been influenced by the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ that gives priority to private over public action in many 
areas such as health and social services. The principle of ‘self-administration’ also gives independence to 
many public institutions and both of these features make it difficult to identify the non-profit or philanthropic 
sector as such. (Salamon and Anheier, 1992[4])  
Given this diversity, identifying the philanthropic sector in a country for the purposes of comparison means 
identifying characteristics that are essential. The Johns Hopkins University Comparative Non-profit Sector 
Project (JHU Project) (Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 2003[9])6 developed a set of factors to identify non-
profit entities that they suggested could be applied across jurisdictions for the purpose of carrying out 
comparisons of the ‘non-profit sector’: 
 voluntary – the voluntariness of those participating and of the entity acting is one of the factors 
that sets these activities apart from government; 
 self-governing – not directed by government or others as to how to act; 
 private – that is, not part of government. The Project notes that in some countries there may a 
blurring of the line between private and public activity; 
 non-profit distributing – although these entities may make profits or generate a surplus, they are 
not formed for the purpose of profit making. The non-distribution requirement distinguishes these 
entities from for-profit entities; 
 formal, that is institutionalised to some extent. This would preclude individual acts of philanthropy 
or assistance to another individual.7 
1.2.1. Philanthropic activity  
This report separates philanthropic activity into three dimensions: Giving; funds; and Public Benefit 
Organisations (PBOs). Each of these activities has different tax implications.  
Giving 
An important source of funds for philanthropic entities is donations. Philanthropic giving occurs at an 
individual or corporate level, typically in the form of gifts to funds or PBOs directly, and in the case of 
individual giving, it may also be in the form of bequests. Individuals may also contribute time or services 
i.e. volunteering. Businesses may also provide services on a pro bono basis.  
Funds 
Funds are entities such as grant-making foundations (or ‘fundaçions’) and trusts that hold assets with which 
they provide support in the form of grants to PBOs to advance a worthy purpose. This report uses the term 
‘funds’ to refer to intermediaries that provide support to PBOs.  
Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs) 
Public Benefit Organisation or ‘PBO’ is the term used in this report to refer to entities that carry out the 
worthy purposes. However, the distinction between funds and PBOs is not always clear cut, for example, 
in some countries PBOs do not exclusively work directly with beneficiaries. Many jurisdictions use the term 
‘charity’ to refer to these types of entities. PBOs can be distinguished from funds as they work directly with 
beneficiaries. There are two matters that are specific to PBOs – the fact that they obtain monies to carry 
out their worthy purpose from philanthropy – both directly and in the form of grants from funds, but also 
from government and from self-funded sources, including commercial activities.  Secondly, PBOs can take 
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Other factors that may make comparisons difficult include notions of ‘legal families’, that is whether the 
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a variety of legal forms. This may have significance for tax purposes e.g. if it is a condition of relief that an 
entity take a particular form.  
In general, philanthropic entities may adopt, or be regarded as having, various legal forms. Some 
jurisdictions may exclude some legal forms from eligibility such as partnerships, political parties or 
government entities. Forms that may be adopted include:  
 unincorporated associations – a number of people coming together to pursue a common purpose. 
Generally, these associations are not treated as having legal personality, although some form of 
registration process may confer legal status in certain jurisdictions. In civil law countries, the right 
to form associations is often enshrined in the Constitution; 
 incorporated entities – the adoption of separate legal form e.g. corporations. Some jurisdictions 
also offer a special form of incorporation for charitable or philanthropic entities. Some jurisdictions 
may offer a modified form of incorporation to allow for the non-distribution requirement;  
 foundations – may be either grant-making or operating foundations. This report uses the term 
‘funds’ to refer to grant-making foundations. Foundations may take a variety of legal forms; 
 trusts – a legal device used in common law countries to denote the separation of the legal rights to 
the (trust) property from the enjoyment of that property. The holding of trust property in this way 
ensures that the holder (the trustee) must comply with high standards in dealing with the property. 
The trust is commonly used for establishing foundations or other funds and denotes a setting aside 
of monies for the philanthropic purpose;     
 co-operatives or mutual entities – are also associations of persons that come together for a 
common purpose, although they may also have a special form of incorporation. A non-profit co-
operative e.g. a child-care co-operative, where the parents run a child care centre but do not 
distribute any surplus (a ‘non-distributing co-operative’), may qualify as part of the philanthropic 
sector in some countries. Other countries may consider such co-operatives or mutual entities as 
providing more than an insubstantial benefit to private interests (e.g. the parents of the children 
being cared for) and therefore would not consider them a philanthropic entity. Co-operatives that 
distribute profits to members (‘distributing co-operatives’) will typically be taxed under special 
provisions. Generally, non-distributing co-operatives will not be taxed under specialist co-operative 
tax provisions;  
 other – there may be other types of entities e.g. religious orders that do not fit into the other 
categories. 
Whatever legal form is adopted; most jurisdictions will treat the entity as a corporation for tax purposes. 
The legal form may however be relevant for matters such as regulation and for other legal obligations.  
1.2.2. The size of the philanthropic sector 
The results of the Taxation and Philanthropy questionnaire highlight significant variety in terms of the size 
and scope of the philanthropic sector. Table 1.1 presents the approximate number of philanthropic entities 
that were eligible for some form of preferential tax treatment in 2018 (for the 27 countries that provided 
data).8 The Table also contains the respective populations, expressed in millions. 
What these numbers show is that there are a significant number of entities that are eligible for tax 
concessions, although the number of entities varies widely between countries. 
The number of philanthropic entities in a country is, of course, only one measure of the size and 
significance of the sector in a country. Other measures include the economic contribution, the size of the 
workforce and, uniquely to the sector, the number of people volunteering. Reliable data on these measures 
across countries is notoriously difficult to estimate. Despite the limitations of measuring the contribution of 
the philanthropic sector, the JHU Project surveyed 35 countries in the period 1995 to 2002 and found that 
using expenditures as a proxy for economic contribution, the sector accounted for USD 1.3 trillion, or 5.1% 
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of combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 2003[9]). The JHU Project 
also looked at the size of the workforce and found that there were 39.5 million full-time equivalent (FTE) 
workers, including 21.8 million paid workers and 12.6 FTE volunteers representing 4.4% of the 
economically active population. Further, they found that 190 million people were volunteers across the 35 
countries surveyed. More recently, in 2013 the JHU project estimated for a smaller sample of 15 countries 
(drawing on data from 2002-2009) that the sector’s economic contribution was 4.5% of GDP (Salamon 
et al., 2013[10]).  
Table 1.1. Number of philanthropic entities across countries 
Notes:  
1. Includes income tax exempt and gift deductible recipients. 
2. Registered since 2018.  
3. This is the total number of taxpayers registered as non-profit organizations, however it may include inactive entities. Additionally, it may 
include organizations that do not fit within the PBO definition. 
4. Total number of not-for-profit entities 
5. Tax exempt entities. 
6. Not-for-profit, but not necessarily eligible for tax concessions. 
7. Authorised donees. 
8.  PBOs; number of funds not available. 
9.  In Singapore, registered charities are eligible for income tax relief. Of these registered charities, 666 are Institutions of Public Character (IPCs) 
which receive 250% tax deductions on qualifying donations.  
10.  Registered as not-for-profit but not necessarily eligible for all concessions. 
11.  Recognised entities under s 501(c) Internal Revenue Code (this does not include churches). 
12. 2 537 foundations and 1 651 active endowment funds (no data on total PBOs). 
13.  Data refer to ONLUS (Non-profit organisation of social utility) from data from tax returns and other fiscal-related administrative information. 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire and OECD Labour Force Statistics 2020 
Country Approximate number of entities Population in 2018 (million) 
Argentina 17 756 44.5 
Australia      188 0001 25.0 
Austria      1 230 8.8 
Belgium 22412 11.4 
Canada     86 000 37.1 
Chile 311 3193 18.8 
Colombia 44 000 49.8 
Czech Republic 130 0004 10.6 
Estonia 2 474 1.3 
France 4 18812 66.9 
Germany  600 000 82.9 
Ireland    9 7815 4.9 
Israel    40 0006 8.9 
Italy 98 23113 60.4 
Latvia 2 000 1.9 
Lithuania 11 400 2.8 
Mexico  8 7637 125.3 
Netherlands   43 0008 17.2 
New Zealand 27 000 4.9 
Portugal 8 148 10.3 
Romania 144 19.5 
Singapore 2 2779 4.0 
Slovak Republic  8 687 5.4 
Slovenia 28 524 2.1 
Sweden 99 30010 10.2 
Switzerland     10 000 8.5 
United States 1 682 09111 327.2 
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1.2.3. Total amount of giving to funds and PBOs 
The significance of philanthropy can also be seen in the level of donations to philanthropic entities, which 
is presented in Table 1.2. Data availability, and comparability, is however imperfect. In particular, not all 
countries were able to provide the total annual amount of donations to PBOs and funds in 2018, and, in 
some countries, only the amount of donations eligible for preferential tax treatment is available. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire responses highlight that the amount of philanthropic giving varies widely 
across countries and that there is a significant amount of giving to philanthropic entities that gets the benefit 
of preferential tax treatment. 
Table 1.2. Total amount of giving to funds and PBOs 
Country Total amount of giving to funds and PBOs USD million 
Argentina ARS 5 019 million (2018) 72.0 
Austria EUR 630 million (2017) 704.0 
Belgium EUR 263.2 million (PIT donations) (2017) 294.0 
Canada CAD 9.6 billion (individuals) (2017) 
CAD 3.8 billion approx. (corporations) (2017) 
7 100.0  
2 790.0 
Chile CLP 276 479 million donations (2018)  
CLP 10 052 million inheritances (2018) 
358.1 
13.0 
Czech Republic CZK 5.9 billion (2017) 249.0 
Estonia EUR 9.4 million (2018). 10.5 
France EUR 2 545 million (PIT donations) (2018) 
EUR 112 million in donations reported by the real estate and wealth tax (2018) 
Between EUR 2.3 billion and EUR 2.5 billion in corporate donations (2015) 
2 968.9 
130.6 
2 683.0 – 2 916.1 
Germany EUR 5.3 billion (2018) 5 920.0 
Ireland EUR 83.7 million 2018    93.5 
Italy EUR 705.5 million (2017) 788.4 
Latvia EUR 28 million (2017) 32.1 
Lithuania EUR 12.2 million (individuals) (2018)  
EUR 68 million (companies) (2018) 
13.6 
76.0 
Mexico MXN 47 659 million (2018) 2 477.0 
Netherlands EUR 845 million (including EUR 20 million from businesses) (yearly average from 2008-2014) 944.5 
New Zealand NZD 900 million approx. (2018) 577.0 
Portugal EUR 372 million, including EUR 59 million in goods in kind 415.0 
Romania RON 115.5 million in 2014-2017 26.0 
Singapore SGD 1 billion (2018) 715.0 
Slovak Republic EUR 14 million (2018) 15.6 
Slovenia EUR 29.6 million (2018) 33.0 
United States USD 180.5 billion in cash donations, USD 88.1 billion in non-cash donations, and USD 35.4 billion 
carried over from prior periods (individuals) (2017) C corporations USD 18.6 billion (2017), charitable 
bequests of USD 22.8 billion (2018) 
345 400.0 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
The data provided does not, of course, reveal the total amount of giving in a country. It does not reflect, for 
example, giving to entities that are not eligible recipients. In Australia, giving to religious entities is not 
deductible, but nevertheless approximately 30% of annual giving is to a religious entity (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2019[11]). The data will also not include giving where the donor has not claimed the tax relief. 
This may be inadvertent, or where giving falls below relevant thresholds, but there are also cases where 
donors choose not to access tax relief as a means of retaining greater control of the spending.9  
Research by the Charities Aid Foundation in 2016, compared giving as a percentage of GDP for 24 
countries using surveys and publicly available data. Table 1.3 shows the results for countries that are 
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included in the questionnaire. It should be noted however that the results are not necessarily confined to 
giving that received subsidies and preferential tax treatment.  
Table 1.3. Giving as a percentage of GDP 



















United Kingdom 0.54 
United States 1.40 
Source: Derived from Charities Aid Foundation, Gross Domestic Philanthropy: An international analysis of GDP, tax and giving, January 2016, 
https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-policy-and-campaigns/gross-domestic-philanthropy-feb-2016.pdf  
1.2.4. Sources of revenue for philanthropic entities 
Another finding of the JHU Project is that philanthropic giving is significant but not the main source of 
revenue for philanthropic entities. The composition of the sources of revenue, namely which proportion of 
revenue is from philanthropy, from fee income and from government, also varies widely. According to the 
JHU Project, the classification they adopted refers to philanthropic giving, which includes individual giving, 
corporate giving  and foundation giving (grants); fees, which includes private payments for goods and 
services, membership dues, and investment income; and government or public sector support, which 
includes grants, contracts, and payments from all levels of government. The results for countries in our 
survey are in Table 1.4. 
The data shows that philanthropic giving is not the most significant source of funding for any country. 
Beyond that, it is not possible to say whether self-funding or government support is the most significant as 
the results vary substantially by type of philanthropic entity and country. Furthermore, averages can be 
misleading. In the United States, for example, non-profit schools, colleges and hospitals receive substantial 
revenues from tuition, fees and some government grants, reducing the average percentage from 
donations. Other types of philanthropic entities, however, such as food banks and other social welfare 
organisations depend much more on donations. It is also not possible to say whether there is any causal 
relationship – that is, whether entities turn to self-funding because the other sources of revenue are in 
decline, or whether the receipt of government funding means the entity has less need to generate its own 
income or to engage in fundraising. One issue that has generated significant literature is whether the 
receipt of government grants by non-profits has a crowding-out effect i.e. whether the receipt of such 
funding means that philanthropy is discouraged. This is considered in Chapter 2.  
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Table 1.4. Not-for-profit revenue sources across countries  
Country % Philanthropic giving % Fees % Government 
Argentina 7 73 19 
Australia 6 63 31 
Austria 6 44 50 
Belgium 5 19 77 
Colombia 15 70 15 
Czech Republic 14 47 39 
Germany 3 32 64 
Finland 7 58 58 
Hungary 18 55 27 
Japan 3 52 45 
Korea 4 71 24 
Ireland 7 16 77 
Israel 10 26 64 
Italy 3 61 37 
Mexico 6 85 9 
Netherlands 2 39 59 
Norway 7 58 35 
Romania 27 29 45 
Slovak Republic  23 55 22 
Sweden 9 62 29 
United Kingdom 9 45 47 
United States 13 57 31 
South Africa 24 31 44 
Source: Derived from Salamon, Sokolowski and List (2003[9]) Figure 11, p 32 and Salamon, Sokolowski and Anheiner (2000[12]) Figure 3, p 6, 
The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project. 
1.3. Outline of the report 
The rest of this report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the various arguments both for and 
against the provision of tax concessions for philanthropic entities, and the provision of tax incentives for 
philanthropic giving.  
Chapter 3 examines the tax treatment of philanthropic entities across OECD member and selected 
participating countries, starting with the qualification process for entities to become recognised PBOs or 
funds, including worthy purpose, public benefit, and not-for-profit requirements, followed by an overview of 
the administrative application and regulatory process. The chapter then analyses the different forms of tax 
relief that philanthropic entities benefit from. Finally, the chapter highlights the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion schemes involving philanthropic entities and the anti-abuse policies countries have 
put in place as a result. 
Chapter 4 examines the tax treatment of donors and philanthropic giving across OECD member and 
selected participating countries. It first considers the tax design of incentives for giving by individuals, and 
then countries’ tax incentives for corporate giving. It also highlights the potential risk of tax avoidance and 
evasion and the anti-abuse policies countries have put in place as a result.  
Chapter 5 considers the taxation of cross-border philanthropy. It first considers tax incentives for giving: 
both donations and bequests; and also considers how gift and inheritance taxes apply and how capital 
gains tax might apply where the gift is non-cash. It then considers the tax treatment of philanthropic entities 
that operate across borders, examining whether tax relief is extended to foreign philanthropic entities 
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operating domestically, and the tax treatment of domestic PBOs operating across borders. Finally, it 
considers the tax treatment of international grant-making by funds. 
Chapter 6 brings together the key insights from the preceding chapters and discusses their tax policy 
implications. It highlights the importance of countries ensuring that the design of their tax incentives for 
philanthropic giving are consistent with their underlying policy goals. It also suggests that countries 
reassess the merits of providing tax exemptions for the commercial income of philanthropic entities, at 
least insofar as this income is unrelated to the entity’s worthy purpose. More broadly, the chapter finds 
scope for countries to both reduce the complexity and improve the oversight of their concessionary regimes 
for philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving. Finally, in light of the increasingly global nature of many 
policy challenges – such as environmental and public health concerns (including the COVID-19 pandemic) 
– it suggests countries reassess the restrictions commonly imposed on access to tax concessions for 
cross-border philanthropy. 
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The chapter provides an overview of the different rationales for tax 
incentives for philanthropy domestically and internationally and some of the 
arguments against providing incentives. It starts by providing a brief 
overview of the different rationales for tax incentives for philanthropic 
entities and the case for tax incentives for giving to philanthropic entities. It 
then summarises the arguments against these tax incentives. Finally, the 
chapter also discusses the rationales for incentivising cross-border giving.   
2.1. Introduction 
While philanthropy plays an important role in most countries, this does not automatically mean that it 
justifies support through the tax system.1 This chapter examines the different rationales for and against 
providing tax incentives for philanthropy2 domestically and internationally. It considers both: (1) tax 
concessions for philanthropic entities; and (2) tax incentives for giving to philanthropic entities. The chapter 
highlights that there is no single generally accepted rationale for preferential tax treatment of philanthropic 
entities. Economic theory provides a limited rationale for providing tax concessions for philanthropy 
(potentially both for entities and giving) where there is under-provision of a public good or where there are 
positive externalities associated with philanthropic activity. In this regard, tax concessions will be justified 
if they result in a larger increase in social welfare than that which government could have otherwise 
achieved through direct spending. Legal scholars frequently refer to this as the subsidy rationale. 
Another often articulated argument for exempting philanthropic entities from income tax is the “base 
defining” rationale which argues that the surplus of a philanthropic entity is different in nature to income 
and therefore beyond the scope of the income tax base. Additional arguments include that philanthropic 
2 The case for providing tax 
concessions for philanthropy  
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giving, as well as the institutions it develops, strengthen civil society, and decentralise decision-making, 
and are thus an important feature of a democratic society and worth supporting. 
A number of arguments have been raised against the provision of tax preferences for philanthropic entities 
and/or giving. The cost of providing concessions is often highlighted as a concern. By reducing government 
revenue, tax concessions for philanthropy require other taxpayers to bear an increased tax burden (or 
alternatively result in less government expenditure on other policy priorities). A concern regarding 
exemption of commercial income of philanthropic entities is that this may create an unfair competitive 
advantage for philanthropic entities over for-profit businesses. 
Two related concerns that are raised regarding tax incentives for giving are that they may be regressive 
and undemocratic. Tax incentives may be regressive in that higher income taxpayers benefit from a larger 
tax incentive than lower income taxpayers. This can be the case in both aggregate terms, but also in 
proportionate terns as a tax deduction will provide a greater benefit to higher income taxpayers where they 
are subject to higher marginal tax rates than lower income taxpayers. The democratic argument highlights 
the concern that, as a tax incentive effectively reallocates tax revenue towards the favoured philanthropic 
entity, higher income taxpayers that make larger donations benefit from a disproportionate influence in the 
determination of how tax revenue is spent. This may be of particular concern where the priorities of donors 
are not consistent with those of society in general. 
Irrespective of the arguments for and against tax concessions, most countries do provide tax incentives 
for giving, and in general provide exemptions from some taxes for philanthropic entities. The design of 
these tax concessions are examined in detail in the subsequent chapters of this report. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 and 2.3 provide, respectively, an overview of the 
rationales for and against the provision of tax concessions for philanthropy in a domestic context. Section 
2.4 then considers arguments for and against tax concessions for cross-border philanthropy. 
2.2. Arguments for tax concessions for domestic philanthropy 
A range of arguments can be made in favour of the provision of tax concessions for philanthropic entities 
and for tax incentives for giving to such entities. This section first considers arguments from economic 
theory that point to a potential market failure rationale for the subsidisation of both philanthropic entities 
and philanthropic giving. It then summarises a number of broader arguments drawing on legal, accounting 
and philosophical perspectives.  
2.2.1. Economic theory 
The section first outlines two economic theory-based rationales for government intervention to subsidise 
philanthropy: the under-provision of a public good; and the presence of positive externalities. It then 
considers whether such a subsidy, if warranted, should be provided via direct grants or via tax concessions 
(to philanthropic entities and/or philanthropic giving). Finally, it discusses the various trade-offs that must 
be made in determining the optimal level of a tax incentive for philanthropic giving. 
Under-provision of public goods 
The under-provision of public goods rationale requires three “failures” to occur to justify government 
subsidisation of philanthropy: “market failure”, “government failure”, and “voluntary failure” (Hansmann 
(1987[1]), Weisbrod (1975[2]) and Salamon (1987[3]) (2016[4]). A “market failure” case will exist for 
government to intervene and provide public goods that would be welfare improving, but that, due to their 
non-rival non-excludable nature, are not provided by the market. However, in some cases “government 
failure” may also occur where the government does not, or is unable to, provide (or unable to provide at a 
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welfare maximising level) the public good. In such cases, philanthropic entities can play an important role 
in providing these public goods. However, “voluntary failure” may also occur in the sense that philanthropic 
entities provide an inefficiently low level of the public good, for example, due to insufficient resourcing.  
In the presence of these three failures, there is a case for the government to subsidise the philanthropic 
activity in order to increase supply of the public good to the social optimal level. This subsidisation could 
occur via a tax incentive for giving, tax concessions to the philanthropic entities themselves, or direct grants 
to these entities. 
Positive externalities 
While not providing a public good in the technical sense of a non-rival non-excludable good, a philanthropic 
entity may provide goods and services that produce positive externalities that are not fully captured by the 
entity itself or by those contributing to the entity. The presence of externalities may justify government 
intervention to correct the market failure. In the case of negative externalities, the intervention generally 
consists of a tax. In the case of positive externalities, on the other hand, the intervention may consist of a 
subsidy which could take the form of a tax incentive for giving, a tax concession for the entity itself, or a 
government grant. 
It is often argued that philanthropic activity may be viewed as having consumption externalities. To the 
extent that the private marginal benefit of a gift to a philanthropic entity (i.e. the donor’s “warm glow” – see 
Box 2.1) is below the social marginal benefit of that gift, philanthropic giving has positive consumption 
externalities and may be ‘under-consumed.’ Although views in the literature differ to which extent this 
argument could justify tax subsidies for giving to philanthropic entities (in particular because the argument 
would provide a justification to subsidise giving to, for instance, other family members, but tax systems 
typically do not provide a tax subsidy for this type of giving).’ 
Therefore, to internalise the externality and correct the market failure, there may be a case for government 
to intervene. This intervention could occur via tax concessions or direct grants to the philanthropic entity. 
In the case of tax concessions to philanthropic entities, reducing the taxes borne will (directly or indirectly) 
lower the private marginal cost of producing the goods and services, which can increase the provision of 
these goods towards the social optimal level. In the case of philanthropic giving, a tax incentive lowers the 
price of giving so that the private marginal benefit of the donor increases towards the social marginal 
benefit, thereby increasing the level of giving towards the social optimal level.  
 
Box 2.1. The drivers of philanthropic giving 
Overview 
Noting the importance of philanthropic giving has led researchers in various fields and the sector itself 
to consider what drives philanthropy. Such analysis is important in the context of tax policy because it 
may indicate whether tax policy is efficient in increasing philanthropy i.e. whether tax is a driver of 
philanthropy. Bekkers and Wiepking (2011[5]) have identified eight mechanisms that they say are key 
mechanisms determinants of philanthropy. They are (i) awareness of need; (ii) solicitation; (iii) costs 
and benefits; (iv) altruism; (v) reputation; (vi) psychological benefits; (vii) values; (viii) efficacy. The 
Charities Aid Foundation (2014[6])  carried out a survey of donors in 2012 and the top 5 factors identified 
for the decision to giver were: (i) personal values; (ii) sense of morality/ethics; (iii) particular belief in 
cause; (iv) faith and (v) personal experience. Other factors, including societal factor may also be 
relevant. Classifications of this kind are complex and rarely clear-cut. Research into the drivers of 
philanthropy can be seen as identifying three types of factors:   personal; societal and ‘other factors’. 
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Personal factors 
Various researchers have identified that personal values; personal experience; belief in specific causes; 
faith and religion are likely to influence the decision to give. The notion of ‘altruism’ – the desire to help 
others, is likely to be part of an individuals’ personal values. Individuals and social entities are said to 
have an altruistic view if they value positively what is good for others.  Such an altruistic view leads to 
giving when the donor views the value of such a gift as greater than the cost to them. This is why a 
number of tax incentives are aimed at either lowering the price of giving (in the case of tax deductions 
and credits) or increasing its value (in the case of matching schemes such as Gift Aid). Altruism is, of 
course, not the only driver of giving, self-esteem as well as social norms and status are examples of 
other causes of philanthropy that have been identified.   
Economic models of philanthropic giving have also identified ‘warm glow’ (or the ‘joy of giving’) as a key 
driver of private giving to philanthropy. Warm glow models suggest that donors receive some positive 
utility from giving to philanthropy. Andreoni (1990[7])  for example, models philanthropic giving with what 
he calls ‘impure altruistic’ motives. In the model, individuals have wealth which they can allocate 
between consuming a private good and a donation towards a public good. In a purely altruistic model, 
the donor does not get any utility from their gift and only receives utility from the level of the public good 
as well as their consumption of the private good. In a purely warm glow model, the donor only receives 
utility from their gift and their consumption of the private good. In the impurely altruistic model, 
individuals receive utility from both the level of the public good as well as the gift itself.  
Personal experience, such as knowing someone assisted by the philanthropic entity or having some 
other connection to the entity or cause may also increase the likelihood of giving. Religious faith may 
also reinforce the sense of moral obligation. Other personal factors may include feeling good about 
oneself by giving or demonstrating virtue to others. Signalling virtue may be demonstrated by requesting 
acknowledgement, particularly for large donations, but this of itself may lead others to give. While these 
personal factors are generally related to individual giving, they may also translate into corporate 
philanthropy. Of course, it may not be possible to know whether a business gives money because they 
care or because they believe it will be good for business. Personal wealth will also be important in 
determining ability to donate to various causes, and much work has been done on the types of entities 
or causes that are likely to attract high wealth individuals. Several studies show that high end 
philanthropy is likely to be attracted to arts and cultural entities, with lower end donors favouring religion 
and welfare.  
Societal factors 
Some countries appear to have a stronger giving culture than others. This might be influenced by 
historical factors as well as cultural factors. The Johns Hopkins University Comparative Non-profit 
Project (‘JHU Project’) has carried out significant research on the ‘social origins’ of philanthropy. This 
theory posits that the political and economic history of a country will be a strong indicator of the size 
and scope of the non-profit sector. This theory has been considered in Chapter 1. Broader cultural and 
political factors may also be important e.g. whether the sector is regulated may impact on perceptions 
of the transparency and reliability of the sector and whether entities are viewed as trustworthy. The way 
in which the government supports the sector e.g. by making grants may also be significant, although 
researchers are divided as to whether government support will ‘crowd-out’ private giving or in fact have 
the effect of ‘crowding-in’, that is signalling to private donors that the worthy purpose and/or the entity 
engaged in carrying out the worthy purpose should be supported. 
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Government grants vs. tax concessions 
The public good and positive externality arguments provide a case for government subsidisation of 
philanthropic entities and giving. However, as alluded to in the preceding discussion, an alternative to 
providing tax concessions to subsidise philanthropic activities, is for government to provide direct grants 
to a philanthropic entity. A grant may be preferable to a tax concession where the government wants 
greater control regarding the destination of the government support, where the level of “crowding out” of 
private contributions is low, or where a tax concession is not “treasury efficient” – that is, where it would 
result in a smaller increase in funding of the philanthropic entity than the tax revenue forgone. Equally, 
when government grants largely crowd out philanthropic giving, tax concessions may be preferable to 
government grants, even when tax incentives for philanthropic giving are not treasury efficient. More 
generally, a tax incentive may still be welfare increasing even if it is not treasury efficient if the benefit to 
society of the activity funded by the giving is sufficiently large. 
The economic literature has focused on two key factors that may influence whether government grants or 
tax concessions are preferable: crowding out of private contributions and the treasury efficiency of a tax 
incentive. For the crowding out effect, the hypothesis is that since government grants are financed through 
taxes, taxpayers will be less inclined to donate to a philanthropic entity that has already received their tax 
dollars (Andreoni and Payne, 2003[8]). Research suggests that although government support for a non-
profit entity might influence private donations, it is unlikely to fully ‘crowd-out’ private giving (references). 
There is, in fact, some support for the opposite conclusion, namely that government support for a 
philanthropic entity may be a signal of the entity’s quality, resulting in a crowding-in effect. A variation on 
the notion of crowding-out is that government grants may discourage an entity from fundraising and that 
this might then lead to a decline in private support (Andreoni and Payne, 2003[8]). 
Whether a tax incentive for philanthropic giving is “treasury efficient” is typically examined by empirical 
estimation of the price elasticity of philanthropic giving – with an elasticity greater than one indicating the 
tax incentive is treasury efficient.3 More generally, the issue of whether philanthropic giving is responsive 
to tax incentives lowering the price of giving, has prompted significant debate in the econometric literature, 
mostly based on data from the United States, but more recently also on European data.  
A major review by Clotfelter in 1985 found a notable consistency in the findings, with the consensus being 
that the price elasticity for the population of taxpayers was probably greater than -1, with a range of -0.9 to 
-1.4.  As well, it was observed that the price elasticity appeared to rise with income; there are substantial 
lags in giving behaviour; and there is little effect of ‘crowding out’ individual contributions through 
government contributions (Clotfelter, 1985[9]). While there were tax effects on corporate giving, this 
appeared to be less than for individual contributions, and there was also evidence that corporations time-
shift their donations (Clotfelter, 1985[9]). 
The literature has examined both the ‘price effects’ (including tax rates), which influence the cost of giving, 
and the ‘income effects’, such as inflation or economic growth, that affect the income available for 
philanthropic giving (Clotfelter and Salamon, 1982[10]). Different methodologies used in other studies 
reported much lower price elasticities (e.g. Steinberg (1990[11]) and Randolph (1995[12])). Nevertheless, an 
analysis in 2005 of 40 years of research in this field concluded that tax deductions were treasury efficient, 
and (surprisingly) that the price elasticity was not significantly higher for high-income earners (Peloza and 
Steel, 2005[13]). 
A more recent paper by Backus and Grant (Backus and Grant, 2019[14]) noted that results varied depending 
on whether studies were based on tax return data of individuals who itemise their deductions (a group 
substantially wealthier than the average taxpayer), or were based on general population survey data. 
Backus and Grant concluded that the top 10% of income earners had an elasticity of at least -1, but middle-
income taxpayers were less sensitive (see also Fack and Landais (2010[15]), Bönke et. al. (2013[16]), and 
Bönke and Werdt (2015[17])).4 
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Determining the size of the tax concession 
When there is a rationale for government intervention in the form of a tax concession for philanthropic 
entities or a tax incentive for philanthropic giving to these entities, determining the optimal subsidy level for 
philanthropic giving is complicated and involves various trade-offs. On the one hand, there are the welfare 
gains from increasing the provision of the public good or the externality generating activity. On the other, 
there is the opportunity cost in terms of what the tax revenue that would have otherwise been collected 
could have been used for (acknowledging the distortionary impact of taxation). Consideration must also be 
given to the distributional impact of the tax concession. In particular, if the benefit (e.g. the additional warm 
glow, or the reduced cost of generating the same warm glow) of the tax concession is primarily enjoyed by 
individuals at the top of the income distribution, this may conflict with the underlying redistributive 
preferences of government. That said, if the resulting increase in the philanthropic activity primarily benefits 
lower-income households this will aid redistribution goals. Moreover, tax concessions can only be enjoyed 
if individuals give away part of their income or wealth to a philanthropic activity, and the mere fact of giving 
by the rich will reduce income and wealth inequality, irrespective of the design of the tax concession. 
The optimal tax literature has attempted to incorporate these trade-offs into a single welfare-maximising 
framework (see Box 2.2 for more detail on optimal taxation of philanthropic giving). In this regard, Saez 
(2004[18]) models the optimal tax rate for private contributions to a public good in the presence of warm-
glow effects, externalities, crowding out, and the redistributive preferences of government. Subject to a 
number of strong assumptions, the model suggests that the optimal tax subsidy for philanthropic giving:  
 increases with the size of the external effect of a marginal increase in the level of contributions;  
 increases with the responsiveness of the donor to the subsidy;  
 increases with the level at which public contributions crowd out private contributions; 
 and decreases with the proportion of giving made by high-income individuals (assuming 
government values redistribution). 
The optimal tax subsidy itself will depend on the interaction of all these factors. In the model, the optimal 
subsidy rate is found to decrease with the proportion of giving made by high-income individuals because 
government is placing a lower weight on the utility that higher income individuals derive from contributing 
as compared to lower income individuals. The model also suggests that the optimal tax subsidy for 
philanthropic activity does not necessarily have to be linked to the personal income tax rate schedule, 
which is the case in countries where contributions are deductible from the personal income tax base.  
 
Box 2.2. Optimal taxation in the presence of externalities 
The optimal taxation literature essentially formalises the equity-efficiency trade-off inherent in tax 
design. Saez (2004[18]) incorporates tax expenditures into the standard optimal tax model of Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971[19]). Previous work in the area has considered the presence of externalities (Sandmo, 
1975[20]) or public goods (Atkinson and Stern, (1974[21]); Boadway and Keen, (1993[22])). 
In Saez’s (2004[18]) model there are three goods: private consumption c, earnings z and a contribution 
good g. A lump sum payment, R, is made to all individuals to achieve the government’s redistributional 
goals. The public good nature of charitable contributions or tax expenditures is reflected in the level of 
contributions per capita 𝐺𝐺. The model assumes that individuals derive utility from giving through what 
is often referred to as warm glow (discussed in more detail in Box 2.1). Therefore, the utility function of 
each individual, 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑔𝑔, 𝐺𝐺), is non-decreasing in 𝑐𝑐, 𝑔𝑔, and 𝐺𝐺 and decreasing in 𝑧𝑧. The government’s 
problem is to set 
 the flat tax rate on earnings (𝜏𝜏),  
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entities or a tax incentive for philanthropic giving to these entities, determining the optimal subsidy level for 
philanthropic giving is complicated and involves various trade-offs. On the one hand, there are the welfare 
gains from increasing the provision of the public good or the externality generating activity. On the other, 
there is the opportunity cost in terms of what the tax revenue that would have otherwise been collected 
could have been used for (acknowledging the distortionary impact of taxation). Consideration must also be 
given to the distributional impact of the tax concession. In particular, if the benefit (e.g. the additional warm 
glow, or the reduced cost of generating the same warm glow) of the tax concession is primarily enjoyed by 
individuals at the top of the income distribution, this may conflict with the underlying redistributive 
preferences of government. That said, if the resulting increase in the philanthropic activity primarily benefits 
lower-income households this will aid redistribution goals. Moreover, tax concessions can only be enjoyed 
if individuals give away part of their income or wealth to a philanthropic activity, and the mere fact of giving 
by the rich will reduce income and wealth inequality, irrespective of the design of the tax concession. 
The optimal tax literature has attempted to incorporate these trade-offs into a single welfare-maximising 
framework (see Box 2.2 for more detail on optimal taxation of philanthropic giving). In this regard, Saez 
(2004[18]) models the optimal tax rate for private contributions to a public good in the presence of warm-
glow effects, externalities, crowding out, and the redistributive preferences of government. Subject to a 
number of strong assumptions, the model suggests that the optimal tax subsidy for philanthropic giving:  
 increases with the size of the external effect of a marginal increase in the level of contributions;  
 increases with the responsiveness of the donor to the subsidy;  
 increases with the level at which public contributions crowd out private contributions; 
 and decreases with the proportion of giving made by high-income individuals (assuming 
government values redistribution). 
The optimal tax subsidy itself will depend on the interaction of all these factors. In the model, the optimal 
subsidy rate is found to decrease with the proportion of giving made by high-income individuals because 
government is placing a lower weight on the utility that higher income individuals derive from contributing 
as compared to lower income individuals. The model also suggests that the optimal tax subsidy for 
philanthropic activity does not necessarily have to be linked to the personal income tax rate schedule, 
which is the case in countries where contributions are deductible from the personal income tax base.  
 
Box 2.2. Optimal taxation in the presence of externalities 
The optimal taxation literature essentially formalises the equity-efficiency trade-off inherent in tax 
design. Saez (2004[18]) incorporates tax expenditures into the standard optimal tax model of Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971[19]). Previous work in the area has considered the presence of externalities (Sandmo, 
1975[20]) or public goods (Atkinson and Stern, (1974[21]); Boadway and Keen, (1993[22])). 
In Saez’s (2004[18]) model there are three goods: private consumption c, earnings z and a contribution 
good g. A lump sum payment, R, is made to all individuals to achieve the government’s redistributional 
goals. The public good nature of charitable contributions or tax expenditures is reflected in the level of 
contributions per capita 𝐺𝐺. The model assumes that individuals derive utility from giving through what 
is often referred to as warm glow (discussed in more detail in Box 2.1). Therefore, the utility function of 
each individual, 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑔𝑔, 𝐺𝐺), is non-decreasing in 𝑐𝑐, 𝑔𝑔, and 𝐺𝐺 and decreasing in 𝑧𝑧. The government’s 
problem is to set 
 the flat tax rate on earnings (𝜏𝜏),  
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2.2.2. Base-defining rationale  
Base-defining theories aim to identify what is properly taxable e.g. as income or profit. This approach 
recognises that some revenue of philanthropic entities may not be appropriately included in the tax base.  
These theories assert that income tax can only logically be levied on activities undertaken for profit (see 
for example, Bittker and Rahdert (1976[23])). For example, for many philanthropic entities, a not insignificant 
portion of revenue will comprise contributions or membership payments which may not fall within notions 
of ‘income’. Similarly, many expenses incurred in operating the philanthropic entity e.g. the Red Cross 
providing relief after a disaster, may not fit within notions of deductible expenditure as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. There will, of course be some philanthropic entities that derive most of their 
 the tax rate on contributions (𝑡𝑡),  
 the level of the lump sum payment to all individuals (𝑅𝑅),  
 and possibly the amount 𝐺𝐺0 of the contribution good that it finances directly (i.e. government 
grants), 
in a way that maximises social welfare subject to the requirement that it collects enough tax revenues 
to finance 𝑅𝑅, 𝐺𝐺0, and government consumption 𝐸𝐸. Welfare is measured by the weighted sum of 
individual utilities, where the weights 𝛽𝛽ℎ reflect the level at which government values redistribution. For 
example, if government values redistribution, 𝛽𝛽ℎis higher for low-income individuals than for high-
income individuals.  
With a few simplifying assumptions5, the model produces two sets of expressions for the optimal tax 
rate 𝑡𝑡 on contributions in a setting where government cannot contribute to the public good, and in a 
setting where it can. In the first setting, the optimal tax rate 𝑡𝑡 on contributions is given by:  
𝑡𝑡 = −𝑒𝑒 + 1𝜌𝜌 [1 − 𝛽𝛽(𝐺𝐺)],          [1] 
where 𝑒𝑒 denotes the external effect of a marginal increase in the level of the contribution good, 𝜌𝜌 is a 
measure of the price response of private contributions, and 𝛽𝛽(𝐺𝐺) denotes the average social welfare 
weight, weighted by contribution levels. Equation [1] shows that the optimal subsidy rate for 
contributions is larger when the external effect of a marginal increase in the level of the contribution 
good is larger. The optimal subsidy rate is lower if the price response of the contribution is small. If on 
the other hand contributions are perfectly elastic, the optimal subsidy rate would equal the external 
effect. Finally, if high-income individuals contribute disproportionately to the rest of the population, 𝛽𝛽(𝐺𝐺) 
is assumed to be low (meaning the utility derived from, for example, warm glow is weighted less 
because it is disproportionately experienced by high-income individuals) and thus the optimal subsidy 
rate for contributions is lower. 
In a setting where the government can contribute directly to the public good (i.e. where crowding out is 
possible), the optimal tax rate on contributions is given by:  
𝑡𝑡 = −1 + 1𝜌𝜌 (1 + ?̅?𝐺𝐺𝐺0)[1 − 𝛽𝛽(𝐺𝐺)],                       [2] 
where public contributions crowd out private contributions when ?̅?𝐺𝐺𝐺0 < 0. Equation [2] shows that the 
optimal subsidy rate increases in 𝛽𝛽(𝐺𝐺), the size of the price response, and in the absolute value of 
crowding out.  
A weakness of the model may be that it assumes that private contributions are equally as efficient as 
direct government contributions. This is likely not the case, due to the fundraising activities that 
philanthropic entities frequently have to engage in to receive private contributions. On the other hand, 
the collection of taxes is not without inefficiencies either.   
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income from ‘business’ activities, e.g. hospitals or universities, and it would be relatively easy to calculate 
taxable income.  
Brody (1999[24])  proposes what she describes as a ‘sovereignty view’ as a variation on the base defining 
approach. She argues that charities go untaxed because ‘Caesar should not tax god’ (or its modern secular 
equivalent). Brody acknowledges that although this might have something to do with the role of religion in 
early charity, its continued existence can be justified based on the independence of the sector. She argues 
that a sovereignty view also explains why a subsidy would take the form of tax exemption rather than more 
logical form of direct grants: for all its imperfections, tax exemption keeps governments out of charities day 
to day business and keeps charities out of the business of petitioning government for subvention.   
Another variation on the tax base theory is that taxation of corporations is sometimes viewed as a proxy 
for taxation of shareholders, and the philanthropic entity will generally not have shareholders (Rushton, 
2007[25]) (Buckles, 2005[26]). Rather those who are beneficiaries of the activities of the philanthropic entity, 
would not be viewed as appropriate subjects of taxation. 
2.2.3. Distributive justice theory 
Fleischer (2018[27]) has put forward an alternative to the traditional theories. She argues that support for 
philanthropy can be justified based on what she terms ‘two bedrock principles of Western liberal 
democracies’ namely: limited government and equal opportunity. She argues that the charitable tax 
subsidies reflect these principles, as expressed in the two theories of distributive justice respectively 
associated with them, libertarianism and resource egalitarianism. However, she acknowledges problems 
that may need to be tempered. In her view, the tax subsidies may undermine the principle of limited 
government by coercing taxpayers to subsidise activities that are not the legitimate purview of government. 
The subsidies’ relation to resource egalitarianism is more complex: she argues that tax subsidies may 
undermine basic equality of opportunity notions both by subsidising activities that increase the head-start 
of the wealthy and by giving wealthy taxpayers more say over government resources than poorer 
taxpayers.  
2.3. Arguments against tax concessions for domestic philanthropy 
Although there were earlier critics of the tax concessions,6 the case against the tax concessions was put 
most powerfully in the 1960s and 1970s by US scholars, most notably Kahn (1960[28]), and Rabin (1966[29]), 
in the context of the charitable contribution deduction. The arguments of the critics are considered below. 
Some, but not all of these arguments can be used to critique all tax concessions for philanthropic entities.  
2.3.1. Cost of providing the concessions and tax expenditure analysis 
The starting point is that tax concessions have a ‘cost’, that is, they reduce government revenue, and 
therefore shift the tax burden to other taxpayers.  This is relatively uncontroversial. More controversial, 
however, is a second related argument that the loss in revenue amounts to a ‘tax expenditure’. Tax 
expenditure analysis distinguishes between tax measures which seek to achieve the primary goal of 
income taxation and those (‘tax expenditures’) which reduce tax liability to support social or economic 
objectives. Tax expenditure analysis treats tax exemptions and concessions as government subsidies and 
evaluates them in the same way as direct expenditures. Tax expenditure analysis has its modern genesis 
in a seminal US Treasury analysis in 1968 (1968[30]) and subsequent explanations of its implications by 
Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury, Stanley Surrey (1970[31])  
It is necessary to consider whether tax concessions for philanthropy are, in fact, tax expenditures. This is 
likely to be the case for property tax exemptions. It is also relatively, although not universally, accepted in 
the case of the charitable contribution deduction or credit, since the outgoing does not fall into either the 
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taxpayers.  
2.3. Arguments against tax concessions for domestic philanthropy 
Although there were earlier critics of the tax concessions,6 the case against the tax concessions was put 
most powerfully in the 1960s and 1970s by US scholars, most notably Kahn (1960[28]), and Rabin (1966[29]), 
in the context of the charitable contribution deduction. The arguments of the critics are considered below. 
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expenditure analysis distinguishes between tax measures which seek to achieve the primary goal of 
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in a seminal US Treasury analysis in 1968 (1968[30]) and subsequent explanations of its implications by 
Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury, Stanley Surrey (1970[31])  
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recognised category of expenses in the production of income, or expenses that are in a legal or moral 
sense necessary or involuntary.  There has been significantly more contest over whether the income tax 
exemption (or other relief) is a tax expenditure or could be justified by principles of income taxation (‘base-
defining theories’) (Brody, 1999[24]) as discussed above.  
There are a number of issues relating to the notion of tax expenditure analysis in relation to the 
philanthropic sector:  
 Tax expenditure analysis compares the current or prospective tax treatment of taxpayers who 
receive the concession to a ‘benchmark’ treatment. (Andrews, 1972[32])  For example, in relation to 
the gift concession it assumes that the same amount would be donated even without the 
concession. That is, it assumes that taxpayer behaviour is unchanged and for that reason may not 
accurately reflect revenue foregone.  
 There is some debate about whether the tax exemptions for non-profits are, in fact, tax 
expenditures. For example, much of the revenue received by philanthropic entities would not be 
income in most countries, such as donations and government grants. In that sense the exemption 
may not be a concession in relation to that revenue (Krever, 1991[33]) . There is also an argument, 
discussed above, that philanthropic entities may be ‘outside’ the system for taxing corporations.    
 There are also concerns about the reliability and accuracy of the tax expenditure statements. For 
example, tax expenditure estimates are only concerned with statutory provisions and do not take 
into account situations where income is not taxed for some other reason e.g. because of the 
common law principle of ‘mutuality’ or because of the exercise of an administrative discretion 
(Burton and Sadiq, 2013[34]).  
 Perhaps most significantly, there is simply insufficient data available to quantify the tax 
expenditures in relation to the philanthropic sector across jurisdictions. There are a number of 
reasons for this: many countries do not calculate tax expenditures – of the countries responding to 
the survey, less than half were able to provide estimates of revenue foregone in relation to either 
gift concessions or exemptions from other taxes. In addition, information to estimate the amount of 
tax that might be payable is often not available e.g. if the philanthropic entity is not required to lodge 
a tax return, it will not be possible to quantify the amount of revenue foregone. Several countries 
that did provide responses to the questions relating to the cost of concessions, were only able to 
provide estimates, suggesting either that it is too soon to provide the data or that the data cannot 
be accurately identified.     
What does appear from the responses provided to our survey is that there is an amount of tax revenue 
foregone, and hence the tax treatment of philanthropy is an important topic that needs to be considered in 
detail to ensure that the concessions are justified and well designed.   
2.3.2. Inequality and the regressive nature of tax incentives for giving 
The pluralism argument considered as part of the subsidy rationale carries with it the importance of a 
heterogeneous and large number of donors. However, the design of tax-subsidies may lead to incentivising 
large donations from a small number of wealthy donors rather than smaller donations from a large number 
of donors. 
In this regard, it has been argued that one of the main objections to the philanthropic gift concessions is 
the inequity that results from its regressive nature (Rabin, 1966[29]). This arises because the deduction is 
tied to progressive tax brackets. A progressive income tax system results in all deductions ‘benefiting’ 
higher income taxpayers more, and the philanthropic contribution deduction has a similar effect of reducing 
the ‘price of giving’ more for higher income earners. This is said to conflict with the basic premise of a 
progressive income tax. It is also said to be inequitable because the evidence is that higher income 
taxpayers favour different types of charities, typically higher education and arts and culture, than lower 
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income taxpayers which tend to favour religion and welfare (Rabin, 1966[29]) (Atkinson, 1997[35]). This may 
have implications for the potentially undemocratic nature of tax concessions for giving (discussed below). 
Incentivising the wealthy more may increase the treasury efficiency of the tax subsidies, that is, if those 
with higher income levels are more responsive to tax incentives for donations, a tax-subsidy would be more 
efficient if it focused on big donors7 
Some authors have observed that this is the effect of all tax deductions and not peculiar to the charitable 
contribution (Bittker, 1972[36]) Most of the proposals that seek to redesign the philanthropic gift concession 
attempt to minimise this regressive effect by proposing tax credits or matching schemes (Duff, 2014[37]).  
2.3.3. Competitive neutrality 
It is often claimed that commercial operations run by non-profit entities have an unfair advantage when 
competing with for-profit organisations offering the same or similar goods and services (Brody and Cordes 
(2001[38]); Sharpe (1996[39])). A competitive advantage may result from tax concessions that apply to the 
income, inputs, or outputs of philanthropic entities, including when they operate businesses. In this context 
it is argued that philanthropic entities can undercut the competition. The notion of unfair competition 
underpinned the introduction of the unrelated business income tax (‘UBIT’) in the United States in the 
1950s. Before that time, the tax system followed a ’destination of income’ approach under which income, 
whatever the source, could be earned tax-free if profits were dedicated to a charitable or philanthropic 
purpose. The introduction of the UBIT was also said to be about preserving the corporate income tax base, 
and to have been the result of the infamous ownership of Mueller Macaroni by New York University Law 
School (Brody and Cordes, 2001[38]). The UBIT operates so that to the extent that an activity is ‘substantially 
related’ to the entity’s tax-exempt purpose, the income is tax-free (and the associated expenses are, 
essentially, not deductible). By contrast, net income from ‘unrelated business activities’, is subject to the 
UBIT, which generally taxes such income at ordinary corporate (or trust) tax rates. Congress, however, 
has exempted dividends, interest, rents, and royalties from the UBIT. 
It has also been argued that an income tax exemption (on all income or on income from related activities) 
does not provide an unfair advantage to philanthropic entities (Henry et al. (2009[40]); Steuerle (1998[41])). 
An income-tax exemption is not a subsidy on the cost of inputs; it does not reduce the charities cost of 
purchasing goods. One commentator has argued that:  
the zero rate for charity is no more ‘unfair’ to a [fully] taxed competitor than are the progressive income-tax 
rates on individuals who conduct business activities in a sole proprietorship or through a partnership, [or a 
corporation]….. Nor is a non-profit organisation likely to under-price its for-profit competitor (the ‘unfair’ part of 
the competition), just as it would not accept a lower return on an (untaxed) passive investment (Weisbrod, 
1988[42]). 
The UBIT in the United States, and similar arrangements in other countries to impose tax on ‘unrelated’ 
commercial profits, suffer from the difficulty of trying to identify what is related and what is unrelated. It has 
been noted that very little revenue is in fact collected in the United States from the UBIT. However, the 
income tax concessions available to philanthropic entities may provide them with some advantages over 
for-profit firms, such as in relation to cash flow.  
In response to these concerns, many countries do tax income or profits derived from commercial 
operations. A variety of terms are used to signify the types of income being taxed e.g., commercial, 
business or trading income; and a distinction is often made between commercial activities that are part of 
the philanthropic activities of the PBO, such as operating a school or hospital (commonly referred to as 
‘related commercial income’) and activities that are not part of the philanthropic activities, other than as 
providing revenue to undertake those philanthropic activities (commonly referred to as ‘unrelated 
commercial income’). These distinctions are often difficult to make and complex to administer. Some 
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32  
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
countries either prohibit, or at least tax, commercial activities that are undertaken by for-profit competitors 
(see Chapter 3). 
It has also been argued that concessions related to the cost of inputs, e.g., employee-related tax 
concessions, do provide a competitive advantage for the commercial activities of philanthropic entities 
compared with for-profits and that they could be distortionary because they provided an incentive for non-
profits to favour the use of the inputs that attracted the concessional taxation treatment. 
Distortions from VAT concessions for philanthropic entities typically arise from the exemption from VAT of 
the output of these entities. The distortion can result in either a competitive advantage or a competitive 
disadvantage to the philanthropic entity, depending on who is the recipient of the supply and what the 
recipient uses it for. 
A VAT exemption can provide a competitive advantage to a philanthropic supplier if the recipient is a 
consumer or an entity that uses it as an input to the production of its own exempt supplies. This is because 
the total price paid by the recipient is lower than the VAT-inclusive price they would pay to a for-profit 
supplier. 
A VAT exemption can create a competitive disadvantage for a philanthropic supplier if the recipient is an 
entity, such as a for-profit business, that uses the good or service as an input to a taxable supply. This is 
because input tax credits would allow the purchaser to fully recover any VAT paid on inputs purchased on 
a non-exempt basis (e.g., from another for-profit business), and the suppliers of those inputs are entitled 
to input tax credits on their own inputs. In contrast, the philanthropic supplier of exempt goods and services 
cannot recover the VAT it pays on its inputs. This VAT gets embedded into the cost of the good or service 
itself and is not recoverable by the purchaser.  
When the exemption of the entity’s outputs causes a competitive disadvantage, input concessions may 
reduce the distortion. Either way, philanthropic entities that make VAT exempt supplies will tend to favour 
the use of inputs with VAT concessions. The VAT treatment of philanthropic entities in countries is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
2.3.4. Inflexibility (once introduced difficult to change) 
A somewhat related argument is that tax subsidies are not subject to the same periodic review that 
spending programs receive. As a result, once enacted, there is no need for the recipients to justify the 
concession. Further, the operation of a tax concession can result in unexpected budgetary outcomes. Tax 
incentives are usually ‘open-ended’ – that is, they do not limit the tax benefits a taxpayer can receive. In 
the case of direct expenditures, if the legislator considers that certain programmed costs in a given year 
are too high, it can cap them in advance. However, it is often impossible to apply such restrictions to 
existing tax incentives: they do not require annual approval from the legislator and remain valid as long as 
the tax law remains unchanged (Lideikyte Huber, 2020[43]). 
Perhaps surprisingly it has been suggested that tax expenditure analysis, which aimed to highlight the 
‘cost’ of providing various concessions has resulted in more ‘tax expenditures’ being included in tax 
legislation in many jurisdictions. One commentator has noted that the effect of producing tax expenditure 
statements, ‘unintended by the advocates of tax expenditure analysis, has been to legitimate and expand 
tax expenditures (Zelinsky, 2012[44]). 
2.3.5. Undemocratic (the power of large philanthropists) 
Reich (2019[45]) argues that much philanthropy is undemocratic and unaccountable. His arguments are 
really concerned with ‘big philanthropy’ or large private foundations, and is focussed on the United States. 
Reich notes that a fundamental commitment of a democratic society is that individuals have an equal 
opportunity to influence politics or public policy. This is enshrined in the constitutional protections for ‘one 
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person, one vote’. However, by operating through a private foundation, wealthy people are able to uniquely 
influence public policy. In other words, the power to spend money gives the philanthropist significant 
political power. This is not restricted to tax-preferred philanthropy e.g., Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan 
have established a limited liability company rather than a private foundation to undertake philanthropic 
activities. This means they will not be subject to IRS rules about disbursements or any reporting 
requirements. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that big philanthropy will relieve poverty or direct monies 
to reducing inequality.  
Reich (2019[45]) also notes that large foundations are largely unaccountable – they do not have to account 
to customers or competitors and, unlike politicians, cannot be voted out of office. Reich notes that this was 
a matter of real concern in the 1880s when the first private foundations were mooted, and refers to the fact 
that Rockefeller had considerable trouble in setting up his private foundation – and that there were no tax 
concessions for doing so at the time. Moreover, he argues that instead of moderating the behaviour of big 
philanthropy, governments encourage it with tax concessions, and the charitable deduction in the US 
provides benefits that reinforce inequality.  However, Reich does not argue that there should be no tax 
support, but rather that the contribution concession should be a credit rather than a deduction, so that the 
value of the concession does not give greater support to wealthy donors. 
While not accountable to ‘customers’, foundations are accountable to the tax authorities in staying 
compliant with the tax rules including using funds for personal benefit and disposing of donated stock within 
a specified period. In the United States, for example, IRS audits periodically result in imposition of 
penalties, court cases or even the closing down of a foundation. 
2.4. The rationale for incentivising cross-border philanthropy is distinct from that 
of domestic philanthropy 
The discussion above has assumed that the donor and the recipient entity are located in the domestic or 
home jurisdiction and that the entity pursues its objectives domestically. The notion of cross-border 
philanthropy raises distinct issues for various stakeholders. Cross-border philanthropy has been defined 
as ‘voluntary contributions from private donors in one country to a recipient in another country’ (Moore and 
Rutzen, 2011[46]).  
There is little comprehensive or comparable data on the extent of cross-border philanthropy, although the 
data that is available suggests that such giving is growing. In many cases, the discussion around cross-
border philanthropy revolves around assistance for developing countries or in conflict situations. But 
potentially, cross-border philanthropy could relate to any of the worthy purposes identified previously. A 
philanthropic intermediary in Europe has reported that for the period 2010 to 2016 donations channelled 
related to education accounted for 42%, social matters 18%, heritage and culture 14%, health 11%, 
international development 11%, environment 3% and religion 1%. (European Foundation Centre, 2017[47]) 
There is some data on private philanthropy related to development. An OECD survey on private foundation 
giving for development found that the 147 foundations surveyed provided approximately USD7.96 billion 
per year to developing countries from 2013 to 2015, representing an average annual increase of 19% 
(OECD, 2018[48]). The OECD survey also noted that the sources of philanthropic giving for development 
are highly concentrated. Of the 143 foundations included in the data survey sample, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation was by far the most significant philanthropic donor, and 81% of the total philanthropic 
giving during 2013-15 was provided by only 20 foundations.  
The increase in cross-border philanthropy has given rise to concerns in both donor and recipient countries. 
Donor countries are concerned that the money donated may be diverted for the purposes of terrorism and 
money-laundering. This was the view taken by the Financial Action Task Force (‘FATF’) – an 
intergovernmental body that promotes implementation of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing 
measures through its recommendations and country evaluations – in its initial assessment of the terrorist 
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financing vulnerabilities and threats faced by the non-profit sector (FATF, 2012[49]). Since 2012, FATF’s 
Recommendation 8 has served as an international policy standard influencing the domestic regulation of 
cross-border philanthropy. FATF subsequently acknowledged that the non-profit sector’s vulnerability to 
terrorist abuse in Recommendation 8 may have been overstated given that ‘not all non-profit organisations 
are inherently high risk (and some may represent little or no risk at all)’ (FATF, 2016[50]). 
The initial view about the vulnerability of the non-profit sector has resulted in additional administrative and 
due diligence requirements being imposed on donors and philanthropic entities seeking to work abroad in 
many countries. It has also been put forward as one reason for imposing restrictions on tax deductibility of 
donations as revenue authorities refer to the lack of control over the recipient entity (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2016[51]).  
Some recipient countries have also viewed foreign funding or foreign activities as a threat to national 
sovereignty and have imposed restrictions that might include prohibiting foreign funding or requiring all 
funding to be channelled through the government or approved by government (Indiana University Lilly 
Family School of Philanthropy, 2018[52]). Concerns about cross-border philanthropy raise some of the same 
issues as official aid programs, although as noted, not all cross-border aid is concerned with humanitarian 
or development activities.  
There are various ways that cross-border philanthropy can occur where:  
 a donor in one country makes a donation directly to a philanthropic entity in another country (‘direct 
cross-border philanthropy’); or  
 the donation is made to a domestic philanthropic entity that pursues its programs abroad; or the 
donation is made to a domestic philanthropic entity that channels the funds to the foreign 
philanthropic entity (‘indirect cross-border philanthropy’).  
2.4.1. Direct philanthropy 
Most countries do not permit tax relief for donations to foreign philanthropic entities (direct cross-border 
philanthropy), subject to some exceptions that allow tax relief for donations within a geographic region.  
The position in the European Union (‘EU’) is based on the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (‘TFEU’) mandating the non-discrimination of philanthropic entities and their donors. 
This has been confirmed by the case law of the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’), which ensures that the 
tax autonomy of the Member States is exercised in accordance with the fundamental freedoms as 
enshrined in the TFEU. In the landmark judgement in Stauffer (Case C-386/04), the ECJ held that non-
resident philanthropic entities should not be treated differently for tax purposes simply because they are 
resident in another Member State. Thus, if a Member State grants an income tax exemption to domestic 
philanthropic entities, it should extend such advantageous tax treatment to entities in other Member States 
which meet the same conditions as domestic philanthropic entities. In a subsequent judgement in Persche 
(Case C-318/07), which complements the Stauffer case with regard to the tax treatment of donors in 
respect of cross-border giving, the ECJ ruled that limiting the preferential tax treatment for donations to 
domestic philanthropic entities while excluding donations to comparable foreign entities is not compatible 
with the free movement of capital as guaranteed by the TFEU. This means that tax relief should be provided 
where the foreign charities in a Member State can be shown to be ‘comparable’ to domestic organisations 
holding charitable tax status. Practical difficulties remain in demonstrating comparability and the process 
for seeking tax incentives is complex and burdensome (European Foundation Centre, 2017[47]). The end 
result is that donors are more likely to use indirect channels (discussed below).  
Another regional grouping that permits some cross-border donations to qualify for tax relief concerns the 
United States. The US permits deductions for philanthropic contributions in its treaties with Canada (USA-
Canada DTA, Article XXI), Mexico (USA-Mexico DTA Article 22) and Israel (USA-Israel DTA Article 15A).  
Like the EU, the basis for the concession is ‘comparability’ with eligible domestic entities. The rationale for 
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the philanthropic contribution provisions in the tax treaties with Canada and Mexico are close geographic 
and economic ties. In the case of Israel, the reasons for the preferential tax treatment appear to be the 
close political ties and the extensive funding of philanthropic activities in Israel by US citizens. There is 
however no equivalent provision in the Canada-Mexico DTA.   
2.4.2. Indirect philanthropy 
Some countries do permit domestic philanthropic entities to transfer funds or to operate overseas. There 
are various models that are used to facilitate this. Many international non-government organisations 
(NGOs) such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Greenpeace and World Vision, establish domestic 
entities in a large number of countries but essentially undertake all their activities offshore.  There may 
also be a process for other domestic philanthropic entities to be approved so that they can undertake 
activities overseas.  The approval processes for such entities tend to be quite onerous and may be 
restricted to entities that undertake humanitarian and/or development type of activities. In addition to an 
approval process, there may be a code of conduct imposed to ensure that entities operating overseas, that 
are eligible for tax preferred donations, meet certain standards. Some countries permit a wider group of 
domestic entities to be approved. One example is the proliferation of entities designated by the prefix 
‘friends of’ which allows tax relief for donations that are to be used offshore. The need to go through an 
onerous approval process tends to penalise smaller philanthropic entities. However, a number of countries 
permit a ‘work around’ that is, entities can request an approved entity to act as a conduit and pass on 
donations to intended recipients overseas. The entity acting as a conduit will typically charge a fee of 
between 5% and 10% and will be responsible for the due diligence associated with the funds being passed 
on.  
An alternative model has developed in Europe where, despite the rulings by the ECJ, cross-border giving 
is still not easy. A private initiative, the Transnational Giving Europe (‘TGE’) network, is a partnership of 
leading European foundations and associations that facilitates tax-efficient cross-border giving within 
Europe (Transnational Giving Europe[53]).The TGE network covers 19 countries and enables donors, both 
corporations and individuals, resident in one of the participating countries, to financially support non-profit 
organisations in other Member States, while benefiting directly from the tax advantages provided for in the 
legislation of their country of residence. (Transnational Giving Europe[53]) 
2.4.3. Arguments in favour of tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy  
As the world becomes more interconnected, the argument that countries should treat cross-border 
philanthropy in much the same way as domestic philanthropy becomes harder to ignore. If governments 
accept that they should subsidise domestic philanthropy, arguments can also be made as to why they 
should subsidise cross-border philanthropy. The arguments in favour of tax incentives fall into two 
categories: arguments that rely on what might be described as the ‘moral imperative’ to assist others, 
especially those less well off, and arguments that are based on the ‘self-interest’ of the country providing 
the tax relief.  
Moral imperative  
The global nature of many of the challenges facing the world require global responses. If the relief of 
poverty, advancement of health and education and preservation of heritage are worthy purposes 
domestically, they should be seen as ‘deserving’ globally and so private contributions should be 
encouraged (Buijze, 2016[54]). Many issues also transcend borders e.g., environmental concerns, or 
medical research or public health issues such as fighting pandemics, can only be dealt with by countries 
cooperating. There is already considerable cooperation in the area of development and humanitarian aid, 
as well as in responding to international disasters. The global public benefit these causes relate to could 
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be a possible reason for some governments to stimulate private contributions to these causes through tax 
incentives. 
Self-interest  
The provision of tax incentives for philanthropy directed abroad can also be justified using the subsidy 
rationale by refocussing on the notion of what constitutes the public benefit. There may be a number of 
benefits to a country from engaging with global causes by supporting cross-border giving. Just as aid 
programs enable a country to develop ‘soft power’ through cultural and economic influence, so does the 
provision of support for philanthropy (Jenkins, 2007[55]). Certainly, there appears to have been a level of 
acceptance of this argument by many countries, given the number of domestic philanthropic entities that 
already have this support. A more focussed notion of self-interest might be present in allowing tax relief in 
a regional context, where wellbeing of a region, increased sense of solidarity and strengthening of 
community ties, may generate benefits for the country in which the donors are present.   
2.4.4. Arguments against tax incentives for cross-border philanthropy  
There are, of course, a number of arguments that can be raised against providing support for cross-border 
giving. Those arguments tend to focus on the lack of benefit for the ‘donor’ country and the lack of oversight 
of the funds once they leave the country. There may also be concerns for the donors or intermediaries 
about navigating the legal and cultural terrain of the recipient country.  
Public benefit 
One possible argument is that the granting of tax relief is a cost to the donor country, and there is no 
matching benefit in terms of spending within the country (Buijze, 2016[54]). This is in effect confining the 
public in the public benefit requirement to the domestic sphere, although it could be argued that a country 
derives a benefit from the provision of assistance to less fortunate countries. In some cases, this is 
recognised as where there is already tax relief for donations to recognised disasters. 
Lack of oversight  
Lack of oversight of the actual spending of the private contributions is often raised as a concern (Buijze, 
2016[54]). This has been exacerbated by the FATF Report in 2012 describing the vulnerability of the non-
profit sector. Although the FATF has since moderated its view, the uneasiness remains. There are also 
issues concerning compliance of domestic entities operating abroad, often in partnership  with local 
entities, to ensure they comply with any codes of conduct as well as the laws of the country in which they 
are operating e.g., Oxfam in Haiti. Philanthropic activities abroad are also more difficult to administer, which 
in some cases may raise accountability and transparency issues.  
Costs to donors and/or entities operating overseas 
Entities that operate across borders may also encounter additional costs of complying with a different legal 
regime, having to navigate supply arrangements in countries that may have an element of endemic 
corruption as well as translation and other costs associated with engaging with local populations (Charities 
Aid Foundation, 2016[51]). All of these costs may mean that less money is actually being spent on the 
worthy purpose and may discourage countries from supporting philanthropy across borders.  
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1 The focus of this chapter is on the case for (and against) providing tax concessions for philanthropy. A 
broader discussion of the benefits to society of philanthropy and the philanthropic sector is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
2 The meaning of the term ‘philanthropy’ has been discussed in Chapter 1. The term ‘philanthropic giving’ 
is used in this report to refer to the act of giving to entities, rather than to individuals, as this is the type of 
giving that may qualify for tax relief. This report uses the term philanthropic entities to refer to not-for-profit 
entities with a ‘worthy’ purpose that typically provide public benefits, and the philanthropic sector to refer 
to the sector covering such entities. 
3 The price elasticity of philanthropic giving is generally estimated by analysing the effect a change in the 
price of giving (which, in a country where private contributions are tax deductible, is equal to (1 − 𝑡𝑡), where 
𝑡𝑡 is an individual’s marginal tax rate) has on the level of philanthropic giving. 
4 There is also evidence that high income taxpayers are more likely to donate large amounts periodically 
rather than regular amounts every year (Auten, Clotfelter and Schmalbeck, 2000[56]). 
5 The three assumptions are that there are no income effects on earnings at the individual level, that 
aggregate earnings are not affected by the level of the contribution good and by the tax rate on 
contributions, and that the compensated supply of contributions does not depend on the tax rate on 
earnings.  
6 See for example, Chancellor of the Exchequer in UK, William Gladstone put forward a bill in 1863 to 
abolish the exempt status of charities on the grounds that it was an undiscriminating public subsidy for a 
large group of organisations not subject to adequate public scrutiny, including elite schools, but was 
defeated.   
7 See the discussion relating to ‘efficiency’.  
 
   41 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
This chapter provides an overview of the tax treatment of philanthropic 
entities, starting with the qualification process for entities to become 
recognised Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs) or funds. This includes a 
description of countries’, worthy purpose, public benefit, and not-for-profit 
requirements, followed by an overview the administrative application and 
oversight process. The chapter then analyses the different forms of tax 
relief that philanthropic entities benefit from, starting with the tax treatment 
of income of philanthropic entities, followed by Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
benefits, and an overview of other forms of tax relief that PBOs or funds 
may be eligible for. Finally, the chapter highlights the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion schemes involving philanthropic entities and the 
anti-abuse policies countries have put in place as a result. 
3.1. Introduction 
Philanthropic entities can be categorised as either funds or Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs). For the 
purposes of this report, funds are entities such as foundations, associations and trusts that hold assets 
with which they support PBOs to advance a social objective. The term PBO refers to entities that provide 
goods and services in pursuit of the public benefit. From a tax perspective, philanthropic entities can benefit 
from tax incentives in a number of ways. Generally, entities with a philanthropic status may be able to 
receive tax incentivised gifts from individuals and corporations, or receive tax relief directly in relation to 
their activities (e.g., exemption from income tax, property tax, VAT1, etc.). For an entity to receive such a 
3 The tax treatment of philanthropic 
entities 
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status (fund or PBO status), it must meet a number of requirements that can be separated into three broad 
categories: 
 Not-for-profit requirements.  
 Worthy purpose requirements. 
 Public benefit requirements. 
Additionally a number of administrative requirements must be met to determine that the requirements listed 
above are met. Countries’ approaches to ensuring that the requirements are fulfilled, as well as the 
stringency of the requirements themselves, vary. Only once the requirements are fulfilled are philanthropic 
entities eligible to benefit from the tax incentives for philanthropy (such as receiving tax incentivised 
donations, income tax exemption, capital gains tax exemption, and VAT tax exemption or relief).  
By subjecting philanthropic entities to the before mentioned requirements, governments may be able to 
better keep track of, and have some oversight over, their tax expenditures used to incentivise philanthropy. 
The not-for-profit requirement ensures that the recipients of tax incentives for philanthropy are entities 
whose primary objective is the public benefit (and not making profit). The not-for profit requirement does 
not prohibit a philanthropic entity from making a surplus, instead, it generally includes non-distribution 
requirements so that the surplus is not distributed as dividends or other benefits beyond the scope of the 
entity’s worthy purpose. The worthy purpose requirement allows the government to direct philanthropic 
funds, as well as its tax expenditures, towards particular social objectives (and possibly away from others). 
The public benefit requirement ensures that tax expenditures are used to incentivise activities that benefit 
a large and inclusive enough section of the public. How large and open the circle of beneficiaries needs to 
be, depends on the country and is discussed in more detail below. Finally, the administrative requirements 
may help ensure that the state has (and will continue to have) all the information necessary to evaluate 
whether an entity meets all the other requirements, particularly if there is an administrative body to monitor 
approvals and compliance. 
3.1.1. Key Findings 
The main findings of this chapter are that:  
 Countries tend to impose not-for-profit, worthy purpose and public benefit requirements to 
determine eligibility for tax concessions. Welfare, education, scientific research, and healthcare are 
deemed worthy purposes most frequently across countries. For the public benefit requirement, 
countries generally stipulate that the benefit must be open to all, that the benefit can be restricted 
to groups with specific characteristics, or that the characteristics used to specify who can benefit 
must relate to the fulfilment of the entities’ worthy purpose.  
 Almost all countries surveyed in this report require philanthropic entities to undergo a specific 
application process to become eligible for preferential tax treatment. Countries typically follow three 
broad approaches: the tax administration is responsible for the accreditation process; the 
responsibility is shared between the tax administration and a competent authority such as an 
independent commission; or the responsibility lies with another department and not the tax 
administration. 
 Countries’ tax relief for the income of philanthropic entities can be separated into two approaches: 
(1) to exempt all or specific income, or (2) to consider all forms of income taxable, but allow the 
entity to reduce its taxable income through current or future reinvestments towards the fulfilment 
of their worthy purpose. Countries following the first approach generally exclude non-commercial 
income (received gifts or grants) from the tax base. Approaches to dealing with commercial 
activities and the income generated from those activities, diverge. A common approach is to 
exempt commercial income that is related to the worthy purpose and tax unrelated commercial 
income. 
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 Finally, countries that offer preferential VAT treatment to philanthropic entities tend to exempt them 
from having to collect VAT on certain (or all) supplies. Because such an exemption can create an 
input tax burden, some countries have implemented rules that help philanthropic entities reclaim 
some of their input tax.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 below summarises the not-for-profit, worthy purpose, public 
benefit and requirements across countries. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the administrative 
requirements and application processes that countries have put in place to ensure that the other conditions 
are being met. Section 3.4 discusses the tax treatment of philanthropic entities’ income. Section 3.5 gives 
an overview of countries’ VAT treatment of PBOs. Section 3.6 discusses other taxes and tax benefits that 
apply to philanthropic entities in some countries. Lastly, section 3.7 analyses the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion schemes that involve philanthropic entities. 
3.2. Qualifying for fund or PBO status and preferential tax treatment  
3.2.1. Not-for-profit entities and commercial activity 
The first requirement is that entities must be ‘not-for-profit’. The term originally used was non-profit but in 
the last 10 years it has been more commonly referred to as ‘not-for-profit’ to reflect that the entity may 
make a surplus, but that its purpose is not to make profits. Thus, the requirement does not in itself limit 
not-for-profit entities from engaging in commercial activity or even acquiring a surplus (as long as that 
surplus is not distributed as dividends or as unreasonably high salaries or payments). Nevertheless, 
countries may choose to limit the degree to which philanthropic entities benefitting from tax incentives are 
able to engage in commercial activity. Furthermore, in a number of countries philanthropic entities must 
reinvest their surplus towards activities aimed at fulfilling their worthy purpose. If philanthropic entities 
engage in too much commercial activity or do not reinvest the surplus into a worthy purpose, countries 
may choose to tax the commercial activity, as well as the remaining surplus, or strip the entities of their 
preferential tax status altogether.  
When philanthropic entities with a preferential tax treatment engage in commercial activity, it may raise 
unfair competition concerns if the goods or services supplied by the entity are also supplied by non-
philanthropic businesses. To overcome this challenge countries may limit the degree to which a 
philanthropic entity can engage in commercial activity, tax the commercial activity, limit the commercial 
activity they can engage in, or only limit the preferential tax treatment of commercial activities that lead to 
unfair competition with for-profit businesses. More detail on this requirement is provided in the section on 
the tax treatment of income of philanthropic entities below (Section 3.4).  
3.2.2. Worthy purpose requirements 
In general, a worthy purpose signifies a cause that is deemed by government to be deserving of the 
philanthropic gifts of a donor and the resources of a fund or PBO. This characteristic is subjective and can 
be determined by the donors or philanthropic entities that are choosing what cause to focus their 
philanthropy on. In this report, however, worthy purposes denote a set of causes that philanthropic entities, 
which are eligible for tax relief, are able to engage in. That is to say that for a philanthropic entity to receive 
preferential tax treatment, it must have a purpose that the state (e.g. the legislature or tax administration) 
accepts as worthy. In a number of countries (e.g. Germany and the United States), PBOs need to focus 
their resources on the worthy purposes they specified in their application for a PBO status. That is to say 
that they cannot simply change their objective to any of the accepted purposes without going through an 
administrative process. In Germany, for example, if a PBO wants to change its worthy purpose, or add a 
new one, it must report this to the fiscal authorities. 
   43 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
 Finally, countries that offer preferential VAT treatment to philanthropic entities tend to exempt them 
from having to collect VAT on certain (or all) supplies. Because such an exemption can create an 
input tax burden, some countries have implemented rules that help philanthropic entities reclaim 
some of their input tax.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 below summarises the not-for-profit, worthy purpose, public 
benefit and requirements across countries. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the administrative 
requirements and application processes that countries have put in place to ensure that the other conditions 
are being met. Section 3.4 discusses the tax treatment of philanthropic entities’ income. Section 3.5 gives 
an overview of countries’ VAT treatment of PBOs. Section 3.6 discusses other taxes and tax benefits that 
apply to philanthropic entities in some countries. Lastly, section 3.7 analyses the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion schemes that involve philanthropic entities. 
3.2. Qualifying for fund or PBO status and preferential tax treatment  
3.2.1. Not-for-profit entities and commercial activity 
The first requirement is that entities must be ‘not-for-profit’. The term originally used was non-profit but in 
the last 10 years it has been more commonly referred to as ‘not-for-profit’ to reflect that the entity may 
make a surplus, but that its purpose is not to make profits. Thus, the requirement does not in itself limit 
not-for-profit entities from engaging in commercial activity or even acquiring a surplus (as long as that 
surplus is not distributed as dividends or as unreasonably high salaries or payments). Nevertheless, 
countries may choose to limit the degree to which philanthropic entities benefitting from tax incentives are 
able to engage in commercial activity. Furthermore, in a number of countries philanthropic entities must 
reinvest their surplus towards activities aimed at fulfilling their worthy purpose. If philanthropic entities 
engage in too much commercial activity or do not reinvest the surplus into a worthy purpose, countries 
may choose to tax the commercial activity, as well as the remaining surplus, or strip the entities of their 
preferential tax status altogether.  
When philanthropic entities with a preferential tax treatment engage in commercial activity, it may raise 
unfair competition concerns if the goods or services supplied by the entity are also supplied by non-
philanthropic businesses. To overcome this challenge countries may limit the degree to which a 
philanthropic entity can engage in commercial activity, tax the commercial activity, limit the commercial 
activity they can engage in, or only limit the preferential tax treatment of commercial activities that lead to 
unfair competition with for-profit businesses. More detail on this requirement is provided in the section on 
the tax treatment of income of philanthropic entities below (Section 3.4).  
3.2.2. Worthy purpose requirements 
In general, a worthy purpose signifies a cause that is deemed by government to be deserving of the 
philanthropic gifts of a donor and the resources of a fund or PBO. This characteristic is subjective and can 
be determined by the donors or philanthropic entities that are choosing what cause to focus their 
philanthropy on. In this report, however, worthy purposes denote a set of causes that philanthropic entities, 
which are eligible for tax relief, are able to engage in. That is to say that for a philanthropic entity to receive 
preferential tax treatment, it must have a purpose that the state (e.g. the legislature or tax administration) 
accepts as worthy. In a number of countries (e.g. Germany and the United States), PBOs need to focus 
their resources on the worthy purposes they specified in their application for a PBO status. That is to say 
that they cannot simply change their objective to any of the accepted purposes without going through an 
administrative process. In Germany, for example, if a PBO wants to change its worthy purpose, or add a 
new one, it must report this to the fiscal authorities. 
44    
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
Table 3.1 presents a non-exhaustive list of worthy purpose categories that countries may choose to 
support by giving tax relief to philanthropic entities with such a purpose. In order to compare worthy 
purpose requirements across countries, the categories listed are umbrella terms that include any related 
philanthropic causes. Welfare, for example, includes organisations offering shelter to fight homelessness 
or foodbanks that distribute food to those in need. Other worthy purposes, such as culture, may include 
museums or particular movie theatres, but may also apply more generally to heritage organisations or 
entities supporting the arts through grants. The categories that are deemed worthy most frequently across 
countries are welfare (37), education (35), scientific research (34), and health care (34).   
Welfare qualifies as a worthy purpose in all countries listed except for Bulgaria, which is an anomaly as it 
only extends preferential tax treatment to the Bulgarian Red Cross. However, Bulgaria does offer tax relief 
to corporate and individual donors that give to entities other than the Bulgarian Red Cross (for more 
information see Chapter 4). Of the countries listed, Argentina, Bulgaria and Malta are the only countries 
that do not include education in their list of eligible causes. All countries listed in Table 3.1, except for Chile, 
Indonesia, Malta, and Bulgaria, include healthcare in their worthy purposes. South Africa, Malta, and 
Bulgaria are the only countries listed for which scientific research does not qualify as a worthy purpose. 
On the other hand, consumer protection (22), civil protection (28), animal protection (28), amateur sports 
(29), and religion (29) are the least frequently recognised worthy purpose categories across the countries 
listed. 
Table 3.1 also shows that some countries have broad definitions for what constitutes a worthy purpose, 
while other countries have a more narrow definition. For instance, all of the listed categories could be 
considered worthy purposes in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United States. 
Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Indonesia, Malta, and South Africa, on the other hand, all have a more narrow 
definition of what constitutes a worthy purpose.  
In the majority of countries, funds and PBOs that meet the worthy purpose and public benefit requirements 
to receive tax incentivised donations also meet the conditions to receive preferential tax treatment and vice 
versa. However, this is not the case in Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, South Africa, and the United States.  
In countries like Bulgaria, the worthy purpose conditions for incentivising giving are less narrow than those 
determining whether a fund or PBO can receive direct tax support. In Bulgaria, funds and PBOs with a 
qualifying worthy purpose can receive tax incentivised donations but only the Bulgarian Red Cross is 
eligible to receive preferential tax treatment directly.  
In Canada, worthy purpose conditions for incentivising giving are not identical to those determining whether 
a fund or PBO can receive direct tax support. In Canada tax-favoured donations can be made to funds and 
PBOs that engage in the worthy purpose activities listed in Table 3.1 as well as to: journalism 
organisations; municipal or public bodies performing a function of government in Canada; universities 
outside of Canada with Canadians in the student body; registered funds and PBOs outside Canada to 
which Her Majesty has made a gift; and the United Nations and its agencies. In general, however, it is 
more onerous for an organisation in Canada to become a registered charity organisation benefiting from 
tax-favoured donations than it is to be considered a non-profit. 
Conversely, in Norway, Sweden and South Africa, the conditions for receiving tax incentivised donations 
are more restrictive than those for receiving tax support directly. In Norway, for example, only a specific 
subset of the philanthropic entities eligible for tax exemption qualify to receive donations from which the 
donating party can claim a tax deduction. In order to qualify, the receiving entity’s worthy purpose must fall 
within the following categories: healthcare; activities directed at children and young people engaged in 
culture or amateur sports; religion; human rights; development aid; disaster relief; and environmental and 
cultural preservation. In South Africa, funds and PBOs are only eligible to receive tax incentivised donations 
if their worthy purpose falls within healthcare, welfare and education. 
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Argentina X   X X         X     X   X         X1 
Australia X X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X X   X2 
Austria X X X X X X X X   X X X X X X X X     
Belgium X X X X X X X X X X X X X     X X     
Bulgaria X   X   X  X  X  X  X  X      X  X  X          X3 
Canada X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X     
Chile X X X   X   X   X   X X     x   X     
Colombia X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X   X     
Czech Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Estonia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Finland X X X X X X   X X     X     X     X X4 
France X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X X   
Germany X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Greece X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
India X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X5 
Indonesia X X X       X             X X       X6 
Ireland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Israel X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Italy X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X   X  
Japan X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Latvia X X X X X X X X   X   X X   X X X     
Lithuania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Luxembourg X X X X  X X  X  X X X    X  X  X X X  X      
Malta X                 X     X             
Mexico X X X X X X X X X X X X       X X X X7 
Netherlands X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X     
New Zealand X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Norway X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X8 
Portugal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Romania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Singapore                                     X9 
Slovak Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Slovenia  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X10 
South Africa X X   X   X         X     X X         
Sweden X X X X X X X X   X X   X X X         
Switzerland X X X X X X X X X X X   X     X   X   
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
United States X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X11 
Frequency 37 35 34 34 33 33 33 32 31 31 30 30 30 29 29 28 28 22   
Notes:  
1. Charity, Art and Literature, Unions 
2. Sporting clubs in general, employer and employee associations, trade unions, associations promoting primary and secondary resources and 
tourism. 
3. The activities of the Bulgarian Red Cross. 
4. Finland does not have an exhaustive list of worthy purposes and categories identified in this table are from a list of non-exhaustive examples 
in the income tax act.  
5. Yoga and the advancement of any other object of general public utility.  
6. Scholarship awarding; environmental preservation.  
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Argentina X   X X         X     X   X         X1 
Australia X X X X X X X X X X X   X X X X X   X2 
Austria X X X X X X X X   X X X X X X X X     
Belgium X X X X X X X X X X X X X     X X     
Bulgaria X   X   X  X  X  X  X  X      X  X  X          X3 
Canada X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X     
Chile X X X   X   X   X   X X     x   X     
Colombia X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X   X     
Czech Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Estonia X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
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France X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X X   
Germany X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Greece X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
India X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X5 
Indonesia X X X       X             X X       X6 
Ireland X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Israel X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Italy X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X   X  
Japan X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Latvia X X X X X X X X   X   X X   X X X     
Lithuania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Luxembourg X X X X  X X  X  X X X    X  X  X X X  X      
Malta X                 X     X             
Mexico X X X X X X X X X X X X       X X X X7 
Netherlands X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   X X     
New Zealand X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Norway X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X8 
Portugal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Romania X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Singapore                                     X9 
Slovak Republic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X   
Slovenia  X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X10 
South Africa X X   X   X         X     X X         
Sweden X X X X X X X X   X X   X X X         
Switzerland X X X X X X X X X X X   X     X   X   
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X  
United States X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X11 
Frequency 37 35 34 34 33 33 33 32 31 31 30 30 30 29 29 28 28 22   
Notes:  
1. Charity, Art and Literature, Unions 
2. Sporting clubs in general, employer and employee associations, trade unions, associations promoting primary and secondary resources and 
tourism. 
3. The activities of the Bulgarian Red Cross. 
4. Finland does not have an exhaustive list of worthy purposes and categories identified in this table are from a list of non-exhaustive examples 
in the income tax act.  
5. Yoga and the advancement of any other object of general public utility.  
6. Scholarship awarding; environmental preservation.  
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7. The worthy purposes for Mexico in this table, are limited to those that receive deductible donations. Other worthy purposes, such as amateur 
sports, religious or some mutual societies can only benefit from preferential income tax treatment. 
8. The tax act does not contain a specification of what constitutes an entity with worthy purposes or activity of public benefit. 
9. Recognises charitable purposes as defined in common: (i) relief of poverty; (ii) advancement of education; (iii) advancement of religion; and 
(iv) other purposes beneficial to the community, such as health-promotion, advancement of arts and heritage, and environmental protection.  
10. Must be considered “generally useful” (splošnokoristen). 
11. Amateur athletics (added for 1976 Olympics). 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire  
3.2.3. Public benefit requirements 
For an entity to be philanthropic, its worthy purpose must be for the public benefit. Generally speaking this 
means that the worthy purpose of a fund or PBO has to benefit the public as a whole or a sufficient section 
of the public (sometimes referred to as a charitable or public class). If the circle of beneficiaries does not 
constitute a sufficient section of the public, the entity’s purpose would only be for the private benefit of a 
few individuals and therefore not meet the necessary requirements to qualify as a philanthropic entity 
worthy of receiving preferential tax treatment.  
Typically, some worthy purposes are considered to benefit the public as a whole, meaning that the benefit 
is not limited to people who satisfy a particular criteria. Such worthy purposes may include, for example, 
protecting the environment, scientific discovery, or animal protection. Other worthy purposes, however, 
tend to benefit a circle of beneficiaries and countries typically regulate the size and/or the criteria used to 
specify who can benefit. An example of a worthy purpose that specifies who can benefit, is a disability 
support group. Generally, countries consider a circle of beneficiaries that is defined by need to be a 
sufficient section of the public.  
Some entities, however, define their circle of beneficiaries using characteristics such as age, disability, 
gender, sexual orientation, race, nationality, pregnancy, or religion. Public benefit rules addressing this 
issue can be categorised into three approaches: countries may restrict philanthropic entities from using 
individual characteristics to define who can benefit altogether; countries may approve a list of 
characteristics (sometimes referred to as protected characteristics) that philanthropic entities are permitted 
to use in order to specify who can benefit; or countries may only allow limiting benefits to people with these 
characteristics if the criteria can be justified in relation to the worthy purpose (e.g., under this approach, a 
PBO committed to the health and well-being of pregnant women can use pregnancy as a characteristic to 
limit the circle of beneficiaries but cannot specify that only individuals of a particular religion may benefit 
from its services).  
The benefit must be open to all and cannot be restricted 
Some countries (e.g. Austria, France, and Slovenia) stipulate that the circle of beneficiaries needs to be 
open to the public and cannot be restricted by specific characteristics of individuals such as gender, sex, 
religion, or origin. In Austria, the circle of beneficiaries has to be the general public in the sense that the 
activity is in line with public interest in regard to intellectual, cultural or material subjects. Furthermore, the 
circle of beneficiaries of public benefit activities cannot be restricted by specific characteristics, including 
sex and gender. In Slovenia, there is no minimum number of people that need to be in the circle of 
beneficiaries and the benefit cannot be limited by individual characteristics including skill, gender, religion, 
nationality, or origin.  
In France, PBOs are referred to as general interest organisations (association d’intérêt general) and can 
issue tax receipts to their donors so that they can benefit from the tax incentive for giving. To be eligible 
for such a status, an entity must meet the public benefit requirement of not working for the benefit of a 
small circle of people. Furthermore, the interests and activities of a general interest organisation must be 
able to benefit everyone, without being limited to any criteria (e.g., race, sex, profession, or religion). 
Additionally, a general interest organisation can become an association of public utility (association d’utilité 
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publique). An association of public utility can receive, in addition to gifts which any PBO can benefit from, 
donations and bequests. To become an association of public utility, a PBO must fulfil additional public 
benefit requirements, such as having an influence and outreach beyond the local context and a minimum 
of 200 members. 
The benefit can be restricted by specified characteristics 
A number of countries allow philanthropic entities to restrict who can benefit using certain characteristics 
(e.g., Chile, Colombia, Greece, Israel, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Norway, Romania, Singapore, the Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, and Switzerland). In Colombia and Switzerland, for example, entities are allowed 
to benefit only one gender but may not use any other characteristics to further restrict who can benefit. In 
Mexico, no restrictions are allowed regarding origin, religion, or nationality. However, restrictions based on 
gender and potentially other characteristics are possible. For instance, philanthropic entities can 
concentrate their support on single mothers. The rule is that they must fulfil their specific purpose.  
In Israel philanthropic entities can target only one gender and can specify origin, or nationality. In Latvia a 
worthy purpose can benefit target groups such as children, young people, people in poverty, and disabled 
people but the philanthropic activity must reach people regardless of their skill, origin, religion or nationality. 
In Lithuania there are no rules that prohibit entities selecting their beneficiaries based on gender or skill as 
long as the activity is in line with the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. The philanthropic 
activities of the entities must also reach people regardless of their origin, religion, or nationality. In 
Romania, on the other hand, entities cannot benefit only one gender but may specify their circle of 
beneficiaries using other individual characteristics such as skill, religion, or nationality.  Singapore permits 
entities to target only one gender if their activities also benefit the public as a whole. For example, PBOs 
such as the Boys Brigade and Girls Brigade engage in activities that benefit the wider community. Chile, 
Greece, Malta and the Slovak Republic have no rules regarding whether or not entities can limit their 
philanthropic activity to individuals with particular characteristics.  
The characteristics used to specify who can benefit must relate to the worthy purpose 
Lastly, a number of countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Germany, India, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States) only permit 
philanthropic entities to limit the circle of beneficiaries to people with particular characteristics if it can be 
justified with their worthy purpose.  
In Australia, philanthropic entities must have a purpose that provides a benefit to the general public or a 
sufficient section of the general public. Whether a purpose benefits a sufficient section of the general public 
is to be assessed on registration. Certain PBOs are presumed to be for the public benefit, such as those 
involved in the relief of poverty. PBOs can limit their beneficiaries to a gender if such a restriction relates 
to the worthy purpose. For example, a charity providing support to victims of domestic violence may be 
permitted to provide services only to women, and a charity with a purpose of advancing health may provide 
services only to men with mental health concerns.  Similarly, a tax-exempt PBO may promote a specific 
religion or provide services to people who have migrated to Australia from a specific country. 
Belgian law prohibits discrimination on grounds of age, sexual orientation, marital status, birth, property, 
religious or philosophical belief, political conviction, language, present or future state of health, disability, 
physical or genetic characteristic or social origin. However, if the PBO receives its accreditation for the 
purpose of benefiting a defined category of people (e.g. disabled persons), it may limit its action to this 
specific section of the public. Such PBOs include associations that specifically defend women's rights with 
a view to achieving greater gender equality. Regarding the geographic reach of an entity’s activities, 
specific criteria are defined by both the Ministry of Finance and the competent authority:  
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 Scientific research: Entities must be active throughout the national or regional territory and not only 
at the local level. 
 Culture: Entities must be active throughout the national territory and not only at the local level, and 
may not be related to teaching activities which fall within the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education. 
 Protection of nature and the environment: Entities must demonstrate that their activities are of a 
continuous and sustainable nature, have an area of influence that extends to more than one 
municipality. 
 Assistance to war victims, to the disabled, the elderly, minors of protected age and people living in 
poverty: Entities must be active throughout the national territory and not only at the local level. 
 Aid to victims of natural disasters recognised in Belgium, aid to developing countries, assistance 
to victims of major industrial accidents and sustainable development: Entities must be active 
throughout the national or regional territory and not only at the local level. 
 Donations to associations that assist the disabled may only benefit the disabled and not their 
families. 
 For cultural associations, activities must be organised in three different provinces. Local 
associations are excluded. A calendar of activities and an activity report for the past year must be 
provided. 
In Canada an entity that benefits only one gender may be eligible to be a registered PBO and receive 
preferential tax treatment if it can show that there is a need to do so. All types of limitations to access have 
the potential to prevent an entity from being registered as a PBO, although to differing degrees. Entities 
that want an outright restriction of benefit or exclusion of services have a far greater burden of establishing 
public benefit than those entities that want only to focus attention on a specific group, but extend service 
delivery to the general public. Most importantly, when a PBO proposes to restrict the beneficiaries of an 
activity in any way, the nature of the restriction must be clearly linked to the proposed benefit. For example, 
a religious charity may well be limited to those who are adherents of that particular religious faith, whereas 
that same limitation would not suffice for an organisation established to assist persons with a disability. 
Overall, an entity with an unreasonably limiting service or programme, will not meet the public benefit 
requirements, unless the restrictions are shown to be relevant to achieving the charitable purpose. 
Within the public benefit requirements, there are several sub-requirements. For instance, the benefit should 
generally be tangible; the beneficiaries must be the public-at-large or come from a sufficient segment of 
the public as determined by the charitable purpose being considered; the entity may not otherwise benefit 
private individuals except under certain limited conditions; subject to some exceptions, the entity cannot 
exist for the benefit of its members; the entity cannot charge fees for its services where the effect of the 
charge would unduly exclude members of the public. 
In Estonia, the benefits of the philanthropic activity must be identifiable and justifiable, but not quantifiable. 
Philanthropic activities cannot only be aimed at individuals with specific characteristics and need to benefit 
a sufficient section of the public. If targeting only one gender can be justified with the entity’s worthy 
purpose, that would be considered a sufficient section of the public. The worthy purpose must not benefit 
a fixed number of people. If the not-for-profit entity has members, it must have two or more.   
In Germany, the worthy purpose must be dedicated to the altruistic advancement of the general public. In 
2017 the federal fiscal court in Germany decided that a PBO cannot be for the common-benefit if it excludes 
women from its membership without a relevant justification. The ruling has led to public debate. Member 
based entities are eligible for preferential tax treatment. There is a minimum number of seven members in 
order to establish a registered association. Non-registered associations may also be eligible for the 
preferential tax treatment. 
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In India a philanthropic entity cannot be for a private religious purpose or be a trust “for the benefit of any 
particular religious community or caste”. Activities may cater to women, children and vulnerable sections 
of society. Similarly in Japan, the beneficiaries can be specified by characteristics such as gender, religion, 
or ability as long as the there is a relevant connection with the worthy purpose. For example, a women’s 
rights organisation can target people based on gender, a religious organisation can target people based 
on religion, or an educational facility can target people based on skill or ability.  
In Italy, most philanthropic entities are open to all, without restrictions to beneficiaries. However, some 
kinds of entities can restrict the benefits from their activities to some groups with characteristics related to 
the PBO’s worthy purpose (for example, philanthropic organisations that help disadvantaged people to find 
employment). 
In the Netherlands, there is no specific definition of ‘public benefit’. In the legislation as well as in case law, 
this term is neutrally described, so that there may be different opinions as to whether the organisation 
benefits the public. The circle of beneficiaries can be restricted by the entity if, for example, its worthy 
purpose is promoting equal treatment of men and women and therefore focusses only on women. 
Importantly, however, the purpose and activities of a philanthropic entity may not violate the constitution 
or international treaties, which forbid discrimination based on (amongst other characteristics) gender, race 
and religion. 
In New Zealand, philanthropic activity needs to benefit a sufficient section of the public. Imposing fees for 
access to a benefit can be acceptable if done reasonably. For example, by providing a benefit that can 
only be accessed by members of a certain group (e.g. a scholarship for Māori students). Limits on public 
access must be reasonable and appropriate. When members of an organisation can also benefit, any 
limitations on membership must also be reasonable in the context of the benefit to the public. For example, 
a society of doctors set up to improve medical practice may reasonably limit its membership to qualified 
doctors, because the real benefit is to the wider public from the improvement of public health. 
In Sweden, member based entities are eligible if they are open to the public. Nevertheless, they are allowed 
to make certain restrictions (e.g., age limit for a shooting club, the ability to play an instrument for an 
orchestra etc.). Similarly, their activities can target only one gender only if this target is naturally associated 
with the objective of the member based entity. 
In the United States, entities need to support a charitable “class”, and not provide a more than insubstantial 
private benefit.  There is not a specific number that constitutes a charitable class, however it must either 
be large enough that potential beneficiaries cannot be individually identified, or sufficiently indefinite that 
the community as a whole, rather than a pre-selected group of people receive benefits. Clubs and 
associations that are not charities are eligible for limited preferential tax treatment and there is not a specific 
minimum number of members needed. 
3.3. Tax Administration and application processes 
3.3.1. Application process 
To ensure that the entities receiving preferential tax treatment meet the public benefit, worthy purpose, 
and not-for-profit conditions, almost all countries surveyed in this report require philanthropic entities to 
undergo a specific application process to become eligible for preferential tax treatment. The assessing 
body must therefore approve entities before they are able to receive the preferential tax treatment. In a 
number of countries (e.g., Canada, France, Ireland, New Zealand, Colombia, and Germany), entities are 
able to apply before starting to operate. An advantage of this approach may be that entities can address 
issues from the start and thereby reduce the chance that they do not receive preferential tax status after 
they have already started operating. On the other hand, the shortcoming of such an approach may be that 
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countries grant entities preferential tax status without being able to evaluate their performance or 
operations. Following up with the entity after it receives its initial tax privileges is a potential way in which 
countries could address this issue. For example, within three years after the approval of the status, the 
German tax administration monitors whether the requirements of the preferential tax treatment are still 
met. In France, the tax administration has six months to respond from the date of receipt of the application. 
After six months without notification of an administration agreement, a general interest association can 
receive preferential tax treatment. When it is negative, the tax administration must justify its decision. If the 
general interest organisation does not agree with the tax administration, it can send a second application 
within two months.  
On the other hand, some countries (e.g., Belgium, Romania, and Argentina), require entities to have 
already been operating for a minimum period of time before they can apply. In Belgium, for example, PBOs 
must provide an activity report for the past year as well as a detailed statement of the current year's 
projects. In Argentina, entities that apply to receive PBO status with preferential tax treatment must 
demonstrate an initial (and largely symbolic, given recent inflation rates) social capital of ARS 1 000 in the 
general case, and ARS 200 for entities with a worthy purpose to promote economic, social and cultural 
rights of vulnerable groups and/or ethnic communities with a poverty or vulnerability status. In the case of 
foundations, the minimum initial social capital required is ARS 80 000. In Romania, entities must have 
been operating for at least three years and have achieved part of their philanthropic objectives before they 
can apply for tax relief. 
In some countries (e.g., Norway and Lithuania), there is no application process for philanthropic entities to 
receive some of the preferential tax treatments. The benefits of not having an application process for 
preferential tax treatment may be to reduce the administrative burden on the entities as well as on the 
assessing body but this may raise issues of accountability. In Norway, for instance, there is no application 
process for qualifying philanthropic entities to benefit from direct preferential tax treatment. For funds and 
PBOs to be able to receive tax-incentivised donations, however, the entity must apply to the tax 
administration and fulfil the accounting and auditing requirements. Similarly, in Lithuania, there is also no 
registration process for philanthropic entities to receive most forms of preferential tax treatment, but if a 
PBO would like to receive sponsorship, it must apply to become an eligible sponsorship recipient.  
3.3.2. Assessing body 
To ensure that philanthropic entities meet the necessary conditions to benefit from preferential tax 
treatment, countries task their tax administration, other ministries or independent commissions with 
accreditation and oversight responsibilities. Table 3.2 shows that the majority of countries (16) have 
specific departments or units within their tax administration and/or Ministry of Finance that are dedicated 
to the philanthropic sector. Such countries may or may not have another department or independent body 
that oversees the funds and PBOs. To ensure that tax relief is targeted efficiently, the oversight body has 
to be able to determine whether the entity is productively fulfilling its worthy purpose. For PBOs with a 
cultural purpose, for example, such a determination may require a very different set of expertise as for 
PBOs with a welfare or environmental objective.  
Table 3.2. Departments devoted to the tax treatment of philanthropic entities 
Countries with a specific department/unit in the 
Ministry of Finance and/or tax administration that 
is dedicated to philanthropy: 
Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Canada; Estonia; Germany; India; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Malta; 
Mexico; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Singapore; South Africa; Sweden; Switzerland; and 
the United Kingdom and the United States1; 
Countries without a specific department/unit in 
the Ministry of Finance and/or tax administration 
that is dedicated to philanthropy: 
Austria; Bulgaria; Chile; Colombia; Czech Republic; France; Indonesia; Lithuania; Latvia; 
Norway; Portugal; Romania; the Slovak Republic; and Slovenia 
Note:  
1. In the United States, the IRS has an office devoted to Exempt Organizations (including philanthropic entities). 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire  
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Table 3.3 indicates where within the government the administrative process of accrediting and overseeing 
philanthropic entities takes place. Countries typically follow one of three broad approaches: the tax 
administration is responsible for the accreditation process; the responsibility is shared between the tax 
administration and a competent authority; or the responsibility lies with another department and not the tax 
administration. 
Table 3.3. Administering body by country 
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4. Registry Agency to the Ministry of Justice.  
5. Tax administration and other competent entities, depending on the activity (e.g., social security, ministry of education, etc.).  
6. Ministry of Interior (“Ministère de l’Intérieur”).  
7. Ministry of Law and Human Rights (for the record of establishment and financial report. 
8. The Charities Regulatory Authority.  
9. With the implementation of the reform, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies will be in charge of administering the new National Register 
of PBOs together with the Tax Administration. 
10. The Commission is a collegial consultative body which includes, in equal number, authorized officials as well as representatives of 
associations and foundations.  
11. Centre of Registers under the supervision of Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania.  
12. The Ministry of Justice as well as the Direct Tax Administration play a role in the administration of PBOs and funds. 
13. Charities Services (Department of Internal Affairs).  
14. There is no accreditation process. However, organisations can request either a binding or advisory advance ruling from the tax administration 
with respect to whether it would qualify for tax exempt status.  
15. General Secretariat of the Government. 
16. Administrative office (as part of state).  
17. Organizations are generally registered as non-profits by the states before they apply to the IRS to receive preferential tax treatment.  
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire  
Tax administration 
In the majority of countries, the responsibility over the accreditation process lies within the tax 
administration (see Table 3.3). This is the case in, for example, Argentina, Austria, Colombia, Estonia, 
Finland, India, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. In all of these countries, entities applying for preferential tax treatment need to apply directly 
to the tax administration, which is then tasked with reviewing the provided materials and determine 
eligibility. The majority of the countries following this approach (Argentina, Australia, Estonia, India, Israel, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, and Sweden) have a department or unit in 
their tax administration that is dedicated to philanthropy (see Table 3.2). For those countries in particular, 
a benefit of this approach may be to centralise the oversight process. On the other hand, this approach 
may require the tax administration to devote a significant amount of resources to entities that pay little to 
no taxes. Depending on the political environment, there could be competing pressures to prioritise 
revenue-raising activities over administering tax incentives for funds and PBOs. In such cases, there may 
be advantages in involving other parts of the government. 
The Colombian approach is unique because it allows the public to be involved in the accreditation process. 
As Figure 3.1 below shows, once the submission of the request and the fulfilment of the online registry are 
correctly completed, the information of the entity will be published online, allowing the public to comment 
on it for five business days. After this, the Colombian tax administration will have four months to decide if 
it approves or denies the request of the entity to be classified as a philanthropic entity benefiting from the 
special tax regime (see the Figure 3.1 for more details on the timeline). 
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Figure 3.1. Colombian special tax regime application process 
 
Note: The days in the infographic correspond to business days 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire  
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Environment and Regional Development, as well as representatives of funds and PBOs who are 
competent and have experience in one of the worthy purpose fields.  
In Ireland, philanthropic entities must firstly apply to an independent charity commission in order to be 
granted philanthropic status. Following that, philanthropic entities can apply to the tax administration for 
tax exemption. To be eligible for tax concessions in New Zealand, charities must first register with the 
Charities Services (a group within the Department of Internal Affairs with an independent charities 
registration board of three people). As part of the registration process, entities must disclose to Charities 
Services if they operate, or intend to operate, overseas. This information is passed on to the tax 
administration to further consider the charity’s eligibility for income tax concessions and for receiving tax-
incentivised donations. Other PBO’s that may be fully income tax exempt, but are not considered charities 
in New Zealand (e.g., amateur sports bodies, or ‘friendly societies’) must apply to the tax administration 
directly and provide a copy of their company rules to ensure their funds can only be applied to their worthy 
purposes before the tax exemption is approved. Other clubs and associations, which are not eligible for 
full income tax exemptions, are also required to supply the tax administration with copies of their rules as 
they may be entitled to a limited NZD 1 000 tax deduction but unlike registered charities, are expected to 
file a tax return.  
In Australia, the assessing body responsible for all decisions, regarding the registration and removal of 
organisations from the charities register is the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC). 
A charity must be registered with the ACNC to be exempt from income tax and obtain other tax 
concessions. Furthermore, a charity must be endorsed by the tax administration to be exempt from income 
tax. An entity wishing to be a deductible gift recipient must be endorsed by the tax administration or 
specifically named in tax legislation. The tax administration’s endorsement process typically takes less 
than 28 days.  
Other department 
Not all countries follow the above approaches of involving the tax administration in oversight 
responsibilities. In Lithuania, for example, the assessing body in charge of the application process to 
becoming a sponsorship recipient is the Centre of Registers under the supervision of the Ministry of the 
Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania. In Luxembourg, a PBO (like any other corporation) 
has to file annual accounts with the Company and Trade Register, which have to be supervised and 
approved by an independent auditor. PBOs may only own property or buildings necessary to carry out its 
mission. In Romania, the assessing body is the General Secretariat of the Government. In Bulgaria, the 
Registry Agency to the Minister of Justice is the body responsible for accrediting philanthropic entities, 
which enables them to receive tax-incentivised donations. 
3.3.3. Additional reporting requirements 
Regardless of what authority is tasked with approving philanthropic entities for tax privileges, the assessing 
body typically requires funds and PBOs to provide them with the information they need to evaluate whether 
or not the entities are, and continue to be, eligible to receive the philanthropic status as well as the 
associated preferential tax treatment. The requirements differ across countries and there is a trade-off 
between requiring entities to provide a lot of detailed information at the cost of a high administrative burden 
and minimal information at the cost of less oversight and perhaps more misconduct. The information 
requirements that countries implement can be categorised into record keeping requirements (so that 
entities can be audited effectively); annual reporting requirements (to help the administrative body oversee 
whether the entities continue to meet the worthy purpose, public benefit and not-for-profit conditions); 
constitutional requirements (to align the company rules with the tax rules); and an activities plan 
requirement (to help the assessing body evaluate the entity’s future plans).  
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Application and record keeping requirements 
Record keeping requirements are necessary for effective auditing. For example, the Canadian tax 
administration conducts selective audits of registered philanthropic entities each year to evaluate whether 
they continue to qualify for registration and ensure they follow the rules (the tax administration maintains 
an audit coverage of approximately 1%).  Funds and PBOs are required to provide books and records to 
demonstrate that their resources were used for worthy purposes and to ensure that official donation 
receipts were issued. So that entities have all the necessary information available during an audit, 
registered funds and PBOs in Canada are obliged to:  
 maintain direction and control of the use of all their resources; 
 meet their annual spending requirement (disbursement quota); 
 keep reliable and complete books and records;  
 issue complete and accurate official donation receipts (see Chapter 4 for more details on 
requirements relating to donation receipts). 
In Belgium, PBOs must provide a budget for the current fiscal year; and the accounts of the last two 
accounting years. Furthermore, they must formally commit to limit management fees to less than 20%, 
limit advertising costs to less than 30%, and make no profits. The minimum duration of the process of 
accreditation is three months. Similarly, in Ireland the application for tax-exempt status must include a full 
set of recent financial accounts; a constitution; a plan for activities for the year ahead; and proof of 
registration of PBO or fund status with an independent charity commission.  
Philanthropic entities in the Netherlands must keep accounting records from which the following can be 
inferred: 
 the nature and scope of the expense allowances and/or attendance fees granted to the separate 
members of the board; 
 the nature and scope of the management activities, and the other costs incurred by the entity; and 
 the nature and scope of the income and the assets held by the entity. 
In Lithuania, philanthropic entities entitled to receive sponsorship must keep separate accounts for 
sponsorship received as well as for donations and/or services provided. Additionally, they must submit 
their monthly or annual reports to the tax administration. If the amount of the sponsorship received since 
the beginning of a calendar year from a single provider of sponsorship exceeds EUR 15 000, the entity 
must submit a monthly report. 
In Colombia, the application process requires the following information:  
 a description of the entity’s worthy purpose; 
 the amount and destination of the reinvestment of the net benefits or surpluses, when applicable; 
 the amount and destination of permanent assignments that have been made in the taxable year;; 
 names of the persons that manage, direct or control the entity; 
 the salary of the members of the governing body of the entity; 
 names of the founders; 
 the amount of equity  as of December 31st of the previous year;  
 the identification of the donors and the amount of the donations, as well as the destination of such 
donation and the projected term for expenditure or investment (if applicable);  
 an annual report of the results that establishes the information about ongoing projects and 
concluded ones, income, agreements entered into, subsidies and contributions received, as well 
as goals achieved for the public benefit; 
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 financial statements of the entity; 
 a certificate of the legal representative or controller, as well as the income tax return that 
establishes that the entity has complied with all requirements for the taxable year; 
In France, PBOs benefiting from a preferential tax treatment are subject to audit by the Court of Auditors. 
Organizations receiving more than EUR 153 000 in grants or more than EUR 153 000 in philanthropic gifts, 
must have their account records certified by an external auditor each year. 
In Luxembourg, PBOs must determine who their beneficial owners are and have to declare them in the 
register of beneficial owners. A form must be completed with the information required by law in order to 
complete this declaration (in most cases, it will be the members of the board of directors). 
Annual reporting requirements 
A number of countries have annual reporting requirements (e.g., Australia, Colombia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Singapore). Typically, annual reporting helps the assessing body monitor an entity’s activities and 
assess whether they are still meeting all the necessary requirements. In Australia, for example, a registered 
entity must provide annual reports – an Annual Information Statement and for medium and large entities, 
a financial statement - to the ACNC. If a philanthropic entity is income tax exempt, it does not need to 
submit an income tax return, although there is a requirement to do so if requested by the tax administration. 
However, if applicable, such an entity may need to submit statements in relation to the VAT. Similarly, in 
order for philanthropic entities to maintain their status in Colombia, funds and PBOs of the special tax 
regime must annually submit their financial and legal information to the Colombian tax administration. 
Furthermore, all entities belonging to the special tax regime must file an annual income tax return. 
Some countries require funds and PBOs to make their information publicly available. This is the case in 
the Netherlands, where philanthropic entities must publish information about the organisation on their own 
website or on a communal website of a trade organisation for example. An advantage of this approach 
may be in fostering the public’s trust in the philanthropic sector.  
A number of countries require philanthropic entities to submit tax returns regardless of whether or not they 
are liable to pay taxes. In Germany, for example, funds and PBOs that receive preferential tax treatment 
can self-assess but are required to submit tax returns even if no tax is payable. Similarly, funds and PBOs 
in Slovenia can self-assess but are required to submit tax returns. On the other hand, for an entity to 
receive preferential tax treatment in the Slovak Republic, the only condition is to establish a business with 
a worthy purpose. The philanthropic entity is then required to submit tax returns but only if their income 
includes non-exempt income. 
In the United States, philanthropic entities (other than churches) must apply for tax exemption from the tax 
administration and receive a tax-exempt status. After the tax-exempt status is granted, the entities (other 
than churches) must file annual information tax returns, which are available to the public. Additionally, if 
they engage in any unrelated trade or business activity, the philanthropic entities (including churches) must 
file a separate tax return, which is also available to the public. 
Company rules and related requirements 
Some countries (e.g., Ireland, New Zealand, Estonia, Mexico, and the Netherlands) require entities to 
report their company rules, constitution or bylaws with the administration, so that they can ensure that they 
are in line with the requirements necessary to receive preferential tax treatment. For example, to be 
qualified as a fund or PBO in the Netherlands, the articles of association of the philanthropic entity must 
stipulate that, in the event of liquidation, the assets remaining are to be passed on to a philanthropic entity 
with a similar purpose or on a foreign philanthropic entity that is (entirely or almost) exclusively committed 
to the public good and has a similar worthy purpose. In New Zealand, clubs and associations which are 
not eligible for full income tax exemptions are required to supply the tax administration with copies of their 
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rules as they may be entitled to a limited NZD 1 000 tax deduction, but are also expected to file a tax 
return. Funds and PBOs in Mexico must include the current company bylaws in their application along with 
a proof of the nature of their activities. 
Activities plan requirement 
In a few countries (e.g., Belgium, Ireland, Colombia, Estonia, and Romania), entities have to provide the 
administration body with an activities plan. A benefit of this approach may be that countries can evaluate 
whether the entities have successfully made progress on their objectives but also allows them to flag any 
issues of eligibility ahead of time. For example, Belgium requires entities to provide a calendar of activities 
and an activity report for the past year as well as a detailed statement of the current year's projects.  
In order to receive preferential tax treatment in Estonia, a philanthropic entity must submit an application 
complying with the requirements of the tax administration. The application should describe the activities of 
the association in the current year (including planned activities), explain the philanthropic activities carried 
out for the public benefit, describe the future visions of the entity and provide the necessary information on 
its founders. In addition to the application, the objectives set out in the articles of the entity and in the 
annual report are reviewed by the tax administration. 
Philanthropic entities in Romania must present an activity report accompanied by annual financial 
statements as well as revenue statements and expenditure budgets for the three years prior to the 
application. The entity must also show proof of collaboration and partnership contracts with public 
institutions, associations or foundations in the country or abroad. Lastly, the entity should be able to show 
significant results in the fulfilment of its worthy purpose or present recommendation letters from competent 
authorities.  
In Singapore, entities that wish to be a registered charity have to apply to the Commissioner of Charities, 
who assesses the application. Once registered, the philanthropic entity is required to make an annual 
submission to the Commissioner of Charities, which includes an annual report (including financial 
statements and a governance evaluation checklist). 
3.4. Tax treatment of income of philanthropic entities 
3.4.1. Sources of income 
Philanthropic entities may have commercial and/or non-commercial income, but the distinction is not 
always clear or the same across countries. Generally, non-commercial income refers to income from 
philanthropic gifts (discussed in Chapter 4) and government grants, or (in the case of PBOs) grants from 
supporting funds. Income from philanthropic gifts includes donations from individuals and corporations and 
testamentary transfers from individuals. In relation to these transfers, in countries that levy an inheritance 
tax instead of an estate tax, the tax liability is with the beneficiary and therefore an inheritance tax incentive 
for giving would benefit the philanthropic entity receiving the inheritance.  
Broadly, commercial income is income derived from the supply of goods or services in return for some 
form of payment. When a corporation makes a payment as sponsorship (i.e. in return for publicity) to a 
philanthropic entity, it may, in some countries, be considered commercial income. That is to say that to the 
extent that the publicity resulting from sponsoring a philanthropic entity is a service, such income could be 
considered commercial.  
Countries’ tax relief for the income of philanthropic entities can be separated into two approaches: (1) to 
exempt all or specific income (e.g. income from philanthropic gifts), or (2) to consider all forms of income 
taxable, but allow the entity to reduce its taxable income through current or future reinvestments towards 
the fulfilment of their worthy purpose. Table 3.4 shows that most countries tend to follow the first approach. 
   57 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
rules as they may be entitled to a limited NZD 1 000 tax deduction, but are also expected to file a tax 
return. Funds and PBOs in Mexico must include the current company bylaws in their application along with 
a proof of the nature of their activities. 
Activities plan requirement 
In a few countries (e.g., Belgium, Ireland, Colombia, Estonia, and Romania), entities have to provide the 
administration body with an activities plan. A benefit of this approach may be that countries can evaluate 
whether the entities have successfully made progress on their objectives but also allows them to flag any 
issues of eligibility ahead of time. For example, Belgium requires entities to provide a calendar of activities 
and an activity report for the past year as well as a detailed statement of the current year's projects.  
In order to receive preferential tax treatment in Estonia, a philanthropic entity must submit an application 
complying with the requirements of the tax administration. The application should describe the activities of 
the association in the current year (including planned activities), explain the philanthropic activities carried 
out for the public benefit, describe the future visions of the entity and provide the necessary information on 
its founders. In addition to the application, the objectives set out in the articles of the entity and in the 
annual report are reviewed by the tax administration. 
Philanthropic entities in Romania must present an activity report accompanied by annual financial 
statements as well as revenue statements and expenditure budgets for the three years prior to the 
application. The entity must also show proof of collaboration and partnership contracts with public 
institutions, associations or foundations in the country or abroad. Lastly, the entity should be able to show 
significant results in the fulfilment of its worthy purpose or present recommendation letters from competent 
authorities.  
In Singapore, entities that wish to be a registered charity have to apply to the Commissioner of Charities, 
who assesses the application. Once registered, the philanthropic entity is required to make an annual 
submission to the Commissioner of Charities, which includes an annual report (including financial 
statements and a governance evaluation checklist). 
3.4. Tax treatment of income of philanthropic entities 
3.4.1. Sources of income 
Philanthropic entities may have commercial and/or non-commercial income, but the distinction is not 
always clear or the same across countries. Generally, non-commercial income refers to income from 
philanthropic gifts (discussed in Chapter 4) and government grants, or (in the case of PBOs) grants from 
supporting funds. Income from philanthropic gifts includes donations from individuals and corporations and 
testamentary transfers from individuals. In relation to these transfers, in countries that levy an inheritance 
tax instead of an estate tax, the tax liability is with the beneficiary and therefore an inheritance tax incentive 
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taxable, but allow the entity to reduce its taxable income through current or future reinvestments towards 
the fulfilment of their worthy purpose. Table 3.4 shows that most countries tend to follow the first approach. 
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Colombia, Indonesia, Lithuania, and Ireland follow the second approach, where all income (including 
philanthropic gifts) is considered taxable unless it is reinvested towards the fulfilment or the worthy purpose 
(see Table 3.5 for a detailed explanation of how the income tax liability of philanthropic entities is 
determined in Colombia).  
Table 3.4. Approaches to providing tax relief for the income of philanthropic entities 
Countries following the exempt all or specific 
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Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Chile; Finland; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Israel; 
Italy; Latvia; Malta; Mexico; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Romania; 
Singapore; the Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South Africa; Sweden; Switzerland; the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
Countries following the exempt income if 
reinvested towards worthy purpose approach: 
Colombia, Indonesia; Lithuania; and Ireland 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
3.4.2. Exempting all or specific sources of income approach 
Countries generally exclude non-commercial income (such as income from philanthropic gifts or 
government grants) from the tax base and do not consider it as taxable income. Countries with inheritance 
taxes tend to exempt philanthropic entities from paying such taxes on the testamentary transfers they 
receive (Belgium and France apply a reduced inheritance tax rate on income from bequests).  
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generally differentiate between income that is related to their worthy purpose and income that is unrelated 
(also referred to as related and unrelated business income). The fourth subsection covers countries that 
tax commercial income above a threshold. Finally, there are also countries that simply tax commercial 
income and are thus not included in the following subsections (this is the case in Greece, Luxembourg, 
and Slovenia, where income derived from commercial activities is taxed). 
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In Australia, philanthropic entities are fully exempt from paying income tax on both commercial and non-
commercial income. Notably, a 2008-2010 review of the Australian tax system considered the issue of 
taxing the unrelated business income of philanthropic entities. The review found that the tax exempt entities 
are not incentivised to undercut the prices of their for-profit counterparts and thus the income tax 
concessions do not violate the principle of competitive neutrality and should be retained (Henry et al., 
2009[2]). Entities may also receive a refund for franking credits (see Box 3.1 for more information).  
New Zealand follows a similar approach: philanthropic entities are exempt from paying corporate income 
tax on non-commercial income and are also exempt from income tax on commercial income if the 
philanthropic entity meets the not-for-profit requirement and has no activities overseas. The issue of 
competitive neutrality concerns arising from exempting the commercial income of philanthropic entities 
was considered in the recent New Zealand Tax Working Group report. The report concluded that the 
underlying issue was the extent to which the philanthropic entity directs its surplus to their worthy purpose 
activities for the public benefit. As a result, the Working Group recommended that the Government regularly 
review the philanthropic sector’s use of tax expenditures to ensure that the intended social outcomes are 
being achieved (Tax Working Group, 2019[3]). In Malta too, philanthropic entities benefit from a tax 
exemption on all their income. 
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Restricting the commercial activities an entity can engage in 
In Canada, qualifying philanthropic entities are exempt from paying income tax. PBOs are not permitted to 
undertake commercial activities unless they are related to the charitable purpose the entity is undertaking 
or the entity is run almost entirely with volunteer labour. Philanthropic entities are prohibited from carrying 
out unrelated commercial activities themselves and may have their registration revoked or be subject to 
financial penalties if they do so. A philanthropic entity may, however, carry out commercial activities 
through separate business corporations or trusts, provided the proper separations between the 
philanthropic entity and the business are in place. There are also expenditure requirements: if the average 
value of an entity’s property not used directly in philanthropic activities (during the 24 months before the 
beginning of the fiscal year) exceeds CAD 100 000, the philanthropic entity’s disbursement quota is 3.5% 
of the average value of that property. 
In Belgium, philanthropic entities are subject to the legal entities income tax (LEIT). The LEIT is not specific 
to philanthropic entities and is applied to all legal entities that are not subject to the corporate income tax. 
A philanthropic entity can engage in economic activity if it does not constitute a principal activity, and is a 
secondary activity whose profits are reinvested in the entity’s worthy purpose. Philanthropic entities liable 
to the LEIT are not taxed on their total annual net income, but only on:  
 their real estate income,  
 their income from capital and movable property, inclusive the first EUR 1 880 euro bracket of 
income from savings deposits and the first EUR 190 bracket of dividends from recognised 
cooperative companies and to companies with a social purpose.  
 certain miscellaneous forms of income.  
Thus, income from donations is exempt from the LEIT, but regional inheritance taxes may still apply to 
bequests.2 
The LEIT is collected as a withholding tax. Where philanthropic entities receive income from movable 
property or miscellaneous income of movable origin without the withholding tax being deducted at source, 
the withholding tax is due by the recipient of the income. In the following cases specific assets are put on 
the Belgian tax roll: 
 Certain types of real estate income, notably net income from land and buildings situated in Belgium 
and leased, are subject to a 20% tax. 
 Capital gains made through the transfer of developed or undeveloped real estate are taxable at 
16.5% or 33%. 
 The transfer of important participations is taxable, at the 16.5% rate, according to the same 
arrangements as for personal income tax. 
 Unjustified expenses, in-kind benefits or financial advantages, are taxable according to the same 
arrangements as for the corporate income tax (contribution of 100% on secret commissions and 
50% if it can be established that the beneficiary for those expenses, in-kind benefits, and financial 
advantages is a legal person). 
 Pension contributions and pensions considered as disallowed expenses under the corporate 
income tax, financial advantages or in-kind benefits, as well as the amount equal to 17% of the 
benefit in kind resulting from the private use of a company car, are liable to a 33% tax. 
 Inter-municipal associations operating a hospital or an institution assisting war victims, disabled 
persons, etc., are taxable on dividends attributed to other legal entities except public 
administrations. The rate of this tax is 25% and the increase for lack or insufficiency of advance 
payments is applicable according to the same arrangements as for corporate income tax. 
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In Latvia, philanthropic entities are not subject to corporate income tax if the purpose of the establishment 
is not to make profit or achieve an increase in capital for their members, religious organisations, trade 
unions, and political parties. Furthermore, monetary assistance received from a public benefit organisation 
for covering expenditure for medical treatment (including in order to ensure transport of a patient and 
accompanying person to a medical treatment institution) is not included in the annual taxable income and 
is thus exempt from personal income tax. 
Box 3.1. Imputation credits 
Overview 
The rationale behind imputation credits (also termed refundable franking credits’) is to reduce the double 
taxation of dividends by imputing the corporate tax to the shareholder. Dividends paid from taxed profits 
are ‘franked’ (i.e. receive an imputation credit) if the company that distributes its dividends has paid tax 
on its profits. Therefore, individuals or corporations receiving the franked dividends may receive an 
imputation credit under certain conditions.  
Imputation Credits in Australia and New Zealand 
In Australia, some tax-exempt entities (i.e. charities and deductible gift recipients) that receive franked 
dividends are eligible to benefit from a refund of franking credit. Since these tax-exempt entities do not 
pay tax on the income received from dividends, the refundable credit is essentially additional income 
for the entity to use for its worthy purpose. In New Zealand, on the other hand, tax-exempt entities that 
receive franked dividends will not be taxed on those dividends but will not be able to use the imputation 
credits attached to the dividends. The effect is that they are effectively subject to tax at the company 
rate, 28%, on the income that is taxed within any companies they invest in. 
Source: Australian Taxation Office website. 
In Japan, the income of PBOs (that fulfil the not-for-profit requirement) is tax exempt. The commercial 
activities that exempt PBOs are permitted to engage in without losing their tax exempt status, are stipulated 
by the most applicable ministry (i.e. the ministry that has the most expertise regarding the particular worthy 
purpose). Furthermore, if half or more of the employees of a commercial activity are persons with 
disabilities and the PBO contributes to the protection of the lives of these persons, than the activity is not 
considered a profitable business, which would otherwise be taxable.  
In Singapore, the income of all philanthropic entities registered under the Charities Act, is exempt from 
income tax. PBOs may engage in commercial activities to generate additional income, or to provide goods 
or services for their members or clients to further their worthy purposes. However, these commercial 
activities, may not undermine the philanthropic entity’s focus and distract the charity from its exclusively 
worthy purpose. Charity boards should also be prudent and must not expose their charitable assets to 
significant risk. Where business activities may expose charitable assets to significant risk, they must be 
carried out by a business subsidiary. Business subsidiaries that are set up by charities are treated in the 
same manner as any other company. The income of these business subsidiaries is subject to income tax. 
In Argentina, philanthropic entities are exempt from corporate income taxes. In Switzerland, PBO's are 
exempt from income and wealth taxes. In Israel, donations, inheritances, government grants and passive 
income are tax exempt. In Chile, some PBOs may be exempt from the corporate income tax when the 
exemption is granted by the President of the Republic. This benefit can only be requested by PBOs where 
their main and effective purpose is to provide aid directly to people with limited economic resources who 
are unable to meet their basic needs. 
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Exempting commercial income if related to worthy purpose activities 
Austria distinguishes between three types of commercial activities: necessary, related, and unrelated. A 
commercial activity is considered necessary if the worthy purpose of the philanthropic entity cannot be 
achieved without it and the exempt entity does not significantly compete with other taxed entities that 
engage in a similar commercial activity. The income generated through necessary commercial activities 
(e.g., selling entry tickets as a museum) is fully tax exempt. A commercial activity is considered related if 
it is a means to achieving the worthy purpose, although not a necessary one. Income generated from 
related commercial activities is liable for the corporate income tax but a EUR 10 000 exemption remains. 
Philanthropic entities that engage in unrelated commercial activities risk losing their tax-exempt status all 
together. If, however, the commercial activities that a philanthropic entity engages in, generates under a 
threshold of EUR 40 000 in the tax year, the entity may keep its tax-exempt status. Furthermore, some 
capital gains of PBOs are tax-exempt. For example, the capital gain from shares (and interest from capital 
assets) that is verifiably used for worthy purposes is tax-free if the business is related to the PBO. 
In Finland, philanthropic entities are liable to a tax on income derived from business activity, as well as a 
6.26% tax on income derived from real property that is used for a purpose other than the eligible worthy 
purposes. For philanthropic entities in Finland, the income from the following activities is not considered to 
be income derived from business activity and is therefore tax exempt:  
 income derived from organising lotteries, fairs, athletic competitions, dances, bingo and other 
entertainment events, as well as the income derived from buffets, sales and other similar activities; 
 income derived from member magazines and other publications directly serving the purpose of the 
entity; 
 income derived from collecting funds through selling remembrance cards, badges, cards, vanes or 
other such products; 
 income derived from selling goods or services, which are manufactured or produced for the 
purposes of therapy, or teaching in hospitals, mental hospitals, penal institutions, workhouses, old 
people’s or disabled people’s homes or other similar care-taking institutions. 
Income subject to tax can be deemed to be wholly or partly income tax exempt by the tax administration. 
A tax exemption can be granted only when the exemption can be regarded as justified with respect to the 
benefit that the entity produces for society. When an exemption is considered, attention is paid to what 
degree the entity's assets and income are used worthy purpose activity that is important for society. 
Attention must also be paid to whether the exemption for an entity's business leads to unfair competition. 
In Germany, the income generated from activities related to the worthy purpose is exempt from corporate 
income and trade tax. Income attributable to economic activities which are not related to the designated 
worthy purpose are not subject to corporate income tax or trade tax if the total annual income including 
VAT from these commercial activities does not exceed EUR 35 000. Furthermore, the income of capital 
assets of philanthropic entities is exempt from the withholding tax on capital investments.  
Philanthropic entities in Bulgaria are not taxed on their non-commercial income (such as income from 
grants or donations), i.e. the income that supports their main purpose, but income from commercial 
activities is subject to the corporate income tax for all philanthropic entities except for the Bulgarian Red 
Cross.  
Similarly in Greece, any income acquired by philanthropic entities through the pursuit of the fulfilment of 
their worthy purpose (such as membership fees, public or private grants, donations, etc.) is not subject to 
income tax. On the other hand, any income generated from commercial/business activities is taxable, 
regardless of whether it is used to fulfil the worthy purpose of the not-for-profit entity (e.g., interest on 
deposits, public events etc.). 
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In Portugal, the income of philanthropic entities that is derived from donations is untaxed. Income derived 
from worthy purpose activities is generally also untaxed. Other sources of income, such as unrelated 
commercial activity or financial assets and investments are considered taxable income.  
In Sweden, as in most other countries, PBOs are exempt from paying income taxes on income received 
or derived from donations, grants, investments, and worthy purpose activities. Furthermore, income earned 
by carrying out philanthropic activities, including under contracts with government, is also tax-exempt. This 
suggests that income from unrelated activities will be taxable income. 
In the United States, PBO’s are generally exempt from corporate income taxes.  However, income from 
unrelated business activities (i.e. activities that are not substantially related to the exempt purpose), is 
taxable at the corporate tax rate. More specifically, such income is taxed at the top corporate tax rate with 
an exclusion of USD 1 000. Income related to the exempt purpose of the non-profit organisation is generally 
income tax exempt. The rules on income from outsourcing work depend on the way in which it is 
outsourced. If, for example, an entity pays a management company to run a business and transfer all of 
the income over to the entity itself, then the income would be taxable as unrelated business income. 
Similarly, if the philanthropic entity is a partner in a partnership and the partnership is running the business, 
then the income would be taxable also. If, on the other hand, the income is from a business that just pays 
the PBO rent, then the income would usually not be taxable. If the income is passive income, for example 
royalty or dividend income, it would also not be taxable. 
Using a threshold to exempt commercial income 
As noted in the section above, Austria, Germany and the United States apply thresholds as well as 
distinguish between related and unrelated commercial income. In Austria, philanthropic entities that 
generate related or unrelated commercial income above the respective thresholds, risk losing their tax-
exempt status. In Germany and the United States, on the other hand, unrelated commercial income above 
the threshold is taxed. In addition, several other countries (France, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, the Slovak Republic, and South Africa) use thresholds to determine how to tax the income of 
philanthropic entities.  
In France, PBOs which carry out commercial activity on a regular or occasional basis, may be exempt from 
corporate taxes (value added tax, corporate income tax, corporate property tax) if the activity does not 
compete with the business sector and if the revenues collected during the calendar year for this activity do 
not exceed EUR 72 000. PBOs that benefit from the corporate tax exemption remain liable for corporate 
income tax at reduced rates for income from asset management such as: 
 income from the rental of built and undeveloped buildings owned by the association (CIT rate at 
24%); 
 profits from the exploitation of agricultural or forestry properties (CIT rate at 24%); 
 dividends (CIT rate at 15%); 
 other securities (CIT rate at 10 % or 24%). 
In Hungary, PBOs are exempt from corporate tax if their income derived from commercial activities 
(including managing real estate) does not exceed 15% of the total income. In India, philanthropic entities 
that are not engaged in certain specified charitable activities and are classified as being engaged in the 
advancement of any other object of general public utility can derive up to 20% of their income from trade, 
commerce or business, provided it is earned in the course of advancing the charitable purpose of the entity. 
In Mexico, philanthropic entities are exempt from income tax on income from donations; government 
grants; the sale of fixed or intangible asset; membership fees; recovery fees; interest; economic rights 
derived from intellectual property; temporary use or enjoyment of real estate, or from yields obtained from 
shares or other credit instruments, provided they are used for the purposes for which they were authorised. 
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Additionally, they may obtain income from activities other than the purposes for which they were 
authorised, provided it does not exceed 10% of their total income.  
In the Netherlands, philanthropic entities are only liable to the corporate income tax if (1) they participate 
in the market economy with labour and capital and thereby make a profit, or (2) if their activities compete 
with commercial businesses, or (3) if no exemption applies. The exemption applies if the entity’s surplus 
is below EUR 15 000 a year or less than EUR 75 000 combined for the prior four years. 
In Norway, a philanthropic entity is exempt from paying income taxes on received donations, inheritances 
and grants. The entity is exempt from income taxes on income generated from any commercial activity it 
undertakes that does not contribute towards the realisation of the institution's worthy purpose, provided 
that the annual revenue from the commercial activity does not exceed a threshold of NOK 140 000. This 
includes any capital gain as a result of economic activity. On the other hand, capital gains resulting from 
the tax-exempt worthy purpose activities are tax-exempt. 
In the Slovak Republic, the income received by philanthropic entities is generally tax-exempt, except for 
commercial income, including income derived from property (rent), the sale of assets, membership fees 
and advertising income above EUR 20 000 per year.  
In South Africa, only welfare, education, healthcare and conservation activities qualify for an income tax 
deduction. The other worthy purposes (shown in Table 3.1 are only exempt from gift tax. Furthermore, 
15% of all commercial income of philanthropic entities is tax exempt, amounts above that are taxable at 
the corporate income tax rate. 
3.4.3. Exempting income if reinvested towards the worthy purpose  
For countries following the second approach (exempting income if reinvested towards the worthy purpose), 
the source of the income is generally secondary to its destination. That is to say that as long as the surplus 
of a philanthropic entity is reinvested towards the worthy purpose within a given time period, the income of 
the entity is exempt. If, on the other hand, the entity decides to defer reinvestment, stockpile its surplus or 
invest it towards something other than its worthy purpose, the surplus may become taxable.  
In Colombia the income tax treatment of philanthropic entities is determined based on whether, and how, 
the net benefit or surplus is reinvested. Other countries discussed in this report tend to exempt non-
commercial income automatically (i.e. not consider it taxable income). In Colombia, however, all forms of 
income are considered taxable and the tax relief instead allows the entity to reinvest the net benefit or 
surplus (resulting from the income) towards the fulfilment of its social objective.  
In Indonesia, donations and grants to philanthropic entities are tax exempt income. If an entity engaged in 
education or research and development has a surplus, it is only tax exempt if the surplus is reinvested in 
its worthy purpose (education or research and development) within a four year period after the income was 
received. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, the corporate income tax exemption only applies to the income 
of a PBO if such income is or will be used for specified worthy purposes. 
In Ireland, philanthropic entities do not enjoy automatic income tax exemption simply by virtue of registering 
with charities commission. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, entities must apply to the revenue 
for the tax exemption separately. Once the tax-exempt status is approved, entities are also exempt from 
capital gains tax and tax on commercial income, provided that the income is applied towards the fulfilment 
of the entities’ worthy purposes. Philanthropic entities also benefit from a matching scheme for donations 
which is described in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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Table 3.5. Tax liability formula for philanthropic entities in Colombia 
+ Ordinary or extraordinary income of the taxable year 
- Expenses of the taxable year, including those not related to the worthy purpose 
- Investments made to strengthen the equity (for more than one year), which are not susceptible to amortisation or depreciation and generate returns for the worthy purpose. 
= Net Benefit or Surplus 
- The assets of the Net Benefit or Surplus reinvested during the following taxable year towards the worthy purpose of the philanthropic entity. 
- 
The assets of the Net Benefit or Surplus reinvested into long-term projects (between 2 to 5 years) towards the “worthy purpose” of the 
entity. These long-term reinvestment projects will be recognized as “Permanent Assignments”. In case the long-term reinvestment project 
surpasses five (5) years, the entity must submit a request to the Colombian Tax Administration to extend the reinvestment term.  
= Taxable Net Benefit or Surplus 
× Income tax rate of 20% 
= Total income tax liability 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
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3.5. Value-added taxes 
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long as those purchases are not exempt goods or services). If they are not registered for VAT purposes, 
the entity is likely treated as a final consumer and cannot recover the VAT paid on its inputs without specific 
tax relief. Similarly, if the entity is registered for VAT purposes but does not make any taxable sales, it will 
also not be able to recover the VAT paid on its inputs. A philanthropic entity may not make any taxable 
sales because its supplies (outputs) are exempt, or because they are out of the scope of the VAT. On the 
other hand, philanthropic entities that do charge VAT on their sales (including zero rated goods and 
services) are able to recover the VAT paid on their inputs. 
Consequentially, countries may choose to allow philanthropic entities to not charge VAT on their supplies 
(or the entities may be under the revenue threshold), which could in return create an input tax burden for 
those entities. As a result, some countries offer tax relief to philanthropic entities that are not able to recover 
VAT paid on their inputs (or are only able to recover a share of it).  
VAT exemptions, reduced rates, and zero rates can create unfair competition, especially if the VAT exempt 
goods or services supplied by a philanthropic entity are also provided by businesses that charge VAT on 
their sales. Thus some countries do not exempt from VAT certain goods and services provided by 
philanthropic entities in order to avoid unfair competition (e.g. Canada and Ireland). Belgium, Chile, 
Colombia, Estonia, Indonesia, Italy, and the Slovak Republic, do not have preferential VAT treatment for 
philanthropic entities and apply the standard VAT rules. Although Italy does not allow a preferential VAT 
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regime for philanthropic entities, PBOs are exempt from the requirement to provide evidence of their sales 
through invoices and sales receipts. 
3.5.1. VAT exempt 
Entities (or the activities of entities) can be exempt from VAT due to their philanthropic nature (e.g., 
France), because their activities do not fall within the coverage of the VAT, or because they operate below 
a VAT registration threshold.  
In Argentina, the services of philanthropic entities that are directly related to the PBO's main purpose are 
exempt from VAT. That means that donations by third parties, membership dues, and fees charged to 
members for specific statutory activities, are all VAT exempt services for PBOs. Other transactions of 
PBOs are subject to the standard VAT rules. 
In Australia, philanthropic entities have a higher revenue threshold for registering for VAT. Eligible entities 
do not need to register for VAT until their turnover is AUD 150 000 or more (normally registration is required 
at AUD 75 000). In some cases, PBO may choose how activities are treated. If, for instance, a PBO (e.g., 
a parents association) operates a school canteen on the grounds of a primary or secondary school, the 
PBO can choose to be VAT exempt, meaning it does not need to remit VAT on its sales of food. However, 
the school canteen cannot claim VAT credits for its purchases. Once the PBO chooses to be VAT exempt 
(i.e. pay input tax) it cannot revoke that choice for 12 months. Similarly, all philanthropic entities can choose 
to exempt their fundraising events from VAT, which in turn means they will have to pay input tax on their 
purchases since they will not be able to claim the VAT credits. This is aimed at reducing the administrative 
burden. 
In Austria, not all philanthropic entities are exempt from the VAT. Instead, only PBOs with a “cultural” or 
“sports promoting” worthy purpose, as well as those running care facilities or health institutions, or providing 
accommodation and food to trainees below the age of 27, are VAT-exempt. Other philanthropic entities 
are subject to the standard VAT rules.  
In Greece, philanthropic entities are exempt from charging VAT on several goods and services, subject to 
certain conditions. Examples of exempted activities are: The provision of services closely related to sport 
to persons engaged in sports or physical education by philanthropic entities. The provision of services to 
their members by philanthropic entities and organizations pursuing religious, philosophical, charitable 
purposes. The provision of cultural or educational services by philanthropic entities operating for cultural 
or educational purposes (in particular those services provided to visitors of museums, monuments, 
archaeological or other similar sites, as well as the organisation of art events, exhibitions and lectures). 
And finally, services provided by the above-mentioned entities in the context of events organised by them 
for their financial support. 
In Israel, PBOs pay VAT on the goods and services they purchase and use as part of the philanthropic 
activity. The VAT paid by the PBOs cannot be deducted as an input tax, as there is no VAT on goods or 
services supplied by the PBO as part of its philanthropic activity. Commercial activity by the PBO is subject 
to VAT and therefore the VAT paid on inputs for the commercial activity can be deducted against VAT 
collected from the commercial activity. 
In Latvia, the non-commercial activities of PBOs are generally considered to be outside the scope of the 
VAT. On the other hand, the commercial activities of PBOs are subject to the standard VAT rules. However, 
the VAT treatment is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. For example, VAT paid on inputs that are used 
as part of the philanthropic activity are not deductible. VAT paid on inputs for the commercial activity on 
the other hand, are deductible. However, if a PBO ‘sells’ the goods and services as part of its philanthropic 
activity, this activity would be regarded as a taxable transaction. The taxable amount of this transaction 
shall be the purchase price of the goods or full cost to the PBO of providing these services.  
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In Mexico, philanthropic entities are exempt from VAT for the sale of goods, the provision of services and 
the temporary use or enjoyment of goods as part of their activities. However, the entities have the obligation 
to pay and withhold the VAT when they receive independent personal services or goods provided or 
granted by individuals. 
In Portugal, philanthropic entities are exempt from charging VAT on goods and services related to: 
 health, social security and social assistance (provided that they do not receive any compensation);  
 education – including day-care centres, kindergartens, leisure centres, establishments for children 
and young people with no normal family environment, establishments for disabled children and 
young people, rehabilitation centres for the disabled;  
 sport, art, and culture – including artistic, sporting, recreational, physical education and cultural 
activities (e.g., visiting museums, art galleries, and castles);  
 civic activities (e.g., political, union);  
 religious activities;  
 and humanitarian activities. 
Fundraising activities (such as access tickets, registration fees, buffet, bar, stand rental, advertising 
revenue, etc.) are also exempt from VAT, as long as the fundraising is on an occasional basis and for the 
exclusive benefit of these entities (and provided they do not distort competition) and is limited to a 
maximum of eight fundraising events. 
In Romania, some activities for the public benefit are exempt from VAT. These activities include the 
supplies of services closely related to sports or physical training, performed by PBOs for persons who 
practice sports, as well as the supplies of cultural services by cultural PBOs, recognised by the Ministry of 
Culture.  
In South Africa, PBOs need to apply separately to be exempt from VAT. However, in general a PBO will 
not have to register for VAT as a vendor since it cannot be a predominantly commercial enterprise. In 
Switzerland, the VAT threshold for PBOs is supplies of CHF 150,000. In Finland, philanthropic entities are 
only liable for VAT on their commercial activities. 
In the Netherlands, VAT is not applicable to non-commercial activities and therefore the VAT paid on inputs 
is not deductible. Within commercial activities there is a distinction between activities that are exempt and 
not exempt from VAT. Where activities are exempt from VAT, the VAT paid on the inputs is not deductible 
either. If a PBO is located in the Netherlands and has sales of no more than EUR 20 000 a year, the PBO 
can choose to be exempt from charging VAT, like any other small business, but will not be able to deduct 
or claim VAT on inputs. 
In Singapore, PBOs are subject to standard VAT rules. PBOs may be regarded as carrying on both 
business and non-business activities for VAT purposes. Non-business activities include the provision of 
free services that are funded by grants, donations or sponsorships. PBOs are liable for VAT registration in 
Singapore if the annual value of taxable supplies arising from business activities exceeds the registration 
threshold of SGD 1 000 000. Once VAT-registered, PBOs are required to charge and account for VAT on 
their taxable supplies made. These include supplies made in the course of commercial activities (e.g. 
school or course fees, and day-care facility fees), as well as subsidised services as part of their 
philanthropic or religious purposes (e.g. dialysis fees, medical consultation fees). Like other businesses 
under standard VAT rules, PBOs are allowed input VAT claims on business purchases if these inputs are 
incurred for the making of taxable supplies in the course or furtherance of their business. Input VAT 
incurred for carrying out wholly non-business activities or exempt supplies is not claimable, while input 
VAT incurred for carrying out subsidised activities (partly business and partly non-business) is to be 
apportioned such that only the portion relating to the business of making taxable supplies is claimable. 
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3.5.2. VAT exempt with possibility of reclaiming input tax 
Exempting entities or activities from VAT can lead to entities having to pay VAT on their inputs and some 
countries have put in place policies that enable philanthropic entities to reclaim some of the VAT they paid 
on inputs.  
In Canada, most supplies of services and some supplies of goods made by registered charities and other 
PBOs are exempt from VAT (e.g. supplies of food and lodging made for the relief of poverty or distress; 
meals on wheels; recreational programs established for children, individuals with a disability and 
disadvantaged individuals; memberships in organizations providing no significant benefit to individual 
members; and trade union and mandatory professional dues). However, the VAT generally applies to 
certain supplies of goods and services made by charities that are similar to goods and services supplied 
by non-charitable businesses. For example, VAT typically applies to admissions to a place of amusement 
(e.g., a theatre), even when supplied by a philanthropic entity. If all or substantially all (90%) of a 
philanthropic entity’s supplies (outputs) are taxable, the entity would typically be entitled to full input tax 
credits for VAT paid on its purchases of inputs to those taxable supplies. For VAT paid on purchases that 
do not qualify for input tax credits, philanthropic entities are eligible for partial rebates. The typical rebate 
rate for PBOs is 50%, however, higher rebate rates are available if the PBO is also a public hospital or a 
non-profit school, college or university. Registered charities that produce or offer a mix of taxable and 
exempt supplies (outputs) use a special streamlined method for calculating their VAT obligations: 
registered charities generally retain 40% of the VAT they collect on their taxable supplies (outputs) and 
receive a rebate on the VAT paid on most of their inputs, but are not entitled to input tax credits on these 
inputs. 
In Ireland, a PBO may have activities which are taxable from a VAT perspective, outside-the-scope of VAT 
or even exempt from VAT.  If their activity is an outside-the-scope or exempt activity, they are neither 
obliged nor entitled to register and account for VAT on the income generated from those income activities.  
In certain circumstances, the activities of a PBO may be considered to be in competition with commercial 
traders and the charity may then be required to register and account for VAT on these activities.  
Additionally, where a PBO acquires, or is likely to acquire more than EUR 41 000 worth of goods from 
other EU Member States in any period of twelve months, there is an obligation to register and account for 
VAT in respect of those intra-Community acquisitions. Overall, the VAT status of the PBO’s activities is 
important in determining the VAT treatment of any income generated and the resultant entitlement to 
deduct VAT on costs associated with that income.  In other words, the activities of a PBO must be 
considered on a case by case basis to decide their VAT status. 
Under Irish legislation, a PBO can only recover VAT on its costs if it makes taxable sales, that is, if it is 
registered for VAT and charges VAT (including sales subject to the zero rate) on its sales. If the PBO has 
taxable supplies, it can reclaim its VAT on inputs.  If the supplies are exempt or out-of-the-scope of VAT, 
no VAT recovery is possible. If the PBO has a mix of both exempt income and income which is subject to 
VAT, and income which is outside the scope of VAT, it can reclaim VAT incurred on the direct costs of 
making its taxable sales as well as a proportion of the VAT incurred on its general costs using an 
apportionment method. Furthermore, Ireland has a unique VAT compensation scheme for PBOs, which is 
described in more detail in Box 3.2. Other reliefs from VAT are available for the following PBOs, goods 
and services: 
 PBOs involved in the transport of severely and permanently physically disabled persons: a refund 
of the amount of VAT paid may be claimed in relation to the purchase and adaptation of vehicles 
for use by qualifying bodies for the transport of severely and permanently disabled persons.  
 Radios for the blind: a refund of the amount of VAT paid may be claimed in respect of radios where 
the PBO has a primary objective of improving the circumstances of blind persons and where the 
radios are intended for the use of blind persons.  
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 Appliances for use by disabled persons: a refund of the amount of VAT paid may be claimed on 
certain aids and appliances purchased by or on behalf of a disabled person to assist that disabled 
person in the performance of essential daily functions or in the exercise of a vocation. 
 Rescue craft and equipment: a refund of the amount of VAT paid may be claimed on certain small 
rescue craft, ancillary equipment and special boat buildings and also on the hire, repair and 
maintenance of these craft to PBO’s who provide a sufficient standard of rescue and assistance 
services at sea and on inland waterways.  
 Humanitarian Goods for Export: a refund for VAT can be granted for goods purchased for 
exportation by philanthropic organisations for humanitarian, charitable or teaching activities abroad 
e.g. Apostolic Societies, Chernobyl Children Projects etc.  
 Donated medical equipment: a refund of the amount of VAT paid may be claimed by a hospital or 
a donor on the purchase of certain new medical instruments and appliances which are funded by 
voluntary donations. The VAT refund may be claimed by whoever suffers the tax i.e. the hospital 
or the donor, as appropriate, but not, of course, both. 
 Donated Research Equipment: a refund of the amount of VAT incurred in the purchase or 
importation of any new instrument or appliance (excluding means of transport) through voluntary 
donations, to a research institution or a university, school or similar educational body engaged in 
medical research in a laboratory. 
In New Zealand, PBOs that make taxable supplies of more than NZD 60 000 per annum are required to 
register for the VAT. PBOs that do not reach this registration threshold may voluntarily register so long as 
they do make taxable supplies of goods or services. The rules do not distinguish between different types 
of activities. PBOs can, as long as they make some taxable supplies, claim back the VAT on any inputs 
they have other than inputs used for making exempt supplies (i.e. rental accommodation or financial 
services). As such, they can claim back the VAT on inputs that are not actually used for making a supply 
of goods or services. This is more generous than the input tax deduction rules for other registered-persons 
who can normally only claim an input tax deduction if the input is applied towards making a taxable supply 
of goods or services. All goods and services sold by PBOs, other than exempt supplies, are subject to 
VAT. Whether the goods and services are sold as part of a commercial activity or a philanthropic activity 
is irrelevant for VAT purposes.  
The United States does not have a VAT although the States and local authorities imposes retail sales 
taxes. In the United States, the specific rules about exemption from State and local retail sales taxes are 
made by the States and can vary.  Philanthropic entities are generally exempt from paying sales tax on 
their purchases and from collecting sales taxes from related business activities provided they meet state 
requirements, which may include a certificate or application for eligibility.  
Germany is an outlier, because it offers a reduced VAT rate for some supplies by philanthropic entities, 
while others are VAT-free (e.g. some medical services). Entities can reclaim the VAT paid on their inputs 
for supplies subject to a reduced VAT rate. If the activities of PBOs are not part of a commercial activity 
and meet the worthy purpose and public benefit requirements, philanthropic entities in Germany are 
subject to the reduced VAT rate of 7%. 
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Box 3.2. Irish VAT compensation scheme for charities 
To mitigate the VAT cost for registered charities that cannot recover VAT on their costs, a VAT 
Compensation Scheme for PBOs was introduced in Ireland in 2019.  This scheme aims to reduce the 
VAT burden on qualifying charities to partially compensate them for irrecoverable VAT which they have 
suffered in the previous calendar year.  They are entitled to claim a refund of a proportion of their VAT 
costs based on the level of non-public funding they receive.   
The scheme is capped at EUR 5 000 000 per year and, where the total amount of all eligible claims in 
each year exceeds the capped amount, claims are paid on a proportional basis.  VAT may only be 
reclaimed on goods and services which were applied only to the PBOs charitable purpose. The charity 
must also provide proof that the charity was not entitled to a deduction or refund of the tax being claimed 
under any other legislation administered by the tax authority. 
3.6. Other taxes 
3.6.1. Recurrent taxes on immovable property  
Philanthropic entities may own real-estate that they use to fulfil their social objectives, or they may own it 
as a source of income. If entities use their real-estate for their worthy purpose such as the location of 
offices or philanthropic activities such as treatment centres, athletic infrastructures, events, or distribution 
centres, some countries may exempt them from property taxes. Philanthropic entities that own immovable 
property as a source of income are generally liable for property taxes on those properties if such a tax is 
levied in their jurisdiction.  
In certain cases philanthropic entities in Canada may be exempt from property taxes. However, property 
tax is predominantly levied at the municipal level and exemptions, rebates and credits vary provincially and 
by municipality. In Germany, real estate used by PBOs for charitable purposes is exempt from local 
property tax. In Ireland, residential properties that are owned by a PBO and used for the sole purpose of 
providing residential accommodation in connection with the facilitation of recreational activities are exempt 
from property taxes. This exemption is intended to benefit philanthropic entities who own residential 
properties that are used by its members when taking part in recreational activities. In Italy, local authorities 
(municipalities and regions) can exempt philanthropic entities from local taxes (such as real estate taxes). 
In Romania, there is an exemption from the tax on buildings for structures owned by the entities established 
either by will or set up according to the law, in order to maintain, develop and help national cultural 
institutions, as well as to support humanitarian, social and cultural actions. Local councils may decide to 
grant exemption or reduction of tax on buildings used for the supply of social services by philanthropic 
entities. In Singapore, PBOs benefit from a property tax exemption for real-estate that is used exclusively 
for public religious worship, as a public school, for charitable purposes, or for purposes conducive to social 
development in Singapore. 
In the United States, property tax rules are determined by the States.  Land and buildings of churches are 
generally exempt, although some States limit the amount of eligible land (such as one acre).  Land and 
buildings of other non-profits are also generally exempt, although this exemption may not apply to all types 
of non-profits. In Sweden, a PBO is exempt from real estate tax if the real estate is mainly used in activities 
promoting the worthy purpose. 
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costs based on the level of non-public funding they receive.   
The scheme is capped at EUR 5 000 000 per year and, where the total amount of all eligible claims in 
each year exceeds the capped amount, claims are paid on a proportional basis.  VAT may only be 
reclaimed on goods and services which were applied only to the PBOs charitable purpose. The charity 
must also provide proof that the charity was not entitled to a deduction or refund of the tax being claimed 
under any other legislation administered by the tax authority. 
3.6. Other taxes 
3.6.1. Recurrent taxes on immovable property  
Philanthropic entities may own real-estate that they use to fulfil their social objectives, or they may own it 
as a source of income. If entities use their real-estate for their worthy purpose such as the location of 
offices or philanthropic activities such as treatment centres, athletic infrastructures, events, or distribution 
centres, some countries may exempt them from property taxes. Philanthropic entities that own immovable 
property as a source of income are generally liable for property taxes on those properties if such a tax is 
levied in their jurisdiction.  
In certain cases philanthropic entities in Canada may be exempt from property taxes. However, property 
tax is predominantly levied at the municipal level and exemptions, rebates and credits vary provincially and 
by municipality. In Germany, real estate used by PBOs for charitable purposes is exempt from local 
property tax. In Ireland, residential properties that are owned by a PBO and used for the sole purpose of 
providing residential accommodation in connection with the facilitation of recreational activities are exempt 
from property taxes. This exemption is intended to benefit philanthropic entities who own residential 
properties that are used by its members when taking part in recreational activities. In Italy, local authorities 
(municipalities and regions) can exempt philanthropic entities from local taxes (such as real estate taxes). 
In Romania, there is an exemption from the tax on buildings for structures owned by the entities established 
either by will or set up according to the law, in order to maintain, develop and help national cultural 
institutions, as well as to support humanitarian, social and cultural actions. Local councils may decide to 
grant exemption or reduction of tax on buildings used for the supply of social services by philanthropic 
entities. In Singapore, PBOs benefit from a property tax exemption for real-estate that is used exclusively 
for public religious worship, as a public school, for charitable purposes, or for purposes conducive to social 
development in Singapore. 
In the United States, property tax rules are determined by the States.  Land and buildings of churches are 
generally exempt, although some States limit the amount of eligible land (such as one acre).  Land and 
buildings of other non-profits are also generally exempt, although this exemption may not apply to all types 
of non-profits. In Sweden, a PBO is exempt from real estate tax if the real estate is mainly used in activities 
promoting the worthy purpose. 
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3.6.2. Miscellaneous tax benefits for philanthropic entities 
Lastly, there are a number of unique tax benefits that some countries offer philanthropic entities in their tax 
jurisdiction. In Norway, philanthropic entities are exempt from employers' SSCs on wage costs related to 
their worthy purpose activity. This exemption is limited to total wage costs below a total of NOK 800 000, 
and NOK 80 000 per employee. Australia and New Zealand both impose a fringe benefits tax (FBT) but 
provide preferential tax treatment to philanthropic entities (see Box 3.3) 
In Portugal, PBOs are exempt from taxes on vehicles if they are used to pursue their philanthropic activities. 
In the Netherlands, PBOs (including churches) are, under certain conditions, eligible to repayment of half 
of the energy tax they pay. In France a PBO which owns a television set on January 1 of the tax year is 
liable for the contribution to public broadcasting. However, organisations hosting people are generally 
exempt. It Italy, philanthropic entities are exempt from the stamp duty and license duty, normally charged 
for the certification of documents and for the authorisation of administrative procedures. The United States 
has recently introduced some additional taxes on income tax-exempt entities (see Box 3.4). 
 
Box 3.4. Implications of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) for philanthropic entities 
Overview 
Signed into law 22 December 2017, the TCJA is considered the biggest overhaul of the US tax system 
in more than thirty years. It includes corporate and individual tax changes, which have implications for 
giving and philanthropic entities.  
Excise tax on net investment income of foundations  
The law imposes a 1.39% excise tax on the net investment income of most domestic tax-exempt private 
funds, including private operating foundations. The tax itself has applied since 1969, but the rate was 
previously 2% (or 1% in some years if certain requirements were met) until the TCJA made it a flat 
1.39%. 
 
Box 3.3. Fringe Benefit Tax and philanthropic entities 
Australia 
In Australia, some PBOs are exempt and other tax-exempt entities pay a reduced rate of fringe 
benefit tax (FBT). The Australian States also impose payroll tax based on the total size of the payroll. 
Exemptions are available to charities where the employees are engaged solely in the philanthropic 
activities of the charity.  
New Zealand 
In New Zealand, charities generally do not have to pay FBT on benefits provided to employees while 
they are carrying out the entity’s charitable activities. For example, if an employee uses the entity’s car 
while doing charitable work, there will not be any FBT due on any private benefit they receive. The one 
exception is where the employee is provided with a credit card or similar facility for private use and the 
value exceeds NZD 300. This will be liable for FBT. If the charity operates a business that is unrelated 
to the philanthropic purpose, FBT will be payable on any benefits provided to employees. New Zealand 
does not impose payroll tax. 
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An exemption (unaltered by the TCJA) from the excise tax may apply to an operating foundation if: 
 it has been publicly supported for the last ten years; 
 Its governing body consists of individuals fewer than 25%  of whom are “disqualified individuals”; 
 It has no officer who is a “disqualified individual”. 
A disqualified individual refers to  
 a substantial contributor; or  
 an owner of more than 20% of the total combined voting power of a corporation, the profits of a 
partnership, or the beneficial interest of a trust which contributes to the PBO; or 
 a member of the family of any individual described in (1) or (2).  
Excise tax on excessive executive remuneration of exempt organisations 
The law imposes a 21% excise tax (based on the top corporate tax rate) on remuneration in excess of 
USD 1 000 000 per year paid by tax-exempt organisations. The tax applies to the highest paid 
employees of a tax-exempt organisation. The tax also applies to termination payments.  
Source: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) website and OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire. 
3.7. Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropic entities 
3.7.1. Examples of tax abuse 
Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropy occurs when the preferred tax status of a fund or PBO is abused 
either by the entity itself, or by taxpayers and donors, or third parties, such as fraudsters who pose as 
philanthropic entities or tax return preparers who falsify tax returns to defraud the government (OECD, 
2009[4]). The abuse of tax incentives, and the diversion of monies intended for public purposes, discussed 
in this chapter focuses on the entities themselves. Common types of abuse include:  
 Excessive salaries and compensation for board members and employees of PBOs and funds; 
 Diverting funds intended for public purposes to private benefit, e.g. misusing the entity’s funds for 
personal expenses such as cars, office spaces, or the employment of unqualified family members; 
 A for-profit business poses as a PBO to benefit from the tax relief; 
 Investment by a philanthropic entity in corporations owned or controlled by employees of the entity 
 Liquidation of a PBO and distribution to individuals, eluding tax liability  
 Salaried employees concealed as volunteer workers (and non-declaration of salary or wages); 
 An entity not registered for VAT that is undertaking taxable activities. 
In Canada, arrangements involving transactions between philanthropic entities and non-arm’s length 
individuals and entities are an ongoing concern.  This can include transactions involving investments by a 
charity in corporations owned by individuals controlling the charity or low or zero interest loans to such 
individuals or corporations.  Often such amounts are at significant risk of not being repaid. Another form of 
non-arm’s length transaction is the above-fair-market value contracts for services between charities and 
individuals or corporations that control the charity.  This includes above fair-market value salaries paid to 
those involved, payment of personal expenses and other fringe benefits. In Colombia abusive schemes 
have included the setting-up of fictional philanthropic entities to take advantage of tax benefits, such as 
those provided for in the Special Tax Regime for Non-Profit Entities. For example, company-M may donate 
money to PBO-X, which is an entity that enjoys preferential tax treatment. Company-M therefore obtains 
a benefit consisting of a 25% tax credit of the value donated while PBO-X allocates the received donations 
   71 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
An exemption (unaltered by the TCJA) from the excise tax may apply to an operating foundation if: 
 it has been publicly supported for the last ten years; 
 Its governing body consists of individuals fewer than 25%  of whom are “disqualified individuals”; 
 It has no officer who is a “disqualified individual”. 
A disqualified individual refers to  
 a substantial contributor; or  
 an owner of more than 20% of the total combined voting power of a corporation, the profits of a 
partnership, or the beneficial interest of a trust which contributes to the PBO; or 
 a member of the family of any individual described in (1) or (2).  
Excise tax on excessive executive remuneration of exempt organisations 
The law imposes a 21% excise tax (based on the top corporate tax rate) on remuneration in excess of 
USD 1 000 000 per year paid by tax-exempt organisations. The tax applies to the highest paid 
employees of a tax-exempt organisation. The tax also applies to termination payments.  
Source: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) website and OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire. 
3.7. Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropic entities 
3.7.1. Examples of tax abuse 
Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropy occurs when the preferred tax status of a fund or PBO is abused 
either by the entity itself, or by taxpayers and donors, or third parties, such as fraudsters who pose as 
philanthropic entities or tax return preparers who falsify tax returns to defraud the government (OECD, 
2009[4]). The abuse of tax incentives, and the diversion of monies intended for public purposes, discussed 
in this chapter focuses on the entities themselves. Common types of abuse include:  
 Excessive salaries and compensation for board members and employees of PBOs and funds; 
 Diverting funds intended for public purposes to private benefit, e.g. misusing the entity’s funds for 
personal expenses such as cars, office spaces, or the employment of unqualified family members; 
 A for-profit business poses as a PBO to benefit from the tax relief; 
 Investment by a philanthropic entity in corporations owned or controlled by employees of the entity 
 Liquidation of a PBO and distribution to individuals, eluding tax liability  
 Salaried employees concealed as volunteer workers (and non-declaration of salary or wages); 
 An entity not registered for VAT that is undertaking taxable activities. 
In Canada, arrangements involving transactions between philanthropic entities and non-arm’s length 
individuals and entities are an ongoing concern.  This can include transactions involving investments by a 
charity in corporations owned by individuals controlling the charity or low or zero interest loans to such 
individuals or corporations.  Often such amounts are at significant risk of not being repaid. Another form of 
non-arm’s length transaction is the above-fair-market value contracts for services between charities and 
individuals or corporations that control the charity.  This includes above fair-market value salaries paid to 
those involved, payment of personal expenses and other fringe benefits. In Colombia abusive schemes 
have included the setting-up of fictional philanthropic entities to take advantage of tax benefits, such as 
those provided for in the Special Tax Regime for Non-Profit Entities. For example, company-M may donate 
money to PBO-X, which is an entity that enjoys preferential tax treatment. Company-M therefore obtains 
a benefit consisting of a 25% tax credit of the value donated while PBO-X allocates the received donations 
72    
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
towards programs in which company-M is a contractor, thereby receiving the initially donated value as 
income. To avoid such schemes some countries have, among other policies, strict donor-benefit rules 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
In a 2009 OECD report on the abuse of charities for money-laundering and tax evasion, a number of 
countries identified tax evasion schemes related to philanthropic entities. Canada, the Czech Republic, 
and the United States reported that they have tracked schemes in which a philanthropic entity is set up so 
it receives approval for issuing donation receipts, but does not engage in the worthy purpose activities and 
instead the individuals who set up the entity use the fund for their personal benefit (OECD, 2009[4]). 
According to the report, the Canadian tax authority has noticed that charities and tax return preparers who 
previously have been identified as being involved in false receipting continue to issue the false receipts. 
At the time, the 2009 report found that suspected fraudulent alteration and creation of receipts has become 
more prevalent due to advancements in printing technology. Most suspicious activities seemed to involve 
tax return preparers and the use of electronic services. 
3.7.2. Risk of terrorist financing 
Another important finding of the 2009 OECD report is that although terrorist abuse of the philanthropic 
sector is rare, it does occur and there are vulnerabilities and risks that countries should keep track of. In 
the United States, the designation, prosecution and investigation of philanthropic entities has shown that 
terrorist abuse of philanthropic entities exists. 
The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits commission (ACNC, 2020[5]) has published some of the ways 
in which terrorist organisations can misuse philanthropic entities to raise and distribute funds for their 
activities:  
 A resident PBO may have an overseas partner organisation that uses its funds to finance terrorism. 
 Terrorist organisations may use a philanthropic entity’s assets (e.g., vehicles, storage, etc.). 
 Terrorist organisations may attempt to use a philanthropic entity’s name and status to raise funds 
without the entity’s knowledge. 
 Terrorist organisations may attempt to infiltrate a philanthropic entity to redirect money to fund 
terrorist purposes. 
 A terrorist organisation may set up and register a philanthropic entity and hide its true purpose.  
3.7.3. Detection of tax abuse related to philanthropic entities 
To prevent abuse of tax concessions for philanthropic entities (including tax evasion and terrorist financing 
schemes), countries need to ensure that the administrative requirements (such as the application process, 
or annual reporting in some cases) enable the oversight body to identify and track suspicious entities and 
activities. However, the philanthropic entities have a role to play in limiting abuse too. As discussed in this 
section, some schemes occur without the entity’s knowledge. Therefore it is important that the entities 
themselves regularly conduct internal audits and investigations, and engage in due diligence before 
financing certain projects or partnering with another organisation.  
For the government oversight body, in-depth audits during an application or renewal of status can help 
detect cases of abuse. In Belgium, the tax administration also verifies if the entity has followed the 
directives with respect to tax receipt preparation and issuance, even if an entity has already been certified 
in the past (OECD, 2009[4]).  
In a number of countries, tax authorities investigate cases of tax abuse in the philanthropic sector in 
partnership with other law enforcement agencies. Exchanging good practices as well as information with 
tax administrations and law enforcement agencies helps countries better detect and track tax abuse 
schemes involving philanthropic entities.  
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Keeping the public and especially donors aware of schemes involving philanthropic entities is also 
important. According to the 2009 OECD report on the abuse of charities, countries such as Canada and 
the United States have introduced awareness campaigns to alert the public about the risks associated with 
the abuse of charities (OECD, 2009[4]). Canada and the United States have put out tax alerts on their 
websites about donation schemes (such as a tax shelters) and the abuse by intermediaries (such as tax 
return preparers) with respect to charitable donations. In Canada, taxpayers can search the online charities 
listing and have access to the list of the registered charities, newly registered charities, charities whose 
status have been revoked and suspended, and which charities have been permanently annulled or have 
been fined. The public can also review the annual information returns filed by registered charities. 
3.7.4. Rules on remuneration and total spending on employment 
Philanthropic entities, generally meet a non-distribution requirement while the entity is in existence. An 
issue that can arise is whether the payment of salaries to employees breaches this notion of ‘non-
distribution’. Generally, the requirement does not prevent the payment of ‘reasonable’ remuneration for 
services (or the provision of goods). Some countries may impose restrictions in this regard, while others 
may be less prescriptive. Disclosure requirements may lessen the opportunities for excessive inurement.  
To ensure that the untaxed income and received donations from philanthropic entities are not used for the 
personal gain of people associated with the entity, some countries have strict rules on remuneration and 
the total spending on employment. In Canada, for example, board members of PBOs are entitled to 
reasonable remuneration for the services they provide.  This includes attendance fees and reimbursement 
of expenses, but does not generally include a salary simply for being a board member. The members of 
the board of trustees (or the board of directors) in Switzerland work on a voluntary basis and are generally 
only entitled to compensation of their effective expenses and cash expenses. For special services of 
individual members of the board of trustees (board members) it is allowed that an adequate compensation 
is paid.  
In Colombia, the budget destined to compensate, remunerate or finance any disbursement, in money or 
in kind, for purposes of payroll, fees or commissions to the persons who hold managerial and directive 
positions of a philanthropic entity, may not exceed 30% of the total annual expenditure of the entity. If such 
payments exceed this limitation, the entity will be excluded from the Special Tax Regime.  
Board members and trustees of PBOs in Ireland cannot accept a salary specifically for acting as a charity 
trustee, or receive other benefits for acting as such. However, they may be reimbursed for reasonable 
expenses, which they incur in carrying out their duties. Similarly, in Australia board members are generally 
unpaid but can be reimbursed for expenses. 
In Sweden, board members of the PBO are entitled to remuneration. The only condition is that the PBO 
must use the main part of the income for a worthy purpose. In the Netherlands, PBOs can have volunteers, 
who may receive a limited compensation for their work. If the compensation is in line with the market, the 
volunteer will be seen as an employee and the normal rules for employees are applicable. In South Africa, 
employees and board members of philanthropic entities are entitled to remuneration, which is taxed as 
their personal income. Further, 75% of all donations received by a philanthropic entity in South Africa must 
be distributed for worthy purpose annually. Therefore, 25% is available to remunerate employees and 
others involved in the entity and for other expenses. The United States levies a 21% tax on excessive (over 
USD 1 000 000) remuneration for the five highest paid employees of exempt organisations (see Box 3.4 
for more details).  
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1 Value Added Tax (VAT) and the equivalent Goods and Services Tax (GST) in some jurisdictions area 
are referred to as "VAT" in this report.  
2 In the Brussels-Capital Region, for example, a reduced rate of 7% is applied for bequests (movable and 
immovable assets). 
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This chapter provides an overview of the tax treatment of donors and 
philanthropic giving across OECD member and selected participating 
countries. The first two sections of the chapter discuss the tax design of 
incentives for giving by individuals and countries’ tax incentives for 
corporate giving. The last section highlights the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion and the anti-abuse policies countries have put in 
place as a result.  
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Characteristics of philanthropic giving 
Philanthropic giving is the act of voluntarily transferring private resources to qualified philanthropic entities 
without receiving, or expecting to receive, anything of equal value in return. Both natural and legal persons 
can engage in philanthropic giving. Any benefit to the donor that arises from the gift must be within the 
statutory limits that apply. A number of countries (e.g. Australia, Austria, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) have rules in place to accommodate the above fair market value purchase of goods and 
services from a philanthropic entity. Examples of such forms of philanthropic giving may include the 
purchase of tickets to a fundraising event (in the case of individuals) or the sponsoring of funds and PBOs 
in return for advertisement (in the case of corporations). 
Philanthropic giving is a significant source of funding for funds and PBOs. All of the countries surveyed 
provide some form of tax incentives to encourage philanthropic giving. The generosity and design of the 
incentives varies. Countries may choose to encourage only some forms of giving or offer more support to 
some donors based on their income or wealth, or whether they are individuals or corporations. 
The design of tax incentives for philanthropic giving depends on four characteristics of the transfer: (1) who 
is giving; (2) how is it given; (3) what is the gift; and (4) who is the recipient? As shown in Figure 4.1, giving 
4 The tax treatment of giving  
   75 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
This chapter provides an overview of the tax treatment of donors and 
philanthropic giving across OECD member and selected participating 
countries. The first two sections of the chapter discuss the tax design of 
incentives for giving by individuals and countries’ tax incentives for 
corporate giving. The last section highlights the potential risk of tax 
avoidance and evasion and the anti-abuse policies countries have put in 
place as a result.  
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Characteristics of philanthropic giving 
Philanthropic giving is the act of voluntarily transferring private resources to qualified philanthropic entities 
without receiving, or expecting to receive, anything of equal value in return. Both natural and legal persons 
can engage in philanthropic giving. Any benefit to the donor that arises from the gift must be within the 
statutory limits that apply. A number of countries (e.g. Australia, Austria, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) have rules in place to accommodate the above fair market value purchase of goods and 
services from a philanthropic entity. Examples of such forms of philanthropic giving may include the 
purchase of tickets to a fundraising event (in the case of individuals) or the sponsoring of funds and PBOs 
in return for advertisement (in the case of corporations). 
Philanthropic giving is a significant source of funding for funds and PBOs. All of the countries surveyed 
provide some form of tax incentives to encourage philanthropic giving. The generosity and design of the 
incentives varies. Countries may choose to encourage only some forms of giving or offer more support to 
some donors based on their income or wealth, or whether they are individuals or corporations. 
The design of tax incentives for philanthropic giving depends on four characteristics of the transfer: (1) who 
is giving; (2) how is it given; (3) what is the gift; and (4) who is the recipient? As shown in Figure 4.1, giving 
4 The tax treatment of giving  
76    
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
can occur at an individual or corporate level, which has implications on motives as well as the tax used to 
incentivise this behaviour. At the individual level, we differentiate between donations during one’s lifetime 
and testamentary giving on death. At the corporate level, we differentiate between donations and 
sponsorship payments to philanthropic entities, which may be considered part of the donor’s business 
expenses. The gifts (or donations) themselves can be in the form of cash, or non-monetary assets (e.g. 
real estate, stocks, cultural assets, and in some cases even blood or organ donations). Finally, the type of 
recipient is important as it determines the philanthropic nature of the gift. This chapter will compare and 
contrast how countries use their tax systems to incentivise giving and how those incentives are designed 
to apply to the different forms of philanthropic giving. 
Figure 4.1. Different tax implications depending on the characteristics of philanthropic giving 
 
Note: This shows the most likely tax implications of philanthropic giving to funds and PBOs. Giving to individuals directly, in most cases, does 
not qualify as philanthropic and could instead lead to inheritance, estate or gift tax liabilities. Abbreviations: personal income tax (PIT); capital 
gains tax (CGT); Inheritance tax (IHT); corporate income tax (CIT).  
4.1.2. Eligibility for tax incentives 
For philanthropic giving, of any kind, to be eligible for tax incentives, the recipient must be an eligible (i.e. 
recognised) fund or PBO. None of the countries surveyed (see Box 4.1 for unique exceptions) offer tax 
subsidies to gifts made directly to individuals in need without passing through a fund or PBO. Moreover, 
such transfers may trigger estate, inheritance or gift tax liabilities. Gifts made to funds or PBOs that are 
earmarked for specific individuals usually do not benefit from tax incentives either. There are a number of 
reasons countries may want funds and PBOs to act as intermediaries between the donors and the final 
beneficiaries of philanthropy. Ensuring that each individual gift is distributed in a way that meets the not-
for-profit, worthy purpose, and public benefit criteria would create a large administrative burden for 
governments and donors. As a result, it is more efficient to make funds and PBOs responsible for meeting 
the conditions necessary for philanthropic giving to be tax incentivised. 
Box 4.1. Exceptions to the rules on giving to individuals directly 
Chilean law concerning national emergencies 
In Chile, philanthropic gifts to individuals directly (i.e. without passing through a fund or PBO) are 
exempt from any tax affecting them, and are deductible from the corporate income tax base, if they 
are given during a national emergency.  
The Virginia Beach Strong Act in the United States 
The Virginia Beach Strong Act states that a cash contribution made for the relief of the families of the 
dead or wounded victims of the mass shooting in Virginia Beach, Virginia, on May 31, 2019, shall be 














Non-cash CIT + CGT
Sponsoring Business expensing rules
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4.1.3. Key findings 
The key findings of this chapter are that: 
 The majority of countries surveyed, offer tax deductions to incentivise individual and corporate 
philanthropic giving. Other countries offer tax credits instead, and in some cases, donations are 
matched or facilitated through an allocation scheme. Furthermore, deductions are more common 
for corporate tax incentives than personal income tax incentives. 
 Countries generally limit the value of their tax deduction or credit to a share of taxable or total 
income; a share of the income tax liability; a fixed value; a combination of ceilings; or limit the size 
of the donation itself.  
 In countries with no tradition of philanthropic giving, an allocation scheme can create awareness 
among taxpayers, financially support funds and PBOs, and develop stronger ties between the 
general public and philanthropic entities. 
 Countries that levy inheritance or estate taxes generally provide preferential tax relief for 
philanthropic bequests. In countries with an inheritance tax, the funds or PBOs receiving the 
bequest is liable for the tax and thus are the ones that receive the tax relief. In countries with an 
estate tax, on the other hand, the tax liability as well as the corresponding tax relief is with the 
estate of the deceased. 
 The majority of countries that incentivise cash donations of individuals, also incentivise non-
monetary donations. Countries may require appraisals if the value of a non-monetary donation 
exceeds a threshold, have different valuation rules for different types of assets, not require 
valuations or review valuations through audits. 
 Corporate payments to philanthropic entities in return for advertising are considered business 
expenses in most countries, if they have a sufficient nexus with producing business income. 
However, these payments may have tax implications for the PBOs receiving them. 
 Common types of tax avoidance and evasion issues with tax relief for philanthropic giving include: 
eligible philanthropic entities that wilfully participate in a tax evasion scheme to benefit their donors; 
falsified donation receipts prepared by the philanthropic entity, tax preparers or donors; payments 
for goods and services disguised as donations; overvalued gifts; and donations of assets in which 
the donor retains an interest in. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 summarises countries’ tax policies that are intended to 
incentivise philanthropic giving by individuals. Within this section, the individual incentive schemes of 
countries are discussed in detail, followed by an analysis of tax rules for non-monetary donations by 
individuals. Section 4.3 provides an overview of tax policies incentivising philanthropic giving by 
corporations. This section covers the design of countries’ tax incentives, as well as the tax rules concerning 
the sponsoring of the philanthropic entity in return for advertising. Finally, section 4.4 discusses the risks 
of tax avoidance and abuse that are related to the tax policies discussed in this chapter.  
4.2. Philanthropic giving by individuals 
In most of the countries surveyed, individual taxpayers that give to a qualifying fund or PBO during their 
lifetime receive some form of tax incentive. Philanthropic giving of individuals can occur during life, in the 
form of donations, or on death, in the form of philanthropic bequests. Donations by individuals are 
encouraged, directly or indirectly, through personal income and/or capital gains tax incentives. Almost all 
countries surveyed have tax incentives for individuals that donate during their lifetime to qualified funds or 
PBOs. In the absence of such an incentive, individual taxpayers that give would do so entirely from their 
post-tax income and with no change to their personal income tax liability or size of their gift (this is the case 
in Malta).  
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4.1.3. Key findings 
The key findings of this chapter are that: 
 The majority of countries surveyed, offer tax deductions to incentivise individual and corporate 
philanthropic giving. Other countries offer tax credits instead, and in some cases, donations are 
matched or facilitated through an allocation scheme. Furthermore, deductions are more common 
for corporate tax incentives than personal income tax incentives. 
 Countries generally limit the value of their tax deduction or credit to a share of taxable or total 
income; a share of the income tax liability; a fixed value; a combination of ceilings; or limit the size 
of the donation itself.  
 In countries with no tradition of philanthropic giving, an allocation scheme can create awareness 
among taxpayers, financially support funds and PBOs, and develop stronger ties between the 
general public and philanthropic entities. 
 Countries that levy inheritance or estate taxes generally provide preferential tax relief for 
philanthropic bequests. In countries with an inheritance tax, the funds or PBOs receiving the 
bequest is liable for the tax and thus are the ones that receive the tax relief. In countries with an 
estate tax, on the other hand, the tax liability as well as the corresponding tax relief is with the 
estate of the deceased. 
 The majority of countries that incentivise cash donations of individuals, also incentivise non-
monetary donations. Countries may require appraisals if the value of a non-monetary donation 
exceeds a threshold, have different valuation rules for different types of assets, not require 
valuations or review valuations through audits. 
 Corporate payments to philanthropic entities in return for advertising are considered business 
expenses in most countries, if they have a sufficient nexus with producing business income. 
However, these payments may have tax implications for the PBOs receiving them. 
 Common types of tax avoidance and evasion issues with tax relief for philanthropic giving include: 
eligible philanthropic entities that wilfully participate in a tax evasion scheme to benefit their donors; 
falsified donation receipts prepared by the philanthropic entity, tax preparers or donors; payments 
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 summarises countries’ tax policies that are intended to 
incentivise philanthropic giving by individuals. Within this section, the individual incentive schemes of 
countries are discussed in detail, followed by an analysis of tax rules for non-monetary donations by 
individuals. Section 4.3 provides an overview of tax policies incentivising philanthropic giving by 
corporations. This section covers the design of countries’ tax incentives, as well as the tax rules concerning 
the sponsoring of the philanthropic entity in return for advertising. Finally, section 4.4 discusses the risks 
of tax avoidance and abuse that are related to the tax policies discussed in this chapter.  
4.2. Philanthropic giving by individuals 
In most of the countries surveyed, individual taxpayers that give to a qualifying fund or PBO during their 
lifetime receive some form of tax incentive. Philanthropic giving of individuals can occur during life, in the 
form of donations, or on death, in the form of philanthropic bequests. Donations by individuals are 
encouraged, directly or indirectly, through personal income and/or capital gains tax incentives. Almost all 
countries surveyed have tax incentives for individuals that donate during their lifetime to qualified funds or 
PBOs. In the absence of such an incentive, individual taxpayers that give would do so entirely from their 
post-tax income and with no change to their personal income tax liability or size of their gift (this is the case 
in Malta).  
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The design of tax incentives for individual donors differs across countries and depends on the nature of 
the gift. A philanthropic donation can be in the form of cash or non-cash, frequently referred to as non-
monetary or in-kind donations. Non-monetary donations may include:  
 real and intellectual property; 
 stock or shares; 
 trading stock; 
 cultural assets; 
 other personal property;  
 services (volunteering); or 
 blood and organ donations.  
None of these forms of donating are always eligible for tax-subsidies. Countries may choose to limit their 
tax incentives to cash donations only (e.g., Austria, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), 
or severely restrict the size and nature of non-monetary donations. Non-monetary donations also raise 
valuation concerns, which may have capital gains tax implications.  
This section provides an overview of countries’ tax treatment of donations made by individuals and is 
organised as follows: an overview of the design of the tax policies meant to support and incentivise 
philanthropy (deductions, credits, matching schemes, and allocation schemes), followed by a discussion 
of tax incentives for philanthropic bequests. Lastly, this section covers the tax policies for in-kind donations 
with a particular focus on the applicable valuation rules, as well as the potential capital gains tax 
implications.  
4.2.1. Tax incentives for cash donations by individuals 
In the large majority of countries surveyed, donations are deductible. Other countries offer tax credits and 
in some cases, donations are matched or facilitated through an allocation scheme. Although allocation 
schemes are not tax incentives, they are included in this discussion as they are part of the toolbox of tax 
policies intended to support philanthropy and are administered through the tax system. Table 4.1 shows 
that donations are deductible in 22 of the countries surveyed. Tax deductions effectively subtract the 
donation, or a portion of the donation, from the personal income tax (PIT) base before the tax liability is 
computed, thereby reducing the taxable amount before calculating the tax. Deductions that are tied to 
progressive tax brackets can become regressive since the value of tax deductions increases with marginal 
tax rates. In the context of deductible donations this means that in countries with a progressive personal 
income tax, the cost of giving is lower for the wealthy. 
Another aspect to consider is whether countries have a comprehensive or schedular income tax system. 
In the case of the latter, the gross income, deductions, and credits are determined separately for each type 
of income (e.g., labour and capital income). Since rates may vary from type to type, the impact of the 
incentive may also. For example, countries with a dual income tax system may have a progressive tax rate 
for labour income, but a flat rate for capital income. As a result, a deduction would only be regressive if it 
is allowed against labour income. 
Twelve countries incentivise donations through tax credits. A tax credit is an amount subtracted directly 
from the tax liability, after the liability has been computed. Unlike tax deductions, the value of tax credits is 
equal for all taxpayers (as long as their tax liability is equal to or larger than the value of the credit). If the 
value of the credit is larger than the tax liability of an individual, the credit would have to be refundable for 
the taxpayer to benefit fully from the incentive (this is the case in New Zealand for example). One country 
(Japan) offers donors a choice between a tax deduction and credit.  
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Table 4.1. Tax incentives for donations by individuals 
Country Deduction Credit Matching Allocation Other 
Argentina X 
    
Australia X 
    
Austria X 
    
Bulgaria X 
    
Czech Republic X     
Estonia X 
    
Finland X 
    
Germany X 
    
India X 
    
Indonesia X 
    
Italy X X  X  
Japan X X    
Latvia X 
    
Luxembourg X     
Mexico X 
    
Netherlands X 










South Africa X 
    
Switzerland X 
    
United States X 
   
X2 




   




   
France  X    
































   
X 
 
Romania    X  
Slovak Republic 




    
X3 
Note:  
1. The tax credit is wholly refundable.  
2. Some states have tax credits for certain donations.  
3. In cases of shares and immovable property donations to a qualifying PBO, such transfers would not be subject to tax. 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire and Ministry of Finance websites 
The United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, and Singapore have a matching scheme, where government tops 
up donations at a given rate so that the entity receiving the donation is able to claim the tax relief. In the 
United Kingdom and Ireland the matched amount is linked to the personal income tax rate of the donor.  
Romania, Slovenia, Portugal, Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic use a tax allocation scheme to 
support philanthropic entities. In countries with an allocation scheme, the tax administration allows 
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taxpayers to designate a fixed percentage or amount of their income tax to a fund or PBO directly through 
their tax return. In itself, such a scheme is neither a tax incentive nor an act of giving. As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, philanthropic giving involves the voluntary transfer of private resources, and the 
money directed at funds and PBOs through a pure allocation scheme is public. Nevertheless, some have 
argued that allocation schemes can be used to help develop a culture of philanthropic giving in countries 
where there is no tradition of philanthropy (Bullain, 2004[1]). On the other hand, such a scheme may curb 
philanthropic giving as individuals will be less inclined to use their private resources to support funds and 
PBOs if they can do so with public resources (Bullain, 2004[1]).  
4.2.2. Tax deductions 
In countries with tax deductions, a donation (or a portion of it) is deductible from the personal income tax 
(PIT) base up to a limit that may be a fixed value and/ or expressed as a share of taxable or total income. 
To limit the size of the deduction, countries can: limit the share of the donation that is deductible (e.g. 50% 
of the donation is deducted from the PIT base); limit the size of the deduction to a share of taxable or total 
income (e.g. up to 20% of the PIT base); or limit the size of the deduction to a fixed value (e.g. up to EUR 
1000). Table 4.2 shows that countries use any combination of tax deduction ceilings with different levels 
of generosity.  
Decisions over what ceilings to use have policy implications on what income groups the tax subsidies 
target and what size of donations they most incentivise. For example, if the ceiling is a rather low share of 
total income but allows for a high fixed limit, high-income taxpayers will still receive a marginal benefit for 
large donations. If on the other hand, the ceiling is set to a high share of total income but the fixed limit on 
the deduction is low, the marginal benefit for any donation exceeding the fixed value limit will be zero. In 
Germany, for instance, deductions are simply capped at 20% of ‘total income’1, while in Estonia deductions 
are capped at 50% of ‘taxable income’ but may not exceed EUR 1 200. 
Limiting the deduction to a share of taxable or total income 
Table 4.2 shows that a number of countries (Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany, 
Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United States, and South Africa) have ceilings that 
are only tied to income (as opposed to those limited to a fixed value). In these countries, the marginal cost 
of giving for large donations is lower for wealthy individuals regardless of the personal income tax rate, as 
higher income raises the deduction ceiling. Of course the fact that most countries have progressive 
personal income taxes leads to the cost of giving being even lower for those in higher tax brackets but this 
effect is independent of whether or not the ceiling is a function of total income or a fixed value.  
Of the above mentioned countries, Argentina, Indonesia, Italy and Slovenia have the lowest ceilings. In 
Argentina, individuals can deduct donations up to 5% of ‘annual earnings’ of Argentinian source. In 
Indonesia, donations of up to 5% of current net income are deductible from the personal income tax base 
and for a taxpayer to be eligible for the deductible deduction, they must have net fiscal income (not a loss) 
based on the income tax return of the previous year, and the donation may not cause a loss in the current 
year. In Italy, individual taxpayers can choose between a deduction and a tax credit. Higher marginal tax 
rate taxpayers have a greater incentive to opt for deductions. Additionally, the gift may not be made through 
cash payments (i.e. it must be made through bank transfers, digital payments, etc.) in order to reduce the 
risk of abuse and tax evasion. For the tax deduction, individuals can deduct donations up to 10% of their 
taxable income. In Slovenia, a taxpayer with business and professional income can deduct donations but 
wage earners are incentivised through an allocation scheme. A taxpayer with business and professional 
income may claim a deduction for donations for humanitarian purposes, disabled persons assistance, 
social assistance, charitable, scientific, educational, health, sporting, cultural, ecological, religious and 
generally useful purposes. The deduction can be up to 0.3% of the taxpayer’s ‘taxable revenue’ in the tax 
period. Additionally, a taxpayer may claim a deduction of up to an added 0.2% of the taxpayer’s taxable 
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revenue in the tax period concerned, for donations to cultural purposes and voluntary societies established 
for the protection against natural disasters. Donations for these purposes (culture and disaster relief) can 
be spread over three tax periods. As a general rule the sum of all tax incentives (not just those for 
philanthropic giving) cannot exceed 63% of the tax base. 
Table 4.2. Limitations to personal income tax deductions 
Country 
Share of the 
donation that is 
deductible 
Ceiling Floor 
Argentina 100% 5% of annual earnings   
Australia 100% A deduction for a gift or contribution cannot add to or create a tax loss. AUD 2  
Austria 100% 10% of total income   
Bulgaria 100% 65% of taxable income (after the deduction)   
Czech Republic 100% 15% of taxable income 2% of the tax base or CZK 1 000  
Estonia 100% EUR 1 200 and 50% of the taxable income   
Finland 100% EUR 500 000 EUR 850 
Germany 100% 20% of total amount of income   
India 50% - 100% 10% of Gross Total Income    
Indonesia 100% 5% from current net income   
Italy 100% 10% of the taxable income.   
Japan 100% 40% of total income JPY 2 000 
Latvia 100% EUR 600 and 50% of the annual taxable income   
Luxembourg 100% EUR 1 000 000 or 20% of net income EUR 120 
Mexico 100% 
For donations to private institution: 7% of last year’s cumulative 
income. For donations to governmental institutions: 4% of last 
year’s cumulative income.  
  
Netherlands 100% 10% of the total income. 1% of total income and over EUR 60. 
Norway 100% NOK 50 000 NOK 500 
Singapore 250% No limits  
Slovenia 100% 0.5% of taxable revenue    
South Africa 100% 10% of taxable income   
Switzerland 100% 20% of taxable income  CHF 100 
United States 100% 60% or 30% of adjusted gross income depending on the beneficiary   
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire and Ministry of Finance websites 
In Bulgaria, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Slovenia the deduction rules vary across worthy purposes. In 
Bulgaria the limitations of deduction varies depending on the worthy purposes that the recipient fund or 
PBO is engaged in. Donations are deductible from the annual personal income tax base up to a total ceiling 
of 65% of the tax base after the deduction. For individual donations, the ceilings further differ depending 
on the beneficiary: 
 Up to 5% of the annual tax base, where donations are in favour of: 
o healthcare and medical-treatment establishments; 
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In Bulgaria, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Slovenia the deduction rules vary across worthy purposes. In 
Bulgaria the limitations of deduction varies depending on the worthy purposes that the recipient fund or 
PBO is engaged in. Donations are deductible from the annual personal income tax base up to a total ceiling 
of 65% of the tax base after the deduction. For individual donations, the ceilings further differ depending 
on the beneficiary: 
 Up to 5% of the annual tax base, where donations are in favour of: 
o healthcare and medical-treatment establishments; 
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o social services for residential care, as well as of the Social Assistance Agency and of the Social 
Protection Fund under the Minister of Labour and Social Policy; 
o public nurseries, kindergartens, schools, higher schools or academies;  
o budgetary organisations, within the meaning given by the Accountancy Act; 
o any religious denominations registered in the country; 
o any specialised enterprises or cooperatives of persons with disabilities; 
o the Bulgarian Red Cross; 
o cultural institutes and community centres; 
o PBOs with the exception of any organisations supporting culture;  
o the Bulgaria Energy Efficiency and Renewable Sources Fund; 
o therapeutic communities for the treatment of drug-addicted persons; 
o the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); 
 Up to 15% of the annual tax base, where donations are in favour of culture; 
 Up to 50% of the annual tax base, where donations are in favour of:  
o the National Health Insurance Fund: for activities related to the medical treatment of children. 
In Mexico, the deduction limits vary depending on the nature of the receiving entity. Donations to private 
philanthropic entities are only deductible for an amount that does not exceed 7% of the ‘cumulative income’ 
earned by the taxpayer in the year immediately preceding the deduction. Mexico also incentivises 
donations to local government entities. Donations in favour of the Federation, the Federal Entities, the 
Municipalities, or their decentralized organisations, are only deductible in an amount that does not exceed 
4% of the taxpayer's cumulative income in the previous year (donations to local government entities or 
institutions are outside the scope of this report and therefore not covered in more detail elsewhere). The 
sum of donations to private philanthropic entities and governments entities must not exceed 7% of the 
‘cumulative income’ earned by the taxpayer in the year immediately preceding the deduction. 
In the Netherlands donations are deductible if the amount of the donation is at least 1% (minimum EUR 
60) and up to 10% of the donor’s total income. A donation that is pledged for at least 5 years in a written 
statement (by a notary) can be deductible without the threshold and ceiling. For donations to a cultural 
PBO, there is a multiplier of 1.25 times the gift (up to a maximum of EUR 1 250). There are no rollover 
provisions and gifts are only deductible in the year they were given. Sole traders and unincorporated 
entities can deduct donations as business expenses as long as they do so for the purpose of producing 
income. Otherwise, the payment to philanthropic entities is deductible as a donation. 
In the Czech Republic, donations to municipalities or qualifying philanthropic entities are deductible from 
the personal income tax base up to a ceiling of 15% of taxable income adjusted for deductible expenses. 
For the donation to qualify, it must be greater than the lesser of 2% of taxable income or CZK 1 000.  
Austria, Australia, Germany, and the United States provide a deduction for donations to a broad range of 
philanthropic entities but also have rules to regulate donations for which the donor receives a benefit 
(donor-benefit rules). In Austria, cash donations of individuals are deductible from the personal income tax 
base in the year the money was donated. The only restriction is that the deduction may not exceed 10% 
of the total income. Donations cannot be carried over to a subsequent year. Austria also has very specific 
donor-benefit rules, for example, in relation to a fundraising event. Donors that give to funds and PBOs by 
purchasing an overpriced good or service, may deduct the amount paid that exceeds the fair market value 
of the good or service purchased. In a fundraising auction, where one individual donates a good and the 
other purchases it, the donor of the good may deduct its fair market value. The buyer of the good may in 
return deduct the amount paid in excess of the fair market value of the good. 
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In Australia, donations of more than AUD 2, are deductible from the personal income tax base. There is 
no specific upper limit on the value of a donation that may be deducted. The only limit is that deductions 
for donations cannot create or add to a tax loss. However, taxpayers can spread a donation over up to five 
income years. Furthermore, Australia differentiates between a gift for which the donor receives no benefit 
at all and a contribution for which the donor does receive a benefit. When the donor does receive a benefit 
(e.g. purchasing a ticket for a philanthropic fundraising event), the transaction is only tax deductible if the 
benefit to the donor is no more than AUD 150 and 20% of the value of the donation.  
In the United States, deductions by individuals to philanthropic entities are generally limited to 60%2 of 
‘adjusted gross income’, although donations to private foundations are limited to 30% of adjusted gross 
income. Donations in excess of these limits can be carried over to up to 5 years. For taxpayers to benefit 
from the deductible deduction, they must itemise their deductions and cannot take the standard deduction 
(see Box 4.2). In the case of an above fair market value purchase of goods and services from a qualified 
fund or PBO (e.g. philanthropic fundraiser tickets), the excess payment (difference between the payment 
and the fair market value of the good or service) can be considered a philanthropic contribution and is tax 
deductible. However, for the excess amount to qualify, the individual must pay it with the intent of making 
a charitable contribution (i.e. the individual must be aware that they are paying more than the fair market 
value of the good or service). 
In Germany, donations are considered special expenses and are deductible from the personal income tax 
base. The deduction is limited to 20% of ‘total income’ (or 4% of the sum of the total turnover and wages 
and salaries paid during the calendar year). Membership fees to entities that promote sports, certain 
cultural or heritage activities as well as customs and traditions are not deductible. Similarly, Germany has 
strict donor-benefit rules so that, unlike in the United States or Australia, the above fair market value 
purchase of goods and services from a fund or PBO (e.g. fundraiser tickets) is not tax deductible.  
In Japan, the amount of a qualifying donation exceeding JPN 2 000 is deductible from donors’ income up 
to 40% of total income. A donation qualifies for the tax incentive if it is made to public interest incorporated 
associations, public interest incorporated foundations and other corporations or groups that carry out 
business for the public benefit, which meet the requirements discussed in Chapter 3. Japan is a unique 
case because it allows donors to choose between a tax deduction and a tax credit (for some donations). 
The design of the tax credit is discussed in the next section.  
In Switzerland, donations over CHF 100 are deductible up to 20% of ‘taxable income’ for federal income 
tax purposes. For cantonal (i.e. regional) income tax purposes, the thresholds are sometimes different. 
The majority of Swiss cantons have adopted the federal threshold and minimum donation amount. Some 
cantons, however, have eliminated the minimum donation amount or given its regional council the authority 
to wave the 20% threshold on a case by case basis if there is found to be ‘a considerable public interest’ 
in the relevant purpose. In South Africa, donations for the purposes of healthcare, conservation, education, 
and welfare activities, are deductible from the personal income tax base up to a limit of 10% of ‘taxable 
income’ (rollover provisions apply).  
Limiting the deduction to a fixed value and/or a share of income 
Countries with a fixed value limit (Estonia, Finland, and Norway) keep the size of the deduction under a 
certain maximum regardless of how high a donor’s income is. This means that in these countries individuals 
with lower incomes can deduct a higher proportion of their income for philanthropic giving than those with 
high incomes. In Finland, donations between EUR 850 and EUR 500 000 are deductible from taxable 
income. Only donations for the purpose of promoting science, or art given to a publicly financed university, 
can qualify for the tax deduction. The ceiling is significantly lower in Norway, where the donation must be 
between NOK 500 and NOK 50 000 (~ EUR 4 500) to qualify for the tax deduction.  
Furthermore, the design of the tax deduction in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland shows that there are regional 
similarities. In Estonia, donations of up to EUR 1 200 and 50% of the taxable income may be deducted. In 
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and the fair market value of the good or service) can be considered a philanthropic contribution and is tax 
deductible. However, for the excess amount to qualify, the individual must pay it with the intent of making 
a charitable contribution (i.e. the individual must be aware that they are paying more than the fair market 
value of the good or service). 
In Germany, donations are considered special expenses and are deductible from the personal income tax 
base. The deduction is limited to 20% of ‘total income’ (or 4% of the sum of the total turnover and wages 
and salaries paid during the calendar year). Membership fees to entities that promote sports, certain 
cultural or heritage activities as well as customs and traditions are not deductible. Similarly, Germany has 
strict donor-benefit rules so that, unlike in the United States or Australia, the above fair market value 
purchase of goods and services from a fund or PBO (e.g. fundraiser tickets) is not tax deductible.  
In Japan, the amount of a qualifying donation exceeding JPN 2 000 is deductible from donors’ income up 
to 40% of total income. A donation qualifies for the tax incentive if it is made to public interest incorporated 
associations, public interest incorporated foundations and other corporations or groups that carry out 
business for the public benefit, which meet the requirements discussed in Chapter 3. Japan is a unique 
case because it allows donors to choose between a tax deduction and a tax credit (for some donations). 
The design of the tax credit is discussed in the next section.  
In Switzerland, donations over CHF 100 are deductible up to 20% of ‘taxable income’ for federal income 
tax purposes. For cantonal (i.e. regional) income tax purposes, the thresholds are sometimes different. 
The majority of Swiss cantons have adopted the federal threshold and minimum donation amount. Some 
cantons, however, have eliminated the minimum donation amount or given its regional council the authority 
to wave the 20% threshold on a case by case basis if there is found to be ‘a considerable public interest’ 
in the relevant purpose. In South Africa, donations for the purposes of healthcare, conservation, education, 
and welfare activities, are deductible from the personal income tax base up to a limit of 10% of ‘taxable 
income’ (rollover provisions apply).  
Limiting the deduction to a fixed value and/or a share of income 
Countries with a fixed value limit (Estonia, Finland, and Norway) keep the size of the deduction under a 
certain maximum regardless of how high a donor’s income is. This means that in these countries individuals 
with lower incomes can deduct a higher proportion of their income for philanthropic giving than those with 
high incomes. In Finland, donations between EUR 850 and EUR 500 000 are deductible from taxable 
income. Only donations for the purpose of promoting science, or art given to a publicly financed university, 
can qualify for the tax deduction. The ceiling is significantly lower in Norway, where the donation must be 
between NOK 500 and NOK 50 000 (~ EUR 4 500) to qualify for the tax deduction.  
Furthermore, the design of the tax deduction in Estonia, Latvia, and Finland shows that there are regional 
similarities. In Estonia, donations of up to EUR 1 200 and 50% of the taxable income may be deducted. In 
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Latvia, donations can be deducted as part of the total eligible expenses including the acquisition of 
education and the use of health and medical treatment services. Total deductions are limited to 50% of the 
annual taxable income, and no more than EUR 600. So the deduction limit is set to the same share of total 
income in both Latvia and Estonia, but the fixed value limit is double the size in Estonia.  
India is a unique case where the donations are limited if they are made in cash. All donations above 
INR 2 000 made in cash are not deductible and must be made by cheque or wire transfer. In India, 100% 
of the donation is deductible if it is given to certain funds (e.g. Prime Minister National Relief Fund) only 
50% of the donation is deductible if it is given to most other philanthropic entities. In most cases, the 
deduction is capped at 10% of the gross total income (after all other eligible tax exemptions and 
deductions). 
In Luxembourg, tax deductible donations must be at least EUR 120 and may not exceed 20% of the donor’s 
total net income, or EUR 1 000 000. Donations that exceed these limits may be reported over the next 2 
tax years. Additionally, the initial donation made by the founder of an eligible foundation or fund is also 
considered deductible donation. 
Box 4.2. Implications of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) for philanthropic giving 
Signed into law on 22 December 2017, the TCJA is considered the biggest overhaul of the United States 
tax system in more than thirty years. It includes corporate and individual tax changes, which have 
implications for giving and philanthropic entities.  
In the United States, taxpayers can choose between itemising their deductions on their income tax 
returns and claiming the standard deduction. Only taxpayers that itemise can deduct charitable 
contributions from their taxable income. Since the tax-subsidy for donations does not apply to those 
that claim the standard deduction, only itemisers have a tax incentive to give to philanthropic causes.  
The TCJA just about doubled the standard deduction and capped the deduction for state and local taxes 
at USD 10 000. Since taxpayers only choose to itemise if the sum of their potential itemised deductions 
is larger than the standard deduction, this is likely to reduce the number of households claiming an 
itemized deduction especially among middle-income households.  
Coupled with a slight decrease in PIT rates, the TCJA reduced the average tax subsidy for charitable 
giving considerably. In other words, the price of giving has increased and the overall design of the tax 
incentive has become even more focused on big donors.  
Source: (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, 2018[2]). 
4.2.3. Tax credits 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Israel, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden all incentivise 
donations by individuals through tax credits. As discussed above, a tax credit is an amount subtracted 
directly from the tax liability, after the liability has been computed. Unlike a deduction, the value of a tax 
credit does not depend on the income tax rate paid by the donor and is, in itself, not regressive in countries 
with a progressive personal income tax.  
To limit the size of tax credits countries may adjust the share of the donation that is creditable (e.g. 50% 
of the donation is creditable); limit the value of the credit to a share of taxable or total income (e.g. up to 
20% of the PIT base); limit the value of the credit to a share of the total PIT liability (e.g. the credit cannot 
exceed 20% of the tax liability); limit the value of the credit to a fixed value (e.g. the credit cannot exceed 
EUR 1 000); or limit the size of the donation to a fixed value (e.g. up to EUR 1 000). Table 4.3 shows that 
countries use a combination of limitations to design their tax credits for philanthropic giving. The minimum 
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amount necessary for a donation to qualify for the tax credit may be used to increase the efficiency of 
administrative costs and incentivise larger donations.  
Table 4.3. Limitations to personal income tax credits 
Country Tax credit Ceiling Floor 
Belgium 45% 
Total amount of the donation may not exceed 
10% of global net income nor EUR 375 350 per 
spouse 
EUR 40 per institution 
Canada 15% - 33% Up to 75% of net income can be claimed (for cash donations)   
Chile 35-50%  
Credits received for donations to charity, and 
education, culture and sport are limited at 20% of 
the amount of the donation subject to beneficial 
tax treatment or UTM 320 (approx. USD 20 558). 
  
Colombia 25%  
Credit received is limited to 25% of the income 
tax liability (the excess may be carried over to 
the following year) 
  
France 66% 20% of taxable income  
Greece 20% Total amount of the donation may not exceed 5% of taxable income EUR 100 
Israel 35% The credit cannot exceed 30% of taxable income or NIS 9 000 000   
Italy 30% (35% for specific PBOs) Up to EUR 30 000 of total giving  
Japan 40% 
The donated amount cannot exceed 40% of total 
income and the value of the tax credit may not 
exceed 25% of the income tax liability.  
JPY 2 000 
New Zealand 33.33% Total amount of the donation may not exceed 100% of taxable income. NZD 5 
Portugal 25% The credit cannot exceed 15% of tax liability (no limit for donations to public institutions).   
Sweden 25% The credit cannot exceed SEK 1 500 
SEK 2 000 total donations 
and at least SEK 200 per 
individual donation 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire and Ministry of Finance websites  
Limiting the value of the credit to a share of taxable or total income 
Canada offers tax credits for donations at the federal and provincial level. The federal tax credit is 15% on 
the first CAD 200 and 29% on donations above that amount, with the exception of individuals with taxable 
income exceeding the highest income tax bracket (which is indexed to annual inflation and approximately 
CAD 200 000), where the tax credit is 33% on all donations above the first CAD 200. Thus the value of the 
tax credit is larger for wealthier donors for all donations above CAD 200. Take, for example two donations 
of CAD 1 000 by donor A and donor B. Donor A has a taxable income above the highest income tax bracket 
(approximately CAD 200 000) and donor B does not. The monetary value of the tax credit for donor A and 
B is CAD 330 and CAD 290 respectively. Provinces tend to extend similar credits for provincial income tax 
at lower rates (e.g., Ontario provides a credit of 5.05% on the first $200 and 11.16% on donations above 
that). Generally, individuals are only able to claim up to 75% of their net income for the year but donations 
can be carried forwarded for 5 years. If the donor receives a benefit (e.g., the purchase of a ticket to a 
fundraising event), the fair market value of the benefit must be determined by the philanthropic entity (this 
is referred to as the ‘split receipt’ method) and deducted from the amount of the payment before the tax 
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credit is applied. Furthermore, a donation is only eligible for tax relief if the value of the benefit received is 
less than 80% of the value of the donation. This is referred to as the ‘intention to make a gift’ threshold as 
gifts with a benefit to the donor above that amount are considered to have been made with no true intention 
of donating. 
France provides a 66% tax credit for donations to philanthropic entities. The reduction applies within the 
limit of 20 % of taxable income. For donations to PBOs providing free meals, care or accommodation for 
people in need, the tax credit is 75% of a donation less than or equal to EUR 546. For the part of the 
donation that exceeds EUR 546, the tax credit is 66%. The 20 % of the taxable income limit remains 
constant. Additionally, France provides a reduction on the real estate wealth tax (“Impôt sur la fortune 
immobilière”). The reduction is 75 % of the amount of the donation with a cap at EUR 50 000.  
In New Zealand, donors receive a fully refundable tax credit of 33.33% of the donation. Furthermore, the 
amount an individual can donate and claim a donation tax credit for is capped at 100% of their taxable 
income for the year the donation was made. The value of the tax credit is limited to 33.33% of the donor’s 
taxable income. For a donation to qualify, it must be a gift of NZD 5 or more. The credits can be claimed 
by sole traders as well as individuals who are wage-earners. 
In Japan, donors can select a 40% tax credit in place of the tax deduction for certain types of donations. 
However, the tax credit is only applied to the part of the donation that exceeds JPN 2 000. Furthermore, 
the donated amount cannot exceed 40% of total income and value of the credit cannot exceed 25% of the 
personal income tax liability.  
Limiting the value of the credit to a share of the income tax liability 
In Colombia and Portugal, the credit ceiling is tied to the tax liability instead of total taxable income. In 
Colombia, the tax credit is 25% of the value donated in the year or taxable period, limited to 25% of 
taxpayers’ income tax liability of the year in which the donation was made. The excess may be offset 
against the income tax liability in the following tax year. For example, if an income taxpayer makes a 
donation of COP 150, such donation creates a credit of COP 37.5 (25% of COP 150). If the tax liability of 
the income tax payer is COP 80, the total amount of the credit that may be offset in the taxable year of the 
donation is COP 20 (25% of USD 80); the remaining COP 17.5 credit may be offset in the following tax 
year if it does not exceed 25% of the total income tax liability. In Portugal, the tax credit is set at 25% of 
the donation but limited to 15% of the tax liability which is ten percentage points lower than in Colombia. 
Limiting the value of the credit to a fixed value 
In Sweden, donors receive a 25% tax credit of up to SEK 1 500, corresponding to a maximum of SEK 6 
000 a year in eligible donations. For the donation to be eligible for the credit it must be at least SEK 2 000 
a year and SEK 200 at each giving occasion. 
Limiting the value of the credit to a combination of ceilings 
In Belgium, a 45% tax credit is granted for donations made to eligible philanthropic entities, provided the 
gifts amount to at least EUR 40 per beneficiary fund or PBO. The total amount of donations for which the 
tax credit is granted cannot exceed 10% of ‘global net income’ nor EUR 376 350 per spouse for a married 
couple. 
In Chile, the size and limits of the tax credit depend on the worthy purpose of the entity receiving the 
donation. For donations to culture and sports, the tax credit can be 35% or 50%. Donations to social and 
public purposes and education, may receive a tax credit of 50%. The donation, however, is limited to 20% 
of the amount of the donation subject to beneficial tax treatment or 320 UTM (which is equal to about CLP 
16 000 000 and EUR 18 000). For so called ‘reconstruction donations’, the tax credit is 40% and there are 
no limits to the size of the donation. 
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In Israel, the donor receives a tax credits equal to 35% of the eligible donations in the tax year. The value 
of the credit is limited 30% of the donor’s yearly income or NIS 9 000 000. 
Limiting the size of the donation 
In Greece, donations are incentivised through a 20% tax credit provided that the sum of all donations 
exceeds EUR 100 during the tax year. The total amount of donations eligible for the tax credit cannot 
exceed 5% of taxable income and there are no carry over provisions. For individuals that have a business 
activity, donations can be considered business expenses without a limit or ceiling (as long as they comply 
with the business expensing rules). 
Box 4.3. Tax measures to incentivise philanthropy in response to the Covid-19 pandemic  
China 
 In-kind donations to help combat COVID-19 are exempt from VAT and other consumption taxes.  
In addition, donations made by enterprises or individuals through qualified Public Benefit 
Organisations or government authorities can be fully deducted for corporate income tax and 
personal income tax purposes. Before the measure, Chinese taxpayers could only deduct part 
of their donation from their PIT base.  
Chile 
 Due to the Covid-19 crisis, a decree was issued by the Chilean government triggering the 
application of the tax benefits of Chilean law concerning national emergencies (see Box 4.1) to 
donations related with this catastrophe. 
United States 
 For 2020, up to USD 300 of monetary donations are deductible from the personal income tax 
base, whether or not the taxpayer itemises or takes the standard deduction (see Box 4.2).  
 The United States also increased the limitations on deductions for charitable contributions by 
individuals who itemise, as well as corporations. For individuals, the 50% of adjusted gross 
income limitation is suspended for 2020. For corporations, the 10% limitation is increased to 
25% of taxable income. This provision also increases the limitation on deductions for 
contributions of food inventory from 15% to 25%. 
Italy 
 Offered tax deductions of 30% for philanthropic donations linked to the COVID-19 emergency. 
Belgium 
 Companies donating medical material and equipment to hospitals do not have to pay VAT on 
these donations. 
Iceland 
 Persons and entities building, renovating or maintaining residential housing or vacation homes 
can seek reimbursement for 100% of the VAT incurred due to certain craftsman labour. The 
reimbursement rate has been increased from 60% to a 100% and now includes more types of 
labour, for example architects. This measure is further extended to PBOs such as charities and 
sports associations. These measures will remain in effect until end 2020. 
Source: OECD Tax Policy Responses to COVID-19 database (http://www.oecd.org/tax/covid-19-tax-policy-and-other-measures.xlsm). 
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4.2.4. Matching schemes 
In a matching scheme, the government tops up donations with a specific amount, which means that the 
fund or PBO receiving the donation is able to claim the tax incentive. The United Kingdom and Ireland both 
have matching schemes. The matching scheme in the United Kingdom is referred to as Gift Aid. The 
donation is treated as if the donor has had the basic tax rate (20%) deducted (i.e. a donation of GBP 1 000 
is treated as GBP 1 250). The PBO or fund receiving the donation is then able to claim Gift Aid from the 
tax administration (HMRC in the United Kingdom) at the basic tax rate (see Table 4.4 for an illustration of 
Gift Aid). Higher rate taxpayers can claim the difference between the basic rate and the higher rate as 
personal tax relief. 
The fiscal devolution of Wales and Scotland allows for differential tax rates across the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, Gift Aid claimed by charities regardless of their location within the United Kingdom is 
determined using the United Kingdom basic rate. On the other hand, the tax relief claimed by the Welsh 
or Scottish donor is determined using the difference between the United Kingdom basic rate and the Welsh 
or Scottish higher rate respectively. 
Table 4.4. Example of Gift Aid in the United Kingdom 
Income tax rate of the donor Donation Gift Aid claimed PBO and fund receive Personal tax relief 
Basic (20%) GBP 1 000 GBP 250 GBP 1 250 GBP 0 
Higher rate (40%) GBP 1 000 GBP 250 GBP 1 250 GBP 250 
Note: (GBP 1000 / 80) * 100 = GBP 1 250. 
Source: Government website (https://www.gov.uk). 
In the United Kingdom, payments to funds and PBOs in return for goods or services (including the purchase 
of a ticket to a fundraising event or raffle) are not considered donations and cannot qualify for Gift Aid. 
However, specific rules apply to a charity auction where individuals are willing to pay substantially more 
than market value in order to support the philanthropic entity. For auctioned goods that have a retail price 
and are freely available, the benefit to the individual for Gift Aid purposes is considered to be the retail 
price. Any excess payment can be treated as a donation if the donor is aware of that the item’s retail price 
and that it is freely available elsewhere (e.g., if an individual knowingly purchases a TV with a retail price 
of GBP 500 for GBP 700 at a charity auction, the excess GBP 200 pounds can qualify as a donation for 
Git Aid purposes). The value of goods that are not freely available and have no retail price (e.g., items 
belonging to celebrities) or services that are not usually available (e.g., babysitting for an evening) are 
considered to be worth the price that they are purchased for and therefore do not qualify for Gift Aid. 
Ireland also has a matching scheme for incentivising charitable donations (called Charitable Donation 
Scheme). Philanthropic donations from an individual which are greater than EUR 250 per year, but do not 
exceed EUR 1 000 000 per year, attract tax relief. The relief may be claimed by the approved body to 
which the money is donated at a rate of 31%, or 10% if there is a connection between the donor and the 
organisation. The matching payment to an approved body cannot exceed the amount of tax that the donor 
has paid for that year. The donor cannot claim a refund of any tax that has been paid to the approved body. 
In 2014, Norway introduced a matching scheme (also known as the gift reinforcement programme) in 
addition to the available deduction. The purpose of the program is to stimulate increased private sector 
funding for art and culture in the form of monetary donations. Recipients of donations receive an additional 
gift reinforcement sum, usually 25% of the donated amount. Applications for the receiving the 
reinforcement sum must be submitted to the Ministry of Culture.  
   89 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
4.2.5. Allocation schemes 
In countries with no tradition of philanthropic giving, an allocation scheme (also referred to as ‘percentage 
philanthropy’ or ‘tax percentage designation’ scheme) can create awareness of philanthropy among 
taxpayers, financially support funds and PBOs, and develop stronger ties between the general public and 
philanthropic entities. Allocation schemes were introduced mainly in post-communist Europe during the 
transition period and reports have estimated that by 2016 these schemes have provided philanthropic 
entities in the region with around five billion in funding (Strečanský and Török, 2016[3]). Of the countries 
surveyed, Romania, Slovenia, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic have a tax 
allocation scheme to support their philanthropic entities. Hungary was the first country to introduce an 
allocation scheme in 1997, followed by Portugal in 2001, the Slovak Republic in 2002, Lithuania in 2003, 
Poland, and Romania in 2004, and Slovenia in 2007 (Bullain, 2004[1]).  
Allocation schemes decentralise the decision-making process of allocating a certain percentage of income 
tax revenues to the taxpayers themselves. As discussed above, allocation schemes are not a form of 
philanthropic giving because they does not involve the transfer of private funds. Instead, taxpayers are 
able to indicate to the tax authorities what philanthropic entities or causes a set percentage of their income 
tax liability should be allocated to. The details of the scheme vary across countries, but typically taxpayers 
need to choose the philanthropic entity or worthy purpose from a list provided by the tax authority.   
Some countries that have allocation schemes do not have incentives for individual philanthropic giving 
(e.g., Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic), while others (e.g. Slovenia and Portugal) also offer 
tax incentives such as deductions or credits. This is worth noting because while allocation schemes can 
complement deductions, credits, or matching schemes, they should not be viewed as a replacement of 
this kind of tax relief for philanthropic giving because the scheme comes at zero cost to the taxpayer making 
the allocation. In Hungary, taxpayers can designate 1% of their personal income tax to an eligible PBO 
since 1997 and since 1998 they can designate an additional 1% to churches. In Lithuania, a taxpayer can 
designate up to a total of 1.2% of their personal income tax to eligible PBOs. In the Slovak Republic, 
individuals can allocate 2% of their income tax to a philanthropic entity and they can do so when submitting 
their tax return. If the taxpayer has volunteered for a ‘worthy’ purpose entity, for at least 40 hours during 
the tax year, the amount that can be allocated increases to 3% of the personal income tax liability. In 
Romania, individuals can allocate 2% or 3.5% of their personal income tax liability to philanthropic entities 
by submitting a form with the list of preferred recipients to the tax authority. The 2% share can be directed 
to philanthropic entities that are established and operate according to legal provisions, but also to religious 
units (including parishes). The share of 3.5% can be directed to PBOs and religious units that are also 
providers of social services. From 2021, the share will become 3.5% and can be directed to all PBOs and 
religious units that operate according to legal provisions. 
What distinguishes Italy, Slovenia and Portugal is that they have tax deductions and credits to incentivise 
philanthropic giving, but have also implemented a tax allocation scheme. In Slovenia, taxpayers can 
allocate either 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.4% or 0.5% of their personal income tax to eligible funds and PBOs 
by submitting a form online, in person, or by mail at any point before end of the year for which the personal 
income tax is assessed. In 2018, a total of about EUR 5 million was allocated to over 5 000 entities, in 
2017 the total sum allocated this way was around EUR 4.6 million and in 2011 it was around EUR 3.8 
million.3 
In Portugal a taxpayer can allocate 0.5% of their personal income tax for religious or charitable purposes, 
to a church, religious community, or PBO. They can do so as part of their annual personal income tax 
declaration or through an online portal by April. In addition to the personal income tax allocation scheme, 
Portugal also introduced a VAT allocation scheme in 2019 (see Box 4.4 for a more detailed overview of 
how it works).  
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Poland, and Romania in 2004, and Slovenia in 2007 (Bullain, 2004[1]).  
Allocation schemes decentralise the decision-making process of allocating a certain percentage of income 
tax revenues to the taxpayers themselves. As discussed above, allocation schemes are not a form of 
philanthropic giving because they does not involve the transfer of private funds. Instead, taxpayers are 
able to indicate to the tax authorities what philanthropic entities or causes a set percentage of their income 
tax liability should be allocated to. The details of the scheme vary across countries, but typically taxpayers 
need to choose the philanthropic entity or worthy purpose from a list provided by the tax authority.   
Some countries that have allocation schemes do not have incentives for individual philanthropic giving 
(e.g., Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic), while others (e.g. Slovenia and Portugal) also offer 
tax incentives such as deductions or credits. This is worth noting because while allocation schemes can 
complement deductions, credits, or matching schemes, they should not be viewed as a replacement of 
this kind of tax relief for philanthropic giving because the scheme comes at zero cost to the taxpayer making 
the allocation. In Hungary, taxpayers can designate 1% of their personal income tax to an eligible PBO 
since 1997 and since 1998 they can designate an additional 1% to churches. In Lithuania, a taxpayer can 
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Romania, individuals can allocate 2% or 3.5% of their personal income tax liability to philanthropic entities 
by submitting a form with the list of preferred recipients to the tax authority. The 2% share can be directed 
to philanthropic entities that are established and operate according to legal provisions, but also to religious 
units (including parishes). The share of 3.5% can be directed to PBOs and religious units that are also 
providers of social services. From 2021, the share will become 3.5% and can be directed to all PBOs and 
religious units that operate according to legal provisions. 
What distinguishes Italy, Slovenia and Portugal is that they have tax deductions and credits to incentivise 
philanthropic giving, but have also implemented a tax allocation scheme. In Slovenia, taxpayers can 
allocate either 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.4% or 0.5% of their personal income tax to eligible funds and PBOs 
by submitting a form online, in person, or by mail at any point before end of the year for which the personal 
income tax is assessed. In 2018, a total of about EUR 5 million was allocated to over 5 000 entities, in 
2017 the total sum allocated this way was around EUR 4.6 million and in 2011 it was around EUR 3.8 
million.3 
In Portugal a taxpayer can allocate 0.5% of their personal income tax for religious or charitable purposes, 
to a church, religious community, or PBO. They can do so as part of their annual personal income tax 
declaration or through an online portal by April. In addition to the personal income tax allocation scheme, 
Portugal also introduced a VAT allocation scheme in 2019 (see Box 4.4 for a more detailed overview of 
how it works).  
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In Italy a large amount of the financing for the philanthropic sector comes from the “5 per mille” option, an 
allocation scheme which enables taxpayers to allocate the 0.5% of their PIT to public and private entities 
operating in cultural, educational, scientific and charitable fields. PBOs represent a relevant part of the 
entities entitled to receive these funds. In 2018 this kind of financing amounted to EUR 439.8 million for 
PBOs. 
Box 4.4. The Portuguese VAT allocation scheme 
In addition to being able to allocate a share of their personal income tax, individuals in Portugal can 
also direct a share of some of their VAT payments to the same entity that they specified for the allocation 
of their income tax.  
Contrary to the allocation of personal income taxes, the VAT allocation scheme comes at a cost to the 
taxpayer and is therefore a form of philanthropic giving. In Portugal 15% of the VAT paid to car 
workshops, restaurants, accommodation services (e.g. hotels), hairdressers, beauty salons and 
veterinaries, and 100% of the VAT paid for social passes (i.e. public transportation) is tax deductible. 
The allocation scheme allows taxpayers to direct their VAT deductible VAT payments to a philanthropic 
entity and forgo the tax benefit themselves.   
4.2.6. Philanthropic bequests 
Countries that levy inheritance or estate taxes generally provide preferential tax relief for philanthropic 
bequests. In countries with an inheritance tax, the PBO or fund receiving the bequest is liable for the tax 
and thus entitled to receive any tax relief. In countries with an estate tax, on the other hand, the tax liability 
as well as the corresponding tax relief is with the estate of the deceased.  
The Brussels-Capital region in Belgium, for example, has a reduced regional inheritance tax rate of 7% for 
bequests of moveable and immovable assets to accredited philanthropic entities (as opposed to the 
standard rate of 25%).  
In France, bequests made to PBOs recognized as being of public utility (see Chapter 3) are subject to the 
inheritance tax rate provided for inheritances between siblings: 
 35 % up to EUR 24 430; 
 45 % above EUR 24 430. 
For other PBOs which do not benefit from the public utility status, the tax rate is set at 60%. Nevertheless, 
some type of donations and bequests are exempted from the inheritance tax: 
 endowment funds of a philanthropic, educational, scientific, social, humanitarian, sporting, family, 
cultural nature, or contributing to the enhancement of artistic heritage, the defence of the natural 
environment or the dissemination of culture , French language and scientific knowledge; 
 endowment funds whose management is selfless and which transfer the income from donations to 
other non-profit organizations, 
In Bulgaria, bequests to the Bulgarian Red Cross, registered religious denominations and community 
centres are exempt from inheritance tax. Funds and PBOs are also exempt from inheritance tax in the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Finland.  
In countries with an estate tax, the estate receives the exemption or other tax relief. In South Africa, for 
example, bequests to PBO’s are exempt from estate tax. In the United States, philanthropic bequests are 
fully deductible from the estate tax base. 
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Norway, Canada and Australia do not have an inheritance or estate tax, but donations on death or in the 
year before can still qualify for tax deductions. In Canada, the tax credit for a donations made by an 
individual in the year of death (but prior to the date of death) can be claimed either on the deceased 
individual’s final tax return or the return for the preceding year. Additionally, the limit of the tax credit for 
donations made in the year of death is raised to 100% of the deceased person's net income or the eligible 
amount of gifts made in the year of death (in addition to any eligible unclaimed portion of the amount of 
any gifts made in previous years). In Norway, testamentary donations (i.e. bequests) are deductible under 
the same conditions as donations made before death. If the conditions are fulfilled, philanthropic bequests 
are deducted from the estate when the tax for the estate of the relevant deceased person is calculated. In 
Australia, a gift on death is not subject to capital gains tax, if the gift would have been deductible if made 
during the donor’s lifetime. In Japan, assets donated by the heir to a PBO, are not included in the taxable 
value of inheritance tax. 
4.2.7. Non-monetary donations of individuals 
In countries that extend tax incentives to non-monetary donations by individuals, the limitation rules or form 
of tax relief may differ from cash donations. Not all countries that incentivise philanthropic giving of 
individuals include non-monetary donations. Of the countries that do (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United 
States), some have specific rules that are different from those for cash donations discussed above. Non-
monetary, or in-kind donations, refer gifts such as property, services, and in some cases even blood and 
organ donations (see Box 4.5). Donations of property can include real and intellectual property; stocks or 
shares; trading stock; cultural assets; or other personal property. Donations of goods and services typically 
refer to the provision of the kind of goods and services that PBOs themselves provide to those in need 
(e.g. clothing, food, medicine, volunteering at a homeless shelter, etc.). Not all of these different forms of 
in-kind donations are eligible in all countries, but most allow for the donation of property. A disposal of 
property may also give rise to a capital gain in some countries. 
In Australia, the same rules that apply to cash donations apply to donations of shares and items of trading 
stock. For donations of property other than shares, the gift must be valued at more than AUD 5,000 unless 
it is donated within 12 months of purchase. Shares listed on a stock exchange must be valued at less than 
AUD 5 000 and acquired within the last 12 months. A disposal of property to a philanthropic entity as a gift 
could give rise to a capital gain (or loss), but this may be offset, in whole or part, by the gift deduction. In 
Belgium, donations in the form of works of art are eligible to receive a tax credit, provided that the donations 
are made to state museums, public welfare centres or communities such as regions, provinces, and 
municipalities. 
In Canada, the valuation rules and by extension limitations to tax incentives also depend on the nature of 
the donated assets. In Canada, generally speaking, non-monetary property can be donated and the donor 
is entitled to claim the charitable donation tax credit on the full fair-market value (FMV) of the donation.  
Dispositions of such property may be subject to capital gains tax. Generally, individuals are only able to 
claim a credit up to 75% of their net income for the year and may be carry forwarded for 5 years. However, 
gifts of ecologically sensitive land to certain qualified PBOs (not private foundations) are not limited to a 
percentage of net income and may be carried forward for up to 10 years. Gifts of certified cultural property 
are not limited to a percentage of net income. 
In Italy, the monetary value of the donation is evaluated according to the open market value of the asset. 
If the giving is higher than EUR 30 000, the donor has to provide with a technical report certifying the 
estimated value of the given asset. Donations of primary goods, such as food, drugs and hygienic products, 
are not taxable for income tax purposes and are exempt from VAT. 
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Box 4.5. Tax incentives for volunteering and blood and organ donations exist in only a few 
countries 
Tax incentives for donations of services 
Tax incentives for donations of services are difficult to design since PBOs often have both employees 
and volunteers and distinguishing between the two can be challenging.   
Germany, for instance, extends preferential tax treatment to income from civic engagements and 
volunteering. Income from a ‘side-line’ activity paid to individuals by a PBO is tax-exempt up to EUR 720 
per year. For certain side-line activities (trainer, instructor, childcare work, support work, artistic activity, 
part-time care of an old, sick or disabled person), the tax exemption is EUR 2 400 per year. 
In the United States, volunteers cannot deduct the value of their services for income tax purposes. 
Expenses incurred as a result of the volunteering may however be deductible. For expenses to qualify 
for tax relief they must be unreimbursed, directly connected with the volunteering, expenses that only 
occurred because of the services given, and not personal, living or family expenses. 
In the Netherlands, volunteers can deduct expenses of up to EUR 1 500 per year (and not more than 
EUR 150 per month) without having to itemise. Expenses above EUR 1 500 have to be itemised and 
justified. If unjustified, any reimbursements that individuals receive for these expenses are treated as 
income and taxed accordingly. 
The Slovak Republic’s allocation scheme indirectly incentivises volunteering because it enables 
taxpayers that have volunteered to designate one percentage point more of their income tax to a 
philanthropic entity of their choice (see section 4.2.3 for more information).  
Incentives for blood and organ donations are less frequent  
In Ireland, compensation received by living donors of kidneys for transplantation are exempt from 
income tax and not included in computing the PIT rate. 
In some states of the United States, organ donations are eligible for certain tax deductions. In New York 
state, for example, a taxpayer that, while living, donates one or more of their human organs for human 
organ transplantation can deduct up to USD 10 000 from their PIT base for any expenses incurred. The 
deductible expenses are limited to travel expenses, lodging expenses, and lost wages.   
In the Czech Republic, blood donations are valued at CZK 3 000 per donation and can be deducted 
from the donor’s PIT base. The donation of bone marrow is also deductible from the personal income 
tax base and valued at CZK 20 000. 
In the United States, contributions of certain ‘long-term capital gain property’ is deductible but generally 
limited to 30% of adjusted gross income (AGI).  Qualified farmers and ranchers (over 50% of gross income 
from farming) can deduct up to 100% of AGI, less any other contribution deductions, for donations of 
qualified real property provided that the property remains generally available for agriculture or livestock 
production. In addition, deductions for certain contributions are limited to the donor’s basis in the property. 
Valuation rules of non-monetary donations  
For non-monetary donations to receive any form of tax relief the value of the gift has to be determined. 
Regardless of whether it is a deduction, credit or matching scheme, the valuation of a non-monetary gift 
determines the amount that can be deducted, credited, or matched. The undervaluation of a gift will 
decrease the incentive power of the tax relief. If a gift is overvalued, on the other hand, the donation will 
increase the benefit to the donor and, in extreme cases, could exceed the actual value of the gift. The 
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valuation of non-monetary donations is therefore essential for tax incentives for philanthropic giving to 
function efficiently. Generally, the fair market value (FMV) is used to calculate the respective tax subsides 
but the regulations concerning who is responsible for the valuation, and how the fair market value is 
determined, typically depends on the size of the gift and varies across countries. The different approaches 
are discussed below. 
Regardless of whether the donor, beneficiary, or tax administration is responsible for determining the 
monetary value of a gift, the valuation process comes at a cost. In some cases it may be as simple as 
looking up the retail price of an item or the market value (e.g., of shares), but for real estate, used goods, 
or artwork, the process tends to be more time and resource intensive. Therefore countries tend to make 
the probable value of a good a determining factor of whether or not it needs to go through a more extensive 
valuation process. Small non-monetary donations (such as gifts of used clothing) are not worth getting 
appraised by an expert and may therefore not qualify for tax relief.  
Require appraisals if the value is likely to exceed a threshold 
In Australia, property valued at over AUD 5 000 (other than shares in a listed company) must be valued by 
the revenue authority i.e. the Australian Taxation Office and the cost of the valuation must be paid by the 
donor. Additionally, the cost of the valuation may be claimed as a deduction if the sole purpose of the 
valuation was to determine the value of a gift. 
In Canada, it is the responsibility of the PBO to ensure that donations are properly valued at their fair 
market value (FMV). If the FMV of the property is less than CAD 1 000, a member of the registered PBO, 
or another individual, with sufficient knowledge of the property may determine its value. If, on the other 
hand, the FMV is greater than CAD 1 000, the valuation or appraisal will generally be carried out by a 
professional third-party appraiser. If it is appraised, the name and address of the appraiser must be 
included on the official donation receipt. In the case of donations of ecologically sensitive land and 
donations of certified cultural property, special rules apply with respect to valuation. Generally, there are 
rules that provide, respectively, the Minister of Environment and the Canadian Cultural Property Export 
Review Board, with the responsibility of determining the FMV of the donation. 
Valuation rules depend on the nature of the asset 
In Colombia, the valuation rules depend on the nature of the asset. The value of gold and other precious 
metals is the commercial value of such goods. The value of motor vehicles is the commercial appraisal 
established annually by the Ministry of Transportation; the value of shares, contributions and other rights 
in companies is determined in the donors’ tax basis of these assets. The value of real or immovable 
property is the one registered in the donor´s last tax return, according to special tax rules. 
In Mexico, the value of donations of land or shares is equal to the Original Investment Amount (MOI), 
updated for the effects of inflation, generated from the date at which the land or shares were acquired until 
the month immediately prior to the donation. In the case of fixed assets, the value of the donation should 
be the updated Original Investment Amount. For other real estate the amount of the donation is valued by 
updating the amount paid to acquire the good for the period of the month in which it was acquired up to 
the month of the donation for inflation. In the event that merchandise/trading stock is donated it would not 
be deductible since it was already considered within the cost of sales for tax deduction purposes. 
The valuation of real estate for tax purposes in Germany, depends on whether the property is developed. 
The value of undeveloped real estate is determined and published by the committee of land valuation 
experts responsible for the local area. In the case of developed property, the value is calculated using the 
comparative value method, the rental value method or the material value method depending on the 
situation.  
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 The comparative value method is generally used to value detached and semi-detached houses as 
well as residential apartments and non-residential rooms forming part of larger properties. The 
value of the property is determined by comparison with the prices of similar properties.  
 The rental value method is used to value property rented for residential purposes, as well as mixed-
use and business property, for which it is possible to determine the customary amount of rent paid 
on the local market. The value of the property is calculated by determining the value of the land in 
the same way as for undeveloped property and adding a value representing the yield from the 
building. 
 The material value method is used for real estate, for which neither the comparative value nor the 
rental value method is practical. Under this method, the value of the property is determined on the 
basis of the standard construction costs for the building and for other facilities together with the 
value of the land. If the taxpayer provides evidence substantiating a lower market value, this is to 
be recognised instead. 
In the United States, donations of property (except publicly traded stock) above USD 5 000 must have a 
qualified appraisal. The appraisal must be signed by a qualified appraiser using generally accepted 
appraisal standards and, in most cases, the receipt of the donation must be acknowledged by the receiving 
entity.  For donations of artwork over USD 20 000 and any donations valued over USD 500 000, signed 
copies of the appraisal must be filed with the tax return in which the deduction is claimed.  Donations of 
artwork to a philanthropic entity are subject to review by art advisory committee. In general, a deduction is 
not allowed if the donor retains any interest in the property, or if the donation is of a partial interest in 
property. The primary exception is that a contribution of a conservation easement is deductible even though 
it is a contribution of a partial interest. The valuation of the easement is based on the loss of value due to 
the easement restrictions determined by a qualified appraiser. 
In France, securities (e.g., stocks, bonds) are valued according to the last price known on the stock market 
(closing price the day before the donation) and the value of real estate (e.g., individual houses, apartments, 
forests, etc.) is estimated according to its market value.  
In the Netherlands, the value of listed shares and bonds is based on the stock market price. For other 
assets the value is based on the FMV, which has to be determined before the donation is made.  
No appraisals are required and valuation may be reviewed through audits 
In some countries the appraisal of donated assets is not required, but the donor’s valuation may be audited, 
in which case the indicated price of the asset has to be confirmed. This is the case in Chile, Estonia, and 
Ireland. In Chile, as a general rule, appraisal of non-monetary donations should be made according to 
special provisions of the inheritance and gift tax law. Special appraisal rules may apply in some cases. In 
Indonesia, the value of a non-monetary donation is determined according to historical value, book value, 
or the retail cost of other goods sold. In the case of in-kind donations such as the construction of 
infrastructure, the value is determined using the actual construction cost necessary to build the donated 
infrastructure. 
Capital gains tax relief 
Donations of assets that have increased in value may have capital gains tax implications in countries that 
levy a capital gains tax (CGT). If, for example, an individual donates property to a PBO that they purchased 
for EUR 50 000 but is now valued at EUR 100 000, a capital gain will be realised. In a country where 
donations are exempt from capital gains tax, the individual may benefit from the tax incentive schemes, 
but may also not have to pay the capital gains tax they would have otherwise had to pay once they had 
either sold or disposed of the asset. 
   95 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
Canada provides a full capital gains exemption for donations of certain types of property (in addition to 
such donations receiving the charitable donation tax credit).  Specifically: 
 Gifts of publicly-traded shares and stock options may be eligible for an inclusion rate of zero on 
any capital gain realised, subject to certain conditions. The capital gains tax on donations of shares 
in private companies, on the other hand, does apply and is not subject to CGT relief. 
 Gifts of ecologically sensitive land to certain qualified funds (not private foundations) are eligible 
for an inclusion rate of zero on any capital gain realised, subject to certain conditions. 
 Gifts of certified cultural property are also not subject to capital gains tax, subject to certain 
conditions. 
Ireland exempts from capital gains tax the disposal of a work of art that has previously been loaned to an 
approved gallery or museum or to the Irish Heritage Trust, for a period of 10 years or more (6 years or 
more for loans made before 2 February 2006) and has been on display to the public. To qualify for this 
relief, a work of art must have a value of at least EUR 31 740 at the time it is loaned to the gallery. For 
information on the capital gains tax relief for the donation of shares, see Box 4.6. 
Box 4.6. Irish capital gains tax (CGT) relief 
Donation of property 
Capital gains tax (CGT) relief is available for donors (both individual and corporate) of tangible assets, 
such as real property. A donation of property will be deemed to have been made at the value it had on 
the date the property was acquired by the donor. This is an exception to the normal rule requiring the 
disposal consideration to be treated for tax purposes as the market value at disposal. The donor will 
therefore be treated as having made neither a gain nor a loss on the disposal and will not be subject to 
capital gains tax. 
Donation of shares 
If an individual donor in Ireland, makes a donation of shares which have increased in value since the 
date on which they were acquired by the donor, the disposal would give rise to a CGT liability. The 
donor can claim CGT relief on this disposal, but the PBO would then not be able to claim the income 
tax relief (described in Box 3.2). If the donor chooses not to claim the CGT relief, then the PBO will 
receive the FMV of the shares plus the relief of 31% (or 10% if there is a connection between the donor 
and the organisation). 
The charity will have no CGT liability on any subsequent sale of the shares provided the proceeds on 
the sale are applied for its charitable purposes. The donor, however, may (subject to their personal 
exemption on capital gains of EUR 1 270 per year) be liable for capital gains tax at 33% on the difference 
between the value of the shares transferred and the original cost of the shares. 
A company making a donation of shares to PBO may choose between claiming corporation tax relief at 
12.5% and deducting the donation as a trading expense, or claiming CGT relief, whichever is higher. If 
corporation tax relief is claimed then the company will be liable for CGT on the disposal and the charity 
will not be able to claim a repayment. 
In the United States, no capital gains tax is imposed on donations of appreciated property, provided that 
the one-year holding period requirement is met. 
In Australia, a gift of property, including shares, may trigger a capital gain or loss event. This is treated 
separately, i.e. the taxpayer may claim a deduction for the gift and must also record a capital gain or loss 
as applicable. Such a gain or loss is treated normally, increasing or decreasing the tax liability as 
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Canada provides a full capital gains exemption for donations of certain types of property (in addition to 
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 Gifts of publicly-traded shares and stock options may be eligible for an inclusion rate of zero on 
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receive the FMV of the shares plus the relief of 31% (or 10% if there is a connection between the donor 
and the organisation). 
The charity will have no CGT liability on any subsequent sale of the shares provided the proceeds on 
the sale are applied for its charitable purposes. The donor, however, may (subject to their personal 
exemption on capital gains of EUR 1 270 per year) be liable for capital gains tax at 33% on the difference 
between the value of the shares transferred and the original cost of the shares. 
A company making a donation of shares to PBO may choose between claiming corporation tax relief at 
12.5% and deducting the donation as a trading expense, or claiming CGT relief, whichever is higher. If 
corporation tax relief is claimed then the company will be liable for CGT on the disposal and the charity 
will not be able to claim a repayment. 
In the United States, no capital gains tax is imposed on donations of appreciated property, provided that 
the one-year holding period requirement is met. 
In Australia, a gift of property, including shares, may trigger a capital gain or loss event. This is treated 
separately, i.e. the taxpayer may claim a deduction for the gift and must also record a capital gain or loss 
as applicable. Such a gain or loss is treated normally, increasing or decreasing the tax liability as 
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applicable. However, a donor is exempt from paying CGT on donations of property to PBOs under the 
Cultural Gifts Program and donations of exempt personal use assets to PBOs (and will also be able to 
claim a deduction for the value of the gift). Testamentary gifts are not subject to CGT provided the gift 
would have been deductible if made during the individual’s lifetime.  
In Norway, a non-monetary donation to a philanthropic entity is not considered an event of 
realisation/divestment for tax purposes. Therefore, potential capital gains arising from donations, do not 
trigger capital gains tax in the hands of the donor. This is also the case in Argentina and Israel. In Indonesia, 
non-monetary donations are exempt from capital gains tax if they are given to a religious body, educational 
or other social entity including a foundation, or cooperative. In Colombia, Estonia, Latvia, Portugal South 
Africa, and Switzerland, donations in the form of assets are not exempt from capital gains tax. 
4.3. Philanthropic giving by corporations 
Of the countries analysed in this report, all except for Sweden incentivise corporate philanthropic giving to 
qualifying funds or PBOs. Corporate giving can occur in the form of donations or sponsorship payments. 
However, for corporate giving to be considered philanthropic it must comply with the country’s donor-
benefit rules. Since sponsoring payments to funds and PBOs are in return for publicity that generates a 
benefit to the donor, it will only be considered philanthropic giving if the benefit is within the statutory limits 
that apply. Corporate donations are encouraged through corporate income and/ or capital gains tax 
incentives. In the absence of such an incentive, corporate taxpayers that donate to philanthropic entities 
would do so from their post-tax profits and receive no tax benefit. In some countries, the donation would 
be considered an expense unrelated to economic activity and therefore remain part of the corporation’s 
taxable income.  
4.3.1. Tax incentives for donations by corporations 
Tax incentives for donations by corporations include tax deductions, credits, and matching schemes. 
Additionally, this section also discusses allocation schemes, on the same basis as for individuals. Unlike 
the incentives for individuals, businesses can also use business expensing rules, which are linked to 
deductions, to incentivise corporate sponsoring of philanthropic entities. Table 4.5 shows that corporate 
donations are deductible in 29 countries.  
Compared to the information in Table 4.1, Table 4.5 shows that deductions are more common for corporate 
tax incentives than personal income tax incentives. For instance, three countries that have personal 
income tax credits to incentivise individual giving (Belgium, Canada, and New Zealand), encourage 
corporate giving through deductions instead. A possible explanation for this difference is that countries 
view corporate donations as business expenses and thus simply allow them to deduct the gift through the 
same mechanism that other business expenses are deducted. Another contributing factor for the difference 
between corporate and individual tax incentives is that countries use personal income tax credits to avoid 
the regressive effect of tax deductions when rates are progressive. Since corporate income tax rates are 
typically flat, tax credits are no longer necessary to avoid the regressive effect (this is not the case in the 
Netherland and discussed in more detail below).  
Six countries incentivise donations using tax credits, three of which (Chile, Latvia, and Portugal) also offer 
deductions. Corporate tax credits allow corporations to subtract a share of the value of their donation from 
their income tax liability, after the liability has been computed. In a number of countries, corporations can 
choose whether they want to make use of the deduction or the credit depending on which incentive would 
benefit them more.  
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Table 4.5. Tax incentives for donations by corporations 
X denotes the tax incentive for corporations; O denotes the tax incentive for individuals (if different from that of 
corporations). 
Country Deduction Credit Matching Allocation Other 
Argentina X     
Australia X     
Austria X     
Belgium X O    
Bulgaria X     
Canada X O    
Chile X X    
Czech Republic X     
Estonia X     
Finland X     
Germany X     
Greece X     
Hungary X   O  
India X     
Indonesia X     
Ireland X  O   
Italy X O  O  
Japan X     
Latvia X X    
Lithuania X   O  
Luxembourg X     
Malta X    O 
Mexico X     
Netherlands X     
New Zealand X O    
Norway X  X   
Portugal X X  O  
Romania X   O  
Singapore X     
Slovenia X   O  
South Africa X     
Switzerland X     
United Kingdom X  O   
United States X     
Colombia  X    
France  X    
Israel  X    
Slovak Republic    X  
Sweden  O   X1 
Note:  
1. No tax incentive for donations by corporations 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
Norway is the only country with a matching scheme for corporate giving and the Slovak Republic is the 
only country with an allocation scheme. The advantages of allocation schemes – such as their ability to 
foster a culture of giving by increasing the awareness of the general public – relate mainly to donations of 
individuals. Thus a potential explanation of the difference in the frequency of allocation schemes between 
incentives for individuals compared to corporations, is that aside from directing public funds to philanthropic 
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entities (which can be done through grants) their effect on the visibility of the philanthropic sector is not as 
powerful when the scheme is applied to corporations.  
The design of tax incentives for corporate donors differs across countries and depends on the nature of 
the gift. A philanthropic donation can be in the form of cash or non-cash, frequently referred to as non-
monetary or in-kind donations. In the case of corporations such gifts may include  
 real and intellectual property, stocks, and cultural assets; 
 the provision of goods (e.g., a medical equipment producer donating its wheelchairs); 
 or the provision of services (e.g., a construction company building infrastructure). 
As with non-monetary donations of individuals, countries have rules regulating the valuation of gifts. 
Section 4.2.7. (above) provides an overview of these valuation rules and unless countries have specific 
regulations for corporate donations the valuation rules are not repeated in this section of the report.   
4.3.2. Limitations for tax incentives to corporate donors  
Tax deductions and credits for corporate donations are tied to the corporate income tax and may be limited 
to: a share of total revenue; a share of total taxable income; a share of the sum of total turnover and wages 
and salaries paid; a share of the corporate income tax liability, a share of the gift itself, a monetary value; 
or a combination of these tax relief ceilings. Furthermore, unlike individuals, corporations can deduct 
business expenses, and thus the sponsoring of philanthropic entities, as well as donating, may partly be 
encouraged through normal business expensing rules. 
Countries can use a combination of limits to their deductions and credits with different levels of generosity. 
In some cases those limits depend on the worthy purpose of the receiving fund or PBO (e.g., Bulgaria, 
Chile, Hungary, and Slovenia). Other countries may offer the taxpayer a choice of limits or even type of 
tax-subsidy (e.g., Germany and Latvia). A number of countries limit their tax relief to a fixed monetary value 
in addition to a ceiling defined as a share of, for example, total revenue or taxable income (e.g. India, 
Belgium, and Lithuania).  
Offering similar incentives for individual and corporate donors 
In Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Singapore, Slovenia, and Switzerland, the same or similar treatment applies to donations by 
individuals and corporations (thus see section 4.2.3. and 4.2.5. for more details). The difference between 
tax reliefs for corporate donations is that the tax credits or deductions apply to the corporate instead of the 
personal income tax. The floors, ceilings, and type of tax subsidy remain the same. In Argentina, 
corporations can deduct donations up to a limit of 5% of annual earnings. In Australia, donations are 
deductible from the corporate income tax base with no upper limit as long as the deduction does not create 
a negative tax liability (and the donation can be spread over 5 years). In Austria, donations by corporations 
are deductible but cannot exceed 10% of total profit. Contrary to donations made by individuals, however, 
corporate donations receive preferential tax treatment for both cash and in-kind donations. In Colombia, 
corporations that make donations to philanthropic entities receive a tax credit of 25%, limited to 25% of the 
corporation’s income tax. In the Czech Republic, corporations can deduct cash and in-kind donations up 
to a ceiling of 10% of the corporate income tax base if the value of the donation is above CZK 2 000. In 
India 100% of the donation is deductible if it is given to certain funds (e.g. Prime Minister National Relief 
Fund) but only 50% of the donation is deductible if it is given to most other philanthropic entities. In most 
cases, the deduction is capped at 10% of the gross total income (after all other eligible tax exemptions and 
deductions). In Indonesia donations are deductible from the corporate income tax base up to a limit of 5% 
taxable income. In Luxembourg, the tax deduction cannot exceed EUR 1 000 000 or 20% of total net 
income, where total net income consists of the revenue remaining after deducting expenses incurred for 
the purpose of acquiring, ensuring and maintaining revenue. In Norway, corporate donations up to NOK 
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50 000 are deductible. Singapore provides a 250% tax deduction on certain types of donations, such as 
cash donations, gift of shares and works of art given to qualifying philanthropic entities. In South Africa 
donations can qualify for a tax deduction of up to 10% of taxable income. In Slovenia, a corporation can 
deduct donations up to 0.5% of their taxable revenue. Deductions for donations to worthy purposes such 
as social assistance science, and religion are limited to 0.3% and deductions for donations for culture and 
disaster relief are capped at 0.5% of their taxable revenue. In Switzerland, donations are deductible up to 
20% of the corporation’s taxable income. 
In Bulgaria the ceiling of the tax deduction varies depending on the worthy purpose and the percentages 
are similar to those for individual donors. Donations are deductible from the corporate income tax base 
(annual accounting profit) up to a total ceiling of 65% of the tax base. The ceilings differ depending on the 
beneficiary as follows: 
 Up to 10% of annual accounting profit where the expenses on donations are incurred in favour of:: 
o healthcare and medical-treatment establishments; 
o social services for residential care, as well as of the Social Assistance Agency and of the Social 
Protection Fund under the Minister of Labour and Social Policy; 
o homes for medical and social care for children; 
o public nurseries, kindergartens, schools, higher schools or academies; 
o public-financed enterprises within the meaning given by the Accountancy Act;  
o religious denominations registered in the country; 
o specialised enterprises or cooperatives of persons with disabilities or the persons with 
disabilities as well as their technical aids; 
o victims of disasters, or of the families thereof; 
o the Bulgarian Red Cross; 
o socially disadvantaged persons including children with disabilities or parentless children;  
o cultural institutes and community centres; 
o PBOs with the exception of any organisations supporting culture;  
o the Bulgaria Energy Efficiency and Renewable Sources Fund; 
o therapeutic communities for the treatment of drug-addicted persons; 
o the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
o social companies listed in the Register of Social Companies, for the conduct of their social 
activities and/or for attainment of their social goals 
 Up to 15% of the accounting profit for the assistance provided gratuitously under the terms and 
according to the procedure established by the Financial Support for Culture Act;  
 Up to 50% of the accounting profit where the expenses on donations are incurred in favour of:  
o the National Health Insurance Fund: for activities related to the medical treatment of children 
which are financed by transfers from the budget of the Ministry of Health, and of the Assisted 
Reproduction Centre. 
 Any expenses for donations of computers and computer peripheral equipment, which are 
manufactured within one year prior to the date of the donation, and donated to Bulgarian schools, 
including higher schools, shall be recognized for tax purposes. 
Any expenses for donations of computers and computer peripheral equipment, which are manufactured 
within one year prior to the date of the donation, and donated to Bulgarian schools, including higher 
schools, shall be recognized for tax purposes. 
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Finland, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Israel, have the same tax incentive for 
corporate donors as they do for individual donors, but their limits differ significantly from the personal 
income tax incentives. In Finland, corporations can deduct cash donations to publicly funded universities 
between EUR 850 and EUR 250 000 euros for the purpose of promoting science, art or the Finnish cultural 
heritage. Additionally, cash donations between EUR 850 and EUR 50 000 are also deductible if they are 
made for the purpose of promoting science, art or Finnish cultural heritage and given to associations, 
foundations or other institutions on the condition that they have been nominated by the tax administration 
and that their purpose is promoting art, science, or the maintenance of Finnish cultural heritage. 
In Ireland, a corporation which donates over EUR 250 to an approved philanthropic entity may claim a 
deduction for the donation as if it were a trading expense or an expense of management for the accounting 
period in which it is paid. For the donation to be tax deductible it must not confer any benefit, either directly 
or indirectly, on the donor or any person connected with the donor, and it must not be conditional on, or 
associated with, any arrangement involving the acquisition of property by the approved philanthropic entity. 
Capital gains tax relief is available for donors of tangible assets, such as real property (for more information 
on the donation of shares see Box 4.6). The capital gains tax relief for donations of works of art is the same 
for individuals and corporations and is discussed in Section 4.2.7.  
Corporations in Mexico can deduct donations to private institutions up to 7% of taxable profit obtained in 
the previous tax year. For donations in favour of the Federation, Federal Entities, Municipalities, or their 
decentralized agencies, the deductible amount cannot exceed 4% of fiscal profits. The sum of both must 
not exceed 7% of taxable profits. 
In the Netherlands, corporate donations are deductible up to a limit of 50% of fiscal profit to a maximum of 
EUR 100 000. Additionally the deductibility of donations cannot lead to a loss and excess donations cannot 
be spread over multiple years. Donations to PBOs with a cultural worthy purpose are marked-up and can 
be deducted at 1.5 times the value of the gift with maximum EUR 2 500. Because the Netherlands has a 
progressive corporate income tax rate (16.5% for profits up to EUR 200 000 and 25% for profits above € 
200 000) the value of the deduction is higher for corporations with profits over EUR 200 000.  
In Germany, donations are deductible up to 20% of taxable income (before the deduction) or 4% of the 
sum of the total turnover and wages and salaries paid (this is similar to the design of the corporate tax 
incentive for giving in Latvia, summarised in Box 4.7. Carry-over provisions apply and donations can be 
considered business expenses. If goods are donated, the corporation can choose between the common 
value approach and the book value approach (see section on valuation rules for more details on the 
approaches). 
France provides corporate donors a 60% tax credit for the share of the donation up to EUR 2 million and 
a 40% tax credit for amount over EUR 2 million. For organizations providing free meals, care or 
accommodation for people in need the tax credit is 60 % of the total amount of donation. The annual cap 
of the tax reduction is EUR 20 000 or 5 % (5 per thousand) of annual turnover excluding tax (ceiling applied 
to all payments made). If the ceiling is exceeded, it is possible to carry the excess over the next 5 years. 
In Israel, corporations that donate to an eligible philanthropic entity can benefit from a 30% tax credit. For 
the donation to qualify for the credit it must be between USD 50 and USD 2.5 Million. The deduction cannot 
exceed 30% of gross income and excess donations cannot be spread over more than one year. 
Furthermore, donations cannot be considered a business expense and capital gains tax applies when a 
non-monetary donation is made. 
In Italy, corporations can deduct philanthropic gifts from their taxable income in the same way as 
individuals. However, they cannot opt for tax credits. 
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Offering tax credits to individual donors and tax deductions to corporate donors 
Belgium, Canada, and New Zealand offer tax credits to individual donors and tax deductions to corporate 
donors. In Belgium, corporate donations to accredited philanthropic entities are deductible up to 5% of the 
taxable profit or 500,000 euros. In Canada, donations are deductible up to a limit of 75% of the 
corporation’s taxable income. The limit is increased by 25% of the amount of taxable capital gains arising 
from donations of appreciated capital property and 25% of any capital cost allowance recapture arising 
from donations of depreciable capital property. The net income percentage limit does not apply to certain 
gifts of cultural property or ecologically sensitive land. As with individuals, gifts of publicly traded shares 
and stock options, ecologically sensitive land, and certified cultural property may be eligible for an inclusion 
rate of zero on any capital gain realised. Donations in excess of the limit may be carried forward up to 5 
years with the exception of gifts of ecologically sensitive land, which may be carried forward up to 10 years. 
In New Zealand, corporations can claim tax deductions for all donations made to an approved funds and 
PBOs providing the deduction does not exceed their total annual net income. For a donation to qualify for 
the deduction it must be a gift of NZD 5 or more of cash. Gifts of property are not eligible for the tax 
deduction and excess donations cannot be spread over multiple years. 
Japan provided individual donors with a choice between a deduction and a credit. Corporate donors, on 
the other hand, may only benefit from a tax deduction. To determine the deduction limit of general 
donations, Japan uses the following formula: [(Amount of capital at the end of the fiscal year × Number of 
months in the current fiscal year / 12 × 2.5 / 1 000) + (income in the current fiscal year × 2.5 / 100)] × 1/4. 
The limit of donations to PBOs with a special status is determined through this formula: [(Amount of capital 
at the end of the fiscal year x number of months in the current fiscal year / 12 x 3.75 / 1 000) + (income in 
the current fiscal year x 6.25 / 100)] x 1/2. The deductible limit is calculated in each fiscal year when the 
donation is made. It is not possible to carry over the deductible limit amount which is not used. 
Offering both tax credits and deductions 
Chile, Latvia and Portugal, offer both tax credits and tax deductions to corporate donors. Corporate donors 
in Latvia are able to choose from three tax relief options to receive a tax benefit from their donation (see 
Box 4.7 for more information). The options are a deduction with a limit tied to profits, a deduction with a 
limit tied to total gross work remuneration, and finally a tax credit tied to the tax on income from dividends. 
In Portugal, corporate donations can be deducted from the tax base by up to 8/1000 of total turnover. 
Depending on the worthy purpose, the donations receive a mark-up of 120% to 150% of their total value 
for deduction purposes. For example, if a corporation makes a donation of EUR 1 000 to a PBO with an 
educational purpose, the corporation will be able to deduct EUR 1 200 from their taxable income.  
In Chile, certain corporate donations can benefit from a 50% tax credit and a tax deduction equal to the 
remaining amount. Others can benefit from a full deduction as a tax incentive. National emergencies’ 
donations and donations made under municipal law are deductible from the tax base. Donations for 
reconstruction are eligible for a 50% tax credit and the remaining is deductible. Cultural donations are 
eligible for a 50% tax credit caped at the lower value of 2% of the tax base or a fixed amount and the 
remaining is deductible. Donations to charities are eligible for a 50% tax credit which is caped to a fixed 
amount and the remaining is deductible. Cultural donations are eligible for a 50% tax credit caped at the 
lower of 2% of the tax base or a fixed amount and the remaining is deductible. Donations for sporting 
associations are eligible for a 50% or 35% tax credit which is capped at 2% of the tax base or a fixed 
amount and the remaining amount is deductible. Donations to philanthropic educational entities qualify for 
a 50% tax credit and the remaining amount is deductible with different limits according to the type of 
educational entity. Additionally, in the majority of cases a general limit on the amount of the donation 
applies corresponding to 5% of the taxable base (special limits apply to entities in a tax loss position and 
other cases). 
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reconstruction are eligible for a 50% tax credit and the remaining is deductible. Cultural donations are 
eligible for a 50% tax credit caped at the lower value of 2% of the tax base or a fixed amount and the 
remaining is deductible. Donations to charities are eligible for a 50% tax credit which is caped to a fixed 
amount and the remaining is deductible. Cultural donations are eligible for a 50% tax credit caped at the 
lower of 2% of the tax base or a fixed amount and the remaining is deductible. Donations for sporting 
associations are eligible for a 50% or 35% tax credit which is capped at 2% of the tax base or a fixed 
amount and the remaining amount is deductible. Donations to philanthropic educational entities qualify for 
a 50% tax credit and the remaining amount is deductible with different limits according to the type of 
educational entity. Additionally, in the majority of cases a general limit on the amount of the donation 
applies corresponding to 5% of the taxable base (special limits apply to entities in a tax loss position and 
other cases). 
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Box 4.7. Tax incentives for corporate giving in Latvia 
The three relief options 
Corporations that have made an eligible donation to an eligible philanthropic entity are entitled to choose 
one of the following three tax relief options:  
 Tax deduction: Deduct the donated amount from the corporate income tax base, where the 
value of the deduction is limited to 5% of the profits from the previous reporting year (after the 
calculated taxes); 
 Tax deduction: Deduct the donated amount from the corporate income tax base, where the 
value of the deduction is limited to 2% of the total gross work remuneration (e.g. wages paid) 
calculated for employees in the previous reporting year; 
 Tax credit: Reduce the corporate income tax liability but only on income from dividends by 85% 
of the donations, where the value of the credit does not exceed 30% of the income tax on income 
from dividends. 
The conditions for a donation to be eligible for the tax relief 
A corporate donation is only eligible for the three tax relief options if the following conditions are met: 
 The donation is not directed at a specific recipient who is related to the donor, an employee of 
the donor or a family member of an employee of the donor; 
 The recipient of the donation does not perform activities of a compensatory nature that are 
related to having received the gift (e.g. advertising, invitations to high-value entertainments). 
 The total amount of tax debt of the donor on the first day of the taxation period does not exceed 
EUR 150. 
 The beneficiary of the donation has not publicised the donor's brand. This could be the case if 
the name of the beneficiary of the donation has an obvious link to the donor's brand (e.g., 
Company A donates money to the Company A Foundation). If the recipient publicises a list of 
all the donors, the name of each individual donor must not exceed 1/20th of the text area.  
Offering allocation schemes to individuals but not to corporations 
Of the six countries that have an allocation scheme for individual taxpayers (Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) the Slovak Republic is the only country that has an allocation 
scheme for corporations. In the Slovak Republic, corporations can attribute 1% or 2% of their income tax 
to an approved non-profit entity. The minimum amount that can be allocated is EUR 8. In Lithuania, 
corporations are allowed to deduct twice the total amount of donations (except for donations in cash 
exceeding EUR 9 750 each to a qualifying philanthropic entity in a tax year). The total deduction amount 
cannot exceed 40% of the corporation’s taxable income during the tax year. In Hungary, a set share of 
corporate donations are deducted from pre-tax profits as a business expense. If a corporation donates to 
a PBO, it can deduct 20% of the total value of the donation. If the donation is made under a long-term 
agreement, the corporation can deduct 40%. Additionally, 50% of donations to the Hungarian Fund for 
Clean-up and Salvage, the National Culture Fund or the Agricultural Compensation Fund are deductible.  
4.3.3. Sponsoring philanthropy in return for advertisement     
This report distinguishes between two kinds of sponsorship payments to philanthropic entities: (1) 
corporations purchase publicity and advertising from philanthropic entities for the fair market value of those 
services; and (2) corporations donate to philanthropic entities and the fair market value of the publicity and 
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advertisement they receive as a result is below the value of the donation and in line with the country’s 
donor-benefit rules. In most countries (e.g., Belgium, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United States), the first form of sponsoring is fully 
deductible. In some cases, advertising contracts tend to be required to ensure that the PBO does in fact 
provide publicity for the corporation. In Belgium, donations are capped at 5% of taxable profits or EUR 500 
000 but sponsoring is fully deductible. In France, on the other hand, all payments towards philanthropic 
entities are considered donations. However, there must an advertisement contract in which the PBO is 
obliged to ensure the visibility of the brand or its products. In New Zealand and Australia, a payment to a 
PBO could be considered a business expense and is deductible under the general rules if the payment is 
incurred in deriving assessable income. Thus a sponsorship payment to a PBO may be deductible under 
the general rules for business expenses if the sponsorship is likely to increase the business’s taxable 
income. In the United States, contributions that are directly related to the taxpayer’s trade or business that 
are made with a reasonable expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount paid may be 
deductible as a business expense. The deduction for a business expense is not limited to the 10% of 
adjusted gross income that the charitable deduction is limited to.  
Although payments can be considered business expenses in many countries (as long as they have a 
sufficient nexus with earning income), these payments may have implications for the PBOs receiving them. 
The income from activities different to those related to the worthy purposes for which they were granted 
PBO status for, may be regarded as commercial activity and limited accordingly. In Mexico, for example, 
income from advertising activity is regarded as commercial and cannot exceed 10% of the PBOs income 
if it wants to be able to receive tax-incentivised donations. PBOs receiving sponsorship payments rather 
than donations may impose a set of obligations on the PBOs, which they may not be able to fulfil or that 
may trigger an increase in their tax liability. The income tax rules for PBOs are discussed in more detail in 
a separate chapter of this report. 
When sponsoring is part of philanthropic giving, corporations may give more than they receive in publicity. 
For example, if a business in Canada receives special recognition for its donation, or if it receives more 
than minimal recognition (for example, banners or advertising of products), this is considered philanthropic 
sponsorship, and donor-benefit rules may apply. In some countries, the payment may not be eligible for 
tax relief (e.g., see Latvia’s strict donor-benefit rules discussed in Box 4.7). In Canada, the fair market 
value of the publicity given to the corporate donor, is subtracted from the amount of the donation for tax 
deductibility purposes. When the value cannot be calculated, the charity cannot issue the business an 
official donation receipt and the business may be entitled to claim the payment as a deduction against 
income as an advertising expense (i.e. not necessarily a form of philanthropic giving). 
4.4. Tax avoidance and evasion risks 
4.4.1. Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropic giving  
The abuse of tax incentives for philanthropy occurs when the sanctioned government status of a fund or 
PBO is abused either by the entity itself, by taxpayers and donors, or third parties, such as fraudsters who 
pose as philanthropic entities or tax return preparers who falsify tax returns to defraud the government 
(OECD, 2009[4]). The abuse of the tax incentives discussed in this chapter do not just lead to losses in tax 
revenue but erode the public’s trust in the philanthropic sector as a whole. Common types of tax avoidance 
and evasion issues with tax relief for philanthropic giving include: philanthropic entities that wilfully 
participate in a tax evasion scheme to benefit its donors (see Box 4.8 for an example); falsified donation 
receipts prepared by the philanthropic entity, tax preparers or donors; payments for goods and services 
disguised as donations; overvalued gifts; and donations of assets in which the donor retains an interest.  
  
   103 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
advertisement they receive as a result is below the value of the donation and in line with the country’s 
donor-benefit rules. In most countries (e.g., Belgium, Latvia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United States), the first form of sponsoring is fully 
deductible. In some cases, advertising contracts tend to be required to ensure that the PBO does in fact 
provide publicity for the corporation. In Belgium, donations are capped at 5% of taxable profits or EUR 500 
000 but sponsoring is fully deductible. In France, on the other hand, all payments towards philanthropic 
entities are considered donations. However, there must an advertisement contract in which the PBO is 
obliged to ensure the visibility of the brand or its products. In New Zealand and Australia, a payment to a 
PBO could be considered a business expense and is deductible under the general rules if the payment is 
incurred in deriving assessable income. Thus a sponsorship payment to a PBO may be deductible under 
the general rules for business expenses if the sponsorship is likely to increase the business’s taxable 
income. In the United States, contributions that are directly related to the taxpayer’s trade or business that 
are made with a reasonable expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount paid may be 
deductible as a business expense. The deduction for a business expense is not limited to the 10% of 
adjusted gross income that the charitable deduction is limited to.  
Although payments can be considered business expenses in many countries (as long as they have a 
sufficient nexus with earning income), these payments may have implications for the PBOs receiving them. 
The income from activities different to those related to the worthy purposes for which they were granted 
PBO status for, may be regarded as commercial activity and limited accordingly. In Mexico, for example, 
income from advertising activity is regarded as commercial and cannot exceed 10% of the PBOs income 
if it wants to be able to receive tax-incentivised donations. PBOs receiving sponsorship payments rather 
than donations may impose a set of obligations on the PBOs, which they may not be able to fulfil or that 
may trigger an increase in their tax liability. The income tax rules for PBOs are discussed in more detail in 
a separate chapter of this report. 
When sponsoring is part of philanthropic giving, corporations may give more than they receive in publicity. 
For example, if a business in Canada receives special recognition for its donation, or if it receives more 
than minimal recognition (for example, banners or advertising of products), this is considered philanthropic 
sponsorship, and donor-benefit rules may apply. In some countries, the payment may not be eligible for 
tax relief (e.g., see Latvia’s strict donor-benefit rules discussed in Box 4.7). In Canada, the fair market 
value of the publicity given to the corporate donor, is subtracted from the amount of the donation for tax 
deductibility purposes. When the value cannot be calculated, the charity cannot issue the business an 
official donation receipt and the business may be entitled to claim the payment as a deduction against 
income as an advertising expense (i.e. not necessarily a form of philanthropic giving). 
4.4. Tax avoidance and evasion risks 
4.4.1. Abuse of tax incentives for philanthropic giving  
The abuse of tax incentives for philanthropy occurs when the sanctioned government status of a fund or 
PBO is abused either by the entity itself, by taxpayers and donors, or third parties, such as fraudsters who 
pose as philanthropic entities or tax return preparers who falsify tax returns to defraud the government 
(OECD, 2009[4]). The abuse of the tax incentives discussed in this chapter do not just lead to losses in tax 
revenue but erode the public’s trust in the philanthropic sector as a whole. Common types of tax avoidance 
and evasion issues with tax relief for philanthropic giving include: philanthropic entities that wilfully 
participate in a tax evasion scheme to benefit its donors (see Box 4.8 for an example); falsified donation 
receipts prepared by the philanthropic entity, tax preparers or donors; payments for goods and services 
disguised as donations; overvalued gifts; and donations of assets in which the donor retains an interest.  
  
104    
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
Box 4.8. The Cup Trust Case in the United Kingdom 
Background 
In 2009 the Charity Commission for England and Wales registered the Cup Trust as a charity, with a 
company based in the British Virgin Islands as its only trustee. Of the GBP 176 000 000 that the Cup Trust 
received in so-called donations, it claimed GBP 46 000 000 in Gift Aid and only gave GBP 55 000 to 
philanthropic causes. 
Overview of the scheme 
The Cup Trust charity was found to be involved in a circular transaction scheme with the objective of 
receiving Gift Aid from the government and obtaining personal tax relief for individuals. The infographic 
below shows a simplified version of how the scheme was designed to work in a 24-hour transaction. In 
summary, the Cup Trust charity took up a loan with which it bought a government bond worth GBP 50 000. 
Cup Trust then proceeded to sell the bond to a third-party intermediary for GBP 5, under the condition that 
it would either receive a donation of GBP 50 005 within 24 hours or the legal title to the bond would be 
returned to the charity. A tax-paying individual would then purchase the bond from the third-party 
intermediary for GBP 5, sell the bond for its full market value of GBP 50 000 and donate the sum of GBP 
50 005 back to Cup Trust, with the intention of receiving personal tax relief for the full GBP 50 005. The 
Cup Trust then used the donation to pay back the loan, which was interest free as long as it was paid 
within 24 hours. The intention was then to claim Gift Aid on the donation it received.  
One 24-hour transaction  
 
Lessons on how to prevent such schemes 
 Regular exchange of information about philanthropic entities of common concern between a 
registering authority and the tax administration to help focus limited resources on suspicious 
entities and track tax avoidance and evasion schemes in the philanthropic sector. 
 Due diligence by registering authorities to check whether there is a clear public benefit to an entities 
purpose before granting them the preferential tax status.  
 The importance of regulation of philanthropic entities is important to safeguarding access to tax 
concessions. Need to improve accountability and transparency through reporting requirements and 
make better use of data from different agencies.  







£50 000 bonds sold 
for £5
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Overvaluation of non-monetary gifts  
Lax valuation rules and lack of oversight can lead to overvaluation schemes. Overvaluation schemes refer 
to cases in which taxpayers, for example, buy property at a low price and donate it at a much higher value 
(often with supportive valuations) thereby generating excess benefits when claiming the charitable 
donation tax relief.  These schemes often utilize foreign entities (foreign PBOs and offshore trusts in tax 
havens) to obscure, but also legitimise, the transaction. In Canada, this was a significant problem in the 
2000s. As a result, the country passed legislation and increased audit resources to address valuations of 
donations, which appears to have curbed the problem. Colombia and Germany too, have experienced 
schemes in which the value of the donations were artificially inflated to increase the tax benefit. 
In the United States, the valuation of donated property has long been an issue. Over time, requirements 
for appraisals and other requirements have been made stricter by legislation or regulation when abuses 
were found. One example is the valuations of donations of used vehicles, which was frequently abused. 
To curb the overvaluation of used vehicles, legislation required appraisals for vehicles valued over USD 
500 and forms required to be submitted to the revenue required information about the year, model and 
vehicle identification number for auditing purposes. 
The falsification or sale of donation receipts  
A lack of oversight and targeted tax audits has, in some countries, led to the sale or falsification of donation 
receipts. The sale of receipts involving PBOs, and tax preparers selling donation receipts for a fraction of 
the value indicated on the receipt, has resulted in an excess tax benefit when claiming the tax incentive. 
In Canada, this was a particular issue in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
In-kind donations deducted as business expenses 
In some countries, in-kind donations have falsely been deducted as business expenses. This occurs in 
Indonesia, where in-kind donations are not deductible. In some cases, businesses will deduct an in-kind 
donation as a business expense and financial assistance is often misused as a personal expense. 
Payments for goods and services disguised as gifts 
Individual donors may, together with the entity involved, want to disguise a payment for goods or services 
as a donation. Common examples of these schemes involve charities that receive donations and then use 
the funds to provide a scholarship to a donor’s child or pay tuition at a private school attended by a donor’s 
child. This was identified as an issue by Canada as well as New Zealand (see Box 4.9). 
4.4.2. Anti-abuse policies  
To ensure that the tax expenditures used to encourage philanthropic giving is efficient, it is important for 
countries to tackle tax avoidance and evasion schemes related to philanthropic giving, and implement 
regulations and policies in response to these schemes. On the other hand, excessive rules and 
requirements can significantly increase the administrative burden to the tax administration/regulatory 
authority, as well as philanthropic entities and their respective donors. Thus countries report that the use 
of targeted audits, increased fines and legal consequences, better use of data, as well as clear tax rules 
have been effective anti-abuse policies.  
The majority of anti-abuse policies, however, are in the form of regulations and transparency and reporting 
requirements for funds and PBOs discussed in chapter five. This is because, a key anti-abuse policy is 
that the recipients of philanthropic giving must be accredited philanthropic entities. This allows the tax 
administration to focus its resources on these entities and shifts the worthy purpose and public benefit 
requirement on to the funds and PBOs that receive the donation. The registration process for entities to 
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qualify as funds and PBOs that are eligible to receive tax subsidies donations is intended also to legitimise 
philanthropic entities, which in return can foster public trust and financial support for the sector as a whole. 
This suggests that a key part of a regime that provides tax concessions for philanthropy is a robust system 
of approval and regulation of philanthropic entities. 
Box 4.9. Common avoidance and evasion schemes related to philanthropic giving in New 
Zealand 
Avoidance schemes 
 Beneficiary and donors treat payments for goods and/or services as gifts (e.g. private school 
fees). Such a scheme would allow the ‘donor’ to receive the goods or services and claim 33% 
of the price paid as a tax credit on their personal income tax.  
 In New Zealand, tax relief for individual donors is limited to gifts of cash. Thus some donors 
make cash ‘gifts’ to philanthropic organisations on the understanding that the organisation uses 
those funds to buy an asset owned by the donor (turning the effective gift of an asset into a gift 
of cash for tax purposes).  
 Donors pay cash ‘gifts’ to a related charity on the understanding that it is immediately loaned 
back to the donor, or an associate, for use in its ongoing business activities (the donor claims a 
tax concession whilst the charity may effectively never have use of the funds).  
Evasion schemes 
 Fraudulent alteration or manufacturing of donation receipts. 
 Using other people’s ID to make a fraudulent donation claims. 
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This chapter examines the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy. It 
first considers tax incentives for cross-border giving: both donations and 
bequests; and also considers how gift and inheritance taxes apply and how 
capital gains tax might apply where the gift is non-cash. It then considers 
the tax treatment of philanthropic entities that operate across borders, 
examining whether tax relief is extended to foreign philanthropic entities 
operating domestically, and the tax treatment of domestic PBOs operating 
across borders. Finally, it considers the tax treatment of international grant-
making by funds. 
5.1. Introduction 
This Chapter considers the approach countries adopt in relation to cross-border philanthropy and tax. 
Cross-border philanthropy can occur where a person (and individual or corporation) makes a gift to an 
entity in another jurisdiction (‘direct philanthropy’). Cross-border philanthropy can also occur where a 
domestic entity operates in another in another jurisdiction or where a foreign entity operates domestically 
(‘indirect philanthropy’). This Chapter considers the tax treatment of both cross-border giving and cross-
border operations by philanthropic entities. 
The Chapter considers the extent to which countries provide tax incentives (deductions, rebates or 
matching) for giving to foreign philanthropic entities, either inter vivos gifts or gifts made on death 
(bequests). It also considers whether other taxes apply to the making of the gift i.e. gift taxes, inheritance 
taxes or, if it involves a transfer of property, capital gains taxes. Apart from the position in the European 
Union (EU) (that extends to countries in the European Economic Area (EEA)), that is governed by rulings 
5 The tax treatment of cross-border 
philanthropy 
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of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), there is little tax support in other countries for cross-border giving. 
The position in the EU requires Member States to adopt a ‘comparability’ approach to ascertain whether a 
gift to a philanthropic entity in another Member State is entitled to tax relief. This may require a case-by-
case approach to determine eligibility, and due to differences between Member States relating to tax relief, 
means that relief is not straightforward. There also appears to be less than complete adoption of the 
position in the ECJ rulings by all Members of the EU. Outside of the EU there are a few cases where there 
are limited tax incentives for cross-border giving. These limitations have led some philanthropic entities to 
establish ‘work arounds’ with entities in various jurisdictions, so that gifts can be made to domestic entities 
(that are eligible for tax relief) but are then passed on to entities in other countries. 
This Chapter also considers whether tax relief is provided to entities that operate across borders – foreign 
philanthropic entities operating domestically, as well as domestic philanthropic entities operating, wholly 
or in part, outside the jurisdiction. Apart from the position in the EU, most countries do not provide tax relief 
for foreign philanthropic entities. The position in the EU is governed by ECJ rulings requiring Member 
States to adopt a ‘comparability’ test to determine the eligibility of an entity in another Member State for 
tax relief, and once again the position is complex. Beyond the EU, there are a few examples of other 
countries providing tax relief for foreign philanthropic entities on a case-by-case basis. The inability of 
foreign entities to qualify for tax relief has meant that many entities that operate internationally establish 
local entities that are eligible for tax relief. Many, but not all, countries provide tax relief to domestic entities 
that operate abroad, particularly where the activities are related to humanitarian relief or development 
assistance. 
This Chapter proceeds as follows: Part 5.2 considers tax incentives for giving: donations and bequests; 
and also considers how gift and inheritance taxes apply and also how capital gains tax might apply where 
the gift is non-cash. Part 5.3 considers the tax treatment of philanthropic entities that operate across 
borders. This Part considers whether tax relief is extended to foreign philanthropic entities operating within 
the country, including any conditions that must be met for that tax relief. It then considers domestic PBOs, 
including domestic PBOs that are branches of international philanthropic entities, operating across borders. 
It also considers the tax treatment of the making of international grants by funds (grant-making). 
5.2. Cross-border giving 
Despite fairly widespread use of incentives for domestic philanthropy, the landscape for a more global 
approach to philanthropy remains fairly guarded. The issues that arise relate to: 
 incentives for individuals and corporations for the making of a cross-border donation; 
 incentives relating to cross-border bequests; and  
 other tax treatment of cross-border donations or bequests e.g. exemptions from gift taxes; 
inheritance taxes and, where property is disposed of, capital gains tax. 
5.2.1. Incentives for cross-border donations 
This section gives an overview of the tax incentives for cross-border donations.  The focus of the section 
are the tax incentives that countries may or may not extend to corporate or individual donors that give to a 
foreign PBO operating abroad. For the majority of countries, cross-border donations are not incentivised 
as a general principal (see Table 5.1). However, certain specific situations allow for a subsidy, if the foreign 
entity meets a set of domestic and/or international requirements. This section will cover three different 
scenarios: donations within the EU/EEA; donations between countries with bilateral tax agreements; and 
countries with other specific regimes.  
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Table 5.1. Tax incentives for cross-border donations 
Country Country incentivises cross-border donations 
Argentina No  
Australia     No 
Austria      Yes, if EU/EEA1 and countries where administrative cooperation exists 
Belgium Yes, if EU/EEA 
Bulgaria Yes, if EU/EEA  
Canada    No, except under DTA 
Chile No 
Colombia No 
Czech Republic Yes, if EU/EEA 
Estonia Yes, if EU/EEA 
Finland Yes, if EU/EEA and entity registered 
France Yes, if EU/EEA  
Germany Yes, if EU/EEA and some connection to Germany 
Greece Yes, if EU/EEA 
Hungary Yes, if EU/EEA (only corporate donors) 
India No 
Indonesia No 
Ireland  Yes, if EU/EEA and entity registered  
Israel No, except under DTA 
Italy Yes, if EU/EEA 
Japan No 
Latvia Yes, if EU/EEA and DTA 
Lithuania  Yes, if EU/EEA 
Luxembourg Yes, if EU/EEA 
Malta Yes, if EU/EEA and entity registered 
Mexico  No, except under DTA 
Netherlands   Yes, if entity registered  
New Zealand No, except for specific cases 
Norway Yes, if EU/EEA  
Portugal No (does not comply with ECJ rulings) 
Romania No (does not comply with ECJ rulings) 
Singapore No 
Slovak Republic  No (no relief for domestic donations) 
Slovenia Yes, if EU/EEA 
South Africa No 
Sweden Yes, if EU/EEA and entity registered 
Switzerland  No2 
United Kingdom Yes, if EU/EEA3 
United States No, except under DTA 
Note:  
1. EU’ refers to countries that are Members of the European Union. They are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. ‘EEA’ refers to the European Economic Area and includes EU 
countries and also Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It allows them to be part of the EU’s single market. 
2. In general, as Switzerland is not in the EU, it is not subject to decisions by the ECJ. It may be that Switzerland can benefit from the ECJ ruling 
for incoming donations based on the principle of free movement of capital that prohibits restrictions on the free movement of capital not only 
between Member States but also between Member States and third states. Oberson notes that the question whether the same treatment can 
apply in the other direction, i.e. gift from Switzerland to an institution established in an EU Member State, is less clear: (Oberson, 2015[1]).       
3. This may change post-BREXIT. 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire  
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Apart from the position in the European Union, which applies to all members of the European Economic 
Agreement (EEA), the general position is that the relief available for donations to domestic philanthropic 
entities is not available for donations to foreign entities. Most countries limit the tax relief to donations to 
entities that are ‘in’, ‘formed in’, or ‘established in’ the jurisdiction or have some other connection to the 
jurisdiction. The nature of the connection required is important in determining whether tax relief is available 
and is discussed further below. Generally, the rules are the same whether the donor is an individual or a 
corporation, although Hungary only provides tax relief to corporations and Sweden only provides tax relief 
to individuals. 
There are three situations where tax relief is available for donations to foreign entities: the first involves the 
Member States of the EU (and EEA) that are subject to rulings of the ECJ. The ECJ has developed a 
general non-discrimination principle relating to philanthropic giving (see Box 5.1). Second, some countries 
have bilateral agreements that permit cross-border tax relief. Third, some countries have a process for 
recognising foreign PBOs in limited circumstances and allowing tax relief for donations to those entities. 
EU law 
The EU Treaties provide for the free movement of capital between Member States and freedom of 
establishment. European Community law therefore requires Member States not to discriminate against a 
gift to a PBO in another Member State. This does not mean a gift to a foreign PBO will automatically benefit 
from the same treatment as a domestic PBO, it means that the nationality of a PBO is not sufficient to 
justify a difference of treatment. The ECJ in Hein Persche v Finanzamt Ludenscheid [2008] Case 318/07 
(14 October 2008) (Persche’s case), stated that European Community law does not require Member States 
to automatically acknowledge a foreign charity status when granting tax relief to donations. However, 
where a taxpayer in one State (in that case Germany) makes a donation to an entity that has philanthropic 
status in its own State (in that case Portugal), the State of the taxpayer cannot deny the right of equal tax 
treatment solely because the recipient entity is not resident in its territory. In that case, Mr Persche, a 
German resident, claimed a deduction from personal income tax for an in-kind donation of bed and bath 
linen, walking frames, and other equipment. The donation was made in favour of a Portuguese PBO 
working on a number of social issues including providing care homes for the elderly. The ECJ did not go 
so far as to require Member States to provide mutual recognition of philanthropic entities, but rather 
required Member States to accord tax benefits when there was ‘comparability’, and in this case Germany 
had not considered whether the Portuguese PBO satisfied such a test. Following this, and other ECJ cases, 
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the entity would be entitled to tax relief in the Member State in 
question but for its establishment elsewhere; and if the taxpayer can prove this the authority must consider 
the evidence presented. 
Almost all Member States have amended their legislation and/or procedures to recognise donations to 
comparable or similar entities in other Member States. A number of Member States assess comparability 
on a case-by-case basis which is often a time-consuming and costly exercise for taxpayers, including the 
requirement to provide translations of relevant documents. This approach typically requires individual 
donors to obtain approval, often from a regional authority, in each case; no record is retained, and no 
precedent is established. This is the case in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic, although in Belgium it is possible to obtain a Ruling 
that the foreign entity is comparable from the central authority. Other Member States require the 
philanthropic entity to demonstrate comparability and/or be registered in that State as well as in their home 
jurisdiction. This is the case in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. This 
approach has the advantage that once registered, other donors can rely on the registered status to support 
the tax relief. However, due to the difficulties of establishing comparability, very few entities are registered 
under this approach. 
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Determining whether a gift to a foreign entity is comparable is problematic because of the diversity of 
approaches to the question of tax relief for donations in the Member States. Differences between the 
jurisdictions that might be relevant include whether the gift is money or in-kind (Finland and Portugal only 
provide tax relief for cash donations) and whether the donor is an individual or corporation (as noted above, 
Hungary only provides relief for corporations and Sweden only provides relief for individuals). There may 
also be differences related to the eligibility of the entity: whether it is a PBO or a fund and the nature of its 
purposes (Austria, Germany, Finland, Malta and Romania have more limited purposes), how monies are 
disbursed including on overheads (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all restrict the 
expenditure on ‘overheads’ in different ways). There are also differences relating to directors’ remuneration 
(most countries prohibit payments to board members, but Sweden does not), whether the entity engages 
in activities abroad (Germany imposes restrictions) and on timely disbursement of funds (Portugal and 
Sweden impose specific time limits while others require the monies to be expended in a ‘reasonable 
period’).  
Some Member States impose additional requirements on foreign entities. For example, Latvia only 
provides relief in relation to Member States with which it has a Double Tax Agreement. The German tax 
legislation also requires that the activities of all philanthropic entities ‘either have to support individuals 
which have their permanent residence in Germany, or the activities could benefit Germany’s reputation’. 
The Netherlands is the most open of the countries responding. The Netherlands makes no distinction 
between domestic and foreign entities, whether from the EU/EEA or elsewhere. Providing the entity can 
satisfy the requirements of the tax law, they are entitled to be registered and donors can claim deductions. 
These entities must be comparable and satisfy other requirements such as integrity requirements, to 
demonstrate that those involved with the entity are ‘fit and proper persons’.  
Finally, it should be noted that some Member States (Portugal, Romania and the Slovak Republic) do not 
comply with the ECJ rulings.  
Bilateral agreements 
The second situation in which a donation may obtain tax relief when made to a foreign PBO is where there 
has been a bilateral agreement between countries to provide such relief. This is the case for the United 
States that has such agreements with Canada, Mexico and Israel. A similar provision applies in the treaties 
between the Netherlands and Barbados and between Mexico and Barbados. 
The US-Canada tax treaty (1980) provides for limited cross-border deductions in certain circumstances. 
Article XXI allows US donors to deduct gifts to Canadian ‘registered charities’, subject to US percentage 
limitations, but the deduction can only be offset against Canadian-source income. The treaty also allows 
US donors a deduction against their US-source income for donations to Canadian colleges and universities 
attended by the donor or a member of the donor's family (again, subject to US percentage limitations). The 
treaty also provides for reciprocal charitable credit for gifts by Canadian residents to US tax exempt 
organisations that could qualify in Canada as ‘registered charities’ if they were Canadian organisations but 
the deduction can only be claimed against US-source income, (subject to Canadian percentage 
limitations). Gifts to US colleges or universities attended by the donor or a member of the donor's family 
are creditable against Canadian-source income (again, subject to Canadian percentage limitations). 
A further issue is whether the Canadian charity will be treated as a private foundation or a public charity 
under US law – as these types of entities have different percentage limits i.e. the deductible donation is 
limited to a maximum of 50% of the donor’s adjusted gross income for public charities or 30% for private 
foundations. A Protocol to the US-Canada treaty recognises that Canadian law governing tax exempt 
status is materially equivalent to US law governing charities. Under the Protocol, the public charity status 
of a Canadian entity is now recognised by the United States, without a separate determination by the IRS 
or a requirement to lodge financial information by the Canadian entity, and vice versa. 
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The US-Mexico tax treaty (1992), also contains provisions allowing deductions for cross-border charitable 
gifts. Article XXII of the treaty allows income tax deductions to US donors for contributions to Mexican 
charities. The deductions are allowed only with respect to Mexican-source income and are subject to US 
percentage limitations. Mexican donors are allowed reciprocal deductions only against US-source income 
(subject to Mexican percentage limitations) for contributions to US charities. The responsibility for 
determining public charity status resides with the taxing authority of the nation in which the charity is 
organised. Although the deduction is limited to particular sources of income, the status of the foreign charity 
is recognised.  
The US-Israel tax treaty (1995), Article 15-A, permits US donors to deduct contributions to Israeli charities 
against their Israeli-source income, but only if the Israeli charity would have qualified for tax exemption 
under US law had it been established there (a comparability test). The deduction is capped at 25% of 
Israeli-source ‘adjusted gross’ income for individual donors and 25% of Israeli-source taxable income for 
corporate donors. Israeli donors are permitted a reciprocal deduction against US-source income for 
contributions to US charities that would qualify for tax exemption under Israeli law if organised there. The 
deduction is limited to 25% of US-source taxable income. 
Another example of bilateral relief can be found in The Netherlands- Barbados Tax Treaty (2006), and in 
the Mexico-Barbados Income Tax Treaty (2008). Article 22 of The Netherlands-Barbados Treaty provides 
that a contribution by a resident of State A to a charity in State B is deductible in State A where the 
competent authority of State A agrees that the entity qualifies as a charity in State A (i.e. it satisfies a 
comparability test). The Mexico-Barbados Treaty provides that a resident of State A can claim a deduction 
for a contribution to an entity that is a qualifying charity in State B. The competent authority in State A can 
consult with the competent authority in State B to ensure that the entity is qualified in State B (that is, there 
is mutual recognition).  
The inclusion of a provision on charitable donations seems to be part of the tax treaty policy of Barbados. 
A similar provision on donations to charitable institutions is included in article 21 of the Barbados-
Seychelles Income and Capital Tax Treaty (2007), Article 22 of the Barbados-Mauritius Income Tax Treaty 
(2004), and Article 23 of the Barbados-Ghana Income Tax Treaty (2008).   
Specific recognition  
There are also a few examples of countries that have a process for providing tax relief for gifts to approved 
foreign PBOs in limited circumstances, namely Canada and New Zealand. In Canada, a tax credit is 
available (to an individual) for a gift to a ‘qualified donee’. This generally means a registered charity, that 
is, a charity that is created in and resident in Canada. However, a foreign entity can become a qualified 
donee if it is: 
 a university outside Canada, the student body of which ordinarily includes students from Canada, 
that has applied for registration by the Minister, or 
 a foreign charity that has applied to the Minister for registration. The Minister may register, in 
consultation with the Minister of Finance, a foreign charity for a 24-month period that includes the 
time at which Her Majesty in right of Canada has made a gift to the foreign charity, if the Minister 
is satisfied that the foreign charity is: 
(i) carrying on relief activities in response to a disaster; 
(ii) providing urgent humanitarian aid; or 
(iii) carrying on activities in the national interest of Canada. 
There are currently only 4 approved foreign charities. 
New Zealand also has a process for foreign PBOs to become approved donees. In such a case, an 
application is made to the Minister through the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) for approval and 
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inclusion on a list in Schedule 32 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ). The criterion for approval is that the 
money received must go towards at least one of these things: 
 relieving poverty, hunger, sickness, damages from war or natural disaster; 
 the economy of developing countries recognised by the United Nations; or 
 raising the educational standards of a developing country recognised by the United Nations. 
Charities are specifically excluded from being listed if they form to foster or administer any religion, cult or 
political creed. There are currently approximately 120 listed charities. 
The non-recognition of a foreign philanthropic entity does not preclude a foreign entity establishing an 
entity or branch in the other jurisdiction. Where an entity is set up in one country but will perform some or 
all of its activities in another country, the issue will be whether a domestic entity is allowed to undertake 
activities abroad. This is considered in Part 5.3.2.  
Finally, it should be noted that in those countries such as the Slovak Republic, that do not provide tax relief 
for donations to domestic PBOs, such relief does not apply to cross-border donations.  
Box 5.1. Cross-border philanthropy in the European Union regulatory framework 
Emergence of a non-discrimination principle 
Historically, EU Member States did not grant tax privileges to foreign PBOs. Indeed, the general rule 
was that tax incentives were restricted to domestic PBOs and donors giving to domestic PBOs. 
However, this regulatory framework was overhauled by a series of judgements by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ).  
Between 2005 and 2011, these judgements developed a general non-discrimination principle as 
regards to tax law in the area of public-benefit activities. It has set the below-mentioned rules for 
Member States. 
Design of the non-discrimination principle  
It is at the discretion of Member States whether or not they wish to provide tax privileges for PBOs and 
their donors (1). Similarly, Member States are in principle free in determining the relevant conditions 
and requirements. Among admissible conditions, Member States may theoretically limit the beneficiary 
circle of PBOs’ activities to domestic citizens or persons living within the domestic territory (2). There is 
also no obligation of automatically granting a PBO status to an entity recognised as a PBO in another 
country (3) 
However, limits to the Member States regulatory powers are established by the fundamental freedoms 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Indeed, Member States may not exclude a foreign EU-based 
PBOs and their donors from eligibility for tax privileges if they fulfil all requirements for domestic PBOs 
(4). Moreover, it is not permitted that a Member State requires a PBO to undertake its philanthropic 
activities solely in its jurisdiction in order to benefit from a preferential tax treatment (unless there are 
compelling objective reasons for this). For example, Member States may not restrict tax benefits for 
donations strictly to domestic universities or laboratories (5) 
Member States should carry out a comparability test to determine whether a foreign EU-based PBO 
meets the requirements of national tax law. Such tests are to be carried out by the national authorities 
and courts of the Member State concerned. (6). While conducting the comparability test, Member States 
may ask that a foreign EU-based PBO provides any document useful for the carrying out of the test (7). 
Note: (1) ECJ, 27. 1. 2009 - C-318/07 (Hein Persche/Finanzamt Lüdenscheid). (2) ECJ, Stauffer, paras. 37f., 57, Missionswerk, para. 30 
(3) ECJ Stauffer, para. 39; Persche, para. 48. (4) ECJ, Persche, para. 46, Missionswerk, paras. 30-31. (5) ECJ, Laboratoires Fournier, para. 
23; or Commission/Austria, paras. 35-38 (6) ECJ, Persche, para. 49, Missionswerk, paras. 33-34. (7) ECJ, Persche, paras. 53-58. 
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5.2.2. Incentives for cross-border bequests 
This section summarises the tax treatment of bequests to foreign PBOs (also referred to as cross-border 
bequests). Although a number of countries did not provide information on this issue, Table 5.2 suggests 
that countries that grant tax incentives to domestic philanthropic bequests also incentivise cross-border 
bequests to PBOs, although exceptions exist. These are predominantly members of the EU, and the 
responses indicate that the same comparability requirements that apply for donations would apply to 
bequests. 
Table 5.2. Tax incentives for cross-border bequests 
Country Countries incentivise domestic and cross-border philanthropic bequests 
Australia      No (but CGT relief available) 
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Bulgaria Yes if EC/EEA 
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Slovenia Yes 
United Kingdom Yes (limited) 
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Canada states that in limited circumstances a cross-border bequest is possible. This would apply where 
the bequest is to a foreign universities or foreign charities approved under the Income Tax Act 2007 (Can) 
(discussed above) or where the US-Canada tax treaty provides comparable tax relief.   
The survey asked whether different rules applied for bequests to funds rather than PBOs. There were no 
differences indicated. 
5.2.3. Gift tax, inheritance tax and capital gains tax 
This section provides an overview of other taxes that countries may levy upon cross-border giving. The 
taxes covered are gift taxes, inheritance/estate taxes and capital gains taxes. Although the approaches 
differ across countries, the majority of countries do not levy taxes on cross-border giving (see Table 5.3). 
Finally, this section provides examples of countries that do levy the before listed taxes on cross-border 
giving. 
Many countries (22) do not levy gift taxes or inheritance taxes. In some countries that do not levy such 
taxes, a disposal of property could give rise to capital gains tax (5) or stamp duty (1). 
The US provides an exemption from gift duty (s 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code) and from 
inheritance tax (s 2055(a) of the Internal Revenue Code) for donations and bequests that could apply to 
gifts to foreign PBOs. 
European countries that do impose such taxes generally noted that an exemption may be available to other 
Member States, presumably on the basis of comparability.  This is supported by the case of Missionswerk 
Werner Heukelbach eV v Belgium [2011] Case 25/2010,10 February 2011 (Missionwerk case). 
Missionswerk was a religious association and PBO registered in Germany. Mrs R, a Belgian citizen, who 
had lived her whole life in Belgium, died in 2004 in Belgium, having left her estate to Missionswerk.  The 
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Belgian regional tax authority applied inheritance tax at a rate of 80% on the amount Missionswerk was to 
receive. Missionswerk sought to have the reduced tax rate of 7% applied instead, which was the rate 
applied for legacies to resident PBOs. The Belgian tax authority rejected the request for the application of 
the reduced tax rate on the grounds that it was only to be applied to foreign EU-based PBOs in cases 
where the testator had lived or worked in the country in which the foreign entity was based.  The ECJ ruled 
that legacies are protected under the free movement of capital and that a restriction on tax incentives would 
be permissible only in the case that the German PBO was not comparable to a Belgian PBO. The 
Missionwerk case means that revenue authorities in Member States are at least obliged to apply the 
comparability test – the practical difficulties of applying the comparability test, including that some States 
assess comparability on a case-by-case basis, have been discussed above.   
Table 5.3. Cross-border giving and gift taxes, inheritance tax, and capital gains tax (CGT)  
Country Gift Tax Inheritance 
tax 
Exemption Other taxes 
Argentina No  No 
  
Australia     No  No 
 
disposals of assets may be subject to CGT 
Austria    No  No 
  
Belgium No  Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
Bulgaria Yes  Yes  may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
Canada    No  No 
 
disposals of assets may be subject to CGT 
Chile Yes Yes 
  
Colombia No  No 
 
disposals of assets may be subject to CGT 
Czech Republic No  No 
  
Estonia No  No 
  
Finland Yes  Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
France Yes Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA   
Germany Yes  Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
Greece Yes  Yes lower rate for PBOs, including within EU/EEA 
 
Hungary  Yes  Yes 
  
Indonesia No No 
  
Ireland    No  Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
Israel    No  No 
 
disposal of assets may be subject to CGT 
Italy Yes Yes May be exempt including within EU/EEA  
Japan No No   
Latvia No  No 
  
Lithuania No  No 
  
Malta No  No 
 
may be stamp duty 
Mexico  No  No 
  
Netherlands  Yes  Yes may be exempt if entity registered 
 
New Zealand No  No 
  
Norway No  No 
  
Portugal No  No 
  
Romania No  No 
  
Singapore No  No 
  
Slovak Republic  No  No 
 
disposals of assets may be subject to CGT 
Slovenia Yes  Yes may be exempt including within EU/EEA 
 
South Africa Yes Yes 
  
Sweden No  No 
  
Switzerland     Yes Yes 
  
United Kingdom No Yes may be exempt within EU/EEA  
United States  Yes  Yes exemptions available 
 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
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Three countries appear have a gift tax or inheritance tax that might be imposed on the making of a donation 
or bequest to a foreign PBO: Switzerland, Greece, and South Africa. In Switzerland, in most cantons, gifts 
and bequests by Swiss residents in favour of foreign resident PBOs are subject to gift and inheritance 
taxes, unless a ‘reciprocity declaration is concluded with the country where the foreign charity is registered. 
Almost all Swiss cantons have so-called reciprocity declarations with France, and some of them with the 
US, Germany and Israel. Greece taxes bequests and donations to philanthropic entities at a lower rate, 
including where the entity is within the EU/EEA. In South Africa, the bequest is taxed in the hands of the 
recipient, so a foreign recipient may be beyond the reach of the domestic taxing authorities. 
In countries that do not impose gift tax or inheritance tax, a donation or bequest that takes the form of a 
disposal of property may be subject to CGT. This is the case in Australia, Canada, Colombia, Israel and 
the Slovak Republic. Malta indicated that stamp duty may be payable on the disposal. 
5.3. Cross-border treatment of PBOs and funds 
This section considers the tax treatment of philanthropic entities that operate across borders. This includes 
the tax treatment of foreign philanthropic entities engaging in activities in another country. It also includes 
domestic PBOs carrying out activities in other countries and funds transferring assets or, more commonly, 
making grants to PBOs or other entities in other countries. Although most countries do not provide tax 
preferences for foreign philanthropic entities, many countries do permit domestic tax-preferred entities to 
operate abroad in various situations. 
5.3.1. Tax treatment of foreign PBOs 
This section analyses the tax treatment of foreign PBOs that engage in activities domestically. An entity 
that was granted a PBO status in one country may engage in activities in another jurisdiction, which raises 
numerous tax questions related to the treatment of income arising from domestic sources. The section 
focuses on the following issues: the extension of the PBO status granted abroad, the test applied by 
domestic jurisdictions allowing for a preferential treatment of domestic income received by the foreign entity 
and the taxation of these incomes in cases where the foreign entity fails to meet domestic requirements 
Table 5.4 shows whether countries provide preferential tax treatment to foreign PBOs operating 
domestically. Most European countries treat comparable philanthropic entities within EU/EEA in the same 
way as domestic entities. The requirement to accord comparable treatment arises from the ruling of the 
ECJ in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für Körperschaften [2006] Case-
386/04, 14 September 2006 (Stauffer’s case). In that case, an Italian philanthropic entity awarded 
scholarships to young people from Switzerland, particularly those from Bern, to pursue studies in music. 
The entity owned a building in Germany from which it obtained rental income. Under German tax law this 
type of income was exempt from corporate tax for domestic philanthropic entities. However, the exemption 
was said to not be available to foreign philanthropic entities. The ECJ stated that European Community 
law does not require Member States to automatically acknowledge a foreign charity status. However, 
where an entity that has philanthropic status in its own State (in that case Italy), also satisfies the 
requirements in another State (in that case Germany), the Member State cannot deny that entity the right 
of equal tax treatment solely because it is not resident in its territory. The operation of the comparability 
test to cross-border donations and cross-border bequests has already been noted. Philanthropic entities 
deriving income in another Member State will need to satisfy the revenue authorities in the source 
jurisdiction as to comparability and this can be complex and costly. Three Member States, Ireland, Malta 
and The Netherlands, require registration of the relevant foreign PBO. The Netherlands is the most 
generous of all countries as it permits entities from any country to register provided it meets the eligibility 
requirements in the legislation. Belgium allows the foreign PBO to assess whether it is exempt from 
corporate tax on one of two criteria. The first criterion is that the PBO does not carry out operations of a 
   117 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
Three countries appear have a gift tax or inheritance tax that might be imposed on the making of a donation 
or bequest to a foreign PBO: Switzerland, Greece, and South Africa. In Switzerland, in most cantons, gifts 
and bequests by Swiss residents in favour of foreign resident PBOs are subject to gift and inheritance 
taxes, unless a ‘reciprocity declaration is concluded with the country where the foreign charity is registered. 
Almost all Swiss cantons have so-called reciprocity declarations with France, and some of them with the 
US, Germany and Israel. Greece taxes bequests and donations to philanthropic entities at a lower rate, 
including where the entity is within the EU/EEA. In South Africa, the bequest is taxed in the hands of the 
recipient, so a foreign recipient may be beyond the reach of the domestic taxing authorities. 
In countries that do not impose gift tax or inheritance tax, a donation or bequest that takes the form of a 
disposal of property may be subject to CGT. This is the case in Australia, Canada, Colombia, Israel and 
the Slovak Republic. Malta indicated that stamp duty may be payable on the disposal. 
5.3. Cross-border treatment of PBOs and funds 
This section considers the tax treatment of philanthropic entities that operate across borders. This includes 
the tax treatment of foreign philanthropic entities engaging in activities in another country. It also includes 
domestic PBOs carrying out activities in other countries and funds transferring assets or, more commonly, 
making grants to PBOs or other entities in other countries. Although most countries do not provide tax 
preferences for foreign philanthropic entities, many countries do permit domestic tax-preferred entities to 
operate abroad in various situations. 
5.3.1. Tax treatment of foreign PBOs 
This section analyses the tax treatment of foreign PBOs that engage in activities domestically. An entity 
that was granted a PBO status in one country may engage in activities in another jurisdiction, which raises 
numerous tax questions related to the treatment of income arising from domestic sources. The section 
focuses on the following issues: the extension of the PBO status granted abroad, the test applied by 
domestic jurisdictions allowing for a preferential treatment of domestic income received by the foreign entity 
and the taxation of these incomes in cases where the foreign entity fails to meet domestic requirements 
Table 5.4 shows whether countries provide preferential tax treatment to foreign PBOs operating 
domestically. Most European countries treat comparable philanthropic entities within EU/EEA in the same 
way as domestic entities. The requirement to accord comparable treatment arises from the ruling of the 
ECJ in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für Körperschaften [2006] Case-
386/04, 14 September 2006 (Stauffer’s case). In that case, an Italian philanthropic entity awarded 
scholarships to young people from Switzerland, particularly those from Bern, to pursue studies in music. 
The entity owned a building in Germany from which it obtained rental income. Under German tax law this 
type of income was exempt from corporate tax for domestic philanthropic entities. However, the exemption 
was said to not be available to foreign philanthropic entities. The ECJ stated that European Community 
law does not require Member States to automatically acknowledge a foreign charity status. However, 
where an entity that has philanthropic status in its own State (in that case Italy), also satisfies the 
requirements in another State (in that case Germany), the Member State cannot deny that entity the right 
of equal tax treatment solely because it is not resident in its territory. The operation of the comparability 
test to cross-border donations and cross-border bequests has already been noted. Philanthropic entities 
deriving income in another Member State will need to satisfy the revenue authorities in the source 
jurisdiction as to comparability and this can be complex and costly. Three Member States, Ireland, Malta 
and The Netherlands, require registration of the relevant foreign PBO. The Netherlands is the most 
generous of all countries as it permits entities from any country to register provided it meets the eligibility 
requirements in the legislation. Belgium allows the foreign PBO to assess whether it is exempt from 
corporate tax on one of two criteria. The first criterion is that the PBO does not carry out operations of a 
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for-profit nature. The exemption based on this criterion can be claimed by both domestic and foreign PBOs. 
The second criterion (which may enable a wider exemption) is that the PBO belongs to one of the privileged 
sectors enumerated by Article 181 of the Income Tax Code (for instance, education). However, this basis 
for exemption is only applicable to domestic PBOs. 
A large number of countries (16) indicated that they did not provide tax concessions to foreign PBOs, 
including some Member States of the EU.  
Table 5.4. Preferential tax treatment of foreign PBOs 
Country Country provides preferential tax treatment to foreign PBO 
Argentina No 
Australia     Generally no, but may obtain approval 
Austria      Yes, if within EU/EEA and countries where administrative cooperation exists 
Belgium Yes, if within EU/EEA but only for one of two alternative grounds  
Bulgaria Yes 
Canada     Foreign charities are not exempt; foreign NPOs may be 
Chile No 
Colombia No 
Czech Republic Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Estonia No 
Finland Yes, if within EU/EEA 
France Yes, if within EU/EEA  
Germany   Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Greece Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Hungary Yes, if within EU/EEA 
India No 
Indonesia Some foreign PBOs may be recognised 
Ireland    Yes, if within EU/EEA but must be registered 
Israel    No 
Italy Yes, within EU/EEA 
Japan No 
Latvia No 
Lithuania Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Luxembourg Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Malta Yes, if within EU/EEA but must be registered 
Mexico  No 
Netherlands   Yes, must be registered 
New Zealand Generally no, but may obtain approval  




Slovak Republic  No  
Slovenia Yes, if within EU/EEA 
South Africa No 
Sweden Yes, if within EU/EEA 
Switzerland     No 
United Kingdom Yes, if within EU/EEA 
United States No 
Source: OECD Questionnaire on Taxation and Philanthropy 
   119 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
The remaining countries had some limited arrangements for recognition of foreign PBOs. For example, 
Indonesia has an arrangement that involves some foreign PBOs being granted a permit by the Central 
Government (see Box 5.2). Canada allows a foreign PBO to qualify as a ‘non-profit organisation’ if it meets 
the conditions under the legislation, specifically that it is not a charity and that it is organised and operated 
for social welfare, civic improvement, pleasure, sport, recreation, or any other purpose except profit. If it 
qualifies as a non-profit organisation its income will generally not be subject to tax but unlike a registered 
charity, it is not eligible to receive tax preferred donations.  In Australia, a small number of foreign PBOs 
are approved by regulation as income tax exempt (but not as deductible gift recipients).  The New Zealand 
revenue has the ability to approve foreign entities as tax charities, which means that they can become 
approved donees (see Part 5.2.1) and also eligible for tax exempt status. It is however necessary to have 
a strong connection with New Zealand, meet the requirements for registered charities, apart from residency 
and demonstrate that they are eligible for charity tax concessions in their home jurisdiction.  This approval 
and inclusion on a list in Schedule 32 of the Income Tax Act 2007 means the foreign entity will be able to 
derive non-business income (i.e. passive investment income) and not be subject to income tax. They will, 
however, be subject to income tax on any business income in New Zealand if all of their charitable 
purposes are carried out overseas. As noted above there are currently approximately 120 listed foreign 
charities. 
South Africa notes that foreign PBOs may establish ‘branches’ and the United States, allows the 
establishment of entities that are closely aligned with foreign PBOs e.g. as ‘friends of’ a foreign PBO (these 
types of entities are discussed in Part 5.3.2). 
To the extent that a foreign PBO does not qualify as a tax-exempt entity, it would likely be taxed as a 
corporation. As a result of these limitations, many philanthropic entities establish separate entities in each 
jurisdiction to take advantage of the tax concessions available to domestic entities (see Part 5.3.2). 
Box 5.2. Foreign PBOs operating in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, a PBO status issued by another country will be verified by relevant ministries before the 
PBO gets an approval to operate in Indonesia. Foreign PBOs must obtain a principal permit and an 
operational permit from the Central Government 
Obtaining of principal permit 
 The country issuing the PBO status has diplomatic relations with Indonesia 
 The PBO has a non-profit principle and worthy purpose 
Obtaining an operational permit 
 The PBO needs a principle permit from the central government  
 It also need a written agreement with relevant ministries/ government agencies according to its 
operational field.  
 An annual work-plan with the relevant regional government is required 
Source: Government Regulation No. 93 Year 2010 
5.3.2. Tax treatment of PBOs that operate abroad 
This section provides an overview of the tax rules concerning domestic PBOs engaging in activities abroad. 
Preferential tax treatment is usually granted to a PBO’s domestic activity and thus PBOs with activities 
abroad may risk losing its preferential tax status. In most cases however, responding countries allow a 
domestic PBO to conduct activities abroad. Typically, this authorisation is reliant upon the respect of worthy 
purpose requirements imposed by the national legislation, usually similar to requirements imposed to 
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domestic PBOs. This forces the imposition of strong documentation requirements for PBOs in order to 
respect the national criteria. Some countries allow these requirements to be lifted in certain specific cases, 
such as the occurrence of a natural disaster or humanitarian crises.  
The question is, of course, concerned with what the tax provisions have to say about operating overseas. 
There may in addition be other requirements or restrictions on cross-border financial flows or activities. For 
example, most countries have regulations aimed at illicit financial flows and anti-money laundering, 
including following FATF recommendations about not permitting monies to be transferred to high-risk 
countries.1 Many countries also have regulations aimed at foreign interference, including restrictions on 
contributions to political parties (Canada, United States) and in some cases restrictions on contributions to 
philanthropic entities (Hungary, India, and Israel).  There may also be restrictions on fundraising, both 
domestically and internationally, that restrict the ability of philanthropic entities to operate abroad. For 
example, in Singapore, if funds are raised from the public, a permit is required, and the applicant has to 
apply at least 80% of the net proceeds of the funds raised within Singapore (and the donations will not be 
tax-deductible). The rule may be waived for private donations or for appeals in aid of providing immediate 
disaster relief. These non-tax restrictions may affect the ability of philanthropic donor or entities to transfer 
funds or engage in activities in other countries. 
Most countries provide tax support to domestic PBOs to carry out activities in another country (see 
Table 5.5). Most countries indicated that the requirements for approval were the same for entities that 
carried out their activities abroad as those that operated domestically. Some countries indicated that there 
may be restrictions relating to purpose and some countries impose additional reporting requirements when 
PBOs operate abroad. It is also important to consider how philanthropic entities can permit donors to 
support overseas activities (‘indirect philanthropy’).  
Purpose requirements 
Countries that do allow domestic PBOs to engage in such activity typically require the PBO to meet the 
domestic worthy purpose requirement. For example, 17 countries indicated that the same purposes were 
relevant whether the entity would be operating domestically or overseas. In some other countries, the 
relevant purpose must be related to assistance for developing countries or to assistance following 
disasters. For example, the Slovak Republic notes that a donation for material humanitarian aid provided 
abroad is a deductible tax expense for the donor, if donated through the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak 
Republic (s 19(2)(u) of the Income Tax Act No 595/2003 as amended).  Presumably such donations are 
tax exempt in the Slovak Republic. In Australia, a registered charity can establish a ‘developing country 
relief fund’ if the Foreign Affairs Minister has declared the country to be a ‘developing country’ and has 
approved the entity. There is also a provision for the Minister to recognise a ‘disaster’, including in countries 
other than developing countries, if the disaster develops rapidly and results in death, serious injury or other 
physical suffering of a large number of people, or in widespread damage to property or the natural 
environment. In India, if a charitable trust derives income from property held for a charitable purpose which 
‘tends to promote international welfare in which India is interested’ and is applied to such purposes outside 
India, the income is exempt, subject to special approval processes.  
In the case of natural disasters and humanitarian crises, some countries note special arrangements. For 
example, in Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) has indicated that following a natural disaster, 
such as an earthquake or flood, many organisations want to provide immediate assistance and relief to 
those affected, and as a result, the CRA often receives applications from such organisations seeking to be 
registered. The CRA has indicated that it will typically assign priority to these applications.  In Germany, in 
cases of natural disasters or humanitarian crisis the tax administration may publish a catastrophe decree 
(‘Katastrophenerlass’). These decrees allow entities with preferential tax treatment to collect donations for 
worthy purposes not set out in their constitutions. In Indonesia, the government permits tax relief for natural 
disasters, although it is not clear whether the disaster must be within Indonesia or whether it could be in 
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some other country (Government Regulation No. 93 Year 2010). In New Zealand, a domestic registered 
charity must apply 75% of its funds within New Zealand, allowing up to 25% to be devoted to charitable 
purposes outside New Zealand. The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) indicates that if the figure is below 
75% in any year, the cumulative total of its funds applied over the current and preceding two years can be 
used for the purposes of determining whether a tax credit or deduction is available. This allows some year-
on-year variation for exceptional years, for example in response to natural disasters: IRD Interpretation 
Statement 18/05.  Importantly the 75% requirement does not apply to foreign charities listed under Sched 
32 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (see Part 5.3.1). 
Table 5.5. Domestic PBOs allowed to carry out activities abroad 
Country Country permits PBOs to carry out activities abroad 
Argentina Yes 
Australia     Yes+ 
Austria     Yes 
Belgium Yes 
Bulgaria Yes 











Ireland   Yes 







Netherlands  Yes 





Slovak Republic Yes+ 
Slovenia Yes 
South Africa Yes 
Sweden Yes 
Switzerland    Yes+ 
United Kingdom Yes 
United States Yes 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
Note: Yes+ indicates that there are additional requirements that must be satisfied or restrictions. These are discussed below. 
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United Kingdom Yes 
United States Yes 
Source: OECD Taxation and Philanthropy Questionnaire 
Note: Yes+ indicates that there are additional requirements that must be satisfied or restrictions. These are discussed below. 
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Additional requirements 
Another group of countries, namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland, require the domestic 
entity to meet the specified worthy purpose but also to satisfy additional reporting requirements 
(documentation, justification of activity, proof of control of the activity abroad etc.). For example, in Australia 
domestic entities will only be approved to engage in activities abroad, whether on their own or in 
partnership with in-country entities, if they can demonstrate that the entity’s focus is on supporting 
development and/or humanitarian assistance activities in developing countries (under the Overseas Aid 
Gift Deduction scheme); that they have the capacity to manage and deliver overseas aid activities and that 
they have appropriate safeguards in place to manage risks associated with child protection and terrorism.  
Some other philanthropic entities that pursue activities abroad may be eligible for income tax exemption 
provided that the entity has a physical presence in Australia and ‘pursues its objectives and incurs its 
expenditure principally in Australia’. This does not mean that the beneficiaries must be in Australia. The 
requirement in Canada that to be tax exempt, the PBO must carry on its activities itself, does not prevent 
the PBO from entering into contracts with local providers or appointing a local agent, but it is important that 
the domestic entity retains direction and control over any intermediaries. Switzerland notes that there must 
be suitable documentation for activities abroad. 
In Luxembourg, a PBO can carry out activities abroad as long as it does not do so exclusively and its main 
activities are domestic. If the PBO has a non-government organisation status (which is authorised by the 
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), it is able to carry out activities abroad more extensively. 
In Italy, domestic PBOs can carry out activities abroad only if related to humanitarian aid. If a PBO gives 
funds abroad, the allocation is allowed only for a humanitarian purpose. In such a case, the domestic entity 
has to comply with additional accounting requirements, with reference to the accountability of the foreign 
beneficiary entity/institution and with reference to how the funds will be spent. 
A few countries, such as Singapore and Romania, indicated that they do not provide tax relief to domestic 
PBOs that engage in activities beyond the borders of the country, although it appears that they may permit 
certain international philanthropic entities such as the Red Cross, World Vision or Oxfam to operate with 
tax relief available. 
Indirect philanthropy 
The restrictions on tax relief for foreign philanthropic entities, but widespread acceptance of domestic 
entities operating overseas, means that donors wishing to support overseas causes need to find a suitable 
domestic entity to make donations to. From the perspective of the philanthropic entity, there are essentially 
two models available for entities to raise funds in one jurisdiction and spend money or carry out activities 
in another jurisdiction: 
 the separate entity model; or 
 use of an intermediary. 
Separate entity model 
An entity that seeks tax-preferred status in a particular jurisdiction, perhaps with a view to fundraising in 
that jurisdiction, but carrying out activities in another jurisdiction, may set up a domestic PBO. The entity 
will, of course need to comply with the tax and other requirements of that jurisdiction. There are two types 
of this model – the international PBO and the specific purpose PBO.  
Many international organisations, sometimes referred to as International Non-Government Organisations 
(INGOs), establish separate entities in different countries e.g. Red Cross, CARE, Amnesty International, 
Greenpeace, World Vision, Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontiere, because of the inability to make tax-
preferred gifts to foreign PBOs or for a foreign PBO to obtain tax relief. For example, there are 192 national 
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Red Cross societies carrying out the work of the international Red Cross movement. The critical point is 
that the funds are to be used in a foreign country by a domestic entity as opposed to being donated to and 
used by a foreign entity.  
Another type of cross-border PBO will typically relate to a particular purpose, perhaps an educational or 
arts-related purpose in another jurisdiction, but because of the inability of donors to obtain tax relief for 
cross border donations, the PBO will establish a separate entity in jurisdictions where potential donors may 
be located. For example, there are a number of entities in the US that support various museums and art 
galleries e.g. the Tate, Museo del Prado and the Rijksmuseum. There are also entities that support 
educational institutions, such as The University of Oxford – including in the US, Canada, Switzerland, 
Germany and Australia. In some countries the entity might be referred to as a ‘branch’ or ‘affiliate’ of the 
foreign entity, but will be treated as a separate domestic entity for tax purposes. Some entities will simply 
adopt a name that reflects the purpose e.g. the Oxford Australia Scholarship Fund.  The US has a tradition 
of allowing US taxpayers to support overseas PBOs through a ‘Friends of’ PBO e.g. American Friends of 
Oxford University, and this nomenclature has now been adopted in Switzerland (Swiss Friends of Oxford) 
and Germany (German Friends of Oxford).  South Africa permits a foreign organisation that is incorporated, 
formed or established in a country outside South Africa, which is exempt from income tax in that other 
country to obtain tax relief as a PBO. The critical point in each of these cases is that it is a domestic entity 
(and so subject to regulatory oversight) that will generate monies that will be passed onto the foreign entity 
in accordance with the stated purposes. 
Use of intermediaries 
An increasingly common phenomena is the use of intermediaries to transfer funds to a foreign PBO.  A 
donor may be able to make a donation to a domestic PBO or fund that is authorised to make grants to 
foreign PBOs. It is likely that such entities will have to satisfy various requirements to be able to make 
grants overseas (see Part 5.3.3) and will need to have some oversight of the spending of the monies. 
Examples of intermediaries that operate in this way include the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), Global 
Giving, Transnational Giving Europe and the King Baudouin Foundation.  
Where a local intermediary is used to direct monies from donors to a nominated foreign PBO, the donation 
will get the benefit of domestic tax relief and the monies will be applied abroad in accordance with the 
donors’ wishes. In some cases, the intermediary may allow the donor to have an account (sometimes 
called a ‘Donor Advised Account’) and have some say about how the monies are to be applied. The 
domestic PBO or fund agrees to act as a ‘conduit’ and pass on donations to nominated foreign PBOs. This 
will typically generate a fee for the entity acting as a conduit (which is likely to be treated as business 
income of the recipient intermediary). For example, Transnational Giving Europe charges a fee equivalent 
to 5% of the donation up to EUR 100 000 and 1% above this, capped at a maximum fee of EUR 15 000.  
Some countries have restrictions on philanthropic entities acting as conduits. For example, in Canada a 
PBO is required to carry on its charitable activities itself. If the purpose of a PBO was to raise funds for 
another entity, the PBO would not be entitled to registration as a charity. A Canadian foundation can make 
grants to other entities, but the entity would need to be a qualified donee. However, a Canadian PBO may 
enter in contracts with foreign entities, provided that the domestic entity ensures that the funds are applied 
for philanthropic or charitable purposes by the foreign PBO. This imposes an obligation on the PBO to take 
‘reasonable steps’ to ensure that the funds are applied appropriately.   
In some countries, the earmarking of a contribution by a donor for a particular entity or project may impact 
on the tax relief. For example, In the United Kingdom, tax reliefs are not available if the charity makes 
payments overseas unless the charity takes reasonable steps to ensure that the funds remitted overseas 
are not only intended for use for a purpose that would qualify as a charitable purpose according to UK law, 
but that the funds are in fact so used. Simply passing on monies to another entity is unlikely to satisfy this 
requirement. In the US, a donor cannot deduct a contribution made to a qualifying philanthropic entity if 
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the contribution is directed to go to a foreign PBO (or some other entity). However, it may be possible to 
express a preference, rather than a direction, as to how the monies are to be used. In the US, the qualified 
entity must approve the program as furthering its own exempt purposes and must keep control over the 
use of the contributed funds. Simply passing on monies would not suffice. However, where the foreign 
entity is an administrative arm of the qualified US entity, a deduction will be available.   
5.3.3. International grant-making 
This section provides an overview of rules concerning international grant-making. Indeed, donations of 
assets or grants to foreign PBOs by a fund can have tax implications. While some countries support this 
form of cross-border giving, others may withdraw the tax-preferred status if grants are made to foreign 
PBOs. 
Some countries indicated that funds were able to make grants to PBOs in other countries without losing 
their tax preferred status. The relevant countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria2, Germany, Ireland, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the US.  
Although many countries have funds that make international grants, the US is home to some of the largest 
funds making such grants and accounts for a significant proportion of grants worldwide. According to a 
report by COF and Foundation Centre in 2018, ‘The State of Global Giving by US Foundations’, covering 
the period 2011-2015, private US foundations give around USD10 billion a year to organisations that work 
on social and environmental problems outside of the country, particularly in Africa, South Asia, and other 
low-income parts of the world. Since the early 2000s, international grant-making has increased from about 
14 to about 30 percent of all foundation giving in the US, which itself has grown dramatically. Half of 
international giving comes from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; the remainder is from other large 
foundations, which might be either independent, community, corporate or operating foundations. According 
to the report, the top 10 international grant-makers are: 
1. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
2. The Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation  
3. Ford Foundation 
4. Foundation to Promote Open Society 
5. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation  
6. Walton Family Foundation 
7. The Rockefeller Foundation 
8. The David and Lucile Packard Foundation  
9. Open Society Institute 
10. Silicon Valley Community Foundation 
There are different types of recipients of these types of grants. Foundations may seek to build relationships 
with governments; or to support international NGOs or develop relationships with in-country NGOs (often 
referred to as ‘local partners’). The Council on Foundations and the Foundation Centre found that about 
88% of all international grants went to or through INGOs. 
The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imposes some restrictions on international grant-making by private 
foundations (i.e. foundations that are tax exempt under the Code), to ensure that grant proceeds will be 
used by the foreign grantee for appropriate charitable purposes. Private foundations may demonstrate 
compliance with such requirements through one of two methods: ‘expenditure responsibility’ which requires 
a level of oversight by the grantor, or ‘an equivalency determination’ that requires the grant-maker to form 
opinion that the foreign organisation it wishes to support is essentially the equivalent of a US s 501(c)(3) 
public charity. 
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US public charities may also make international grants and are generally not subject to the same 
restrictions on international grant-making as private foundations. A public charity must ensure that the 
foreign recipient of its funds engages in activities that are consistent with the public charity's exempt 
purpose. This invariably means having a grant agreement in place requiring progress reporting and return 
of the funds if they are used for an improper purpose. 
Other countries indicated that a fund may lose its tax-preferred status if grants are made to PBOs in other 
countries. For example, in Australia an approved fund (which may be a Private Ancillary Fund or a Public 
Ancillary Fund) can only make grants to PBOs in Australia (although those PBOs may undertake activities 
in other countries, see 5.3.2).  
Similarly, in Canada, tax-preferred charitable foundations are only allowed to gift funds to ‘qualified donees’ 
which are generally only situated in Canada. Foundations that donate assets or make grants to PBOs in 
other countries may have their registration temporarily suspended or revoked or be subject to a monetary 
penalty. However, foundations are able to carry out activities through intermediaries.  This means that 
foundations can transfer funds to PBOs in other countries, provided that they maintain sufficient direction 
and control over their resources such that the activity can be considered their own.    
In New Zealand, as is the case for PBOs (see 5.3.2), funds will lose their donee status (so donors will not 
be eligible for tax concessions) if monies are not applied ‘wholly or mainly to charitable, benevolent, 
philanthropic or cultural purposes within New Zealand’.  This means that a maximum of 25% of funds could 
be applied to purposes outside NZ. These restrictions do not apply to foreign charities listed in Sched 32 
of the Income Tax Act 2007 (see 5.3.1) 
Colombia, Israel and Mexico indicated that funds that make grants abroad may lose their preferential tax 
treatment. 
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Notes
1 The FATF recommendations in relation to non-profit entities are discussed in Chapter 2. 
2 The Bulgarian income tax legislation does not place any restrictions on making grants to PBOs in other 
countries. 
 
   127 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
This concluding chapter brings together the key insights from the report and 
discusses their tax policy implications. It highlights the importance of 
countries ensuring that the design of their tax incentives for philanthropic 
giving are consistent with their underlying policy goals. It also suggests that 
countries reassess the merits of providing tax exemptions for the 
commercial income of philanthropic entities, at least insofar as this income 
is unrelated to the entity’s worthy purpose. More broadly, it finds scope for 
countries to both reduce the complexity and improve the oversight of their 
concessionary regimes for philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving. 
Finally, in light of the increasingly global nature of many policy challenges – 
such as environmental and public health concerns (including the COVID-19 
pandemic) – it suggests countries reassess the restrictions commonly 
imposed on access to tax concessions for cross-border philanthropy. 
6.1. Introduction 
Philanthropy plays an important role in most countries, providing private support to a range of activities for 
the public good. This differentiates the sector from government initiatives (i.e., public action for the public 
good) and profit-based initiatives (i.e., private action for the private good). Almost all OECD countries 
provide some form of preferential tax treatment for philanthropy. Entities with a philanthropic status typically 
receive tax relief directly in relation to their activities, while both individual and corporate donors to these 
entities are typically able to receive tax incentives that lower the cost of giving. 
This report has undertaken a detailed review of the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and philanthropic 
giving in 40 OECD member and participating countries. It has first examined the various arguments for 
and against the provision of preferential tax treatment for philanthropic entities and giving. It has then 
6 Conclusions and policy options 
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reviewed the tax treatment of philanthropic entities and giving in a domestic context, before then examining 
the cross-border taxation of philanthropy. This final chapter brings together the insights from this analysis 
and discusses their tax policy implications. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 6.2-6.5 summarise the key messages from the preceding 
chapters in the report. Section 6.6 then presents the resulting conclusions and discusses a range of policy 
options. 
6.2. The case for preferential tax treatment for philanthropy 
Chapter 2 summarised the various arguments for and against the use of tax concessions for philanthropic 
entities and philanthropic giving. This highlighted that there is no single generally accepted rationale for 
preferential tax treatment of philanthropic entities. Economic theory provides a limited rationale for 
providing tax concessions for philanthropy (potentially both for entities and giving) where there is under-
provision of a public good or where there are positive externalities associated with the activity of the 
philanthropic entity. The under-provision of a public good rationale requires there to have been a 
combination of “market failure”, “government failure” and “voluntary failure”, in the sense that the private 
market, government, and voluntary sector are all unable to provide the welfare-maximising level of public 
good provision.  
A related public good-based rationale put forward by legal scholars posits that tax favoured status (again 
potentially for both entities and giving) is justified on the basis that it provides a subsidy for the provision 
of public goods that would otherwise be required to be provided by the state (the “subsidy” rationale). 
Another often articulated argument is the “base defining” rationale which argues that the surplus of a 
philanthropic entity is different in nature to income and therefore beyond the scope of the income tax base. 
Additional arguments include that philanthropic giving, as well as the institutions it develops, strengthen 
civil society and decentralise decision-making, and are thus an important feature of a democratic society 
and worth supporting. 
A number of arguments have been raised against the provision of tax preferences for philanthropic entities 
and/or giving. The cost of providing concessions is often highlighted as a concern. By reducing government 
revenue, tax concessions for philanthropy require other taxpayers to bear an increased tax burden (or 
alternatively result in less government expenditure on other policy priorities). Another argument, is that 
taxpayers are often relatively unresponsive to tax incentives for philanthropic giving, suggesting they may 
not be “treasury efficient” in the sense that they increase giving by less than the tax revenue lost. Empirical 
evidence on the elasticity of giving provides some support for this argument. However, it is important to 
note that a tax incentive could be treasury inefficient but still welfare improving if the benefit to society of 
the activity funded by the giving is sufficiently large. While grants could in this case be more effective, 
concerns of government grants crowding out private donations may in some instances still justify the use 
of tax incentives. A concern regarding exemption of commercial income of philanthropic entities is that this 
may create an unfair competitive advantage for philanthropic entities over for-profit businesses. 
Two related concerns that are raised regarding tax incentives for giving are that they may be regressive 
and undemocratic. Tax incentives may be regressive in that higher income taxpayers benefit from a larger 
tax incentive than lower income taxpayers. This can be the case in both aggregate terms, but also in 
proportionate terms as a tax deduction will provide a greater benefit to higher income taxpayers if they are 
subject to higher marginal tax rates than lower income taxpayers. The democratic argument highlights the 
concern that, as a tax incentive effectively reallocates tax revenue towards the favoured philanthropic 
entity, higher income taxpayers that make greater donations benefit from a disproportionate influence in 
the determination of how tax revenue is spent. This may be of particular concern where the priorities of 
donors are not consistent with those of society in general. Greater control by the government over the 
range of entities for which donations are eligible for tax incentives may limit this concern to some extent. 
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Irrespective of these arguments, most countries do provide tax incentives for giving, and in general provide 
exemptions from some taxes for philanthropic entities. The next sections summarise the approaches 
countries have taken. 
6.3. Taxation and philanthropic entities 
In almost all of the countries analysed in this report, entities with a philanthropic status (funds and PBOs) 
can receive tax incentivised gifts from individuals and corporations, as well as receive tax relief directly in 
relation to their activities. The report finds that for an entity to receive a philanthropic status with the 
associated tax benefits, it must meet not-for-profit, worthy purpose, and public benefit requirements.  
The not-for profit requirement does not prohibit a philanthropic entity from making a surplus, instead, it 
generally includes non-distribution requirements so that the surplus is not distributed as dividends or other 
benefits beyond the scope of the entity’s worthy purpose. An issue that can arise is whether the payment 
of some salaries to employees breaches this notion of ‘non-distribution’. This report finds that generally 
the requirement does not prevent the payment of ‘reasonable’ remuneration for services (or the provision 
of goods). Some countries may impose restrictions in this regard, while others may be less prescriptive.  
With regard to the worthy purpose requirement, welfare, education, scientific research, and health care are 
deemed worthy purposes most frequently across countries. Countries generally stipulate that the benefit 
must be open to all, that the benefit can be restricted to groups with specific characteristics, or that the 
characteristics used to specify who can benefit must relate to the fulfilment of the entity’s worthy purpose. 
Additionally, to help assess whether entities meet these requirements, countries tend to impose a number 
of administrative requirements. Almost all countries surveyed in this report require philanthropic entities to 
undergo a specific application process to become eligible for preferential tax treatment. Countries typically 
follow one of three broad approaches in determining the administrative and oversight body. Under the first 
approach, the tax administration is responsible for oversight of the sector (including the accreditation 
process). The second approach is to assign the responsibility to both the tax administration and a 
competent authority such as an independent commission. Lastly, in some countries the accreditation and 
oversight responsibility lies entirely with another department and not the tax administration. 
The report identifies two approaches for providing tax relief for the income of philanthropic entities: the first 
is to exempt all or specific income, and the second is to consider all forms of income taxable, but allow the 
entity to reduce its taxable income through current or future reinvestments towards the fulfilment of its 
worthy purpose. Countries following the first approach generally exclude non-commercial income (received 
gifts or grants) from the tax base. Approaches to dealing with commercial activities and the income 
generated from those activities, diverge. Countries, whose philanthropic entities are fully income tax 
exempt, restrict these entities from engaging in certain kinds of activities. On the other hand, countries that 
want philanthropic entities to pay taxes on some of their income generally differentiate between commercial 
income that is related and unrelated to the worthy purpose. 
The report also finds that countries that offer preferential VAT treatment to philanthropic entities tend to 
exempt them from having to collect VAT on certain (or all) supplies. As such an exemption can create an 
input tax burden, some countries have implemented rules that enable philanthropic entities to reclaim a 
portion of their input tax. 
Philanthropic entities may own real estate that they use to fulfil their social objectives, or they may own it 
as a source of income. The report finds that, in some countries, entities that use their real estate for their 
worthy purpose, such as the location of offices or philanthropic activities, may be exempt from property 
taxes. 
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deemed worthy purposes most frequently across countries. Countries generally stipulate that the benefit 
must be open to all, that the benefit can be restricted to groups with specific characteristics, or that the 
characteristics used to specify who can benefit must relate to the fulfilment of the entity’s worthy purpose. 
Additionally, to help assess whether entities meet these requirements, countries tend to impose a number 
of administrative requirements. Almost all countries surveyed in this report require philanthropic entities to 
undergo a specific application process to become eligible for preferential tax treatment. Countries typically 
follow one of three broad approaches in determining the administrative and oversight body. Under the first 
approach, the tax administration is responsible for oversight of the sector (including the accreditation 
process). The second approach is to assign the responsibility to both the tax administration and a 
competent authority such as an independent commission. Lastly, in some countries the accreditation and 
oversight responsibility lies entirely with another department and not the tax administration. 
The report identifies two approaches for providing tax relief for the income of philanthropic entities: the first 
is to exempt all or specific income, and the second is to consider all forms of income taxable, but allow the 
entity to reduce its taxable income through current or future reinvestments towards the fulfilment of its 
worthy purpose. Countries following the first approach generally exclude non-commercial income (received 
gifts or grants) from the tax base. Approaches to dealing with commercial activities and the income 
generated from those activities, diverge. Countries, whose philanthropic entities are fully income tax 
exempt, restrict these entities from engaging in certain kinds of activities. On the other hand, countries that 
want philanthropic entities to pay taxes on some of their income generally differentiate between commercial 
income that is related and unrelated to the worthy purpose. 
The report also finds that countries that offer preferential VAT treatment to philanthropic entities tend to 
exempt them from having to collect VAT on certain (or all) supplies. As such an exemption can create an 
input tax burden, some countries have implemented rules that enable philanthropic entities to reclaim a 
portion of their input tax. 
Philanthropic entities may own real estate that they use to fulfil their social objectives, or they may own it 
as a source of income. The report finds that, in some countries, entities that use their real estate for their 
worthy purpose, such as the location of offices or philanthropic activities, may be exempt from property 
taxes. 
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A number of common types of abuse of the preferential tax treatment provided to philanthropic entities are 
identified in this report. For example, they include diverting funds intended for public purposes to private 
benefits, for-profit businesses posing as PBOs to benefit from the tax relief; philanthropic entities investing 
in corporations owned or controlled by employees or managers of the entity; salaried employees concealed 
as volunteer workers; or entities not registered for VAT that are undertaking taxable activities. 
6.4. Taxation and philanthropic giving 
In most of the countries surveyed, individual taxpayers that give to a qualifying fund or PBO receive some 
form of tax incentive. In the large majority of countries surveyed, donations are deductible. Other countries 
offer tax credits instead and, in some cases, the donations of individuals are matched or facilitated through 
an allocation scheme. In countries with a matching scheme, government tops up donations at a given rate 
so that the entity receiving the donation is able to claim the tax relief. In countries with an allocation scheme, 
the tax administration allows taxpayers to designate a fixed percentage or amount of their income tax to a 
fund or PBO directly through their tax return. Although allocation schemes are not tax incentives, they are 
included in this discussion as they are administered through the tax system and their objective is to support 
philanthropy. Unlike individual donors, companies can also claim deductions (under standard business 
expensing rules) for corporate sponsoring of philanthropic entities. As a result, the report finds that 
deductions are more common for incentives for corporate donors than for individual ones. 
In countries with no tradition of philanthropic giving, an allocation scheme can create awareness among 
taxpayers, financially support funds and PBOs, and develop stronger ties between the general public and 
philanthropic entities. The report finds that allocation schemes were introduced mainly in eastern European 
countries and may thus be a part of a regional trend. 
Countries’ approaches to limiting the fiscal cost of their incentives vary. Countries that provide tax 
deductions, may cap the share of the donation that is deductible, cap the size of the deduction to a share 
of taxable or total income, cap the size of the deduction to a fixed value, or use a combination of these 
ceilings. Countries that provide a tax credit, may cap the value of their tax credit to a share of taxable or 
total income; a share of the income tax liability, a fixed value, a combination of ceilings, or cap the size of 
the donation that is creditable. To limit the cost of matching schemes, countries set the rate at which the 
relief may be claimed by the receiving philanthropic entity.  
The report also finds that countries that levy inheritance or estate taxes generally provide preferential tax 
relief for philanthropic bequests. In countries with an inheritance tax, the PBO or fund receiving the bequest 
are liable for the tax and thus are the ones that receive the tax relief. In countries with an estate tax, on the 
other hand, the tax liability as well as the corresponding tax relief is with the estate of the deceased. 
The majority of countries that incentivise cash donations of individuals also incentivise non-monetary 
donations. Nevertheless, some countries choose to limit their tax incentives to cash donations only, and 
some severely restrict the size and nature of non-monetary donations. With respect to countries that 
incentivise non-monetary donations, the report identifies a number of different approaches to designing 
valuation rules: some countries require appraisals if the value of a non-monetary donation exceeds a 
threshold, others have different valuation rules for different types of assets and a number of countries do 
not require appraisals and review valuations through audits.  
Corporate sponsoring of philanthropic entities (i.e. payments in return for publicity or advertisement) is 
considered a business expense in most countries, as long as there is a sufficient nexus with earning 
income. However, the report finds that, in a number of countries, these payments may be considered 
commercial income of the philanthropic entities receiving them and thus have tax implications. 
Common types of tax avoidance and evasion issues with tax relief for philanthropic giving include: falsified 
donation receipts prepared by the philanthropic entity, tax preparers or donors; payments for goods and 
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services disguised as donations; overvalued gifts; and donations of assets in which the donor retains an 
interest. Given that a key anti-abuse policy is that the recipients of philanthropic giving must be accredited 
philanthropic entities, the majority of anti-abuse policies identified in the report are in the form of 
transparency and reporting requirements for funds and PBOs. This allows the tax administration to focus 
its resources on these entities and generally shifts the onus of demonstrating that the worthy purpose and 
public benefit requirements have been satisfied on to the philanthropic entities that receive the donations. 
6.5. Taxation and cross-border philanthropy 
The report has also examined the tax treatment of cross-border philanthropy. Cross-border philanthropy 
can occur where a person (an individual or a corporation) makes a gift to an entity in another jurisdiction 
(‘direct philanthropy’). Cross-border philanthropy can also occur where a domestic philanthropic entity 
operates in another jurisdiction or where a foreign entity operates domestically (‘indirect philanthropy’). 
The report finds that, beyond the European Union (EU), there is little tax support provided by countries for 
cross-border giving. Within the EU, Member States are governed by European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rulings requiring Member States to adopt a ‘comparability’ approach to ascertain whether a gift to a 
philanthropic entity in another Member State is entitled to tax relief. This typically requires a case-by-case 
analysis to determine eligibility, and due to differences between Member States relating to tax relief, can 
result in considerable complexity and uncertainty. The report finds that the ECJ rulings have not been fully 
adopted by all Members of the EU. Beyond the EU, there are a small number of bilateral treaties (such as 
the US-Canada and US-Mexico treaties) where tax relief may be obtained for a donation in the partner 
country. There are also a small number of countries (e.g. Canada) that provide tax concessions for 
donations to certain approved foreign PBOs. The limitations imposed on tax support for cross-border giving 
have led some philanthropic entities to establish ‘work arounds’ with entities in various jurisdictions, so that 
gifts can be made to domestic entities (that are eligible for tax relief) but are then passed on to entities in 
other countries. 
With regard to PBOs that operate across borders, most countries do not provide tax relief for foreign 
philanthropic entities. The position in the EU is again governed by ECJ rulings requiring Member States to 
adopt a ‘comparability’ test to determine the eligibility of an entity in another Member State for tax relief. 
Beyond the EU, there are a small number of countries that provide tax relief for foreign philanthropic entities 
on a case-by-case basis (e.g. Australia, Canada, Indonesia). The inability of foreign entities to qualify for 
tax relief has meant that many entities that operate internationally establish local entities that are eligible 
for tax relief.  
Many, but not all, countries provide tax relief to domestic entities that operate abroad, particularly where 
the activities are related to humanitarian relief or development assistance. Typically, this authorisation is 
reliant upon the philanthropic entity respecting the worthy purpose requirements imposed by the national 
legislation, usually similar to the requirements imposed on domestic PBOs. 
6.6. Policy options 
While, as noted above, there are arguments both in favour of and against the use of tax incentives for 
philanthropy, in practice most governments judge them as worthwhile. This section draws on the preceding 
analysis to highlight a number of key issues that countries face in the design of their tax rules for 
philanthropic entities and philanthropic giving. 
First, it is important that countries ensure that the design of their tax incentives for philanthropic giving are 
consistent with their underlying policy goals. Second, there is scope in many countries to reassess the 
design of tax concessions for philanthropic entities. More broadly, countries should also look to both reduce 
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reliant upon the philanthropic entity respecting the worthy purpose requirements imposed by the national 
legislation, usually similar to the requirements imposed on domestic PBOs. 
6.6. Policy options 
While, as noted above, there are arguments both in favour of and against the use of tax incentives for 
philanthropy, in practice most governments judge them as worthwhile. This section draws on the preceding 
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design of tax concessions for philanthropic entities. More broadly, countries should also look to both reduce 
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the complexity and improve the oversight of their concessionary regimes for philanthropic entities and 
philanthropic giving. Finally, there may be merit in countries reassessing the restrictions that are typically 
imposed on cross-border philanthropic activity. These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
6.6.1. Ensuring the design of tax incentives for philanthropic giving meets policy goals 
Designing tax incentives for philanthropic giving is complicated due to the need to balance a range of 
potential policy goals. While the overall aim of a tax incentive can be seen as maximising social welfare, 
determining how to achieve this is challenging and requires various value judgements to be made. Broadly 
speaking, trade-offs must be made between incentivising giving, limiting fiscal cost, and managing both 
the distributional and democratic (in terms of influence over how tax revenue is spent) impacts of the tax 
incentive. A range of design choices impact on these goals. 
Choice of eligibility criteria 
Most countries allow tax incentives for a broad range of worthy purposes. The choice of eligibility criteria 
offers policy makers a means of targeting the benefit of tax concessions. Narrower eligibility conditions will 
ensure tax concessions more tightly target activities that align with the priorities of policy makers, but may 
result in a lower level of total giving. In contrast, wider eligibility conditions will ensure that the philanthropic 
priorities of a wider range of taxpayers are eligible for concessionary treatment and may therefore lead to 
increased giving. 
Countries that are particularly concerned about restricting support to those areas prioritised by government 
may wish to consider limiting the breadth of eligibility. For example, by restricting eligibility to activities that 
directly support those suffering from poverty, illness and disability. Ensuring that tax incentives are limited 
to a narrow scope of activities is likely to be a more effective means of targeting support than by imposing 
fiscal caps (see below). 
Tax deductions vs tax credits  
As noted above, the most popular tax incentive for philanthropic giving across the countries examined in 
this study is a tax deduction. However, for countries with a progressive personal income tax (PIT) system, 
a deduction will disproportionately benefit higher income taxpayers because the benefit of the deduction 
increases with the marginal tax rate of the giver. This may create distributional concerns in light of the 
broader goals of progressivity and redistribution associated with the progressive PIT systems adopted in 
most countries. Furthermore, it may also create concern regarding the increased degree of influence that 
high-income taxpayers are given in the determination of how tax revenue is spent (with richer households 
potentially favouring different types of philanthropic activities than poorer households), and the consistency 
of this with democratic principles. This, in turn, may exacerbate distributional concerns if higher income 
taxpayers not only benefit more in terms of the tax concession they receive, but also in terms of the benefit 
they derive from the type of activities the tax-incentivised giving funds. At the same time, providing a greater 
tax incentive to richer taxpayers is likely to result in greater increases in aggregate philanthropic giving 
both because the bulk of giving comes from higher income as compared to lower income taxpayers and 
they are also more responsive to tax incentives. 
In contrast, countries particularly concerned about distributional impacts, may wish to consider moving to 
a tax credit. A tax credit will ensure that the same proportionate tax benefit is provided to taxpayers 
irrespective of their income level. Providing a credit that is lower than the deduction currently available to 
top-PIT rate taxpayers may reduce the incentive to give among high-income earners. Alternatively, 
matching the top-rate may come at some additional fiscal cost. This creates a trade-off that governments 
will need to balance. At a minimum, countries with deductions should reassess the merits of maintaining 
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the deduction to ensure that the decision to maintain the deduction is based on a clear policy decision to 
provide a greater incentive to higher income taxpayers. 
Fixed vs percentage-based fiscal caps  
Restrictions on the size of tax incentives are common in light of countries’ desire to restrict the fiscal cost 
of their tax incentives for giving. Some countries adopt caps on the size of the tax incentive set equal to a 
specific fixed currency amount, while others adopt caps based on a percentage of the donor’s income or 
tax liability, and some adopt a combination of both. 
The adoption of such caps do, however, have an impact on both the degree of incentive provided by the 
concession and their distributional impact. A fixed cap will result in no taxpayers above the cap receiving 
any additional incentive to give on their marginal earnings, thereby reducing the amount of giving. The 
extent of the restriction will depend on the level of the cap set. Such a cap may improve distributional 
outcomes as it will ensure that the maximum potential aggregate benefit available to both poor and rich 
households will be the same. It will also cap the influence of high-income taxpayers in the determination 
of how tax revenue is spent. However, the imposition of a relatively high cap may be binding on high-
income taxpayers but not on low-income taxpayers and will still result in a greater concession being 
provided to high-income taxpayers in practice.  
A percentage-based cap will instead equalise the maximum potential proportional benefit available to both 
poor and rich households. Richer households will still benefit more in aggregate terms, but not in 
proportional terms (with a proportionate cap more likely to be binding on lower income households than a 
high fixed cap). For a given fiscal cost, this may result in a greater increase in giving than a fixed cap due 
to the greater responsiveness of higher income taxpayers.  As such, if a country aims to maximise total 
giving for a given fiscal cost then it should consider applying a percentage based cap, rather than a fixed 
cap. If instead distributional concerns are of high importance then consideration may be given to applying 
a fixed cap. An alternative option in balancing these goals may be to combine a percentage-based cap 
together with a generous fixed cap. Such an approach may be of particular merit for countries concerned 
about the disproportionate influence of high-income taxpayers in the determination of how tax revenue is 
spent. 
Allocation schemes  
A small number of countries apply allocation schemes, where taxpayers can designate a fixed percentage 
or amount of their income tax to a fund or PBO directly through their tax return. Allocation schemes can 
increase the visibility of the philanthropic sector and create a culture of giving in a country where there is 
no such a culture. However, allocation schemes do not provide a tax incentive to give and so are unlikely 
to have a significant impact on the level of giving. As such, the use of tax incentives should generally be 
preferred where the aim is to increase the level of giving. 
6.6.2. Preferential tax treatment of philanthropic entities 
As stated above, a common approach of countries that provide tax concessions to philanthropic entities, 
is to exempt all or specific income of these entities. Furthermore, a number of countries exempt 
philanthropic entities from having to collect VAT on certain (or all) supplies. This section discusses the 
challenges that may arise as a result of these concessions and provides policy options that may reduce 
complexities and distortions as well as increase compliance.  
Commercial income of philanthropic entities 
Philanthropic entities may have commercial and/or non-commercial income, but the distinction is not 
always clear or the same across countries. Generally, non-commercial income refers to income from 
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philanthropic gifts (discussed in Chapter 4) and government grants, or (in the case of PBOs) grants from 
supporting funds. Broadly, commercial income is income derived from the supply of goods or services in 
return for some form of payment.  
If there are no restrictions on the commercial activities a philanthropic entity can engage in and the income 
from those activities is fully tax exempt, it may give rise to competitive neutrality and revenue loss concerns. 
To avoid such concerns, the report identifies a number of policy options. A common approach is to only 
exempt income generated from commercial activities that are related to the philanthropic entity’s worthy 
purpose. However, the definitions of related and unrelated commercial income vary widely across countries 
and such tax rules often result in significant complexity.  
Other approaches are less complex, but may not fully exclude unrelated income from the preferential tax 
treatment. One approach is to only exempt income generated from commercial activities where it is 
reinvested towards the entity’s worthy purpose in a timely fashion. To facilitate some flexibility on behalf of 
the entities, such a policy could potentially be subject to an exception or allowance for the creation of small 
reserves that may be necessary to support the ongoing pursuit or expansion of the philanthropic entity’s 
activities that are directly connected to its worthy purpose. Another approach may be to limit the size of 
the expansion through a threshold beyond which income from commercial activities is taxed. 
The competitive neutrality concerns associated with exempting the commercial income of philanthropic 
entities gives rise to an important issue that requires the attention of policy makers. For this reason, 
countries should reassess the merits of providing tax exemptions for the commercial income of PBOs, at 
least in so far as this income is unrelated to the entity’s worthy purpose. However, in undertaking such a 
reassessment, countries will need to consider the added complexities associated with distinguishing 
between taxable (i.e. unrelated commercial income) and exempt income and weigh the additional 
compliance and administrative costs against the pursuit of competitive neutrality.  
VAT 
Exempting philanthropic entities, or their activities from VAT may also lead to competitive neutrality 
concerns between for-profit and philanthropic entities. Furthermore, policies intended to refund parts of the 
tax paid on inputs tend to be very complex. Therefore, countries that currently provide an exemption should 
consider fully subjecting philanthropic entities to the VAT. As is typically the case with for-profit businesses, 
a registration threshold could be applied to exclude small philanthropic entities for whom compliance costs 
are likely to be disproportionate relative to the VAT revenue collected. 
6.6.3. Reduce complexity 
Another challenge for designing tax incentives for philanthropy is to find a balance between tailoring 
policies to the wide range of philanthropic activities and limiting the complexity of the tax system. This 
report identifies three key areas that could benefit from reducing the complexity of the tax rules in a number 
of countries: eligibility requirements for different kinds of tax incentives, tax rules for non-monetary 
donations and the valuation processes, and payroll giving.  
Overly complex tax rules risk increasing compliance costs and uncertainty. This, in turn, can lead to both 
accidental and deliberate tax compliance issues. Complex tax rules and the related compliance costs that 
ensue may also put low-income donors and smaller philanthropic entities at a disadvantage compared to 
high-income donors and larger philanthropic entities. This is because the compliance costs may be lower 
in relative terms for high-income donors and large entities, which may also be more likely to afford tax 
advice from experts. Therefore, limiting complexity where possible has the potential of making tax 
incentives for philanthropy more efficient, less regressive, and increase overall compliance.  
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Eligibility requirements for different kinds of tax incentives 
The report finds that in most countries, entities with a recognised philanthropic status are able to receive 
tax-incentivised gifts from individuals and corporations, or receive tax relief directly in relation to their 
activities. For an entity to be eligible for these incentives, it must meet not-for-profit, worthy purpose, and 
public benefit requirements. To reduce complexity, countries should consider applying the same eligibility 
tests for both kinds of incentives.  
Non-monetary donations 
A philanthropic donation can be in cash or non-cash form, with the latter frequently referred to as non-
monetary or in-kind donations. Non-monetary donations may include: real and intellectual property; 
corporate stock or shares; trading stock; cultural assets; other personal property; services (volunteering); 
or blood and organ donations. To apply a tax incentive to non-monetary donations, the gift must be 
assigned a value. The valuation rules and process increase compliance and administration costs for 
donors, government, and in some cases the receiving entities. The valuation of a non-monetary donation 
determines the value of the tax incentive for the donor, and thus creates an incentive for donors to inflate 
the value of their donation. As such, valuation rules for non-monetary donations are intended to limit the 
possibility of abuse. Furthermore, the value of assets can fluctuate significantly. To the extent that the 
value of assets is subjective, valuation rules need to establish a process through which the value is 
determined as objectively as possible. This, in turn, may require a professional assessment (e.g., the 
valuation of artwork), which increases the compliance cost to whoever is responsible for the valuation.  
In light of the complexities around valuation and the associated compliance costs, imposing a minimum 
value threshold for a non-monetary donation to receive concessionary tax treatment, may be warranted. 
Furthermore, countries may consider reassessing the kinds of non-monetary donations eligible for the tax 
incentives. When considering what kind of non-monetary donations to incentivise, the benefit resulting 
from the donation being non-monetary (as opposed to cash), should be weighed against the additional 
cost associated with the required valuation process and risk of abuse.  
On the other hand, determining the kinds of non-monetary donations that could more effectively be made 
through cash donations, may be challenging as future needs are uncertain. For example, the COVID-19 
health crisis has shown how an unexpected shortage in personal protective equipment (PPE) created a 
demand for non-monetary donations of masks and other PPE products. Similar needs can arise where 
natural disasters occur and often the provision of goods and materials that are urgently needed, may be 
more helpful than the provision of cash donations. 
Payroll giving 
A number of countries have introduced payroll giving schemes. These schemes enable employees to elect 
to have donations to approved philanthropic entities deducted from their income by their employer, and for 
them to receive the relevant tax incentive (deduction or tax credit), within an extended pay-as-you-earn 
withholding tax system. Effectively, they shift the compliance costs associated with giving from employees 
to employers – who may be able to more efficiently bear this compliance burden. Such schemes may 
therefore be an administratively efficient way to increase the effectiveness of a tax incentive for giving. 
6.6.4.  Improve oversight 
Improving oversight of the philanthropic sector is important for protecting public trust in the sector as well 
as ensuring that the tax concessions used to subsidise philanthropy are not abused through tax avoidance 
and evasion schemes. This section provides an overview of policy options that may help protect public 
trust, increase compliance, limit loopholes and ultimately improve oversight of the philanthropic sector and 
its activities. 
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donors, government, and in some cases the receiving entities. The valuation of a non-monetary donation 
determines the value of the tax incentive for the donor, and thus creates an incentive for donors to inflate 
the value of their donation. As such, valuation rules for non-monetary donations are intended to limit the 
possibility of abuse. Furthermore, the value of assets can fluctuate significantly. To the extent that the 
value of assets is subjective, valuation rules need to establish a process through which the value is 
determined as objectively as possible. This, in turn, may require a professional assessment (e.g., the 
valuation of artwork), which increases the compliance cost to whoever is responsible for the valuation.  
In light of the complexities around valuation and the associated compliance costs, imposing a minimum 
value threshold for a non-monetary donation to receive concessionary tax treatment, may be warranted. 
Furthermore, countries may consider reassessing the kinds of non-monetary donations eligible for the tax 
incentives. When considering what kind of non-monetary donations to incentivise, the benefit resulting 
from the donation being non-monetary (as opposed to cash), should be weighed against the additional 
cost associated with the required valuation process and risk of abuse.  
On the other hand, determining the kinds of non-monetary donations that could more effectively be made 
through cash donations, may be challenging as future needs are uncertain. For example, the COVID-19 
health crisis has shown how an unexpected shortage in personal protective equipment (PPE) created a 
demand for non-monetary donations of masks and other PPE products. Similar needs can arise where 
natural disasters occur and often the provision of goods and materials that are urgently needed, may be 
more helpful than the provision of cash donations. 
Payroll giving 
A number of countries have introduced payroll giving schemes. These schemes enable employees to elect 
to have donations to approved philanthropic entities deducted from their income by their employer, and for 
them to receive the relevant tax incentive (deduction or tax credit), within an extended pay-as-you-earn 
withholding tax system. Effectively, they shift the compliance costs associated with giving from employees 
to employers – who may be able to more efficiently bear this compliance burden. Such schemes may 
therefore be an administratively efficient way to increase the effectiveness of a tax incentive for giving. 
6.6.4.  Improve oversight 
Improving oversight of the philanthropic sector is important for protecting public trust in the sector as well 
as ensuring that the tax concessions used to subsidise philanthropy are not abused through tax avoidance 
and evasion schemes. This section provides an overview of policy options that may help protect public 
trust, increase compliance, limit loopholes and ultimately improve oversight of the philanthropic sector and 
its activities. 
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Publicly available register of approved philanthropic entities 
Public trust and confidence in the philanthropic sector is a key priority for government as well as the sector 
itself. In part due to philanthropy’s reliance on private philanthropic giving, public trust is an essential 
component of financing the sector. Additionally, because philanthropy benefits from considerable tax 
support, public trust is also important in justifying and upholding the tax concessions used to subsidise 
philanthropic activities. A key way in which many countries improve transparency, certainty and 
accountability regarding what entities are eligible for receiving tax concessions as well as tax incentivised 
gifts, is to make publicly available a register of approved philanthropic entities. Countries that do not 
currently do so, should consider adopting such a publicly available register of approved philanthropic 
entities.  
Such a policy may also help combat schemes in which fraudulent entities pretend to be eligible funds or 
PBOs in order to receive donations. Having a publicly available register would enable donors to cross-
reference the information. Furthermore, a publicly available register invites public scrutiny, which may help 
to increase compliance and improve the detection of abuse.   
Annual reporting requirements 
A key challenge for oversight bodies (whether that is the tax administration, an independent commission 
or other department within the government) is to be able to collect the information needed to evaluate 
whether the philanthropic entities are complying with existing regulations and meeting the necessary 
requirements of organisations benefitting from preferential tax status. This report finds that in the majority 
of countries, entities have to go through an application process in order to qualify for the preferential tax 
status. Such a process, however, can only ensure that entities are compliant and meet the requirements 
at the time of their application (which frequently is at the start of their operations).  
Imposing annual reporting requirements on funds and PBOs could improve oversight. This is because the 
oversight bodies are able to use the annual reports to keep track of philanthropic entities even after they 
have been granted preferential tax status.  Such a policy may also help countries better identify errors or 
compliance issues early on, which may be beneficial for the entities as well. Furthermore, annual reports 
also have the potential to increase public trust, especially if some of the information in the report is made 
public. As annual reporting requirements may increase compliance costs, countries may wish to consider 
the adoption of a de minimis amount of revenue above which the reporting requirements would apply. 
Combined oversight approach 
The range of activities that philanthropic entities may engage in is typically very broad and thus it may be 
challenging for a tax administration to properly assess and oversee entities that are involved in fields that 
are not within the expertise of the tax administration. Additionally, it may be difficult for a revenue 
administration to justify the allocation of significant resources to the oversight of a largely untaxed 
philanthropic sector, resulting in a degree of under-supervision. To both improve the level of oversight in 
areas that require specific expertise, and alleviate the workload on the tax administration, countries should 
consider the adoption of a combined oversight approach. In a combined oversight approach, the tax 
administration and a competent ministry or commission with experts in a field related to the worthy purpose, 
would oversee the philanthropic entity and its activities.  
Tax avoidance and evasion schemes 
Abuse of incentives for philanthropic giving could deprive governments of much-needed revenues and 
risks undermining public trust in the government and the philanthropic sector. To reduce the risk of tax 
abuse, countries should consider a number of policy options: 
   137 
TAXATION AND PHILANTHROPY © OECD 2020 
  
 Maintaining a database of suspicious activities to help identify trends and develop expertise on tax 
abuse related to tax concessions for philanthropy. Collecting data on suspicious activities may also 
assist the oversight bodies to conduct more targeted audits and thus become more efficient.  
 Exchanging good practices as well as information with tax administrations and law enforcement 
agencies may improve the efficiency of the oversight process as non-compliant actors in the 
philanthropic sector may already be on the radar of other law enforcement agencies. More 
specifically, exchanging information across law enforcement agencies may also strengthen the 
effort to ensure that organisations involved in illegal and inappropriate activities do not abuse the 
concessions afforded to the philanthropic sector to finance their activities.  
 Implementing limits to fundraising expenditures may be an effective approach to restrict tax-exempt 
entities from overspending on fundraising events.  
 Similarly, implementing rules that limit certain types of operating expenses of PBOs that are at an 
increased risk of being misused for the private benefit of people associated with the entity (e.g., 
vehicles, residential real estate, etc.) may limit schemes in which managers, employees, board 
members, or large donors use the assets of tax-exempt entities for their private benefit.  
 Limiting the remuneration of staff, managers, and board members of PBOs may help ensure that 
the untaxed income and donations received by philanthropic entities are not used for the personal 
gain of people associated with the entity. Unreasonably high remuneration may also be an 
indication of a scheme to circumvent the non-distribution requirement of the not-for-profit status. 
Therefore, limiting the remuneration that people associated with the entity can receive could be an 
effective policy at ensuring the not-for-profit requirement is met.   
 Screening non-resident PBOs and funds eligible for receiving tax-incentivised donations helps 
ensure that the requirements countries impose on resident entities that may receive tax-
incentivised donations are also met abroad. Furthermore, screening non-resident PBOs is a key 
strategy of a number of countries to combat terrorist financing schemes involving philanthropic 
entities.   
 Implementing clear and transparent procedures for authorities to deal with non-compliance quickly. 
Rules for corporate and individual giving 
As discussed in Chapter 4, corporate philanthropic giving can occur in the form of donations or sponsorship 
payments. Sponsoring funds and PBOs are payments in return for publicity and thus generate a benefit to 
the donor. This report has highlighted that in many countries, sponsorship or advertising payments (which 
have a sufficient nexus with earning income) are deductible under business expensing rules and not 
subject to the limitations placed on deductions for corporate donations. This in turn may create an incentive 
for managers or owners of businesses to support causes through business sponsorship payments instead 
of personal donations in order to circumvent the limits placed on the tax incentives for philanthropic giving 
in a number of countries. Therefore, countries should better align rules for corporate and individual giving 
to limit distortions and ambiguities. This may be achieved by, for example, implementing similar limits for 
tax incentives for corporate and individual donations.  
To do so, tax rules should clearly differentiate between donating and sponsoring. This may be done by, for 
example, requiring a sponsorship contract that clearly specifies the publicity the corporation will receive. 
This, in turn, allows policy makers to only provide deductions for sponsorship equal to the market value of 
the publicity/advertisement received in return for the payment. The amount of the payment in excess of 
the fair market value should be treated as a donation and subject to the respective limits. 
Clearly differentiating between donations and sponsorship may also have important tax consequences for 
the philanthropic entity receiving the donation or the sponsorship payment. Countries that tax the 
commercial income of philanthropic entities may consider advertising to be a commercial activity and tax 
the sponsorship payments accordingly (while the income from donations is generally exempt). 
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 Exchanging good practices as well as information with tax administrations and law enforcement 
agencies may improve the efficiency of the oversight process as non-compliant actors in the 
philanthropic sector may already be on the radar of other law enforcement agencies. More 
specifically, exchanging information across law enforcement agencies may also strengthen the 
effort to ensure that organisations involved in illegal and inappropriate activities do not abuse the 
concessions afforded to the philanthropic sector to finance their activities.  
 Implementing limits to fundraising expenditures may be an effective approach to restrict tax-exempt 
entities from overspending on fundraising events.  
 Similarly, implementing rules that limit certain types of operating expenses of PBOs that are at an 
increased risk of being misused for the private benefit of people associated with the entity (e.g., 
vehicles, residential real estate, etc.) may limit schemes in which managers, employees, board 
members, or large donors use the assets of tax-exempt entities for their private benefit.  
 Limiting the remuneration of staff, managers, and board members of PBOs may help ensure that 
the untaxed income and donations received by philanthropic entities are not used for the personal 
gain of people associated with the entity. Unreasonably high remuneration may also be an 
indication of a scheme to circumvent the non-distribution requirement of the not-for-profit status. 
Therefore, limiting the remuneration that people associated with the entity can receive could be an 
effective policy at ensuring the not-for-profit requirement is met.   
 Screening non-resident PBOs and funds eligible for receiving tax-incentivised donations helps 
ensure that the requirements countries impose on resident entities that may receive tax-
incentivised donations are also met abroad. Furthermore, screening non-resident PBOs is a key 
strategy of a number of countries to combat terrorist financing schemes involving philanthropic 
entities.   
 Implementing clear and transparent procedures for authorities to deal with non-compliance quickly. 
Rules for corporate and individual giving 
As discussed in Chapter 4, corporate philanthropic giving can occur in the form of donations or sponsorship 
payments. Sponsoring funds and PBOs are payments in return for publicity and thus generate a benefit to 
the donor. This report has highlighted that in many countries, sponsorship or advertising payments (which 
have a sufficient nexus with earning income) are deductible under business expensing rules and not 
subject to the limitations placed on deductions for corporate donations. This in turn may create an incentive 
for managers or owners of businesses to support causes through business sponsorship payments instead 
of personal donations in order to circumvent the limits placed on the tax incentives for philanthropic giving 
in a number of countries. Therefore, countries should better align rules for corporate and individual giving 
to limit distortions and ambiguities. This may be achieved by, for example, implementing similar limits for 
tax incentives for corporate and individual donations.  
To do so, tax rules should clearly differentiate between donating and sponsoring. This may be done by, for 
example, requiring a sponsorship contract that clearly specifies the publicity the corporation will receive. 
This, in turn, allows policy makers to only provide deductions for sponsorship equal to the market value of 
the publicity/advertisement received in return for the payment. The amount of the payment in excess of 
the fair market value should be treated as a donation and subject to the respective limits. 
Clearly differentiating between donations and sponsorship may also have important tax consequences for 
the philanthropic entity receiving the donation or the sponsorship payment. Countries that tax the 
commercial income of philanthropic entities may consider advertising to be a commercial activity and tax 
the sponsorship payments accordingly (while the income from donations is generally exempt). 
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Data collection and tax expenditure reports 
Part of improving oversight of the tax incentives provided for philanthropy is to be able to estimate the cost 
of these incentives. To do so, countries should collect data and estimate as well as publish tax expenditures 
used to subsidise philanthropy. Furthermore, tax expenditure data may also enable countries to conduct 
studies that evaluate the efficiency of their individual incentives.  
6.6.5. Reassess the current restrictions for international giving 
Concerns regarding the degree of benefit (or lack thereof) to the country providing the tax concession, as 
well as regarding a potential lack of oversight, have resulted in only a very limited degree of tax support 
for cross-border philanthropy. However, the global nature of many of the challenges facing the world 
emphasises the importance of countries taking a global rather than an insular perspective. In particular, 
responding to issues such as poverty, war and conflict, environmental concerns, medical research, and 
public health issues such as pandemics, may require countries and institutions to cooperate across 
borders. A number of countries now also see a role for cross-border philanthropy in limited circumstances 
such as the provision of development assistance, and in relation to conflict situations. 
In this context, there is merit in countries reassessing whether there may be some instances where 
equivalent tax treatment should be provided to domestic and cross-border philanthropy. For example, 
countries may wish to consider ensuring that domestic PBOs operating overseas for certain health, 
environmental and development assistance purposes, or those providing direct humanitarian support in 
conflict situations, should receive equivalent tax treatment to those operating domestically. 
To address concerns regarding oversight and risks of abuse of tax concessions, countries could impose 
equivalent requirements as apply in the domestic philanthropy context, or require additional checks before 
providing tax-favoured status. Given the difficulties associated with monitoring and ensuring the 
compliance of philanthropic entities operating overseas, it would seem appropriate that additional checks 
and mechanisms would be required to ensure that the tax support provided is being directed towards the 
entities’ worthy purposes and that these entities are complying with all requirements that would be 
expected of entities operating domestically. 
In the European Union, countries may wish to examine the possibility of explicitly incorporating the non-
discrimination requirements of European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings as they pertain to philanthropic 
entities into their domestic legislation. This may reduce uncertainty for both philanthropic entities and 
donors, and minimise compliance and administrative costs associated with the current case-by-case 
comparability analysis required under the ECJ rulings. 
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